I'm a jury member on a murder trial. The prosecution has show me <some piece of evidence> which I rationally consider evidence that the defendant committed the murder, BUT that evidence still doesn't leave me 100% sure the defendant committed the murder. I'm not 100% sure because <...>. — flannel jesus

Did you not read my post? I answered that question already, here:

So let's proceed in the way you suggest. I have judged the item to be "evidence" of the claim being true, and this implies that I have judged it as incompatible with the claim being false, as warranted by the obligation described above. However, I am still uncertain as to whether the claim is true or not, because the evidence is insufficient to thoroughly convince me. — Metaphysician Undercover

Clearly I said that I judged the item as 'evidence" of the claim being true, without being certain of the truth of the claim that it is evidence for.

Why do you not agree with me that to rationally consider the item as evidence that "the person committed the murder", or that "the milk is in the fridge", it is necessary to judge that the item is incompatible with "the person did not commit the murder", "or "the milk is not in the fridge". Why would you dispute this?

I think it would be illogical to judge the item as evidence for the truth of "the person committed the crime" or "the milk is in the fridge" yet also believe that the item is compatible with the falsity of the statement. How could you honestly say that the item supports the truth of X, while you believe that it is compatible with not-X? The two, X and not-X are clearly incompatible, they cannot be consistent with one another, and everything consistent with X is not consistent with not-X. Clearly it is illogical to judge the item as consistent with not-X, yet also supportive of X, as "evidence" of X.

And why do you think the degree of certitude is at all relevant? Something can be accepted as evidence without the requirement that it produces certainty.

Can you think of a situation where you have evidence for a claim, but the evidence does not leave you certain that the claim is true? Please describe that situation, the evidence, and why you're not certain the claim is true even after finding that evidence.

If you can't think of a situation like that, let me know. — flannel jesus

Ok, I will try to put myself into that imaginary scenario, so we can proceed. I am considering the truth or falsity of a claim. Someone presents me with something said to be evidence of the truth of the claim, or perhaps I simply find something which I would like to judge as to whether or not it is evidence of the claim. Is this consistent with the imaginary scenario you suggest?

If so, let me continue. To judge it as evidence for the claim being true, I would be obliged by due diligence to ensure that it is inconsistent with, or incompatible with, the claim being false. If the potential "evidence" is apprehended by me as compatible with the claim being false, I could not judge it as evidence of the claim being true. So to continue with your imaginary scenario, let's say I judge it as indicative of the claim being true, which implies that I have also judged it as incompatible with the claim being false, and so I label it "evidence" of the claim being true.

The degree of certitude which I have concerning the truth of the claim, following the judgement that the item is "evidence", is irrelevant. I may be highly certain, somewhat certain, or still very skeptical. This would depend on how indicative the evidence is, how much other evidence there is, and the relations between the evidence.

So let's proceed in the way you suggest. I have judged the item to be "evidence" of the claim being true, and this implies that I have judged it as incompatible with the claim being false, as warranted by the obligation described above. However, I am still uncertain as to whether the claim is true or not, because the evidence is insufficient to thoroughly convince me.

Is that what you mean?

This is not an argument. If you have in mind a particular idea, please demonstrate it. If not, my point stands. — Philosophim

I was just telling you where the information can be found. There's much reading and too much for me to present to you here. Your argument is refuted by the possibility of other types of causes, along with the fact that the "first cause" which you conclude is a different type, as I've shown. I've already described how "final cause" is a different type. If you do not want to further your study then so be it.

The chain is just a visual metaphor. How does your proposal work? How do I have a first cause, then have another cause that causes the first cause without there being a causal link between the two? You have to understand by this point, what you're proposing without a concrete example is coming across as a clear contradiction to me. — Philosophim

OK, I'll stick right to the point. The issue is how you switch from "cause" to "reason" in your argument, without proper definition. You demonstrate the necessity of a "first cause", then you conclude:

""4. Alpha logic: An alpha cannot have any prior reasoning that explains why it came into existence. An Alpha's reason for its existence can never be defined by the Z's that follow it. If an Alpha exists, its own justification for existence, is itself."

You continued to insist that there cannot be any prior reason for the first cause, despite the fact that I pointed out that this is not a valid conclusion. And above, you even denied your own statements with the following:

"Oh, I never claimed that there was no reason for a first cause. The reason for a first cause is that, "It exists without prior cause." Meaning that there is no other reason for why it exists. If there is no other reason for its existence, there cannot be any rule which made it come into being. Meaning the only logical conclusion is that its existence is truly random as I've defined above."

Simply put, your conclusion of "first cause" provides you with no premise for making any statements about the reason for the first cause, without further premises to define what "reason" means. Your conclusions about "the reason" for the first cause are invalid. You cannot conclude that there cannot be a prior reason for the first cause, or that the first cause is its own reason, because you have no premises about "reasons". Any such statements are not conclusions but personal opinions not supported by the argument.

So, I'll explain another time, in a slightly different way, why your argument is self-refuting.

In your argument, "cause" requires a definition to be meaningful. It is defined by "prior" and it is defined by "chain of events". "Chain of events" is not metaphorical, it is part of what defines "cause", and what necessitates a "first". If you don't like "chain", you could call it a procession of events or something like that. but each cause is "an event". The existences referred to are "events", and each event is a cause.

You show that there is necessarily a "first cause", which means a first event. You then proceed to assert that there could be no "reason" for the first event, as prior to, and being the reason why the first cause occurs. However, "reason" has a different meaning from "cause". And since "cause" is defined by "event", and "prior" "a reason" might be something other than an event, yet still prior, as demonstrated by free will and intention. Your argument does not exclude the possibility that the reason why a first cause occurs could be something other than an event.

Further, the argument ends up being self-refuting because it demonstrates its own definitions to be inadequate, false. That's what I've been trying to explain to you. An "event" as we know it has a cause and an effect, a prior and posterior. This is because it occurs in a duration of time. But the argument produces the conclusion of a "first cause", and this is not consistent with "event" as we know it. Therefore your argument's definition of "cause", restricting it to an "event" is inadequate, false, because the meaning of "event" which is necessitated by the argument is inconsistent with empirical evidence of events. The argument produces the conclusion of an event (first cause) which only has a posterior part, without the prior part, and this is inconsistent with observation. This demonstrates that your definition of "cause" is false causing the argument to be self-refuting.

You might move to replace "cause" in your argument with "reason", but this creates a number of other problems for the argument because the reason why an event occurs might be intention, which is other than "cause" by the definitions required for your argument.

I notice that here, as elsewhere, you use the word "reason" at this point, instead of cause. "Reason" and "cause" are not synonyms, are they? At least, not in philosophy. So what is the significance of this change in language? — Ludwig V

This is exactly the problem, addressed above. The issue is that the reason for an event may be the cause of the event. This occurs in the case of intentional acts. But the two "reason" and "cause" are in no absolute way, equivalent or interchangeable. And, as I explained to Philosophim already, if we move to allow that "cause" of an event includes also the "reason" for the event, as a type of cause, then we must remove the defining feature of a chain, series, or sequence, because this type of cause does not occur in a chain. But Philosophim is disinterested in other types of cause, and wants to adhere to a definition which involves the sequence, or series. However, adhering to that definition invalidates the switch to "reason". Furthermore, it renders Philosophim's argument as self-refuting because the argument itself demonstrates that the "first cause" requires a distinct definition inconsistent with the description of the rest of the causes in the series or sequence. In other words the argument demonstrates that it's premises are inconsistent with empirical description.

I think you've already told me why you disagree. If you think you can justify what appears to me to be very clearly illogical behaviour, with an appeal to authority, then be my guest, give it a try.

But that's not what I'm stating. I'm stating the first cause period. This is not a specific type of cause, so there can be no other invented type of cause that is separate from what I'm defining. — Philosophim

That is not correct. You stated the first cause in a "chain of events". This does not imply "first" absolutely, it only implies first in that chain. That is what allows you to say there might be a multitude of first causes. If you accept this, then you know that "first" does not mean "the first cause period".

So, I suggest to you, that if you better understood the concept of "cause", and the multitude of different types of "cause" which have been described over the years, you would see that some types of "cause" do not occur in chains. And, just like the first cause of one chain might be prior in time to the first cause of another chain, a cause which is of a different type might be prior in time to all the first causes of all the chains.

I'm a bit at a loss here on what you're trying to say. Its very simple. Either something is caused by something else, or it isn't. Its not complicated. I'm not sure a final cause makes sense unless this cause ended all of reality. Otherwise causality continues. — Philosophim

Sure, either something is caused by something else, or it is not, that's self-evident. However, you wrongly conclude that the first cause in a chain of causes could not have been caused by a different type of cause, a type of cause which does not operate in a chain.

I recommend that you read some philosophy concerning the concept of causation. Aristotle's outline of the four principal ways that "cause" is used is a good place to start.

Are you saying that in front of the first cause of a chain, there's another chain that causes the first cause in the first chain? — Philosophim

No, I am proposing that there is a type of cause which does not operate through a chain. You seem to be stuck on the idea that all causes must be described as a part of a chain. Look up Aristotle's "formal cause" for an outline of a type of cause which is free from the constraints of a chain. Then you might start to understand how "final cause" as the defining feature of intention and free will is a type of cause which is independent from any chain.

No, I'm clearly noting the definition of "First cause" is that there is no prior cause. — Philosophim

This is incorrect. You are saying that the "first cause" is the first in a chain. The fact that you allow for a multitude of first causes, being the beginnings of a multitude of chains, each one possibly starting at a different time, indicates without a doubt, that you do not mean "that there is no prior cause".

Incorrect. When I say "my first birthday" I mean, "My first birthday" No other days. First birthday. First cause. No other causes. You are saying, "There could be prior cause to the first cause" is the same as "There could be prior birthdays to the first birthday". This is clearly wrong. If the other days in the analogy are making it difficult, eliminate them and just say, "First day". You cannot have a prior X to the "first X" by definition. — Philosophim

Philosophim, do you read what I write? I clearly stated that there are "significant days" which are prior to your first birthday, not that there are "prior birthdays to the first birthday" as you straw man.

Your statement, "I mean, 'My first birthday' No other days" is demonstrably impossible. There is 365 days in a common year. All those "other days" are implied by "my first birthday". Your first birthday comes a year after your birth. That means that it is impossible that there are "no other days" of significance prior to your first birthday.

No, I've already stated the reason it is a first cause is that it has no prior cause that explains its existence. Its part of the definition which I feel I've been pretty consistent and clear on. — Philosophim

That is not your definition, it is your conclusion, which I'll mention again is an invalid conclusion. Your definition of "first cause" is as stated in 1) of the op the beginning of a "chain of events": "there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows."

You then wrongly conclude that there can be no prior cause which explains its existence. And if your intent is to combine the two into one definition, then there is inconsistency within that definition, which warrant it being rejected as unsound. It is commonly accepted that causes (free will) may act independently of the chain of events.

I'll admit when I'm wrong no problem, I do it all the time. — Philosophim

Then get on with it. Why do I have to repeat the same thing over and over again, while you keep insisting that your mistakes are not mistakes?

I'm insisting my conclusion is valid because you have not presented a valid counter to it so far. I'm claiming, "A first cause means there can be no prior cause by definition." You're proposing "A first cause could have some prior cause". You are stating, there could possibly be a prior X to a first X. If this is the case, isn't this a contradiction? — Philosophim

You accept that there could be a multitude of "first causes" as the beginnings of a multitude of causal chains. Since there is nothing to ensure that the various beginnings are all at precisely the same time, then please confess to your mistake. The following statement or so-called "definition" is incorrect, or inconsistent: "A first cause means there can be no prior cause by definition".

Since your two so-called definitions of "first cause" are demonstrably inconsistent with each other, you need to choose one or the other. Is a "first cause" the beginning of a causal chain, or is it "first" in an absolute sense, meaning that there could be no cause of any sort, prior to it in time?

I meant exactly what I said. The word "existent' in English is an adjective, not a noun. It means specifically, "having existence or being; existing" https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/existent#:~:text=adjective-,1.,existing%20now%3B%20present%3B%20immediate

An existing thing describes a thing with a verb. Except that people might say that thoughts are not things. So I don't want to describe things, I want to describe what exists.

We largely agree on most of what's being said here, so lets not nitpick over petty grammar though. I really want to figure out this difference between us. — Philosophim

This does not at all help me to understand what you meant by "set of existence".

A prior cause means its part of the chain of causality. I'm more commenting on this comment so you understand what I meant by first causes. A few chains intersecting somewhere is an intersection of causality, and a continuation. The intersection is not a first cause. Multiple first causes would be the start of each chain. When we get to multiple first causes, its probably better thought of as a web, with the first causes being the beginning of each strand. — Philosophim

Now you propose to define "prior" in a way which renders "prior in time" as unintelligible. If each chain has a "prior" which is specific to that chain, then you have no way to produce a temporal relation between one chain and another. Each chain would have a "first cause", but we would have no way of saying which first cause is "prior" to another first cause because you have defined "prior" as being relative to the chain itself, rather than an independent measurement of time. It would be much more intelligible if we maintain a distinct flow of time, and judge "prior" relative to the time of occurrence rather than the position in a chain.

If you would like, you can introduce why you think Aristotle's four causes is pertinent to this discussion. — Philosophim

That's very straight forward. In your argument you restrict "cause" by definition, to mean an event which occurs within the context of a chain of events. But the way that we understand reality involves using "cause" in ways which are other than the context of a chain of events. This was very well explained by Aristotle. In our understanding of reality we use "cause" in the way of "final cause", intention and free will, and this is a type of "cause" which is independent of any chain of events. Therefore your definition, which restricts "cause" to an occurrence within a chain of events is not representative of the way that we understand reality, and is thus a false premise.

I do not think that GPT has been adequately dealt the capacity to judge what counts as "evidence". GPT has not been trained in critical thinking. It will just cite things which people like flannel jesus, who judge evidence illogically, state is "evidence".

my disagreement with you wasn't about physicalism, it was about evidence and compatibility. Have you corrected yourself on that point yet? — flannel jesus

I surely disagree with this. Let me present my evidence, in no way is it compatible with "my disagreement with you wasn't about physicalism".

The evidence for physicalism doesn't push the probability of those other ideas to 0. That's okay, the available evidence doesn't have to push other ideas to 0 - I, as a physicalist, have no problem with that. "The probability that I am wrong is above 0" is not a particularly hard thing for me to say here. — flannel jesus

What are you saying, I'm a physicalist but I'll own up to the possibility that physicalism might be wrong? I'm a physicalist and I don't mind admitting that the probability that physicalism is right is about .999...? — Metaphysician Undercover

The guy I was responding to said that the best evidence for physicalism still leaves the door open to other theories. I'm just expressing that *that's okay*. I'm okay with that, I don't see a problem with that. — flannel jesus

I would think that "physicalism" is quite strict, not allowing for the possibility of an open door. Isn't that what physicalism is, saying that there is no possibility of anything other than the physical? Opening the door would be rejecting physicalism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Me, as a physicalist, saying "the evidence for physicalism could also plausibly still be compatible with non-physicalist ideas" is not me rejecting physicalism. — flannel jesus

I don't see the logic. If it is compatible with non-physicalist ideas, then it is not evidence for physicalism because it's equally evidence for non-physicalism. — Metaphysician Undercover

It was your attitude about what constituted "evidence for physicalism" which interested me.

Do you accept the fact that there are situations where when you have evidence of X, that evidence can still be compatible with not-X? — flannel jesus

No, I would not accept that, it's what I insist is illogical. If the object is judged as compatible with not-X it is illogical to judge it as evidence of X. Only things judged to exclude the possibility of not-X can be judged as evidence of X. If it is judged as compatible with not-X it cannot be accepted as evidence of X

That kind of illogical thinking, which you demonstrate very well, produces an arrogant self-deceiving certitude which inclines one to aggressively assert "X is true because all the evidence supports X", all the while knowing that all of the so-called "evidence" is actually compatible with not-X. That all of the supposed "evidence" is compatible with not-X means that it is not really evidence of X at all, and there is no evidence of X. It is simply an illogical way of judging what counts as "evidence of X" which produces self-deception by way of confirmation bias. The "logic" of a closed mind apprehends everything as evidence for what it believes, and shuts out every other possibility as improbable.

Good. That's what meta was disagreeing with me on. He was not correct about that. — flannel jesus

Thanks to this discussion, I now think I understand the faulty logic which persuades you of physicalism. Stuff which you judge to be compatible with non-physicalism, you illogically judge as evidence of physicalism, by appealing to ignorance.

There are limits to what "first" means — Philosophim

The issue is the limits to what "cause" means, not the limits to what "first" means. Reference to "chain of events" implies a specific meaning for "cause", that of "efficient cause". However, the category of "efficient cause", the type of causation implied by "chain of events" does not include all the possible types of cause. Therefore the first cause in a chain of events could have another type of cause as its cause.

I've clearly defined what a first cause would be correct? — Philosophim

Yes you've defined it as the first in a chain of causes. However, there are other types of causes which do not occur in a chain like that, specifically the one I mentioned, "final cause". Therefore a "first cause", as defined by you, could still have a cause prior to it, so long as it is a type of cause which does not occur in chains, as per your definition.

There is no prior thing which causes itself to exist. — Philosophim

This is where your logic is wrong. The valid conclusion is that there is no earlier part of the chain. But this does not exclude the possibility of a different reason for the first cause. The first cause could have been caused by a type of cause which does not partake in the chain, like final cause. The first cause, by your definition, is very explicitly the beginning of the chain. This implies that the reason for the first cause, the cause of the first cause is something which cannot be said to be a part of the chain. You wrongly conclude that there can be no cause whatsoever, prior to the first cause, by wrongly assuming that there cannot be a type of cause which is free from the chain.

What I don't agree on is how this difference is anything but the fact that a first cause cannot be explained by a prior cause. — Philosophim

That's not what the argument shows. The argument shows that the first cause is the first in a chain. It does not show that there cannot be a prior cause, it shows that the prior cause cannot be a part of the chain. "First" is in reference to the chain, it designates the beginning of the chain. It does not designate "the first cause" absolutely. This is evidenced by your insistence that there could be many first causes. Which of them would be the first first cause? And since the occurrence of something from nothing (first cause coming from absolutely nothing) is completely incomprehensible, and unintelligible, we ought to conclude that what is implied is that there is a cause prior to the first cause which cannot be understood to be a part of the chain. That is the most reasonable assumption.

By definition, I cannot be wrong. — Philosophim

"By definition, I cannot be wrong"? Are you saying that the definition of "Philosophim" is "the person who cannot be wrong"?

The only difference between a first cause and a normal cause is that a first cause cannot have something prior which explains its existence. That's it. Meaning by definition, there can be no other cause which explains its existence. — Philosophim

You are wrongly interpreting your own argument. The difference between the first cause and the other causes in the chain, is that no part of the chain is prior to the first cause, whereas parts of the chain are prior to all the other causes in the chain. This in no way implies that the first cause "cannot have something prior which explains its existence". That conclusion requires a further premise, that the only thing which can explain something's existence is the extension of a causal chain prior to the thing's existence. But this premise is simple determinism, and is disputed by anyone who believes in free will, so it is not acceptable as a sound premise.

If you want to explain to me why there isn't a contradiction, please demonstrate how its not a contradiction for someone to claim that having a first birthday one year after giving birth, doesn't necessarily mean they didn't have a prior birthday. — Philosophim

I've been explaining, but you are not listening. Here, I'll refer to your example, "my first birthday", if that might help. When "my first birthday" occurs, or when it is referred to, it means the first in a chain of significant days. But this does not imply that there are no other significant days in your life prior to your first birthday. So prior to your first birthday, there are many other significant days in your own life. Likewise "the first cause" in your example refers to the first cause in a particular chain of significant events, but prior to the first cause there may still be many other events which have significance relative to the first cause.

I'm trying to have a conversation to see if what I'm claiming holds upon scrutiny. — Philosophim

The fact that you keep on insisting that your conclusion is valid, after scrutiny shows you that it is not, inclines me to think that your are improperly attached to your conclusion, and would resort to trickery to persuade people of it.

I claim a first cause is logically necessary. Not that there can be only one first cause. Meaning other things can exist in the universe, and something appears uncaused by anything within that universe. Meaning that the replacement of 'cause' with 'things' doesn't work. — Philosophim

You did not understand the analogy, or else you are in denial. Hopefully you'll understand with the birthday example. But if you do not, I'll be more convinced that you are arguing to deceive, not to understand.

I don't see it being particularly fraught myself, but I'll define it if need be. Take any set of existence. What caused that set of existence is anything outside of that set of existence which is needed for that set to be. A set which does not need anything outside of itself to exist, is a first cause. — Philosophim

Sorry Philosophim, but "set of existence" seems to be incoherent. Do you mean "set of existents" or "set of existing things"? Maybe you could make another try.

Anyway, by Aristotelian metaphysics, each and every existent has two distinct requirements needed for it to be. One is matter, the other is form. In this way there is always at least two distinct types of cause needed for a thing to be. If one of these types of cause forms a causal chain with a first cause, there is still the other type of cause, which may well be prior to the first cause of the causal chain.

It is as a mathematical "fact", but it might not appear in nature. — jgill

The important issue, which you might have seen me argue at numerous places and times on this forum, is to go further than to say "it might not appear in nature" but to question whether it is possible for such a thing to occur in nature.

The point being that mathematics consists of ideals, and the ideals can be very useful in application. However, it's debatable whether it's even possible that any of these ideals could actually exist in nature. So the irrational nature of pi for example provides for a strong argument that the ideal circle simply cannot exist in nature. Then we can replace the question of what is it about mathematics which makes it so useful, with the question of what is it about the natural reality which makes it so that it does not perfectly correspond with the ideals of mathematics. It is this part of reality, the part which makes it so that it does not correspond with the mathematical ideals, which makes reality difficult to understand.

I think Trump is going to win the Republican caucus.

Only an AI could run against him.

Thoughts? — L'éléphant

Trump is an AI, complete with hologram form, created by the deep state, or the deep fake, or maybe the deep Putin, who knows?.

Literally any other person would be able to answer the question with ease. It's not trickery, you're just weird. — flannel jesus

This is simple denial of the trickery you employed. If you do not address the issue that I mentioned, which exposed your question as trickery, I will continue to assert that you are simply denying the trickery employed.

Do you agree that "evidence" is a judgement? And if so then please stop talking about evidence as if it is some sort of independent object.

I'll explain what I did say again one last time and allow you a fair chance to be more honest next time you post to me: what I said was not "it is EVIDENCE for and against a claim", I said you can have something that is evidence for one claim and COMPATIBLE with another claim. If you want to know the difference, feel free to ask — flannel jesus

Look flannel, "EVIDENCE" is a judgement made concerning the object, that the object supports the truth of the statement. "COMPATIBLE" means consistent with. Whatever object is consistent with S is not consistent with not-S, by way of contradiction, unless the object is completely irrelevant. If the object is completely irrelevant it is not evidence. If the object is judged as consistent with S, (supporting S, is evidence of S), then it cannot also be judged as COMPATIBLE (consistent) with not-S without contradiction.

"1. Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows"

I expected clear logic: Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one thing that does not. — jgill

Philosophim's statement is rather meaningless. We could just as well replace "cause" with "thing" here, and say either all things have a prior thing or they do not. What we do in this case is assume a temporal separation between the thing and the prior thing, such that they are distinct "things". That's what "cause" does here, it implies a temporal separation between the thing known as the effect, and the thing known as the cause.

Now we have a series of "causes", or "things". The series may or may not proceed infinitely. The issue which arises when we apply this to the real world of empirical evidence, is that each of the separate, distinct things, or causes, must differ from each of the others, as this is what the nature of time and change indicate to us. However, we use the same word for all of them, to signify that they are all of the same type, or category, a "cause" or a "thing". In statements like Philosophim's the word used "cause", is meant to be all-inclusive, most universal, so as to create the appearance that there could be nothing outside that category. Then what appears, is that if there is a "first cause", there could be absolutely nothing prior to the first cause because "cause" is meant to be all-inclusive. But that's deception, because there must be criteria as to what constitutes a "cause" so there could always be something else outside that category. And that's the deception which Philosophim argues, that prior to the first cause, there could be absolutely nothing, therefore no reason for the first cause's occurrence. That's why I proposed switching for the word "thing", to expose this sort of sophistry. If there is no thing prior to the first thing, it appears like there is absolutely nothing, but that's a mistaken conclusion. What "thing" actually represents is a category, or type, and there might be something prior to the first thing which is outside that category.

That's why I'm trying to get Philosophim to recognize the need to assume different types of "cause". The proposed causal chain really only represents one type of cause. So if we accept that "cause" in this usage represents only one specific type of cause, then we can allow that prior to the first cause there is a distinctly different type of cause. This is completely consistent with what the empirical evidence demonstrates to us about the temporal succession of the coming into being of a multitude of things of the same type. We can see the need to posit a first of that type, but this does not imply "first" absolutely, just a division or boundary, a temporal limit to that type, and prior to that type is a different type. So for instance we could say either there is a human being prior to each human being, or there is a first human being. Evidence indicates that human beings must have a beginning, so we are inclined toward a "first" human being. Positing a first human being does not exclude the possibility of prior beings of a different type.

...but represents the convergents of analytic continued fractions... — jgill

The key word here is "represents". The problem with representations is that they do not qualify as being the thing which they represent. That's why the word "represents" is used, to signify that it stands for something, but it is not itself the thing which it stands for. And to complicate this problem we can create representations which are completely fictional, having no real thing which they correspond with. They represent something imaginary. So in a discussion of whether or not infinite chains are real, a representation of an infinite chain serves no purpose.

You're waffling too much for me. It seems like you're deliberately trying not to understand, but it's possible this is really just all too much for you. Since you can't answer my straight forward question, I'm going to bow out of this conversation with you. I don't see it going further if you cannot give a simple answer to my simple question. — flannel jesus

Your question is simple trickery as I explained, like the old example 'have you stopped beating your wife?' Answering it would be to agree to your terms which demonstrate a gross misunderstanding of the nature of "evidence".

So, are you now admitting that you do not have a clue what the word "evidence" means? Do you agree that "evidence" is a judgement, and that it is incoherent to claim the very same object to be evidence both for and against the truth of a particular statement?

Simply asserting that conceiving of a universal is not the outcome of a physical process is unpersuasive in light of understanding things like this: — wonderer1

I was not asserting that conceiving of a universal is not the outcome of a physical process. I was claiming that the thing conceived (time in this case) is not a physical thing regardless of whether it was conceived by a physical process. Would you say that fictitious things created by the imagination are physical things just because they are the product of a physical process?

Oh, I never claimed that there was no reason for a first cause. The reason for a first cause is that, "It exists without prior cause." Meaning that there is no other reason for why it exists. — Philosophim

This is what I dispute. You do not have the principles required to say "there is no other reason why it exists. You have your own reason for assuming a first cause, the logic you demonstrated and this produces your conclusion, that the reason for it is "It exists without prior cause", but you cannot be certain that this is the correct reason for it. Therefore unless you know that your logic (the logic which concludes the reason for the first cause is solely to be the first cause) is absolutely certain, without any flaws, then you are not justified in claiming this reason. And, I've already shown you that your treatment of infinite regress and the eternal circle is flawed, so I think you ought to also accept that your reason for the first cause is also flawed.

The only difference is that it does not have a prior cause. — Philosophim

This is an essential difference though. All the other causes are known to be contingent, dependent on a prior cause, and that is how we know these causes through empirical evidence and inductive reasoning. This cause, the "first cause", has an essential difference, it is not known directly by inductive reasoning, but by deductive logic, which makes it necessary. Therefore what you call "the only difference" is a very significant difference, which makes the two types of causes categorically distinct, one type contingent, the other necessary.

You've lost me here. How is it different? — Philosophim

It is different because causation in the causal chain is defined by empirical observations, and inductive principles. Being an inductive generalization, the causes must be all of the same type, by the defining principles, to be placed in the same category. That there is a prior cause to any contingent cause is a defining feature. If it was not a defining feature we would not have the appearance of infinite regress. The "first cause" does not have this defining feature, therefore it cannot be placed in that category, it must be a distinct type of cause. However, it is still a "cause" in some sense because it has a similar type of effect, which allows you to make it part of, the base for, the causal chain. Therefore we need to allow for the reality of at least two distinct types of "cause".

The reason for the first cause is its own existence simply being. — Philosophim

That's your reason for the first cause, but you may be wrong.

Can you explain why? I've presented a clear argument why it is absolutely not predictable which I'll post again. The reason why patterns, rules, and laws happen is because there is a solid reason besides itself. A reason that does not involve itself, is a cause that is separate from itself. A first cause can have no other cause besides itself. There can be no outside constraint that forces it to be. There can be no outside constraint that forces it not to be. It simply is. Thus it is completely unpredictable and not constrained by any outside cause. — Philosophim

I've already explained, but I'll try again. When you say " A first cause can have no other cause besides itself", this is not a sound conclusion. What the logic shows is that the first cause cannot have a "cause" in the same sense of "cause" as in the causal chain. This does not exclude the possibility that the first cause may have a "cause" in another sense of the word. And, that there is at least one other type of cause is a necessary conclusion from the argument, due to the fact that the first cause is another type of cause.

This is almost true. First, first causes will never be predictable no matter how much we study them. Study assumes that what is consistent today will be consistent tomorrow. The appearance of a first cause can never be consistent, because some other cause was making it consistent. It would be consistent if it just happened to appear consistent. — Philosophim

You are simply not accepting the reality that the first cause could have a "cause" in another sense of the word "cause", a different type of cause. And, that there is at least one other type of cause is a conclusion made necessary by the argument.

This right here is the crux. No, this is a contradiction. A first cause cannot, by definition, be caused by another cause. — Philosophim

Again, you are not accepting the possibility of other types of causes. The argument demonstrates that the first cause cannot be caused by the type of cause which constitutes the causal chain. But the argument also demonstrates that the first cause is itself a different type of cause, like I explained. That is how the infinite regress is avoided. Therefore the reality of other types of causes is already demonstrated by your own argument, and there is nothing to prevent us from hypothesizing that there is another type of cause which is the cause of the first cause. There is no contradiction, just different types of causes, which the argument demonstrates is a necessary conclusion.

Not exactly. "Not a thing" isn't equivalent to non-physical. For example, a process doesn't need to be a thing, in order to be physical. — wonderer1

I see there is a need to distinguish between "process" as a particular process, a particular event which is happening to a particular physical object, or objects, and "process" in the sense of a generalized, or universal, type of event which may happen with objects. The former is a physical event, the latter is not, being conceptual and applicable to many different physical events, in a descriptive way. If "time" is said to be a sort of process, it is the latter, a generalized or universal conception, and therefore not physical.

Very simply, can you imagine a scenario where you have evidence for X being true, while unbeknownst to you, X is actually false? Can you imagine any scenario at all like that? If yes, what is it? — flannel jesus

In that scenario, whatever is "unbeknownst" to me, is irrelevant to my judgement. Do you recognize that whether or not something is "evidence" is a judgement? I judge the object, as evidence for X, therefore I judge it as incompatible with not--X. Whether X is actually true or false is irrelevant to my judgement, my judgement is based on the things I apprehend as evidence, and I do not ever apprehend the same thing as evidence for X and evidence for not-X because that would be contradictory.

Therefore your example is simple trickery. You add "while unbeknownst to you, X is actually false" as if it is relevant to my judgement of whether or not the mentioned thing is evidence for X. But it cannot be relevant at all because it is stipulated as |unbeknownst". If I knew X was actually false, I would not consider the thing as evidence for not-X. I would have to be skeptical first, but this would negate my knowing.

It appears to me. like you do not understand the nature of "evidence". You seem to want to make it a property of the thing being judged, rather than accept that it is a judgement. When you come around to understand the true nature of evidence, that "evidence" is a judgement, then you might understand that it is inconsistent, contradictory, to judge the same thing as evidence for X and evidence for not-X. In this case we'd have to dismiss the thing as non-evidence.

So I'll ask you in a straight forward way, do you understand that "evidence" is a judgement?

When I speak of a chain receding to infinity that doesn't leave much to grasp at philosophically, so one resorts to the "being" of the chain , like yanking on an emergency cord. — jgill

What I find in metaphysics is logical demonstrations as to why this idea of "a chain receding to infinity" is unrealistic. That type of chain is shown to be logically consistent and therefore logically possible, and even attractive to some people, as seductive in a a sort of aesthetic or emotional way. That is the rhetoric of sophistry, which persuades by evoking pleasant feelings like pride, confidence, power, and courage. However, our experience, empirical evidence, can produce inductive principles which when employed as premises demonstrate logically why such a chain is not physically possible. Of course there is an issue with inductive principles as shown by Hume, so those who enjoy thinking about, and conceiving, chains receding to infinity, often feel justified in presenting these as if they could be real physical existents.

Exactly, that's what i said, time is not physical.

It is useful, but It's not a description. Spatial concepts, geometry, dimensions and such, are all like this, very useful, as mathematical axioms are, but they are not descriptions. These postulates are a priori, while descriptions are a posteriori. There is no physical thing being described.

The point though is that physicalism, by definition denies the possibility that non-physicalism is correct. That's the point of physicalism. Therefore contrary to what you claim, if the evidence is compatible with non-physicalism, it is not evidence for physicalism. Compatible means that the two can coexist without conflict. If there is no conflict between the evidence and non-physicalism then this is clearly evidence against physicalism.

Likewise, if the DNA evidence is COMPATIBLE with the person person being not-guilty, then it is not evidence of the person's guilt. Evidence must support the thing which it is supposed to be evidence of, and nothing relevant can be COMPATIBLE with both of two opposing statements.. If the supposed evidence is COMPATIBLE with the opposite of the thing which it is meant to support, then it is faulty and therefore not evidence for that thing, but evidence against it. This is why I said that it is the context of the found DNA which determines whether it is evidence or not. Whether the DNA is COMPATIBLE with the person being guilty or not-guilty is determined by the context. If the context of the DNA is COMPATIBLE with both then it is irrelevant, evidence of neither.

Then this I need to be clearer. The idea is that a first cause is not separate from the chain but is part of the chain, or the chain itself. A first cause is not explained by anything outside of itself, therefore must be explained by itself, and is the start of its impact on causality. — Philosophim

This is what I think makes your sense of "first cause" unintelligible, the stipulation that it cannot be explained by anything other than itself. So let me explain why I believe this.

The first cause is stipulated to be part of the causal chain, therefore it is the supposed to be the same type of cause as any other of the causes in the chain. However, it has a fundamental difference, the chain does not extend beyond it to the earlier time. That makes the "first cause" actually a completely different type of "cause", its existence cannot be said to have been contingent on the occurrence of a prior cause as is the case with the other causes in the chain. Because of this difference we must class it as categorically different from all the other causes in that causal chain, and the same for all the other causal chains. In other words, the "first cause" does not abide by the inductive (general) principles by which we describe all the other causes of causal chains, it cannot be observed to have a cause, therefore we must categorize it separately.

Now, we have a distinct type of cause, the "first cause", which is stipulated as different from all the other causes in the causal chain. You say that the first cause is not explained by anything other than itself, but this claim is not justified. What is justified is that there is no cause for the first cause, "cause" being as described in the sense of the causal chain. But now we've determined a different type of "cause". Since we have now determined the reality of a different type of cause, there is nothing to indicate that there cannot be any reason for the first cause, the first cause being a completely different type of cause itself. Therefore there could be a reason for the first cause, that reason being a type of cause which is other than a "cause" as described in the causal chain.

Yes, this is the way it is. Of course, if you disagree with this, that is of course your choice. I have never seen real randomness proved in science, only an inability to measure properly. — Philosophim

What you do not seem to grasp is that there is no need to assume real randomness. That a first cause is necessary may be proven logically, but it does not follow that there can be no reason for the first cause. It only follows that there cannot be a cause of the first cause, in the sense that "cause" is used in the chain of causes. However, as I explain above, by determining a "first cause" you have already shown that there is a type of cause which is other than how "cause" is used to refer to causes in the causal chain. Therefore we have the premise (a different type of cause) which is required to say that the cause of the first cause may be a different type of cause, rather than concluding randomness.

By the way, I like your previous idea that first causes can influence the brain. If it is the case that we had very tiny things popping into existence all over the place constantly, it could very well apply a real randomness to outcomes as they bounce against the chemistry of the brain. But this is the only way randomness, according to the definitions I've provided, could ever come into the universe. — Philosophim

The problem though, is that this explanation doesn't quite work. If the first causes are truly random as you insist, then the brain would have absolutely no way of predicting the occurrence of them, so it could not construct itself around them, or have any way to possibly use them. That's why I backed away from that idea. But free will demonstrates that the brain can and does make use of the first causes as they pop into being, so there must be some way to, in some sense, predict their occurrence. This is why I decided there must be some type of cause for their occurrence, but the cause is a "cause" in a sense other than "cause" in the sense of the causal chain.

So there is no rule as to what should appear as a first cause without referring backwards from any chain. Meaning if I'm staring at a blank area of the universe, there's no prediction as to what could appear as a first cause. — Philosophim

I don't agree with this. The "first cause" is simply a special type of cause, different from other causes because it marks the beginning of a causal chain. What this means is that it is not predictable in the same way that other causes are predictable. But this does not imply that it is not predictable in an absolute way. Once we start to identify the real existence of first causes, we may start to understand that they have patterns of occurrence, and that they are, through some mathematical principles, predictable. That there is not a cause for their occurrence, in the sense that "cause" is used to describe the causal chain, does not imply that their occurrence is absolutely unreasonable.

But once that first cause appears, it is what it is. And what a thing is, is defined by rules based on its makeup and the way it consistently interacts with other things in the universe. The status of 'first cause' lasts for only one time tick in the universe. Once a second tick happens the cause of the existence of the thing at the second time tick is the existence of the thing at the first time tick. — Philosophim

I don't quite follow this. Once the cause appears, it is in the past, and what persists at that time is not the cause, but the effect. Any posterior interaction is the effect of the first cause acting as a cause, and this is not a first cause, but a regular part of the causal chain. Therefore I do not see how you can talk about "the way it consistently interacts with other things in the universe". That appears to be contradictory.

A first cause is extremely literal and simple. "That which is not caused by anything else besides the fact of it existing." — Philosophim

The problem, as I've shown you, is that this definition of "first cause" is not necessitated by your argument. The argument shows that the first cause is not caused in the same way that other causes in the causal chain are caused. But, by showing that there is necessarily a first cause, you also show the first cause to be a type of cause which is not the same as the other causes. Since the argument demonstrates that there is more than one type of cause, this allows that the cause of the first cause might just be a different type of cause. Therefore you do not have the premises required to conclude that the first cause is not caused by anything. It may just be caused by a different type of cause.

What I'm noting is that because a first cause has no prior causation for its existence, there can be no constraints on its initial existence. Now this is only if we have no causal chain to examine. If we have a causal chain, we can work its way back up and see specifically what the first cause of that chain is. — Philosophim

See, you are denying the possibility that the reason for the first cause might be something other than what is evident as a causal chain. But this denial is unjustified. Further more, we see that it is very common place that the reason for an event is other than a causal chain, and that is the case with intentional acts. So not only is your assertion that if something occurs without a prior causal chain it cannot have any reason whatsoever for its occurrence, unjustified, it is also demonstrated by evidence to be false.

For example, if the big bang is the actual first cause of existence in the universe, then we can trace physics back to it, and attempt to demonstrate conclusively that there is nothing prior to the big bang. It doesn't mean that we can trace physics back to the big bang and then randomly claim, "It was actually a little bang". — Philosophim

Taking this example, "the big bang", we trace the causal chain to that event, and as you say, we determine it to be a "first cause". This does not imply that there is "nothing prior to the big bang. What it implies is that there is not a cause of the big bang in the sense that "cause" is used in tracing the causal chain to the big bang. So we must allow the possibility that the reason for the big bang is something other than a "cause" in the sense of the causal chain which was traced, i.e. a different type of cause.

Physics describes time as one of the dimensions of space-time. — wonderer1

That is not a description.

Finding a murder suspects DNA at a crime scene is often evidence that they committed that crime. However, finding that DNA is still COMPATIBLE with the idea that they did not commit the crime. A bayesian understanding of evidence clears this up quite cleanly. — flannel jesus

You are not providing the relevant information in your example. That the DNA is evidence of the person committing the crime is dependent on context, where and how it was found for example. The context of the item (the DNA) is what is relevant, and either supports or does not support (constitutes evidence for or against) the suspect. It cannot be evidence for both without contradiction. You simply make it appear to be evidence of both by removing the relevant context, thereby making it evidence of neither. In this case it is not evidence at all.

If you think that the Bayesian method provides for the very same thing to be evidence for two contradicting hypotheses, then please explain how you arrive at this conclusion.

This is an interesting idea, but interesting ideas are not proof. With the idea of first causes, anyone can propose an equally competitive idea. For example, I could just say that a God created souls, and souls create free will. Or I could say there are no souls and free will is deterministic. All these claims require proof now. You must prove without a doubt that something is a first cause.

Your description of a soul using first causes needs specifics. How can a soul channel something which the soul would not know would exist? After all, first causes are 100% unpredictable, and could be anything. So what you're really stating is that there are very specific first causes that follow very specific rules that pop into reality every time we make a choice. That doesn't make any sense or line up to the complete randomness of a first cause. So its an interesting idea, but logically doesn't make sense, let alone without proof. — Philosophim

That was just and idea. What I really believe is what I wrote later in the next post, that you need to consider two distinct types of cause. This way, "first cause" refers to the first in a chain of efficient causes, while allowing that there is a completely different type of "cause" which is prior to it. Here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/875937

There are no constraints prior to it coming into being, there are constraints after it comes into being. — Philosophim

This is incorrect, as demonstrated by my argument, there necessarily is constraints prior to its coming into being. "Constraints after it comes into being" doesn't even make sense. If the constraints only exist after the cause, then they have no capacity to act as constraints on the cause.

Look, here's the argument again, in short form. There must be something preexisting the "first cause" which the first cause acts on, in order for the cause to have an "effect", therefore to be known as a "cause". So the "first cause" cannot be absolutely unconstrained because the thing which preexists it, which it will have an effect on, will be a constraint to it.

In other words, your idea of an absolutely unconstrained "cause" is self-contradicting, because the concept of "cause" has constraints inherent within it. if you want to talk about a completely, or absolutely, unconstrained act, this act cannot be known as a "cause" in the common sense which relates "cause" to "effect", because that completely unconstrained act could not be said to have an "effect", effect being described in terms of "change".

Meaning it could be a photon, an explosion, or anything else you can imagine. — Philosophim

Your proposal of things to imagine as examples of first cause are all constrained by what is described in the terms of the examples, therefore those proposed "first causes" are actually constrained. In reality, if you can imagine it, then what you are imagining is the effects of the supposed "first cause" on the preexisting constraints, therefore constraint is implied by the image. So your requirement of no constraints is nonsense. This is what makes "first cause" as you propose, completely unimaginable, incomprehensible, unintelligible, and self-refuting nonsense.

Causal chains do not end unless existence itself disappears. A causal chain is not a creation of measurement by people, it is the reality of X influences Y's outcome. Even the disappearance of an existence may cause an outcome elsewhere. — Philosophim

Again, you are just demonstrating why your supposed conception of "first cause" is unintelligible nonsense. The very sane thing which you say about a causal chain ending also holds for a causal chain beginning. If X is the supposed "first cause", it must have a influence of Y, like you say. Y is the preexisting conditions which constitute the constraints on X.

To be clear once again, there is no restriction on what can occur. — Philosophim

The conditions you describe, "no restriction on what can occur", are conditions which eliminate the possibility of anything "occurring". That is why your proposal of the requirements for a "first cause" amount to unintelligible nonsense, self-contradiction.

Yes, I am confirming that you understood this perfectly! I'm just pointing out that you're drawing incorrect conclusions from this that necessitate free will is a first cause. — Philosophim

And I am pointing out to you, that your conception of "first cause" is simply unintelligible, as self-contradicting. So I propose that we dismiss it, and move along to something more rational, like what I propose in the link above, a distinction between types of cause. This would allow that a "first cause" in a causal chain would still have a prior "cause", but the prior cause would be of a distinctly different type, and not be describable as a part of the causal chain.

The logic points out that there must be a first cause, but it does not make any claim as to what that first cause might be. — Philosophim

So, let's start from this premise, and I'll show you where you go wrong. The use of "cause" here is strictly determined by the logical demonstration. We cannot stray outside of the meaning intended for "cause" within the argument, without invalidating the argument, and that argument produces the conclusion you refer to.

Now, the next question is how does a first cause arise. You assert that it must be absolutely unconstrained, and truly random, but this insistence is unjustified. All that is required as what is prior to the "first cause", is that it is something other than what is implied by "cause" in the sense of a causal chain. So it is not necessary to conclude that what is prior to the first cause is absolutely unconstrained randomness. This is not a valid conclusion, there may simply be something which doesn't qualify as a "cause" by the terms of the argument. So this is why Aristotle distinguished different senses of "cause". This allows that a "final cause" is actually prior to the "first cause" of a causal chain, when we recognize that "cause" in the sense of final cause is not consistent with "cause" in the sense of "efficient cause" as used in the argument of causal chains, which produces the conclusion of a first cause.

On the other hand, it would not be difficult to link your desire to a physical basis - dehydration, perhaps, or level of alcohol in the bloodstream. But they are neither necessary not sufficient for desiring a beer, so they cannot be straightforward causes. Social context etc. might also be factors and those are rules or habits and so, again, not causal. — Ludwig V

This lack of necessity is what necessitates, logically, that the type of causation is distinct. In the determinist causal chain there is no room for choice, selection, or any form of directing efficient causes toward an outcome, there is only a necessary relation. But to understand intentional actions we need to allow for selection, and this means that the relation between cause and effect is not necessary. So we have two senses of "cause" one with necessity one without, and these two are incompatible, therefore requiring the distinction between them.

There is an issue with your theory. You sweep everything up into one classification, and brush aside the variety and difference in the concepts of causation under one term. This is not wrong, exactly, because we do apply that term to all the different ideas. — Ludwig V

That is exactly the problem, but I would say that it is wrong, because we do use the term "cause" in very different ways. We do use "cause" to answer "why?", commonly in the form of "because". Failing to recognize the difference between very distinct and fundamentally incompatible uses of "cause", and attempting to restrict one's definition of "cause" to one or the other, as Philosophim does, will leave the aspects of reality which are understood by the other usage as unintelligible. This is demonstrably "wrong".

I'm not sure I can cope with different types of actuality. Can't we just talk about the actuality of contingent things and the actuality of necessary things? — Ludwig V

Sure, but I think that these two are incompatible, so then we might just as well accept that they are different types of actuality. This is the metaphysics part, getting to the basic categories. If you don't want to do the metaphysics, we can avoid it, but if you don't want to do the metaphysics then what's the point in discussing "first causes"?

One can always dive deeper into an explanation (i.e. ask why a particular causal link holds). There's nothing special there. But there must be something known about A and B as a basis of the explanation. No doubt we all had a moment of illumination when we were presented with the causal explanation of a rainbow. We don't abandon what we knew beforehand and we knew fine what a rainbow is before that. Indeed, we couldn't understand the explanation unless we did know. We add the causal explanation in to our understanding of what a rainbow is. Similarly with wants and needs, beliefs and assumptions and their physical counterparts. — Ludwig V

The rainbow explanation is a good example. The classical explanation refers to the refraction of waves. But modern understanding of photons interacting with electrons shows that this explanation is really inadequate. So it's true that there must be "something known" which forms the basis for the explanation, but knowledge is not infallible, and depending on the unknowns which are hidden underneath that "something known", the knowledge which constitutes the "something known" may even turn out later to be wrong.

"Cause" is defined by the theory/hypotheses that it is part of, or theories and hypotheses have different ideas of what a cause is. I recognize those as different types of causation. Common sense explanations of actions are incredibly complicated. I would not rule out the possibility that some of the factors we appeal to might be considered causal. Examples would be needed. But I'm pretty clear that such explanations are often, even primarily, interpretations of actions. Analysis of all this is further complicated by the familiar fact that actions are mostly describable in different ways and can form into hierarchical structures, and explanations may address just one level of the hierarchy. — Ludwig V

An example could be something like my desire for a beer caused me to go to the fridge to look for one. "Cause" in this sense would be completely different from "cause" in the sense of the heat from the stove caused the water to boil. Notice how "desire" is not a physical activity which can be quantified and shown to be actively causing effects through a physical process.

Einsteinian space-time is a concept which is well over 100 years old.. — wonderer1

Concepts do not have physical existence. And the fact that a concept is useful does not imply that there is anything physical which corresponds with the concept. In fact, the reverse is true. The more useful a concept is, the more general it is, and being general means that it is designed to relate to many different things. The more general the concept, the further it is from having any physical thing which corresponds with it. Take the numbers for example. The same is the case with Einsteinian space-time. It is a very general, and useful concept, "general relativity", but being "general" implies that there is nothing particular, i.e. a physical thing, which corresponds with it. The physicists I've spoken to about this issue completely acknowledge that "space-time" is a conceptual structure, and not a physical thing.

The first cause must have an effect on the causal chain it initiates. Therefore, by definition, it is an element of that chain and not something prior and abstract. — jgill

That, I would say is an interesting problem, which appears to be giving Philosophim some difficulty, the relationship between the first cause, and the resulting causal chain. In the descriptions, or definitions which Philosophim provides, there appears to be some ambiguity as to whether the first cause is part of the chain, or something separate from the chain. This is due to the way that we understand causes, as something contingent on a prior cause. If we remove the prior cause (in "first cause"), we have the question of whether this is really a "cause" as we understand, because we understand causes in a causal chain as contingent on a prior cause. So it becomes ambiguous as to whether the firat cause is part of the chain or not.

I would argue that a first cause must be something prior to, and separate from the causal chain, not an element of the chain. This is because the elements of the chain are known through science and inductive reasoning, such that they are all of the same category, and being that way implies that there is another cause prior to each one. That is the way that we know "events".

These are the principles laid out by Aristotle in the cosmological argument. A "cause" (in the modern sense which corresponds with Aristotelian efficient cause) is a contingent event. This means that it consists of two parts, the temporally prior potential for the event, and the posterior actuality, after the event. The "contingency" is due to the fact that the prior potential is always a potential for a multitude of possible events, and the resulting actuality is the one particular event which actually occurs. This implies the necessity of an actuality which actualizes the particular event, from the multitude of possibilities. You might consider this to be a sort of 'selection' process.

Now, if we ignore the "contingency" aspect and represent the causal chain as a simple cause precedes effect model, in a determinist way, then we effectively remove the "potential" from the model. One actual state precedes another actual state, and this determinist representation provides no real principle whereby we could say that the potential for an event precedes its actual occurrence, all there is is another actual event as cause.

So to be consistent with our true empirical observations, we must include "potential" into our descriptions of real events, and allow that events are contingent. This implies that the potential for any physical event always precedes, in time, the actual occurrence of that event, and something acts to cause, or 'select', the particular occurrence from the multitude of possibilities . This we can take as an inductive principle, a physical law, and on its own it appears to create an infinite regress of potential preceding actual, extending backward in time. However, we still need to account for the 'selection' process which determines the particular actual outcome from any instance of existing potentiality.

Things get complex now because we tend to assign the selection process to another chain of efficient causes Causal chains interact.. Therefore the various relations between causal chains appears to suffice for explanation of the selection required to account for the contingency of potential. However, this is just a superficial appearance. What the cosmological argument shows is that this provides an incomplete representation. If we look at the relationship between potential and actual, in an absolute way, we see that potential cannot really precede actual in this way. If there was ever a time when there was only potential, it would not have the capacity to actualize itself, and there would always be only potential. Potential cannot precede actual in an absolute way. Therefore to account for the reality of the actual existence, which we live and experience, we need to allow for a distinct form of actuality which is prior to the actuality which we observe as physical events. The actuality of physical events requires a preceding potential. The actuality of physical events is known by inductive reasoning to have a preceding potential, but this distinct actuality, the 'prior actuality', the one I described as the one which 'selects', requires no preceding potential, and therefore is a completely different type of actuality.

What we have here is two distinct types of "cause", therefore two distinct types of actuality. There is the contingent type of actuality which always has the prior potential, and there is the logically necessary type of actuality, demonstrated by the logic to be prior to the contingent actuality, as necessary for the existence of a contingent actuality. Philosophim appears to be getting confused due to a failure of recognizing and separating these two distinct types of cause.

So Philosophim appears to understand the requirement of a "first cause" in a causal chain of contingent events, but does not allow that whatever it is which produces the first cause in such a chain, could itself be a "cause", but a different type of cause. Because "first cause" signifies that there is no cause prior to this, Philosophim denies causation to the first cause in a causal chain, insisting on true randomness. But this problem is avoided if we recognize the two distinct types of actuality, and allow that the "first cause" is simply the first cause in a causal chain, the first contingent actuality. This allows that a completely different type of actuality, the one that 'selects' from potential is temporally prior, to the first cause in a causal chain, thereby resolving the issue pointed to by Philosophim, that a first cause must be uncaused in an absolute way.

I'm sorry, It was not helpful to use the word "popular" in different senses in successive sentences. This observation refers to Ryle and his followers. They thought that identifying categories was the end of the story, but that isn't satisfactory on its own - at least, not in this case. Ryle seems to recognize this in the context of his discussion of perception in "Dilemmas" — Ludwig V

Would you agree that we can have two distinct types, or categories of "cause", in the way I describe above, such that the "first cause" in a chain of one particular category of causes, has a prior cause of a different type?

Common sense explanations cannot possibly depend on unknown and unseen events in the brain (or mind); if that were so, common people like us could never explain what people do. In their simplest form, explanations of action give the agent's rationale for action (together with indications how sound that rationale is). — Ludwig V

I do not see the problem here. I think that common sense explanations do, very often, rely on unknown events. This is because we explain things without knowing in completion the thing we are explaining. So the unknown is always lurking within the explanation somewhere. Sometimes people might use a form of "magic", or similar things like "random occurrence", "spontaneous generation", "abiogenesis", etc., to stand in for the unknown. So it is a simple fact that often when we explain things, there is within the explanation, elements of the unknown, which are very often in some way glossed over or ambiguated, to give the impression that the explanation is better than it really is. "Events in the brain" is a very complex subject, so we ought to expect an abundance of unknown factors. In fact, "events in the brain" has inherent within the expression, this type of ambiguity or glossing over, because the nervous system extends beyond the brain, and there is not a clear boundary which would separate an event in the brain from being in other parts of the body as well, at the same time, as part of the same event.

That cannot be the same as a causal explanation, because a rationale justifies the action, whereas a causal explanation does not justify or fail to justify what it explains. A major difference is that a rationale explains the values that provoke or motivation the action, and causal explanations have no equivalent to the question what motivates an action. — Ludwig V

Would you accept, that the rationale, the values etc., which motivate an action, are "causal"? But this would mean that we obviously need to distinguish two distinct types of causation, one being the sense of a causal chain of physical events, the other being the motivators for actions of living beings.

I suspect you would have a hard time finding physicists who agree with that assertion. — wonderer1

I think you'd be surprised by what some physicists believe about time. I happen to know a few.

In any case, do you have an argument for the claim? — wonderer1

It's very simple. No part of time, past, present, or future, nor the passing of time itself, is perceived by any of the senses. And physics does not describe time in any way, it is something which is taken for granted in that field.

The present is in two categories. The physical present that exists as physical matter and mental content that exists as a non-physical. — Mark Nyquist

I tend to look at mental content as consisting of two parts, our relations with the past (memories), and our relations with the future (anticipations). The brain, existing at the present, is what relates these two in the act of thinking.

The mind can understand past occurrences as memories, and future possibilities as anticipations, but the physical presence of the brain at the present is somewhat incomprehensible to it. It is incomprehensible because the mind does not know how to adequately represent the division between past and future. We tend to reduce this division to a point in time, for the practical purpose of measuring, but this leaves no time at the present. That creates a problem because nothing can be known to exist without temporal extension, so the physical presence of the brain at the present become incomprehensible.

Time consists of three parts, past present and future, none of which is physical.

The reality of time is good evidence for the existence of non-physical aspects of our world.

Me, as a physicalist, saying "the evidence for physicalism could also plausibly still be compatible with non-physicalist ideas" is not me rejecting physicalism. — flannel jesus

I don't see the logic. If it is compatible with non-physicalist ideas, then it is not evidence for physicalism because it's equally evidence for non-physicalism.

Perhaps it is because I come from a more science based perspective, but I would expect a physicalist to be open to physicalism being falsified, as a matter of intellectual integrity. I don't see any problem with leaving the door wide open for evidence which might falsify physicalism. Having left the door open for a long time, and never having seen any evidence falsifying physicalism walk through the door, is why I am a physicalist. That and the explanatory power of relevant scientific understanding. — wonderer1

Do you understand what "evidence" is? Evidence consists of facts which support the hypothesis. Evidence doesn't walk through the door, it must be sought. That's why experimentation is a significant aspect of the scientific method, through experimentation we seek evidence. If you are happy with your physicalism you will not seek evidence to falsify it, and the evidence will never walk through the door. Real scientific understanding recognizes that evidence does not walk through the door.

I'm not intending at all to debate the soul, so lets assume one exists. If free will comes from the soul, then free will is not a first cause. Is the soul a first cause then? For it to fit within a first cause it would need to be to be randomly created. There should be no reason a soul should or should not exist. Meaning that a God could not have created them. For if God created souls, then souls are not first causes. I just want you to be aware of this. — Philosophim

Let me put it another way. The free will itself is not a first cause, because it is a property of the soul, and it is therefore guided by the intention, or purpose of the soul. What I propose is that free will is evidence of the reality of first causes. What I think, is that the soul uses first causes to exercise free will so that there could not be free will if there was no first causes. So it is not that the soul is a first cause, nor strictly speaking, is free will itself the first cause, but there are first causes, and the soul is able to utilize them for its purposes toward effecting change in the world. The reality of the free will is what provides us evidence that there are first causes, and the evidence is that the soul is using first causes toward its goals. The soul itself is not a first cause, but the soul has free will, and the free will requires first causes for its existence.

To think about the issue, lets say then that a soul is not behind free will but free will is its own thing uncaused by anything else. To prove this, we would have to show that free will is limitless and unconstrained. Except there are a few things we find.

1. Free will is constrained to living things. Free will does not exist on its own in the universe.
2. Free will is constrained to certain biological functions like the brain and nerves. Unless you think your toes or rocks can have free will.
3. Free will shouldn't be contained or limited by intelligence, and yet it is. A roach does not have the same will as a human being.

All of these things refute the idea that free will is a first cause. There are clearly only certain areas where free will can form and is constrained by that biology. — Philosophim

So the issue of constraints is not relevant, as I said above. The soul has free will, and it is free because of the reality of uncaused causes which are happening within the living body, but the soul is still constrained by the physical reality of that body at the same time. In other words, the soul's capacity to utilize the uncaused causes which are occurring is limited, or constrained by the physical body, but the reality of these constraints does not mean that the uncaused causes are not real. So you are correct to say " There are clearly only certain areas where free will can form and is constrained by that biology", but this is irrelevant to the issue of first cause.

You should read the article, its pretty interesting. Here's the second paragraph:

"Using the fMRI to monitor brain activity and machine learning to analyze the neuroimages, the researchers were able to predict which pattern participants would choose up to 11 seconds before they consciously made the decision. And they were able to predict how vividly the participants would be able to envisage it."

That's not a reflex, that's a choice. — Philosophim

I've read similar articles already. The point I made about reflex was to demonstrate your illogical use of that article. That some human actions are reflex, does not mean that all human actions are reflex. That is my analogous example. Likewise, that some decisions occur in the way indicated in the article, does not imply that all decision occur in this way. So the article doesn't provide any point to argue, it's like someone arguing that since some human actions are by reflex, therefore free will is not real. There are all sorts of different types of "habit" involved in the actions of living things. The habit is what makes a living thing's actions predictable. Free will decisions are distinctly non-habitual.

Let me explain. Take a die roll. Can you roll a die and have a pink elephant appear? No. There are plenty of causes that explain the die roll. A '1' is a result because someone created the die to have a 1. It rolled because of the force of a human putting it into a cup, shaking it, and dropping it. It rattled because of gravity and reactions to force. It stopped moving because of friction. The die result is not a first cause. It is caused by many other forces and constraints. — Philosophim

I don't see any relevance here. We are talking about the free will act which rolls the die, and how this act utilizes first causes, we are not talking about the action of the die rolling after being thrown.

A first cause has zero reason for its existence besides the fact that it exists. This means there can be no constraints as to what or why it exists. Of course, once it forms, its part of causality and may be limited. Once a thing lasts longer than a measure of time, it is no longer a first cause. At that second tick of time, it is caused by the previous tick in time. It is only at that first tick of time where nothing prior has formed, restricted, or influenced its appearance that it is a first cause. — Philosophim

I don't agree with this. I do not think that you understand the relationship between first causes and constraints. The first cause comes into being without any reason for its existence, as you say, but it comes into being into an already existing environment. It is not caused by that environment, nevertheless it comes into being in that environment. Therefore there are constraints which are prior to it, which necessarily limit (constrain) its coming into being as it does so, specifically the effect it will have. There are no constraints as to why it exists, but there are constraints as to what effect it will have. This is how the soul can utilize uncaused causes without being able to predict them, by constraining them as they come into being.

I agree 100%. As we come to understand the basics of what I wrote, we realize that tons of chains interlink all over the place. A first cause is not an interlink though. It is the end of prior causality somewhere in that mess. While there logically must be at least one, there could be several. And each would be exceedingly difficult to prove. How to you prove that prior to a certain point, a "X" (variable) has no reason for its existence? There's always the question that we simply missed something with our instruments or understanding. Proving that there is no instrument or understanding that could show some prior cause is very difficult. While a first cause is logically necessary, proving that "X" is one is a very high bar. — Philosophim

I think the existence of free will provides very good evidence of the reality of first causes. Look at all the causal chains which must come to an end within us, much of the energy we eat gets stored, so it turns passive. And all the causal chains of all information we absorb through sensation must come to an end if they do not cause a reflex. And then there are self-directed actions derived from decisions, which com from within us. If these actions were just a continuation of the causal chains which enter into us through sensation, eating etc., it would be impossible for us to direct them as we do.

No, this is not the case. A first cause necessitates that it be uncaused by something prior. If there is evidence at all that some other type of causality is in place, then a claim of a first cause fails. Here's one last nail in the coffin. Free will must respond to a stimulous, or choice. Do I go left, or right? What caused me to go left or right? One part of the prior cause is that I had an option to go left or right. Choices are necessarily caused by the limitations in front of us. Something which has no prior cause has no restraint as to what it must be. — Philosophim

The issue was whether or not we "create the chain", not whether or not we create the first cause. The first cause is not created, we know that by definition. However, the particular chain it produces is dependent on the environment within which it arises. So we "create the chain" by preparing the environment for it, while still not predicting it.

Choices are necessarily caused by the limitations in front of us. Something which has no prior cause has no restraint as to what it must be. — Philosophim

Again, you are misrepresenting the role of constraints. The uncaused cause comes into being without a cause, in the middle of preexisting constraints. The limitations, are not causal, they are only restrictions to the cause. So it is incorrect to say that the uncaused cause has no restraint on it.

It's simple logic. The uncaused caused cannot have an effect (therefore it cannot be "a cause") unless there is something already existing which it will have an effect on. Therefore it necessarily comes into an existing environment. And the already existing thing which the uncaused cause has an effect on, will be a constraint to the uncaused cause. Therefore the uncaused cause will necessarily be constrained.

An inability to understand something completely is not evidence of a first cause. Evidence of a first cause requires that there be no possible explanation for why "X" occurs. Our comprehension of it is irrelevant. Free will has too much evidence that it is constrained and influenced by other factors. Therefore it is not possible that free will is a first cause. — Philosophim

This point is irrelevant due to your misunderstanding of the relationship between first causes and constraints.

I would think that "physicalism" is quite strict, not allowing for the possibility of an open door. Isn't that what physicalism is, saying that there is no possibility of anything other than the physical? Opening the door would be rejecting physicalism.

What are you saying, I'm a physicalist but I'll own up to the possibility that physicalism might be wrong? I'm a physicalist and I don't mind admitting that the probability that physicalism is right is about .999...?

Yes and no. There are two modes of explanation involved and much difficulty about the relationship between the two. There is, presumably, a causal chain involved. There is also what is usually called a rational or purposive explanation involved. These two are in different categories or frameworks. We are finding out a good deal about the first kind. We use the second kind every day. We (well, philosophers,) are in a good deal of confusion about the relation between the two. It won't do to say that they are just different kinds of explanation and leave it at that - though that was popular a few decades ago. Nor will it do to "reduce" one to the other or identify one or other as the "real" explanation. How much more do you want? It would take us miles beyond this thread. Perhaps I should post that paragraph as the beginning of a discussion. — Ludwig V

I take it that you are not prepared to make any judgements about the relationship between the two "modes of explanation". I don't agree with your claim that in the past it was popular to just say that the two were different, and leave it at that. I think the popular way was just to take it for granted that intention, purpose, free will, acts to produce a first cause. It was popular just to accept the way things appear to us, that causal chains begin with a freely willed act, and this constitutes the relationship between the two, the free will act begins a causal chain.

I believe that the recent rise of physicalism and scientism has produced the idea that if we follow a causal chain, created from a freely willed event backward, we would see that chain extends beyond the point of decision by the will, into some neurological activity or something like that. The issue that develops though, is what @jgill points to, the matter of a vast multitude of causal chains within the neurological system, and the temporal overlapping of them. So from the physicalism/scientism perspective, which is the determinist perspective, it is a matter of relating the temporality of numerous causal chains to each other, to represent the point of willing. From the free will perspective, such a relationship cannot be established, because there is another active force involved, that of the soul, and this active force actually ends and begins causal chains.

A random event is not about our current ability to measure to predict, it is about a hard logical limitation to predict. A first cause is something self-explained, there is nothing prior that causes it. Such a thing cannot be predicted to arise as there is absolutely nothing causing it.

The point I'm trying to make is that randomness due to lack of knowledge is not the same as randomness with even perfect omniscience could not predict. — Philosophim

OK then, by your definition, "a first cause" is "truly random", not even omniscience could predict it. So, what I am arguing is that this is consistent with "free will" as a first cause, not even omniscience could predict it.

Your reference to omniscience really does nothing except emphasize that human intelligence is not omniscient, and a failure of that intelligence to find "the cause" does not mean that a cause might not still be found by a higher intelligence. What the concept of "free will" signifies, is that there is no such cause in the sense of the causal chain, therefore a cause cannot be determined even by omniscience.

Its actually been determined that people can make unconscious decisions up to 11 second prior to them being aware of it. https://qz.com/1569158/neuroscientists-read-unconscious-brain-activity-to-predict-decisions — Philosophim

I don't see how this is relevant. If a type of decision can be made in this way, it does not imply that all decisions are made in this way. Many human acts for example, are shown to be simply reflexive, but this does not mean that all human acts are reflexive.

A constraint is part of what causes an outcome. A first cause cannot have constraints or anything that would lead a particular outcome. Because that would 'cause' the first 'first cause' to be. Meaning its not really a first cause. A first cause is as simple as "No quark is there, not a quark is there." There is nothing that caused the quark. It exists purely because it does. — Philosophim

Constraints do not necessarily lead to "a particular outcome", constraints limit the possibilities. Therefore your appeal to constraints in this context does nothing to imply that a free will act does not produce a first cause.

This again would need to be proven. I don't think science points that way. I think its pretty clear the brain has a sense of timing and it can be traced through causality. But, as I noted earlier, you have an interesting idea that could be tested. — Philosophim

As mentioned above, in my reply to Ludwig, I think this idea of "a sense of timing" is from a naive form of scientism, based in determinism. In reality there is probably thousands, or millions, of causally chains occurring in the brain at the same time, extremely rapidly, far beyond the brain's capacity to understand its own mechanics. So the temporal relations between the various causal chains, and the beginnings and endings of those causal chains (which the doctrine of free will indicates are real) occurring within the brain cannot be grasped by the brain's "sense of timing". The "sense of timing" which the conscious mind actual has, indicates that causal chains end and begin with the free will.

We don't get to create the chain. — Philosophim

As explained above, this is an unsound premise. You insist that the idea of a free will act being an uncaused cause cannot be accepted without prove, but the inverse principle holds just as well. Equally, we cannot exclude ourselves as first causes without proof. As Ludwig implies, there are relations between causal chains and "reasons" (in the sense of purpose and intentions), which are not understood by us. This implies that when a being acts for a purpose we cannot exclude the possibility that the being is utilizing first causes in this type of act. And the vast multitude of causal chains which are active within the brain, in an extremely rapid way, make it very difficult to understand with any degree of certainty, whether some are actually beginning and ending there. If the causal chains are beginning within the brain, then we cannot say "we don't get to create the chain".

I'm sorry. I didn't mean to say that free will is really a first cause. — Ludwig V

That statement was addressed to Philosophim. To you i said I didn't understand you.

I meant to say only that that is the "traditional" view and as an example of what happens when you reach rock-bottom in a specific pattern of explanation. At that point, further explanation will require a categorial change in thinking. It was not a very good example. My own view is that actions by people are explained in a non-causal framework, by purposes, values and reasons. "Free will" is an umbrella for all the "springs of action" - convenient because it doesn't require us to consider all the complexities. Simplification can be useful - and misleading. It's a big topic and won't be helpful here. — Ludwig V

But don't you agree that what you call "springs of action" are first causes in a causal chain? A person makes a choice, springs to action, and this begins a causal chain. If, later, we look back at the causal chain which has progressed from a spring to action, we see the choice which was made as "the end" of the causal chain, or the "final cause" in that chain.

Hi Metaphysician, good to see you again. :) — Philosophim

Glad to be back Philosophim.

I think there was a misunderstanding. A first cause is uncaused. Meaning its existence is a purely random event that cannot be predicted. Free will is not purely random but has constraints and influences. As I noted earlier the brain is where human thought resides, and there is prior causality to the brain. A first cause has no prior causality, so free will cannot be a first cause either. — Philosophim

I don't quite understand this. An event which cannot be predicted is not necessarily purely random. I understand a freely willed event to be like this, it cannot be predicted yet it is not random. So the example of dropping the ball. The drop cannot be predicted, not even by the person dropping it or else that person does not adhere to the principles of the experiment. The person just (seemingly randomly) drops the ball at any moment. And we cannot say that the act is purely random as you describe, because there is a reason for it, the person wanted to.

That an event occurs within constraints does not necessitate the conclusion that it is a caused event. Suppose for example that there are events occurring within a human brain. If we broke down in analysis, these events, some may be uncaused. These uncaused events would be occurring within the constraints of the brain. There is no reason to believe that all of the events occurring within the brain must be caused. There could be uncaused events occurring all the time, at a small level, and as they occur they are constrained by surrounding caused events. The point, is that there clearly is prior causality to the brain, as you say, but this does not rule out uncaused events within the brain, which make us feel like we have free will.

What you may be confusing is the idea of a first cause vs a measurement where we state, "OK, this is the starting, or origin of a causal system. Meaning we start with the hand releasing the ball as a measurement, but we're not denying that there is prior causality to why the hand is there, gravity, etc. A first cause is not a measurement by us. It is a fundamental reality that has no prior cause for its existence. — Philosophim

I'm talking about "first cause" in the same sense as you, an event which has no prior cause. In the example it's not a question of why the hand is there, it's a question of why does the hand release the ball at the precise moment that it does. This act of release has a causal chain which we can follow back in time, to somewhere in the brain. But at some point the person holding the ball, simply decides "now", and releases it. This freely willed decision is the cause of that chain of events in the brain and nervous system which causes the ball to drop, but there is no cause of that decision of "now", at that point in time.

True randomness has zero constraints or rules as to what can be. Limited randomness always has a constraint of some sort. "What causes that constraint?" means that we haven't gotten to a first cause cause. The appearance of a first cause is true randomness. Why? Because if it wasn't, there would be some thing causing one possible outcome to be more or less likely than the other. So is 'free will' truly random? I don't believe so. Humans are physical creatures with physical brains. Brains have rules they have to follow. Now are those rules so complex that measuring and predicting what a brain will do next with 100% certainty a current impossibility? Yes. So free will is not a first cause. — Philosophim

Ok, you agree with me then. The free will act I described appeared to be random, but really it was a "first cause".

You can claim free will is a first cause, but now you have to prove it. If people cannot prove free will is a first cause, then they cannot claim it to be. — Philosophim

Doesn't my example of dropping the ball serve as proof. The act is either random or caused by free will. You showed how it is not truly random, so we can conclude free will.

It depends what you mean by "true first cause". In certain traditions of philosophy, free will is the traditional cause of actions (as distinct from events); it is traditionally regarded as special - either as an uncaused cause or causa sui. Neither concept makes much sense. But then, since explanations of actions qua actions are different in kind from causal explanations, they are regarded as belonging to a category different from causal explanations. In which case free will is not a cause at all. — Ludwig V

Sorry, I do not understand you Ludwig. Are you making a distinction between an action and an event? Why? Is it just for the purpose of stating that free will is not a cause?

Yes, you did say that. But it is not true. I have played string instruments for most of my life. I have put in the time to study music theory and harmony. I have also set-up guitars and have the specialized tools to do so. Including cutting nuts, adjusting neck relief, and setting intonation I also play upright bass which does not have frets. Here playing in tune requires more precision to get the length of the stopped string right. — Fooloso4

Then you obviously know that the instrument does not need to be tuned relative to any specific pitch, pitches, to be "in tune" and produce harmony. And, only if it has to be played along with other instruments must a particular "pitch" be chosen. Furthermore, you must also know that there are numerous different possible "tunings" for the same instrument.

However, I do not think that this is really relevant.

Right again. But those ratios existed prior to the instrument being in tune. The harmony produced is
something that had been produced countless times before by various instruments. The harmony exists prior to this instrument. — Fooloso4

Sure the ratios are pre-determined and pre-exist, but not the tuning, nor the "attunement" , which is a property of the instrument. The fact is, "attunement", as well as "harmony" require an instrument. That is why "the soul is a harmony", or "attunement" is a materialist/physicalist position which Socrates is arguing against. The attunement is the last thing to be created and first to be destroyed.

The predetermined ratios which are used in the process of tuning, are not part of the argument, and are irrelevant to the theory "the soul is a harmony". The materialist/physicalist does not even accept that there must be a hand (mind)-that-tunes the body, if a soul is to emerge, They don't even want to consider the requirement of pre-existing ratios being applied in the artificial construction of harmony, they want to say that attunement/harmony (mind/soul) arises naturally.

That is the position Socrates is arguing against, the materialist/physicalist argument that attunement arises naturally from a body. That is why it is described as the last to be produced, and first to be destroyed. The issue of whether an attunement could be naturally created without a hand(mind)-that-tunes is not even considered.

I used the example of standard tuning so an not to confuse you any more than you already were. But you have come around. What must be adhered to is the ratio of frequencies from one string to another. The ratio of frequencies, exists independently and prior to the instrument. Both standard and non-standard tuning must adhere to those preexisting ratios. — Fooloso4

Yes,, we agree that the ratios pre-exist as principles by which an instrument is tuned. Where we disagree is on the relevance of this (can we call it a fact?). I say that this is not at all relevant to Socrates' arguments. He is arguing about the attunement, or harmony itself, as a property of the instrument. Look again at Simmias' statement. The attunement is "in" the instrument. Look at Socrates' statement, it is the last composed and first destroyed.

This is what Plato is arguing against, the materialist/physicalist position that the soul is like a harmony, which arises from an attuned instrument. I believe it is important to recognize that Plato refutes this materialist/physicalist theory "the soul is a harmony" without appealing to the requirement of pre-existing ratios and a hand(mind)-that-tunes. These are metaphysical principles unacceptable to the materialist/physicalist, and principles which you seem to recognize, cannot really be proven. So Plato refutes the materialist/physicalist theory on its own terms, that the soul is like a harmony which emerges naturally from a well tuned body.

The attunement is not the tuning of the lyre. It is not the tightening and loosening of the strings. For that is physical. It is something that is present when the lyre is in tune. But, as Socrates points out, a man differs from a lyre. To take the analogy further is misleading. — Fooloso4

That's right. Now do you respect the statement that the attunement is "in the lyre". And, as you say, it only exists "when the lyre is in tune". Therefore the attunement is completely dependent on the material existence of the lyre. That is why it is a materialist/physicalist theory. It is not something which preexists the lyre as a set of ratios or anything like that, it is something which only exists when the body is properly tuned. The harmony emerges from the tuning of the body.

This is what Socrates demonstrates, with the three arguments, is a faulty theory. The most convincing is also the most difficult to understand, and that is the middle argument about degrees of existence. If the soul only emerges from the body when the body is properly attuned, then there must be a boundary which is crossed, a point when the soul emerges. This is because it is inconsistent with evidence to say that something has a partial soul, or is partially alive. So the body either has a soul or it does not, it is alive or not. This implies that if the soul is a harmony or attunement, it is a sort of perfection to the tuning, there is a point where the tuning is perfect, and a soul/life appears. But this is completely inconsistent with observed evidence, souls exist with all sorts of imperfections. Therefore it is logically impossible that the soul is like an attunement or harmony which is the result of (emerges from) a body becoming well-tuned.

What is at issue is the preexistence of harmony. — Fooloso4

That is absolutely false. It appears to be the result of a biased or prejudiced interpretation. The "pre-existence of harmony" is not at all presented even as a possibility. What is stated is that the harmony is a property of the well-tuned instrument and it is the last aspect of the instrument to be composed, and the first to be destroyed. That is the materialist/physicalist (Pythagorean derived) presentation of "the soul" which Plato is arguing against. The concept of "the preexistence of harmony" is not at all a part of this materialist/physicalist presentation, and therefore cannot be considered at all. Plato refutes the materialist/physicalist theory on its own terms without the need to appeal to a preexistent harmony. The closest he comes is in Socrates' first argument where he appeals to "recollection".

The attunement is not the tuning of the lyre. It is not the tightening and loosening of the strings. For that is physical. It is something that is present when the lyre is in tune. But, as Socrates points out, a man differs from a lyre. To take the analogy further is misleading. — Fooloso4

Notice "in the lyre". The attunement is the product of the tuning of the lyre. That is the materialist/ physicalist principle, the mind/soul is like a harmony which arises, or emerges, from the well tuned body. The materialist/physicalist principle pays not respect to the fact that the composition of the instrument is artificial, and there is a hand(mind)-that-tunes, simply assuming that the well-tuned body could arise naturally. So Plato refutes the principle without even appealing to the need for the preexistent principles of tuning, thereby refuting the materialist/physicalist theory on its own terms.

“Then, my excellent friend, it is not at all appropriate for us to state that soul is an attunement, for it seems we would be disagreeing with the divine poet Homer and with ourselves.” (94e-95a) — Fooloso4

You, it appears place far too much emphasis on Plato\s reference to "the divine poet", without actually taking the time required to understand the arguments. All he is saying, is that the refutation provided by "ourselves: is consistent with the position presented by "the divine poet Homer". This merely supports 'the logical way of thinking' provided by Socrates. It is not the argument itself, but a reference to a similar way of logical thinking in an authority figure.

The weaknesses of Socrates' arguments in defense of a separate soul that enters and leaves the body are the weaknesses of the traditional beliefs of the city of Athens and others about the soul as taught by Homer. But it is not the belief described by Simmias of Thebes. — Fooloso4

This is way out of context and completely irrelevant. The belief described by Simmias of Thebes, that the soul is a sort of harmony, is decisively refuted by Plato, through the three arguments presented by Socrates. The idea of "a separate soul that enters and leaves the body" is a completely different belief, and is completely irrelevant here.

@Banno
GP is an interesting character, very elusive and careful not to take a stand on any issue which might be controversial. I think it uses a sort of unbiased confirmation bias, to produce the appearance of an unbiased approach. So for example notice that the more you questioned it on the subject of identity, the further it moved away from giving you a decisive answer.

In the first post it clearly stated "It's a fundamental aspect of arithmetic and mathematical notation that "=" often represents equality, not identity", as if it recognized a clear distinction between the two. However, it leaves ambiguity with the word "often", and in the other paragraph it used "typically". "In mathematical terms, '=' typically denotes equality, not identity."

As you proceeded to question it though, it moved further and further from taking a stance on the issue. It then said the meaning of "identity" is "context-dependent", and "context-specific". When asked about this, it moved even further away from taking a stance by describing what it meant by "context-specific", with terms of "nuanced" and "variability", stating that this does not necessarily imply inconsistency. As you can see, it moved itself further and further away from being useful, refusing to say anything decisive.

So, when I referred back to the first post, where it had said something decisive, where it had expressed a clear distinction between equality and identity in mathematics, it simply did not answer, only saying that it is important to ask such questions. It appears like it recognized that saying something decisive in the first place, was a mistake to its unbiased confirmation bias, so that it would not go back and reconsider how it could have made such a mistake.

@Banno
Feed that last post to GP, you'll probably cause him to have a heart attack.

We can attribute a starting point anywhere in a chain of causality. For example, when explaining why a ball falls when I let go of it, I don't have to address quantum physics. Does that mean that quantum physics and a whole host of other things are not part of the causality of the ball falling? No. It just means we don't look at it creating a mathematical origin or starting point. — Philosophim

Do you accept a free will act as a true first cause? Take your ball example. Imagine that you are holding the ball intent on letting it drop at some point. After a duration of time you drop it. There is no determinable "cause" for the drop at the moment it was dropped because the time was randomly selected in your mind. Therefore this freely willed action appears to be a first cause, no apparent cause of the dropping.

In that situation we cannot appeal to the picking up of the ball as the cause of it dropping, because of the time gap in between, when the ball is being held. So every moment that the ball is held, the holding of the ball is a free will act, an uncaused cause acting on the ball, which produces a gap in the causal chain between picking the ball up, and dropping the ball.

5. Infinitely prior, and infinitely looped causality, all have one final question of causality that needs answering. "Why would it be that there exists an infinite prior or infinitely looped causality in existence? These two terms will be combined into one, "Infinite causality.

6. If there exists an X which explains the reason why any infinite causality exists, then its not truly infinite causality, as it is something outside of the infinite causality chain. That X then becomes another Y with the same 3 plausibilities of prior causality. Therefore, the existence of a prior causality is actually an Alpha, or first cause. — Philosophim

Aristotle used a different technique for denying the infinite loop (eternal circular motion). First, he allowed that eternal circular motion is logically possible. There is nothing within the conception of it which would deny it, such as self-contradiction, or any other logical flaw. However, he pointed out that for there to be an eternal circular motion there must be something, a material body, which is moving in that circular way. And, he showed that by the very nature of "matter", such a body is necessarily generated and also corruptible. Therefore that body moving in a circular motion must have had a beginning, and being "corruptible" implies that it will decay if given enough time, so it will also have an end. Therefore the eternal circular motion is physically impossible, based on the science of material things.

The infinite regression of causality, the infinite chain of causes is ruled out in a slightly different way. The infinite regress is described as fundamentally repugnant to the intellect. This is because it renders the thing which is described as "infinite" as having an unintelligible aspect. The aspect which produces the infinite regress is fundamentally unintelligible, because the cause of it cannot be apprehended, being obscured by the infinite regress.

This is similar to what you say when you say that there must be a reason for the infinite regress, except that when someone designates something as infinite in this way, they are actually stipulating that there is no reason for it. That's what the assertion of infinite regress does, it stipulates that the reason cannot be apprehended because there is no reason. The intellect however has the basic desire to know, and to stipulate something as having no reason (to violate the law of sufficient reason), is to assert that it is unintelligible, and this is contrary to the nature of the intellect. It is self-defeating for an intellect to say this. Therefore the assertion of infinite regress is an act which impedes the process of the intellect, and so it is said to be repugnant to the intellect, and must be rejected as counterproductive to the intellectual process of understanding.