As regards the intuition of the colour red, which is procedural knowledge, the brain knows how to perceive the colour red when presented with a wavelength of 700nm. — RussellA

This makes no sense to me. There are many different shades of red, produced from many different combinations of wavelengths. We learn how to perceive the colour red by learning how to correctly apply the word "red". Without learning the word "red", we would perceive many different shades of colours without knowing any of them as "red". For example, the Japanese classify colours in a way completely different from us.

Kant was in a bind because his reason could not prove there was something besides appearance and his intuition was locked unto the empirical. — Gregory

But Kant posited something distinct from both reason and appearance, intuition.

Why do we need an argument or premise for the passage of time? How about this: time passes such that what is yet to happen becomes what is happening becomes what has happened. — Luke

It's called "justification". Such propositions are meaningless if not supported by experience or evidence. I could propose this: time passes such that what has happened becomes what is happening, becomes what will happen. Why would your proposition be more acceptable than mine?

The future is what will happen regardless of, or including, our expectations of what will happen. — Luke

As I told you, this is incorrect. The future consists of possibilities, not of "what will happen". That is the mistake of determinism. If the future consisted of what will happen, rather than possibilities, there would be no point in deliberation concerning one's actions. Since there is usefulness in such deliberation, because we can make choices and act accordingly, it is clear that the future consists of possibilities rather than of what will happen.

f I plan and book an overseas holiday, I might end up taking it, but something unforeseen might prevent me from going. We'll see what happens. — Luke

Exactly as you say, the future consists of "we'll see what happens" (meaning numerous possibilities), not "what will happen".

The future is not the plans or anticipations, but the reality of what will come to pass — Luke

This is a false representation, a misconception. There is no such thing as "the reality of what will come to pass", the reality of the future is possibility. What comes to pass only becomes real when it comes to pass. This is why Aristotle argued that we need to provide exemption from the law of excluded middle to allow for the reality of the future. His famous example is the possibility of a sea battle tomorrow. There is neither truth nor falsity to the proposition "there will be a sea battle tomorrow", because it has not been decided. That was Aristotle's argument for exceptions to the law of excluded middle. Propositions concerning the future are neither true nor false. And it does not matter that you can look back after the fact, and suppose that before the fact that proposition would have been true, because the nature of reality is that before the fact it could have gone either way. In other words, there is no such thing as the reality of what will come to pass in this matter. After tomorrow has come to pass, there is such a reality, and a truth to that question, but that's only when it's in the past. Prior to the even there really is no truth or falsity to the matter.

I don't deny that we remember the past and anticipate the future, but memories are not the past and anticipations are not the future. — Luke

I didn't say that memories are the past, nor that anticipations are the future. I said that we have defined the present according to conscious experience. Now if we want to give past and future positions relative to the present, we must refer to conscious experience as well, as this is what defines "present". And, conscious experience gives us memories and anticipations which we can use to position past and future relative to the present.

Assessment – MU’s thesis has something new to say about time and quantum entanglement within the macro-space of everyday human experience. — ucarr

Thanks ucarr, you've provided a satisfactory explanation of what I've been arguing. In relation to the uncertainty principle, I will say that the issue is the way that we have come to represent points, mathematically as limits, through calculus. As we approach the limit, the margin of error approaches infinity. So if in the case of time, the limit is a point in time, known as "the present", then as we approach that limit uncertainty is maximized.

The number of human chromosomes was published in 1923 by Theophilus...; — Wiki

Theophilus Thistle, the successful thistle sifter,
In sifting a sieve full of unsifted thistles,
Thrust three thousand thistles through the thick of his thumb.
If Theophilus Thistle, the successful thistle sifter,
Can thrust three thousand thistles through the thick of his thumb,
See thou, in sifting a sieve full of unsifted thistles,
Thrust not three thousand thistles through the thick of thy thumb.

Wiki says now we know "the true number", simple as that. But of course that's not exactly true, because there are variations in the number, types, and arrangement of chromosomes listed on that very page. More importantly, for more than 30 years every biologist and every doctor believed it was a fact that humans have 48 chromosomes. Of course, we now believe they were all wrong, but it ought to give one pause. — Srap Tasmaner

Tell me now Srap Tasmaner,

If Theophilus Thistle, the unsuccessful thistle sifter,
in sifting a sieve full of unsifted thistles,
Thrust not three thousand thistles through the thick of his thumb.
How many thistles has Theophilus Thistle the unsuccessful thistle sifter,
while sifting unsifted thistles through the thick of his thumb,
thrust through the thick of his thumb?

Yet without intuition you can't have faith, the act Kant considered the crown of practical reason — Gregory

Faith is not a type of knowledge. Is it a cause of knowledge?

In today's terms it's referred to as Innatism. Chomsky mentions it. — RussellA

Well, where is Chomsky when you need him?

SEP - Innateness and Language
The philosophical debate over innate ideas and their role in the acquisition of knowledge has a venerable history. — RussellA

Here, "the acquisition of knowledge" is mentioned. But surely there is a difference between the conditions required for the acquisition of knowledge, and knowledge itself.

Wikipedia - Innatism
In the philosophy of mind, innatism is the view that the mind is born with already-formed ideas, knowledge, and beliefs. — RussellA

I do not think that what might be called "innate knowledge" would classify as "knowledge" under a strict epistemological definition, like justified true belief. And since these two senses pf "knowledge" must be different, then there is ambiguity and the possibility of equivocation in any logical argument proceeding from the premise that we are born with "knowledge".

This is why Aristotle distinguished between different types of "potentials". We are born with the capacity to obtain knowledge, and this is a specific type of potential, as the capacity to learn. After we learn, we have a different type of potential, we've ascended to a higher level, which is the actual possession of knowledge. The two, what we are born with, and what we acquire, are in the same general category, as "potential", but they are very different in character because one is logically prior to the other, as a necessary condition for it.

If we use the very general category, "potential" to refer to them both, there is less chance of equivocation, because unless specified, "potential" refers to a very general category. "Knowledge", on the other hand is more often used in the more specific sense of epistemology. So talking about a type of "knowledge" which we are born with is more conducive to equivocation because many people think of :knowledge as what we acquire through learning and education, and something which is justified through the use of language. But we do not possess the skill of language when we are born, just an innate condition which inclines us with the desire to learn.

We have intuitions. — RussellA

Really? Do you think so? We claim to have sensations. We claim to have thoughts, and ideas. But do we have intuitions? "Intuition" appears to refer to a faculty or means by which we obtain knowledge directly, without the need for sensation nor reasoning. I assume "an intuition" would be an object of knowledge acquired through intuition.

But is it really appropriate to call something acquired through intuition, Knowledge? Don't we assume a separation between the cause and the effect, as if each of these refers to something distinct from the other? So if intuition is the means by which someone might obtain a specific type of knowledge, it would be the cause of this type of knowledge. Then why would we call the knowledge itself, as the effect derived from this cause, "an intuition"? Consider, "a thought" refers to a past act of thinking, which is the cause of the currently existing "thought", and this is way that "a thought" as an effect, is differentiated from the act of thinking, as the cause.

If, however, I suppose there to be things that are merely objects of the understanding and that, nevertheless, can be given to an intuition, although not to sensible intuition (as coram intuiti intellectuali),then such things would be called noumena (intelligibilia). — RussellA

The issue here is the type of "intuition" which could receive the noumena. Notice that Kant distinctly states that there is an intuition which these objects of understanding called "noumena" are given to. This implies that the noumena are not foreign, or unintelligible to the intellect, as they are received through a type of intuition. The problem though, is that if we cannot identify the type of intuition which receives the noumena, then we don't seem to have the capacity to understand them at all.

The intuitions which receive sense phenomena are named by Kant as space and time, and from this Kant produces the categories by which phenomena are understood. And I think it is implied by Kant that neither of these intuitions, space nor time, is the intuition which apprehends the noumena, otherwise we might produce an understanding of them through those same categories.

So the type of intuition which receives the noumena is left as undisclosed by Kant. Furthermore, the exact nature of "intuition" in general is left as unclear. Each named category represents a determined intuition by which its object is received, so there must be a distinct intuition for each category. Each determined intuition is a judgement made. The intuition through which noumena are received has not been determined by Kant, so that is left as a judgement not made by him.

I don't see any difference. It follows from the definition of "the present" as that time when things are happening, etc., that the past is what has happened and the future is what is yet to happen. Therefore, the present does signify the division between past and future. What difference do you see? — Luke

We need a premise concerning the passing of time, to get from the present as what is happening, to "what has happened" and "what is yet to happen". In the case of "what has happened" we have memory to refer to. In the case of "what is yet to happen", it is much more difficult because of the way that we look at the future in terms of possibility. So as much as we like to think of the past as what has happened, we cannot think of the future as you propose. Therefore we cannot describe the relationship between past and future, nor the passing of time, until we have a better premise about the future.

The past and future are both defined in terms of the present, and the present is not defined in terms of either the past or the future, so there is no circularity. I already explained how they are different: "has been" was present and "will be" will be present. — Luke

Again, the future cannot be defined in terms of what will be, because that is not how we relate to the future as conscious beings. We act to cause what we want to happen, and prevent what we do not want to happen. So as much as we might truthfully say that we think of the past in the terms of what has happened, we cannot truthfully say that we think of the future in terms of what will happen. This is because we have some degree of choice about what will happen. And that creates all sorts of dilemmas and anxiety about what one can and cannot do, and what one ought and ought not do, etc.. Because of this, "the future" is not simply an opposing term to "the past".

I agree that we remember the past and anticipate the future. I don't agree that memory and anticipation distinguish the meanings or definitions of the terms "past" and "future". — Luke

The issue though, is that we've agreed that "present" ought to be defined in terms of conscious experience. So when we move forward now to define past and future in reference to "the present" we need to maintain this status of "the present" as the definition provided by conscious experience, which we agreed was being, or existing. From this position of existing as conscious beings who experience "the present", we can only have an indication of anything which we might call "the past", through memory. Memory is the only thing which indicates to us that there is anything distinct from the present, as the past, so we have no choice but to define "the past" with reference to memory. And defining future is similar, but somewhat different.

How else would you propose that we could define "past" and "future" in terms of the present, when "present" is defined in this way? Without reference to memory we have no way to derive a "has been" because all that can be present to the mind would be what is happening. And the future would be a similar situation, we'd have all sorts of activity occurring, but no premonitions about what might be about to happen, or what was needed. So I don't see how we can bring our minds to the bigger picture of "has been", and "may be" (or something like that) without referring to these other parts of our experience of being present.

How does that follow? You said in the first quote above that you agreed the present should be defined in terms of when things are happening, occurring, existing, one's awareness, an utterance, etc. Why do you now say that "being and existing" get defined in terms of memories and anticipations? — Luke

To be perfectly clear to you, so that there is no misunderstanding, I will reproduce the rest of the context here. Prior to this I had said the following:

I agree that "the present" ought to be defined like this. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is how I believe that "the present" should be defined, as you propose, with reference to conscious experience, being, and existing. Notice the use of "ought". However, as I've been saying, I do not believe that this is the convention, I believe that in convention, present actually gets defined in reference to past and future, not vise versa, as it should be.

So, as I proceeded, the text you quoted appeared:

But then we see that "being and existing" gets defined in terms of having memories and anticipations, so the present is then actually defined in terms of past and future, because being and existing are described as having memories and anticipations. — Metaphysician Undercover

Would you please take notice that I proceeded from saying that the present "ought to be defined like this", to later saying "but then we see that...", and this implies that what ought to be the case is not what we actually see, or what actually is the case. In other words, I believe that the convention is to define "the present" in a way other than how it ought to be defined.

I don't agree that "being and existing" gets defined in terms of having memories and anticipations. But neither do I see how it follows from this that the present is actually defined in terms of past and future. Memories are not the past and anticipations are not the future. We experience both memories and anticipations in the present; they are about the past and the future, but they are not the past and the future. Furthermore, when are "being" and "existing" described as having memories and anticipations? — Luke

This is where we disagree. You seem to think that "has been", and "past" can be derived from the conscious experience of existing, or being present, without reference to memory. And the same for future. I do not see how this is possible, if we adhere to "the present" as being defined in the way we both agree it ought to be defined.

And, the only way to explore the problem I am describing, is to address the means by which these conceptions are derived from each other. Then we can see the difference between defining the present with reference to memories of past, and predictions of future, and defining the past and future with reference to the present. Pretending that these are both the same is no solution.

But we cannot even approach this problem until you provide some propositions, or a description of how you would like to make "past" and "future" something intelligible to a conscious being existing at the present.

The effect of this false randomness of boundary placement is to render the present an abstraction whereas, per your thesis, the present is an existential flowing of time no less than past/future. — ucarr

A slight correction here. The "flowing of time" is an appearance, how time appears to us. And, it is from this appearance of time, as a continuous flow, that the idea of placing points of division in any random, or arbitrary place, is derived. So, as per my thesis, the existential, or ontic present, is not to be conceived as a "flowing of time". The "flowing of time" is an illusion created by the deficiencies in the living being's ability to produce a true representation of time. We tend to think of human beings as being so far advanced in comparison to other animals in this respect, but in reality we're all very primitive in our capacity to apprehend the nature of time.

This means the present can’t be rendered a mental abstraction without introducing distortion into the perception of the existential reality of time. — ucarr

I would say that perhaps you have this backward, though I'm not quite sure what you meant. I think that the present is a mental abstraction, and it cannot be anything other than an abstraction for human beings. This is better explained in theological texts, by the fact that the human soul is inextricably united to the material body as a result of the original sin. This, being united with a physical body renders the soul's understanding of the immaterial, and all that side of the present which consists of the immaterial, which is the future, as limited to abstraction and conjecture.

So I would rather say, that we have an abstraction of "the present" which can be and is useful, but we have no perception of the existential reality of time. And since we cannot have a perception of it, it will always be an abstraction rather than a perception, and this leaves us limited in our capacity to obtain truth.

In the above you seem to be signed on to the arrow of time having only one direction. For you, per your above statement, that direction is from the future to the past. That claim caused my reverse-temporal universe statements. — ucarr

I now see why you think of this as "reverse-temporal". You see the present as what is flowing, not time as what is flowing. So you see time as a sort of number line of order, with the present as moving along that line. We might say that the present is flowing through all the dates. But this cannot be realistic because we would need a strong propellant to move us temporally through a static universe, and we see no evidence of the present being propelled. Instead, the evidence indicates that all events, and even things around us get moved into the past, and this is the result of the energy of the universe.

If we conceive of time as flowing, doesn't it have to be flowing from future to past? As time passes, isn't the past growing larger and the future growing smaller? How could the flow be the other way. Again, you might think that there is more time behind us, and less time in front of us, because we are being propelled. But in reality, all the force is experienced as being from the other side, so this does not make sense.

How I understand the above quote: One of the main objectives of your thesis is to establish the present within the flowing stream of time. — ucarr

The flowing stream of time is a specific description from the perspective of the human presence. This is the perspective which gives us the continuous time. What I argue is that this is really an illusion and not a true representation, so I apologize for accepting it initially, and misleading you. What I argued is that to put the present within time itself requires that we conceive of the conscious experience as being within time. This produces the conclusion that past and future must inhere within the conscious experience of being present.

So to model the present as an independent feature, instead of being a feature of the observer, requires that we find real substantial points in time which can be employed to distinguish past features from present features within the conflated unity of what we experience as "the present" As Luke argued, points or boundaries are a logical necessity to distinguish distinct parts. But the convention of continuity is to arbitrarily place a point at any time. This is what marks the difference between conceiving of the present as outside of time, and the present as inside time.

How I understand the above quote: The crux of your correction of the misconception of present time is the show that the present, being rooted within the flowing stream of time, differs existentially from a notion of the present as a static POV artificially demarcated by non-dimensional points. — ucarr

From the "static POV" of "the present", time appears to be a continuous flow., into which we can arbitrarily insert points of separation. From the "active POV", the continuous flow is replaced by an interaction of past aspects with future aspect. The need for "interaction" is the result of a mix of causal determination form the past, and freely willed selections from future possibilities. This implies that within any arbitrarily placed point of "the present", there are spatial aspects which are already determined (necessarily past), and also spatial aspects which are possibilities (still in the future). So the distinguishing features (points) appear to be spatial features.

How I understand the above quote: You have flipped your position to coincide with the conventional conception of the present as a non-flowing i.e., static perspective. Henceforth, one can only conclude you've renounced you earlier plan to correct the convention. — ucarr

No, as explained above, the "continuous flow" of time is what I believe to be the mistaken representation. When "the present" is the external perspective, or POV, sense observation appears to imply a continuous flow. But when the present is conceived of as within time, then there appears to be interaction between past and future. It is the need to account for the reality of interaction which inclines me to reject the "continuous flow".

How I understand the above quote: We're inhabiting a temporal universe running in reverse. If our universe has a finite lifespan, it began (inexplicably) at its endpoint and now runs backwards toward its beginning and, presumably, will continue beyond its conception into non-existence. I'm pondering whether that means our reverse-temporal universe is a one-cycle only universe. Also, I observe that our reverse-temporal universe is rigidly deterministic. Everything populating the present was always assured of existing exactly according to its current manifestation with the proviso that the evolving present keeps transitioning to younger manifestations of all existing things. — ucarr

I don't understand this at all. Why do you understand this as reverse? How do you orient yourself? Do you think that facing the future is facing forward, or do you think that facing the past is facing forward? If you think like I, then facing the future is facing forward. Do you see that the (apparently) continual onslaught of the future, is a force against you, which you always have to be thinking about to avoid mishaps? We spend our time thinking about what is coming at us in the future, trying to find the ways and means for making better lives for ourselves. This is what I mean by the flow of time being the future coming at us, and passing into the past, when you try to put the "static POV" into the "flow of time". However, when you consider that we make actions within this position, to change what is coming at us, we must take the "active POV".

How I understand the above quote: You have flipped your position back to positing the present as a flowing stream, albeit a reverse-temporal flowing stream that, paradoxically, you claim is a feature of the flow of time, yet not the flow of time itself. — ucarr

As explained, I think the flow of time is an illusion, which coexists with, and supports the idea of positing arbitrary points. Both of these are actually inappropriate, so I'm sorry to have misled you by initially accepting it.

Can you explain how the reverse-temporal flowing of present time is not the flow of time itself? — ucarr

I really don understand this "reverse-temporal flowing" stuff.

What's childish and silly are the obvious lies you have given to account for your contradictory statements, rather than acknowledging that your shifting position has been a result of my questioning and that your argument cannot support your attempts to overturn conventional grammar. — Luke

I'm sorry Luke, but I see no point in trying to explain anything to anyone who simply disputes my explanation, insisting that I'm being dishonest. When you ask for an explanation, please be prepared to accept it, otherwise you reduce the discussion to disrespectful bickering.

The definition of "present" is independent of the definitions of "past" and "future". The present is defined in terms of when things are happening, occurring, existing, one's awareness, an utterance, etc; not in terms of the past and future. As I have repeatedly told you, it is the past and future which are defined in terms of the present, not the other way around. — Luke

I agree that "the present" ought to be defined like this. Where we disagree is whether this is the convention. I do not think that it is the common practice. Maybe just some philosophers think that way. I think it is more common to define "the present" as "now", where "now" signifies the division between past and future. However, there are numerous different conventions in practise, so I think we could both support what we believe as "the convention", or "conventional".

Since we both agree that "present" ought to be defined this way, we can take it as a starting point for discussion.

I've explained this several times and it's not difficult. If "the present" is defined in terms of being and existing, then "did happen" is synonymous with "has been" or "did exist" and "will happen" is synonymous with "will be" or "will exist". The past is what was present. The future is what will be present. — Luke

What I ask for is how are these terms conceived. We have the present, as being and existing. The question is how is "has been" different from "will be"? You cannot say that one is past and the other future, because these are what we are trying to define, so that would be circular. What I proposed earlier is that we refer to memory and anticipation, as what distinguishes past and future. Do you agree?

But then we see that "being and existing" gets defined in terms of having memories and anticipations, so the present is then actually defined in terms of past and future, because being and existing are described as having memories and anticipations. So what I proposed earlier is to describe being and existing in terms of sensing, which is the more immediate activity of being present. This leads to the conclusion that the present consists of a duration of time. Still, we are within the present, and have not yet found the means to define past and future.

For those interested in the history of these kinds of political projects - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lysenkoism — apokrisis

Thanks for the interesting reference apokrisis. But I think the Wikipedia article somewhat misrepresents Lamarckism, especially here: "In contrast, Lamarckism proposes that an organism can somehow pass on characteristics that it has acquired during its lifetime to its offspring, implying that change in the body can affect the genetic material in the germ line.[2][3]".

What Lamarck proposed is that it is the activities of the organism, "habits", which may produce a change in the offspring, not that a change to the parent's body produces a change to the genetic material. I think that this is a critical difference to respect, because the habit doesn't necessarily cause a a change to the physical body engaged in the activity, but it causes a change to the genetic material.

This is relevant to the op because it assigns priority to activity, over changes to the passive material form which are observed as the effect of the activity. But misappropriating the effect of the activity, and assigning it to the body performing the habit (the parent), rather than assigning it to the offspring. is the straw-man representation of Lamarckism which opens it up to ridicule.

I'm sorry ucarr, I did not make myself clear. I cannot conceive of the present itself as a flowing stream. It would have to be the perspective from which the stream is observed. The changes we see all around us are evidence of the flowing time. Time is flowing from future to past, as the date of tomorrow, which is in the future, will become the date of yesterday. Death is a case of being forced by the flow of time, away from your observational point of the present, into the past.

If we want to give "present" an objective referent, as something other than the subjective point of view, Then it would be the process which is the future becoming the past. This is what we observe at the present, as change. It is a feature of the flow of time, yet not the flow of time itself.

My question to you was whether you agreed that past and future are defined relative to the present time. I did not ask you about what you had said earlier, that "the only coherent way is to define past and future by the present". I did not ask what is "coherent" to you, or whether you find it coherent to define the terms this way. I find it odd, then, that this is how you understood my question about whether you agreed that past and future are defined relative to the present time. I find your present explanation - that your response to my queston was a correction to what you said on page 1 about coherency - dubious at best. — Luke

As I said, your original question was incomprehensible to me. The part which followed "if not..." was a very poor representation (straw man) because the "view" I am arguing is how I think "present" ought to be defined, not how I think it is defined. The difference between these two is the point of this discussion. So I just addressed the first part, which was to answer "not", and explain my answer. The question after "if not..." made not sense.

Furthermore, I don't see any point to pursuing this issue. When we are discussing the writing of a third party, like we've discussed Wittgenstein in the past, it is often useful to compare different interpretations, the author not being there to answer our questions. In this case, I am the author, so I can explain what I meant by any particular passage. It's ridiculous for you to think that you can interpret what I meant better than I can myself, and then claim that what I meant was to contradict myself. Some other authors might be insulted by your behaviour, but I just find it very childish and silly

Presentism defines the present in terms of existence. Most conventional/dictionary definitions define the present in terms of things happening or occurring now or at this time. In philosophy and grammar, it is common for the present to be defined in terms of the time of an utterance. — Luke

In my understanding, presentism is inconsistent with the conventional definition of "present", because presentism treats past and future as unintelligible, which is clearly not the common convention.

I've already answered this. The present is what is happening or occurring; the past is what did happen or occurred; and the future is what will happen or occur. — Luke

We have no reference for "what did happen", or "what will happen". Based on what we agree on, we have only "the present", defined in terms of being and existing. How does "did happen", or "will happen" enter your conception?

If the present is a flowing stream of time that commingles with the past on one side & the future on the other side, most we conclude logically that past/future, like the present, are flowing streams of time? — ucarr

I would say that if the present is analogous to a flowing stream, then the future is the part flowing toward you, and the past is the part flowing away from you.

a) the present is outside of time; — ucarr

This is not what I am arguing for, it is what I called the "conventional" perspective, which I am arguing against as a misconception.. What I called "the conventional definition" (which Luke took exception to because it is inconsistent with what he thinks of as "the conventional definition) , puts the present outside of time. It puts the present outside of time as a derivation of the perspective from which the passing of time is observed. I am arguing that this is a misunderstanding of time, and that we ought to conceive of "the present" as a feature of time itself.

b) the present is the standard of reference against which past/future are defined; — ucarr

That's what I propose, to define past and future with reference to the present. But I argued that the convention makes past and future the reference against which "present" is defined. (again, Luke disputed that this is conventional). The convention, I say, is based in the distinction between memories and anticipations, events which have passed and those not yet come, and this distinction produces the conclusion of a "present moment" which separates these two distinct aspects of our experience. So this convention, I have claimed, defines "the present", as the separation or distinction between past and future.

If you are wondering how this puts the present outside of time as per my response to your (a) above, it is because this separation becomes, in practise, an arbitrary application of a non-dimensional point. The non dimensional point has no temporal extension, and cannot be understood as a part of passing time. So this, what I call "the conventional definition" (disputed by Luke, as not really the convention), cannot include "the present" as a part of time, because anytime we try to insert this observational perspective into the passing of time, whether as non-dimensional, infinitesimal, a short duration, etc., it requires arbitrarily placed points of separation between the present, and the rest of time, past and future. Therefore this "present", what I call the conventional one, is always incompatible with a true understanding of the passing of time.

c) events evolve over past/future through the lens of the present which is outside of time. — ucarr

This is what the conventional definition (again with the appropriate qualifications on "conventional") provides us with. We employ "the present", as we would employ a point in space, for the purpose of measurement. The so-called "lens" is the mode of employment. Depending on the purpose, the point which marks "the present", when we start the stopwatch (or whatever device of measurement), varies in precision and other features of arbitrariness.

The employment of "the present" thus described, is always an attempt to put the observational perspective (the present of the conscious being) into the thing being observed (the passing of time). However, what I've argued is that this does not provide us with a representation of "the present" which is consistent with "the passing of time", because of this assumed separation between observer and thing observed.

What I have been arguing, is that to properly understand time, we need to proceed from a different starting point. We ought to start with a conception of "the present", which allows for the flow of time within the present, therefore past and future within the present. Then there would be no incompatibility between the present, and the flow of time, because we would not start with the assumption that the present is a separate observational point, from which we observe the passing of time. The passing of time would be understood as occurring within the observational point, which we call "the present".

How do you counter-argue the claim "experiencing the passing of time," is measuring time? — ucarr

Measurement is of quantify. And we do not experience any distinct points, or quanta of time, which would provide for such a quantification. That is central to this discussion.

So our experience of time, in itself, does not provide what is necessary for measuring time. Therefore we end up measuring time by comparing physical activities, usually cyclical activities.

I note that you were not referring to convention here, but to your own opinion. — Luke

Yes I was referring to the convention, and I really think that's obvious. I also think it's very childish of you to be arguing in this way.

It is my opinion, of the convention, read through it. It continually refers to "us", and how we have produced these conceptions. It is a correction of what I said earlier, because earlier I said that I could see no coherent way to define the present by reference to past and future. But then I realized that this is actually the convention for defining time, and it is coherent. It is coherent, but as I argue from that point onward, mistaken. It is mistaken because it is not properly grounded with true premises (it divides future and past instead of uniting them) but it is still logically coherent.

So, I was definitely referring to convention at that point, not to my opinion of how "Present" ought to be defined. Also, I said that I was mistaken earlier, in reference to having said that I could think of no coherent way to define present by reference to past and future. That was my mistake, because I later realized that this is the conventional way, and it actually is logically coherent, just flawed in premises

Did you misspeak when you said "the only coherent way is to define past and future by the present." on page 1? — Luke

Yes, as above, I misspoke because at that time, I did not recognize that it could be coherent to define present relative to past and future. I then recognized that it was coherent, but a misunderstanding, and misleading.

The answer to both of these questions is: the present. — Luke

No, the present does not go by, nor is it yet to come. Both of these refer to time, as what goes by. But the present is the perspective from which it is observed to go by. That's why I said earlier, that this conception, the conventional one, gives us "the present" as a perspective, a view point, and it does not provide for a "present" which is a part of time. And I criticized you when you separated yourself from reality.

Past and future are defined relative to the present. — Luke

We'd be better off to yo say what "present is defined "in reference to", rather than "relative to", because "relltive to" is ambiguous. Every definition is "relative to" a human perspective, or view point. But the view point, or perspective from which a definition is made, does not necessarily enter into the definition. We do not commonly include that, though it is implied as necessary, because there is a person making the definition. So when past and future are defined as what has gone by, and what is yet to go by, this refers directly to time itself, as that which is passing us. This definition refers to time gone by, and time not gone by. However, it is implied that there is a human perspective, from which this judgement is made. The definition is "relative to" the human perspective, which we might call "the present", but the perspective does not enter the definition by way of reference. That is not necessary, a human perspective is always implied in all definitions. The definition does not include the "us", as not a required part of it, though it truly is "relative" to us. By not including the "us" which the definition is relative to, we produce the illusion of an objective definition.

Most supposed "objective" definitions are like this, and it creates fodder for philosophical discussion. We can define "red" for example, as a specific range of wavelength, creating the illusion that there is no observer necessary for there to be the colour red. But there is a problem here, because most incidents of naturally occurring light, judged to be "red" are combinations of different wavelengths. The convention in definition, is to remove the need for a point of observation, from the definition, to create an objective definition, but such definitions are always somewhat lacking, therefore open to philosophical criticism. Hence the proverbial philosophical question, "If a tree falls in the forest with no one there, does it make a sound?"

So, yes, past and future are defined "relative to" the present, because the present is taken as the subjective view point, and every definition is made relative to a subjective view point. But from here onward, I'll say that in the conventional definition "present" is defined in reference to past and future, but what I propose is that past and future be defined in reference to the present. That both of these definitions are created from, and therefore relative to, the subjective view point which we know as "the present", is irrelevant.

Again, this contradicts what you said earlier: — Luke

I see no contradiction. A definition is not the same as a description, you ought to know this Luke.

This could not be misconstrued as anything but you defining the present as an overlap between past and future. — Luke

Again, you are confusing the description, which is posterior to the definition, with the definition, which is prior to the description.

I agree that the present is defined relative to experience or being, but I disagree that it is not conventionally defined this way. The present is conventionally defined in relation to (or as the time of) being, existing or happening, and the past and future are conventionally defined relative to this, with the past as what has been, has existed or has happened, and the future with what will be, will exist or will happen. — Luke

I've never seen "the present" defined like this. But I've discussed time enough to know that there are many differing and even contradicting conventions. So it does not surprise me to see that this is the convention that you are familiar with, and that it is different from the convention I am familiar with.

Since we are in agreement about the way that "the present" ought to be defined, we can get back to the points of my argument. Now, we have only a definition of "present", and we have no definition of past or future, because they are to be defined in reference to the present. That we agree on. Do you see that "being", "existing", and "happening" are all verbs, referring to activity. And you seem to agree, earlier, that such activity must occur in a duration of time. So we have a temporal duration, within which activity occurs, and we call this "the present". Are we agreed so far? How do you propose that we proceed to define "past" and "future" in reference to this duration of time as being or existing at the present?

Can you accept, as another representational example of your above claims, the lap dissolve, a scene transition mechanism essential to the continuity of motion pictures? — ucarr

I suppose, the "lap dissolve" seems analogous.

This is evidently false. You have it backwards. The past and future are conventionally defined in terms of the present. — Luke

I gave a complete explanation. The past is defined as what has gone by in time, and this is substantiated by memory. The future is defined as what will come in time, and this is substantiated by anticipations. The present is defined by now, which is supposed to be neither past nor future.

You, on the other hand, are proposing that the present is defined in terms of the past and future, because you define the present as an overlap between the past and future. — Luke

I do not define the present as an overlap between the past and future. That there is such an overlap is a logical conclusion which is produced from defining present by conscious experience, instead of defining it in relation to past and future as is the conventional way. You really don't pay attention to what I write sometimes Luke.

Here is more of your earlier quote, by the way. From page 3 of the discussion: — Luke

Yes, that post of mine is consistent with what I am saying. You can see, that is the conceptualization I am critical of. Your post is a little incomprehensible to me though, so I might not have addressed your question.

Conventionally, the present is defined relative to the past and future, and this what I am arguing is a mistake. The present ought to be defined relative to conscious experience, and from this we'd derive the conclusion of an overlapping past and future. It took me a while at the beginning of the thread to realize that the problem with the conventional conception is that "present" is defined relative to past and future rather than conscious experience. That is why my understanding of "present" which is based directly in conscious experience is so different from the conventional. Making the present the separation between the mutually exclusive past and present, instead of defining it in a way which is based directly on experience, creates the problem I've been talking about.

Right, I think that what is really the case, is that "the present is defined relative to the past and the future". That is the conventional definition, as I explained in my last post, It is "what is really the case". What I am proposing is something other than the conventional definition. My proposition is that we ought to define past and future relative to the present. This is not "what is really the case" it is what I believe ought to be. Notice in the following paragraph that I characterized the separation between past and future, which results from the conventional way of defining present as a misrepresentation, a misunderstanding.

What I am arguing is that this separation between past and future is a misrepresentation, a misunderstanding, as the present is really a unity of the past and future. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are quite correct to say that I revert to common usage at times, and that is because I make much effort to explain common usage, to reveal its faults. That is what I am arguing, that our way of speaking, our grammar of language, from which you derive your temporal conceptions, is misleading, because it is based in some fundamental misunderstandings concerning the present and the nature of time in general.

What you need to do in order to understand what I am saying, is to pay close attention to the difference between what I am criticizing and what I am promoting. This is very important in philosophy. It is a common mistake here at 'The Forum' for people to take quotes from philosophers, Plato especially, but also other greats like Aristotle, completely out of context. They present these out-of-context quotes as representing something which is being promoted, without recognizing the reality of the context, that the author is being critical of that perspective.

Then what is your conception? How do you define "the past" and "the future"? — Luke

"Present" is defined by conscious experience, the presence of being. Past and future are defined by before and after in relation to a duration of time which is the present. Before and after are defined by the order observed in temporal duration.

There is "the past" which is not part of "the present" (call this P1), and "the past" which is part of the present (call this P2). There is also "the future" which is not part of "the present" (call this F1), and "the future" which is part of the present (call this F2). — Luke

Yes, you seem to be finally getting it.

Can we not distinguish P1 from P2 and F1 from F2? — Luke

Right, we cannot make these distinctions, now you're catching on. Due to the problems already discussed, we cannot establish such points of division. These points are arbitrarily assigned, not distinctions based on anything real.

Most people call only P1 "the past" and only F1 "the future", with "the present" as its own distinct third period of time that contains neither P2 or F2 (inside it) and to which P1 and F1 (outside it) are relative. I think you sometimes revert to this common usage, too. — Luke

Right again, the way we speak displays a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the present, and of time in general. I discussed the reasons for this. The fact that I sometimes speak in the conventional way does not lessen my claim that I think this is incorrect. It's like a bad habit.

I think this common usage is apparent in your claim that at the beginning of time there is all future and no past, and that at the end of time there is all past and no future. For what are "the past" and "the future" relative to in this scenario? — Luke

That was not a claim, it was an example to help you understand the nature of the overlap, and that it is not necessary that all past overlaps with all future in such an overlap. You didn't seem to understand so I gave you an example. Notice I said "if" there was a beginning in time, then this would have been the case at that time. If the example confused things more, then forget it. You seem to be understanding now without it.

I am not making any claims of necessity about the relation of P1 to P2, and F1 to F2. Since we cannot determine the points of division, it may be the case that all past overlaps all future, in the way of proportions, like I suggested. Conscious experience gives the appearance that there are such divisions, but conscious experience may be misleading us.

In your argument, the past and future are not defined relative to the present, as it is per common usage; instead you define the present relative to the past and future, as an overlapping region containing parts of each. — Luke

I don't think that this is quite right. Convention defines "present" relative to past and future. We have conscious memories, and conscious anticipations, as you and javra assert, and these represent past and future. By recognizing that there is past and future, we posit a "present" which is now, the centre of the conscious experience of the living being, as the separation, or division between the past and future which we are consciously aware of. So conventionally, we have started with past and future, which we are consciously aware of, and have defined "present" accordingly.

My proposition is to start with the conscious experience of the present, and define "present" according to the conscious experience of being present, directly. Then we move from this definition of "present" to define "past" and "future". This is opposite to the conventional way which derives "present" from a recognition pf past and future.

And what we notice in our experience of being present, is that we observe activities, motions. From this we can conclude that there is a duration of time at the present because motion requires the passing of time. And, we can say that any length of time is divisible into a before part and an after part. In relation to the present we can call the before part "past" and the after part "future".

Would you find it more acceptable to say that the future part is before the past part?

So why would there be all future and no past at the beginning of time on your view? This appears to be defining past and future relative to the present, with the present presupposed at the beginning, and all of time as F1 outside it. — Luke

Right, I define past and future relative to the present, and the present relative to conscious experience, as I've said numerous times. This is different from the conventional way, which defines present relative to the past and future, and past and future relative to conscious experience. Does that make things clearer for you?

First off, what I expressed was about “prioritizing” and not “limiting” one’s understanding of time. Makes a world of difference. — javra

The issue I explained, is that I can conclude from a logical process, that my conscious experience of the present must consist partly of past. I went through this at the beginning of my posting in this thread. I only supported it with the evidence of sensory experience later in the thread because Luke would not accept the logic.

By the time I say "now" it's in the past. But I sense activities, motions, at the present. This means that the present must consist of duration. Also any duration can be divided into before and after. And before and after in relation to my experience of the present are past and future. Therefore I can conclude that this duration of time which I experience as the present consists of future and past, which are inherent within my experience of the present, as memories and anticipations. My experience of the present consists of memories and anticipations.

Your way of "prioritizing" limits "memory" to conscious memory,. Therefore it excludes these memories which are inherent within my conscious experience of the present. That's why I called this type of prioritizing a bias.

Obviously what I meant was: in the context of your argument, do you call it "the future" or "the present"? — Luke

In that context it is very clearly both. You do not see it as that, because you enforce a mutual exclusion between these terms which is unwarranted.

I'll try another way. Do you agree with the following definitions?

(1) "The present" is the temporal region in which the past and the future are combined.
(2) "The past" is the temporal region which is not combined with the future.
(3) "The future" is the temporal region which is not combined with the past.

Can you see that there are two different definitions of "the past" and "the future" here? — Luke

Of course, 2 contradicts 1, and is not part of my conception.

If the past is not combined with the future as per (2), then how can the present be a region in which the past and the future are combined, as per (1)? Seems like you have two definitions of "the past". — Luke

I already explained all this, it is explained by parts, like the Venn diagram example.

If the future is not combined with the past as per (3), then how can the present be a region in which the past and the future are combined, as per (1)? Seems like you have two definitions of "the future". — Luke

It is not two definitions of "future". Look at my example of "animal". It does not require two definitions of " "animal" to have some animals which are human beings and some which are not. Nor does it require two definitions of "future" to have some of the future combined with the past, and some not.

That analogy would hold only if you were arguing that a human being is a combination of an animal and something else. — Luke

Yes, "human being" traditionally is a combination of "animal" and "rational". that part of the realm of animality which overlaps with rationality is known as "human being". That is the way that conceptualization works.

To be clear about what I meant, I qualiified the perfect fixedness of the past with "for all intended purposes". Meaning that the past is not, as I interpret it, absolutely fixed. — javra

I agree that the past is fixed, and the future is not, but this creates enormous, seemingly unsurmountable problems for understanding the nature of the present. The first question is, what happens at the present, which could cause such a change? The unfixed future must consist of possibilities, and the past must consist of the results of some sort of selection process. The selection process is often referred to as the Will of God, and in this way we meet the subject of the op head on.

The deeper question is how does the unfixed future relate to the fixed past, how is the selection process allowed to be carried out? This is why I like to assume a present which consists of an overlap of past and future. The human being has a fixed presence, by its physical body, sharing in the principles of continuity of Newton's first law, which states that the fixedness will continue into the future in a fixed way, unless caused to change. But in the mental world of intelligible objects, the mind partakes of the future, full of possibilities. So the human being as a whole, at the present, must be partly in the fixed world of the past, and partly in the unfixed world of the future. The overlap allows that the mind, in the future, can have influence over, and the capacity to change the continuity of the fixed body, in the form of free will choices.

So I so far don't find this epistemological prioritization to be a matter of confirmation bias. — javra

Let me say then, that it is a limitation you impose. The problem with this limitation, limiting your understanding of time to conscious experience, is that if you adhere to it strictly, you get a solipsist position. But you do not accept the solipsist position, you allow conscious experiences other than your own to have an influence on your understanding of time.

By taking this step, you must allow for the reality of a whole lot of other things, beginning with the separation which makes another's conscious experience distinct from your own. And by your own description, you allow a lengthening of the duration which you call "present", to allow for human beings to communicate. Strictly speaking, this lengthening of the present is not consistent with conscious experience, it is an adaptation you must make to allow for the reality of other individuals, and the separation between individuals. So now, you have allowed right here, that logic, along with premises derived from observation of the external world, infringes on your stated limitation, strict adherence to conscious experience.

In reality, once you leave the world of solipsism, to allow that the experience of others has any influence over your principles, you no longer adhere to the strict epistemic principle of conscious experience. Then allowing a specific type of alteration to your principles, as the result of your interaction with others, while disallowing others because you claim to adhere only to conscious experience, is a sort of bias.

Not typically. Our vision, as one example, always holds a focal point (more technically, a "focal zone"), i.e. some given area of vision upon which we visually focus, which is itself surrounded by peripheral vision we don't focus on, itself surrounded by non-vision. — javra

I don't think this is a good example. I think that vision is always dependent on conscious effort, it requires attention. So i do not see any argument from you, which would persuade me that the focus of vision can be carried out without conscious effort.

And all this occurs, typically, in manners fully devoid of conscious effort. When we're very attentive visually, this focal point becomes smaller bringing more details into visual focus; when we "zone out" this focal point can become so disperse so as to virtually blend everything into our peripheral vision; nevertheless, most of the time, our visual focal point, or that which we visually focus on, will occur without any conscious effort. — javra

I think we must have differing ideas as to what constitutes "conscious effort". Do you for example, find that you point your head toward that which you are looking at? Isn't this a matter of conscious effort? And suppose you are not even pointing your head, isn't moving your eyes a matter of conscious effort? In general, when you direct your attention toward something, anything, don't you consider this a matter of conscious effort? How do you believe that you could focus on anything, in any way, without conscious effort? Isn't that exactly what "focusing" is, to direct your attention at something? And directing your attention is making conscious effort.

Nevertheless, you bring up good points. My tentative, overall understanding of what you've written is that it addresses the issue of time by prioritizing physical matter over conscious experience. (I say "physical matter" so as differentiate it from the Aristotelian notions of, for example, individual ideas being the constituent matter - or material substrate - of a paradigm (with neither ideas nor paradigms being physical matter)).

If so, our metaphysical outlooks will then get in the way of our agreeing upon the nature of time.

But if I'm not misinterpreting you with the just mentioned, I'd be interested to know how you would address time in regard to prime matter? This given that prime matter, from which all matter as individual units develops, is understood to be completely undifferentiated in all ways. — javra

The answer to this question is complex and layered. I'll be brie but probably hard to understand. The Aristotelian conception of matter characterizes matter as potential, just like the modern conception of energy is as potential. "Matter" also provides for temporal continuity, that which persists through a change of form. And for Aristotle matter is proposed as the possibility for a substrate to reality. But it fails in its capacity to meet the requirements of this position due to its nature as potential. The cosmological argument demonstrates that ultimately there must be an actuality as the substrate.

So "prime matter" is shown by the cosmological argument to be a concept whose physical reality is impossible due to the reality of the physical world we inhabit. Aristotle shows how the form of any particular thing must precede in time, the material existence of that thing, in order that when it comes to be the thing which it is, it is that thing and not something else, which it must be, as dictated by the law of identity. By this fact of reality, prime matter cannot be a true concept. Individual units come to be by the form which determines what they will be and this is an actuality, not the potential of matter.

But what do you call that part of the future that lies inside the present? Do you call that “the future” or do you call that “the present”? — Luke

You can call it either one, or both, depending on the context and what you are trying to say. What do you call those animals who are also human beings? Do you call them human beings, or do you call them animals? Obviously, either one, or both, depending on the context and what you are trying to say.

Allow me to put it another way.

What do you call that part of the future which lies outside the present? You call that “the future”, right?

But what do you call that part of the future that lies inside the present? Do you call that “the future” or do you call that “the present”?

Now, does the future exceed the present? If so, then it is distinct from the present.

You are trying to use “the future” in two different ways.

And same for “the past”. — Luke

Sorry Luke, I just can't see your point. Look, "animal" exceeds "human being", and "animal" is distinct from "human being". However, there is overlap because some animals are human beings. In a similar way, "the future" exceeds "the present", and is distinct from the present, yet there is overlap because some of the future is at the present. That is not a case of using "animal" in two different ways, nor is it a case of using "future" in two different ways. Why is this so hard for you to understand?

The grammar of our language is not synonymous with "the way we speak". It involves the logic of our language and the meaning of words, e.g. why you cannot be both asleep and awake, but you can be both asleep and dreaming. It is also why the past and future cannot both exceed the present and not exceed the present. It does not concern any propositions or theories about the world, so neither does it concern truth or falsity in the manner you suggest. — Luke

To me, what you describe here is simply the way we speak. That it makes no sense to say that a person is asleep and awake, both at the same time, is simply a feature of the way we speak. That there is logic which supports the way we speak requires that there are premises as well. In this case the premise would be the law of noncontradiction. Therefore "the grammar of our language" does involve propositions and theories about our world, such as the fundamental laws of logic. But, we also speak about awakening, and this is understood as a process which is neither being asleep nor awake. So despite the fact that the way we speak, or "the grammar of our language" discourages us from claiming that we are both asleep and awake at the same time, it does allow us to say that we are neither asleep nor awake.

That we understand awakening as neither being awake nor asleep is the result of the rule established by Aristotle, that becoming violates the law of excluded middle. Aristotle's logical structure resulted in the convention, that becoming, which is now expressed as processes like awakening are neither one nor the other of the two opposing predications. In modern times, there are some who following Hegel, like the dialectical materialists, think that becoming ought to be expressed as a combination of both the opposing predications, in violation of the law of noncontradiction.

How can differences in the frame of reference cause the arbitrariness to the points in time? This makes no sense to me. — Luke

According to the relativity of simultaneity, two events which are simultaneous from one frame of reference (the specific time on a specific clock, and another event), are not simultaneous from another frame of reference. Therefore the point in time at which the specified event occurred is arbitrary, depending of the choice of frames of reference.

So "the reality [is] that in between distinct states-of-being lies the process of becoming" which is not compatible with states (or arbitrary points). I don't believe I got #4 wrong. — Luke

You are still not understanding. The "becoming" which lies between particular states-of-being is real, but so are the states-of-being real. Both are real, and this is contrary to your #4 which states that reality is continuous. Reality is not continuous, by what I am arguing, it consists of states-of-being and a process of becoming which lies between the states of being. Hence the need for real points, and the conclusion that continuity is not real.

I'm asking: what are we meant to do in the meantime, until we find them? — Luke

Look for them, obviously.

In that case, until we get "conclusive proof" that there are not points in time, then we ought to continue talking as if there are points. — Luke

Sure, why not? As long as it serves the purpose. But when we get to the limits of any specific representation we need to switch to another, rather than trying to force the reality to fit the representation, when it does not. That is known figuratively as trying to force a square peg into a round hole.

Then that's both (i) and (ii). (i) is where past and future do not exceed the present. (ii) is where past and future do exceed the present. You are arguing for both, which is a contradiction. — Luke

No, it's not contradiction, your options were just not well formulated. My perspective takes parts from each. You did not give the proper option, past and future being unified at the present, and also each of them exceeding the present. As I said, unification does not imply that all properties of the things unified overlap with each other, or are unified, only that some are unified or overlap.

When you first mentioned this "zero point", you defined it as the point in time when an object begins a new motion after being acted on by a force. You are now saying it is a logical point instead of a physical point. This is fine, but please stick with one or the other. — Luke

It's both, I explained. We determine logically that there must be a point in time when a change begins. So it's as I explained, we see logically that there must be such points, and these ought to be supported by physical evidence, but we have not been able to find the physical evidence. So we employ the mathematics of limits, and this hides the fact that we can't find or are simply not looking for, the real points.

There is both continuity and non-continuity in mathematics. And it's not my premises that "produce the conclusion of a zero point", but the grammar of our language. — Luke

Logical conclusions require premises. If you want to characterize your premises as "the grammar of our language", then I will assume that your principle premise is "the way we speak". The problem with this premise of course is that we often speak falsely and deceptively. So it makes for an unsound argument. Such and such is the truth, because we say it's the truth.

Do you recognize the distinction between being "correct", meaning according to convention, and being "true", meaning according to reality? And do you acknowledge that a statement might be correct but false, according to that distinction?

Why blame the relativity of simultaneity for the arbitrariness? — Luke

The arbitrariness to the points in time, at which acceleration begins and ends is due to differences in the frame of reference. This arbitrariness is known as the relativity of simultaneity.

To summarise:
1. Reality is represented as a continuum
2. To use logic (or grammar or language), the continuum must be divided into arbitrary states
3. Arbitrary states are incompatible with becoming (implying that becoming is continuous)
4. Reality is actually continuous, therefore we should not use logic (or grammar or language) to divide the continuum into arbitrary states — Luke

You got #4 wrong. Remember, I argue for real zero points. I also said that I believe sense experience misleads us into thinking that reality is continuous, when it really is not. The reason I spent so long arguing the continuity of time was to get a good understanding of exactly what sense experience gives us as an experience of time as continuous.

My question is: how do you intend to represent reality without dividing it into arbitrary states (i.e. without using language)? — Luke

What I proposed already, is that we need to find the real points of division, then we can avoid the arbitrariness of the current way of dividing.

Are you suggesting that we should stop using all temporal concepts until we know whether there are "real" points in time? — Luke

No, I said if we get conclusive proof that there are not points in time then we ought to stop talking as if there is points.

Do the past and the future exceed the present? — Luke

I don't know the answer of this. Remember, that was an example of how such an overlap could be real, and I cautioned you not to take it as necessarily the way I would conceive of time, just an example.

That is, do you use "the present" to represent (i) a combination of the past and the future (where past and future do not exceed the present), or do you use "the present" to represent (ii) a period of time that separates the past from the future (where past and future do exceed the present)? You earlier rejected (ii), that the present is a period of time which separates the past from the future. However, since you now say "they are not perfectly overlapping", this indicates that you accept (ii), because it implies that the past and future exceed the present. Or, do you accept both (i) and (ii)? — Luke

I think I would choose (i), with a change, that past and future exceed the future. A combination of past and future where past and future exceed the present. So not all of past, or all of future are combined at present, only some of each, in the way I described already. "Union" does not imply that all the parts of the things united are equally united to each other. But I do not think that experience gives me what is required to answer with any certitude, as to exactly how past and future overlap, and exactly how the parts exist outside the overlap.

Perhaps I am lost, because I don't see how this is supposed to work. "Points in time" supposedly exist in reality, whereas memory and anticipation exist in my mind. How do we use real points in time to distinguish memory from anticipation? You say that the points would enable a distinction to be made between the past and future parts of a sensation, but how will that help to separate a memory from an anticipation? — Luke

Your mind is part of reality. Determining the real points within the mind would allow for application outside the mind, because both are part of the same reality.

What I argued is that the experience of sensation, which is an activity we do at the present, must consist of both past and future. The past part consists of memory and the future part consists of future. Real points of "present" would allow a separation between these two, for a better understanding, instead of having them conflated into one activity, sensation.

If we distinguish past, present and future from each other by reference to properties rather than by reference to (arbitrary) dimensionless points, then why are you taking issue with arbitrary points? — Luke

Many people, including you it seems, claim that we distinguish past, present, and future by dimensionless points, when in reality we distinguish these by description. It is "the grammar of our language", which makes people think like that, but it is a misrepresentation of how we really understand the difference between these three. It's done for simplicity to facilitate ease of speaking. Since our descriptions of past, present, and future are so thoroughly underdeveloped and vary from person to person, yet the need to separate past from future in discussion is very commonplace, it's much easier just to talk as if there is a point in time, present, which separates past from future.

There exists a process/entity duality (which in some ways is akin to the wave/particle duality of QM) in the operations of cognition. For one example, our cognition naturally, innately, perceives physical objects, or entities, set against a background – objects that we can cognize as sometimes engaging in processes (e.g., the rock (entity) is rolling (process) down the hill (entity)).

All these experiences then result in our cognizing that everything physical is in an underlying state of flux, i.e. is process, or becoming. Yet the moment we focus on something it becomes a thing, or entity, within our cognition; and this applies to both perceived givens and concepts. For example, the concept of “running (as process)” itself becomes an entity (an individual unit) - linguistically, a noun – in the form of a specific type of process that we then can cognitively manipulate as concept. — javra

I would say, that traditionally the background is of entities. The entity is what is static, and changes occur to it. This is the traditional logic of predication, the subject accepts changing predications. The static aspect is representative of what does not change as time passes, what is continuous, and this is matter in ancient philosophy, and matter is the background. It is only in the modern world view, that energy has taken the place of matter, as the continuous. But energy is fundamentally a predicate, the capacity which a moving thing has, to do work. So now movement, which really ought to be predicated to something, as that which is moving, is allowed to be the background, or substratum itself, hence your background of flux. But this is inherently problematic, because without the ether we have wave motion with no substance which the waves are the waves of.

All these experiences then result in our cognizing that everything physical is in an underlying state of flux, i.e. is process, or becoming. Yet the moment we focus on something it becomes a thing, or entity, within our cognition; and this applies to both perceived givens and concepts. For example, the concept of “running (as process)” itself becomes an entity (an individual unit) - linguistically, a noun – in the form of a specific type of process that we then can cognitively manipulate as concept. — javra

What makes a thing a thing, is temporal continuity. Anything which displays temporal extension is given thinghood. So for example, in Newton's first law, uniform motion is given thinghood. It will continue to persist through time, as it has, unless ended by a force.

Unlike the future, though, our recollections of past present-durations wherein we in any way interacted with other minds will always reference events commonly stored (here overlooking mistakes of memory and such) within the memory of all minds concerned. Hence, the past will be fixed relative to all minds that once partook of it when it was a (commonly shared) present duration. In contrast, the future – not having yet been presently experienced – will not be.

As an aside, I’m one to believe that such musings could (together with other principles) be applied so as to formulate a theory of presentism wherein the past is for all intended purposes perfectly fixed and the future is indeterminate – a theory of presentism that parallels the theory of relativity’s stipulation that simultaneity is always observer-dependent. But I’m here presenting all this simply to provide better general background for the current purposes, this in terms of defining the present in respect to the past and future. (In other words, though I’m aware these given premises could be further enquired into, I’m only here presenting them for the purpose of the current issue.) — javra

If you define the past as absolutely fixed, and the future as absolutely unfixed, then we run into the same problem that I was showing with Luke's arguments when past and future are mutually exclusive contraries. There cannot be any overlap of past and future. Then, the nature of "the present" becomes extremely problematic. Since the present has to be a process (it cannot be a dimensionless point when a predicate changes to is contrary because this requires a duration of becoming), this time, "the present" must be completely distinct from past and future. But then we need to account for the process whereby the past becomes the present, and the present the future, and I think we'd have to posit some other form of time for this. It may become an infinite regress.

So, when we don’t focus on the past, present, and future we know that these are all aspects of an inseparable process. Yet when we focus on them, each becomes an individual unit distinct from the others. — javra

I think that these points of distinction are imposed pragmatically, depending on the purpose. For example, you intentionally qualified "past" with what is consciously remembered as past. That is just for the purpose of having a clear division. If we allow all past, then we have to deal with things like "sensory memory", which I brought up earlier. So sure, you can say that we can make clear and distinct divisions between memories (past), and anticipations (future), so long as you restrict your definitions of memories and anticipations to those which we recognize clearly and distinctly as memories and anticipations. That's a sort of confirmation bias, defining terms to support a bias. These things defined by that bias are further back in the past, and things further ahead in the future. But if you include things in the very immediate future and past, bringing your perspective narrower than the conscious perspective, to consider the relations of the constituent parts of the conscious perspective, then we cannot distinguish between memory aspects and anticipatory aspects in this way.

We then know from experience that there is no measurable distinction between the future and the experienced present, with the latter always changing to incorporate what in the past was strict future. The same lack of measurable distinction holds between the experienced present and the past. So we know all this to be process, for it's all continuous change. Notwithstanding, we also know that the experienced present is always qualitatively distinct from all past we can recall (be it the past of two seconds ago or that of two years ago, etc.). Likewise with future present-durations which we can in part predict and thereby anticipate.

So, when we don’t focus on the past, present, and future we know that these are all aspects of an inseparable process. Yet when we focus on them, each becomes an individual unit distinct from the others.

Furthermore, when we focus on the past, present, or future, we then cognize each of these to be composed of befores and afters. For example, I am in this current duration of the experienced present writing this word before this one. Upon closer experiential examination, all these befores and afters too are perfectly devoid of measurable distinctions. Yet, when we conceptualize these processes of lived experience – such as by consciously or unconsciously ascribing causality – each before and each after will then be cognized as a distinct unit. — javra

Here is where the problems present themselves. When you say "focus on", I consider this to be conscious effort. The process which we know as experiencing the present, if it were purely experiencing, without applying any conscious effort, perhaps in meditation or something like that, would not consist of any differentiation between past and future. Maybe dreaming is like this, no discernible difference between past and future. But dreaming is completely removed from sensation. When sensation is active, then it actually takes conscious effort to remove a sort of natural distinction between past and future which inheres within, or underpins our consciousness.

What I think is the case, is that what you call the "measurable distinction" between past and present, and also future and present, is so deeply inherent within the conscious experience of the present, or prior to it, as foundational to it, that to say that there is no such measurable distinction without conscious effort, is somewhat incorrect. This is why it actually requires conscious effort to remove the influence of this distinction from the conscious experience. For example, practises like meditation which are designed to put oneself into a purely experiential mode of being without the influence of memories and anticipations, actually require great effort.

This would imply that most or all life forms, even those which have not evolved enough to be fully conscious, would have some process for distinguishing between memories and anticipations, as fundamental to their experience of being present. That is implied by the fact that it requires great effort, and is actually impossible, to remove the difference between memory and anticipation from the experience of being present.

The issue here is that consciousness has developed a method of cognizing and recognizing memories and anticipations, through conscious effort, which is most likely completely distinct, and different from the underlying "natural way" of distinguishing memories from anticipations, which underpins, and forms the foundation of the conscious experience. I propose that there are two distinct ways involved, one being the way of continual process and the other being the way of distinct states-of-being, what you call entities.

I believe that the crux of the matter is the use of symbols or signs. If we take Luke's proposed "grammar of our language" for example, we see that language is fundamentally conformed to the entities, or states-of-being type of temporal reality. But there is always a part of the conscious experience of being present, which language cannot get at, or is ill-formed for describing. This is the underlying, background of process which you refer to. So the underlying experience of being conscious at the present appears to consist of a continuous process, and the conscious effort to distinguish past memories and future goals as objects or entities, is somewhat inconsistent with this natural background.

What I propose is that even the underlying experience of continuity is constructed from an even more primitive way of recognizing distinct past and future entities or states-of-being. And what has happened is that the living system for pragmatic reasons has produced a synthesis which creates the appearance of continuity. This type of synthesis is the very same type that we find in modern physics. The underlying grammar of language provides an understanding of temporal reality in terms of entities, objects which are states-of-being. This representation is supposedly supported by strong philosophical principles, metaphysics and ontology, so theology and religion have enforced this usage for centuries, as best representative of the truth. However, all the entities we find in the physical temporal reality are in flux, so we move to represent the entities as active, Newton's first law for example. This law represents continuity as a uniform motion. And this representation is supported by the underlying experience, which is itself an experience of continuous process. Since the fundamental inner experience is apprehended as continuous process, we move to represent the entire outer universe as continuous process. This is done for pragmatic reasons, but it is claimed as truth, because it is supported by the underlying inner experience, which is apprehended as a continuous process.

So I have exposed four levels of representation in the preceding paragraph. At the upper levels of consciousness we have the entire universe represented as continuous process. This is a synthesis of of the distinct entities which are the substance of the layer below that, in the more base levels of consciousness, the common language. The synthesis is carried out for pragmatic purposes of understanding the motions and activities of the entities represented in the more base level of consciousness. Below this base level of representing performed by consciousness is the conscious experience itself. The conscious experience is apprehended as a continuous process and the base level representation of it, with entities, which is derived from ancient metaphysics is seen as a faulty representation. However, what I've proposed is that this presumed foundational level, the continuity of the conscious experience at the present, is really itself a synthesis, produced by the evolution of the living being for pragmatic reasons, and that underlying this apparent continuity is further, more base, entities, or states-of-being, which have been synthesized into the continuity evident as the conscious experience of the present.

In summary, what I say is that the representation of entities is more real, more truthful in its correspondence with temporal reality, than is the representation of the continuum. But temporal reality is extremely complex and very far from understood by any living beings on earth. So as our understanding of temporal existence progresses, it proceeds through an evolution of representing entities, synthesizing them into a continuity of existence, which is guided by pragmatic reasons, until the synthesis reaches the limits of its usefulness. At this time, a whole new level of representation of entities is required, so that the cycle starts over again.

Therefore I can propose a fifth level to the four described above. The representation of modern physics, as a synthesized space-time continuum has pretty much reached the limits of its usefulness. Quantum physics has presented us with the reality of fundamental quanta, entities which underly the spatial-temporal reality. The space-time continuum as currently synthesized cannot provide comprehension of these fundamental entities because it has reached the limits of its usefulness. So we need to identify a whole new level of entities, as foundational to spatial-temporal reality, and renew the cycle on a new level.

The Paradox is roughly this: information or knowledge of the initial conditions and laws of nature should allow a true prediction of the action of some person or subsystem with those initial conditions and that is governed by those laws of nature. Such a prediction must be true. However, if the person or subsystem in question acts in a way that falsifies the prediction, then the prediction is not true. In brief, the prediction must be true, however it is not true when the prediction is falsified by the action of the person or subsystem considered. — NotAristotle

The problem here is that we need to know, with absolute certainty that the conditions have been met, in order for the experiment to be useful. The two conditions are knowledge of the initial conditions, and accurate laws of nature. If it is not known with absolute certainty that these two conditions are met, then failure of the prediction could be the result of inadequate knowledge of the conditions. And, success of the prediction is only useful to the extent covered by Hume's induction problem. Since we cannot know the two conditions with absolute certainty, due to that induction problem, the proposed experiment is useless.

I have given you an argument for why there must be points of distinction between past, present and future. I'm not saying this for the sake of saying that you contradict yourself. However, you did contradict yourself, as I pointed out. — Luke

This is the point we've come to. We seem to be in total agreement. I agree that "there must be" such points of distinction. That is what I've called the "zero point" and I've explained why intuition provides us with the premises which make such zero points a logical necessity. However, what I argue is that experience, therefore empirical evidence, does not support these premises. Empirical evidence shows us time as continuous, and without such points of distinction. And, because we need such points of distinction for our measurement procedures, though experience does not provide them for us, we impose them arbitrarily, according to pragmatic conditions.

I'll grant you these "in between periods" of being half asleep and half awake. However, you must admit that there comes a point when you are no longer half asleep but asleep, and there comes a point when you are no longer half awake but awake.

Likewise, there comes a point where an event is no longer in the present (i.e., in combination with the future) but is fully in the past, and there comes a point where an event is no longer fully in the future but is in the present (i.e., in combination with the past). — Luke

There is no such point though, in experience. When I awaken, I can say with certainty, "now I am awake", and also say with certainty that at some temporally separated (duration of time) past time, "I was asleep", but I cannot find within my experience, the precise point which separates the two.

What you are arguing is a logical necessity for such a point, as the "zero point". You are not showing me the experience of such a point. This logical necessity which you refer to is produced from our common way of speaking about time, and this reflects our intuitions. The logic proceeds from premises derived from intuition. The problem is that the logical systems of mathematics. which are adopted by, and employed by science use premises derived from experience, these are the premises of continuity, and these premises are incompatible with your premises which produce the conclusion of a zero point.

The problem was well explained by Aristotle, as the incompatibility between being and becoming. There is an incompatibility between describing things as distinct states-of-being (what is and is not), and the process, becoming, which is the change which must occur for one state to lead to the other. I have characterized the premises of being and not being as intuitive, and the premises of becoming as empirical.

If we describe things in terms of states-of-being, 'Luke is asleep', and 'Luke is not asleep', this is what is known as predication. The one excludes the other (contradiction) if we follow the fundamental laws of logic, and there is no third possibility (excluded middle). However, if we try to describe the entirety of reality in this way, there is a very serious problem, we cannot account for how one state of being is produced from its opposite. We cannot account for how the subject 'Luke' alters from being asleep to being not asleep.

The intermediary is the process, "becoming", by means of which the subject changes to its opposite state of being, in relation to that predicate. If we try to describe becoming as an intermediary state-of-being we meet the problem of infinite regress. 'Luke is awakening' is a proposition of an intermediary state-of-being. Now we have 'Luke was asleep', 'Luke is awakening', and 'Luke will be not asleep', as three distinct states-of-being. To fully understand, we need to account for how the subject 'Luke' changes from being asleep, to being awakening, and from being awakening to being awake. If we propose further states-of-being we face infinite regress. So Aristotle proposed that becoming is incompatible with being, and the intermediary between distinct and mutually exclusive states-of-being, the process of change, cannot be understood through the terms of states-of-being.

In classical physics (modern physics) the state-of-being is represented by Newton's first law of motion. This is the continuity of experience, empirical evidence, a body at rest remains at rest, or in uniform motion remains in uniform motion continuously, unless acted upon by a force. States-of-being are represented as continuous through time, which is consistent with experience. The intermediary, the process of becoming, by which one state-of-being is changed to another, is represented as acceleration. These are the two incompatible types of description, uniform motion, and acceleration.

However, introducing a distinct and incompatible intermediary (becoming), between two contrary states-of-being does not relieve us of the inclination to assume points. You demonstrate this by insisting that there is a requirement for a point between future and present, and a point between present and past. So if the past is a continuous state 'Luke was asleep' and the future is a continuous state 'Luke will be not asleep', and the intermediary present is 'Luke is awakening' is also a sate-of being, you insist that there must be a point in time when the past state 'asleep' changes to the intermediary state 'awakening', and the intermediary state 'awakening' changes to the future state of 'not asleep'.

Notice the mistake there. The intermediary, the becoming or process of awakening has been represented as an intermediary state. This is what Aristotle showed leads to infinite regress. The intermediary "becoming" cannot be made to be compatible with states-of-being in this way because it only produces an infinite regress and stymies any true understanding which requires that becoming remains incompatible with being.

In modern physics, the intermediary is acceleration. So 'Luke is awakening' is analogous with acceleration, as the intermediary between two distinct states of uniform motion. In physics, we practise the mistake exposed above, and describe the intermediary, acceleration, the becoming, as a third distinct of state. This produces the need for two points which separate the prior state and the posterior state from the intermediary state of acceleration. The points have the characteristic of arbitrariness due to the relativity of simultaneity, and the infinite regress produced from representing the intermediary "becoming" as a state-of being, is absorbed by the concept of a "limit" in calculus.

The conclusion to that long-winded explanation above, is that modern physics represents the reality of physical existence as continuous. To be consistent with the empirical evidence, spatial-temporal reality is represented as a continuum. However, to be able to employ deductive logic, the continuum is divided into distinct states-of-being, and this produces the need for points of separation or division. The application of points is arbitrary as provided for by the axioms of "continuity". The mistake in this practise is that it does not provide for the reality, that in between distinct states-of-being lies the process of becoming which is fundamentally incompatible with states-of-being, and cannot be represented as a state-of-being. By placing points or "limits" as the divisions between states-of being instead of the incompatible process of becoming, the change between one state-of-being and another is misunderstood due to the implied infinite regress.

Why must we "substantiate our way of speaking"? — Luke

So that we are speaking truth, instead of falsity. If it turns out that there are no points in time, then we should stop speaking as if there is, and get on with understanding the true nature of time as continuous. I have substantiated my way of thinking, that's what I've been doing in this thread. I've explained the reason why we talk about points in time, and also the reason why we talk about the continuity of time

This implies that the present (the combination of past and future times) consists of all of time. In that case, I did misunderstand you. This is not your typical Venn diagram, because the "past" and "future" circles here are perfectly overlapping with each other, one directly on top of the other. Thanks for clarifying. — Luke

No they are not perfectly overlapping, you still misunderstand. At the beginning, there is all future and not past, therefore no overlap here. At the end there is all past and no future, therefore no overlap there. For all we know, these non overlapping areas could be bigger than the overlapping area. We have no way to measure this.

Why do we need such points in order to distinguish memories from anticipation? — Luke

You seem to be lost here. Suppose you are sensing (seeing) the chair. You cannot tell which part of the sensation is produced from memory, and which part is produced from anticipation. Points in time would enable a distinction to be made between the past part of the sensation and future part. This would be helpful to understanding sensation, therefore also helpful to empirical science which relies on sense evidence.

If you don't want any "arbitrary points" in your description of a continuous present, then there will be nothing to distinguish the present from the past from the future from a turnip. These temporal terms become meaningless. — Luke

We usually distinguish things from each other by reference to properties, not dimensionless points. So this is completely false.

Is there any reason that we would choose a "way of speaking" that makes it impossible to distinguish one object or event from another? That is what your "way of speaking" without "points" gives us. — Luke

Again, we generally use properties to distinguish things, not points.

It seems this discussion has become rather pointless, even though you are continually trying to insert arbitrary points. This you do simply for the sake of saying that I contradict myself when I say there are no points. That's not interesting for me, so maybe the discussion has run its course.

I was following your example of two different types of experience: — Luke

It was not my example, you proposed two different types of experience. I just showed you why it wouldn't work.

Tell me, what other experience is in between being asleep and being awake? What separates them? Must there be another experience between these? Aren't we asleep and then, at some point, awake again, in succession? — Luke

Come on Luke. Don't you experience awakening, that brief period when you're half asleep and half awake? And don't you experience this 'in between period' when you are falling asleep as well?

Why do we need "something real" to distinguish the end of one and the beginning of another? What real thing distinguishes the end of being asleep and the beginning of being awake? Perhaps there is no distinction between being asleep and being awake and it's just "one continuous experience"? Or did you "arbitrarily assert" that being asleep and being awake were distinct types of experience? — Luke

I am not following you now.

But there must be a point when an event is no longer present and becomes past. Otherwise, past and present are indistinguishable. — Luke

I've been through this already. No point is required if "past" and "future" name different categories which may overlap, instead of them being opposing terms where one denies the possibility of the other by way of contradiction. And this is consistent with our experience, "future" does not name the opposite of "past", it names something categorically different. So, past and present are distinguishable from each other by their relation with the future.

I really don't see why you insist on inserting an arbitrary point all the time.

In this quote, the "point" at which what is in the present becomes past is the starting point of the present. In your terminology, this is when the past (proper) meets "the present" (the combination of past and future). There is also a second point where the future has not yet passed the present, which is the end point of "the present". In your terminology, this is when the future (proper) meets "the present" (the combination of past and future). — Luke

I don't see my use of "point" anywhere in those quotes, so I think you are constructing a contradiction from a misquote.

I know that you are trying to argue that there is some smooth, unnoticeable transition between them, but the distinct concepts won't let you. — Luke

You are treating the concepts as mutually exclusive, not as distinct. That is your failure to properly understand what I've already explained numerous times, not a contradiction by me.

There can be a period of changing, but at some point there must be a moment of change when what is present is no longer future and what is past is no longer present; when the past is no longer combined with the future and when the future has not yet become combined with the past. — Luke

This is what I called the "zero point", and the fact that we tend to think like this, intuitively, instead of the way that I proposed, is evidence that we need to seek, and find the real points in time, to substantiate our way of speaking.

But since you are having so much difficulty understanding this idea of overlap, try this image as an example. In the overlap of past and future, which I described as "the present", consider that the proportion of each, the amount of past, in relation to the amount of future, is constantly changing. So if there was a beginning of time, then at the very beginning, there was only future, and no past. At the very end of time, there will be all past, and no future. We are somewhere in between, and the past and future at our present is proportioned accordingly.

That is just an example of how such a thing could be conceived, so please do not say that it contradicts a completely different example.

Do you believe that, in order to distinguish memories from anticipation, we need to discover "real points in time"? — Luke

No you seem to misunderstand. In order to distinguish memories form anticipations within what we experience as "the present", (for example or sensations), we need such points.

Moreover, if the present is a combination of past and future, as you claim, then how will the discovery of "real points in time" help to disentangle this entanglement of memories and anticipation? — Luke

By providing a point of separation, like you've been desperately trying to do. But your points of separation are arbitrary, I'm looking for points with substance.

Is "the chair of two seconds ago" in the present or in the past (according to your context)? — Luke

Sorry, I do not follow. And I'm tired of trying to explain this point to you, it appears hopeless, just like trying to get you to quit inserting arbitrary points into my description of a continuous present.

The relevant question is "when are you perceiving?" — Luke

We are always perceiving at the present, and the present consists of past and future. We've already discussed this. Where's the problem?

Be that as it may…..I mean, you pretty much disagree with everybody…..it is clear that priority in the mind, as such, cannot be phenomena. — Mww

Sure, I might not be very agreeable, but if you read Stanford's article on a priori justification, you'll see that there are many problems with Kant\s system. So it's not just me.

The problem I have with the idea of a priori judgements, is that if the justification comes from within the mind, this just produces an infinite regress, as each a priori judgement would require an a priori justification, which would be an a priori judgement requiring a further a priori justification, and there would be no substance upon which all these justifications would be supported, just an implied infinite regress.

What Kant does do though, is grounds, or substantiate the a priori in intuition. However, this removes "intuition" from the mind, making it prior to the mind, as the basis for the a priori judgements within the mind. But intuition is also the necessary condition for phenomena. Therefore he provides no real principles which would place a priori judgements as prior to phenomena in the mind. In reality, he just uses "intuition" in an ambiguous, obscure way, to hide the problems with his proposed system.

This is a false dichotomy. You're saying there must either be a gap between the two experiences or else there must be an overlap between them. The third option is that one experience follows the other immediately without any gap or overlap. — Luke

It is incoherent to describe this as two distinct experiences, in succession, unless there is something which separates them. Otherwise you have just arbitrarily inserted a point and claim that on one side of the point is one type of experience and on the other side is another distinct type. You need something real, which distinguishes the end of one and the beginning of another, or else you are just arbitrarily asserting distinct experiences in a succession, rather than one continuous experience.

Your other questions on this matter will be answered for you, when you come to comprehend what I've said above.

Okay, at some point inside the present, the future becomes the past. — Luke

No! We have no premise for a "point". You incessantly want to insert a "point" when the unreality of such a point is my primary premise. You insert the unjustified "point" which is completely inconsistent with the justified position I am arguing, then you ask me to make sense of such a point. It cannot be made sense of because it is incompatible with what makes sense.

Ah, but here you say that the past refers to time that has passed (or "past") the present. This means that the past is not within the present and is no longer within the present because it has passed (outside of) it. If it has passed the present, then it is not inside the present. It cannot be both inside the present and outside the present. There is your contradiction. — Luke

I explained this, the present consists of duration. read the following:

When the future is inside the present it is past a part of the present, so it has already become past in relation to that part of the present, and is still future in relation to the rest of the present. This is the nature of change, it does not happen all at once, but over a duration of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course, there is the issue of dividing the continuous into parts, the parts are arbitrary. But this is why it is so extremely difficult to distinguish the anticipatory parts of the human experience of "the present" from the memory parts. That is why I argue that the present will remain unintelligible to us until we find the real points in time. That there necessarily is real points, is demonstrated by the issue with the "zero point" of change, which I described. The problem is that we do not experience these points, so experience has misled us into modeling motions as continuous, and accepting mathematical axioms which produce a continuum. And since these premises prove to be very useful (up to a limit), we are reluctant to see them as misrepresentations. What is required to get beyond the limitations which those premises impose, is to determine the real points.

If "there is no now" as you say, then what did you mean by "your perception of it now"? — Luke

Human experience, along with the conventions employed for measurement have misled you to believe that you perceive a "now" at the present. There is no such now, as described by you, your perception of it is an illusion.

I was referring to your scenario of looking at a chair in front of you. Which event is simultaneous with the present in that scenario? You used the phrase "your perception of it now". If you used "now" to mean something different than "the present", then what did you mean?

And, again, when is the present situated in that scenario? — Luke

OK, I found the paragraph in question:

The problem is that all experience is completely wrapped up in memory, whether you like to admit it or not. Consider looking at an object in front of you, a chair or something. What you see is not a hundredth of a second of chair, or a half a second of chair. You are seeing the chair over a continuous duration. But the chair of two seconds ago must be only in your memory. However, that chair of two seconds ago is an integral part of your perception of it now,. That's how you know whether it's moving or not. — Metaphysician Undercover

In this context, "now" means present, which is continuous. It is not the "now" of a point in time, which you propose, the one I argue is an illusion. The context ought to reveal this to you, " the chair of two seconds ago is an integral part of your perception of it now".

Your perception of anything at the present, what is called "now" above, includes memories of past (exemplified by sensory memory). The perception also includes anticipations for the future. Due to the problem described above, it is impossible to separate which aspects of your conscious perception are produced bu memory and which parts are produced by anticipation.

So for example, if you are consciously watching the chair, and something unexpected suddenly happens, you will recognize the sudden occurrence as unanticipated, but this will occur with a reaction time. That there is a reaction to sudden change indicates that anticipation is part of the conscious experience, that there is a time it takes for the reaction to occur, indicates that memory is part of the conscious experience. Therefore we can understand the conscious experience described as "the perception of it now" as a combination of past and future.

So, to answer your questions, "your perception of it now" refers to "at the present", and this is an extended duration of time, as indicated, by "the chair of two seconds ago is an integral part" of that perception now. And, as explained above, your anticipations concerning the future of that chair, 'the chair in the future' are also an integral part of that perception of the chair at the present. Your true perception of the chair now, or at the present, is as of the chair as existing through a continuous duration of time, not the illusionary point, or infinitesimal point, or anything like that, as you keep proposing for me to make sense of. What you ask me to make sense of cannot be made sense of because it is inconsistent with what makes sense.

At best, with respect to phenomena, it can only be said that the priority in the mind is the antecedent conceptual conditions by which they are possible, which is the deduction of the pure conceptions, better known as the categories. — Mww

I do not agree with your interpretation of Kant here. The categories are produced by judgement, and I think that Kant does not properly characterize judgement. This is where the issues of his system are evident, and Kant runs into problems. I think you and I have discussed the nature of judgement before.

The conditions for sensibility, phenomena, are the pure intuitions of space and time. And "intuition" is not well defined by Kant. It is not even implied that intuition is necessarily within the mind. But these pure intuitions are necessarily prior to phenomena. But the categories are created, or discovered as a means for judging phenomena. They are not necessarily prior to phenomena, as Kant described them as conforming to the appearance of phenomena. Nor are the categories properly called "intuitions" because they are already judgements of some sort, and judgement is posterior to intuition. But then he seems to want to assert that such tools of judging phenomena are prior to phenomena, though he formulates his categories as conforming to phenomena.

'universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts.' ~ Bertrand Russell — Wayfarer

As an "object" of thought, we can ask where that object exists. Thinking occurs within the mind, and we can conclude that the object of thinking, the goal or end, is within the mind as well, as directing the thought. Other objects of thought must exist within as well.

The problem with Plato's analogy, comparing the good with the sun, and the intelligible object with the visible object, is that the sun and visible object are external to the mind. This may create the impression that the good and the intelligible object are external to the mind as well. I believe the proper interpretation of the analogy is to compare the internal "realm" of thinking, mind, and intellect, with the external "realm" of sensation. This places the good, the intellect, and the intelligible object as internal to the mind.

However, since there is ambiguity as to how the intelligible object, and the intelligible realm are to be understood, there is also ambiguity as to the proper location of "the good". Accordingly, Aristotle distinguished between the apparent good, and the real good. This distinction is commonly used, and misused in Christianity. It is often proposed that the real good is the external good, as supported by God, and the internal good is the apparent good. However, God cannot support the real good, as demonstrated by the Euthyphro problem. And it becomes evident from the problems of the immoral human being knowing what is good (as external good), yet acting in a contrary way (guided by the internal good), that the real good must be the internal good. This is "the good" which motivates the actions of a human being, therefore it is the real good, and the external good, the one supposedly supported by God is the apparent good, as other external objects are only appearances of objects as well.

What does it mean to be 'much closer to what is?' — Wayfarer

I think that is best interpreted as temporal priority, "what is", is the present, therefore what is meant is closer to the present. The shadows are the effect, therefore in the past. If you come to apprehend the causal role of the internal, then a vast realm of "inner space" with its own mode of relations, distinct from external relations, will be revealed to you. The temporal order, which is supported in some degree with science by the concept of spatial expansion, is from the inside outward. The future, with all its related features lies within the internal realm which the human mind partakes of in a very limited degree. The internal (future) manifests at the present in an outward process and this is what gives the internal intelligible objects causal capacity.

This still doesn't explain what makes something a "true and real" whole object, rather than just a part. All coconuts (that we know of) are part of the Earth, and the Earth is part of the Solar System, and so on. All of these divisions - indeed all divisions - are "artificial", because those concepts belong to our language and we divide the world up into those "objects" or concepts that we value, not according to any "natural" divisions. — Luke

I agree, that is one way of looking at things. We can class all divisions as artificial. Then we must look at the nature of divisibility itself. The assumption of the reality of continuity implies that any division imagined in theory can be carried out in practice. So the real issue now is whether some theoretical divisions are impossible in practise. If some theoretical divisions are impossible then the assumption of continuity is incorrect. I think that physicists general believe Planck units to be a boundary to divisibility. Divisions beyond this are possible in theory but not in practise. And if there are fundamental units like this, limits to divisibility, then spatial-temporal reality is not as a continuum.

You are complaining about the infinite divisibility of the continuum of numbers while also arguing that the empirical reality of time, or the present, is continuous. Are you arguing against yourself? — Luke

No, I am saying that it is highly likely that the human conscious experience misleads us in respect to the true nature of time. This way of looking at human experience is common in philosophy, dating back to Plato who said that the senses deceive, and the mind is to be trusted over the body.

So I've argued that the conscious experience provides for us a representation of a continuous spatial-temporal reality. So the assumption of continuity provided the foundation for classical physics, and along with this came the relevant mathematical axioms required to model physical activity within this continuum. However, I see that the assumption of continuity has reached the limits of its effectiveness. Quantum uncertainty has revealed that there are real problems with this assumption of continuity.

The evidence therefore ought to lead us to question, doubt, what we assume about conscious experience. This is the philosophical way, to accept the possibility that the senses mislead us, what we accept as "empirical fact", is really a deep misunderstanding. So the common example is that a serious of still frames can produce what appears to be the continuous activity of a movie. Likewise for the human experience, it may feel just like a continuity of consciousness, a continuum of space and time, but at the foundation is really a series of discrete units.

The important point is that with the assumption of continuity, points of divisibility are allowed to be anywhere within the supposed continuum, arbitrarily. But if the real underlying substratum of spatial temporal existence has within itself, natural points of divisibility, then the arbitrarily assigned points will not correspond, therefore no truth will ensue.

If there are different types of experience, then we can sensibly speak of having one type then another, different type. Hence, we can sensibly speak of a succession of different types of experience. — Luke

Unless we posit points to separate the different experiences, this would lead to an infinite regress. To be a succession, one would have to follow the other, and something would have to separate them, or else there'd be an overlap, and not a succession. The thing which separates two distinct types of experience would have to be another type of experience, and this would lead to an infinite regress of always positing another type of experience to separate one from the other. Otherwise we'd have to posit points which separate one type of experience from the other, and then we're back to the problem I described, of the "zero point", and points in general.

How can the future become the past at the present, when you also claim that the present contains both the future and the past; when the past and future are inside the present? — Luke

I don't see the problem. This is what happens "inside the present", the future becomes the past. Therefore both future and past must exist within the present, as one becomes the other inside the present. Consider the freezing point of water for example. "Inside the freezing point", water becomes ice, so both water and ice exist inside the freezing point. This process though, is also reversible, as ice becomes water inside the melting point, which is the same as the freezing point.

How can this be, when you claim that the past and future are both inside the present? — Luke

I see no problem. The present is not a point, as I've been arguing, it has breadth, or width. "Point" has been adopted by pragmaticism As the Venn diagram example shows, past and future extend outside the present, but they also overlap inside the present. When the future is inside the present it is past a part of the present, so it has already become past in relation to that part of the present, and is still future in relation to the rest of the present. This is the nature of change, it does not happen all at once, but over a duration of time.

It contradicts what you said just above. This is what I've been telling you all along. — Luke

Sorry, you've lost me. I've addressed all your concerns, so there is no reason to accuse me of contradiction, just your refusal to accept my terms.

When is "now" (i.e. the present) in this scenario? Which event is simultaneous with the present here? — Luke

There is no now, unless we change the meaning of "now", as I've been explaining. By the time you say "now" it is in the past. So the use of "now" to designate some point at the present is just a pragmatic practise to facilitate measuring and such things. There is no "now" in that scenario because there is no now in general, it's a useful fiction.

"Simultaneous with the present" makes no sense. There are events which move from future to past, at the present, and every single real event does this, but there is no sense to ask which event is "simultaneous with the present", because every event occurs at the present, yet they have different times when they are at the present.

One of those straws is the belief that the parable of the cave does indeed present an allegory for a kind of intellectual illumination or an insight into a higher domain of being, and that those who have ascended to it see something which others do not, as I think the allegory plainly states. (I’m of the view that this is what is represented by the later term ‘metanoia’ which is not found in the Platonic dialogues but which means in this context an intellectual conversion or the breakthrough into a new way of seeing the world.) I suppose one secondary source I could refer to for support is this SEP entry on ’divine illumination’ in Greek philosophy. — Wayfarer

The breakthrough referred to here, intellectual conversion, or illumination, is to apprehend the priority of conceptions and ideas. Ideas are first in the mind of the individual, as what are present to the mind. This is Kant's starting point in the Critique of Pure Reason, the priority of what's in the mind, phenomena. But for Plato the priority is not just a logical priority, but also a temporal priority as well. He sees ideas as causal through the reality of "the good". This way of looking at things is outlined in The Symposium, when the student of love grasps the beauty of human artefacts and institutions, and learns of a Beauty which transcends the beauty of any particular artefact.

So the cave allegory expresses this causal relationship of temporal priority. What the people in the cave see, are shadows on the wall, and the shadows are representative of artificial material objects. Behind the scenes, what few people properly relate to, and understand, is that human ideas, along with ambition, desire, intention or good, are the cause of these artificial products. Human intention and ambition is represented as the fire, and we are directed to apprehend the material products as simple representations of the human ideas, the shadows which come into being through the means of the fire.

That is the first stage of the philosopher's illumination, and the important point is that the ideas, along with the intention or good (the fire), are temporally prior to the material products as the cause of them. This temporal priority is what validates Plato's claim of a higher degree of reality to the intelligible realm (what's inside the mind), as the artificial material products are simply a copy or reflection of what's inside the mind. Aristotle adopts this position, and assigns actuality to form.

The second stage of the illumination is when the philosopher exits the cave. Then the philosopher sees the entirety of the natural world under this conceptual structure of temporal priority. All material objects are seen as reflections of the Form which produces them. The human good (the fire) is replaced by the natural good (the sun) and the philosopher sees all natural material objects illuminated by the sun, as reflections of the Forms which produce them. The Forms are temporally prior to the material objects as the cause of their existence, and this priority is also a logical priority as expressed in Plato's Timaeus and Aristotle's Metaphysics as the cosmological argument.

The logical necessity of the priority of the Forms is the result of assigning actuality to form, and this is validated by the concept of final cause, the causal force of human ideas, and the existence of artificial objects. You'll notice that Plotinus' proposition of "the One" as prior to all, fails in logical necessity because "the One" is assigned the character of unlimited potential. So "the One" as Plotinus' first principle, lacks in the required actuality to be causal. Therefore it lacks the logical force required as a first principle.

Yeah, I'm aware of Einstein's Nobel Prize-winning work, but that doesn't begin to explain why you think that quanta signify any sort of "natural points" in time, or why time might possibly be naturally divisible into quanta. — Luke

Well, it's intuition, with many complicated factors involved. But I am not arguing that, am I? I am arguing continuity. So despite the fact that there are many reasons to make me intuitively believe that there are natural points in time, this is not consistent with our experience of time as continuous, and that is what I am arguing, the experience of time as continuous.

Briefly though, there is an issue with what could be called "point zero". Whenever an object at rest, or one in regular motion as per Newton's first law, begins a new motion from being acted upon by a force, there must be a point in time, or "moment" when the motion begins. In human experience, this would be self-movement. If I'm sitting on the couch, and decide to stand up, and actually move in that way, there must be a point in time when this motion begins.

Classical physics represents an object being acted on by a force, with the concept of acceleration. But there is a problem with this representation because there must be a point in time, the zero point, when the object goes from not having, to having, the new motion. At this time, the rate of acceleration must be infinite because the value goes from zero to some quantity. Conventional mathematics handles this with calculus, which treats the zero point as a limit rather than a point in time which is actually traversed. In short, the concept of acceleration cannot account for the zero point, because of the need for infinity, and a different form of this same problem manifests in quantum mechanics as the uncertainty principle.

What is intuitive though, is that there must be a real point in time, when a new motion of an object begins. This is assuming that objects have real distinct existence. If objects are not distinct, then a change in motion is just a continuation of the whole (universe) through cause and effect, and there is no need for a real point of beginning. It is intuitive because objects appear to have real distinct existence, independent from each other, and can be moved freely.

For example, is a coconut an object or a part? How about a hydrogen atom? — Luke

Your examples are concepts, "a coconut", "a hydrogen atom", universals. You are not pointing to particular aspects of the world here, so I cannot address the examples directly. Each of these named types could have particulars which exist as a separate object, or as a part of a larger object. As I said, we need to refer to empirical evidence, and this would give us the context of existence of each particular occurrence.

Naming the type usually doesn't provide for us the context of existence. However, whether the thing is a part or a whole is essential to some universals. This depends on how the named things exists within its environment. So the hydrogen atom for example cannot exist naturally as an object, it must be a part. Human beings can in some sense separate hydrogen atoms, and present it as an object. But in reality, it is not an independent object even after this separation, because the device which separates it is required for its purported separation, therefore this device is necessary to its environment, so it really just becomes a part of that device. This is why I referred to "natural" divisibility. Artificial divisibility is very deceptive, creating divisions where divisions are not naturally possible, such that the separation of the supposedly separated part is dependent on the coexistence of some device, and this renders the objective existence (existence as an object) of the part as not properly independent according to empirical evidence. Empirical evidence indicates that such a part has just changed from being a part of a natural object to being a part of an artificial object, the device which separates it from its natural place.

So, unlike a continuum, only a finite set of (positive?) integers has natural points of division. Is that right? Does the set need to contain an even number of integers? — Luke

No, numbers are conceptual, therefore divisions are fundamentally arbitrary. When I spoke of natural divisibility I was referring to material things, the empirical world which we sense. That's why theories of real divisibility are based on empirical information.

Since numbers may be divided in any way we can manipulate the divisibility of them to match the natural divisibility of the world, through the use of axioms. This in part, is what makes numbers useful. Pure mathematicians may create whatever axioms they desire, at will, but the way that the axioms conform to the empirical world is what determines how useful they are.

The problem with "the continuum" is that this is itself a stipulation, or proposition concerning the empirical world, 'space and time form a continuum'. It is very useful because it conforms to the empirical reality to a large degree. However, since we observe that natural divisibility within the empirical world is restricted, according to the spatial existence of independent objects, "continuum" is not completely appropriate. So the problems begin.

The concept of "continuum" allows for divisibility in any way, but this is not truly consistent with the empirical reality of spatial-temporal existence. However, it is consistent with a large percentage of practical applications, and it has proven itself to be extremely useful in facilitating all sorts of measurements. Because it is so extremely useful, it is the accepted convention, so it gets used even where it is not adequately suited. In these instances, we impose the principles of continuity onto aspects of the empirical world which do not properly correspond. This misleads us, leading to misunderstanding and misconception.

Take the hydrogen atom example. The assumption of continuity leads us to believe that the empirical world can be divided in any way that we want. So, the hydrogen atom must be separable from its natural environment. We produce a device to separate it, and we conclude that we have created an independent hydrogen atom. This in turn, is supposed to support, as empirical evidence that reality is continuous, and can be divided anywhere. However, the truth of the situation is that the hydrogen atom has not really been given independent existence as an object on its own, its supposed independent existence relies on the device which removed it from its natural environment, so it is now just a part of that device. Therefore the appropriate interpretation of the empirical evidence ought to be that the empirical reality is not continuous, and cannot be divided anywhere we want. This issue becomes extremely evident when the existence of massive fundamental particles like hadrons and quarks which are associated with the strong force, are considered. It becomes very clear, that the assumption of continuity, the spatial-temporal "continuum" is completely inappropriate here.

You're saying that, unless time has natural points of division, then everything we count in reality is arbitrary and not real? — Luke

I said "the entirety of reality", not strictly "time". When the entirety of reality is considered, we do find natural points of division, distinct spatial objects, as explained above. These divisions are what allow one object to move in one direction, and another in another direction. This is what allows you to take one individual away from a group, and activities like that. These natural points of division are what make a count more than arbitrary. The count is based on real, natural divisibility, as substantiated by empirical evidence.

In the case of time alone, we have identified no such natural points of divisibility. So counts of time are dependent on the repetitive motions of distinct, naturally divided objects. However, since measurement requires comparison, and with time we are comparing motions, the problem of the relativity of simultaneity arises.

We have a continuous succession of experiences from birth to death; we do not experience everything in our lives "all at once". — Luke

This is a misrepresentation. We have continuous experience, not a "succession of experiences". Any division of that continuous experience into separate experiences is arbitrary. Even during sleep we are experiencing, in dreaming etc., it's just a change in type of experience. This misrepresentation is fundamental to your insistence that "duration" must be "a duration" with beginning and end. There really is not any such natural points of divisibility in human experience which would substantiate this representation of a "succession of experiences". Therefore, "the present moment" as a point along that succession of experiences is not substantiated either.

This question also applies to you. If you reject the present as a short period, or moment, of time, then it must be "an infinitely long duration of time" that "continues on and on indefinitely" (since they are the only two options you have given). What, then, of the past and future? When is something past and when is it future? That is, what are the past and future relative to? — Luke

There is no problem here. As time continues onward, the future is always becoming the past. That's what happens at the present, as the present continues, next minute becomes last minute, next hour becomes last hour, etc.. "Future" refers to time which has not yet passed the present and past refers to time which has past the present, such that if there was a fixed amount of future at the beginning of time, the future is always getting smaller while the past is getting bigger. This is a continuous process which we experience as the continuity of the present.

I don't deny this, except it's not only for the sake of measurement, because it is also relative to when one is experiencing, doing or being, and specifically, indexical to when one is speaking. I have never claimed that "the present" is something we find in nature (just as I wouldn't say that "here" is something we find in nature), but I would say that the passage of time is something we find in nature, because things age. Looking for some natural source of "the present" or for natural divisions in time is not my concern. — Luke

OK. let's say that this type of point in time, this moment, is like the "point zero" I described above. The point in time when you are saying "now", or the point in time when you start to do X, etc.. Notice that it is better not to refer to this type of point as "the present", because it is just a designation of the relation between one physical action in the world, to another, or others. We might assign the point zero a date and a time, which relates it to the position of the earth and sun, etc.. If it's a real event, with real occurrence, then that point is in the past. If it's a designated possible future event, the point is in the future. But there is no reason to think that such a point would be exclusive to the present, so it should in no way be a defining feature of the present.

But what would it be like to conceive of such a point at the present? Suppose we can talk about a zero point in the past, and a zero point in the future. And also suppose that the present is when future points are becoming past points. Since this is a process, "the present", the process whereby future points become past points, and processes are events which take time to occur, then we must conclude that it takes time for a future point to become a past point, even while it is at the present. In this time, we might say that the point is neither past nor future, but that seems to imply that this point, when it's at the present, is right outside of time. But it's already been determined that there is time at the present because it is a process. So the point itself doesn't really go anywhere outside of time when it's said to be at the present. Therefore I think it would be better to say that the point is both future and past in this transition which is the present, rather than neither. And as I explained earlier there is no reason to think that this implies contradiction.

Aren't you claiming that my "perception of it now" is also a memory? — Luke

Right, that's why I mentioned the concept of "sensory memory". If I understand correctly, the information from the senses is put into a type of extremely short term, subconscious memory, and this memory is what the conscious mind interprets as the sense experience, and then allocates the memories to other types of memory, which the conscious mind has influence over.

How does quanta possibly indicate that there are "points in time"? I'm guessing that you consider these "points" to be natural divisions in time. I don't see what difference they would make over and above the quanta. Couldn't we have quanta without any natural divisions in time (like we already do)? What do these "natural divisions" add? — Luke

That's a complex issue beyond the scope of this thread, which would only serve as a distraction, but the photoelectric effect indicates that energy is transmitted as discrete units rather than as a continuous wave.

How do you plan to take a "precise measurement of time" without any sort of clock, or without making a comparison to any physical, cyclical event? — Luke

As I said, this would require determining natural points in time. Then the points can be counted as real objects, units of time.

How can you tell if something is a "true and real" object or only part of a "true and real" object? Presuming it's via "natural divisibility", how does that work? — Luke

As I explained, empirical evidence.

Explain to me again why a continuum does not have natural points of division? — Luke

There's nothing to explain. A continuum is assumed to be infinitely divisible. It can be divided in any way, and no particular way is more suited to the matter itself being divided than any other way, because there are no natural points of divisibility, proper to it. If you do not understand this, then you do not understand what "continuum" means.

Okay, but the measurement is made in numbers and what is measured is something that isn't numbers, but is objects/events. I don't see how the numbers (or the set or the continuum) has any effect on which objects/events are real or not. I can count objects using either a finite or an infinite set of numbers. — Luke

The point is not the effect of the numbers on the real, but the effect of the real on the numbers. If the entirety of reality is indivisible, then there is nothing real to count. Any count is arbitrary. If the entirety of reality is continuous, yet infinitely divisible in anyway possible way, then division is arbitrary and the count is arbitrary. Each of these produces an unmeasurable reality. But if reality has natural divisibility, then we can distinguish real objects to count and measure according to those divisions. Such a reality is measurable.

It's funny how you say that "the present" is not a moment, yet you consider "the moment" to be one of the "two important features" of "the present". — Luke

Laugh all you want. I use the quotes to signify the concept of "the present". So what was meant is that the concept of "the present" has two important features. And as I've been explaining, I believe the "present moment" is a misconception. Nevertheless, regardless of its truth or falsity, it maintains status as a very significant feature of the concept "the present".

The feature that you say I "point to" also continues on and on continuously. There's not much that I disagree with here, except that the present is not a "conjunction" between past and future because past and future are not concurrent with the present. — Luke

Explain to me how you conceive of this "present moment", that infinitesimal period of time, or shortest duration of conscious awareness, as something which continues on and on indefinitely.

You did say that you could exchange "present moment" for "present" didn't you? Now you are saying that the present continues on and on indefinitely. How do you formulate consistency between the present being an extremely short duration, yet also something which continues on and on indefinitely?

That's right, the present continues on and on just like your experiencing. And it's not a coincidence, because whenever you are experiencing is when the present is for you. In relation to this, those things that you've already experienced are in your past, and those things you will experience but are yet to experience are in your future. It's simple really. — Luke

If this is what you believe, then do you see that it is incoherent to speak about a "present moment" as if the present is a very short period of time, or a point in time? How could it be that the present continues on and on indefinitely, as if it is an infinitely long duration of time, yet it is also an infinitesimally short period of time, as "the moment". One of these must be dismissed as the cause of contradiction, and the latter, "the moment", is inconsistent with empirical evidence. That is why I say "the present moment" is incoherent to me. .

Yes, except we don't speak of the present as a continuous, long duration, but as a moment or point along that duration which is present for us at that moment. — Luke

Now, look closely at this statement. Do you see that "at that moment" has no real meaning, no real referent. It refers to nothing real. It's a convention which human beings concocted for pragmatic reasons, for the sake of measuring. "Start the clock now, at this moment". "Motion is transferred from one object to another at the moment of collision". Etc.. "At the moment" is a convenient fiction.

So, remove "at that moment" from the proposition above, as an untruthful part of the proposition. Now we have "the present as a continuous, long duration", exactly as we experience it, and all this speaking about a moment, or point along this duration, is nothing but bs.

I think there is a distinct difference between having or undergoing an experience and remembering it later. Think back to any memorable event in your life. That is just a memory compared to the actual event that you lived through and experienced. I understand your reluctance to acknowledge this obvious distinction, however, given that it is simply too detrimental to your argument (that every experience is a memory). — Luke

The problem is that all experience is completely wrapped up in memory, whether you like to admit it or not. Consider looking at an object in front of you, a chair or something. What you see is not a hundredth of a second of chair, or a half a second of chair. You are seeing the chair over a continuous duration. But the chair of two seconds ago must be only in your memory. However, that chair of two seconds ago is an integral part of your perception of it now,. That's how you know whether it's moving or not.

So, it's easy for you to take an event years ago, and say that's in the past, its only memory, and you can surely tell the difference between that memory and what's happening now. But when we are talking about the perception of events happening right now ("right now" being incoherent) then we are faced with having to separate what we anticipate from what we remember, as having influence over the perception. And this is much more difficult because we cannot fall back on the false premise of the "present moment". We cannot assert that our sense perceptions are at the present moment, because "the present moment" is incoherent. It's a convenient fiction created for pragmatic purposes, not consistent with reality. Look into the concept of "sensory memory" for example, it's very important to the way that we hear music.

It's a shame his work is not more approachable, because I think his central thesis - that Platonism basically articulates the central concerns of philosophy proper, and that it can't be reconciled with today's naturalism - is both important and neglected. — Wayfarer

I believe that understanding the various forms of post-Platonism (rather than Neo-Platonism) is very significant to any study of metaphysics. Plato exposed many ontological and metaphysical problems inherent within the conventions of his day. He pointed in numerous different directions as to possible resolutions. The different ways that various philosophers have taken up his challenges is very indicative of the problems which philosophy encounters in addressing the nature of reality.

But I'm of the view that it was the decline of scholastic realism and the ascendancy of nominalism which were key factors in the rise of philosophical and scientific materialism and the much-touted 'decline of the West'. — Wayfarer

The decline was predicted by Plato, in "Republic", Bk. 8, 546. There is a number which relates the circumference of circles to the fertility of living creatures. That number is also related to the powers of 3,4, and 5 (Pythagorean theorem?) in some obscure way. Knowledge of the "perfect number" is required for divine birth. And the rulers of the state, lacking this knowledge will inevitably provide for the births of human beings who are not good natured and fortunate. Because of this, even the best state, as proposed, will decay and face dissolution.

Unless you are able to present some evidence, that animal learning does not supervene on cellular learning it's a bit ludicrous to call it very deceptive use of equivocation. — wonderer1

More evidence of your indoctrination. The onus is on the researcher, to show the evidence, that's how science works. By giving the process the same name, "learning", the authors of this article are hinting that a direct and necessary relation has already been established. That's how the psychology of this type of deception works. Use the same word and a psychological association is made, which "implies" that a relationship has been established.

Suppose instead, we rename this process which they have named "cellular learning", calling it "laboratory manipulation of cells". Then the deception might be much more evident to you. You'd be more inclined to ask, how is this laboratory manipulation related to the actual learning process of an animal, instead of taking for granted that there is a direct and necessary relation, because of the use of the same word, "learning".

Then you might notice a few weaknesses in your assumption of a direct and necessary relation. Consider the following passage:

"Surprisingly, however, the biphasic changes occurred over a time scale five-fold longer than that anticipated from typical STDP studies in vitro (Markram et al., 2012). Using a computer model, Pawlak and co-workers showed that this temporal rescaling could result from noise in the spike timing of inputs. Such noise is to be expected in the intact brain, where there is always ongoing activity, but not in dissected brain tissue, which is relatively inactive.

It appears like the cellular responses (so-called learning) took five times longer to occur in living tissue than it took in prior studies inanimate mass, "in vitro". That is very clear evidence that the relationship between stimulus and effect, is not direct. The cause of this five-fold delay (clear evidence that there is not a direct cause/effect relation) is simply dismissed as "noise" in the living brain.

Furthermore, it is noted that the the subjects upon which the manipulation is carried out are unconscious, and so it is implied that "attention" could add so much extra "noise" that the entire process modeled by the laboratory manipulation might be completely irrelevant to actual learning carried out by an attentive, conscious subject. Read the following:

"It is important to note that these findings were obtained in anaesthetized animals, and remain to be confirmed in the awake state. Indeed, factors such as attention are likely to influence cellular learning processes (Markram et al., 2012).

Now, take note of the concluding sentence of the article:

"Despite these limitations, the elegant work of Pawlak, Kerr and colleagues provides some of the strongest evidence to date that STDP may underlie cellular learning in the intact brain."

Sure, STDP may underlie this process which they have called "cellular learning", but it's very clear that they have established no relationship between this process (more appropriately called "laboratory manipulation of cells") to actual animal learning. In fact, the exposed problem with "noise" indicates that the idea of such a relationship is rather far-fetched.

It looks to me like you simply have a bias against science. — wonderer1

It looks to me, like you are easily swayed by pseudo-science.

The article is evidence of your indoctrination. There is clearly equivocation. The opening paragraph starts talking about "cellular learning", then claims a relation with how the "animal learns". And then it makes a conclusion about "learning" in general, as if these two senses of "learn" are the same. That's very deceptive use of equivocation.

I think you equivocate. Neural networks of AI are said to be "trained". But we weren't talking AI, we were talking about biological neurons, involved in a person reading.

To me it sounds like you are saying something like, "It is inappropriate to talk about riding in a car, because riding is something which is done on a horse, or in a carriage drawn by a horse. — wonderer1

Yes, similar to that, but not quite the same. An individual is trained, a person or some other being. We do not train a part of a person. I find that to be an absurd usage of the term to say that a person trains a part of one's body, like saying that a man trains his penis when to have an erection and when not to.

Anyway, it's off topic and I see that discussion with you on this subject would probably be pointless, as you seem to be indoctrinated.

The possibility of Trump winning the election in 2024 and making all of his legal troubles go away as if by waving a magic wand is absurd. — GRWelsh

Many of us thought that the idea of Trump getting elected in the first place was absurd. There must be magic wand out there somewhere.

Plato's Ideas are both sensible and intellectual, yet they do not exhibit necessity and strict universality and, thus, are not transcendental conditions for the possibility of the entirety of human experience.

They necessarily apply to only some, but not to all the objects of human experience. For example, the Idea Elm Tree applies necessarily to only some trees, but not to all trees.

In fact, most of Plato's Ideas exhibit only a limited necessity and a restricted universality. — charles ferraro

I don't see your point. We always apply such restrictions in the case of any universals. "Elm" has its restrictions, "tree" has its restrictions, "plant" has its restrictions, "living" has its restrictions, "being" has its restrictions, etc.. If there was a universal which did not have any restrictions it couldn't have any real meaning, because the lack of restrictions would allow it to have any meaning whatsoever, therefore no specific meaning and incomprehensible.

So even when we apprehend "space" and "time" as universals, and propose these as the names of categories, they still have restrictions, as is the case with categories. These restrictions which characterize the category may be provided by definitions. Therefore the presence or non-presence of "restrictions" is not the distinguishing factor here as any such named categories must have restrictions.

I believe that the difference you are alluding to is to be found in the nature of the restrictions. Some definitions (restrictions) are produced from (empirical) descriptions, while others are produced from stipulations (like the axioms of pure mathematics). The former obviously cannot be "transcendental conditions for the possibility of the entirety of human experience". And the latter, since they are stipulated by human beings which are already engaged in experiencing, surely cannot be the transcendental conditions for human experience either.

Therefore, I think it is misdirected to try and categorize the "transcendental conditions for the possibility of the entirety of human experience" as some sort of universal idea. The transcendental conditions are not categories, conceptions, or universals. There doesn't seem to be any evidence for the existence of that sort of "idea", so we should not think of these conditions as ideas. Therefore, if "space" and "time" are proposed by Kant as "transcendental conditions for the possibility of the entirety of human experience", we need to understand these terms as referring to something other than universals, ideas, or conceptions. I think Kant calls them "intuitions".

Trained neural nets can have a lot of 'fault tolerance', which is easy to say, but not so easy to explain. — wonderer1

It's not appropriate to say that a neural net is "trained". Nor is it appropriate to say that a neural net performs word recognition. So I'll just say that your post is an attempt to simplify something very complex and the result is a gross misrepresentation, and leave it at that.

Yes, I read it and found the additional text samples interesting as well. Regardless of the hoax, it is still interesting to consider what text samples like that can reveal to us about our thinking. — wonderer1

I think that what it reveals is that the process is noy like we think it is. And I guess that's why we have different opinions about it, no one really knows how they read.

More work is required on what? Is it possible, in principle, that we are able to experience "such points"? — Luke

More work is required on understanding what we call the passage of time, in order to establish more accurate measurement. I think that the work done in quantum mechanics indicates that it is highly likely that there actually is points in time, that's why events occur as quanta rather than continuous. If this is the case, then we probably do experience such points in time, in some way, but we do not recognize them, just like we experience molecules, atoms and electrons, but we do not recognize them as such, through sensation.

I might see that they are two different (types of) objects. I don't know what "natural divisibility" is supposed to mean. — Luke

Let me try again then. When you see two different chairs in a room, do you not see them as two distinct objects? The natural, spatial separation between them, which we apprehend through the sense of sight, represents a natural divisibility in spatial existence. We see distinct objects, and this apprehension of distinct objects is a division performed by the perceptual process, which is carried out according to a natural spatial divisibility which we perceive in our environment. It is the way that we perceive our environment, as consisting of a natural divisibility, which the perceptual process takes advantage of, to produce distinct objects of perception. This is the foundation for the concept of quantity. We need principles to distinguish one thing from another, in order that we can evaluate a multitude of distinct things, count, quantify or measure them. If there was no natural divisibility in our environment any division into discrete objects would be completely arbitrary, therefore any measurement of quantity would also be completely arbitrary.

In the case of time, we assume a continuum, therefore no natural divisibility. So to count or quantify distinct periods of time we look to repeating cycles, earth, moon, sun, quartz crystal vibrations, and now the quantum characteristics of the cesium atom. The problem is that all of these cycles are physical events, which in order to serve as measurement need to be compared to other physical events, the ones to be measured. This requires a means of determining the beginning and ending of a cycle, in relation to the event to be measured. The event to be measured is always spatially separated form the clock. The various possible features of this spatial separation are what Einstein dealt with in his special theory of relativity, where he stipulated that simultaneity is relative. This stipulation means an accurate comparison is

\ impossible, and therefore precise measurement of time impossible, because the simultaneity of the beginning and ending of the cycle of measurement, in comparison with the event to be measured, is dependent on the frame of reference. In other word the temporal measurement of the same event will differ depending on the frame of reference.

This sounds like little more than a complaint about infinity, or uncountable sets, but it's unclear what the complaint is exactly. I assume what you mean by "natural points of divisibility" is that we should use only a finite set of numbers? But I don't see how a reduced, finite set of numbers would give us more accurate or more precise (or non-arbitrary) measurements. We would miss out on all those "in-between" numbers/measurements, and that would make our measurements less accurate, not more. Otherwise, I don't know what you mean. — Luke

No, the point is that the object to be counted in any act of quantification (a count) must be a true and real object, or else any proposed count is arbitrary. To be a true and real object, it must be distinct, discrete, separate from its surroundings, or else it's just a part of another object. And if we are allowed to count parts as objects, and everything is infinitely divisible, then every count will be infinite.

That's what happens when we try to quantify something which is already assumed to be a continuum (the real number line, or time, as examples). Since there are no natural points of division we can't even start to count anything because there are no distinct objects to count. So we allow divisions and we produce a count according to the divisions. But these divisions are arbitrary, so there is no rule about how to apply them, except that they can be applied anywhere. Then any count will be a count of infinity (any random section of the number line contains an infinity of numbers, and any random section of time contains an infinite number of time durations).

So it's not a matter of choosing finite numbers over infinite numbers, it's a matter of basing "the count", which is the act of quantifying, or measuring, in something real, real divisibility as the example of distinct physical objects (mentioned above) demonstrates. Then the measurement is of something real.

The problem therefore, is the assumption of continuity, the continuum. The number line, with the real numbers is a very good example. The assumption is continuity, represented as the infinitely divisible line. That assumption is problematic when applying numbers to the divisions, because the divisions are arbitrary. Of course in most practise of measuring, things are separated by natural divisions (as explained above), and so numbers are applied in measurement according to the natural divisions. But then there is time, and we do not find natural divisions, so we assume continuity, but this creates problems.

I don't understand your complaint here. I don't care if we call it "the present" or "the present time" or "the present moment"; I see no difference between these. If it will help to prevent your complaints, I will stop using the phrase "present moment". However, if I accidentally use the phrase again in future, then please just substitute it with "the present" instead. That seems to keep you calm. — Luke

If "moment" has no meaning to you, then so be it. It has meaning to me. And, "the present" is not a moment because the present goes on and on continuously. This seems to be where we are having difficulty. You do not conceive of the present as something which goes on and on continuously, like I do. You want to mark "the present" as a very short period of time, but this cannot capture, or represent the present as we know it through experience. This is why I used that example, by the time you say "now", that point which you have tried to mark as the present, is in the past. What you do not seem to apprehend is that the present continues on after that particular "moment" has gone into the past. And no matter how many times you mark "now", the present continues through all of them, and onward.

This is why we must apprehend "the present" as having two important features. One is the feature you point to, the moment, "now", from which we base measurements, starting the stop watch, etc.. The other feature is the conjunction between past and future, which I point to, and this continues on and on, seemingly continuously, so it is indefinite. This continuity of the present is what is measured when we measure passing time. We use arbitrary points, and mark a section of the continuity of the present, as a period of time.

So it does no good for me to substitute your "present moment" with my "present", because these have completely different meanings, referring each to a different aspect of time. One is the artificial, imaginary, or fictional "point" which you wan to deem as "the present", the other is the continuous, extended passage of time, duration, which is "the present" as we experience it.

If so, then why do you say that the present has a duration? — Luke

The present continues on and on, as time passes. From this perspective, its duration may be as long as time itself.

The present (moment) is defined in terms of when we are experiencing. — Luke

There is no such thing as the moment when you are experiencing. Experience continues on and on, in a seemingly continuous and indefinite duration, just like the present, except you die. Do you not apprehend your experience in this way, as a continuous, long duration, rather than as a moment, or any sort of pin pointed duration?

Or are there two different types of remembering? Otherwise, we could say that we experience things in the present and remember things that we experienced in the past, and not try to change the grammar in the way you are proposing. — Luke

There are many different types of remembering, and many different ways of reading. So this does not look like a productive direction for the discussion, too much ambiguity and confusion. For example, do you not think that remembering is part of your experience? So this distinction you make here, between remembering things and experiencing things is not sound because remembering is a form of experiencing.

You were proposing from the start of this discussion that the present has a duration. Have you changed your position on this? — Luke

Obviously not.

Agreeing (for the sake of argument) that the present has a duration does not require two pinpoints; it requires one larger pinpoint. — Luke

Can you agree, that according to experience, the present continues on and on indefinitely, and so trying to pinpoint it is trying to represent it in a way completely opposed to how we experience it? The present is our experience of time, and the present continues indefinitely, just like time. Trying to represent it as a dimensionless point in time, as an infinitesimal point in time, or as a slightly larger point in time, is a completely futile adventure, because these points cannot represent "the present" as we know it from experience, as extended indefinitely

Do you know that a duration has a start time and a finish time? The duration of the present is the pinpoint (or what we were earlier attempting to pinpoint). The start and finish times of that duration are not two separate pinpoints. — Luke

There is a difference between "duration" in the general sense, and "a duration", as a particular. The former is how I have been describing the present, as an indefinite duration. You have been wrongly interpreting me as speaking of "a duration". If I was unclear, and that mislead you, then I apologize. However, now I have made the clarification. When I speak of the duration of the present, it is in the general sense of duration, indefinite duration.

Maybe we just experience it differently. — wonderer1

I think that's right. I think different people read in different ways. That's why some read faster than others. I myself read in different ways depending on what it is that I am reading. Sometimes I need to read carefully, sometimes i skim through.

I thought you might recognize that you didn't need to be conscious of every letter to understand the content. — wonderer1

If understanding the content is the issue, rather than simply reading, then the entire content must be respected, so Luke's claim that we read one word after the other could not be correct. We only really understand each word after reading the entire sentence, and we only really understand the sentence within the context of the entire passage.

But the issue of misreading, and misunderstanding must also be addressed. If someone reads a passage very quickly, and mixes up some words so that there is misunderstanding, can this really be called reading it?

Would you say that for you it was like solving a sort of logic puzzle to determine the following content? — wonderer1

It definitely is a sort of puzzle, but not a logic puzzle. Some words (especially the long ones) are very easy, and flow naturally, but others require thought. I would say that much thought was put into the way the presentation was made. And I do not agree that it is the positioning of the first and last letter which makes the word recognizable. Notice the double c in According, and the ch's in research, (if that is what that word is supposed to be). I am not educated in phonetics, but things like that strike me as give aways, which if they had been scrambled in a different way would have made the words much harder to recognize. If you read the article, it's all a hoax anyway, there was no such research.