Yeah, I'm aware of Einstein's Nobel Prize-winning work, but that doesn't begin to explain why you think that quanta signify any sort of "natural points" in time, or why time might possibly be naturally divisible into quanta. — Luke

Well, it's intuition, with many complicated factors involved. But I am not arguing that, am I? I am arguing continuity. So despite the fact that there are many reasons to make me intuitively believe that there are natural points in time, this is not consistent with our experience of time as continuous, and that is what I am arguing, the experience of time as continuous.

Briefly though, there is an issue with what could be called "point zero". Whenever an object at rest, or one in regular motion as per Newton's first law, begins a new motion from being acted upon by a force, there must be a point in time, or "moment" when the motion begins. In human experience, this would be self-movement. If I'm sitting on the couch, and decide to stand up, and actually move in that way, there must be a point in time when this motion begins.

Classical physics represents an object being acted on by a force, with the concept of acceleration. But there is a problem with this representation because there must be a point in time, the zero point, when the object goes from not having, to having, the new motion. At this time, the rate of acceleration must be infinite because the value goes from zero to some quantity. Conventional mathematics handles this with calculus, which treats the zero point as a limit rather than a point in time which is actually traversed. In short, the concept of acceleration cannot account for the zero point, because of the need for infinity, and a different form of this same problem manifests in quantum mechanics as the uncertainty principle.

What is intuitive though, is that there must be a real point in time, when a new motion of an object begins. This is assuming that objects have real distinct existence. If objects are not distinct, then a change in motion is just a continuation of the whole (universe) through cause and effect, and there is no need for a real point of beginning. It is intuitive because objects appear to have real distinct existence, independent from each other, and can be moved freely.

For example, is a coconut an object or a part? How about a hydrogen atom? — Luke

Your examples are concepts, "a coconut", "a hydrogen atom", universals. You are not pointing to particular aspects of the world here, so I cannot address the examples directly. Each of these named types could have particulars which exist as a separate object, or as a part of a larger object. As I said, we need to refer to empirical evidence, and this would give us the context of existence of each particular occurrence.

Naming the type usually doesn't provide for us the context of existence. However, whether the thing is a part or a whole is essential to some universals. This depends on how the named things exists within its environment. So the hydrogen atom for example cannot exist naturally as an object, it must be a part. Human beings can in some sense separate hydrogen atoms, and present it as an object. But in reality, it is not an independent object even after this separation, because the device which separates it is required for its purported separation, therefore this device is necessary to its environment, so it really just becomes a part of that device. This is why I referred to "natural" divisibility. Artificial divisibility is very deceptive, creating divisions where divisions are not naturally possible, such that the separation of the supposedly separated part is dependent on the coexistence of some device, and this renders the objective existence (existence as an object) of the part as not properly independent according to empirical evidence. Empirical evidence indicates that such a part has just changed from being a part of a natural object to being a part of an artificial object, the device which separates it from its natural place.

So, unlike a continuum, only a finite set of (positive?) integers has natural points of division. Is that right? Does the set need to contain an even number of integers? — Luke

No, numbers are conceptual, therefore divisions are fundamentally arbitrary. When I spoke of natural divisibility I was referring to material things, the empirical world which we sense. That's why theories of real divisibility are based on empirical information.

Since numbers may be divided in any way we can manipulate the divisibility of them to match the natural divisibility of the world, through the use of axioms. This in part, is what makes numbers useful. Pure mathematicians may create whatever axioms they desire, at will, but the way that the axioms conform to the empirical world is what determines how useful they are.

The problem with "the continuum" is that this is itself a stipulation, or proposition concerning the empirical world, 'space and time form a continuum'. It is very useful because it conforms to the empirical reality to a large degree. However, since we observe that natural divisibility within the empirical world is restricted, according to the spatial existence of independent objects, "continuum" is not completely appropriate. So the problems begin.

The concept of "continuum" allows for divisibility in any way, but this is not truly consistent with the empirical reality of spatial-temporal existence. However, it is consistent with a large percentage of practical applications, and it has proven itself to be extremely useful in facilitating all sorts of measurements. Because it is so extremely useful, it is the accepted convention, so it gets used even where it is not adequately suited. In these instances, we impose the principles of continuity onto aspects of the empirical world which do not properly correspond. This misleads us, leading to misunderstanding and misconception.

Take the hydrogen atom example. The assumption of continuity leads us to believe that the empirical world can be divided in any way that we want. So, the hydrogen atom must be separable from its natural environment. We produce a device to separate it, and we conclude that we have created an independent hydrogen atom. This in turn, is supposed to support, as empirical evidence that reality is continuous, and can be divided anywhere. However, the truth of the situation is that the hydrogen atom has not really been given independent existence as an object on its own, its supposed independent existence relies on the device which removed it from its natural environment, so it is now just a part of that device. Therefore the appropriate interpretation of the empirical evidence ought to be that the empirical reality is not continuous, and cannot be divided anywhere we want. This issue becomes extremely evident when the existence of massive fundamental particles like hadrons and quarks which are associated with the strong force, are considered. It becomes very clear, that the assumption of continuity, the spatial-temporal "continuum" is completely inappropriate here.

You're saying that, unless time has natural points of division, then everything we count in reality is arbitrary and not real? — Luke

I said "the entirety of reality", not strictly "time". When the entirety of reality is considered, we do find natural points of division, distinct spatial objects, as explained above. These divisions are what allow one object to move in one direction, and another in another direction. This is what allows you to take one individual away from a group, and activities like that. These natural points of division are what make a count more than arbitrary. The count is based on real, natural divisibility, as substantiated by empirical evidence.

In the case of time alone, we have identified no such natural points of divisibility. So counts of time are dependent on the repetitive motions of distinct, naturally divided objects. However, since measurement requires comparison, and with time we are comparing motions, the problem of the relativity of simultaneity arises.

We have a continuous succession of experiences from birth to death; we do not experience everything in our lives "all at once". — Luke

This is a misrepresentation. We have continuous experience, not a "succession of experiences". Any division of that continuous experience into separate experiences is arbitrary. Even during sleep we are experiencing, in dreaming etc., it's just a change in type of experience. This misrepresentation is fundamental to your insistence that "duration" must be "a duration" with beginning and end. There really is not any such natural points of divisibility in human experience which would substantiate this representation of a "succession of experiences". Therefore, "the present moment" as a point along that succession of experiences is not substantiated either.

This question also applies to you. If you reject the present as a short period, or moment, of time, then it must be "an infinitely long duration of time" that "continues on and on indefinitely" (since they are the only two options you have given). What, then, of the past and future? When is something past and when is it future? That is, what are the past and future relative to? — Luke

There is no problem here. As time continues onward, the future is always becoming the past. That's what happens at the present, as the present continues, next minute becomes last minute, next hour becomes last hour, etc.. "Future" refers to time which has not yet passed the present and past refers to time which has past the present, such that if there was a fixed amount of future at the beginning of time, the future is always getting smaller while the past is getting bigger. This is a continuous process which we experience as the continuity of the present.

I don't deny this, except it's not only for the sake of measurement, because it is also relative to when one is experiencing, doing or being, and specifically, indexical to when one is speaking. I have never claimed that "the present" is something we find in nature (just as I wouldn't say that "here" is something we find in nature), but I would say that the passage of time is something we find in nature, because things age. Looking for some natural source of "the present" or for natural divisions in time is not my concern. — Luke

OK. let's say that this type of point in time, this moment, is like the "point zero" I described above. The point in time when you are saying "now", or the point in time when you start to do X, etc.. Notice that it is better not to refer to this type of point as "the present", because it is just a designation of the relation between one physical action in the world, to another, or others. We might assign the point zero a date and a time, which relates it to the position of the earth and sun, etc.. If it's a real event, with real occurrence, then that point is in the past. If it's a designated possible future event, the point is in the future. But there is no reason to think that such a point would be exclusive to the present, so it should in no way be a defining feature of the present.

But what would it be like to conceive of such a point at the present? Suppose we can talk about a zero point in the past, and a zero point in the future. And also suppose that the present is when future points are becoming past points. Since this is a process, "the present", the process whereby future points become past points, and processes are events which take time to occur, then we must conclude that it takes time for a future point to become a past point, even while it is at the present. In this time, we might say that the point is neither past nor future, but that seems to imply that this point, when it's at the present, is right outside of time. But it's already been determined that there is time at the present because it is a process. So the point itself doesn't really go anywhere outside of time when it's said to be at the present. Therefore I think it would be better to say that the point is both future and past in this transition which is the present, rather than neither. And as I explained earlier there is no reason to think that this implies contradiction.

Aren't you claiming that my "perception of it now" is also a memory? — Luke

Right, that's why I mentioned the concept of "sensory memory". If I understand correctly, the information from the senses is put into a type of extremely short term, subconscious memory, and this memory is what the conscious mind interprets as the sense experience, and then allocates the memories to other types of memory, which the conscious mind has influence over.

How does quanta possibly indicate that there are "points in time"? I'm guessing that you consider these "points" to be natural divisions in time. I don't see what difference they would make over and above the quanta. Couldn't we have quanta without any natural divisions in time (like we already do)? What do these "natural divisions" add? — Luke

That's a complex issue beyond the scope of this thread, which would only serve as a distraction, but the photoelectric effect indicates that energy is transmitted as discrete units rather than as a continuous wave.

How do you plan to take a "precise measurement of time" without any sort of clock, or without making a comparison to any physical, cyclical event? — Luke

As I said, this would require determining natural points in time. Then the points can be counted as real objects, units of time.

How can you tell if something is a "true and real" object or only part of a "true and real" object? Presuming it's via "natural divisibility", how does that work? — Luke

As I explained, empirical evidence.

Explain to me again why a continuum does not have natural points of division? — Luke

There's nothing to explain. A continuum is assumed to be infinitely divisible. It can be divided in any way, and no particular way is more suited to the matter itself being divided than any other way, because there are no natural points of divisibility, proper to it. If you do not understand this, then you do not understand what "continuum" means.

Okay, but the measurement is made in numbers and what is measured is something that isn't numbers, but is objects/events. I don't see how the numbers (or the set or the continuum) has any effect on which objects/events are real or not. I can count objects using either a finite or an infinite set of numbers. — Luke

The point is not the effect of the numbers on the real, but the effect of the real on the numbers. If the entirety of reality is indivisible, then there is nothing real to count. Any count is arbitrary. If the entirety of reality is continuous, yet infinitely divisible in anyway possible way, then division is arbitrary and the count is arbitrary. Each of these produces an unmeasurable reality. But if reality has natural divisibility, then we can distinguish real objects to count and measure according to those divisions. Such a reality is measurable.

It's funny how you say that "the present" is not a moment, yet you consider "the moment" to be one of the "two important features" of "the present". — Luke

Laugh all you want. I use the quotes to signify the concept of "the present". So what was meant is that the concept of "the present" has two important features. And as I've been explaining, I believe the "present moment" is a misconception. Nevertheless, regardless of its truth or falsity, it maintains status as a very significant feature of the concept "the present".

The feature that you say I "point to" also continues on and on continuously. There's not much that I disagree with here, except that the present is not a "conjunction" between past and future because past and future are not concurrent with the present. — Luke

Explain to me how you conceive of this "present moment", that infinitesimal period of time, or shortest duration of conscious awareness, as something which continues on and on indefinitely.

You did say that you could exchange "present moment" for "present" didn't you? Now you are saying that the present continues on and on indefinitely. How do you formulate consistency between the present being an extremely short duration, yet also something which continues on and on indefinitely?

That's right, the present continues on and on just like your experiencing. And it's not a coincidence, because whenever you are experiencing is when the present is for you. In relation to this, those things that you've already experienced are in your past, and those things you will experience but are yet to experience are in your future. It's simple really. — Luke

If this is what you believe, then do you see that it is incoherent to speak about a "present moment" as if the present is a very short period of time, or a point in time? How could it be that the present continues on and on indefinitely, as if it is an infinitely long duration of time, yet it is also an infinitesimally short period of time, as "the moment". One of these must be dismissed as the cause of contradiction, and the latter, "the moment", is inconsistent with empirical evidence. That is why I say "the present moment" is incoherent to me. .

Yes, except we don't speak of the present as a continuous, long duration, but as a moment or point along that duration which is present for us at that moment. — Luke

Now, look closely at this statement. Do you see that "at that moment" has no real meaning, no real referent. It refers to nothing real. It's a convention which human beings concocted for pragmatic reasons, for the sake of measuring. "Start the clock now, at this moment". "Motion is transferred from one object to another at the moment of collision". Etc.. "At the moment" is a convenient fiction.

So, remove "at that moment" from the proposition above, as an untruthful part of the proposition. Now we have "the present as a continuous, long duration", exactly as we experience it, and all this speaking about a moment, or point along this duration, is nothing but bs.

I think there is a distinct difference between having or undergoing an experience and remembering it later. Think back to any memorable event in your life. That is just a memory compared to the actual event that you lived through and experienced. I understand your reluctance to acknowledge this obvious distinction, however, given that it is simply too detrimental to your argument (that every experience is a memory). — Luke

The problem is that all experience is completely wrapped up in memory, whether you like to admit it or not. Consider looking at an object in front of you, a chair or something. What you see is not a hundredth of a second of chair, or a half a second of chair. You are seeing the chair over a continuous duration. But the chair of two seconds ago must be only in your memory. However, that chair of two seconds ago is an integral part of your perception of it now,. That's how you know whether it's moving or not.

So, it's easy for you to take an event years ago, and say that's in the past, its only memory, and you can surely tell the difference between that memory and what's happening now. But when we are talking about the perception of events happening right now ("right now" being incoherent) then we are faced with having to separate what we anticipate from what we remember, as having influence over the perception. And this is much more difficult because we cannot fall back on the false premise of the "present moment". We cannot assert that our sense perceptions are at the present moment, because "the present moment" is incoherent. It's a convenient fiction created for pragmatic purposes, not consistent with reality. Look into the concept of "sensory memory" for example, it's very important to the way that we hear music.

It's a shame his work is not more approachable, because I think his central thesis - that Platonism basically articulates the central concerns of philosophy proper, and that it can't be reconciled with today's naturalism - is both important and neglected. — Wayfarer

I believe that understanding the various forms of post-Platonism (rather than Neo-Platonism) is very significant to any study of metaphysics. Plato exposed many ontological and metaphysical problems inherent within the conventions of his day. He pointed in numerous different directions as to possible resolutions. The different ways that various philosophers have taken up his challenges is very indicative of the problems which philosophy encounters in addressing the nature of reality.

But I'm of the view that it was the decline of scholastic realism and the ascendancy of nominalism which were key factors in the rise of philosophical and scientific materialism and the much-touted 'decline of the West'. — Wayfarer

The decline was predicted by Plato, in "Republic", Bk. 8, 546. There is a number which relates the circumference of circles to the fertility of living creatures. That number is also related to the powers of 3,4, and 5 (Pythagorean theorem?) in some obscure way. Knowledge of the "perfect number" is required for divine birth. And the rulers of the state, lacking this knowledge will inevitably provide for the births of human beings who are not good natured and fortunate. Because of this, even the best state, as proposed, will decay and face dissolution.

Unless you are able to present some evidence, that animal learning does not supervene on cellular learning it's a bit ludicrous to call it very deceptive use of equivocation. — wonderer1

More evidence of your indoctrination. The onus is on the researcher, to show the evidence, that's how science works. By giving the process the same name, "learning", the authors of this article are hinting that a direct and necessary relation has already been established. That's how the psychology of this type of deception works. Use the same word and a psychological association is made, which "implies" that a relationship has been established.

Suppose instead, we rename this process which they have named "cellular learning", calling it "laboratory manipulation of cells". Then the deception might be much more evident to you. You'd be more inclined to ask, how is this laboratory manipulation related to the actual learning process of an animal, instead of taking for granted that there is a direct and necessary relation, because of the use of the same word, "learning".

Then you might notice a few weaknesses in your assumption of a direct and necessary relation. Consider the following passage:

"Surprisingly, however, the biphasic changes occurred over a time scale five-fold longer than that anticipated from typical STDP studies in vitro (Markram et al., 2012). Using a computer model, Pawlak and co-workers showed that this temporal rescaling could result from noise in the spike timing of inputs. Such noise is to be expected in the intact brain, where there is always ongoing activity, but not in dissected brain tissue, which is relatively inactive.

It appears like the cellular responses (so-called learning) took five times longer to occur in living tissue than it took in prior studies inanimate mass, "in vitro". That is very clear evidence that the relationship between stimulus and effect, is not direct. The cause of this five-fold delay (clear evidence that there is not a direct cause/effect relation) is simply dismissed as "noise" in the living brain.

Furthermore, it is noted that the the subjects upon which the manipulation is carried out are unconscious, and so it is implied that "attention" could add so much extra "noise" that the entire process modeled by the laboratory manipulation might be completely irrelevant to actual learning carried out by an attentive, conscious subject. Read the following:

"It is important to note that these findings were obtained in anaesthetized animals, and remain to be confirmed in the awake state. Indeed, factors such as attention are likely to influence cellular learning processes (Markram et al., 2012).

Now, take note of the concluding sentence of the article:

"Despite these limitations, the elegant work of Pawlak, Kerr and colleagues provides some of the strongest evidence to date that STDP may underlie cellular learning in the intact brain."

Sure, STDP may underlie this process which they have called "cellular learning", but it's very clear that they have established no relationship between this process (more appropriately called "laboratory manipulation of cells") to actual animal learning. In fact, the exposed problem with "noise" indicates that the idea of such a relationship is rather far-fetched.

It looks to me like you simply have a bias against science. — wonderer1

It looks to me, like you are easily swayed by pseudo-science.

The article is evidence of your indoctrination. There is clearly equivocation. The opening paragraph starts talking about "cellular learning", then claims a relation with how the "animal learns". And then it makes a conclusion about "learning" in general, as if these two senses of "learn" are the same. That's very deceptive use of equivocation.

I think you equivocate. Neural networks of AI are said to be "trained". But we weren't talking AI, we were talking about biological neurons, involved in a person reading.

To me it sounds like you are saying something like, "It is inappropriate to talk about riding in a car, because riding is something which is done on a horse, or in a carriage drawn by a horse. — wonderer1

Yes, similar to that, but not quite the same. An individual is trained, a person or some other being. We do not train a part of a person. I find that to be an absurd usage of the term to say that a person trains a part of one's body, like saying that a man trains his penis when to have an erection and when not to.

Anyway, it's off topic and I see that discussion with you on this subject would probably be pointless, as you seem to be indoctrinated.

The possibility of Trump winning the election in 2024 and making all of his legal troubles go away as if by waving a magic wand is absurd. — GRWelsh

Many of us thought that the idea of Trump getting elected in the first place was absurd. There must be magic wand out there somewhere.

Plato's Ideas are both sensible and intellectual, yet they do not exhibit necessity and strict universality and, thus, are not transcendental conditions for the possibility of the entirety of human experience.

They necessarily apply to only some, but not to all the objects of human experience. For example, the Idea Elm Tree applies necessarily to only some trees, but not to all trees.

In fact, most of Plato's Ideas exhibit only a limited necessity and a restricted universality. — charles ferraro

I don't see your point. We always apply such restrictions in the case of any universals. "Elm" has its restrictions, "tree" has its restrictions, "plant" has its restrictions, "living" has its restrictions, "being" has its restrictions, etc.. If there was a universal which did not have any restrictions it couldn't have any real meaning, because the lack of restrictions would allow it to have any meaning whatsoever, therefore no specific meaning and incomprehensible.

So even when we apprehend "space" and "time" as universals, and propose these as the names of categories, they still have restrictions, as is the case with categories. These restrictions which characterize the category may be provided by definitions. Therefore the presence or non-presence of "restrictions" is not the distinguishing factor here as any such named categories must have restrictions.

I believe that the difference you are alluding to is to be found in the nature of the restrictions. Some definitions (restrictions) are produced from (empirical) descriptions, while others are produced from stipulations (like the axioms of pure mathematics). The former obviously cannot be "transcendental conditions for the possibility of the entirety of human experience". And the latter, since they are stipulated by human beings which are already engaged in experiencing, surely cannot be the transcendental conditions for human experience either.

Therefore, I think it is misdirected to try and categorize the "transcendental conditions for the possibility of the entirety of human experience" as some sort of universal idea. The transcendental conditions are not categories, conceptions, or universals. There doesn't seem to be any evidence for the existence of that sort of "idea", so we should not think of these conditions as ideas. Therefore, if "space" and "time" are proposed by Kant as "transcendental conditions for the possibility of the entirety of human experience", we need to understand these terms as referring to something other than universals, ideas, or conceptions. I think Kant calls them "intuitions".

Trained neural nets can have a lot of 'fault tolerance', which is easy to say, but not so easy to explain. — wonderer1

It's not appropriate to say that a neural net is "trained". Nor is it appropriate to say that a neural net performs word recognition. So I'll just say that your post is an attempt to simplify something very complex and the result is a gross misrepresentation, and leave it at that.

Yes, I read it and found the additional text samples interesting as well. Regardless of the hoax, it is still interesting to consider what text samples like that can reveal to us about our thinking. — wonderer1

I think that what it reveals is that the process is noy like we think it is. And I guess that's why we have different opinions about it, no one really knows how they read.

More work is required on what? Is it possible, in principle, that we are able to experience "such points"? — Luke

More work is required on understanding what we call the passage of time, in order to establish more accurate measurement. I think that the work done in quantum mechanics indicates that it is highly likely that there actually is points in time, that's why events occur as quanta rather than continuous. If this is the case, then we probably do experience such points in time, in some way, but we do not recognize them, just like we experience molecules, atoms and electrons, but we do not recognize them as such, through sensation.

I might see that they are two different (types of) objects. I don't know what "natural divisibility" is supposed to mean. — Luke

Let me try again then. When you see two different chairs in a room, do you not see them as two distinct objects? The natural, spatial separation between them, which we apprehend through the sense of sight, represents a natural divisibility in spatial existence. We see distinct objects, and this apprehension of distinct objects is a division performed by the perceptual process, which is carried out according to a natural spatial divisibility which we perceive in our environment. It is the way that we perceive our environment, as consisting of a natural divisibility, which the perceptual process takes advantage of, to produce distinct objects of perception. This is the foundation for the concept of quantity. We need principles to distinguish one thing from another, in order that we can evaluate a multitude of distinct things, count, quantify or measure them. If there was no natural divisibility in our environment any division into discrete objects would be completely arbitrary, therefore any measurement of quantity would also be completely arbitrary.

In the case of time, we assume a continuum, therefore no natural divisibility. So to count or quantify distinct periods of time we look to repeating cycles, earth, moon, sun, quartz crystal vibrations, and now the quantum characteristics of the cesium atom. The problem is that all of these cycles are physical events, which in order to serve as measurement need to be compared to other physical events, the ones to be measured. This requires a means of determining the beginning and ending of a cycle, in relation to the event to be measured. The event to be measured is always spatially separated form the clock. The various possible features of this spatial separation are what Einstein dealt with in his special theory of relativity, where he stipulated that simultaneity is relative. This stipulation means an accurate comparison is

\ impossible, and therefore precise measurement of time impossible, because the simultaneity of the beginning and ending of the cycle of measurement, in comparison with the event to be measured, is dependent on the frame of reference. In other word the temporal measurement of the same event will differ depending on the frame of reference.

This sounds like little more than a complaint about infinity, or uncountable sets, but it's unclear what the complaint is exactly. I assume what you mean by "natural points of divisibility" is that we should use only a finite set of numbers? But I don't see how a reduced, finite set of numbers would give us more accurate or more precise (or non-arbitrary) measurements. We would miss out on all those "in-between" numbers/measurements, and that would make our measurements less accurate, not more. Otherwise, I don't know what you mean. — Luke

No, the point is that the object to be counted in any act of quantification (a count) must be a true and real object, or else any proposed count is arbitrary. To be a true and real object, it must be distinct, discrete, separate from its surroundings, or else it's just a part of another object. And if we are allowed to count parts as objects, and everything is infinitely divisible, then every count will be infinite.

That's what happens when we try to quantify something which is already assumed to be a continuum (the real number line, or time, as examples). Since there are no natural points of division we can't even start to count anything because there are no distinct objects to count. So we allow divisions and we produce a count according to the divisions. But these divisions are arbitrary, so there is no rule about how to apply them, except that they can be applied anywhere. Then any count will be a count of infinity (any random section of the number line contains an infinity of numbers, and any random section of time contains an infinite number of time durations).

So it's not a matter of choosing finite numbers over infinite numbers, it's a matter of basing "the count", which is the act of quantifying, or measuring, in something real, real divisibility as the example of distinct physical objects (mentioned above) demonstrates. Then the measurement is of something real.

The problem therefore, is the assumption of continuity, the continuum. The number line, with the real numbers is a very good example. The assumption is continuity, represented as the infinitely divisible line. That assumption is problematic when applying numbers to the divisions, because the divisions are arbitrary. Of course in most practise of measuring, things are separated by natural divisions (as explained above), and so numbers are applied in measurement according to the natural divisions. But then there is time, and we do not find natural divisions, so we assume continuity, but this creates problems.

I don't understand your complaint here. I don't care if we call it "the present" or "the present time" or "the present moment"; I see no difference between these. If it will help to prevent your complaints, I will stop using the phrase "present moment". However, if I accidentally use the phrase again in future, then please just substitute it with "the present" instead. That seems to keep you calm. — Luke

If "moment" has no meaning to you, then so be it. It has meaning to me. And, "the present" is not a moment because the present goes on and on continuously. This seems to be where we are having difficulty. You do not conceive of the present as something which goes on and on continuously, like I do. You want to mark "the present" as a very short period of time, but this cannot capture, or represent the present as we know it through experience. This is why I used that example, by the time you say "now", that point which you have tried to mark as the present, is in the past. What you do not seem to apprehend is that the present continues on after that particular "moment" has gone into the past. And no matter how many times you mark "now", the present continues through all of them, and onward.

This is why we must apprehend "the present" as having two important features. One is the feature you point to, the moment, "now", from which we base measurements, starting the stop watch, etc.. The other feature is the conjunction between past and future, which I point to, and this continues on and on, seemingly continuously, so it is indefinite. This continuity of the present is what is measured when we measure passing time. We use arbitrary points, and mark a section of the continuity of the present, as a period of time.

So it does no good for me to substitute your "present moment" with my "present", because these have completely different meanings, referring each to a different aspect of time. One is the artificial, imaginary, or fictional "point" which you wan to deem as "the present", the other is the continuous, extended passage of time, duration, which is "the present" as we experience it.

If so, then why do you say that the present has a duration? — Luke

The present continues on and on, as time passes. From this perspective, its duration may be as long as time itself.

The present (moment) is defined in terms of when we are experiencing. — Luke

There is no such thing as the moment when you are experiencing. Experience continues on and on, in a seemingly continuous and indefinite duration, just like the present, except you die. Do you not apprehend your experience in this way, as a continuous, long duration, rather than as a moment, or any sort of pin pointed duration?

Or are there two different types of remembering? Otherwise, we could say that we experience things in the present and remember things that we experienced in the past, and not try to change the grammar in the way you are proposing. — Luke

There are many different types of remembering, and many different ways of reading. So this does not look like a productive direction for the discussion, too much ambiguity and confusion. For example, do you not think that remembering is part of your experience? So this distinction you make here, between remembering things and experiencing things is not sound because remembering is a form of experiencing.

You were proposing from the start of this discussion that the present has a duration. Have you changed your position on this? — Luke

Obviously not.

Agreeing (for the sake of argument) that the present has a duration does not require two pinpoints; it requires one larger pinpoint. — Luke

Can you agree, that according to experience, the present continues on and on indefinitely, and so trying to pinpoint it is trying to represent it in a way completely opposed to how we experience it? The present is our experience of time, and the present continues indefinitely, just like time. Trying to represent it as a dimensionless point in time, as an infinitesimal point in time, or as a slightly larger point in time, is a completely futile adventure, because these points cannot represent "the present" as we know it from experience, as extended indefinitely

Do you know that a duration has a start time and a finish time? The duration of the present is the pinpoint (or what we were earlier attempting to pinpoint). The start and finish times of that duration are not two separate pinpoints. — Luke

There is a difference between "duration" in the general sense, and "a duration", as a particular. The former is how I have been describing the present, as an indefinite duration. You have been wrongly interpreting me as speaking of "a duration". If I was unclear, and that mislead you, then I apologize. However, now I have made the clarification. When I speak of the duration of the present, it is in the general sense of duration, indefinite duration.

Maybe we just experience it differently. — wonderer1

I think that's right. I think different people read in different ways. That's why some read faster than others. I myself read in different ways depending on what it is that I am reading. Sometimes I need to read carefully, sometimes i skim through.

I thought you might recognize that you didn't need to be conscious of every letter to understand the content. — wonderer1

If understanding the content is the issue, rather than simply reading, then the entire content must be respected, so Luke's claim that we read one word after the other could not be correct. We only really understand each word after reading the entire sentence, and we only really understand the sentence within the context of the entire passage.

But the issue of misreading, and misunderstanding must also be addressed. If someone reads a passage very quickly, and mixes up some words so that there is misunderstanding, can this really be called reading it?

Would you say that for you it was like solving a sort of logic puzzle to determine the following content? — wonderer1

It definitely is a sort of puzzle, but not a logic puzzle. Some words (especially the long ones) are very easy, and flow naturally, but others require thought. I would say that much thought was put into the way the presentation was made. And I do not agree that it is the positioning of the first and last letter which makes the word recognizable. Notice the double c in According, and the ch's in research, (if that is what that word is supposed to be). I am not educated in phonetics, but things like that strike me as give aways, which if they had been scrambled in a different way would have made the words much harder to recognize. If you read the article, it's all a hoax anyway, there was no such research.

..while any sensible and intellectual characteristics of the experienced object which do not exhibit necessity and strict universality have their originating source in the object per se... — charles ferraro

How could there be such a thing as a "sensible and intellectual characteristics of the experienced object which do not exhibit necessity and strict universality"? If it's a sensible and intellectual characteristic, isn't it necessarily universal?

I'd ask you to look at the following link. — wonderer1

I checked your link. Notice that each letter still needs to be there. Luke says reading occurs as a temporal order, I disagreed. Your link seems to support my position.

I'm not averse to discussing some of the complexities of sensation, but your denial that eyes are objects in the world is indulgent -- contrary to ordinary English. 'Wanting to examine them objectivity' is way too fancy here. Kant himself invokes the sense organs. That's the context.

An object is (first definition) something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by vision or touch; a material thing. I see others' eyes directly, my own in a mirror. I'm not being metaphorical.
https://duckduckgo.com/?q=objects&atb=v379-1&ia=definition — plaque flag

A measured appreciation of what the subject contributes is maybe the essence of philosophy. But claiming there is only subject is as empty as claiming there is left without right. — plaque flag

Can you, plaque flag, explain to me, the principles by which you distinguish a subject from an object? For example, notice in the second quote above, that you draw this analogy, the subject/object relation is like the left/right relation. So we have principles to distinguish left from right, face north and right is east, left is west, or something like that.

Notice in the first quote, you say that an eye is an object. Is an eye a part of a subject? If so, are all objects parts of subjects?

I would not say that an eye in its natural state qualifies as an object. This is because I think that "object" implies a degree of independence from its environment. That independence is what allows objects to move, and be moved freely. Eyes do not have the independence required of "object", in my opinion. However, an eye can be removed from its natural place, and treated as an object, but this removal denies its function, so it is not a natural eye anymore after being removed from its proper place. Therefore, to treat an eye as an object is to make it something other than what it really is, and that is to deny its dependence on something else (as a part of something else), thereby giving it independence as an "object". That act of giving it independence, to make it an object, robs it of its function, which makes it no longer "an eye" when "eye" is defined by what it does.

I would say that both, subjects and objects have this in common, independence from their environment. This independence is what allows them to move and be moved freely. What principles would you refer to, to argue that there is a difference between an object and a subject, like the difference between left and right?

Then how could the accuracy or precision of the measurement be improved? — Luke

More work is required before this can be determined. If we can find natural points of division, and abide by them, measurement would be improved greatly. The problem though is that such points are not experienced by us.

What would a "natural point of divisibility" look like? — Luke

Take a look at two distinct objects, like a chair and a table. Do you not see a natural divisibility between these two? This is the foundation for counting, such natural points of divisibility allow us to count objects as distinct things. A supposed continuum has no such natural points of divisibility, therefore it can provide no principles for counting.

Because the present is defined in terms of conscious awareness, and I am conscious of reading each word, per my internal monologue, not of reading each letter of a word. — Luke

I am very sure that I am conscious of each letter in each word, or else I would misread the word. Are you sure that you are not conscious of each letter in each word?

Are you saying that conscious awareness has nothing to do with what we are consciously aware of (in the present)? It is merely "an awareness of the difference between past and future"? — Luke

No, I said that we are not consciously aware of the present. We are consciously aware of the past, through sensation and memory, and consciously aware of the future, through anticipation. And I said that since we are consciously aware of both, past and future, we come to the logical conclusion that our awareness is at the present.

The present is defined in terms of your "consciously aware mind". Whenever your "consciously aware mind apprehends a sensation", it does so in the present moment. The present moment is not the time at which you are consciously aware of something plus (or minus?) the time it takes to become aware of it or for your brain/body to produce your conscious mind or anything of the sort. — Luke

I am not at all understanding what you are saying. First, as you are well aware, "present moment" doesn't make any sense to me. And what I said, is that the consciously aware mind is in the future relative to whatever it is aware of via sensation. So in your example of the distant celestial object, the conscious mind is in the future of the past event that it becomes aware of in that celestial object.

The point is that the thing, whatever it is, which we become aware of, through sensation, is always in the past by the time we become aware of it. And, the mind which becomes aware of it is therefore always in the future relative to the thing which it becomes aware of. Furthermore, the mind is concerned with anticipating what will happen next, and it is even actively determining (as cause through freedom of choice) what will happen next.

There is no room for your "present moment" here. The mind is in the future relative to the things sensed which are in the past. So where do you think this so-called "present moment" is, where the mind apprehends the sensations? That "present moment" is just a misconception.

No, it is the time at which we consciously experience. Scientific understanding does not change that. — Luke

That is the faulty definition which is inconsistent with human experience, and which you are trying to impose on human experience. We do not experience any present moment. We experience the past and we anticipate the future. There is not anything within human experience which indicates a present moment. You assume that since past and future are "distinct", they must be separated, therefore there must be a present which separates them. You deny and refuse to accept the reality that past and future are distinct in the sense of different categories, and therefore may overlap. So there is no need to impose a "present moment" to separate them.

But the division of time into the periods of past, present and future is unchanging, so I don't see how the passage of time affects your Venn diagram, or its overlap, at all. — Luke

Again, you fall back on your misrepresentation. Time is divided into past and future. The conventional divisor is "the present". In the conventional sense, the present divides time, it is not itself a period of time. What I propose is that in reality the present unites the two parts of time, past and future. When these two are united, then the present may actually be a part of time, the part when past and future coexist. But this cannot be represented as time being divided into three periods, past present and future, that is a misrepresentation.

I thought we were talking in terms of the present when defined in terms of conscious experience, and the duration of the present denoting the shortest duration of one's conscious awareness. Or, as you put it earlier: — Luke

The problem is that you always think in terms of separate portions of time past, present, and future, as if the present is a distinct portion of time. I know that this is your preferred way of understanding "the present", but this idea is inconsistent with what I am proposing, so if you cannot dismiss it for the sake of discussion, and quit falling back on it as a crutch, you'll never be able to understand what I am proposing.

It is this meaning of "present" that I thought we were discussing, where uttered words become past once spoken, not longer periods such as hours or days. How can you not understand this "pinpointing" of the present? — Luke

What I've been arguing is that the pinpointing of the present is a mistake. That is what is at issue, I am saying it is a mistaken notion of "the present". You were willing to respect that first step, and accept the present as a duration instead of a pinpoint, but then you wanted two pinpoints, one at the beginning and one at the end of the present. So all you did was double the mistake. And then you wanted to move the two pinpoints closer and closer together, to produce a shortest period of conscious awareness, as if you were trying to get back to the original one pinpoint. You need to drop these ideas about shortest duration, pinpoints, etc. these are not what the experience of time is all about.

The idea was to remove points in time altogether, as inconsistent with the nature of time as we experience it. Until you remove from your mind, this idea of dividing points in time, you will never be able to understand "the present" as a unifier, and the paradigm of unity, rather than as a divisor.

See above. You very clearly said that "it is impossible to measure one's present". In fact, you said it twice. You also added that any arbitrary measurement is "not a measurement at all". — Luke

To clarify what I meant, the "arbitrary" measurement is a type of measurement, but not accurate or precise. I should not have said it is not a measurement at all.

So I thought we were discussing the possible duration of this "shortest window of consciousness" (or conscious awareness), rather than the colloquial usage denoting longer periods, such as the present hour, day, year or millennium. If it's the latter, then I don't understand what's in dispute, or what you mean by "the duration of the present", as though the colloquial usage might have only one standard duration. Your response to my Google search results did not indicate any surprise on your part of the duration being in the range of only milliseconds or seconds. — Luke

Sorry, I just don't see your point. There's no such thing as "the shortest window of consciousness", that's what your google search shows. It's an arbitrary designation. That's why I said it's not a measurement at all. But to clarify now, it would be a type of measurement, but not a very accurate or precise one.

I don't find any "points" in my conscious experience that separate the present from the past and future. Instead, I experience the passage of time in a continuous manner. This continuity may help to explain why some people think of the present moment as having an infinitesimal duration, as it is the shortest discernible "unit" within a continuum. — Luke

There is no such thing as a unit within a continuum. That is the whole problem here. It is a fundamental issue with "the real numbers". The continuum is designated as divisible in any way (infinitely). This means that any division of it is purely arbitrary, and artificial, there are no natural points of divisibility within it. If there was any natural dividing points, then any true division would be constrained to follow those natural points of divisibility. But the very nature of "continuum", by definition means that there are no such points of natural divisibility, all is the same. So the assignment of points of division (real numbers on the number line for example) is completely arbitrary. There is an infinity of numbers between any two numbers.

You seem to think that the proposition of an "infinitesimal duration" could provide real dividing points. But the infinitesimal duration is itself arbitrary. You call it a "shortest discernible 'unit' within a continuum" But there are no discernible units within a continuum, that's the definition of continuum. Any units are assigned to the continuum in an arbitrary way of representation. But this "representation" is not a true representation because the units represented cannot exist within the continuum itself (by definition).

To clarify though, the assignment of units is not absolutely arbitrary, it is carried out according to some mathematical axioms which are principles of order, such as the real numbers of the number line. This is supposed to be a way of "representing" division of the continuum. That is why it was incorrect for me to say that the arbitrary measurement is not a measurement at all. It is a real measurement in the sense that it's carried out according to principles, but the axioms are not based in any thing real.

Therefore, what your refer to, "an infinitesimal duration, as it is the shortest discernible 'unit' within a continuum", is just a fictional thing. There are no discernible units within a continuum, and any representation of the continuum as "units" is an arbitrary representation, based in some axioms of pure mathematics, rather than discerning real units within the thing divided. So this proposal does nothing for us.

While reading, my internal monologue "reads" the words. That is, I "hear" the words in my mind while I am reading them. Since each word is distinct in my mind, then I believe my conscious awareness while reading can be divided into individual words. SInce the present time is defined in terms of my conscious awareness, and since my conscious awareness can be divided into the reading of individual words, then the present time can be associated (or present-time-stamped) with my reading of each word, and the past and future are defined relative to the present time. — Luke

Of course this is just arbitrary. Why not divide your conscious awareness by apprehending each letter of a word, in order, instead of by apprehending each word of a sentence in order?

Do you agree that the past and future are defined relative to the present time? If not, then how do you reconcile this with your view that the present time is defined relative to one's conscious awareness? — Luke

I think I may have said that earlier, that past and future are defined relative to present. But now I see I may have misspoke on this as well. I think what is really the case is that "the present" is defined relative to past and future, which are defined relative to conscious experience. This means that conscious experience gives to us, past and future, as the memories and anticipations which I mentioned, and from this we derive a present. "The present" is derived from conscious experience, but from an understanding of the elements of it (past and future).

So what we call "conscious awareness", or the conscious experience of the present, is really an awareness of the difference between past and future. Since these two are radically different, yet appear to be in some way a continuum, we conclude that there must be a "present" which separates them. What I am arguing is that this separation between past and future is a misrepresentation, a misunderstanding, as the present is really a unity of the past and future. This unity would be the basis for the conception of the "unit", parts united. The "unit" you mentioned above fails as being completely arbitrary.

How do you find that "everything sensed is in the past"? When you are consciously aware of having a sensation, how is that sensation (and everything sensed) in the past? You said that "the present is defined by conscious experience". — Luke

I know from science, that there is a process within my body whereby the information, signals which are sensed, are apprehended by the consciously aware mind. That process is carried out by organs which have a spatial separation of some degree, and I know that it takes time for such information to traverse spatial separation, even at the speed of light. So I know that even by the time my consciously aware mind apprehends a sensation, the thing sensed is in the past in relation to my consciously aware mind. This is a principle which is well understood scientifically as "reflex".

In what sense is the overlap changing? The duration of the present (i.e. the shortest possible window of conscious awareness) is changing over time? Why? — Luke

As I said, "the shortest possible window of conscious awareness" makes no sense to me as your Google search supports. Different aspects of conscious awareness take different amounts of time. Check the reflex of different senses for example.

The overlap between past and future is changing because time is passing. For simplicity, the overlap is the present, and the present is changing as time passes. That's why the "now" is a moving target, by the time you say "now" it's in the past.

You consider the past and future to be additive or subtractive forces working in harmony or in opposition with each other to produce the present? — Luke

That was an example of how things can overlap, yet still be distinct. There are many different examples, each different in its own way. So you ought not take one example and assume that I think time is defined by the example.

In your opinion, are "temporal things, objects, events, etc." a part of time at all? — Luke

Strictly speaking, no. Thinking that temporal things are the parts of time produces the misconception that time is change. Temporal things, events and change, demonstrate the existence of time to us. From the existence of change we abstract the idea of time. Time, in this sense is an abstraction. The abstraction is distinct from the things which it is derived from. The things are particulars, the abstraction is universal.

I believe that the reason why people believe time and change to be one and the same thing, is that they know that "time" must represent something real, but they are not prepared to take the next step, to see that this real thing called "time" is necessarily logically prior to physical existence which we know as change. Time is what is required for change therefore is logically prior to it. This is the same problem which people have with "God". God is required for material existence, as prior to (cause of) material existence, but people are not ready to take that next step to apprehend this logical requirement. So they refuse and deny.

So temporal things are not, strictly speaking, a part of time, just like material things are not a part of God. Time, and God are prior to temporal, material, or physical things, as necessary for their existence, the cause of them. This produces a separation similar to that of the separation between cause and effect, past and future, between them. And as I explained earlier, the separation is categorical, which allows for overlap of distinct things as predicates, rather than denying them as contradictory. Cause as prior to, is not contrary to effect as posterior.

This appears to contradict your latest statements, such as: — Luke

Yes, I think I made a mistake back then. The proper representation would be that we determine a past and a future, then we deduce that we must be at the present, as described above. My apologies for the mistake. Conscious experience demonstrates that the idea of "the present" is a deduction derived from experience. The conception of "present" is based in the conscious experience which consists of past and future, as I've been saying, but "present" is not what is experienced, it is deduced logically.

This explains why we have such a wide ranging variety of claims concerning the conscious experience of "the present". No one really experiences "the present", they deduce the existence of the present, and that they must be present. That they produce this conclusion from different premises depending on how they understand "being" is the reason why you and I, and others, have different conclusions as to what the conscious experience of the present is.

You cannot, on the one hand, claim it is impossible to measure one's present, but, on the other hand, accept the Google search results indicating that the measurement of the present is milliseconds to seconds in duration. — Luke

I don't think I said it's impossible to measure one's present, only that such a measurement would be quite arbitrary. Your Google search supports this.

For example, each word of this post you are reading is read in the present; each word you have finished reading is now in the past; and each word you are yet to read is now in the future. You could also substitute "speaking" for "reading". — Luke

What are you saying, that the present is as long as it takes to read a word? That supports what I said, that the present is as long as the event which has one's attention. If doing something else was your example, the duration of the present would be defined by that activity.

Why do you claim that this "separation" between past, present and future is inconsistent with subjective experience? — Luke

I explained that already, it has to do with the "point" in time which separates past from present, and the point in time which separates present from future. Why do you keep asking me this? Are you having difficulty understanding that such a separation requires a point? Or do you find points in time in your subjective experience of time? I even asked you to explain your experience of these points which separate these parts of time?

For example, when you are reading, do you find that there is temporal points of separation between each word you read? I do not. In fact, I don't find that reading is anywhere near like how you described it. I have to understand the words in context, so I'm always reading a bunch of words at a time. Proper understanding requires that the entire sentence is present to my mind, so I often reread. I don't find these points of separation anywhere.

All of your memories are related to your actions and conscious awareness in the present. All of your anticipations of the future are made in the present. If there is no "present" in your experience, then it sounds as though you deny the present. But, until now, the present is what you have been claiming has a duration and has an overlap with the past and the future. I thought that's what was in dispute here. Now you seem to be saying there is no "present". — Luke

What's in dispute is my understanding of "the present" vs. your understanding of "the present". You have a habit of saying things like 'then there is no present for you' when what I describe as the present is contrary to your description.

Is this your analysis of your own sensation? — Luke

Yes.

Now you appear to have changed your argument to claim that there is only one overlap, and that the present is an overlapping area between the past and future. — Luke

I haven't changed my mind, I mentioned the Venn diagram example, past overlapping future, as the present, a long time ago. You are just so consumed by your intent to look for things i say which are contrary to how you understand "the present", that you didn't even try to understand my examples.

In that case, there are very "real points which mark the beginning and ending of that [present] duration", which are where the past and future (circles) intersect. — Luke

This is incorrect, because time is not static. If past and future were static, then there would by specific points of overlap. However, the relation between past and future is not static, as we know, the future slips into the past. Therefore there are no points of overlap, as the overlap is constantly changing continuously, as time is passing.

If the present is the area within the overlap of the past and future (circles) in your Venn diagram, then the present has two distinct boundary lines, which are simply the arcs of the past and future that form the boundaries of the overlapping area (i.e. the present). Those two arcs are distinct, single lines. — Luke

The Venn diagram is not a perfect example. As you can see, it consists of two static circles with an overlap, while time is not static. So what is required for a better illustration is a moving overlap. The time of the future (tomorrow for example) has to move through the period of overlap (today), and then become the time of the past (yesterday), or something like that. Supposing a point at which the overlap begins and a point at which it ends produces the very same problem as supposing that the present is one point, except the problem is doubled. So this supposition is not useful.

There is no distinction between past, present and future in "the present" area of your Venn diagram, or in the overlapping area of past and future which creates/defines the present. That section contains all three time periods and there is no distinction between them. — Luke

Again, this is incorrect. The distinction may still exist despite the overlap. For example the wavelength which constitutes green may overlap with the wavelength which constitutes yellow, and this might produce the colour blue. But that does not mean that those wavelengths are no longer there just because a different colour is created. Also, two equal and opposite forces may balance each other as an equilibrium, but that does not mean that the forces are not there. Therefore there is no problem whatsoever with conceiving of the past and future as distinct, yet overlapping at the present.

Furthermore, the present is distinct in terms of its boundary, which is formed by the non-overlapping sections of the past and future (times/circles) that lie outside the present. The boundary created by the overlap distinctly defines the beginning and end points of the present that you earlier claimed were not distinct. — Luke

This objection is based on the incorrect things you've stated, so it is not relevant.

Once again, you appear to deny that the present is a part of time. In that case, what have we been discussing? What is it that has a duration? How can a duration exist outside of time? — Luke

I don't see the problem here. Temporal things, objects, events, etc., have duration. The human experience of the present is such a thing, it has duration. Duration is not time itself, it is what is measured through the principles of a conception of time. So, what exactly is the problem you are pointing to here?

What do you think? — leo

:"Limitless power" implies nothing is impossible. Don't you think? So the question is an exercise in recognizing incompatible concepts, kind of like asking can a circle be square.

There are implications to that, relevent to having a theory of time that is explanatory in a general way of a great many events that go on in the world. Your theory of time defines time in terms of your subjective experience. It suggests solipsism. — wonderer1

If you read more of my posting in the last week, you'll see this is not true at all. We can discuss our differences and work out systems of compromise. Look at the way the world is divided into time zones for example. As you look around the world, the numbers assigned to the present time are different depending on location, but we have a system which works. And as I described to Luke, "the present" in general, is reduced to a point in time because this facilitates measurement. There is no suggestion of solipsism, because we wok out our differences, but truth is sometimes sacrificed to simplicity due to pragmatic forces. That is why the present is commonly represented as a point in time.

The way things are in reality, is that in the period of time it takes you to have a subjective recognition of PRESENT-NOW, zillions of things happen, one after the other, all around you, and within you. — wonderer1

This is clear evidence that what I say is true, "PRESENT-NOW" always consists of duration, and is never actually a point in time.

You lack sufficient resolution on your metric for time, because your metric for time is part of a paradigm that doesn't really work for communicating with people about time with accuracy. — wonderer1

You have this reversed. What you call "communicating with people about time with accuracy" is really communicating with people about time without accuracy. You think that since we manage to engineer complex systems, and get things done, that this implies "accuracy" in our communications about time. However, if you look at the problems, the brick walls, which scientists have run into, quantum uncertainty, multiple worlds, loop gravity, spatial expansion, etc., you'll see that accuracy is impossible with the methods currently used.

I recognize that despite what you and Luke might say, claiming that such problems are insignificant, these are very real and significant problems which have manifested due to our inability to communicate about time with accuracy. You look at human successes as evidence of perfection in our conception of time, while I look at human failures as evidence of imperfection in our conception of time. So I propose a way to get around these failures, and you say there is no need to because we already have the best, or most accurate way of measuring time that is possible.

Do you see how it's a bit egocentric to base your metric of time on your subjective experience? — wonderer1

I see that the only possible way to have a truthful and accurate metric of time is to base it in human experience, empirical evidence. Whether this is egocentric or not is irrelevant.

I would have thought that Hume based his theory of constant conjunction on our natural sensations, not on some abstract philosophical reasonings. — RussellA

Clearly, Hume's understanding of "our natural sensations" was somewhat off the mark, as I explained. Therefore what he took as being "our natural sensations", was really just some abstract philosophical reasoning.

Anyway, unless they are specifically scientific, aren't all theories about natural sensations just abstract philosophical reasonings?

Right, but as an empirical matter, have you done any measurements of anyone's duration of the present? Even on yourself? If not, then how do you know that judgements vary? — Luke

Measurements of time rely on the determination of points which mark the moments which begin and end the measured period. Such points are not real, but arbitrary. In practise, we mark a point with the occurrence of an event, (the numbers on a clock for example). There are no such events which mark the beginning and ending of one's present, unless of course we make arbitrary ones. Therefore any such measurement of one's present would be completely arbitrary, and that is not a measurement at all. Without such points it is impossible to measure one's present.

So I know that the judgements of anyone's duration of the present vary because it is impossible to measure one's present, and through my experience with common usage I have noticed variance. People usually mark "the present" with reference to an event, "the moment when X is occurring, or occurred. But different types of events take different amounts of time, so the length of the person's present is dependent on the type of event that the person is concerned with at the time. Right now my present is marked by writing this post, and that might be an hour or so. When I'm pouring a coffee, that's a present of less than a minute. Since "the present" is arbitrary, without any real points, it's defined by whatever event one is paying attention to. So it is very clear to me that my own present varies in length.

If you accept the Google results, then where's the dispute? — Luke

What you presented from Google shows a very significant variance, between a couple hundred milliseconds and a couple seconds. Yet you claim this is not significant.

My "insistence" (I've only said it once) that the difference between various subjective experiences in this matter are insignificant does not affect, and is completely unrelated to, our agreement that the "present" time is defined in terms of conscious experience. — Luke

The principal disagreement between us is your insistence that no part of the past or future overlaps into the present. This would require points which separate past from present and future from present. Such a separation is inconsistent with subjective experience. It is an ideal which you hold, and you impose, yet you insist that your conception of the present is based on subjective experience. My reference to the differences between various subjective experiences is just provided as evidence that there is no such points of separation between past/present and future/present, because you refuse to find this in your own subjective experience, being in a state of denial.

I do not agree that "dimensionless points are not consistent with the subjective experience of time". Dimensionless points may be inconsistent with your view of the subjective experience of time, but they are not inconsistent with my view. Earlier in the discussion, I suggested an improvement to your argument that the present consists of a duration rather than a dimensionless point. However, even if I were to agree that the present consists of a duration rather than a dimensionless point, then I would only agree that the duration of the present itself is not a dimensionless point; that the present has a duration, and that that duration is bounded by definite end-points which separate it from the past and the future. I have maintained this position regarding definite distinctions between past, present and future throughout the discussion. — Luke

OK, so now it's your turn. Analyze your own subjective experience, find those points which separate past/present and future/present, and describe them to me. Justify your claim that there is no overlap in your own subjective experience.

Can you honestly tell me that your experience of time provides an overlap between past and present so that there is no boundary? How do you identify this overlap? — Luke

That's simple. I know there is past because of memories. I know there is future because anticipation. I can identify nothing which marks "the present" in my experience. Analysis of sensation indicates that everything sensed is in the past, therefore memories, and analysis of anticipations indicates that these relate to things in the future. Therefore I can conclude that my entire experience of "the present" is just an overlap of memories and anticipations, as the Venn diagram example I mentioned earlier.

What updated "understanding of what being present" means leads you to believe that there is an overlap of past/present and present/future? I thought your knowledge of this "overlap" was derived from your own personal experience, rather than from scientific knowledge? — Luke

Personal experience needs to be subjected to relevant knowledge in order to understand it. A being looking at one's own experience without any knowledge at the outset would come away with very little. Modern science, physics and engineering, which deals with extremely short periods of time indicates very clearly that what we thought was the present experience, sensations, are really in the past by the time they are apprehended by the mind. So the mind is "ahead of", or in the future, relative to the information it gets from the senses. That information is delayed through electrical processes. This implies that if the human being itself is said to be at the present, some parts of the human being, the mind, are in the future, while other parts, the senses are in the past. This means that the whole act of sensing and apprehending what is sensed, being eventual, and requiring an extended period of time, is part past, and part future.

What does any of this have to do with your proposed "overlap" between past/present and present/future? — Luke

It describe how other conceptions of the present, like yours, have been found to be incompatible with experience, and that we ought to change our conception of the present rather than blindly insist on compatibility.

If there is no distinction between past, present and future, then the duration of the present must be infinite, right? — Luke

It is not that there is no distinction, it is that they are not "distinct" in the sense of not overlapping. I already addressed this, you equivocate between "distinct" as in the way you use it to mean mutually exclusive, and "distinction" as in the way I use it to determine different features. So I say that there is a distinction between past and future, meaning that these are different predications of the same subject "time" but they are not necessarily opposing predications, therefore there is no contradiction in the subject, time, having both these predication at the same time, the present. You make them opposing predications so that there can be no overlap without contradiction.

If you take some time to consider the difference between past and future, you will see that these are not opposite to each other in the sense required in order that one would necessarily negate the other. Yes, they are completely different, but in no way is the past the opposite of the future, in the sense required for one to negate the other, as contraries.

Otherwise, what is the duration of your personal present time? How do you know if something is still present or if it is now in the past? Likewise, how do you know if something is still in the future or if it is now present? — Luke

These are difficult questions because time is a difficult subject. There is no reason to expect that anyone ought to know the answers to this sort of questioning.

If there is no distinction between them, then past, present and future just blur into one single time period. — Luke

Clearly there is a distinction between past and future. I never denied this. I only deny that it is the type of distinction we know as opposition, where the presence of one would deny the possibility of the presence of the other, by the law of non-contradiction. So the distinction is more like a distinction of category, like the difference between light and sound for example. There is a distinction to be made between light and sound, but the presence of sound in no way implies that the presence of light is impossible, nor vise versa. That is the type of distinction I am talking about, a difference in category.

But, in that case, there cannot be any differences between the duration of the "present" for different people because there really is no present time distinct from past and future times, and therefore there cannot there be any overlap of past/present and present/future. — Luke

You misunderstand this. There really is no present time distinct from past and future time. What I said is that the present is the perspective. So it is not a part of time at all, but the perspective from which time is observed. Time consists of the two aspects, past and future, and where these two are observed as overlapping is known as the present. Refer back to my Venn diagram explanation. There are two overlapping categories, past and future, and where these two overlap is called the present.

The reason why there is difference in the duration of the present, for different people, is that we all understand and interpret the overlap differently. Most, like yourself, don't even recognize the overlap, claiming "the present" to be something completely different from this, like you do. Obviously, if you do not even recognize that the overlap of past and future is real, then for you, any claimed duration of this overlap would be completely arbitrary. Therefore, since most people do not even recognize the reality of this overlap, if they were asked to state the duration of the present, it would be something arbitrary. So the duration would be different for different people.

On the other hand, if people started to take this perspective seriously, and started looking into the reality, and objective truth of this overlap, then they could come up with principles to measure it. In this way we could develop a conventional, standardized measurement of the overlap (the present). Then instead of "the present" signifying the perspective from which the overlap is view, we could move toward "the present" signifying the overlap itself, after we develop the principles required to understand the overlap itself.

In driving along a busy road through a city centre, if all me perceptions were of instants of time, and I had to connect these frozen perceptions by cognitive judgement, I would have crashed my car within the first five minutes. No amount of quick thinking would allow the human to successfully succeed in any task requiring a quick response - such as driving through a city centre, playing tennis, reading a novel, cooking a meal, engaging in conversation - if they had to constantly consciously reason how one event at one moment in time is connected to a different event a fraction of a second later. — RussellA

You have no argument here, because each of your examples requires practise. The exercise must be learned, and in the learning process the activity is nowhere near as smooth and fluid as you make it out to be here, in the case of an individual who is well educated and practised.

There is an object to the right of my field of vision, and one second later there is an object to the left of my field of vision. Hume induces that there is only one object and it is moving from right to left. — RussellA

The problem with this approach is that we expect to see the object move from right to left, if we watch it. And if the object suddenly jumps from right to left, without me seeing it move, this is very suspicious to me. It is suspicious because we naturally sense movement, so to see something jump from point A to point B without moving there looks unnatural, as if magical or supernatural. We assume that the eyes can keep up with any movement that the object can make, even if it's just a blur, so for it to instantaneously go from being at one spot, to being at another, would appear very suspicious.

So Hume's explanation is not consistent with our natural sensation which is to see the object moving from right to left, in a manner of spatial-temporal continuity of the object. In other words, we expect to see the spatial-temporal continuity of the object, including its motions, that is intuitive. So Hume's starting point, the assumption that we see the object at point A and then at point B, is not consistent with our intuitions. It starts from a broken spatial-temporal existence, one which would appear like magic, or supernatural if we ever saw it in the way he proposed.

Firstly, how do you know that judgements vary on this matter? — Luke

To begin with, yours and mine vary, obviously. And, I've had numerous similar discussions on this forum which indicate variance among others. Also the google search you cited indicates a range between "a couple of hundred milliseconds to a couple of seconds"

Secondly, I don't believe that it does vary; at least, not to any significant degree. There is general consensus and conventional agreement over the present time, down to the microsecond, thanks to GPS satellites. Almost anyone with a working mobile phone or computer can verify the present time. — Luke

Obviously we disagree on what constitutes "significant". Engineers today are working in timescales of nanoseconds and shorter, so clearly the difference you derived from google, of over a second is very significant

We, at least, agree that "the present" time is defined in terms of conscious experience. — Luke

You assert this, but display otherwise with your expressions, insisting that the difference between various subjective experiences in this matter is insignificant.

You've also been insisting that there is no overlap between past and present, or present and future. This implies that there are two points in time, dimensionless boundaries, one which separates past from present, and one which separates future from present. But you agree that such dimensionless points are not consistent with the subjective experience of time You don't seem to grasp the fact that assuming that there is no overlap between such segments of time implies dimensionless boundaries, points within the experience of time, to provide these separations, and this is completely inconsistent with the subjective experience of time.

Can you honestly tell me that your experience of time provides a boundary between past and present so that there is no overlap? How do you identify this boundary? Do you see it, or otherwise sense it? Or, is it the case that this is just an ideal which you impose on your experience, insisting that your experience must be like this in order that your experience be consistent with your definition of "present", even though you do not really experience any such boundary between present and past, whatsoever? You just think that there must be a boundary because that's what your conception tells you, but you do not experience any such boundary.

Furthermore, many people assume the "present moment" to be a simple point in time, which separates past from future. This reduces your assumed two points, one separating past from present, the other separating present from future, to one point separating past from future. That point is the present. This is a significant simplification in comparison to your proposal, and one which has agreement amongst many different people. But it signifies a radical difference from your conception. Now "the present moment" has no duration at all. But this, though it is more agreeable than any stipulated length of time as "the present" because it is a simplification, requiring one point in time rather than two, and creating the illusion that measurements are precise, is not at all consistent with subjective experience of time.

ou are attempting to change the conventional meaning of the concept of "the present" to account for all potentially different "present times" — Luke

I am proposing a definition which is not conventional. This is because there is no conventional definition of "the present" which is consistent with the empirical evidence, the human experience of being present. Conventional definitions are outdated, coming from a time when we had less understanding of what being present meant.

There is no conventional definition of "the present" which states that it consists of parts of the past and/or the future. — Luke

That is exactly the problem with conventional definitions of "the present". None of these proposed definitions are consistent with the reality of the present according to human experience. This has created a significant problem, which is that many people have been led to deny the reality of the present. So, what is most basic, and fundamental to human experience, being at the present, is now completely denied by many people who insist that "the present" is not something real.

Therefore we have the very significant problem which is the denial of the reality of the human experience. Some insist for example, that we live in a simulation. This denial of the reality of human experience is the result of there being not a single conventional definition of "the present" which is consistent with reality. There are only false representations of "the present", like what you propose, ones which utilize arbitrary points in time. Since the subjective experience is inconsistent with the conventional definitions of "the present", instead of rejecting the definitions, as I do, people accept these representations of "the present" as true representations of the present, and reject the human experience of "the present" as not real.

Presumably, this "overlap" is due to the fact that the duration of one person's "present" is different from the duration of another person's "present". — Luke

No, this is a bit of a misunderstanding of what I've argued. The overlap is not due to the fact that one person's present is different from another. The overlap is the true nature of what the present is, and what time is. We do not know why time exists like this, so we cannot say what the overlap is due to. The fact that the duration of one person's present is different from the duration of another person's present, is evidence that this overlap is the real, or true nature of the present.

So you need to reverse the order of implied causation in your statement. The overlap is not caused by one person's present being different from another's, the overlap causes one person's present to be different from another's. That's why we can say that the difference between one person's present and another's, is evidence of overlap.

Maybe they have the same duration. It does not necessarily follow that the durations are different or that there must be some overlap. So how do you know that different people must have a different duration of "the present" in the first place? — Luke

As I explained already, the standard convention is to represent the present as "a moment", or "an instant", and this is a zero duration. It is the convention because it is an ideal which is agreeable, acceptable. But when it is seen by philosophers that this ideal is not consistent with the reality of time, then durations are proposed, such as infinitesimals. The fact that we cannot agree on the precise length of the infinitesimal which represents "the present" indicates that we do not all experience the same length of duration for the present. If we all experienced the same length of present, we could agree on the length of present, just like we agree on colours and things like that. We do not agree on the length of the present though, because we do not experience it the same as one another,. Therefore we've adopted a durationless, dimensionless, "present moment" instead, as something which is agreeable, and avoids the problem of having to find some means for determining the actual length of the present.

But I cannot perceive an object moving without perceiving the manner in which it is moving. — RussellA

I don't think that this is right at all. Think about how sensation works. Sight and hearing receive the activity of waves. But people were seeing and hearing long before they knew the manner of this motion. And the other senses perceive the activities of molecules, but the perceptions which result do not include anything about the manner in which the molecules are moving.

This is to say that the percept, the sense image, or whatever you want to call what your mind apprehends, is nothing at all like, or similar to the motion which is actually being sensed. So your mind creates for you an image of an object moving, but this is not even similar to the manner of motion which the senses are sensing.

I agree judgement is independent to perception, but when perceiving a moving object, the fact that the object is coming straight towards me is part of the perception, not part of a subsequent cognitive judgement. — RussellA

This is the issue which Hume had difficulty with. To determine which direction the object is moving, requires sensing it over an extended period of time. For him this meant a number of distinct sensations of the object at different locations, a conclusion as to the direction it has moved, then a cause/effect assumption that it will continue to move in a similar way in the future.

In reality, the conclusion that the object is coming straight towards you requires what is known as "quick thinking". When someone is capable of ducking from a rapidly approaching flying object, we say that the person has demonstrated "quick thinking". You'll notice that human beings are much better at this quick thinking than other animals.

Not necessarily.

It is true that Hume is described as an Empiricist, meaning he believed "causes and effects are discoverable not by reason, but by experience", such that the cornerstone of his epistemology was the problem of induction.

However, such a philosophy may be argued to be founded on Hume's belief in natural instinct, rather than reason, thereby discovering a strong link between Hume's inductive inference and Kant's non-empirical intuition. — RussellA

But the point is that Hume describes sensation as apprehending distinct states, then using what you call "natural instinct" to infer that motion has occurred between these distinct states. This is completely different from Kant who places the intuitions of space and time as necessary for the possibility of sensation. For Kant then, motion is already inherent within the sensation as those intuitions are prior to and necessary for sensation, but for Hume motion is inferred from the sensation of distinct states, so this "natural instinct" operates posterior to sensation making judgements about motion from the sensations..

But even if motion is already inherent within sensation, this does not validate your claim that sensation provides for you the judgement as to which way the motion is going. We sense change as motion, activity, without knowing where the change is headed toward.

Why does this require there to be any "overlap" of the past, present and future? — Luke

"The present" is defined by human experience. This implies human judgement. The distinct judgements of distinct human beings varies on this matter. Therefore "the present" as a standard, or principle, varies accordingly, and there is overlap accordingly.

I don't see the need to create a singular past, present and future that accommodates everyone, everywhere, travelling at all speeds, especially if relativity is acknowledged. — Luke

The goal is to understand the nature of time. I was defining "the present". If "present" refers to something completely different in every different situation then we cannot have any definition, Nor will we ever be able to understand the nature of time, because we will not be able to make any true propositions about the present in order to proceed logically. Instead, we look for general, true propositions which we can make, such as the following. The present separates past from future. It is itself a duration of time. Depending on one's point of view, past and future must extend into this duration which is called the present.

. A quick Google search suggests this duration ranges from a couple of hundred milliseconds to a couple of seconds. — Luke

This is clear evidence of the overlap I described. The fact that "the present" has duration, and there are no real points which mark the beginning and ending of that duration, nor is there a standard length of that duration, implies that there must be some overlap between past, present, and future.

Moreover, I don't believe it's a terribly important question. — Luke

Maybe you don't see it as important, but it definitely has implications. That is, that there cannot be distinct boundaries of separation between past, present, and future, if "present" is defined by human experience. There must be overlap of past and future within the present, "the present" being defined as what is common to us all, and possibly even overlap between past and future.

Once we realize, and accept as fact, that the overlap is very real, then we can see that the intuition which inclines us to define these temporal terms so as to exclude overlap, misleads us in this way. Then each one of us can look at one's own personal experience as having such an overlap inherent within, and recognize that the inclination toward exclusion was simply the result of that faulty intuition.

If I wasn't able to perceive space and time, I wouldn't be able to perceive that the truck was moving straight towards me. It would appear stationary and not presenting an immediate danger. — RussellA

That the truck is moving straight toward you is a conclusion, not a perception. You perceive (sense) motion, and you make a judgement as to whether the truck is coming toward you or not. The judgement that it is coming straight toward you is not a perception, and is independent from the sensation that it is moving.

Unfortunately, when going to the dentist, it is my mind that perceives the pain of the cold water on a sensitive tooth. If only it was just my unconscious senses that perceived the pain. — RussellA

You make a judgement that the cause of your pain is cold water, rather than that it is something else, like hot water. You do not perceive that the "water is cold", you decide this by way of judgement. You do not perceive that the "sky is blue", nor that the "grass is green". Those are all judgements, which in basic epistemology are called predications.

But according to Kant, you do perceive (sense) activity and motion. And this is why space and time, as a priori intuitions, are said to be prior to sensibility and sense experience in general, as necessary conditions for the possibility of sensation.

This is perhaps the fundamental difference between Hume and Kant. Hume represents sensations as static, states of existence, which change from one moment to the next. Kant represents sensations as active, according to the necessary requirements for sensation, those pure a priori intuitions, space and time. This is the means by which Kant places mind as prior to sense experience, as required for sensation, while Hume is empiricist. Hume would argue that change and movement are judgements derived from sense experience.

However, in your latest post, you refer to the present time as "the temporal position of the sentient being" and "the human perspective" of one individual. — Luke

Your addition of "one individual" here is what I described as "unreasonable" in the rest of that post. So read the rest of my post, and keep that in mind. It is unreasonable to reduce "the human perspective" to the perspective of one human being. Each individual human being makes the judgement concerning "the present", past/future, before/after, but the judgement is "unreasonable" if the perspective of other human beings is not considered in that judgement.

Therefore, no, you did not explain this. You simply changed your definition of "the present" to suit your argument, and once again did not address mine. — Luke

The definition is still the same. I just expanded it to explain how we account for the reality of other subjects. This is necessary to avoid solipsism. I touched on this already in my replies to Wonderer1 concerning the subjectivity of the present.

Disputes over when, or how long, the present time is are irrelevant. Once agreement is reached (or context understood) on that matter, then past and future are determined relative to that. — Luke

Obviously, as demonstrated right here, between you and I, it is highly probable that agreement will never be reached in the way you propose. It's simply not realistic to think that people will ever agree on how long a period of time "the present" lasts for.

No, the present needn't be reduced to a non-dimensional point in time, hence my 1000 years example. You've also given examples of the present time being 2023 or July 8. Once established, the past and future are determined relative to that. — Luke

I don't see anyone agreeing with you, that the present is a period of time which lasts for 1,000 years. Nor do I see any one agreeing that the present is one year, one day, one hour, a second, or a nanosecond. So you're simply speaking out of your hat, assuming that people will agree to such proposals. I brought those up as examples of what might be proposed as "the present", but clearly none of these are acceptable, and this demonstrates hoe the present, a a length of time is indefinite.

That people might bicker over the "real" duration of the present is irrelevant. — Luke

No, this is not irrelevant at all, it's the whole point. If the length of the period of time which is called "the present" cannot be justified, and people disagree because it is nothing more than an any arbitrary length, then clearly no one knows the real length of "the present". Therefore the length of "the present" might just as well consist of all past and all future time. That is why I called it "indefinite".

If we agree to refer to the current millennium as "the present time" then what comes before the current millennium is the past and what comes after the current millennium is the future, wIthout overlap. Your assertion is therefore refuted. — Luke

Your statement starts with "if", and ends with what would be the case if that condition, "we agree", would be fulfilled. Obviously we do not agree, nor is agreement likely, therefore it will likely be the end of time before my assertion is refuted. Have a happy time waiting for agreement.

Why must it be "reduced to a mathematical point" in order to be "agreeable and reasonable"? You clearly don't agree with it or find it reasonable. — Luke

Obviously, any proposed length of time, as that length of time which provides a distinct separation between past and future, (as are your conditions for "the present"), will never find agreement. And agreement is what demonstrates "reasonable". Because a specific length of time will never be agreed upon, and is therefore unreasonable, the proposal may be reduced to a point in time which separates past from future. That is why the point in time, as "the present moment" is the common convention for "the present". It is agreeable and reasonable. Therefore we might call it justified. However, it is not true, because it is not consistent with reality.

You are repeating your error of conflating "before" with "past" and "after" with "future". These are not interchangeable terms. If before and after are inside the now, it does not follow that past and future are inside the now, because past and future are determined relative to now. — Luke

I explained this. "Now" is the human perspective. Both, past/future, before/after, are judgements made from within that perspective. The human subject is a sensing being, and such judgements are made from within that being. Therefore past/future are within "the present". "The present" is the temporal position of the sentient being and past/future are judgements made within.. To put past/future outside the present requires projection, extrapolation. Putting past/future outside the present of the sentient being is a further process which can only be understood after a firm grasp of past/future within the sentient being is established.

Nonsense. Past and future are determined relative to the present. The present is not divisible into past and future, otherwise it would not be the present. — Luke

Any example that anyone gives as what is referred to as "the present" can always be broken down by someone else, and denied as the true "present". Look at the examples I already gave. If someone says that 2023 is the present, someone else could say no, July 8 is the present, and the rest of 2023 is past and future. Then someone could state the hour as the present, and the rest of July 8 is past and future. Then the second, nanosecond, etc.. Whatever is referred to as "the present" is always divisible into a smaller present with a past and future. I've explained this to you already. Why is it so hard for you to understand? It's never clear exactly what "now" or "present" refers to when someone uses these terms.

No part of the present can be in the past because if it were then it would no longer be in the present, and no part of the future can be in the present because if it were then it would no longer be in the future. Likewise, no part of the past can be in the present because if it were then it would not yet be in the past, and no part of the present can be in the future because if it were then it would not yet be in the present. — Luke

All you are doing here is explaining why your definition of "present" is not consistent with reality. What you stipulate as required for the meaning of "the present" cannot be upheld in reality. Look at the examples. If 2023 is stipulated as the present, then someone can say part is in the past and part is in the future. And this is the case with any time period which is stipulated as "the present", anyone can argue that part of that time period is in the past and part is in the future.

To avoid this problem, and maintain your stipulated requirements "no part of the present can be in the past...etc.", the present must be reduced to a non-dimensional point in time, which separates future from past. However, such points are not consistent with the reality of our experience of time.

Therefore, what is stipulated as required for "the present" under your proposed definition, "no part of the present can be in the past...etc.", cannot be fulfilled in a way which is both logically rigorous (agreeable to all rational people) and consistent with reality. If a time period is proposed as "the present", any rational person can show how that time period contains both past and future, (as the examples demonstrate). And if "the present" is reduced to a mere point, this is not consistent with reality. So the reasonable response is to reject your stipulated conditions for "the present" as providing nothing but a false premise.

The present could be a dimensionless mathematical point or it could be 1,000 years long and, either way, it would still not overlap the past or future. The past is before the present and the future is after the present. — Luke

Don't you see that if you propose that "the present" is 1,000 years long, or any other period of time, without any overlap of past or future, any reasonable person would reject this proposition, saying that the time period has some past and some future within it. You could insist that this time period is what you stipulate as "the present", but then you are only being unreasonable, as trying to force your own arbitrary stipulated time period as "the present". So to make your stipulation agreeable, and reasonable, it must be reduced to a mathematical point. But then it is not consistent with the reality of time as we experience it. The problem is that your requirement "no part of the present can be in the past.." is impossible to fulfill in a reasonable way. Therefore it is unreasonable.

This is not part of the measurement... — Luke

You and I have such a vastly different idea of what constitutes "measurement", that discussion on this subject would just make the thread a messy digression. That's why I've been insisting that we avoid the topic, as not a requirement for the subject of the op.

But, as I understand it, while numbers tend to get grounded in quite abstruse work within set theory that there is less general confidence in, they can also be grounded using category theory. Barry Mazur has some relatively approachable stuff on this, although I certainly don't get all of it.

Timelessness remains either way, mathematics is eternal, not involved in becoming— in most takes at least. This, I think, may be a problem. Mazur had an article on time in mathematics but it didn't go that deep. But I recently discovered Gisin's work on intuitionist mathematics in physics, and that is quite interesting and sort of bound up with the philosophy of time. The Nature article seems stuck behind a paywall, but there is this Quanta article and one on arXiv.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.02348

https://www.quantamagazine.org/does-time-really-flow-new-clues-come-from-a-century-old-approach-to-math-20200407/ — Count Timothy von Icarus

I haven't had a chance to read the referred material yet, but I think that this is an important subject, very much related to the op. As I see it the crux of the matter is the nature of "order". The first principle of mathematics is order, yet pure mathematicians do not want to be constrained by any natural order. So they propose a fundamental orderless condition which would allow infinite freedom for creations of order. This is the set which is not ordered.

The problem with this "not ordered" condition is that time is a type of order, and this puts the "not ordered condition as outside of, or prior to time. Now we can ask in what sense is this condition "prior" because it really cannot be prior in a temporal sense. And we might say that it is "logically prior". But this ought to be questioned. So the question might be, does it make sense logically, to speak of something which is "not ordered". If this idea, the existence of something without any order, is itself illogical, then the "priority" implied by placing this condition as prior to temporal order, cannot be said to be a logical priority, because it would appear more like an illogical type of priority.

You can forget about mathematical "points". The upshot is that there is no overlap between them; no part of the past or the future "inside" the present. — Luke

The reality is that there is a whole lot of overlap. As I said in my first post, by the time you say "now", it is in the past. By the time someone hears you say "now" it is in the past. That's the unavoidable reality. And if you say that what was meant by "now" is a period of time encompassing both speaking and hearing, then there is both before and after inside the now. So, any time that someone uses "the present" to refer to a period of time, anyone can divide that period of time into past and future, consequently there is "overlap".

The overlap in usage is very real, obvious, and unavoidable, yet you just deny this with "there is no overlap", as if denial makes the obvious overlap not real. If you really believe what you say, tell me how "the present" can refer to anything other than a dimensionless mathematical point separating past from future, which everyone must respect, if there is to be no overlap in the usage of these terms.

When have the conventional meanings of "past", "present" and "future" been "employed for the purpose of measurement"? — Luke

The conventional meanings are put to use anytime that time is measured. A future is presupposed prior to measurement as the time which will be measured. A present moment is designated to start the measurement. The time going past is measured until another designated present moment. Have you ever used a stopwatch?

You have changed the meanings of "past", "present" and "future" to try and accommodate relativity? — Luke

Since relativity is one of the most often used theories in physics, don't you see it as a problem if it is not consist with the conventional (correct) meanings of "past", "present", and "future"? Obviously, something needs to be changed. Perhaps it is the case that conventional usage is actually based in false premises, as I've been telling you.

Right, so past and future come before and after the present, respectively. In fact, that's what these words are typically used to mean. — Luke

No, "past or future", "before or after", are judgements made from a perspective. The perspective is said to be "the present". Therefore past and future are before and after each other, from the perspective of the present. Think of the way that first is before second, which is after first. The observer, or counter's perspective is not between first and second. The perspective encompasses both, it is not between the two. This is no different from any other set of opposing terms, right and left, up and down, hot and cold, etc.. The two opposing terms are conceptual, and are used to describe things relative to the perceiver.

And my argument has been that if you want to place the past and the future within the present time, then you need another present time inside that, that these past and future times actually come before and after. The words create the distinction. You are misusing these words. — Luke

No, your argument is based on equivocation. The claimed "need" is the result of you trying to create compatibility between your use of "present" and my use of "present". But your use relies on the false premises of points or boundaries which divide separate parts of time. Therefore it ought to simply be rejected as incompatible with the truth, due to falsity, and there is no such need for your proposed nested present time.

Why do they need to be within the present? — Luke

To be consistent with reality, and this is known as being true. To proceed from true premises, true proposition about the nature of time, in an effort to understand further, the nature of time, we must accept the propositions which position past and future as within present.

As I explained to Wonderer1, this makes presentism into a coherent ontological perspective by making past and future intelligible, and real, to the presentist.

Okay. But the past is not before the present and the future is not after the present in this example (per your second premise). Of course you will say that some of it is, but then you will need another present which completely is. That's what coming before and after means. — Luke

This is your misunderstanding. The past and future are before and after, each other. None of this is before or after the present, as the present is simply the position of perspective, the so-called point of view. The idea that the perspective is a "point" of view is the problem, the false premise. So "before: and "after" are judgements made from that perspective. Think of the way that right and left, up and down, etc;, are judgements made from a perspective.

Therefore there is no need for your proposed "another present", because this is already accounted for within my proposed "present" due to the nature of subjectivity, as I discussed with Wonderer1. The overlap of past and future (as evident in the Venn diagram example), which appears to contradict the premise that past and future are before and after relative to each other, is the result of subjective differences in perspective. This feature of "the present", as the perspective of the observer manifests as the relativity of simultaneity. And, we can extend it even further to cover the unclarity within one person's own subjective experience.

No, the meaning of the words requires those arbitrary points. — Luke

No, the meaning of the words does not require "points". The points are just a mathematical tool applied in the practise of measurement. For example, to my right, and to my left requires no point, to have meaning, up and down requires no point. What is required is a perspective, and the perspective is often referred to as the "point of view", and this is commonly reduced to a "point". The reduction of the perspective to a "point" is done to facilitate measurement, but it is not as you say, a requirement for meaning.

Are you saying that everyone uses the words "past", "present" and "future" incorrectly? — Luke

"Correct" and "incorrect" are a matter of convention, meaning consistent with or inconsistent with a specific conventions. "Truth" is a matter of consistent with reality. What I am saying is that the conventions which are employed for the purpose of measurement are principles which are not consistent with reality. Therefore when people talk about points in time they speak correctly, but not truthfully.

Since we can think about the past or the future in the present, then those times are present? — Luke

Past and future, like before and after, are concepts employed in judgement. We must respect the fact that judgements made by distinct people may be inconsistent with each other, just like whether something is to the right or to the left. Because of this we must look at the judgement as property of the judge (i.e. within the judge), and not as something independent, regardless of whether the thing judged is supposed to be external to the judge. The latter, is a projection of the internal to the external.

If you make a distinction between these, then what is it? — Luke

I've been through this so many times, I don't know why I continue. The distinction is a judgement of before and after in relation to, or if you prefer, from the perspective of, the present.

As a reminder, (A) represents past and future times that are external to the present time (A), whereas (B) represents past and future times that are internal to the present time (A); of which the present time (A) consists. Except you later reclaimed (A) times but with imprecise boundaries. However, I note that I never mentioned anything about sharp or imprecise boundaries with regard to (A) times (in the post where I first referred to (A) and (B) times). — Luke

You referred to |"three distinct periods of time", and that's what I objected to. And I told you why, because to be distinct periods of time requires boundaries of separation. These boundaries, or points in time re what I consider to be a false premise.

If the past and future, as we experience them, are within the present then there is not three distinct periods. But this still allows that the past and future might extend outside the present as well. Think of a Venn diagram of past and future, overlapping at the present, for example. In no way can this be described as three distinct periods of time. However, both past and future are within the present, and also extend outside the present.

You designed it that way? — Luke

Yes, of course, that is the point. The conventional way, which you describe requires arbitrary points, or boundaries in time, to separate distinct periods of time. However, these points and boundaries are nowhere to be found in our experience of time. So I designed a conception which works very well without such points, but it is necessarily incompatible with a conception which employs such arbitrary points.

Once again: If the present time (A) consists of both past (B) and future (B) times, then what are those past (B) and future (B) times relative to? They are in the past and in the future of what? — Luke

As I explained in my last reply to wonderer1, distinctions of past and future are judgements made by the thinking being. So "past" and "future" are conceptions within the mind of the being, at the present, who uses these conceptions to make judgements. So the "past (B) and future (B) times" are past and future relative to those judgements. And the thinking being may use projections to extend one's judgement to things outside of one's mind.

If there is no distinction between "past", "present" and "future", then what does each word mean? — Luke

You have an unbelievable way of associating meaning with words Luke. That is why it is very difficult to hold a discussion with you. Obviously what I mean by "distinct" is not the same as what you mean by "distinction" here. So your criticism of my argument has just turned into an exercise in equivocation. My use of "past" and "future" (A) is inconsistent with, and cannot support yours (B), therefore my use is problematic. What you apparently fail to understand is that my use is designed to be incompatible with yours, because of the problems I associate with yours. The principal problem is that you require points in time to distinguish your three aspects, and these points are not real, but arbitrary.

I'm curious about your theory, as to how it is we are communicating with each other. However, I can tell you, that you can't understand much about the answer without a more accurate theory of time than you currently have. I suspect you haven't subjected your theory of time to the many falsifying tests which could be done. Thus you haven't seen the need for a more accurate paradigm. — wonderer1

The theory is a starting point, a launch pad toward a more accurate understanding of the reality of time.
It is designed and intended to avoid many of the current problems associated with the conventional understanding of time. I don't see how your comment about communication is relevant. Clearly communication is a difficult task, as my attempt at discussion with Luke indicates, and the capacity to communicate is not something which ought to be taken for granted. However, I don't see how this bears on my temporal theory.

Perhaps you could explain the "falsifying tests" which could be carried out. I've described the theory as well grounded in conscious experience, and extremely sound, therefore I clearly believe that the required falsifying tests have already been carried out in human practise.

You are correct that we can't think thoughts without a period of time elapsing but look at the inability to clearly distinguish between past and future that comes with your perspective. Do you think it is your thought processes which determine what is past and what is future? — wonderer1

Distinguishing between past and future is a judgement which is carried out by human beings. I do not think that any other creatures could do such a thing because they would have to form an understanding of the meanings of these words, "past" and "future", and then make a judgement according to some criteria. So I think human beings are the only creatures we know of who attempt to make such a judgement. In any case, it is only thought which makes such a judgement, whether it's your thought, mine, Luke's, anyone else, or everyone. So I think it is very clear that it is thought processes which determine what is past and what is future, whether it's yours, mine, or some other. Can you think of anything else which might determine what is past and what is future?

ou don't acknowledge any duration called "the present" that is distinct from past and future times? — Luke

That's exactly right, and the principal premise of my argument. Since there are no points in time the past and future cannot be distinct from the present. Therefore our only means for understanding the nature of time is through our conscious experience of the present. And within our conscious experience of the present, we encounter the past and future.

Sorry Luke, but I see a whole lot of straw men in your post, and nothing worth replying to, very little effort, if any, on your part. If you put some effort into an attempt to understand, I would be very willing to reply.

Well, we have different subjective experiences, and based on my subjective experiences it is not only possible, but extremely valuable to recognize difference in our subjective experiences of a present, and happenings in time in the world. — wonderer1

Yes, this is another good point. Since we all have somewhat different subjective experiences of "the present", this is a very good reason why there cannot be an objective, and to use Luke's word, "distinct", separation between present, past, and future. There are no objective points of distinction within time, those distinctions are subjective and somewhat arbitrary

Another factor in my subjective experience is looking at signals captured by oscilloscopes that represent things at time resolutions down to around a nanosecond. I have very good reasons for thinking events really are happening on extremely small time scales regardless of the fact that my unaided perceptions don't reveal things on such small time scales. — wonderer1

I agree, things happen on a very large time scale, and also on a very small time scale. And we observe this, in one way or another. That's another good reason why we cannot limit "the present" to one particular time scale. If we designated "the present moment" as a tenth of a second, or something like that, then a whole lot of nanoseconds would be going past at the present moment. This would mean that within "the present moment" some nanoseconds would be in the future, and some would be in the past.

Might it be the case that there is a relevant lack of diversity to the sort of subjective experiences you have had? — wonderer1

I don't understand the question. Diversity in the conscious experience of the present is what this conception of the present is aimed at accounting for.

Most people use the following terms to refer to three distinct periods of time: — Luke

Yes, and I've discussed the problems with this way that most people think. "Distinct periods of time" requires points, dimensionless boundaries to separate them. These points are inconsistent with our experience. Furthermore, if we assume that there are dimensionless points, boundaries, within time, then these points cannot themselves consist of time, but must be composed of something other than time. Then we have something other than time within time, and this produces the incoherency.

If 1 and 3 above are determined relative to 2, then 4 and 5 are determined relative to what? That is, 4 and 5 are in the past and in the future of what? — Luke

We've been through this a number of times, 1 and 3 are simply rejected as incoherent, false ideas of what past and future are. There are no points or dimensionless boundaries separating distinct parts of time. That idea is completely inconsistent with our conscious experience of time. Then after these are dismissed, we adopt 4 and 5 as a more realistic representation of past and future, a representation which is consistent with our empirical knowledge.

We might then proceed toward understanding a "past and future" which is outside the realm of experience and empirical knowledge, and this would be a "past and future" which is outside of the present, like your 1 and 3, with the difference being that they are not based on distinct boundaries. Then we have a way to properly understand past and future as they are, outside the realm of the present , and this understanding will be consistent with our experience, and therefore our empirical knowledge, as not based in distinct boundaries.

The answer can only be a second present - Present (B) - that is nested within Present (A). — Luke

Not at all, Present (A) is simply incoherent, and wrong, as explained above. It is inconsistent with experience and is a faulty idea which cannot be justified, because it is wrong. That is the point I made when I first entered this thread, and you still do not get it, wanting to nest Present (B) with present (A). The point is that Present (A) is incompatible with conscious experience, and incompatible with present (B) which is compatible with conscious experience. Therefore there can be no nesting, and present (A) must be rejected as a misleading idea.

Rather than a set of immutable numbers, which seems less defensible today, we can have a set of possible, contextually immutable axioms, which define a vast, perhaps infinite space of systems. The truths in the systems are mutable, because there are different systems, but then there is a sort of fall back, second-order Platonism where the existence of the systems themselves, and relations between them, are immutable. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think that this works. The reason why different systems are needed is because incompatibilities arise between one and another. Incompatibility makes it impossible to have immutable axioms which would be applicable to all systems.

The problem is right at the foundation, the nature of a unit, one. We can assume an ideal unit, "one", but then the things which we allow ourselves to do with "one" through stated axioms, must be consistent with what we can actually do with one object, in practise. In practise though, we find that different types of things, or objects, allow us to do different types of activities with them. This is very evident with division. Each type of thing has specific ways which it can be divided. In mathematics, the common principle is to allow that the unit "one" can be divided in any possible way. This does not properly represent the restrictions on division which exist in reality.

Do you think it would make sense to distinguish between the nature of our subjective experiences of 'the present' and the nature of time in the larger reality we are a part of? — wonderer1

I don't think that this would be possible at this point. The only thing we have to go on is our subjective experiences. So I think it's necessary to get a good understanding of our subjective experiences of time before we can proceed toward speculating about the nature of time in a larger reality. This is because our subjective experiences of time have a very significant impact on our speculations concerning any larger reality. I think that how one interprets one's subjective experience of time influences whether God may or may not enter the speculations about the larger reality.

It seems to me that you and Luke are both right in ways, but this discussion seems a muddled mess due to not making such a distinction. — wonderer1

The muddled mess is due to Luke's assumption that we can step outside of our experience of the present, and make assumptions about the nature of time outside of this experience of the present. See below, Luke puts forward an unwarranted and unjustified proposition that the future and past are "outside" of our experience of the present. So Luke seeks to define "present" in such a way that the future and past are outside of the present, leaving them as impossible to experience, therefore unknowable and unintelligible to empirical knowledge.

This is the problem with "presentism". By assuming Luke's premise, future and past get placed outside of the present. Then future and past become unintelligible to presentism when Luke\s premise is adopted without a thorough understanding of how we really experience "the present".

I, on the other hand define "present" in a way which is completely consistent with our experience of the present, and in a way which also brings "past" and "future" into our experience of the present, as part of it. This makes activity at the present (as we do sense motion at the present) coherent and intelligible, and it also brings past and future into our experience of the present, making these empirically knowable.

It is relevant because you are misusing the terms "past" and "future" — Luke

This supposed "misuse" is a product of your incoherent definition of "present", as I've already shown to you. You have an incoherent definition of "present" which puts past and future outside of the present, and this renders all aspects of time as unintelligible. By the terms of this incoherent definition, I misuse "past" and "future".

Your use of two different senses for each of these terms indicates your use of two different senses of "the present". — Luke

In the course of this discussion, I have on occasion, used "the present" in your way, solely for the purpose of demonstrating the incoherency of that way of using "the present".

Points in time are consistent with a duration. A duration is a determinate period of time with beginning and end points. It is your premise that the present consists of a duration. — Luke

Points in time are not consistent with our conscious experience of duration. As I said, the duration of the present is indefinite. I said the present consist of "duration", not "a duration", and if I sometimes mentioned "a duration", I meant an indefinite duration.

This seems to be our principal disagreement. If you want to understand, then drop the points. But if this is where you think the weakness of the argument lies, then explain to me how you think there are points within our conscious experience of the present. Because that lack of points is a fundamental premise which I believe is very sound.

Thanks for clarifying. However, there seems to be some hidden premises because I fail to see how you reach the conclusion that "time passes" from these premises alone. — Luke

The conscious experience of the present is the experience of time passing. We could discuss whether or not it's properly called "passing", or if some other word would be better. As I explained in the original argument it is the experiencing of a continuous passing which cannot be pinpointed.

Also, if we take a closer look, premise 1 states that the present consists of a duration and premise 2 states that a duration consists of before and after parts. This implies that the present consists of before and after parts. This does not imply that those before and after parts are past and future parts, because it is the present which consists of those before and after parts. — Luke

The premise is "duration", not "a duration".

I don't see how the matter described is relevant. It's an issue of defining the terms. "Before and after" in relation to "the present" are known as past and future. If you like, we could adhere to "the present consists of before and after parts", and discuss what this means. But what it means is that the present consists of future and past parts, because if it consisted of only past, or only future parts, this would not be consistent with the conscious experience.

We could add that, relative to the present moment, the past comes before the present moment and the future comes after the present moment, but we are not committed to any conclusion that the before parts of the present are past nor that the after parts of the present are future. The before and after parts are only what the present consists of. — Luke

But we have no "present moment". You are inserting an unwarranted "moment" into the scenario. This is the manifestation of your desire to utilize "points". There is not "moment" in the conscious experience of the present. We only have the continuous experience of time passing to deal with, and this manifests as duration, indefinite duration.

So I don't see any reason for your limiting of the naming of the before and after parts. You impose an unwarranted "moment", in order to define "past" and "future" as relative to this moment. Then by this unwarranted definition you exclude "past" and "future" from the naming of the parts of "the present", because they have already been used as names relative to the "present moment". But there is no "moment" in the conscious experience so we must deny this proposition as false and this frees up "past" and "future" to be used relative to "the present", as I described, without any "moment" .

You are still using two different senses of the present moment. — Luke

I do not use "present moment". You introduced this. The present is duration, not a moment. That is the principal premise. Any time we try to assign "a moment", or "a point" to the present, the assignment fails, because the present does not consist of moments, nor is it "moment" in general.

However, on the other hand, you also treat the present as some mid-point within the duration, which has some parts before it and some parts after, and you treat these as being past and future. — Luke

Saying "before parts and after parts" does not imply a mid-point. There is no mention as to how any division into parts is to be carried out here, it is only implied that there is distinct parts. The mode of division is not mentioned so "mid-point" is not implied.

You should instead treat what is outside the duration of the present as being past and future, rather than what is inside it on either side of the duration of the present's mid-point. — Luke

This proposal is the manifestation of your faulty way of looking at the present, as a moment. Since there are no moments, only an apprehension of duration, which is indefinite, we have no boundary which would enable us to go "outside" the present. The principles for this "going outside" have not yet been established. We need a thorough understanding of the fundamentals before making such complex proposals.

The Golden Rule advocates initiating indirect reciprocity, the most powerful cooperation strategy known. Indirect reciprocity has no stated goal - it is a cooperation strategy, not a goal generator. — Mark S

As I've repeated already, I believe there is no reciprocity implied by the Golden Rule, and I think that this represents a gross misinterpretation on your part.

It appears like neither of us has any will to compromise on this issue.