Just a suggestion. Let's call whatever it is that is behind the appearance of the rock, a "rock". — Banno

This doesn't work, because what is behind the appearance of the rock could be all sorts of strange interactions, meaning, information, which is not included in the meaning of "rock". So this would mislead us into thinking that we know what we do not know.

As an analogy, 'let's say that the meaning of the word "rock" is rock. It doesn't work to say that the meaning of the symbol is the symbol.

As I argued in my article, there is no reason to think that physics has no intentional effects. — Dfpolis

I believe that intentional effects are fundamentally incompatible with Newton's first law. A force acting from within a body, to alter the motion of that body, cannot be described a force acting on the body.

The missing essential is the interface, viz., the entanglement of data-neutral-wrt-order of the phenomenal universe and operational intentionality of agent-intellect. — ucarr

Wouldn't the "missing essential" be knowledge itself? This would be the mode of interaction.

With active order absent, we have a chaotic jumble of disconnected attributes. — ucarr

The problem with this is that we could not even call this "attributes", because "attribute" refers to an apprehended order. That's the reason for separating matter from form. In principle, matter is the absence of form. But Aristotle demonstrates that in reality the absence of form is logically impossible. So this is kind of like the concept of "infinite", a very useful concept which has no corresponding physical reality.

About the seed: I wonder if it does not already have all the order that the mature tree will have, but packed tighter. — Dfpolis

I do not think that this could be the case, because the growing seed is subjected to external forces, these are accidents, and the way that the growing form responds produces a unique order. So within the seed itself there is an allowance for the development of an order which is not already there. This is why evolution is possible, and consequently a reality.

This capacity to create order is what makes life so difficult to understand. That the order (form) is created as a response, rather than casually determined from the accidents, is what I've been telling you is very important to the understanding of sensation and intellection. This provides for the reality of a being with free will, the form in the mind must be created from within, rather than determined by the external accidents.

I do see that they're both flawed. Do you mean that this leads to idealism? — frank

Where else are you going to turn to get principles for understanding the reasons for these flaws?

Here's my incredible photoshopping skills at work. — Michael

I'd say, that's much better.



When you understand that indirect realism undermines itself, as proposed in the op, and the problems of direct realism persist, the door to idealism will open within you. I'll be waiting for you at that door, which opens inward rather than outward.

But you defined the latter as the same as the former. 'How many marbles are in the jar' is a mental quantity in your mind, which tautologically is going to correlate to count, also the mental quantity in your mind, no matter which number you choose. Interaction with the jar (counting) seem unnecessary for this. — noAxioms

Right, that's the way ontology works, we make definitions which accord with the way that we understand reality, and we proceed from those principles. If you think that you have a better ontological understanding of this matter, (perhaps you think that God always counts how many marbles are in the jar, or something like that), then propose your better definition.

You seem to suffer from the same problem as Wayfarer, which is insistence on applying the premises and definitions of idealism to falsify a view that isn't idealism, which is a begging fallacy.' — noAxioms

This is obviously because idealist premises are the one which best correspond with the reality of the situation. You haven't provided any reasons why you think that they are not the best premises, only the attitude of 'those are idealist therefore reject them'.

The representation in the op is incorrect. it is inherently biased, direct realist, by showing the external as the same as the image which the direct realist has in mind.

What the diagram needs to show is that the direct realist, and the indirect realist both have the same, or similar image in the mind. But the direct realist thinks that this image is as the external world is, and the indirect realist thinks that it is not.

Indirect realism is a prevalent ontological view because it is supported by ideas derived from modern science. Principally, there is the idea that the world really consists of a bunch of tiny particles moving at a high speed, or perhaps even in some sort of superposition, and objects don't really exist in the way that that they are imaged through sense representation.

I believe that ideological conformity requires effort because evolution is a fundamental, essential feature, of the living organism. Intensified societal change makes conformity more difficult, and attempts at conformity become less successful. The only way that ideological conformity can persist is if the will to conform is cultivated. Traditionally, this was moral training, cultivating the desire to be good.

If you think I described a particular stop sign, then surely you can inform me which one was specified.
The sign thing was simply my attempt to figure out how you distinguish ‘perspective’ from ‘point of view’, something you’ve not clarified. — noAxioms

I didn't see that either of us was trying to distinguish 'perspective' from 'point of view'. What would be the point of making such a distinction?

You did not answer my question about this, and it’s important. Correlates to what? — noAxioms

The number which correlates with the defined parameter. I went though that already. There's an object described as a jar full of marbles. The defined parameter is 'how many marbles are in the jar?'. There is no specific number which correlates with this parameter until someone counts the marbles and establishes that relation. You can say that someone estimates, guesses, or assigns a random number, these are all different modes of counting, and the mode of "counting" is not relevant. The point is that there is no answer to the question of "how many marbles are in the jar?" until someone answers it.

No, they are grounded in the reality of change. — Dfpolis

That's not accurate, because they are grounded in before and after, which is a specific feature of change. Your definition was "according to before and after". So if time is a measure of change, it measures only this particular parameter, that which relates to "before and after".

But the problem is that these other terms such as "lately", "long ago", "suddenly", introduce another aspect of time, other than "before and after" and that is duration, temporal extension, the meantime between before and after . So temporal measurement requires not only a judgement of before and after, but also a method for measuring the time (duration) between these, the meantime.

No, the potential and the actualized ground before and after. — Dfpolis

You have this backward, before and after are used to ground potential and actual. That this is the case can be seen from what you refer to as "actualization". Actualization is the concept which establishes a relationship between potential and actual. Without that concept there is no direct relation between those two, and no way of deriving "before and after". Therefore "before and after" are not derived from potential and actual, and are not grounded in potential and actual.

Instead, "actualization" is used as a concept to relate potential to actual, by establishing the temporal relation of "before and after" between potential and actual. So, that there is a relationship between potential and actual is established with "actualization", and that this relationship is the relationship of "before and after" is established by the nature of "actualization".

"Actualization" represents the meantime, the duration between before and after. In traditional Greek terms this is "coming-to-be", the time between being not-X, and being X, in the condition of change, the act of generation. Therefore the concepts of "potential and actual" are grounded in the empirically observed reality of "coming-to-be", which occurs in the temporal duration (extension) of the meantime between before and after.

Change is measurable according to before and after, say in the movement of clock hands. The act of measuring this produces time as a measure number. — Dfpolis

Before and after set the boundaries of the parameter to be measured, which is the duration, or extension of time in between these two, the meantime. This is how we employ the "now" as Aristotle explained, we project it as a point in time, using it to establish boundaries to segregate a specific temporal duration. One instance of the projected "now" represents the before, the other represents the after, the duration between is measured.

It is necessary that "before" and "after" represent something empirically real, this grounds the projection of the now in real. And, in order that the temporal duration measured is applicable, the measured duration must also be something empirically real. Accordingly, the temporal duration measured, as the meantime between the two artificial boundaries created by the projection of the "now", is equally real and measurable and empirically verifiable, as is "before and after".

Potencies are grounded in actual states of nature, not the mind. — Dfpolis

Yes, potencies are grounded in actual states of nature, but potencies are produced by the mind. What is described by us, is what we claim as "actual", and from this we derive through the application of principles, specific potencies which are attributable to that described actuality. So potencies are grounded in actual states, but the "actual states" are descriptions which we produce, and these are themselves grounded in empirical observation.

The important point is that we cannot directly describe the world in terms of potencies, because what is derived from the activity of sensing is actualities. So it is only actualities, forms, which are grounded in the world; "grounded" meaning supported by empirical observation. From an analysis of these forms, actualities, along with the application of specific principles derived from an understanding of change, we can describe potencies. But the key point to apprehend is that there are "principles" which lie between, and separate the descriptions as actualities, and the derivative potencies. So both actualities and potencies are "grounded", but actualities are grounded directly by empirical observation, while potencies are grounded by actualities, through the means of principles which relate potencies to actualities. As described above, in Aristotle this relationship is established with the concept of "actualization", which is derived from the ancient understanding of "coming-to-be".

The discussion of time begins in ch. 10. There he notes that "no part of it is" (218a6). So, we need to be aware that while it is convenient to speak of beings of reason (ens rationis) as though they exist simpliciter, they do not. Time, as a measure number, exists only in the minds contemplating it. So, you need to distinguish between what is a convenient way of speaking, and Aristotle's doctrine. — Dfpolis

I really think you need to reread that section, you might come to a better understanding. He clearly talks about time as being measured and he describes how time exists. This is what he says at 226b, 28:

"We have stated, then, that time exists and what it is, and in how many senses we speak of the 'now', and what 'at some time', 'lately', 'presently' or 'just', 'long ago', and 'suddenly' mean."

Notice that all these terms, all these ways of speaking, are grounded in time being something real. This is not a matter of "a convenient way of speaking". What is the case, is that there must be a real difference between the time referred to as "now", and the time referred to as "before now", and "after now", or else the distinction of before and after is incoherent. In other words, if time isn't something real, before and after make no sense.

As a number, it is not something existing in nature, but a mental entity resulting from a numbering operation. — Dfpolis

Aristotle was a student, of Plato, and numbers were considered to be existent things, as well as the symbols we use to count things. That's why he says number is used in two ways, what is countable, and that with which we count. Time is what is countable, therefore the terrain, not the map.

This is entirely compatible with the classic definition of time as the measure of change according to before and after. — Dfpolis

Sure, but don't you see that in order for "before and after" to have any meaning, there must be time which is something real in nature, to give these words significance. So consider that we use time to measure change according to before and after, as you say. We can't just assign "before" and "after" arbitrarily, these designations are grounded in empirical observations, and this is the manifestation of time in its real, natural occurrence. Before and after are not mere fabrications of the mind, these words refer to a real, observed order in the physical world. The glass fell off the table before it broke on the floor. If there was no real order here, it would make just as much sense to say that the glass broke before it fell.

There is no point in continuing to pile quotation on quotation. You are misinterpreting the text. — Dfpolis

I agree there is no point in looking at quotes, or even discussing what Aristotle thought, what is important is what we believe, you and I, and what is the truth to this matter.

What is measured is time potentially. The result is time actually. — Dfpolis

I don't get this at all , maybe you could explain. Doesn't time have to actually pass before it can be measured? How could one measure the potential passing of time? It seems to me like that would be a fictional measurement. Therefore I think you might want to reconsider this, as you seem to have it backward.

In our minds, in theory, we can work with all sorts of time intervals, and time durations, these mental constructions we might call "time potentially". Also, when we hand a name to a duration, like "day", "hour", "second", these are 'time potentially", because they do not refer to any actual, specific time period. But when we use a clock to measure time, the passing of time, this is actual time, as time is actually passing. The clock provides us with a measurement, "ten seconds" for example. But this is back to a mental construction. "Ten seconds" is potential time, unless we relate this to the actual passing of time in the world, for context, and say in qualification, "the ten seconds when...".

Where? — Dfpolis

That would be "Physics" Bk 4, Ch 11-14.

In Aristotle's definition, the territory is the changing world. Time is a coordinate we place on its map. — Dfpolis

I don't think you've read the section of the "Physics" which I refer to, if this is what you think.

219b: "Time then is a kind of number (Number, we must note, is used in two senses --- both of what is counted or the countable and also of that with which we count. Time obviously is what is counted not that with which we count: these are different kinds of thing.)"

That is not a definition because it is implicitly circular. The result of measurement is time. So, by your definition, time is both the source and result of measurement, which leaves us completely in the dark about what we are measuring. A's definition makes clear what we are measuring, viz. change, which he defines with no reference to time as "the actualization of a potency insofar as it is still in potency." — Dfpolis

It only becomes circular if you allow "time" to have both definitions, which would be equivocation anyway. So your argument that it is circular is an argument based in equivocation. The explicit equivocation is that "time" refers to both the thing measured, and what is produced by the measurement. If we adhere to the one definition, that time is what is counted, then the thing produced by the measurement is not time, but theory relating to time.

As an analogy, let "quantity" refer to the thing counted, and "number" refer to the counting theory. When a quantity is counted, the counting theory is employed to produce a theory which represents the thing counted. "There is x number of C in the lot", would be an example of such a theory produced from counting. Whether or not the theory is sound is not relevant here.

It may be the case that Aristotle in some ways establishes an equivalence between time and change, but he does qualify this by saying that time is the number of "continuous change". He defines "change" in terms of coming to be and passing away, and further with "cause". "Cause" is analyzed even further and divided into potential and actual. In a number of ways he describes how causes precede the end, and he also argues how time is a necessary condition for change. Therefore change is defined with reference to time. This is why he proceeds in the "Physics" from "change" to motion and time.

No, it does not. It allows us to eliminate misconceptions about spatially separate events. Some events are before or after a given event, no matter how we measure time. Others are not. If we fix upon a single place, the sequence of events is never in doubt. — Dfpolis

That sure looks like inconsistency to me. If one way of measuring time results in a reversal of before and after, in comparison with another, and time is defined with reference to before and after, then there is inconsistency within the way that time is measured.

Aristotle's defines time as "the measure of change according to before and after." — Dfpolis

He also says, that in another sense "time" is what is measured.

Of course, you could change the definition of time, but then you would need to ensure that it agreed with our normal time when the new definition reduced to that case. — Dfpolis

"Time" as that which is measured, is completely different from "time" as "the measure of...". One's the territory, the other the map, so to speak. But, they both agree with a "normal time", to some extent. Notice though, that the definition you provided is qualified with "according to before and after". This means that we must refer to an apprehended "before and after" to be able to employ time as a measure of change. And this is where the problem which points to, lies.

Since this is a very real problem, we ought to start with the other definition, that time is what is measured. Then we can say that "before" and "after" are products of the measurement of time, and the inconsistency in before and after which ucarr points to, is attributable to the way that time is measured, distinguishing between the measure, and what is measured. And, we can say deficiencies in the way that time is measured creates the appearance of inconsistency in before and after.

That time is what is measured is more consistent with our wider range of experience with the concept of "time" anyway. For example, when someone says what time it is. And when we see the problems of measurement exposed by the relativity of simultaneity, we can start to apprehend the need for more than one dimension of time, in order to give us precise measurement.

Good thing I didn’t specify a particular stop sign. — noAxioms

In your question you asked about describing "parts of the world". This implies particular stop signs. So it just means that your example was not relevant to what you asked for.

I know Bell’s point, but the marble thing is classical and thus doesn’t illustrate the point at all. — noAxioms

You are not grasping the fact that an act of measurement is essentially the same whether it is classical or quantum. There is an act, "measurement" and there is a result produced from the act of measurement, which is "the measurement". The idea that the result, the measurement, exists prior to the act of measurement in a classical measurement, is a fundamental misunderstanding of the act, which is misleading you into thinking that there is a difference in this matter, between classical and quantum measurement.

We could use the map/terrain analogy. The act of measurement is part of the act of making the map, and the resultant measurement is part of the map. The idea that "the quantity" is actually part of the thing measured (terrain), instead of a product of the measurement (part of the map) is a basic misunderstanding of the act of measuring.

In the example, the thing measured is called "the jar of marbles". The parameter is "the quantity of marbles in the jar". To describe the thing (jar of marbles) in terms of parameters requires parametrization which is a human act of defining boundaries. In this respect there is no difference between a classical measurement and a quantum measurement. The "quantity" is the result, posterior to the act of measurement, as derived from and posterior to parameterization. These are human acts which are necessarily prior to the existence of the quantity. This principle is validated by the nature of description in general, as "the property" is representative of the quale, so a property is part of the map, not the terrain.

What Bell is pointing out is that the vulgar way of understanding "measurement" misleads us because we commonly think that the quantity is what is measured, not what we assign to the thing after we measure it. The vulgar way confuses map and terrain. In mundane measurements this mistaken view is inconsequential, therefore it has propagated. But this view misleads us when we consider quantum measurements. It is not the case that quantum measurements differ in this respect, as you propose, it is the case that the vulgar way of understanding "measurement" is mistaken, and misleads us.

That’s a pretty idealistic statement. Not being one, I deny this. — noAxioms

It appears like your anti-idealist attitude is making it difficult for you to understand the nature of the act of measurement.

For instance, I described a stop sign, all without either of us observing it. — noAxioms

To describe a type of thing, a stop sign for example, is not the same as describing a particular thing, like a particular stop sign.

It seems a form of reality supervening on models instead of the other way around. The baguette is skinny and long. The baguette is circular. Both are equally valid. Something like that. — noAxioms

It's not that they are equally valid, but they are equally true, "true" meaning corresponding with reality.

But the baguette being circular and skinny-long are not wrong descriptions, but neither are they complete. Neither fully describes the thing. — noAxioms

If you do not think that "long and skinny" is inconsistent with "circular", then so be it. I don't think that's something I can convince you of.

It was fixed, but then before they were counted, somebody goes and adds a handful more. — noAxioms

You are not grasping the point which Bell is making. The number is not fixed, because no one has determined the quantity. The quantity is not fixed until someone determines it. How could it be? Do you have an explanation as to how a specific numbered could be associated with the objects, unless someone counts them? Does God establish that relationship between the number and the container? If not, who does, if no one counts them?

It does not matter what is counted. What matters is how many marbles are in there. — noAxioms

Obviously, it does matter. If they are not counted there is no number which correlates. Tell me how there could be one specific number which represents how many marbles are in there, if they have not been counted. Who would designate which number that is? And if no one designates the number, how can you say that there is a number which represents how many marbles are there?

Would you also argue that the winning number for a lottery is already designated before the draw is made?

No, I’m asking for vocabulary that you would accept in describing parts of the world that are not in a laboratory or anywhere else where attention is being paid by some human. — noAxioms

Describing something requires paying attention to it. How do you think that someone could describe a part of the world which has no one paying attention to it? You are asking for the impossible, what is excluded by contradiction.

OK, maybe I’m confusing your usage of both, and my stop sign example was a difference of perspective, in which case I need an example of a different PoV that isn’t a different perspective. Point of view usually means appearance from some specific location in space, but you seem to be using the term differently.
None of this seems to have anything to do with relativity theory. — noAxioms

Yes, you seem very confused as to what I was trying to say. I did not express it very well, so we better forget about that. It's very apparent that you have a completely different idea about what relativity theory says from what I do.

Relativity theory isn’t different depending on one’s realism stance on quantum theory and works pretty much the same either way. — noAxioms

It isn't the case that relativity theory is different depending on one's realism stance, but it is the case that a true realism cannot be maintained in the application of relativity theory.

Consider that within any system of formal logic, one must maintain consistency with the axioms. Any premise not consistent with the axioms cannot be employed because it would cause contradiction and incoherency. Take what you said above for example. Axiom: to be described requires that the thing described be observed. If we now proceed with the premise that we can describe something which has not been observed, we'll run into some incoherency.

Realism is not consistent with relativity. Refer back to Galileo's initial development of relativity theory. His point was to show that the orbits of the planets could equally be represented by the geocentric model, or the heliocentric model. By relativity theory each model is equally correct, there is no such thing as the "real" representation. That each representation, or description, is equally correct, and they are contradictory to each other, is the reason why relativity is not consistent with realism. Are you familiar with "model-dependent realism". This is an attempt to make relativity theory consistent with realism, but it isn't a form of realism at all. It just borrows the word "realism", assuming itself to be the closest thing to realism which we can get under the precepts of relativity theory.

The actual physical system isn’t any different due to your choice of description... — noAxioms

Yes it is different. The actual physical system is as described, and the descriptions differ. That's the point. There is no axiom which allows us to say that the physical system is different from what is described, because that would imply that the description is wrong. And, the descriptions differ according to one's choice of description. Therefore the actual physical system is different depending on one's choice of description. For more information read about model-dependent realism.

If you are a hard core realist, there is an escape from this trap. The escape is to realize that relativity theory is not truthful. What it says about the world is a falsity, and we just use it as a useful tool, but the tool is not a truth. Then we can reject model-dependent realism as just a manifestation of relativity theory, and we can maintain a true realism.

Marbles in a jar is a classical system, and yes, the count of them is fixed before they’ve been counted. At the quantum level, which is what Bell was talking about, these things are not necessarily true. — noAxioms

What Bell is saying, is that this idea, that the number of marbles in the jar is fixed, prior to the count is a misleading idea. The quantity of marbles, the number which corresponds with the physical situation, is only determined through a judgement. So the idea, that the number is fixed, prior to the count is a false idea.

Think about this. If the number is fixed, prior to the count, then it is necessary that nothing changes in the meantime, the time between the fixing and the count. If it is even possible that something could change, then we cannot say that the number is fixed. So we tend to think along the lines of Newton's law of inertia, and we figure that a force would be required to change things, so if the jar is watched in the meantime, we'd see if a marble was added or removed. Therefore if we exclude all the ways that we deem are possible ways that the quantity could change, then we can say that the number is fixed. But what if we do not apprehend all the possible ways, and there's other ways, what a physicalist might call "magic" or something like that. The proper conclusion therefore, is to recognize that the number is not actually fixed prior to the count, because there is always some logically possible way that it could change in the meantime. The idea that the number is fixed prior to the count, is just another useful tool that is not the truth about the situation.

Responding to you is very time-consuming, and not enlightening as we go over the same points repeatedly. So, there is no sign that we are approaching agreement. — Dfpolis

I believe we have come to have a much better understanding of our differences, at least I think I understand your perspective much better. The biggest gap between us seems to be concerning the nature of things like selection, choice, decision, and judgement, as well as the relationship between possibility and these. So if we get together again, we'll know where to start. Until then, thanks for the stimulating conversation.

You are conflating sense experience, which is how we know intrinsic properties, with the experience of mental processes, such as judging. It is not that judging is a type of experience, but that we experience judging. — Dfpolis

I've told you already, this is a division which cannot be made. And we discussed what your use of "intrinsic properties" refers to. You agreed that it refers to properties of "awareness", not properties of the sensible object. The point is that we cannot separate sense experience from mental processes, to look at the intrinsic properties of sense experience, independent of mental processes, as you claim, because mental processes are intrinsic properties of sense experience.

Again, this is confused. The judgement is wrong, not the experience of making a wrong judgement. — Dfpolis

By what principles do you separate the judgement from the experience of making the judgement? The experience of judging, and the act of making the judgement are one and the same. How do you say that it is the judgement which is mistaken, but the act of judging, which is the experience of judging, is not wrong? Of course it is the act, which is the experience, which is mistaken.

Associations are not choices, either. — Dfpolis

To associate is to connect with the mind. This is done by choice. Your drive to separate basic associations done at the level of sense experience, from selective causes, for the sake of separating sense experience from mental processes, is inclining you deeper and deeper into false premises. I warned you about this already. You need to turn your ship around, stop trying to support bad conclusions by adopting worse premises.

I am concentrating on truth and falsity because we are not discussing error in general, but having a false idea of an object's intrinsic properties. Other kinds of errors are irrelevant to that. — Dfpolis

Look, your premises have gotten so bad, that you are confusing your own principles now. You've said that judgement, as a mental process is the only thing capable of truth and falsity. You've said that abstraction of intrinsic properties of the sense object occurs at a level prior to judgement. Since we are talking about mistake, error, concerning these intrinsic properties it is impossible that we are talking about error in truth and falsity, which only can occur at the higher level of mental activity, judgement. Please, respect your own principles and maintain consistency.

Because we inherit our sensory capabilities. We do not select them. — Dfpolis

I was not talking about selecting our senses, I was talking about the senses being selective themselves. An intrinsic property of sensing is that it is selective. It must be if we represent the sensible objects as sense possibilities.

You simply refuse to accept that there is any sort of selective capacity independent from conscious choice. Where do you think conscious choice 'emerges' from? Or do you believe that no other living beings practise any sort of selection, then suddenly human beings evolve this radically new capability called "free will", which is not based in any other selective capacities of living beings?

I base my claim based on the physics and neurophysiology of sensation. If you want to see this as programming, then the author of the laws of nature and the initial state of the cosmos would be the programmer. — Dfpolis

This does not explain why you want to exclude philosophers from considering the laws of nature and the designer of those laws.

I agree that many possibilities are reduced to one actuality. I do not agree that the sensing subject has to choose what is sensed. Actual sensation is normally determined by the physical situation and the laws of nature. — Dfpolis

I told you why this is illogical. If sensation is 'determined" by the laws of nature, then it is impossible that many possibilities are reduced to one actuality. By the laws of nature things act on other things through the application of force. There are no possibilities, as these are all in the human mind. Furthermore, as Aristotle explains, a possibility cannot act, it must be acted on. Therefore if it is the case, as you say "many possibilities are reduced to one actuality", then something must select which possibilities will be actualized.

So you have two inconsistent and incompatible statements right within this paragraph. 1) "many possibilities are reduced to one actuality", and 2) "determined by the physical situation and the laws of nature".

Yes, we could. Potency alone does not entail free will. It just means that a change is possible. — Dfpolis

This in no way justifies your illogical claim. It is not the existence of potential which implies a selective process, it is the act which reduces a multitude of possibilities to one particular actuality which implies a selective process. If the act is determined, then the supposed other possibilities were not real possibilities. If the possibilities are real, then something must select. So the issue is not "change is possible", the issue is "change is actual".

The choice is yours, choose from the alternatives. Either the idea that the sensible objects consists of possibilities is really false, and this is just an illusion, based in a faulty mode of expression, an inaccurate way of speaking, or else the possibilities are real possibilities, and there is a selective process that "chooses" which will be actualized. The former is the view from modern determinist scientism, the latter is the view from Aristotle. The two are fundamentally incompatible.

Evolution can also help explain why vision evolved to see the wave lengths we do -- they are the ones that penetrate water, where vertebrates evolved. — Dfpolis

The answers to these questions are speculative, and unverifiable, therefore not scientific. The scientific method requires experimentation to verify theories. So it is not science which gives these answers, it is philosophy.

First, this confuses the first actuality of essence with the second actuality of the acts flowing out of a thing's essence. — Dfpolis

This make no sense to me. When you say "the acts flowing out of a thing's essence", are these acts of final cause, or what?

Finally, if the acts of substances were determined solely by their essences, they could not interact with other things and would be monads. — Dfpolis

What kind of act does a material substance have which would be other than its essence? That would not be an Aristotelian principle. I went through this already in this thread, Aristotle explicitly says in Metaphysics, Bk 7 I believe, that in the case of subsistent things, the thing and its essence are the very same. This is the law of identity. It makes no sense to say that a thing has an act which is other than its essence. A thing has a description, which is formal, and therefore actual, but this is not a proper act of the thing, it is what is predicated of a subject, in the sense of secondary substance.

The principle is that accidents are aspects of the substance, inhering in it, not distinct entities. The more aspects we know, the more we know of the whole. — Dfpolis

We already discussed this we do not know the properties, or accidents which inhere within the sensible substance. You agreed that what we know as "intrinsic properties" is what is intrinsic to our awareness of the thing, not the thing itself.

What follows is based on your misunderstanding of first and second act. — Dfpolis

It is you who misunderstands the two senses of "act". You represent one as potential. I went through this with you already. You distinguish actually "operating" from "being operational". The latter though, "being operational" is just the potential to operate, and therefore not a true sense of "act" as Aristotle intends, an "actuality".

Aristotle's distinction is described as the distinction between the act of being in "possession of knowledge", and "the actual exercise of knowledge'. The former, "possession of knowledge" is the type of actuality which the soul is said to have. We cannot represent "possession of knowledge as you do, because this reduces it to the potential to exercise knowledge, which is not an actuality but a potential. Therefore we must represent it as a form, an actuality, which has the knowledge inherent within, as a possession, rather than as the potential which is the possessed knowledge.

So that is the mistake in your interpretation of these two senses of actuality. You represent the actuality which possesses the knowledge, as the possessed knowledge (a potential), when you say "being operational", instead of representing the actuality, "the soul", as separate from the potential possessed, (the potential to operate), and as the actuality which possesses that potential. In other words, you represent the predicate, "being operational" which is a potential, as if it were the subject itself, the soul, which is what is actual.

The soul is the actuality of the organism. That actuality includes the power of awareness, aka the agent intellect. — Dfpolis

No, this is wrong. All the powers of the soul are distinct from the soul, as potencies, potentials, while the soul itself is defined as the first actuality. This excludes the possibility that "the power of awareness" (not a power listed by Aristotle), as a potential, is included with "the soul". These powers are what the soul possesses, the soul being the actuality which possesses the potential, it has them as habits. The soul is clearly described as separate (an actuality, form) from the potentials possessed, which are the powers.

See, your way of interpreting the first act, as itself a potential, renders all the potencies of the soul as inseparable from the soul, but this is not what was intended by Aristotle who described the soul as the first actuality, and the potential as what is possessed (knowledge possessed) by that first actuality.

The agent intellect therefore is necessarily separated from the soul (as actuality) by the passive intellect. The intellect in relation to the soul is a power of the soul, therefore a potential. Aristotle clearly lists intellection as one of the potencies of the soul. Therefore it is a potential in relation to the soul, as a power possessed by that actuality which is the soul. Likewise all the other powers of the soul explicitly exist as potentials. These are like predications of the subject, the soul being the subject, and the predicates being the habits of the soul, as what the actuality has in its capacity to act.

However, all the powers in relation to their proper objects are active and causal, receiving that actualization from the soul. so the agent intellect is active in relation to its object, the senses are active in relation to their respective objects, the power of self-movement is active in relation to its object, which is movement, the power of self-nourishment is active in relation to its object, nourishment. But in relation to the soul, which is the first actuality of the living body, all these powers are potentials.

I can because the process begins with physical operations, subject to physical analysis, and ends in an intentional operation, subject to intentional analysis. — Dfpolis

This is wrong, the process "began" a long time ago with the soul as the first actuality of the living body, causing the body to become organized in a particular way, so as to be able to sense. Clearly this is prior to the "physical operations" and therefore where the process really begins.

No. The soul is not a Cartesian res. It is the first actuality of a body. What acts is the whole -- the living organism, not some aspect of it. You are committing the mereological fallacy here. — Dfpolis

This makes no sense. The whole, the living organism, is the body of which the soul is the first actuality. Any act of the whole is necessarily an act of the soul which is the first actuality of that organized body.

I have no problem with this principle. My problem is with how you are applying it. The end of organic activity is the good of the organism = its self realization. The application to sensing and knowing is that information contributes to more effective living -- living better suited to our self-realization. Sensing and knowing could not do this unless they informed us of reality -- of the things we interact with as we interact with them. I am arguing that they do, and showing how they do. — Dfpolis

The point though is that "the good" is relative to the soul itself, as the first actuality, not relative to any specific organism. Therefore the end is not the good of the organism, but the good of the soul. This is why the death of organisms is a necessary feature of evolution. Therefore "self-realization" is not relevant, and consequently your assumptions about sensing and knowing are also unfounded. Until you start with the good of the soul, instead of the good of the individual organism, you have not an appropriate approach to sensing and knowing.

That is not my claim. My claim is that only judgements can be true or false, because only they make assertions about reality. Experience, concepts, associations -- none of them claim anything about reality. So, none of them can be true or false. — Dfpolis

We agree here, the problem is that you want to equate error with judgements of true and false. But this overlooks the evidence that the bulk of errors occur in judgements which are other than judgement of true and false. Therefore we must conclude that error extends far beyond judgements of true and false.

I agree. For example, there can be practical judgements -- about what should be done -- or judgements of taste -- what we prefer and what we have no interest in. Still, this does not bear on whether we can know intrinsic properties. — Dfpolis

Yes it does bear on whether we know intrinsic properties. That is because what we perceive as properties which are "intrinsic" to the sense object might be erroneous. Therefore what we know is not really 'intrinsic properties", but something else which is subject to error.

That is not an error. Being unable to "distinguish what" means we did not sense enough to elicit a prior concept. It does not mean that we did not experience what we experienced. It is impossible not to experience what we experience. — Dfpolis

"Error within experience" does not imply that the person did not experience what was experienced, it implies that mistake is inherent within the experience. To make a judgement is a type of experience, and to make an erroneous judgement does not imply that the person did not judge what was judged. No, it implies that the person's experience of judging was erroneous. Your assertion that there cannot be error within experience because this would imply that the person did not experience what was experienced is nonsensical.

I did not say that they cannot be, but, since you bring it up, they cannot be because associations are not assertions that could be true or false. — Dfpolis

How many times do I have to tell you? "Error" is not necessarily related to truth and falsity, it is related directly to mistake, and many mistaken actions are not assertions which could be judged as true or false. "Mistake" is best understood as a wrong choice, and most choices which a person makes do not involve assertions which could be judged as true or false. So the majority of errors which human beings make cannot even be classed as errors by your restrictions. That's how erroneous your category of "error" is.

I have not talked about selection in reference to sensing, but clearly we can choose to look at an object, or avert our eyes. The selection I was discussing was our choice to attend to some aspects of what is sensed, and not others. It does not select our physical interaction, but our mental response. We do this all the time. In racial profiling, police focus on a person's appearance instead of their behavior. We may be interested in the time displayed instead of a clock's mechanism (or vice versa). — Dfpolis

I was the one talking about "selection", and I insisted that you need to recognize that selection occurs within the sense organ. You agree with me that there are aspects of the form of the sensible object which the sensing being senses, not all of the form in completion. How do you think it is the case that some parts of the form are sensed, but not others, unless there is some type of selection going on?

All you provided for me as an explanation of your belief is that it is automatic, the senses just happen to respond to specific stimuli automatically. What do you believe, that the senses are programmed like a computer, or some other piece of machinery to respond automatically to specified stimuli? Who do you think does the programming?

Yes. — Dfpolis

So you agree that the object exists as a multitude of possibilities. Do you not understand that when a specific set of possibilities is actualized out of a multitude of possibilities, it is necessary to assume that something selects which possibilities will be actualized? That is a necessity, because if it was just a matter of determinist causation, then we could not truthfully say that there were any possibilities in the first place.

Therefore in order to portray the sense object as existing as possibilities to the sensing being, you must allow that the sensing being selects from these possibilities. So when specific possibilities are actualized by specific sense organs, this is a selection process carried out by the sensing being. Otherwise you cannot say that the sense object exists as possibilities, because this would not be consistent, possibilities being actualized without any selection.

Still, there is no active selection by sense organs. They respond automatically, in a way specified by their intrinsic nature and current state. — Dfpolis

Do you not see the logic? If the sense object is present to the sensing being as possibilities, then when specific possibilities are actualized, this must be through a process of selection. If there is no type of selection made, then there is automatic, deterministic efficient causation, and there is no real possibilities in the sense object. The sense object just exists as active efficient causes acting on the senses, in a deterministic way, and it would be completely erroneous to represent those active efficient causes as possibilities.

This is not a philosophical question. It is a question for a neurophysiologist or an evolutionary biologist. From a philosophical perspective, it is a contingent fact that we can sense some forms of interaction and not others, and, as a consequence, our experiential knowledge is limited. — Dfpolis

Are you saying that it's a fact that we sense some things but not others, yet philosophers ought not ask why this is the case, because that's a question for neurophysiology? Come on Df, you've got to be joking. Neurophysiology intends to explain how the senses work, it does not question why the eyes are designed to interact with light, and why the ears are designed to interact with sounds, and why there are some things which we cannot sense at all.

That is not the basic reason we cannot know essences exhaustively. The basic reason is that essences specify a substance's possible acts, not just its actual acts. — Dfpolis

This is completely unAristotelian. Essence is form, actuality. Essence does not specify possibilities. Possibilities are derived in another way.

I have no problem with this. In Scholastic language, you are saying that we do not know fully know substantial forms. That does not mean that we do not know accidental forms, which is all that I claim that we know.

In reflecting on this, you need to realize that accidents are not separate from substances, but aspects of them. So, a growing knowledge of a substance's accidental forms is a growing knowledge of its substantial form. — Dfpolis

The problem though, is that primary substance, the sensible object, consists of matter as well as form. And why this is a problem is that matter must be understood as the essence of such objects. And since form is what is intelligible to us, this implies that we cannot know the essence of sensible objects. So you say that "a growing knowledge of a substance's accidental forms is a growing knowledge of its substantial form", but this is not true. There is a gap between the two which cannot be bridged as you suggest. Knowledge of a substance's accidental forms in no way implies knowledge of it substantial form, unless the principles required to bridge this gap (metaphysical principles) are produced.

Aristotle is quite clear in De Anima, that the sense organ changes in sensation. Being changed is undergoing passion. — Dfpolis

I believe you have already demonstrated that you misinterpret Aristotle. He distinguished two senses of 'actual" when defining the soul. You have representedAone of these as a form of potential. At Bk2 Ch 5 when he begins discussing the power of sensation, he refers back to those two senses of actual, and now describes two senses of potential. He says at 418a 3, "We cannot help using the incorrect terms 'being acted upon or altered' of the two transitions involved."

So, he uses these words, "acted upon", "altered' but he is explicit in saying that this is not a correct description. The words facilitate the discussion, but do not actually produce a true representation of the process, hence they are said to be "incorrect terms".

You need to reread De Anima III. The role of the agent intellect is to make intelligiblity actually understood. The actualization of potential information (intelligibility) requires an agent in act, viz. the agent intellect. — Dfpolis

This is not inconsistent with what I said. But what I also said was that the intellect is passive in relation to the soul, which is the source of actuality of the agent intellect. Bk3, Ch8. "Within the soul the faculties of knowledge and sensation are potentially these objects, the one what is knowable the other what is sensible." In relation to the soul, ("within the soul"), the powers are potencies, potentials, but in relation to their proper object the powers act. So the agent intellect provides the act which makes intelligibility understood, as you say, but the intellect is still passive, as a potential in relation to the soul, which actualizes the intellect to act as the agent intellect.

With regard to (1) I think Aristotle thought of sensation holistically, starting in the physical modification of the sense organ by the sensible object, and terminating in awareness, which is an intentional process. So, I half agree with you: immateral operations are involved in his model, and in them (but not in the physical operation of the sense organ) the agent intellect is an efficient cause. However, Aristotle did not see the operation of the agent intellect in awareness of sense data. He belived its proper object was universal knowledge. That was an error on his part. — Dfpolis

How can you claim consistency between "the agent intellect is an efficient cause", and, "starting in the physical modification of the sense organ by the sensible object, and terminating in awareness"? You have the start in the modification of the sense organ, and the end in awareness, as a sort of chain of efficient causation, yet you want to say that the agent intellect is the efficient cause as well. How can the efficient cause (as the agent intellect) be at the end point as well as the beginning point in a chain of efficient causation?

However, if we say that the agent intellect acts as final cause, immaterial causation derived from the soul, then we can also allow that the act of the sense object on the sense organ is efficient causation. But as I've been explaining to you, in relation to final cause, efficient causes are selected for, as the means to ends. The actions of the sense objects on the sense organs are selected for, by the final cause of the soul.

Being physical does not mean that it is not an act of the organism and so an expression of (not an act of) the soul as the actuality of the organism. — Dfpolis

An expression of the soul is an act of the soul. I don't think there are any principles allowing you to separate physical acts of the organism from acts of the soul. As the first actuality of the living body, all physical are acts of the soul. And, it makes no sense to separate physical acts, and call them 'expressions" of the soul, and say that expressions are not acts.

No, I do not. If I see a spider, it is acting on me. All I am doing is recognizing that we not only act, we are also acted upon (aka suffer passion). Interaction involves both acting and being acted upon. — Dfpolis

Sure, I do not disagree about "interaction" we've agreed on this already. What I am trying to impress on you is the priority of final cause over efficient cause, within the acts of the living being. in relation to final cause, efficient causes are apprehended as possibilities, as possible means to ends. Since efficient causes are apprehended as possibilities in relation to final cause, then final cause is prior in the absolute sense. This is why the soul is defined as "the first actuality". It is first in causal power, as the first actuality.

The insight that only judgements can be true or false is central to Aquinas' theory of truth. — Dfpolis

But you seem to make a type of inversion fallacy, because you claim that judgements can only be of truth or falsity. Aquinas might be right, that judgements are the only type of things which can be true or false, but this does not mean that all judgements must be either true or false. There are all sorts of different types of judgements, in the general category of "judgement", which do not involve truth and falsity. Judgements of truth and falsity are a specific type of judgement. Likewise with "error". Errors in relation to truth and falsity are a specific type of error, but this only constitutes a small percentage of all the mistakes which people make, which are called errors.

We are not talking about memory, but sensation. The "recognition" that is subject to error is judgement. You have provided no example of an error in experience per se. — Dfpolis

I cannot understand sensation without memory, this is incoherent to me. Sensation is the activity of a thinking being with a brain and a nervous system. I gave you an example of error in sensation, when you cannot distinguish what you are seeing. I could say the same for all the senses, when you can't tell what you are tasting, feeling, hearing, or smelling. If you want to make sensation something other than this to support your erroneous definition of judgement, and your proposed faulty way of separating sense acts from mental acts, then so be it.

Of course, judgement is superior to mere association. — Dfpolis

What is your argument now, that "association" (which my dictionary defines as "connect in the mind") is an aspect of sensation, but judgement is not? This is all becoming very incoherent to me.

How do you think that association occurs without the use of memory? What is associated with what, if memory is not involved in this act? And, why would you think that associations cannot be erroneous. If the association made is not conducive to the desired end which caused it to be made, then it is erroneous. Or is it your intent to remove final causation from "association", leaving no principle by which it may be judged as useful or not? If so, then all associations would be random and this could not provide any foundation for any knowledge to be built upon.

I have no idea what you are talking about. Judgement is not a process that rejects notes of intelligibility. Abstraction selects some notes, but it does not reject the others. It just leaves unattended notes alone for the present. — Dfpolis

When i look at something as illogical and incoherent, like the claims which you are presenting to me, i reject them as unintelligible. That is an example of judgement. Your narrowing of your conception of "judgement' is leaving it without any real instances to correspond with.

This is what happened to Socrates and Theaetetus in the dialogue with that name. They spoke of "knowledge" in a way which required that knowledge must contain only truth and no falsity, then they found no instances of any possible way that falsity could be excluded from the stuff which we call "knowledge", so they concluded that they were going in the wrong direction, they started with an erroneous idea of "knowledge".

That's what I find is occurring with you definition of judgement. You exclude "association" as not a form of judgement, and you exclude the use of logic as not a form of judgement, so what are you left with? Can you give an example of judgement which would not be a matter of association nor a matter of applying logic? You've already mentioned "classification", but to me classification is just a form of association, which you've already separated out to say that it occurs in sensation rather than abstract thinking and is not a form of judgement.

No. We do not. The object does not typically select anything, as most objects have no will by which they could select. They simply interact with their environment, including organisms capable of sensing some forms of interaction. We are one of those organisms. — Dfpolis

I was not talking about the object selecting, I was talking about the subject selecting. You said:

"The action of the object on our neural state is an aspect of the object's actuality or form. ... For example, the object has intrinsic optical properties (aspects of its form) that interact with light and our eyes to create a visual image. That image is both the action of the object, and an aspect of our neural state."

Clearly there are "aspects" of the form which the sensing being senses. The being does not sense the entirety of the form. The issue of "selection" is the question of how does the being select which aspects of the object's form will interact with it.

From the perspective of the being, the object exists as a multitude of possibilities for interaction. Only some of these possibilities are actualized in the act of sensation. Therefore the being must somehow "select" from those possibilities. That is the issue of "selection" which I was talking about.

You are confusing "selection" with specific responsiveness. Sense organs respond to specific kinds of stimuli, but they do not select what they respond to. Their response is automatic, not by choice. Consequently, we cannot and do not know objects exhaustively, but only as they relate to us. I have said this a number of times. This is what Aquinas means when he says that we do not know essences directly, but only via accidents. — Dfpolis

This does not answer the problem of selection. Let's assume that all responses are automatic, in respect to a specific kind of stimuli, as you claim. The question is why does a sense organ respond to only a specific kind of stimuli, and not to other stimuli. This is a matter of "selection". The sense organ must select, from a vast field of potential stimuli which specific kind of stimuli it will respond to. Clearly it does not respond to all stimuli, so it must somehow select a type of stimuli to respond to. Saying that its response to the specific type is automatic, does not answer the question of how that specific type was selected for.

So, we have this matter unanswered. And, we move on to the rest of your paragraph. "Consequently, we cannot and do not know objects exhaustively, but only as they relate to us." Now you need to acknowledge that what underlies "as they relate to us" is "as we select", in this matter. So "we cannot and do not know objects exhaustively", because we know them selectively, and deficiencies in our selective processes leave us unable to know objects exhaustively. We can write this off to evolution, and say that evolution has not provided us with the means to know the object exhaustively, but the fact remains that the form of the object which exists in the mind of the knower is not the same as the form of the object known, and this is very evident in what you say about Aquinas.

Tada!! YES. That is why I keep saying that the object is sensible. — Dfpolis

Now, can you take the next step, and grasp the reality that if the object exists as potential to the sensing subject, there must be a process of selection which determines which potentials will be actualized? And, this selection is caused, and that type of causation is what is known as final cause? We cannot say that this type of causation is random, because random selections and associations cannot support any type of knowledge.

No! Because what is merely potential cannot act, and, in particular, cannot act on the sense organ. — Dfpolis

You keep refusing to recognize that the act of sensation is an act of the sensing being. The source of the "act" here, is the first actuality, the soul itself. You know that the soul is active, actual. And, the object sensed exists as potential, from the perspective of the active soul, whose form of act is that of final cause, as described in the "Metaphysics". There is no need for the sense object to act on the senses, because the soul as the first actuality of the organized living body makes this body active in relation to the passive sense object. And this is how the soul can select which type of potential the various parts of the body (sense organs) will actualize in sensation, by being prior to, (as the first actuality), that very body which selects from those potentials, which exist as the sense object.

What Aristotle pointed out, and I keep repeating, is that one and the same event (actually sensing) actualizes two potentials: (1) the object's potential to be sensed (its sensibility) and (2) the subject's capacity to sense. The sensing event is an action of the object and a passion of the subject. — Dfpolis

See, you even talk about this "actual sensing", as if the organism is carrying out the act, "sensing". Then you go on to describe it as if the sense object is carrying out the act. And you conclude "sensing event is an action of the object". That is implied inconsistency.

You are completely ignoring Aristotle's designation of the soul as the first actuality of the living body, and the very fact that "living" is an activity. There is a reason for that designation. This makes all the powers of the soul, sense organs included, potencies, potentials in relation to the soul itself. He determines these powers, such as sensation and intellection as potentials, because they are not all active all the time. That is essential to understanding Aristotle's "On the Soul". The powers of the soul, potentials, must be actualized by the soul, to be active, operating, otherwise they lie dormant as potentials. And the fact that they are actualized by the soul, in the act of living, makes them each active in relation to each one's respective proper object, which exists as passive potential.

I suggest that this is how we ought to understand the passive and active intellect. Prior to Aristotle there was confusion between soul and mind, the two were sometimes used interchangeably, and sometimes distinct. There was a lot of ambiguity in Plato and others. Aristotle provided a proper separation between the soul, as first actuality, and the intellect as a power of the soul. This means that in relation to the soul, the intellect exists as potential, passive, to be actualized by the soul. And when it is actualized by the soul it is the active intellect.

This is not material causality on the part of the object because the object is an agent acting to modify the state of the sense organ. — Dfpolis

This is backward, not Aristotelian, but the perspective of modern science, which sees the object as an active cause, acting on the sense organ. But Aristotle describes the sense organ as potential in relation to the actuality of the soul. When the sense organ is not active (in sleep for example), it exists as the potential to sense. The soul as the first actuality, must activate it, and then it is actually sensing. When it is sensing, the sense organ is active in relation to the objects sensed, which are passive. That's why we intuitively comprehend the reality of our environment as "objects", first, then motion of the objects second. To the senses, which are active, the things being sensed are passive, objects.

You are confusing sensation as a physical process with awareness, which is an intentional process. In sensing, the object is an efficient cause. In awareness, it is a material cause. — Dfpolis

No, you are misrepresenting, "sensation" in an unAristotelian way, as a physical process, instead of as an act of the soul. You do not seem to comprehend that the soul is the first actuality, and that the powers of the soul, like self-nourishment, self-movement, sensation, and intellection exist as potentials relative to the actuality which is the soul. So you do not recognize that in Aristotle's conceptual space, the act of sensing is an act of the immaterial soul, through the operation of the sense organs, rather than a physical process. And this is why your descriptions are so backward in relation to Aristotle's descriptions.

he same thing can be actual in one respect, say being a living organism, while being potential in different respects, being sensible and intelligible. — Dfpolis

Here, you recognize that being a living organism is a type of act, but you refuse to recognize that the things which living organism do are also acts. So you do not see sensing as an act, you see it as a passivity in relation to the active sense object. This is to stray from Aristotle, who sees sensation as an act of the living organism rather than as an act of the sense object.

Do you have a citation in Plato for this? I would like the reference to compare Plato's with Aristotle's doctrine. — Dfpolis

The Republic, Bk 6, specifically 508b "What the good itself is in the intelligible realm, in relation to understanding and intelligible things, the sun is in the visible realm, in relation to sight and visible things". You'd be best off to read the entirety of that chapter, to get an understanding of the context and the complexity of the issue.

No. The will, which does the selection and directs the agent intellect, is drawn to the good. — Dfpolis

Why do you say "no" here? It appears like you are saying the same thing as me, but in a different way. If the will is drawn towards the good, and also directs the agent intellect, then if the agent intellect judges, this is done in the direction of "the good".

I really do not understand your way of conceiving judgement. it appears like you want to make judgement distinct from choice and selection, but why?

What would you call an interaction between systems of which humans are completely unaware, say where one system (some radioactive atom) emits an alpha particle which alters a second system (some molecule somewhere) by altering its molecular structure (and probably heating up the material of which the molecule is part). It isn’t a measurement because there’s no intent and no numerical result yielded, so what word describes this exchange between the atom and the molecule? — noAxioms

It's all descriptive. There's no way around it. That's why it becomes "the hard problem" for those who do not accept the reality that there's an unbridgeable gap between the map and the territory. And, the problem is that the description is completely different depending on the perspective one takes. That's the importance of understanding the true nature of relativity theory.

We can take "relativity" in two ways. 1) The world appears different to us, depending on the perspective we take. 2) The world is different from different points of view. The former is realist, as assuming a true way that things are, independent of the various perspectives. The latter assumes no such independent "real" point of view. And the problem is that to apply relativity theory, and make it work for us, we need to assume the latter. Since that position is adopted for the purpose of applying relativity theory, we cannot make the results derived from the application of relativity theory compatible with the realist assumption of a real independent world. We must recognize and respect this fact, that whatever results are produced from the application of relativity theory, these are fundamentally incompatible with that form of realism.

Consider "an apple hanging from a tree". That's one way of describing the scenario, it's a static scenario, though "hanging" is still a verb. But we could also describe it as a whole bunch of different molecules with atoms interacting, and the gravity of the earth interacting with the massive molecules, putting immense force on the stem, until with ripeness, the atomic and molecular interactions change considerably, and the apple falls.

Notice, the former is a very simple description, as a static state, it takes no account of the passing of time, except for the word "hanging". The latter description makes an attempt to account for the effects of time passing, by describing the scenario in terms of activity.

This is what I am talking about. What precisely physically ‘does something’ to a system that makes its [past] state change, I say physically because I’m not talking about somebody’s mere knowledge or description of a system. I assure you it isn’t the determination of a numerical value by a conscious entity that changes the target system. — noAxioms

This question is answered with "the passing of time". The passing of time "does something" to the system, and we have only the vaguest idea of what it does. Sometimes it's named by "entropy". But what the passing of time really does, is understood much better through terms other than "entropy". You see, we understand the future in terms of possibilities, what may or may not happen, and the past we understand in terms of actualities, what has actually happened. This leaves "the present" with a peculiar temporal position, as the time when possibilities are selected for as the ones which will be actualized. And this actualization of possibilities we observe as the activity which occurs at the present.

The significant and important thing to consider here is that when a vast multitude (even approaching infinity) of possibilities for the future is related to a single, or at least a very restricted number of actualities in the past, there is a need to assume a process of "selection". The determinist wants to describe the selection process as completely determined, while the free willie understands final cause as a type of causation which is not determined in that way. So the free willie concludes that if there is a way that the conscious human being can pick and choose from possibilities, as to which ones will be actualized, in an undeterministic way, so it must be in the greater universe in general, that something (traditionally "God") picks and chooses from the possibilities in an undeterministic way.

The wave function in quantum mechanics evolves deterministically according to the Schrödinger equation as a linear superposition of different states. — ”Wiki: Measurement problem

This "deterministic" evolution of the wave function is completely a feature of the type of description employed. It is described so as to be deterministic, when in reality, this description, the "superposition of different states", violates the law of noncontradiction, showing that this deterministic description is actually very faulty.

We can say, "the apple hanging on the tree" is a determinist description, and by Newton's laws that hanging apple will continue to hang, as an equilibrium, in its deterministic way, until a force causes it to fall. The deterministic wave function is analogous with the apple hanging, and we could place bets concerning the collapse, the fall. The deterministic bettor would look for the upcoming forces which would cause the fall. The undeterministic bettor would look at the passing of time itself, and the selective process which inheres within the passing of time itself (the Will of God), as a force which could potentially act on the apple. But the laws of physics, from the foundations of Newton's first law, which provides the basis for the deterministic perspective, do not have the required provisions for looking at the passing of time as a selective force. As Newton himself said, his first law takes the Will of God for granted. So if this implied selective process (as the Will of God) which is active at the micro scale, as time passes, actually makes selections, our determinist laws of physics have no way to account for these selections.

I was going to agree with this until the last bit about physical boundaries. A system’s boundaries are an arbitrary abstraction, nothing physical about it. But the arbitrary designations are needed for description, not for the actual processes to work. — noAxioms

You are not following the distinction I made between a system in theory, and an engineered system. The latter being a designed physically existing system created for the purpose of doing work. It has a physical boundary, and the energy lost to the system as entropy, may or may not escape somehow through this boundary, because where the energy which is lost to entropy actually goes to, is an unknown.

That’s pretty pragmatic to assume that, yes. It’s also pretty pragmatic to assume that I cannot choose to alter some event in the past, but it’s been demonstrated that one of those assumptions (if not both) are wrong. — noAxioms

Huh? I don't see how this follows at all. I don't think you understood what I said. I was taking that from the reference from Bell which you provided. I don't think you understand that quote very well. Here's the part:

When it is said that something is 'measured' it is difficult not to think of the result as referring to some pre-existing property of the object in question. — Against ‘measurement’ - John Bell, 1990

I discussed this principle in another thread with a number of participants. Suppose there is a jar with marbles in it. The marbles can be counted and this will determine the quantity. The others argued that the quantity is already determined, prior to the counting. The quantity is a "pre-existing property". But "quantity" is a human determination produced by the act of counting, and cannot exist prior to the counting. This idea, that the quantity determined by the act of measuring exists prior to the act of measuring, is what Bell is referring to here as a problematic way of looking at QM.

This faulty way of looking at reality is pervasive in the modern intellect. It seems to have been propagated by Platonism in mathematical axioms, which would imply that there is "a number" for the potential count, already in existence, and all we need to do is somehow find that number. The problem manifests deeply when the axioms deal with infinities, and assume that a "countable number" has some type of actual existence in the same way as a counted number.

I didn’t say a frame was a point. — noAxioms

This discussion is pointless (please excuse the pun, it just came out that way). You were arguing that "here" constitutes a frame. If you still can't admit to the fault in this, I really don't see the point to continuing.

If you disagree with that, then do you deny that Earth moves at about 30 km/sec relative to the sun? What additional references are required before that statement can be made? — noAxioms

Do you not see, that "the earth" and "the sun" involves two distinct places, unlike "here"?

It does not. For instance, there is the cosmological frame, an expanding metric that foliates most of the universe. — noAxioms

And "metric" doesn't imply "coordinate system" to you, in this context, such that a coordinate system is a logical necessity for a metric?

No, because I didn’t define it relative to that which says ‘here’. I chose a different origin, which was the nose of the rocket. In fact, I never used the word ‘here’ in releation to the frame of the rocket. — noAxioms

This is exactly the point. What we were discussing is the meaning of "here" in your previous example, and the ridiculousness of that example. Now you want to replace "here" with "the nose of the rocket", but you admit right here (excuse the pun again), that the two are not analogous.

The failure to distinguish between two different kinds of bodies, terrestrial and heavenly or primary body, leads to false assertions and conclusions. — Fooloso4

We already went through this Fooloso4. those quotes come from a small part of the beginning of Bk 1, ch2, we he is stating some principles, theories put forward by the Pythagoreans, as what will be discussed in the book. The arguments and refutations of some of these principles is what follows in the chapters I referred to. It's nonsense for you to take what he states as the current theories of his time, as what he actually believed, and then simply ignore all the arguments he provides concerning these theories. The various arguments are where he states his case. What you are doing is exactly what you accuse me of, to ignore what he actually wrote. You look at Bk1 Ch2, then completely ignore all the logical arguments made throughout ch 3,,4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.

Let me remind you of your argument. It did not involve the identity issue directly. I said that in classification, we compared intrinsic properties to the class concept. You said that we do not because we cannot know intrinsic properties because of the possibility of error. I countered that the recognition of falsity implies that we can know the truth. You said the very possibility of error implied falsehood. My response is above. — Dfpolis

Come on Df, that's a misrepresentation. What I said is that it is not the case that our knowledge of the sense object consists of knowing the properties which are intrinsic to the sense object (intrinsic meaning inhering within the the sense thing itself). And, my argument is that since there is a possibility of error within our knowledge of the properties, this proves that the properties which we know are not the properties which are intrinsic to the thing itself. If our knowledge of the sense object consisted of properties intrinsic to the sense object, it would be impossible that we are mistaken.

This confuses knowledge as acquaintance, by which we know forms or properties, with propositional knowledge, which results from judgement, and which alone can be true or false. Knowledge as acquaintance, which is what the actualization of intelligibility is, makes no assertion that could be true or false. We just experience whatever we experience. The possibility of error comes in categorizing what we experience. We might, for example, judge the tall pointy thing on the horizon is a church steeple when it is actually a pine. — Dfpolis

You are confusing "error" with "falsity". I already explained this to you, error does not necessarily mean false, it simply means mistaken, and this is "unsuccessful". It is very clear that "Knowledge as acquaintance" is very susceptible to error, poor memory, poor recognition, etc..

The problem here, is that you have restricted "judgement" to the higher levels of knowledge, propositional knowledge. Now you have no type of judgement involved in this "acquaintance" process, so you must say that this process cannot be wrong. But of course mistake dwell in the deepest levels, and your claim "we just experience whatever we experience" is nonsense, because something within the experiencing subject must select from that experience the aspects of it which will be remembered, and how they will be remembered etc.. And, there are all sorts of errors here.

This analysis shows that your conclusion is unfounded. The error does not result from the lack of a form in the knower (we experience a tall, pointy thing), but from the misclassification of that form. The misclassification is the result of adding associated, imagined or hypothetical elements not in the experienced form. (We add that it is a human artifact, that it sits atop an unseen structure, etc., etc.) This kind of "filling-out" may have evolutionary advantages, (the two eyes we see in the darkness might belong to a predator), but its results are unreliable. — Dfpolis

Sorry df, this nonsense has no sway over me. Error occurs without classification. We do not need to classify something prior to remembering it, in order to have a mistaken memory. We have mistaken memories about images all the time.

The opposite to what you say is actually what is the case. We classify things as a memory aid. Remembering the word "steeple " is much easier than remembering the image which was seen, so this facilitates memory. And when we put events into sentences, or descriptions into sentences, this enables us to remember entire sequences of images with a simple sentence.

It is very clear to me, that this higher knowledge, what you say is "judgement', actually eliminates a whole lot of errors which would otherwise occur if we did not have this judgement process. The processes which occur without this form of judgement are much more riddled with error. That's why human beings are generally considered to be more intelligent than other animals, they use this "judgement" process which the other animals do not use, to help them cut down on errors. And logic, as a higher form of judgement, helps us to even further reduce error.

Awareness has two aspects: intelligible contents (forms), and the awareness of those contents. In the first instance, we are aware of being -- that there is something present, something acting on our senses in empirical knowledge. The content of this inchoate awareness is Aristotle's tode ti (this something). If we choose to attend to it more closely, we begin to distinguish various notes of intelligibility, e.g. shape, color(s), dimensions and so on. These aspects of the whole are the "accidents" of Aristotle's Categories. — Dfpolis

But this "awareness" you spoke of is prior to the synthesis, prior to judgement. How can it consist of intelligible forms? Or, is there no difference between "intelligible forms" at the level of awareness, and "intelligible forms" at the post judgement level? If there is no difference, then what is the point of judgement? And if there is a difference, then wouldn't the ones which get rejected in judgement actually be rejected because they are not intelligible. If that is the case, then we cannot even call this content at the level of awareness "intelligible forms" at all, because some are intelligible and some are not.

I argue that the capacity to be aware of intelligibility is what Aristotle calls the "agent intellect" and it is a power of individual subjects. The intelligible content we are aware of is both an act of the object, and encoded by a modification of our neural state. Thus, it is a case of shared (accidental) existence. I say "accidental" because the action is an accident of the object, and the modification is an accident of the subject. — Dfpolis

So we have the issue of "selection" here, which I've been mentioning and you have not been addressing. The content at the level of awareness cannot all be intelligible, or else there would be no need for judgement at the higher level. Since there is a need for judgement, we must assume that the content of awareness contains many aspects which are unintelligible, illogical or nonsensical, just like when you see something in the distance and you can't tell what it is. So "judgement" is a form of selection which occurs at the intellectual level of reasoning. But many other forms of selection also exist.

Don't you think that there must be selective mechanisms built right into the sense organs, and the neurological system? The taste buds, and the cone cells in the eyes for example. Since these features are selective for the sake of some purpose, how can you say that they are accidental causes, on the side of the agent? In the Aristotelian conceptual space, things caused for a purpose are not accidental, but the product of final cause.

This answers your last question. The action of the object on our neural state is an aspect of the object's actuality or form. More precisely, it is the second actuality, or operation, of the object's form. For example, the object has intrinsic optical properties (aspects of its form) that interact with light and our eyes to create a visual image. That image is both the action of the object, and an aspect of our neural state. — Dfpolis

So that part of the questioning has been answered. The action of the "object's actuality or form, has a real causal impact. However, we still have to address the selective process which is inherent and intrinsic within the sensing subject. So when the eyes receive from the sense object, that activity which it will use in making the image, they select certain aspects of the activity which will be utilized.

Now here's the problem. If the sensing subject has the capacity to select from the object's actuality, then the object's actuality consists of possibilities, potentials, from the true perspective of the sensing subject. This would mean that the sense organs are not receiving forms from the sense object, but matter (potential) from the sense object. And so the type of cause which best describes the sense object's position is material cause. Since matter is what persists through a change, then in the act of sensation there must something which comes from the sense objects, and persists through the act of imaging, and the acts of abstraction and judgement, as the underlying matter. I would say then that the same matter might be within both the sensing subject, and the object sensed.

As I explained, in awareness, the neurally encoded content is the material, not the efficient, cause of knowing. — Dfpolis

This is consistent with what I just wrote above. However, if we take this approach we cannot say that the sensing subject receives the form from the sense object, because within the neurological system there is only the material content, rather than the form.

So, the intelligible form is the material, not the efficient, cause of knowledge. — Dfpolis

But this is a little confused now. Matter cannot be the "intelligible form", that is contradictory. And this is why we need to respect the selective process, judgement, intent, and final cause. The soul, with the intellect, operates as final cause, and selects the matter (as the means) best suited for the end. This is the Platonic principle of 'the good". The good he says is what illuminates the intelligible objects, like the sun illuminates sensible objects. So the good (the end) is the cause of the intelligible object in the sense that it is what makes it intelligible, like the sun is the cause of the visible objects in the sense that it is what makes the visible objects visible. And we cannot neglect the importance of this selective process, this final cause, which brings about an intelligible form from the material cause (neurological data).

Abstraction occurs when our awareness (the agent intellect) attends to some aspects of the object to the exclusion of others. So, we can be aware of the inchoate whole (tode it, the substance), and/or of some specific intelligible aspect(s) (accidents). These intelligible aspects are the intrinsic properties we are discussing. Since intelligibility is a precondition of knowledge, intelligible properties are prior to, and independent of, the act of knowing. — Dfpolis

This is that selective process, "attends to some aspects of the object to the exclusion of others". The issue is, that if the agent intellect has this selective capacity, then what is selected from must be possibilities, potential, therefore material. We cannot say that the aspects selected are "intrinsic properties", because properties are formal, and possibilities are material. And, the agent intellect selects on the basis of "the good", or "the end", not on the basis of intelligibility. Intelligibility in its relationship with the subject is posterior to the subject's relationship with the good, or final cause, as explained by Plato.

Since intelligibility is a precondition of knowledge, intelligible properties are prior to, and independent of, the act of knowing. — Dfpolis

Yes, is a precondition of knowledge, but intelligibility is not a precondition for selection. As I explained, selection is built into the sense organs. But selection is done for the sake of a good, final cause. Final cause and selection are prior to "intelligible properties".

Relativity shows simultaneity is local, not that it is somehow arbitrary. It is not the case that relativity in any way prescribes eternalism, although this has not stopped popular science authors from making this claim (or others from continually coming along to debunk it; I have not seen the debunking debunked in turn however, and it convinced me). — Count Timothy von Icarus

What I said in the quoted passage is that the idea that there is a present state of the universe, is shown to be unsound by special relativity, as a premise which is inconsistent with special relativity. This is consistent with "simultaneity is local". I wasn't talking about eternalism.

No one present is privileged, but you can have a "many fingered time," with multiple time variables. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure, but this presents a problem toward understanding any causal relations between "one present" and another present. The present is local, but there is still interaction between far away places, as the travel of light indicates.

That there are issues with positing the world as it is sans observers is quite true, but it is true even ignoring SR/GR. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I certainly agree with this. However, as a person who is a temporal realist, it is easy for me to see SR/GR as taking advantage of the fact that there are issues with positing the world as it is sans observers.

The issue is that knowing how the world would have been without observers is not a realistic counterfactual to entertain. This is because even if we could theoretically produce a "without observers" perspective, any sort of "knowing" which is derived from this perspective still implies observers, as "knowledge" has an observational aspect.

So the first thing that I notice, if I try to produce an observer-free perspective in theory, is that the "here" of "here and now" (here and now being the defining features of the observational perspective), could be anywhere, and the universe would maintain intelligibility. However, the now, since "now" must be restricted to a specific duration of time to make the universe intelligible, does admit to that freedom. If "now" were an infinite duration of time, the universe would be unintelligible because everything would be everywhere, now. The conclusion therefore, is that how we understand "now" determines which aspects of the universe will be intelligible to us.

So let me relate this to why I say SR/GR takes advantage of the problem with positing a world without observers. To understand the universe in its totality requires that we have a conception of "now", which accurately accounts for all the restrictions imposed by the reality of what now is. But SR/GR provides no real principles to account for the reality of now, thus allowing "now" to be defined by other principles. As explained above, this will render aspects of the universe (where the restrictions imposed by theory are not representative of the restrictions imposed in reality) as unintelligible.

Thisness—which is also known by medieval philosophers as haecceity—has its own special version in the work of Adorno, namely the non-identical. It’s the part of the thing that remains unique to it when you bring it under a category or think of it in terms of concepts, but which is lost sight of in this process. The singular thing is non-identical with the specimen, the latter being an instantiation, an example defined by categories, universals, or concepts. But the thing is not exhausted by any category you put it in, any abstract universal you bring it under, or any set of concepts you apply to describe it. — Jamal

:ok:

Possible errors do not imply actual falsity. — Dfpolis

Your categories are very confused Df. We were not talking about falsity, we were talking about identity. Your claim is that the form in the knower is the same as the form of the known sensible object. My argument is that the possibility that the form in the knower is mistaken indicates that they are not the same. There is no need to show actual mistake in any particular instance, to refute your claim. The premise that there is a possibility of mistake in any instance of the form in the knower, in its representation as the form of the sensible object, indicates that the two "forms" are not the same.

Please address the argument as it stands, and quit with your strawman misrepresentations. The argument does not move from what is possible to conclude what is actual. It is a refutation of your claim of what is actual. And it refutes your claim by moving from what is possible to conclude what is impossible. And the conclusion is that what you claim, is impossible.

No. First, there is knowing by acquaintance. It is not judgement, but an inchoate awareness of intelligibility. Second, we may parse or divide that awareness, abstracting property concepts. Judgement is a third movement of mind in which we reunite what we have abstracted, to form propositional knowledge. Thus, the abstraction (or knowing) of intrinsic property concepts is a necessary precondition for judgements about objects, and it is these abstracted concepts we compare to definitions in category judgements. — Dfpolis

OK, so in relations to the sense object, you say that there is first awareness, second a sort of analysis, which is to divide the "awareness", and third a sort of synthesis, which is to reunite abstracted parts to form propositional knowledge. "Judgement" you confine to this described synthesis, and you deny that the analysis portion ought to be called judgement.

Let me ask you now, what is this "awareness" which is divided in the second stage? What is the content? Obviously, you would not be talking about the sense object itself being divided, in this process of abstraction, it is the "awareness" of it which is being divided. Where does this awareness come from, and how does it exist? Would you agree that the "awareness" you speak of here, from which properties are abstracted is a property of the sensing subject, and not a property of the object sensed? How then is the "form" which comes from this abstraction "the same form" as the "form" which we call the actuality of the sense object?

Your Lockean prejudices — Dfpolis

First I was Kantian in my bias, now I'm Lockean.

our Lockean prejudices make you think that we know ideas, rather than objects, in the first instance. Yet, <This something is six-legged> is not a comparison of concepts, but of the source of concepts. The judgement means that the object that elicits the concept <This something> is the identical object that elicits <six-legged> -- not that the concept <This something> is identically the concept <six-legged>. — Dfpolis

By your own description above, it is not the sense object which elicits the concept, it is "awareness" of the object which does that. Awareness is a property of the subject not the object. So you are being inconsistent, unless "object" now refers to that property which the subject has as "awareness". Now, don't equivocate with "object" and say that this object which is a property of the subject, and is divided in analysis and abstraction is "the same" as the sense object.

So we need to know intrinsic properties prior to judging their type. — Dfpolis

Let's place these "intrinsic properties" now, which you keep referring to. Since the content, "awareness" is what is abstracted in the described analysis process, the "intrinsic properties" are intrinsic to the awareness. Do you agree?

I suggest that you reflect on the state of mind called "invincible ignorance" in which the will closes the mind to evidence that would undermine a prior belief. — Dfpolis

I am well exposed to this phenomena, having spent much time here at "The Philosophy Forum". You, are turning out to be a fine example. Maybe you'll address the above in a reasonable way, rather than totally misrepresenting all the evidence and arguments against your prior belief, as you are starting to do, and turn your ship around.

Yes, it does, because the vehicle of intelligibility is the phantasm or neural state encoding sensory content -- and it is identically the action of the sensible on our nervous system. So, it is the form or first actuality of the object, as expressed in the object's action (its second actuality), that the intellect grasps. — Dfpolis

Again, you are being inconsistent. According to your explanation above, (2) is not "sensory content", it is "awareness". And, it would be completely wrong to classify "awareness" as simply "sensory content", because awareness consists of many things, including memories (past) and anticipations (future).

You need to respect your own premises, and see how they are not consistent with your conclusions. The behaviour which you are starting to demonstrate though, is that you simply alter and reproduce your premises in a way which is intended to support your conclusions. This will leave your premises further and further away from what you truly believe, or what anyone truly believes. That's the problem which is the manifestation of "invincible ignorance", the sufferer will continue to describe the evidence in a more and more unreal way, as the willful means of supporting prejudice.

It is the first time I've seen you appealing to Kant. Had you done so earlier, I would have pointed it out earlier. Do you prefer "closet Kantian"? — Dfpolis

I really don't care how people classify me, but there's a lot worse names to be called than "Kantian". To me, name calling is a form of humour, to be laughed at. Perhaps that puts me on the side of the bully, who makes fun of others through name calling, but if I can't join in on the fun, where would that leave me?

I hate this piecemeal sort of reply. — Paine

Is the following ok, even though I put it in the same post as my reply to Dfpolis?

I did so here in response to: — Paine

The quotes in those posts showed no objection against what I had said. Eternal causes are actual, a sort of independent "form", and not natural, as I've been saying. The world, as well as the planet and stars (according to On The Heavens) are natural bodies and consist of matter. Therefore they are not eternal. Show me where you think that there is inconsistency between what I have said and what Aristotle has said, so I can determine whether this is due to your misunderstanding, my misunderstanding, or as in the case of fooloso4's references, inconsistency in the texts.

This does not make sense of much of what Aristotle has said. I am getting off the merry-go-round now. You do not recognize my efforts as efforts. I will make no more of them. — Paine

Have you read "On The Heavens"? He spends most of the first book demonstrating how the stars and planets which move in circular orbits must be material, natural bodies, generated and destructible. Here are some conclusions stated at the ends of the chapters. Ch 5: "We have now shown that the body which moves in a circle is not endless or infinite, but has its limits." Ch 6: "That there is no infinite body may be shown, as we have shown it, by a detailed consideration of the various cases." Ch 7: "From these arguments then it is clear that the body of the universe is not infinite." Ch 8: "We have now said enough to make plain the character and number of the bodily elements, the place of each, and further, in general, how many in number, the various places are." Ch 9: "Its unceasing movement, then, is also reasonable, since everything ceases to move when it comes to its proper place, but the body whose path is the circle has one and the same place for starting-point and goal. " Following this there are three chapters dedicated to discussion of whether the heaven is generated, destructible, or not. The last lines of Ch 12: "Whatever is destructible or generated is always alterable. Now alteration is due to contraries, and the things which compose the natural body are the very same that destroy it..."

Once again, see Bell’s quote above discussing why quantum theory should never have used the word ‘observer’ or ‘measurement’ for precisely the reason you are demonstrating: — noAxioms

I read that. It in no way indicates that there is not intent behind measurement in quantum physics. The article suggests replacing "measurement" with "experiment". The use of "experiment" simply enforces the fact that there is intent. And I really do not see how you can conceive of any sort of measurement (experiment) without intent. I explained already why I think measurement without intent is impossible, now it's your turn to explain how you think there could be such a thing.

To begin with, do you recognize that a system is an artificial thing, a human creation, whether it is a theoretical system, with boundaries imposed by theory, or a mechanical system, with created physical boundaries? And, artificial things are created with intent.

A rock measures the moon as much as I do, and so the moon exists to the rock. — noAxioms

All you are saying here, is that you've never measured the moon, because the rock sure hasn't, by any definition of "measure", measured the moon.

Realist is counterfactual definiteness, existence in absence of measurement. Existence due to measurement is not that. — noAxioms

How are you using "measurement" here? If to interact is to measure and be measured, as you seem to think (which is a ridiculous definition of "measure" not consistent with any actual usage), then by what principle do you assume that there is any sort of "existence in absence of measurement"? That would mean you are assuming something which interacts with nothing.

I expect such statements from Metaphysician Undercover, but you also seem to fail to use the quantum theory definition of 'measurement' in a topic discussing quantum theory. Hence the rise (and fall) of the Wigner interpretation which, due to that language ambiguity, gave rise to the proposal that consciousness causes wave function collapse, an interpretation abandoned by Wigner himself due to it being driven to solipsism. — noAxioms

You are not paying attention to the article which you requested that I read. The article suggests reasons why "measurement" should not be used, because "measurement" to most people implies some real existing aspect of the universe which is measured, like when we count something we assume that there is an existing quantity which can be counted and it has some real existence as that quantity, prior to being counted. This is what Bell says is misleading in quantum mechanics. What is being "measured" has no real existence prior to the measurement. And so he suggest that "measurement" be replaced with "experiment".

I leads the naive reader to suspect that humans are somehow necessary for physics to work, that the universe supervenes on you and not the other way around. — noAxioms

The issue is not the relation between human beings and the universe, it is the relation between human beings and the "measurement". In order to make a measurement there are constraints placed on the universe. These controls are necessary in order that the measurement measures what it is supposed to measure. The form of an "experiment" for example is to follow a specific procedure. It is necessary to follow the procedure in order to fulfil the intent of the experiment, which is to test an hypothesis.

Humans are necessary for the measurement. But when you represent the measurement (being the confines of the experiment) as the universe, you step way outside the boundaries of the measurement. The measurement is not measuring the universe, it is measuring whatever is being controlled for, which is dictated by the intent behind the experiment.

No, it doesn’t. I had specified the frame in which I was stationary. — noAxioms

You did not specify a frame, you said "here".

Just a velocity reference is enough, — noAxioms

"Here" does not provide a velocity reference. And you've got things backward anyway. A frame of reference, with multiple location points is required to make a velocity reference, not vise versa.

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but a ‘frame’ does not require additional references. — noAxioms

Yes it does, and you've misrepresent "frame" as a point. A point is not a frame.

As per the above, a specification of only the origin defines a frame... — noAxioms

No, a point does not constitute a frame. You seem to have no technical understanding of this matter, insisting that the coordinate system is derived from the frame, rather than that the frame is a derivative of the coordinate system. You need to straighten out your logical priority. "Frame" implies "coordinate system". There is no frame without a coordinate system as you seem to believe.

So I could for instance have a frame of a rocket with the origin at the nose, the very ‘front’. That point will always be at the origin no matter what the rocket does, but we need two more points to make a coordinate system of it. So say the rear-most point is on the x axis, and some feature on the side defines the y axis. The z is just orthogonal to the other two and requires no additional reference. Now it’s a coordinate system, and the ‘abort’ button is always (nearly) stationary in this coordinate system regardless of what the rocket does. The astronaut knows where the button is despite the motion of the rocket because he’s using that coordinate system when needing to hit that button. I say ‘nearly stationary’ because vibration and other stresses will move that button a mm or two now and then due to strain on the vehicle. — noAxioms

Your "frame" in this example is a coordinate system which maps the rocket, not one point such as "here". And if you say that the rocket is one point, "here", this is a misrepresentation, because the rocket is mapped as a frame of reference, consisting of a coordinate system with multiple locational points.

Very good, The latter half even constitutes the frame reference, which you almost always omit. — noAxioms

This clearly demonstrates your misunderstanding. a point cannot constitute the frame of reference.

If that is your argument, you need to rethink it. Possibilities do not imply actualities. — Dfpolis

You quoted only one premise of the argument, the other stated the actuality. If X then Y. (Possibility). X (Actuality). Therefore Y (conclusion).

No, you are not. Judging makes description possible, but it is not actual description. You are confusing potency and act. An actual description articulates a whole set of judgements in words or some other medium. Each individual property judgement is being aware (aka knowing) that the organism elicits the property concept. Judgement is not expression of a judgement. — Dfpolis

Ok, I'm fine to define "judging" in this way, as long as we stick to the definition. Each bit of knowledge is a judgement, and a description involves a bunch of judgements. But this doesn't really affect the issue. The description is still a matter of judgement, but instead of being one judgement it's a multitude of judgements, which is really what i meant anyway. I didn't mean to imply that an entire description consists of only one judgement.

To judge <A is B> we must be aware that the entity eliciting the concept <A>, say <this something>, is identically that eliciting the concept <B> grasping some property. Were this not the case, if a <A> were elicited by one thing, and <B> by another, the judgement would be unsound. Thus, the eliciting of concepts is a prerequisite for any sound judgement about an entity. So we have the following operations in sequence (1) sensing, (2) conceptualization, (3) judgement, and then, possibly, (4) expression in a description. — Dfpolis

I don't understand this argument at all. We never judge "A is B" in any unqualified way. We say "A is A", and "B is B", but not "A is B" because these two are different. We might say A is B in predication, but then one is the subject and the other the predicate. Or we might judge A and B as the same category, or place object A into category B, but that's different from saying "A is B" in any unqualified way. Such a judgement, "A is B" in an unqualified sense, is always unsound, so your argument demonstrates nothing.

The very expression "compare judgements" is deeply confused, because a judgement is an act of comparison. So, we could not compare judgements without first making the comparison that is the judgement we are comparing. — Dfpolis

As per your definition of judging, every bit of knowledge is a judgement, so it is you who is forcing this problem with a problematic definition of "judgement". Unless you allow that there is some form of knowledge prior to judgement you will always have this problem, it's a vicious circle. We need to allow that "judgement" requires knowledge, and can only be made after knowledge has accumulated, but this would undermine your argument of how judgement relates to description.

In essential causality, the operation of the cause and the creation of the effect are one and the same event -- and so identical. The builder building the house is identically the house being built by the builder. Please do not confuse this with accidental, or Humean-Kantian, causality, which is the succession of separate events by rule. — Dfpolis

Sorry, I cannot grasp this at all. I've never heard of "essential causality". It is not Aristotelian and seems to be a Dfpolis idiosyncrasy, so you'll have to provide a better description. it seems like a contrived statement to serve some purpose. What does "the operation of a cause" even mean? Your statement of identity would be much better stated as 'the cause is the same as the cause', or something like that. But what's the point to this?

It shows (1) the subject sensing is inseparable from the object being sensed, and (2) the subject knowing is inseparable from the object being known. This means that there is no possibility of an intervening factor such as Aquinas's intelligible species, Locke's ideas, Kant's phenomena or your descriptions. — Dfpolis

I don't see how it shows that at all. Now it is you who is claiming to get necessity from an argument consisting of possibilities. You have not at all shown how you produce this claimed necessity.

This selection should suffice. If not, read R. C. Koons, (2019) "Aristotle's formal identity of intellect and object: A solution to the problem of modal epistemology," Ancient Philosophy Today 1, pp. 84-107. — Dfpolis

There's only a couple mentions of identity in all those quotes, and they say that the mind is identical, or potentially identical with "its object". Obviously he is talking about intelligible objects here, not sensible objects, so you continue to equivocate between the two senses of "form". Nothing in those quotes indicates what you claim, that the form in the knower is identical to the form in the sensible object which is known. if Koons makes the same sort of error of equivocation, I'm not interested

The quotes support the distinction which I claim. This one for example: "and yet the distinction between their being remains." and this one: "identical in character with its object without being the object." "Identical in character" means identical in type, as is the case with intelligible objects, but this does not mean identical as in the same as the form of the particular object.

I am sorry that you cannot see that one and the same act makes the object's intelligibility known and the mind informed. I cannot make it any clearer than I have: the subject knowing is inseparable from the object being known. — Dfpolis

See, you are equivocating between 'intelligible' object and 'sensible' object. Of course the knowing subject is inseparable from the (intelligible) object known, because without that intelligible object, the subject would be not-knowing. But this says absolutely nothing about the knowing subject's relation with the sensible object. So to proceed toward any conclusions about the knower's relation to the form of the material object (sensible object) would be through equivocation only.

It is entirely relevant, as your Kantian commitments prevent you from understanding Aristotle, and through him, the nature of knowledge. — Dfpolis

Wow, that's the first time I've been called a Kantian. And, Fooloso4 says my Thomistic commitments prevent me from understanding Aristotle. it's a strange world we live in.

That is not a fair accounting. I have quoted Aristotle extensively where I think he does not support your thesis. — Paine

I agree that you've produced many, what I called "random" quotes. I called them random because I could not see how they were supposed to relate to any objection to what I said. And, when I asked you to explain what you were trying to say with these quotes, you never did. I find it a very odd form of discourse, to just produce a random order of out of context quotes, with no explanation.

I am no expert in the matter. It is obvious that we both have read a lot of primary text. I appreciate anyone who has made that effort. I am not making accusations but saying why your view does not make sense to me. — Paine

I also appreciate the fact that you have much experience with the text. In our last discussion on Aristotle, you gave me some indication as to what aspects of my perspective did not make sense to you. I think it seemed to be related to the active intellect and the immortality of the soul. Those are difficult subjects and ones not expressed clearly by Aristotle at all, so I think we can only approach these from different angles, which you and I demonstrate. In this thread, you haven't really indicated what it is I am saying which doesn't make sense to you. The quotes you produce seem mostly consistent with what I am saying (unlike fooloso4 who will scour the texts seeking anything which appears to contradict me), so I can't find your point of disagreement here. Still you claim to disagree.


The job of a good philosopher is to rip apart in analysis, the work of the other philosophers, seeking what you call the "true position". The "true position" would be what, from that philosopher's texts, resonates within one's own true being. Otherwise we just follow what someone else says about the philosophy of the other, and we become part of the mob following not the philosopher, but the person who says something about the philosopher.

I gave up at ‘there’s a unique form for every particular’. — Wayfarer

At least dfpolis agrees with me on that point, calling it the actuality of the material thing. Without a unique and particular form, a supposed unique and particular thing has no actual existence as a unique and particular thing, and we lose our grounding for realism and truth concerning the material world.

You didn't address the post.

I'll consider what you say anyway. Ok, I have, and it's completely untruthful accusations. Thanks for the opinion.

There are too many places where the eternal is interwoven with the temporal for your theory of matter to explain away. — Paine

The eternal (what cannot change) is interwoven with the temporal (what is changing) at every moment of passing time, and matter (as the aspect of the temporal which persists from one moment to the next) is the intermediary between these two. That matter is the intermediary between the eternal and the temporal is one of the oldest theological principles. Traditionally, it's what separates man from God.

You like to make objections against my interpretation without any real support, like pointing to what exactly is wrong with my interpretation. At least you're not as bad as Fooloso4 who just makes the same false accusations over and over again.

Your response does not support your original point, which was that we could not know intrinsic properties because of the possibility of error. Only errors resulting in the false apprehension of intrinsic properties need concern us, and to know that they are actual errors, we must have a true apprehension. — Dfpolis

You seem to have inverted the conditional. My argument is that if it is possible that we err in our knowledge, then our knowledge is not of the properties which are intrinsic to the thing known. It is possible that we err, therefore our knowledge is not of the properties which are intrinsic to the thing.

We cannot describe anything without first judging what categories its propertied belong to. For example, I cannot say "the organism is six-legged," without judging that it has appendages, that the relevant appendages are legs, and that the count of those legs is 6. So, the apprehension and classification of properties is necessarily prior to any description. — Dfpolis

I find that you represent "judging" in a very strange way, you've done this already. Describing something is a form of judgement, just like how you describe judging things here. So you make an artificial separation which is not representative of what is the case in the act of describing. These judgements you describe, "the apprehension and classification of properties" is the act of describing. When I judge that the organism has appendages, and that the appendages are legs, and that the count of the legs is 6, I am describing the organism. This, even if it's done in my head without writing it down, is the act of describing the organism. It is not a separate act which is prior to the description, it is the act of describing. And if I repeat these conclusions later, by writing them down, or telling someone else, I am just repeating the description I've already produced.

Thus, the form of the known object, is a cause of knowledge in the knower. — Dfpolis

Good, the form of the known is a cause of the form in the knower is much better than that they are identical.

Your, Locke's, and Kant's views miss the identity of sense and sensible, and of intellect and intelligibility, Aristotle discusses at length in De Anima: (1) the sense organ sensing the sensible is identically the sensible being sensed by the sense organ and (2) the intellect knowing the intelligible object is identically the intelligible object being known by the intellect. Your responses continue to ignore these essential points. — Dfpolis

I do not understand what you are saying here. "The sense organ sensing the sensible" is just another way of saying "the sensible being sensed by the sense organ". This makes no analysis of the relationship between the sensation and the sensible, which is what we are discussing. So how do you think it says anything significant?

The law of identity clearly puts identity of the thing within the thing itself, therefore not in the caused form in the knower. The actuality of the form within the knower is actualized by the mind (Metaphysics Bk 9), and so the form within the object only holds potential (as matter) in relation to the form in the mind. I think you ought to reread De Anima, and if you still think that he uses identity in this way, bring me the direct quotes of the precise places where you find this.

In each case, a single act actualizes two potencies. In sensing, the sensible object is actually sensed in the same act in which the sense organ's ability to sense is actualized. In knowing, the intelligible object is actually known in the same act as the intellect's ability to be informed is actualized. Since there is one act or event in each case, the lack of causal necessity argued by Hume does not apply. Why? Because he is analyzing a different kind of causality: one involving two events following one another by rule. It is possible for some disruptive influence to intervene between two events, but one event has no "between" in which an intervention might occur. — Dfpolis

It is wrong to characterize this as a single act. Clearly there is two acts involved, the actuality of the thing itself, and the actuality of the soul. if these two appear together as a single event, we need to look at both as causal. The description as a single event is just a simplification which has resulted from the need to facilitate communication. The lofty theory of the time was described in Plato's Theaetetus, as a motion coming from the eye meeting with a motion coming from the object. Your inclination to characterize what is described as a single event (sensation) as having only one cause is a failure of analysis.

My assertion is that our knowledge is specified by the form of the object. The form of the object also specifies much that we do not, and may never, know. I am not claiming that our knowledge is exhaustive, only that it grasps aspects of (a projection of) the object's form. — Dfpolis

This is what I insist is not Aristotelian. The form of the object is within the object itself, and distinct from the mind and what is in the mind. The forms in the mind are actualized (caused) by the mind, and from this perspective, the object provides potential, matter. However, the object does have a causal relation, and this is why we need to assume a passive intellect, to receive form from the object through the senses.

We have a sort of unknown now, a gap in understanding between the active intellect which creates the form in the mind, and the passive intellect which receives the formal information from the object. This is why the active and passive intellect, and the relation between them is so difficult. The activity in the mind must be passive in relation to the sense object, in order to know the object, but it must also be active in relation to the intelligible objects which it actualizes.

But I think it is wrong to say that the object "specifies". That is what the mind does in actualizing the species. The activity received through the senses is particular in relation to the mind, according to it being received by the passive intellect which is a form of potential. The active intellect "specifies", as a form of judgement. This you do not want to call "judgement" on the one hand, and I'm fine with that if we maintain consistency, but when it comes to analysis you want to say that judgement is prior to description, so you are forcing "judgement" to that position anyway.

I have no problem with that. In sensing, the object is the efficient cause of the neural effect. The effect it causes (a modification of our neural system), is specified by the form of the object, which can act on us in some ways, but not others. So, the effect carries information (the reduction of possibility -- for of all the ways we could be affected, we are affected in this specific way). This information is intelligible, and its intelligibility derives from the form of the object. — Dfpolis

The issue though, is that in relation to final cause, intention, judgement, and choice, which is the type of activity proper to the soul, efficient cause is secondary, as the means to the end. Therefore efficient causes are selected for, as those which produce success, and they are chosen as the means to the end. So if the sense object provides efficient causation in the single event which is "knowing", the efficient causation from the object is selected for by the intentional activity of the soul (final cause). And we really have very little idea of how the soul selects for efficient causes when actualizing a form in the mind (intelligible object).

In the act of awareness, we are the agent. The object does not force its intelligibility on the intellect. Rather, we must choose to attend, and in attending, the agent intellect acts to make what was merely intelligible (the neurally encoded information) actually understood. Here the object, via its neural effect, is the material cause. It limits the possible result (for information is the reduction of possibility), but it does not actualize it. The result, of course, is our awareness of the intelligibility specified by the form of the object. — Dfpolis

This is a better description. But for some reason, you want to separate conscious awareness from all the other powers of the soul, so that you can characterize the causation within the lower powers in a way which is reverse to the causation in the higher power. But this is inconsistent, and although Aristotle may seem to lean this way sometimes in the discussion of the active intellect, it is better and more realistic that we maintain consistency then try to allow for every word spoken by him.

It means that the object's action on our sense is only one aspect of (part of) the object's actuality. That action is identical with our sense being acted upon by the object. Further, our sense being acted upon by the object is not the whole of our actuality. So, while the relevant action and passion are identical, they are not the whole of either the subject or the object. — Dfpolis

There is no such "identity" here because of the temporal gap between the active and passive intellect. Identity of the thing is placed in the thing itself, as primary substance, and what the active intellect creates, the species is the secondary substance.

You are confusing first and second actuality. The soul is the first actuality or "being operational" of a potentially living body. It is not the second actuality or operation of the body. So, in sensation, the capacity to sense is an aspect of the psyche, but actually sensing is due to the sensible object acting on the sense -- e.g. light being scattered into the eye, or a hot object heating the skin. — Dfpolis

See how you are reversing first and secondary actualities between the act of the soul, and the act of the soul through its powers? The act of the soul is the operating of the organism. The capacity to operate, is the potential which the soul has, through it's material body. Sensing is an instance of operating, therefore the actuality of sensation is properly attributed to the soul, in the primary sense, and the act of the sensible body, in this operation, is the actuality in the secondary sense.

You have ignored my critique of Kant's epistemology. — Dfpolis

i didn't see it as relevant to our discussion of Aristotle. If you reject Kant, then I cannot use him as a reference, that's all.

I appreciate your recognition that what you present is at odds with the text, as testimony. — Paine

What I think is a better description is that "the text" is at odds with itself. That there are points of inconsistency within the work of Aristotle is nothing new to me. But there is a fundamental consistency which runs through the majority of the material, especially with the basic categories, matter, form, potential, actual. When he gets to highly complicated topics like active and passive intellect there is some ambiguity. His consistency is not quite so high in his use of "cause" according to the senses of "cause" he lays out, sometimes there's ambiguity. What I think is the proper approach is to find the threads of consistency which extend through multiple texts, and adhere to this consistency. The small parts which are not consistent are best disregarded rather than trying to work them into the overall consistency because this would be an impossible task.

It is not. Have you forgotten what you have claimed? — Fooloso4

What I claimed is that for Aristotle, the heavenly bodies are not eternal, nor are their motions eternal. There is an underlying substance, but this underlying substance cannot be bodily, it must be properly immaterial. How is this inconsistent with your quoted passage that there is "something beyond the bodies that are about us on this earth, different and separate from them"?

On all these grounds, therefore, we may infer with confidence that there is something beyond the bodies that are about us on this earth, different and separate from them ; and that the superior glory of its nature is proportionate to its distance from this world of ours. (269b 14)

This is completely consistent with what I've been arguing. There is something, (immaterial substance), which is beyond the bodies that are about us on the earth. That is what I've been arguing is Aristotle's true position.

Aristotle does not want simply to inform us or give us our opinion, he wants us to grapple with problems, to think. — Fooloso4

Right, this is why he states the beliefs of others, then relevant logical principles, and allows you to come to your own conclusion.

I'll tell you what I think about this issue, you can take it or leave it, as you will, it's my opinion about the situation which Aristotle was in, when he taught.

Greek theology at the time held that the planets and stars were divine, and eternal. The heavenly bodies had been observed for thousands of years and the appearance of them seemed to be consistent, without change. The eternality of them was logically supported by the proposal of circular motion, motion in a perfect circle has no beginning or end. But, as Aristotle mentions, at his time, some people believed that the stars and planets were generated. The two beliefs are obviously not consistent, and we know from Plato\s writing that there could be punishment for publicly denouncing theological beliefs. Therefore anyone who taught ideas which were contrary to the conventional theology would have motivation not to reveal publicly the exact nature of what was being taught in the school.

The complicating factor is Pythagorean cosmology, And I think Pythagorean cosmology is key to understanding the situation in Aristotle's school. It is completely distinct from Greek theology. The Pythagoreans are known for being secretive about their cosmology, and there isn't a whole lot published about it. They are the ones who proposed the underlying substance, the aether. I believe that in their cosmology the stars and planets are manifestations of vibrations in the aether (underlying substance), and there is a hierarchy of vibrations arranged in an order representative of the ratios which are the divisions of the octave, comprising the musical scale.

The idea of an underlying substance could, in a way, be presented as consistent with the idea of eternal, divine planets and stars. However, a thorough analysis, and logical scrutiny from someone like Aristotle would reveal that these two are not consistent. The underlying substance, is necessarily prior to, and cause of the existence of the heavenly bodies, and this demonstrates that the heavenly bodies must by generated, therefore not eternal. This problem is displayed in the quote from Metaphysics Bk 12, provided by Paine. "For the nature of the stars is eternal, because it is a certain sort of substance, and the mover is eternal and prior to the moved, and what is prior to a substance must be a substance." Notice the problem. The mover is prior to the moved, as cause of the movement. But if the movement is caused, then there must be something prior to the movement in time, therefore the movement cannot be eternal.

So this is the problem which Aristotle was presented with. It became necessary to assume an underlying substance as the cause of the circular motions which appeared to be eternal. However, if there is an underlying substance, as cause, then the stars and planets must be caused, therefore they are generated and not eternal. And this is contrary to the official theology which held these to be eternal.

Your references help to demonstrate the problem Aristotle was faced with. Conventional Greek theology held that the divine bodies, the planets and stars were eternal, therefore not caused or generated. However, there was much evidence, in the form of logical arguments, to indicate that these divine bodies were caused, therefore not eternal. So Aristotle had to present the evidence, being the principles argued by others, and the logic behind all these submissions, seeking truth in this matter. All the while we need to respect what Plato demonstrated, that to teach principles contrary to the official theology was punishable. Therefore even if Aristotle made arguments for an underlying substance as the cause of the divine bodies (so the bodies are not eternal), that this idea of an underlying substance is contrary to the official theology, might be somewhat disguised.

My translation is Stocks, but it is within a compilation, "The Basic Works of Aristotle", edited by Richard McKeon, Random House, 1941. Most the titles are reproduced in completion, but that particular one has Bk 2 Ch 1-13 (which is 283b-293a) omitted. No reason is given for the omission. It is just stated in the preface that a portion of one of the four books of On The Heavens has been omitted. Though it also states in the preface that where omissions are made reasons are given, which I cannot find.

It also states in the preface that the Oxford translation into English was completed in 1931, and this followed from the Berlin Academy 1831-1870. It says "The eleven volumes of the Oxford translation can be reduced to a single volume, once the clearly inauthentic works have been excluded from consideration, without too serious loss of portions that bear on problems of philosophic interest."

It then says in the Introduction by C.D. C. Reeve, "The most credible view of these writings is that they are lecture notes written or dictated by Aristotle himself and not intended for publication. Their organization into treatises and the internal organizations into books and chapters may, however, not be his. No doubt this accounts for some, though not all, of their legendary and manifest difficulty."

You can see, that if we allow for a progression and evolution in Aristotle's thought over time, (as is very evident in Plato's material), the notes on the same subject, "the heavens", or "the heaven", may have gotten placed together, even though they come from completely different times, therefore expressing different ideas in the evolution of his thought. Because of this, considerable inconsistency may exist within the same treatise. And if you add to this the fact that some of the material within the same treatise may not even be derived from Aristotle himself, but from other lecturers in his school, the probability of inconsistency is increased even higher. This is what makes the understanding of what is presented to us as "Aristotle", so difficult to understand. Instead of latching on to specific assertions found here and there, we need to look for threads, patterns which run through the bulk of the material, and simply reject the parts which are inconsistent with the threads, as out of place.

That little section from which you take those quotes has been omitted from my translation. For whatever reason I do not know, because I haven't researched that. But I suggest that perhaps it was judged as not from Aristotle, due to the inconsistency you are showing. Notice, it's the part that you are quoting which has been removed from the translation, not the part that I quote.

Still, the fact that we can recognize errors, means that we can grasp the truth. — Dfpolis

I don't think that this follows. This is because error, and mistake may be relative to some pragmatic principle of success. So to recognize an error is to recognize that the process was unsuccessful and this does not require any recognition of truth, only that the desired end was not brought to fruition. The same principle holds for what you say about science. Most often science is guided by pragmaticism rather than truth.

No, intrinsic properties are not descriptions. They are what we seek to describe. — Dfpolis

You said that intrinsic properties are what is compared to the definition. This is incorrect, the description is what is compared. So there is a gap between the intrinsic properties, and what is compared with the definition. We cannot say that the intrinsic properties are compared.

hen, (2) by the identity of knower and known which is knowledge, they may exist in an observer as an integral set of concepts. — Dfpolis

This is where our problem of misunderstanding each other lies.

You recognize the difference between "form" as the concept, universal, abstraction, and "form" as the actuality of the individual. What exists in the mind of the knower is "form" in the sense of the abstraction, and what exists in the material individual is "form" in the sense of of the actuality of the individual. Yet you insist that the form in the knower is somehow the form of the known. They are two distinct senses of "form", how do you reconcile this?

We may do so if we trust the observer, but first-rate scientists much prefer to see the data, or even better, the object. When my brother Gary, a world-renowned biologist, wished to confirm the species of a scorpion (his specialty), he did not send a description, or even a picture, of the organism to the taxonomist, but the organism itself. — Dfpolis

This doesn't really change the matter. Let's say that we compare the object with the definition of the species. We might ask, how is that comparison made. And we might conclude that questions are asked. Does it have x? Does it have y? Answering question like this is just a form of description. Don't you agree? By answering the questions, it has x, it does not have y, etc., a description is being made. Then a judgement is made as to whether this description fulfils the criteria of the definition.

The knower being informed by the known is identically the known informing the knower. In more contemporary terms, the brain state encoding information about a sensed object is identically the modification of the brain by the action of the sensed object. This allows no separation of knower and known. (I made this point in the paper we are discussing.) — Dfpolis

This is not Aristotelian. The two distinct senses of "form" which you have acknowledged is Aristotelian. But, as I described above, your assertions that the form in the knower is the same as the form in the object is not consistent with this.

No, it is not. It is the action of the sensed object on the sensing subject. Action is inseparable from the agent acting. E.g. when the builders stop building, building stops. — Dfpolis

You have identified two actions here, the action of the object, and the action of the subject. The two actions are distinct and are not the same. This is evident when you consider how each affect, through causation, the combined thing which we call sensation. The object effects through efficient causation and the subject affects through final causation. You have two types of actions identified, two active agents identified, object and subject, now you need to acknowledge that there are two types of causation involved.

It fundamentally misunderstands the nature of knowing as a partial identity between knower and known. — Dfpolis

Oh, now you've revised it to a "partial identity". What could that even mean?

We cannot understand forms unless they inform us, and they inform us, not directly as Plato thought, but via sensation. — Dfpolis

You are assigning all causation to the object, as that which informs. But this is completely inconsistent with Aristotle who says that the mind abstracts, and this means that the mind is the active thing. However, Aristotle does see the need to place an active principle in the object which is sensed, therefore each object has a form, what you described as the actuality of the thing.

You need to lessen your restrictions on causation, which seem to be heavily influenced by physicalism, or scientism, because you want to assign the cause of the sensation to the object sensed. But there is another condition to be met, and that is that the organism must have the capacity to sense. And, under Aristotelian conceptual space, the soul, as the source of internal actuality, or activity, must actualize that capacity. So we must represent the internal act as causal as well as the external act. But the internal act may be like the imagination, creating fictitious things, or things for whatever pragmatic purpose developed through evolution, and this has a causal affect on the sensation, just like the object does. That's why we can hallucinate.

I won't repeat last year's argument concerning your interpretation of De Anima Book 1. I will just leave this discussion by observing that it does not fit with Aristotle's view of Astronomy: — Paine

It seems to me, that you base your claim that my interpretation does not fit with Aristotle's Astronomy on that one book of the Metaphysics. Clearly though, my claim is supported by both On the Heavens, and On the Soul, The argument in On The Heavens, against the idea that the heavenly bodies and their orbits are eternal, is lengthy, many faceted, and extensive, as I outlined. I do not understand why you dispute this. It's very clear.

And, as I said in the earlier discussion, there are indications that this book of Metaphysics which you quote was not even written by Aristotle. It does not display his usual style, it is not consistent with the other work which is known to be his, and also it is a well known fact that the entire Metaphysics is a collection of material put together by his school, many years after his death.

For the nature of the stars is eternal, because it is a certain sort of substance, and the mover is eternal and prior to the moved, and what is prior to a substance must be a substance. — Paine

This is a terrible translation, it provides a bunch of unsupported assertions (very un-Aristotelian), and it doesn't even make sense. It says that the stars are eternal, and there is something prior to the eternal stars which is "a certain sort of substance". Clearly, if there is something prior to the stars, then the stars cannot be eternal. Aristotle is not known for making illogical statements like that, and this is why it is doubtful that this part of the Metaphysics was actually produced by him.

A few quotes from On the Heavens that support your claim: — Fooloso4

I've been through your out of context quotes already. This is where he is discussing the ideas of others, which he is refuting.

The common name, too, which has been handed down from our distant ancestors even to our own day, seems to show that they conceived of it in this fashion which we have been expressing. The same ideas, one must believe, recur in men's minds not once or twice but again and again. And so, implying that the primary body is something else beyond earth, fire, air, and water, they gave the highest place a name of its own, aither, derived from the fact that it 'runs always' for an eternity of time. Anaxagoras however scandalously misuses this name, taking aither as equivalent to fire. — 270b, 16-20

Those are the ideas of the others which are commonly accepted. That he is actually refuting these ideas, rather than supporting them becomes quite obvious if you pay attention to his arguments, rather than simply reading the assertions that he says others have made, and take them as what he is professing.

And so, the conclusion of that chapter, Ch 5:

We have now shown that the body which moves in a circle is not endless or infinite, but has its limit. — 273a, 5

That the heaven as a whole neither came. into being nor admits of destruction, as some assert, but is one and eternal, with no end or beginning of its total duration, containing and embracing in itself the infinity of time, we may convince ourselves not only by the arguments already set forth but also by a consideration of the views of those who differ from us in providing for its generation. (283b)

And here, you conveniently left out the conditional stated after this. It says that if this view is a possible one, and the view that the world is generated is shown to be impossible, then this would serve to convince us of this view. Of course, he proceeds to show that the view of the heaven as generated, is not only possible, but also more credible.

Your thesis of a mortal Kosmos is so sharply different from Aristotle's' account of different kinds of ousia (substances) that the contradiction itself requires an explanation. — Paine

I don't see that you have a point Paine. And I'm having a hard time to understand what you are trying to say. Perhaps you could explain yourself better, but I'll try to explain myself.

"Separable" in your quote means separate from matter, as Aristotle explained in that context. Theoretical studies deal with things separable. "Immovable" we can interpret as eternal, unchangeable. Physics deals with things separable, but movable. Mathematics deals with separable things, but whether or not they are immovable has not yet been made clear, he says, despite some claims that the things of mathematics are immovable.

So he says there needs to be a "first science" that deals with things "which both exist separately and are immovable". This science can only be theoretical, and through it we might develop a proper understanding of whether or not the things of mathematics are immovable.

Clearly, he is not referring to the Kosmos here, as what would be studied by this "first science", as he has spent the entirety of Bk 1, "On The Heavens" explaining why the Kosmos is of the category of things which physics deals with, separable and movable.

Therefore, we need to look elsewhere, other than the Kosmos, to fulfill the needs of this first science. He calls the first science "theology", and states:

We answer that if there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature, natural science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. — 1026a, 27-28

That there necessarily is a first substance, separate from matter, and immovable is revealed later in Bk 9, when he explains why actuality is necessarily prior to potentiality. This implies that there is an actuality (substance) which is immaterial, as prior to the potentiality of matter. And, this first substance must be immovable because motion is a property of material things (explained in On The Heavens). As demonstrated in On The Heavens, the first substance cannot be bodily in any way, nor can it move like the things of the heavens. And, as stated in On the Soul, it cannot be represented as a spatial magnitude in any way. Nevertheless, the logic of Bk 9, "Metaphysics" demonstrates that there is a definite need to assume the reality of the first substance, which is not describable in the way that the Kosmos is.

You seem to be using the street definition of ‘measurement’ instead of the definition relevant to quantum theory — noAxioms

Ha, ha, "street definition", that's funny. Is that the definition of "measurement" which the cop with the radar gun uses to prosecute in court? "I calibrated my machine in the lab according to...so that it would be accurate to within... on the street". On the street we don't really use definitions noAxioms.

Face it no Axioms, there's alwaya intent behind "measurement" no matter how you use the word. There must be or else there'd be no measurement. It determines what will be measured, when, how, all those decisions,

That would be ridiculous since the frame reference was omitted from the assertion of not having moved, rendering it meaningless at best. — noAxioms

Yes, and that was your assertion, that's why I said you were being ridiculous. "If I’m here now and here later, that seems to be not-moving relative to ‘here’." "Here" does not constitute a frame of reference. We went over that already. You are not adhering to proper definitions, as we discussed, and slipping back into street talk. You blabber on about "coordinate systems", then you assume that "here" constitutes one. The point of course, is that no frame of reference can use just one point, location must be established relative to another point. "Here" means nothing on its own. That's why I called your example solipsistic.

Given a coordinate system in which some object is always at the origin, that object always at location zero and thus not moving relative to that coordinate system. This is tautologically true. That coordinate system would be an inertial coordinate system only if no external forces were acting on the object in question. Given the comment below, you seem to already know this. — noAxioms

Are you proposing that you could map motion with a spatial representation that employs a coordinate system with only one locational point, a point zero, without any other points? How would that work? Let's see, object is always at point zero therefore object is never moving. What defines point zero? The place where the object is. Hmm, object never moves because object is always at point zero, 'here', and point zero is defined as "the location of that which said ‘here’". My spidey sense is tingling.

Don't you see a problem with that? — magritte

Aristotle refers to different kinds of ousia. You said that there was a division between kinds that was a critical departure from the holistic view Aristotle seems to aspire to. — Paine

I don't understand this. I discussed primary and secondary substance earlier in the thread. What do you mean by "a division between kinds". That doesn't sound like something I said.

Don't you realize that this kind of hostile language, with the implication of bad faith, is what discourages dialog with you? You have insights to share, but the tone of many of your posts invites defensiveness and counterattack rather than an open exchange of views. We can disagree in good faith. — Dfpolis

My apologies. I truly attempt to avoid hostile language. Sometimes I instinctively reflect it back, but that is not the case here. I think that when the language of the other person shows what appears to be intentional evasion of important points, I believe it is my duty to point out the intentionality involved. You can lead a horse to water, but you cannot make it drink. However, you can attempt to point out to the horse that refusing to drink is not wise. The horse is not rational so this probably will not be successful. The human being is rational, so pointing out incidents of intentional evasion, refusal, and denial, can be successful, though it can be received as hostile or confrontational. That is the case when we point out another's bad habits, it is often received as hostility. So I'm sorry for the tone, and I'm glad you appreciate insight.

It is simple. For example, if we encounter an organism with four or eight legs instead of six, or without a segmented body, it would be wrong (an intellectual, not a moral, error) to "assign it" to the insect category because it does not meet the agreed upon definition. The judgement of error depends on comparing (1) the conventional (human generated) definition of "insect" with (2) the objective (intrinsic) properties of the organism, e.g. having eight legs. — Dfpolis

This does not suffice. There are exceptions, mutations, and other problems which lend themselves to error. Furthermore, the important point is that (2) is a description. It is not the intrinsic property itself, but a description, an observation. So this is what you appear to be avoiding, the human aspect of (2). We do not take the intrinsic properties, the properties which inhere within the thing itself, and compare them to the definition, we take a description and compare the description. And, error is possible in the description. Since error is possible in the description, it is very clear that it is not the case that we are actually comparing intrinsic properties, we are comparing a description which is not the same as intrinsic properties, it is what is said to be intrinsic properties.

Here is the source of confusion. Aristotle's eidos ("form") has two meanings. One is a being's actuality (as opposed to its hyle/potency), the other is the universal concept this actuality elicits. Thus, when he says that Callias and Socrates are “the same in form; for their form is indivisible” (Metaphysics VII, 8, 1034a5), he does not mean they have the same actuality, or the same Platonic Idea, but that they elicit the same concept, <human>. — Dfpolis

Yes, I completely agree with this, and it is exactly what I have been saying. Some of the others, Wayfarer, and Fooloso4 I believe, do not accept this sense of "form" which is the actuality of the individual. They want to limit "form" to the universal, or type, as a Platonic "form".

This creates a problem, because the Platonists here want to insist that this Platonic form, the type, or universal concept, has independent existence, in the Platonic way. But in the Aristotelian conceptual space it is only the "form" in the sense of the individual being's actuality, which has separate, independent existence, as the actuality of the the thing itself. The other sense of "form" has no actual independent existence, relying on the human mind for its actualization, as described in Bk. 9 Metaphysics.

Still, Aristotle seems not to recognize that the same organisms can elicit different species concepts. As I explained in my two Studia Gilsoniana articles on metaphysics and evolution, there are at least 26 different ways of defining biological species and at least five ways of defining philosophical species. Each has a basis in, but is not dictated by, reality. Rather, the taxonomist chooses what type of properties to base classification on.

Different objective taxonomic schemes are possible because organisms are intelligible, rather than instances of actual (Platonic) ideas. When humans actualize potentials, we further specify them. We decide what to chisel from the marble or mold from the clay. We also choose which notes of intelligibility in an organism, or in a collection of organisms, to attend to and so actualize. The notes of intelligibility are the organism's. The choice of which to actualize is ours. So, the resulting concept (e.g. a species concept) is both objective and subjective. — Dfpolis

We seem to be much in agreement here.

No. It is essential that the classification be based on intrinsic properties once the category is defined. If it were not, there would be no connection between the organism and the category. — Dfpolis

There is no direct connection between the organism and the category. That is the point of Kantian metaphysics. The "phenomenon", or how the organism appears to the sensing subjects as observers, is intermediary. That's why I'm insisting that you are misusing, or misunderstanding "intrinsic property". Since the judgement is based on the organism's relation to us, as external observers, then the properties which are being judged are a feature of an external relation of the organism, it's relation to the observer.

No. For a correct classification, the description must not merely exist, it must be accurate -- reflecting intrinsic properties as they are. — Dfpolis

Again, this is the Kantian point. We have no access to the intrinsic properties "as they are", all we have is "as they appear to us". Therefore the best we can get is to be consistent with how the properties appear to us.

But Plato and Aristotle opened a whole different can of worms, suggesting that with logic we can get beyond "as they appear to us", to make some logic based conclusions about the true actual forms of particular things. Kant does not go this far. The first thing to recognize is that there is a realm of intelligible forms, as the actuality of the thing itself, which we must come to understand directly through reasoning rather than through sensing. Kant seems to deny this possibility of a direct approach to the independent forms through logic.

What you are talking about is contrary, not contradictory, properties. Contradictories negate each other. Contraries are opposites, but do not rule each other out. — Dfpolis

Contradictory properties are opposing properties, like red and not red. They do not actually negate each other in Aristotelian conceptual space, because they cannot exist at the same time in the same subject, in order to actually do that. It is simply disallowed that we make contradictory predications of the same subject, by the law of non-contradiction. Perhaps in Hegelian conceptual space contradictories might negate each other, but I think this is more correctly understood as sublation, and not a true negation. But this would imply that they are not true opposites.

This separation of what is natural from what is divine runs counter to the way ousia is presented as different in kind but all connected to the same ultimate cause and the reason we can speak of 'being as being'. — Paine

I don't understand what you mean here. When Aristotle speaks of being as being, he refers to the question of why a particular being is the thing which it is (what it is) rather than something else. This points to the form of the individual, and the unique nature of the particular being, therefore specific cause rather than some "ultimate cause".

It does, however, put you in the position of explaining away discussions of ousia where the difference in kind is focused upon. For example, Metaphysics Book Epsilon:

The primary science, by contrast, is concerned with things that are both separable and immovable. Now all causes are necessarily eternal, and these most of all. For they are the causes of the divine beings that are perceptible.
— Metaphysics, 1026a10 — Paine

I have to say, that the difference in kind is not what is being focused on here, rather particular, individual differences are what is focused on. This is how he starts 1026a:

If then all natural things are analogous to the snub in their nature---e.g. nose, eye,face, flesh, bone, and, in general, animal; leaf root , bark, and, in general, plant; (for none of these can be defined without reference to movement---they always have matter), it is clear how we must seek and define the 'what'' in the case of natural objects, and also that it belongs to the student of nature to study even soul in a certain sense, i.e. so much of it as it is not independent of matter.

So, notice your quote refers to "things that are both separable and immovable". Kinds, as universals, concepts or abstractions, are not separable according to Aristotle, their actuality is dependent on the human mind (Bk 9 Metaphysics).

Physics, he says deals with things that are separable and movable. These are the individual material things. Things which are separable and immovable are individuals but immaterial, like the individual soul. In the context he is talking about individual things, with matter, and there is nothing here to make us think that he is talking about kinds. He is saying that this must be a theoretical science which approaches separate immovable things. But he implies that these things are individuals, in the same way that a soul is an individual, they are not kinds.

It is not, but believe whatever you need to. I will leave it there. — Fooloso4

You obviously have not been paying attention to what I said Fooloso4, so let me repeat it very succinctly.

In On The Heavens Bk 1, Aristotle attends to the Pythagorean idea (mostly as presented by Plato), that the heavenly bodies exist as eternal circular motions. The logic of eternal circular motions is valid, and cannot be refuted directly, and that is why he says that those premises lead to that conclusion.

The problem which Aristotle reveals is with the Pythagorean conception of eternal, divine, "bodies". So the Pythagorean conception has a division between a "natural body" and an "unnatural body", as explained in the chapter you referred, chapter 2. The Pythagorean argument shows that natural bodies must have an underlying unnatural body, and this is the eternal body of the eternal circular motion. What Aristotle objects to is that the underlying unnatural thing is properly called a "body". This is why he closes chapter 2 with "...there is something beyond the bodies..." as a replacement for the Pythagorean proposal of a "divine bodily substance".

So he spends most of the rest of Bk 1 providing many reasons why there cannot be a such an unnatural, divine, eternal body. Ch 5, circular motion in relation to infinity and the body. Conclusion: "We have now shown that the body which moves in a circle is not endless or infinite, but has its limit." 273a, 5. Ch 6: An infinite body is impossible. Ch 7: A continuation of the discussion concerning the relationship between "infinite" and "body". Conclusion: "From these arguments then it is clear that the body of the universe is not infinite" 276a, 17. Ch 8, he shows why local motion cannot be continued to infinity, and why there cannot be more than one universe. Ch 9, The whole universe as one must be a sensible body. "Now the whole included within the extreme circumference must be composed of all physical and sensible body, because there neither is nor can come into being, any body outside the heaven." 278b, 23. From here, Chs 10, 11, and 12 are spent demonstrated that the whole, which is the universe, has been generated, and will in time be corrupted. Therefore the universe is not eternal.

From this we can say that Aristotle has demonstrated that the entire universe is composed of natural bodies, and is itself a natural body. There are no unnatural, or divine bodies, nothing in the universe is moving in an eternal circular motion, because all has been generated and will be destroyed, consisting of natural bodies.

However, he doesn't rule out the possibility of an underlying eternal substance which is not bodily. In fact, he continues to promote the idea of eternal "things", only insisting that they are not bodily. We see this in On the Soul when he addresses the idea of a soul moving a body in a sort of eternal circular motion, as proposed by Plato and the Pythagoreans. He rejects this idea (On the Soul Bk1,Ch 3) "Now in the first place it is a mistake to say that the soul is a spatial magnitude" (407a 3). Further, he rejects the idea that if the thinking of the soul was like a motion, such a motion, if it was circular, would not be eternal. Furthermore, there is not even any reason to think that such a motion would be circular. Therefore the soul, as something eternal, must be represented in some way other than as a spatial magnitude or a spatial motion (circular).

We see this idea further developed in Metaphysics Bk 8-9. Here, he very much speaks of "eternal substance". And such a substance is necessarily prior to the material existence of bodies, as the cause of them. But this eternal substance can have no matter or potential, for the reasons discussed in "On the Heavens. This would mean it is susceptible to change, and is therefore generated and will be destroyed, like any body. Therefore we conclude that eternal things are purely actual, forms, having no matter or potential, and such a substance is prior to the substance of material bodies as the cause of existence of these.

It’s the use of the word ‘substance’ especially when said to ‘immaterial substance’ . That’s what I say is oxymoronic. But then, ‘substance’ is not the word that Aristotle would have used. (Actually wasn’t it in this context where the word ‘dunamis’ was used?) — Wayfarer

Read the reply above to Fooloso4, if you are interested in this. "Substance" is Aristotle's replacement for "body". He demonstrates how no body can be eternal, unnatural, or divine, by showing that all bodies consist of matter, therefore change, and ultimately are generated and destroyed. He effectively annuls the ancient separation Paine refers to, between earthly bodies and heavenly bodies. In On the Heavens, Aristotle shows why all the properties which were commonly attributed to the divine, eternal "bodies", could not actually be the properties of bodies. Therefore he moved to dissolve this division between heavenly bodies and earthly bodies. The heavenly bodies must be considered as an extension of earthly bodies, and if there is something divine or eternal, it must lie beyond all bodies.

However, he demonstrates in "Metaphysics" how substance is primarily formal, rather than material. And he also show why it is necessary to conclude that there is an actuality which is prior to material existence, as cause of material bodies. So he argues for the reality of this divine, eternal "substance", which must be substantial, actual, and real, but not a body or material. Since form is actuality and substance, this allows that there is an immaterial substance, or form, which is prior to the existence of material bodies.

Aristotle used ousia in numerous places regarding the 'immaterial',if you are suggesting they were always connected with matter. — Paine

Check what I wrote above to Fooloso4. "Substance" to me is Aristotle's replacement for "body" when speaking of the divine or eternal. What he saw was the problem discussed above, the commonly cited separation between natural bodies (earthly) and divinely bodies (heavenly). He moved to dissolve this separation by enforcing consistency in the definition of "body". Fundamentally this is the principle that all bodies are spatial, and consist of matter.

At the same time, he realized, as explained in "Metaphysics" that the substance (what validates or grounds something as real) of a body is better understood as its form rather than its matter. The form of the thing is what makes the thing what it is, rather than something else, and this is more properly understood as the first principle of existence of the thing, rather than the matter which provides the potential for the thing to become something else.

So he has effectively removed the designation of "divine" and "eternal" from the bodies which are heavenly bodies (that the heavenly bodies were gods is a principle from ancient theology), making all bodies natural bodies, but this did not remove the need for something divine and eternal. So he still needed a principle to ground the divine, the eternal, and this was substance now, rather than body.

No, things do not place themselves in species, nor was that my claim. I said that species are defined by objective commonalities. We decide which commonalities define a category, but, having decided that, whether a new object is an instance of the category is an objective question, with a right and wrong answer. — Dfpolis

Since you've just deferred the issue into a question of what it means to be "objective", an effective evasion, instead of addressing the question head on, I don't see any point to continuing. I mean how would you ground the supposed "right and wrong" of your claimed objectivity? Would you assume that right and wrong is what is agreed upon by human convention, or what corresponds to some independent form? If it's the former, then you are just saying the same thing as me, the "form" which is "the species", is a construct of human convention.

This is a confused, as it is on the basis of intrinsic properties that an organism fits or does not fit into one of the categories we have defined. If it has 6 legs and a segmented body, it is an insect. If it has scaled wings, it belongs to the order lepidoptera, etc. — Dfpolis

I don't think you are properly understanding "intrinsic property". Any property which inheres within a thing is intrinsic to that thing, even if it is accidental in relation to the category or species that the thing is judged as being in. We judge the category by what is deemed as essential to that category. So many properties which are intrinsic and essential to thing itself, are accidental in relation to the category, and therefore do not enter into the judgement of whether the thing belongs to the category or not.

Therefore, that the properties are intrinsic to the organism is accidental to the judgement. What is necessary or essential, is that the described properties correspond with the defined essential properties. The fact that this is the case is evidenced by the possibility of mistake. A mistaken description will allow the organism to be placed in the category regardless of whether the affirmed property actually is intrinsic to the organism. So the possibility of a wrong classification is actually evidence that whether or not the property actually is intrinsic to the organism, is irrelevant. All that is relevant is the description of the organism and the definition of the species. And when mistake is exposed, either the description is judged as wrong or the definition is judged as wrong, and what is actually inherent, or intrinsic within the organism still remains irrelevant.

Nothing can have contradicting properties. Either it has a property, or if does not. — Dfpolis

What I said was that "members" can have contradicting properties. So, for example I can have a property which is contradictory to a property which you have, and we can still be members of the same species. This indicates that the judgement is not based on "inherent properties". Rather, it is based on essential properties, which are provided by the definition. If you and I are both judged to have those essential properties, we are members of that species, regardless of all the various properties which are said to be intrinsic to you, and intrinsic to me.

If we have two things with the identical form, they are two (different) in virture of being made out of different instances of stuff. If we take a batch of plastic and make different kinds of things with it, they are not different because they are plastic, but because they have different forms. — Dfpolis

There is no such thing as two things with the same form. That is the point of the law of identity. A thing's form is the same as itself, and since all things are unique, no two things have the same form. "Form" refers to "what the thing is". And, in order that two things which appear to be similar or even the same, yet are clearly distinct, can actually be understood as distinct, they must each have a distinct "what the thing is". If they didn't each have a distinct "what the thing is", it would be impossible to distinguish them from one another, and by the fact that they cannot be distinguished one from the other, we'd have to conclude that they are not two distinct things but really one and the same thing.

Therefore a thing's "form" as "what the thing is", must be unique and particular to the thing itself. And there is no such thing as two things with the same form. We place two things into the same category, or type, and under Platonist principles we'd call the category or type itself a "form", but this is not the same use of "form" as the "form" which a material object has.