Time doesn't exist if nothing exists, that's true. — Philosophim

Until we come up with a clear description of what time is, this statement cannot be justified

Circular motion is a very strange sort.

The velocity of the patch in contact with the ground is zero with respect to the ground, unless you've lost traction. — wonderer1

Traction is often less than a hundred percent, so the motion of that point on the wheel, relative to the ground, would often be in the direction opposite to the intended direction of the vehicle. That produces unpredictability, making it so much fun to hit the gas pedal hard on a slick surface.

If you are asking if I know what God's intentions were, the answer is no I do not. Otherwise, the answer is in the way that I've already described, a way similar to the way that you or I might decide in taking action, we are free to choose according to intention.

A reasonable person could go to a transcript of his speech, pick out one of the twenty-odd times he uses the word “fight”, and show how he is being literal, that he’s talking about actually fighting, like everyone who quotes “fight like hell” wants you to believe. — NOS4A2

Twenty-odd times? Wow. It seems the mentioned time, "fight like hell", suffices for what you ask. Why not accept it?

The “fight like hell” canard is stupid because each time he uses the word in that speech he does so metaphorically. For some reason they take this one, and only this one, as literal. — NOS4A2

So this is your mode of interpretation? Every time the word "fight" is used it is metaphorical, and not meant to conjure up any notions of physical aggression. And if the word "peacefully" happened to be uttered this was meant to quell any such mistaken notions of physical aggression aroused by repeated use of the "fight" word.

OK, I see very clearly why Trump followers like yourself, are so gullible. You have no capacity to see the true intentions behind deceptive speech.

If the universe is actually eternal, that solves the problem. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Determining that something is infinite (such as eternal time) solves no problem. It just means that the theory being applied toward understanding the thing is inadequate for actual understanding. Application of the theory produces the appearance of infinity and the thing cannot be understood with that theory. Thus the thing appears to be infinite, and therefore unintelligible. Explained here in the first cause thread: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/868259
To some, this may appear as a resolution to the problem, because we would just say that the thing which led to the appearance of infinity in our attempts to understand it, is fundamentally unintelligible, therefore we can forget about trying to understand it, and move along. But we know that putting a problem aside because it appears to have no solution, thereby forgetting about it, does not actually solve the problem.

No, that's why I was clear to differentiate between two senses of "necessary". It was necessary in the sense of needed. For example, if I want to walk it is necessary for me to move my legs. But moving my legs is not necessary in the absolute sense of "cannot be otherwise", because I might decide not to walk.

Right, from our perspective it is "necessary" in the sense of 'what we have is what we got, and things are not otherwise'. From God's perspective, prior to creation, it was what is "necessary" in the sense of needed or wanted.

Yes, which is to say that the base and the peak do not occupy the same position in space. The space between them is called distance. — Michael

This is a very misleading statement. To say there is distance between two objects is completely different from saying that there is space between two objects, yet you imply that the two are the same with "the space between them is called distance". What is between two objects, as the medium, could be air, water, or in the case of the example, the mountain; the mountain itself is between the base and the peak. Your use of "space" here is vulgar and improper for a philosophical discussion. Unless one is thinking of two objects separated by void, which is not the case in the mountain example, we would not consider that the distance between two objects consists of space. And what else could you mean with "The space between them is called distance"? Clearly what is between the base and the peak is the mountain itself, and not "space".

That there is distance between the base and the peak is measurement-independent. It's certainly not the case that the base and the peak are touching until we look at the mountain.

That this distance is described as being "8,000m" or as being "26,246.72 feet" is measurement- and language-dependent.

I'm not sure why you felt the need to explain the latter fact. I'm not sure how it's exactly relevant. — Michael

Do you see that "distance" in the first statement has a distinctly different meaning from "distance" in the second statement, so that when you say "this distance" in the second statement, suggesting that it is the same "distance" as the first statement, you equivocate? Of course "distance" must have two distinct meanings because the unmeasured "distance" is measurement-independent yet the measured "distance" is measurement-dependent.

The first use of "distance" is to signify that there is separation, remoteness between the two named things. They are not contiguous. The second use of "distance" indicates the measured length of this separation. Will you agree that "distance" refers to two distinct things, 1) the separation, and 2) the measured length of the separation. You've already stated that one is measurement- independent, and the other is measurement-dependent. So surely you will see that it is impossible that "distance" refers to the same thing in each case. Will you also recognize that if you say that "this distance" has a specific measured value of 8000m, you would equivocate? Therefore when you say "this distance is described as being '8,000m'" you equivocate. It is the measurement-dependent sense of "distance" which is said to be 8,000m, not the measurement-independent sense of "distance" which cannot be described as having a specific value.

"Distance" as a specific measured value (as in "the distance" or "a distance" for example), has not the same meaning as "distance" in the case of a general separation. So when you say "this distance is..." you equivocate because you give a specific measured value to the general use of "there is difference...".

To avoid the equivocation, I suggest we alter the first statement to read "there is a distance between the base and the peak". This would signify a specific measured value. However, we could not say then, that this distance is mind-independent. To refer to what is between the base and the peak we would have to use other terminology.

Did you read the next part of my comment where I said "that the distance of one mountain is given the label '8,849 m' is a consequence of our measurement"? — Michael

Yes I read that, and it is why I accused you of being ambiguous with "distance". In the first sentence you said there is a distance "even if we never measure it". In the following statement you gave the distance a number. The number you designate as the "label" of the "distance", but this is only produced as a consequence of measurement, as you agree. The ambiguity is that in the first sentence "distance" as referring to something which exists independent of measurement, refers to something extremely vague and general. In the second use, the "label" refers to a specific value, which requires measurement. The thing labeled as the "distance" is a specific value, whereas the "distance" in the first instance is a general unspecified separation. This ambiguity invites equivocation, such that one might think that "distance" is used in the same way both times, so that "distance" as the specific value which is dependent on measurement is the same as "distance" in the sense of the vague and general separation between the two things which is supposed to be independent from measurement.

It's certainly not "obvious". Space is often thought of as being mind-independent, notably by scientific realists, and I suspect also most laymen. Idealists, scientific instrumentalists, and Kantians may think differently, but such positions are not self-evident. — Michael

I have to disagree with this. I believe the idea that "space" as independent came about from the union of space and time, in the concept of space-time. So the mind-independent substance believed in by scientific realists is not "space" per se, but "space-time".

This is an important distinction to make, because classically "space" was a static medium designated by the coordinate system employed by geometers. Since it was logically necessarily to think of space as static, to prevent the principles of geometry from changing randomly, it was known by geometers to be separate, distinct from the real world within which things are continually changing. It was an eternal ideal. So it was clear and obvious to the scientifically minded, that space was a mind-dependent ideal.

However, extending way back to ancient times there was significant difficulty in understanding the reality of motion. Ancient Greeks, I believe the atomists, demonstrated logically that unless there was some sort of empty space, "void", motion would be impossible. Every piece of matter would be contiguous with other matter and nothing could move anywhere. This produced the need to assume an independent "space". But since this "space" is independent of the mental constructs which describe the "space" that makes up the volume of an object, describing instead the space between objects, an incompatibility between the two senses of "space" was created. The "space" of an object which accounted for the static unchangingness of the object, and the "space" between an object which accounted for the activities of things.

The conclusion we can draw, is that what is referred to as "space-time", as the supposedly real and independent substance, (the concept which supports the real motion of objects), is fundamentally incompatible with our conceptions of "space", which is an ideal constructed and used in coordinate systems. This is why fundamental axioms of "space", like Euclid's parallel postulate are found to be inconsistent with the concept of "space-time", and those realists you refer to turn to non-Euclidian space. "Space-time" is what is supposed to be real, not "space".

I should note that I use "materialism" and "physicalism" interchangeably, and that physicalism "encompasses matter, but also energy, physical laws, space, time, structure, physical processes, information, state, and forces, among other things." — Michael

Notice, that by including "energy" "time", "physical processes", you are no longer talking about "space". You are talking about "space-time" which is fundamentally different, and as explained above, incompatible with "space". So when you make an argument concerning "space", and you allow that "space" refers to what is known as space-time, you produce significant ambiguity, most likely resulting in an equivocal conclusion.

My question is simply, how can something which is necessary' and simple 'want' different things. — Walter

I don't see any evidence that God wanted anything other than what He created. We are agreeing that it is logically possible that God could have created something other than He did, because He is deemed to have had the capacity to do such, but nothing indicates that He wanted to create something other than He did. And, since God is deemed to have the highest possible degree of intelligence, and also deemed to want only what is good, then I do not see why you would even consider the possibility that God would have wanted something other. Don't you find that to be illogical?

Here is an example which may be analogous. You and I are capable of doing many things, not nearly to the degree of God, but still at any moment each one of us has the capacity for a wide assortment of activities. We have many possibilities in front of us. But this in no way implies that we "want" all those things. In making a decision we would consider different things which we want, and this presents us with a very much narrowed field of possibilities, in comparison with what is actually possible to each one of us. Then, we judge and choose from this field of possibilities which is present to our minds, but is very much narrowed from the overall field of what is possible.

In the case of God, He only wants what is good, the absolute best in fact. This means that God narrowed His own field of possibilities to one thing, the absolute best. The narrowing of possibilities is not due to the non-existence of the infinity of other possibilities, they were all still available to Him. The narrowing was due to Him only wanting one thing, the best thing.

If you want to argue that God actually did not create the absolute best thing, then that's a different argument.

Sorry, but there is no willful misunderstanding. What you said simply makes not sense.

It is "logically necessary" to "begin counting" somewhere...

Thus, beginnings, or "first causes", are demonstrably not "logically necessary".... — 180 Proof

I ask you, how can you demonstrate that beginnings are not logically necessary, when you start from the premise that it is logically necessary to begin counting somewhere? Counting is an activity. If this activity requires a beginning, then by what premise do you conclude that other activities might occur without a beginning?

You have absolutely no logic which supports your stated conclusion ("Thus, beginnings, or "first causes", are demonstrably not "logically necessary" in ontology [topology or cosmology] though, of course, they are possible.). In fact, your premise contradicts your conclusion.

This is very ambiguous.

There is a distance between the base of a mountain and its peak even if we never measure it. — Michael

It is you who is being ambiguous, with your use of "distance". If the word is meant to signify that there is a separation between the base of the mountain and the peak, that is self-evident. But if the word is meant to signify that this separation has a specific value, number of feet, meters, or whatever, without being measured, then this cannot be true. How do you think it is possible that there is a specific value attached to this separation if no one has actually done the work of assigning that value?

Unless you want to argue that space itself is some sort of "mental fabrication"? An idealist might agree with you. A materialist (or dualist) won't. — Michael

Obviously, "space" is a "mental fabrication". What do you think space is, something we can stick a tape measure beside and say how long it is, or that we can weigh and say how heavy it is? I am dualist, and that space is a mental fabrication is indubitable. Also, a materialist would have to say the same, because "space" could not refer to any type of material, and the materialist thinks that any thing which is not imaginary is material. So your statement makes no sense.

It is "logically necessary" to "begin counting" somewhere in a beginning-less sequence just as it is to be standing somewhere on the Earth's surface. Thus, beginnings, or "first causes", are demonstrably not "logically necessary" in ontology (topology or cosmology) though, of course, they are possible. — 180 Proof

How is this not contradictory to your mind? You say first, a beginning is necessary, it is logically necessary to begin somewhere, but then you proceed to say that beginnings are not logically necessary, they are possible. Can you explain to me what you mean, in a way which would make the apparent contradiction between 'it is logically necessary to begin somewhere', and 'beginnings are not logically necessary' disappear?

You'd have to be more specific in your question for me to give a reply, but off the cuff, I'd say that possible world semantics is inappropriate for discussing God as the assumed "necessary Being". Perhaps this is why I am not getting anywhere with Walter. Walter seems to want to apply the terms of possibility to something which is necessary, and that opens a gap of incompatibility. So we just continue to talk past each other.

I think a more appropriate consideration is a first counted number. Counting has to start somewhere, and each second of passed time is a type of counting. — Michael

This is why, in metaphysics, it is important to understand that a thing must have actually been measured in order to have a measurement. As in the examples above, the mountain is commonly assumed to have a "height" prior to being measured, and the jar full of marbles is commonly assumed to have a "quantity" prior to being counted. But both of these, the height and the quantity are actually products of the act of measurement, therefore it is incorrect to assume that they exist prior to being determined by that act which determines them. Common assumptions are produced to facilitate common mundane actions, and are therefore not necessarily consistent with good metaphysics.

The reason why it is important to understand this is that metaphysics is logically prior to epistemology, meaning that principles of epistemology are supported by principles of metaphysics. And if we do not properly account for the fact that the quantitative value assigned to the physical world is a product of the act of measurement rather than something which inheres within an independent physical reality, we lose the required principles for understanding the true nature of mistake.

It appears like we, as human beings have become so confident in our techniques of measurement, that when we correctly determine the measured value, we believe that we are correct in the sense of having determined something which inheres within the thing itself, and therefore a correct judgement could not possibly be other than the value determined. But this attitude toward the measurement practice conceals the fact that the technique which produces the correct answer, according to the rules of the system applied, may not be the best possible technique. "Correctness" is determined by properly applying the rules of the measurement system to the thing being measured. However, if the measurement system is in some way inadequate for measurement of the thing it is being applied to, the correct measurement would still be in that way, a mistaken measurement.

If we turn to the classical distinction between theory and practise, this is the difference between mistakes in practise, and mistakes in theory. Mistaken practise is relatively easy to determine, being a matter of following rules. Mistaken theory is much more difficult to determine because we must allow our minds to go beyond the rules of correctness, and find further principles to support our judgements. That's why the scientific method was developed, as a sort of direction for testing theory.

In relation to the op, the type of theory which produces an infinite regress, infinity in the act of measurement, has been demonstrated to be a defective type of theory. It is defective because it designates the independent thing which we are trying to measure as unmeasurable (the thing we are trying to count is designated as uncountable). Any theory of measurement which designates the thing which it is trying to measure as unmeasurable is a self-defeating theory, and by that principle it is a defective theory. In other words, the measurement system which produces an infinite regress in its application, is inadequate for measuring the thing which it is being applied to.

So this already created world is B. How is it that the following is not saying that God creating a different world is not even possible? — wonderer1

It's not possible that God created a different world, because the world that we have is the world that God created. However, at the time when God was about to create, it was possible for him to create whichever world he wanted.

I don't see why that is hard to understand.

No. How would you draw that conclusion?

Would you agree that there is no possible world in which God creates B and therefore it was necessary that God create A? — wonderer1

By what Walter stipulated, A and B are incompatible, so not only is it impossible that such is necessary, I would say that it is not even possible that God create A, if God has already created B.

How would you know if 101 was actually spelled backward or not? How would we know if all those people like Banno who appear to be looking backward aren't really looking forward?

So. the Will of God is a property of God and this Will of God is the same, whether A of B is created?
And God's action to create A is the very same as God's action to create B? — Walter

I think we're back to the beginning, and you are just going around in a circle. God only makes one of the two choices, A or B. The choice was A. So we have "God's action to create A". There is no "God's action to create B" because God did not make that choice. That is a false premise. So your conclusion "God's action to create A is the very same as God's action to create B" is an unsound conclusion because it requires the false premise that God created bot A and B.

Maybe you ought to consider it in terms of a counterfactual. Take your own will for example. Suppose you could have gone to work this morning, but you stayed home instead. Therefore "went to work this morning" is a counterfactual, it is not what you really did. And if I say "you went to work this morning" when you did not, that is a false premise. It is not a true description of you. Likewise, if God chose to create A, then "God's action to create B" is a false description of God, in the very same way. Therefore to say "God's action to create A is the very same as God's action to create B" is false in the same way that "your action to go to work is the very same as your action to stay home" is false.

What I would like to ask you now, is are you really having so much trouble understanding this? Or, are you just refusing to understand, denying, for the sake of supporting an obviously ridiculous argument?

Does an inch exist on a ruler without someone looking at it? — jgill

A ruler has markings, it might say "inch", or it may not. I don't see the relevance, an act of measurement was required to produce that marking.

Long ago, one of the regulars here insisted that Mount Everest did not have a height until it was measured. The prognosis was advanced pragmatism, unfortunately incurable. — Banno

Reminds me of the time when I argued that a jar full of marbles does not have a number until counted.
But I'm in no way a pragmatist. This was in a thread about quantum mechanics, and it was an example of the point which a physicist (I believe it was Bell) had made about quantum measurement. Measurement, he explained, whether quantum, or any type of measurement, is fundamentally not what the average person thinks it is. The value which we assign is not there until it is assigned.

Edit: The last sentence ought to be revised, the value is never actually there in the thing, it's simply what we say about it.

Very good logic. We are all right therefore we all agree.

I have been talking about God's Will to create A and God's Will to create B.
Are they different or is God's Will to create A the same as God's Will to create B? — Walter

I think you are misunderstanding what is meant by "God's Will". The will is the source of action, as the cause. So there is only a will to create A (cause of A) if A is created, and a will to create B (cause of B) if B is created. If A and B are conflicting there cannot be the will to create both.

If they are different, then they are contingent properties. — Walter

They are not properties of God at all. As I said earlier, "God's Will" refers to the property, the Will of God is a property of God. "A", or "B", is what we use to describe what has been created by that will. Our description of what God has Willed is not a description of God's Will.

The measures simply are. — jgill

That's a mistaken idea. Measurements need to be made, and measurement is an act which requires time. The simple fact that any measurement requires time is a fundamental premise of Einstein's special relativity, which produces the concept of the relativity of simultaneity.

Yes, you can remove the temporality from measurement, and work with measurements which "simply are", but that is to assume a static world which you are working with. This is adequate for many applications, things in the same frame of reference, static relative to each other. Even the locations which are used to produce the "rest frame" are taken to be static locations which "simply are", as indicated by "rest frame". The assumed "rest" provides the premise required to remove temporality.

But as an ontological principle, the "static world" assumption, the assumed "rest" which is required to remove the temporal aspect as you describe, is a false premise, therefore producing unsound logic for any ontological purpose.

This is a very good demonstration of why Banno has much difficulty understanding metaphysics. Banno seems to think that axioms of mathematics which have been proven very useful in a wide range of physical applications can automatically be given an even wider range of application, a metaphysical application, without first undergoing the critical analysis of a metaphysician. Not recognizing that metaphysics is a broader field than physics, and that some axioms which are very useful to physics will turn out to be inapplicable in the wider field of metaphysics, and therefore very misleading if applied by a pseudo-metaphysician, is a fundamental misunderstanding of the field of metaphysics. That is a failure to recognize the difference between a trained metaphysician and a pseudo-metaphysician.

Oh, I was thinking of the height, say above sea level, decreasing as one moves away from the peak - not the apparent height of the hill. Interesting take. — Banno

This is very clear evidence that your claim is simply unintelligible. No one can even figure out what the hell you are saying, and to make yourself understood you need to add the temporal aspect ("decreasing as one moves away from the peak"), which you are insisting can be removed. That's hypocrisy plain and simple, and hypocrisy demonstrates with actions the exact opposite of what one is arguing in words.

The example I gave was the height of a hill with regard to distance from the peak. The height changes over distance, not over time. — Banno

The distance from the peak does not change without a change in location, and this requires time. What you can say, that the distance to the peak (height) differs according to location is a simple statement of difference, not change. You seem to be confusing difference with change.

As javra indicates "The height changes over distance, not over time" is not even intelligible.

And of course, there's the hypocritical anti-philosophy types who don't wish to be doing philosophy, and even claim not to be doing philosophy, while not having the will power to prevent themselves from doing philosophy... and so they go, into the production of depraved philosophy.

So the mother both of and prior to all human mothers is not human, or not material? — tim wood

I just cannot see how you could possibly come to this conclusion from what i said.

Um, science has determined that there is not an infinite regress of material things? — tim wood

There is a first material thing, it's called "the universe", and it came into being at the Big Bang. Therefore no infinite regress of material things. What was prior to the Big Bang cannot be said to be material, because matter is dependent on the spatial temporal conditions of our universe.

I'll take your insistence that change requires time as axiomatic, then. — Banno

Ahh, now you're catching on, but not quite right. If it was mathematical, we might call it axiomatic. But this is philosophy so we call it "self-evident". There is a difference between the two, the former being mere stipulation, and the latter being supported by empirical evidence.

God is simple and immutable, but He can be red of blue?
The redness or blueness of God is a contingent property. But if God is necessary and simple He is identical to all His properties. But how can a necessary being be identical to a contingent property? — Walter

You have not been saying that God is red or blue, you have been saying that God can choose to create A or B. The property we are talking about is a property of God, and this is God's will. We are not talking about a property of the thing which God creates, such as if the thing created is red or blue. So the example is not analogous.

It appears like you do not respect a separation between God and the thing which God creates, so that if God creates a thing describable as A, you want to say that A is a property of God. That would be a pantheist way of understanding God, and this is not Thomistic.

I had a brief look, but came up empty apart from anti-left, anti covid, anti philosophy; I don't feel like it is a great loss to the forum, but someone could show me some gems if I have missed them. — unenlightened

Anti-philosophy! That sounds like very good reason for banning from an explicitly philosophy forum, to me.

. Consider it proved that either there is an infinite supply of mothers, or there must be a first motherless mother. The matter settled; we just don't know which. — tim wood

The type of mother in question here is explicitly the mother of a human being. So the infinite supply you suggest as a possibility, would imply that human beings have always existed. Science has determined otherwise, so we really do know which.

The conclusion I stated remains sound, there is a mother which is prior to all human mothers. Likewise, science has determined that there is not an infinite regress of material things, so the conclusion that there is an immaterial cause which is prior to all material existence, remains sound as well.

Which reminds me of Russell's joke that while every individual human being has a mother, it is a fallacy to supose that therefore the human species has a mother...

The mother of the race is a limit, not an item in the sequence...

But Mitochondrial Eve ruined the joke. — Banno

The limit to a type is completely different from the cause of an individual. So what Russell shows is that switching from individuals to types is nothing but a category mistake. To avoid the category mistake we must remain with individuals, and not switch to "the race" as you do.

Taking the stated analogy, the point which the cosmological argument makes, is that if every individual human being has a mother, then there is necessarily a mother which is prior to every human being, and therefore not a human being.

So, in the terms of the cosmological argument, if every material thing has a cause, then there is a cause which is prior to every material thing, therefore not material, i.e. immaterial.

To redefine "cause" with the intent to remove temporal priority is simply avoidance, just like redefining "change" to remove temporality is avoidance. Finding clever ways to avoid the truth of what an argument demonstrates is not philosophy it's denial.

That means there are two Gods — Walter

As you said, God does not will both A and B, God wills one or the other. Therefore we cannot conclude that there is two Gods.

Various quantum effects, for a start. — Banno

That the cause is unknown to us does not imply that there is no cause.

In general, this is the problem with free will, and intention, as "cause", we do not properly know this type of causation, but this does not imply that we can exclude intention as a cause

The bowling ball causes the depression in the cushion. — Banno

The bowling ball example is a misrepresentation. Since there is not an action described, only a static object, "the bowling ball", there is not the premise required to say that the ball causes anything. It is always an activity of an object which is causal. We do however assign causal capacity to objects in the case of intentional acts, final cause, when "the object" is an intentional being. In this case we say that the act which is causal, comes from within the intentional being itself.

Cause is not always prior to effect. Indeed sometimes it is impossible to decide which event is the cause and which the result. — Banno

This makes no sense. Whenever it is impossible to determine which is prior, we can conclude that it is impossible to determine which is the cause and which is the effect. There is no premise to allow us to conclude that in cases where we cannot determine which event is prior, and which is posterior, we can conclude that the cause is posterior to the effect.

The question is: was it possible for God to create B instead of A? The Thomist's answer is yes. — Walter

So, how do you perceive this to be a problem? If God had created B instead of A, then there would be B instead of A. How is that a problem for divine simplicity? The fact is that God created the one, and not the other, and if He had created the other, He would have created that one instead. It is never implied that God could actualize (or will) both.

Well, we are not talking about God creating A at t1 and B at t2, we are talking about God creating B instead of A, which, according to most Thomists, is prefectly possible. — Walter

How is that a problem? God created (or actualized) B, and God did not create (or actualize A). Where's the problem?

Well, I am not saying that God can will conficting things. But God's will to create A cannot be identical to God's will to create B, unless God is not simple or has no control over what He creates.
A Will, no matter what it exactly is, is intrinsic to a person. — Walter

I don't understand your point. Let's say that at t1 God wills to create A, and at t2 God wills to create B. We could say that A and B are each a part of God's bigger plan, but I don't think that expressing these as distinct parts denies God's simplicity. It's just a feature of how we describe the situation, as A being something distinct from B, when the truer description would show the whole. Then A being distinct from B is just an artificial separation created by human analysis.

Possible worlds are simply a way of saying if God what could be/have been the case.
According to most Christians, including Thomists, it could have been that God created a completely different world or even no world at all.
My question is if God's essence is his existence , how can He end up xiiling to create different things? — Walter

This does not produce the problem you mentioned. If God's intention is to create A, then A is created, and if God's intention is to create B, then B is created. If there was confliction between A and B then God would know this, and not will both. Nowhere is it implied that God would will conflicting things.

But that's the problem. God's intention to actualize A does conflict with God's intention to actualize B.
So, ther can be no intention to actualiz A or B in God's mind. How can God have control over whther A occurs in that case? If God's will is is unified and consistent, then it cannot lead to A in one possible world and B in another, at least not if God is supposed to be in control. — Walter

I don't see how you can introduce possible worlds to the scenario. What God wills is necessary by His act of willing it, therefore it is actual. You cannot say that God wills A in one possible world and B in another possible world, because that would contradict the nature of God as 'His essence is His existence'. Therefore God is necessarily actual, and this excludes Him from "possible worlds" which is a tool of the human intellect. Attributing possible worlds to God is to attribute matter to God, but God is immaterial.

Sure, the speed of light is constant, but as is the case with all motion, the speed is always relative to a frame of reference. That's why your statement ("The result comes out of consideration of speed 'relative to our position.' It is not an actual speed") is nonsense. All speed is relative, and to distinguish "actual speed" is nonsense.
I suppose you are going to argue that the speed of light is relative to nothing, and this makes it an actual speed rather than a relative speed?

Points and continuums, space and time . . . . . remain beyond complete understanding, although we manipulate them confidently. When I asked an old friend, an analytic number theorist, what he thinks of real analysis, he says, "It's very, very complicated and it starts with a metaphysical notion, points." — jgill

The issue I see with the "expansion of space", is that in order to conceive of numerous distinct locations from which everything is receding, it is necessary to assume that these locations are "points" in space which have real substantial existence. These points are not particles of mass or any form of elementary substance, but points of space itself. So this requires a type of understanding of space which allows for real points (as opposed to arbitrarily assigned points of location), and a determination of the characteristics of these points which would allow them to be identified.