I understand Aristotle's definition of a 'final cause', but it makes no sense to me to muddle such "final causes" with the "causes" meant by the modern scientific definition of "causes" that refer to experimental inventions that go on to produce measurable effects. — sime

You don't seem to understand causation sime. There is no scientific definition of cause. Cause is a philosophical concept.

Since, by your declaration, logical priority ≠ temporal causality, it seems to follow that a realm of ideal forms exemplifies your statement that:

...we have an inductive principle that there is a cause prior to every material thing.
— Metaphysician Undercover

Furthermore, it seems to follow that this realm of ideal forms, being outside time because it timelessly causes material objects to exist, holds possession of a metaphysical identity in the sense that it is beyond both the temporal and the physical. — ucarr

No, not at all. A cause, as I painstakingly explained, cannot be outside of time.

Furthermore, you seem to be implying time is physical. — ucarr

No, not at all. As I explained, the idea that time is physical is what leads to the conclusion that God is outside time, God being the immaterial cause of the physical. This renders "God" as unintelligible, incoherent, as a cause, or act which is outside of time. Since logic indicates that the material (or physical) world must have a cause, we must conclude that time is not material (or physical).

Since you appear to be having difficulty let me restate the principles which I've been trying to explain.. Tell me what you don't understand.
1. Logic produces the conclusion that there must be a cause prior in time to all material (physical) things. This cause cannot be material (physical) because it is prior in time to material (physical) things. Theologians call this "God".
2. If time is the product of physical activity then God must be outside of time.
3. As an actual cause, it is impossible that God is outside of time.
4. Therefore time as well as God must be prior to material (physical) things, and is not material (physical).

Does this incline you to think time has a cause? — ucarr

No, that's what I describe as incoherent. "Cause" implies temporality, it is a temporal concept where a cause is understood to be prior in time to the effect. To say that there is something prior in time to time, as the cause of time, is incoherent. If we wanted to speak of something prior to time, we would have to use terms other than temporal terms to describe this sort of "priority". We might say "logically prior to" for example. But this would require a description of time itself, to determine what is logically prior to time, and we do not have such a description.

Does the following train of thought reflect your thinking: Since time predates God and God created the material world of physics, time must be something other than physical. — ucarr

No, that's backwards, you need to reverse it. We have the physical world first, as our source of evidence. We see that something preexists each and every material thing as the cause of existence of that thing. So we have an inductive principle that there is a cause prior to every material thing. This is what theologians refer to as "God". But "cause" is a temporal term, implying an act, and acts only occur within a duration of time (another inductive principle). So God requires time as a precondition for acting.

I think the whole idea of final causation was a casuality of the Scientific Revolution and the rejection of scholastic/Aristotelian ideas of causality. Note however Aristotle's Revenge by Edward Feser — Wayfarer

I think that's right, that "Revolution" came along with the rejection of Aristotelian philosophy. It started when Galileo and others demonstrated faults in his physics. Then there was no need to teach his physics, and this attitude progressed through his other topics, and eventually even his logic was removed from the standard curriculum.

As a part of his physics, "final cause" was an early casualty. It was completely removed from the field of physics, as irrelevant. The social sciences, such as law, replaced "final cause" with "intention". Now, "intention" retains the status of "final cause", as causal. But in as much as intention is seen as causal in law, this is far removed from physics, so the relationship between these two types of causes, efficient cause and intention, is not very well upheld in any discipline.

Because of this, we have no accurate representation of intention as a cause in the physical world, physics using "efficient cause". There is intention in law, where it is implied that intention is a cause, and there is efficient cause in physics, where it is presumed that there are no other forms of causation. As a result, intention is commonly comprehended as a form of efficient causation. Then there is no understanding of "final cause" at all, in any scientific discipline.

You can see this from sime's reply. The idea that thoughts and goals caused the existence of the shed is off-handedly rejected, because it is inconsistent with the understanding of "cause", as efficient cause. After this off-handed rejection, sime is left with the incoherent proposition 'the shed caused me to build it', as a representation of final cause.

If I had to quibble or add something, I’d want to emphasize that “material needs” for Marx included social, creative, spiritual and intellectual needs. — Jamal

Right, and I think that is actually quite important. The reason I said Marx is so insightful, is the same reason why his materialism is so similar to Hegel's idealism. He successfully transforms Hegel's "Idea" into "matter". So instead of rejecting Hegel, as pie-in-the-sky idealism, he just takes Hegel's historicity pretty much as it is, goes one step beyond, and grounds it in something supposedly real, i.e. matter. Therefore all the features of the Idea are manifestations of matter.

This is similar to what Aristotle did with Plato's "the good". The good is cast as some sort of guiding principle for the human being, combining both body and mind to act coherently, in unison. But the good is left by Plato as fundamentally unknowable. Aristotle saw that if the good is supposed to be the guiding principle, it cannot be left as unknowable, so he moved toward positing a real tangible "end" to human actions and that was "happiness".

The issue which arises, is that if the thing posited as the real tangible end, happiness for Aristotle, or material existence for Marx, turns out to be elusive, incoherent, or unintelligible itself (merely a pie-in-the-sky ideal), then the proposal is eroded, the structure collapses back, and is revealed as being just another form of idealism. So what is pivotal is the truth to the grounding of the idea.

Thanks Tom. It's an oversimplification which I believe to be somewhat accurate.

According to one of the two main accounts of causality, namely the perspectival "interventionist" interpretation, a causal model is a set of conditional propositions whose inferences are conditioned upon variables that are considered to have implicative relevance but which are external to the model, such as the hypothetical actions of an agent. These models, whose use is now widespread in industry and the sciences, are thus naturally "compatibilist" in conditioning all models inferences upon hypothetical or possible values of external variables that are considered to be chosen freely. So I presume you are criticising earlier historical conceptions of causality such as Bertrand Russells', which assumed a causal model to be a complete description of a system's actual dynamics (thus making cause and effect redundant notions). — sime

Look at it this way. The "variable" in the model described is a freely chosen act. But from the perspective of the agent, the chosen act is not a variable. It is known by the agent, chosen, and in that way determined. So to model the chosen act as a variable does not provide a good description of what a chosen act really is.

What I don't follow is the relevance of a "final cause", unless it is surreptitiously being used to refer to an initial cause, i.e. a bog standard cause. For example, if I am working to build a shed in the back garden, what is the "final cause" of the shed here? Obviously my thoughts, goals and motivation throughout the project cannot be considered a literally "final" cause, which speculation notwithstanding, leaves the resulting actual shed as the only remaining contender for the final cause. Are you insinuating that the resulting shed caused me to build it? (which incidentally isn't likely to look anything like my imagined shed due to my terrible practical skills) — sime

"Final cause" is the intent, the purpose. So it is exactly the case that your thoughts, goals, and motivation are literally the final cause of the shed. Whatever reason you had, whatever purpose you had in your mind, this is the reason why the shed was built. Therefore these ideas, as intent, are the cause of your actions, and by extension the cause of existence of the shed. This is the basis of the concept of "intent" in law, the decision to bring about consequences.

That is why "variable" does not serve as an adequate representation. The fact that you wanted a shed, and this motivated you to go out and built a shed, is the cause of the shed. And you could further specify the particular purpose you had in mind for the shed when you built it. The intent, purpose in mind, or "final cause", is not a "variable" in the coming into existence of the shed, it is the cause of existence of the shed

.

Without knowing exactly what you mean, I tend to agree. However, it’s probably essential in understanding Marx to see that he was attempting a philosophy of praxis, a realization of philosophy in history: — Jamal

I'll see if I can state succinctly what I believe to be the important point. The difference between Hegel and Marx is the difference between idealism and materialism. The two are actually very similar, but there is an inversion between them in the way that first principles are produced, which results in somewhat opposing ways of looking at the very same thing.

So Hegel described the State as being a manifestation of the Idea. The Idea might be something like "the good", "the right", "the just", and being ideal, it's derived from God. From here, the history of the State is described as a history of the Idea, and how human beings strive to serve the Idea. The Idea comes from God, and there is always a need for the human subjects to be servants to the Idea.

Marx liked Hegel's historical approach, but figured he got the first principle wrong. In order to produce a true historicity he had to replace the Idea with matter, as the first principle. This was to place the living human being, and its material body as the first principle, rather than some pie in the sky "good", "right", or "God". So from Marx's perspective there is real substance grounding these ideas like "good", "right", "just", and this is the material needs of the material human being. From this perspective we can have a real history of the State, judging by its practises of providing for the material needs of material human bodies.

You can see the inversion. From the Hegelian perspective, the people must be judged in their capacity to serve the ideals of the State. From the Marxian perspective, the State must be judged in its capacity to serve the material needs of human beings.

Your assumptions lead you towards your understanding and mine mine. So you are already assuming that there is a correct understanding, meaning your reasoning is circular. — Janus

No, there's no circle. I've already noticed that some of my presumed understandings turn out to be misunderstandings. And that is the basis for the conclusion that there is such a thing as correctness. It's not circular because the grounding for "misunderstanding" is in my personal failures.

How do you know there is a correct metaphysical understanding and how would you identify it as being correct? — Janus

I can know this from the same principle. I know that some supposed understandings lead to success, and some lead to failures, and, metaphysics is comprised of propositions for understanding. By deduction I can conclude that some metaphysical understandings lead to successes and others to failures.

How do you know there is a correct metaphysical understanding and how would you identify it as being correct? — Janus

I tend to judge metaphysical understandings by how pervasive they are through multiple cultures, and how well they stand up to the test of time. I think that those principles provide a good indication of success and therefore correctness. It's similar to natural selection in evolution.

One is my Anglo mode, in which I’m a plain-speaking direct realist, and the other is my sort of phenomenological, sort of Marxian, quite traditional, wannabe Hegelian mode, in which philosophy has ambitions as grand as you’ve set out here. — Jamal

I believe that Marx provided a very unique and informative approach (in the form of basic assumptions) toward the interactions between things, both animate and inanimate. He has very insightful principles which ought not be ignored by anyone interested in the interactions between beings, things, and both.

If you go back to the beginning of philosophy (with Parmenides and the Eleatics) the understanding of how things can come to be as they are is the fundamental question. — Wayfarer

When Aristotle addressed being qua being, in his Metaphysics, this he said was the fundamental question, why is a thing what it is, rather than something else. As an approach to this question, the law of identity, that a thing is necessarily what it is and not something else, was presented. When he considered the law of identity, (that a thing is necessarily what it is and not something else), along with the activity of becoming (coming to be), he concluded that the form of the thing is necessarily prior to the material existence of it. We can say that the form predetermines, as a cause, what the thing will be, so that when it comes to be, it will be the thing that it is, rather than something else.

Philosophy delivers only contextual truths, and there are as many possible assumptions to begin from as there are philosophies. The idea that some are "correct" and others not, tout court, erroneously fails to acknowledge the different presuppositions in play, and the reality of talking past one another on account of that. — Janus

The problem is that some assumptions lead us toward understanding, while others lead us toward misunderstanding. Since understanding is what is desired over misunderstanding, it is appropriate to say that some assumptions are correct and others incorrect.

What is it that interaction between non-perceiving objects is like? — schopenhauer1

The tree wraps its roots around the rock, and takes from the rock whatever it can get. Unbeknownst to the tree, the rock is also active, and may roll, killing the tree. This is the way of interaction between living things and inanimate things. The living being wants to take all that it can get from the inanimate. But the living being's inadequate knowledge of the activity of inanimate things makes this a very risky activity. So the being must develop a balanced approach between taking all that it can get, and producing the knowledge and capacity required to restrain itself, according to the dangers involved with the activities of inanimate things.

Beyond the problem of interaction between living beings and non-perceiving things, there is a further problem of interaction between distinct living beings. This problem is far more difficult because when the basic problem is complex, and unresolved, the difficulties tend to mount exponentially.

Okay. God is not self-caused. Does God have a cause? — ucarr

I don't know, I can't imagine the possibility of anything uncaused, so probably. But God is noy well understood by me so I can't make any firm judgement.

Okay. Time predates God. And God created the material universe.

So, time before God was metaphysical and there were no material things?

Okay. God can only act within time.

So, outside of time God cannot exist? — ucarr

I think my answer to all this is generally yes. But I don't know what you mean by saying time is "metaphysical". If you mean that it's an object of study in metaphysics, then I agree.

Also the answer to the last question depends on one's conception of time. In relation to the conventional conception of time (which is faulty), God is outside of time. In relation to a true conception of time God cannot be outside of time.

This demonstrates the usefulness of the conception of God. It helps us to understand the reality of faults in conventional conceptions, and the fallibility of humanity in general, as indicated by unenlightened above.

Are they following rules when they play then?

I think it’s the ‘realm of possibility’ and that it is a real realm, in a way analogous to ‘the realm of intelligible objects’. — Wayfarer

I agree, and I see a problem with the determinist attitude. Describing activity in the physical world in terms of efficient causation has been a very useful and practical venture. The problem is that this descriptive format has limitations which the determinist ignores or denies. We find that within human beings there is an active mind, working with immaterial ideas, to have real causal affect in the physical world. Causation from the mind, with its immaterial ideas is described in terms of final cause (goals purpose and intent), choosing from possibilities, which is completely distinct from efficient causation.

So there is a very real need to recognize the limitations of "efficient causation" as an explanation of the activities in the physical world. And we need to accept the reality of the immaterial "final cause" as having real efficacy in the material world.

Yes, I think so. This is clearly seen in the case of jazz. The innovators made the rules that those who came after them learned and followed. But the innovators did not make the rules in the sense of first making them and then playing according to them. They played and those who studied them codified them. — Fooloso4

So the innovators don't make rules at all. They just play. The ones wo study the innovators are the ones who make the rules.

No important reason. I'm accustomed to form and substance as a set. I perceive form and matter as being interchangeable.

It's true substance has a meaning other than matter. It can mean quality.

Do you think quality has form? More generally, do you think abstractions have form? — ucarr

A material object consists of matter and form. And, material objects are also said to be substance. So it cannot be correct to say that substance is matter. You could define "substance" to say that it is the same as "matter", but then why not just use "matter" instead?

I've never heard anyone use "substance" to mean quality. That's a new one on me.

Self-creation of God took time to occur? — ucarr

I already said that self-creation is incoherent, and I explained why. This discussion is not progressing.

Time predates God? — ucarr

If God is actual, time must predate God, because any act requires time. Don't you agree? How could God ever begin to do anything if there was no time?

No matter which intermediary you choose, all of it is a part of the environment, which is directly accessible and perceived directly. — NOS4A2

It is not directly perceived though, that's the point. I do not sense space, it's conceptual. But if you're quite sure that you are sensing space I see no point to the discussion.

The intermediaries you speak of are in the environment, which is still directly accessible, and therefor still entails direct realism. You seem to be stuck on this point. — NOS4A2

Ok, I'm stuck on this point because you seem to be incredibly wrong to me. I see some stars very far away. There is obviously an intermediary between my perception and the stars which I perceive. What is this intermediary, space, light, ether? How do you think that any of these proposals to account for the apparent separation between me and the stars, would be directly accessible to be perceived? I see each and every one of such proposals as a logical construct produced as a means to account for the intermediary. Don\t you? If I could see the thing between me and the stars, it would block my vision of the stars.

So the question is, where is this potential? — EnPassant

And the fact that this causes us to ask 'what we mean by "real"' is central to the whole matter. — Wayfarer

We might combine these two questions, to ask what does it mean to say that potential is real. The best way to look at this, in my opinion, is in respect to the nature of time. The reality of "potential" can be found to inhere within the way that time passes at the present. In relation to the future, there is real possibility as to what will come to be. This real possibility constitutes the reality of potential.

From the perspective of the living breathing human being, there is real possibility (therefore real potential) with respect to future acts. This real possibility is what gives human beings their power of choice, and their power to create. Mathematics is a great tool in exercising this power, therefore the reality of mathematics, in our understanding of it, is related directly to human potential.

But this opens the question of how human potential is related to real potential. We, from our human perspective, comprehend real possibility to inhere within the passing of time. The passing of time provides us with real possibility in future acts. However, it appears to us, that this real possibility requires the human mind to manifest its realness. How this could be the case is extremely difficult to grasp. How could it be that physical existence appears to progress in a completely determined manner of causation, yet somehow the human mind grasps real possibility to inhere within this determined world?

This is to say that the physicist will model the passing of time in the physical world as deterministic, and maybe even some would claim that this is a real representation of the world, yet this model excludes the reality of possibility. Then the philosopher will step in and say wait, human potential demonstrates real possibility. Now we get a sort of compromised understanding. The compromise is to say that there is real possibility, real potential within the world, but that real potential only exists as a property of the human mind, as ideas and conceptions within the human mind.

Any rigorous analysis of this compromised understanding will demonstrate that it is faulty. If the human being has real capacity to change things in the world, the potential for change must inhere within the world itself, in order that the world itself may be changed. And if the capacity to change things in the world is only a property of the human mind, it is an illusion, a falsity. The one perspective is that of free will. The other perspective is that of determinism. The compromised understanding is compatibilism.

In my mind the “internal stages” are a part of the perceiver and thus mediated by him. I don’t see why we need to include some other intermediary. If there is no intermediary the perception is direct. — NOS4A2

There is no mitigating factor or intermediary between perceiver and perceived, therefor the perception is not indirect. — NOS4A2

You seem to be stuck on this point, which is incorrect. We hear things which are far away, therefore there is an intermediary. We see things which are far away, therefore an intermediary is called for. Touch and taste appear to have no intermediary, but smell appears to have an intermediary.

Because of these differences between the various modes of perceiving, we cannot make any general statement about whether perception requires an intermediary or not. Therefore we need a more precise description as to how we perceive, one which would be inclusive of all five senses, before we can make any general conclusions about whether there is an intermediary or not.

Yes. Our empirical experience of reality always finds form and substance interwoven. Do you have any empirical experience of form and substance in separation?

I argue that: form without substance is an unreachable abstraction; substance without form is an unintelligible chaos. This leads to the claim that form and substance are essential attributes of existence. — ucarr

Why have you replaced my word, "matter" with "substance"? There is nothing to prevent the conception of substance without matter, such as the conception of independent Forms. So form without matter might be substance without matter. Matter is not essential to substance.

In making your argument here, you’re presupposing God is in time and, moreover, that time WRT God is insuperable. You need firstly to establish the logical necessity of this supposition. If you can do this you will then be in position to establish the logical necessity of “God prior to time” being incoherent. — ucarr

I told you the logic of this. God acts as a cause of the material world. Any act requires time to occur. Therefore the idea that God is prior to time, is inconsistent with the idea of God having actual existence, or God as the actual creator of the world. Therefore to think of God in both ways, as creator, and as prior to time, is incoherent.

No? Then what is? And what of the notion that all thoughts are singular and succession, which implies any thought is itself a particular instance of it? All conceptions are thought, so….. — Mww

I think I explained this. I guess not satisfactorily. Let me try again, in a different way. What is conceptualized is a bunch of relations between concepts, as you described earlier. "The particular" is something posited as having a relation to these conceptions. The particular does not enter into the conceptualization though, so we cannot properly say that it is conceptualized.

This is the point with truth and falsity being a judgement which is outside the validity of the logic. Logic here represents the conceptualization. The relation between the logic and the particular is that judgement of truth, which cannot be said to be part of the conception. That's the point with Wittgenstein's chair example. The person sees the chair one day, and sees it the next day looking exactly the same, and in the same place, yet the person cannot say whether it is the same particular (it may have been switched overnight). This indicates the what we call "the particular" does not enter into the conception of the chair. The person has all this knowledge about "the chair" in that place, but cannot accurately judge whether it is the same particular which is there now as was before. This is a statement of how we understand "the particular", as an object with temporal extension.

It's actually a very difficult ontological principle to grasp, which is tied up in Aristotle's law of identity. The law of identity is set up to support the very intuitive notion that there are real objects in the world, particulars, which exist with temporal extension, despite undergoing minor changes as time passes. Change is incompatible with our conceptualizations of an object, yet it very much appears (is very intuitive) that an object maintains its identity as the same object despite changing. Logically, if a thing requires two different descriptions, at two different times, then it is two different things. So Aristotle posited a principle of continuity, matter, which links the object at one moment, to the changed object at the next moment. This accounts for the reality of "the particular", as a thing having temporal extension.

The problem is that matter is described as potential, in order to account for the reality of change, and potential as what may or may not be, escapes intelligibility by defying the law of excluded middle. The other way of portraying the unintelligibility of matter, is that it defies the law of non-contradiction, as both is and is not. This is the position of dialectical materialism, which comes from Hegel's dialectics of being.

I hope that will help to explain this idea, that the particular does not enter into the conceptualization. There is something about the particular, that it changes (its properties change) while remaining the same (it maintains its identity as the same thing), which makes it fundamentally unacceptable to conceptualization. So logic simply leaves the particular out, and works with the properties. "Socrates is a man", for example, indicates a particular with that name "Socrates". But the proposition replaces the particular with a name, "Socrates", and the name, as the subject receives predications. If we say that the name, which enters into the conceptualization as the subject, is the particular, then we deny the grounds for truth, because it is what we say about it. So truth in the sense of correspondence requires that the name must represent the particular, rather than be the particular.

As for the issue of thoughts being singular, and in succession, as particulars, I don't think this is an accurate representation of thoughts. Thoughts are very much overlapped, in their comings and goings, and this is why they are best described as relations and associations.

It is still logical that a sensation now is of the same thing as the sensation is of that thing at a later time. — Mww

This is the key point. If the supposed "thing" requires a different description at a different time, it is not logical to say that the two are the same thing. A different description indicates a different thing. And when we learn that a thing undergoes minor changes at each moment of passing time, logic dictates that it cannot be the same thing unless we establish something which relates them like temporal continuity. This is what the thing is at one moment, and this is what it is at another moment, the two are not the same, therefore the two are different things. So we simply assume a temporal continuity between the two, and this allows us to say that they really are the same thing.

So, we allow a separation between the thing (particular) and its description (its conceptualization). This allows that the same thing can have certain predications at one time and contradicting predications at another time. The predications are applied to the subject, and the subject is a stand in for the thing, the particular, as a representation of it. We cannot allow that the subject is the thing, or particular, or we lose the grounds for truth (as correspondence).

Compromise: if we say my transferring is your collecting, I might still be inclined to grant intuition is the collecting tool, in that the matter of an object from which sensation proper arises, is represented as an empirical intuition. Dunno if that works for you. — Mww

It doesn't really work for me. The point is to make a complete separation between your mind and my mind, as each is being confined within distinct particulars (different bodies). The ideas produced in my mind are created by my mind, and the ideas produced in your mind are created by your mind. Similarities are the result of past occurrences, genetics, and conformity in teaching practises, etc..

So there is nothing which is really being transferred when you and I communicate. You write something (create something) according to the way your mind works, and I interpret it ( a creation of my mind) according to the way my mind works.

You might, I would not. I would limit the senses to information transferring devices, the information already residing in the things perceived. There isn’t any information collected per se, it is, rather, merely that which the mind employs as the instantiation of its methods. — Mww

This is the difference in our understanding of causation, which has pervaded this discussion. I place the cause of perceptions and ideas as within the person. You place the cause as external to the person. So where I say the person uses the senses as tools, in the mind's creation of ideas, you say that the external thing enters into the mind through the senses, and causes the existence of what the mind perceives.

Of course this is where some compromise could be afforded. I think we would both agree to some of each, as a combination. The question though is to priority, which is the principal form of causation in perceptions and ideas. And this is where determinist/choice becomes relevant. From my perspective, the chain of causation, which we commonly represent as necessary, is broken, so your representation cannot hold. Causation from the internal side is final cause, and there is no necessity in how external things are represented within the mind, so the chain of efficient cause from the external is broken.

Ok, so what something other than the mind creates forms? And if the information contains inherent meaning within it, what does understanding do? How is this not precisely the materialist doctrine writ large? — Mww

The common solution here is "God", simply because we really do not know where the order which appears to inhere within the universe comes from.

Ok, the mind abstracts meaning inherent within forms received as information, according to what it knows. But once again….what if the mind doesn’t know? Why would the mind create its own meaning, if there is already meaning inherent in the forms? Although, I’m beginning to see where your notion that judgement being the source of error, as I hold it to be, is not the case. I’m not sure it is legitimate to permit the mind to misinterpret, that is, mistake the meaning inherent in forms with the meaning it creates for itself. — Mww

Again, I will insist on a complete separation. The way that the independent Forms (the forms which particulars are supposed to have) affect us, is the way of efficient cause. The way that the perceiving mind creates its forms in conception, is the way of final cause. The two are incompatible, because "efficient cause" is a representation of how material bodies affect each other, and "final cause" is a representation of how the immaterial affects the material. In our commonly accepted understanding of efficient causation, those employed in science, there is no room for the immaterial to affect the material.

The only reasonable explanation for why the mind must create its own meaning (through final causation) rather than simply receiving meaning from the existing independent Forms (forms of the particulars), through efficient causation, is that there is a separation between the two. The separation is what we know as "matter", and this is the barrier of unintelligibility.

There is a temporal principle here. The immaterial soul has a causal impact on matter, final cause. But the mind understands causation within material things (particulars) as efficient cause, without the influence of final cause. So until the mind understands causation within the world of material things (particulars) as including an immaterial cause, final cause, there will always be a separation in our understanding of how things affect us, and the way that we affect things. The gap may be closable, but not under our current understanding (misunderstanding).

This works for objects received more than once. In other words, objects known to the mind as experience, re: according to conceptions which it already has. — Mww

You don't seem to be getting the point. This is the way of first time perception, because each instance of perception is a first time, as unique and distinct from every other instance. We class by similarity, not by being the same. There is no need for the same object to have already been sensed, only similarity in prior sensations. You don't seem to be grasping this fundamental point. Your bee sting this year is not "the same" as your bee sting last year, it is only similar. So it is not at all a case of receiving the same object twice, it is a case of similarity. No two distinct experiences are "the same". We class them as the same, but this just means of the same type. And when you come to understand that all such judgements are judgements of type rather than a judgement of the same particular, you'll see that the particular never enters into the conception. "The same" as in the same particular is some sort of ideal intuition, which we cannot grasp in conception because it is contrary to logic.

Consider the alternative, wherein the mind classifies in accordance with conceptions it already has…..how is it determinable that none of them represent the forms inherent in the information it received? — Mww

We can determine this in the way described above, from the known fact that the independent Forms (the forms inherent within particular material things) are constantly changing. In the mind's system of classification each change means that the thing has become a different thing. But this is counterintuitive to our idea that a minute change ought not constitute a different thing, so we posit a temporal continuity of existence whereby the thing would undergo minute changes and maintain its status as the same thing. However, this implies that the form of the particular, the independent Form is constantly changing, and this is fundamentally different from our conception of the form of a thing, which is a static description. Therefore we have a determination of the difference. A form inside a person's mind is a static description, the independent Form is a continuous change. In the mind, the form consists of properties which are attributable at a moment in time. At a different moment the form would consist of different properties. This implies that something happens between those two moments, and this "something" is fundamentally unintelligible to this way of conceptualizing. The independent Form, the form inherent within the material thing, is constantly changing. So there is no static thing with X properties at time 1 and Y properties at time 2, in the independent Form of the material thing which exists as continuous change.

OK. This is better, in that conceptualization is really categorization, in which the essentials are determined. Now, the mind can certainly interpret the information contained in forms in accordance with categories it already has, and the categories are themselves conceptions, but of a very specific gender and origin. But no particular instance of an object of sense is ever to be conceptualized from a mere category. Th essentials determined by categorization, are necessary conditions for the possibility of knowing what an object may be in general, not properties for determining what it is in particular. — Mww

This is exactly the point. Because of this, what you say "no particular instance of an object of sense is ever to be conceptualized from a mere category", we never actually get a conception of the particular. It's a sort of illusion, we tell ourselves that we've conceptualized the particular, but really, that there is a particular is just a stipulation which we make to account for our inability to properly conceptualize the way things really are. Aristotle stipulated a particular, with the law of identity, and the particular is necessarily distinct from the conceptualization, and this accounts for the failings of conceptualization.

There is certainly still a problem, in that the a priori which exists prior to the first instance, the categorizing conceptual structure, and any instance at all, doesn’t have anything to do with the determination of what that thing is, only that knowing what it is, is possible from them. — Mww

This is exactly why the symbol may be completely arbitrary and have no similarity to the thing represented, and why we must hand priority to final cause with its inherent choice. In one dialogue, I can't remember which one, Plato went through a whole lot of different words, trying to determine the origin of each, and how it somehow is similar to the thing represented. Some are easy, but in the end there is no need for the symbol to be similar, that's just a sort of memory aid for understanding meaning. So the principal determination, we give the thing a name, need not have any thing to do with what the thing is, no value in the sense of similarity. The problem which arises though, is that we find out later that calling two instances of appearance by the same name doesn't necessitate that it truly is the same thing (W's chair), which we've assigned the name to. Now we demand real principles of similarity to ensure that what is called the same thing really is the same thing. And then we get lost because we see that a thing is constantly changing, and it isn't by similarity that we make such a judgement of "the same particular" but by an assumption of temporal continuity. And we cannot understand temporal continuity.

Pinter's asserted view of "the way the present universe is outside the view of any observer" is a performative contradiction. That's the problem with the so-called view from nowhere in a nutshell. — Andrew M

The real problem here is with the notion of "the present universe". What Einstein reveals with the relativity of simultaneity is that "the present" is frame dependent. So the whole idea that there is such a thing as "the present universe" is an unsound premise because "the present" is something created by the observational perspective.

When we realize that "the present" is purely subjective, and we try to imagine an objective universe, independent from any observer, we have no place to insert "the present", because this would be an artificial insertion, therefore the creation of an observational perspective. Then we cannot possibly imagine such a universe, without a designated temporal perspective, (a point in time of now), because all things would exist everywhere, without some way of determining a specific point in time in their motions.

There is a form belonging to any sensed object which becomes known as a certain thing, but it is not abstracted through sense, but resides a priori in the mind. This also relates to the question as to what do you do in the case of first instances.

Again….lots of what you say I agree with, but I can’t see an answer to the original question in it. — Mww

This where I think you have it backward. The form of the sensed object inheres within the thing itself, as indicated by Aristotle's law of identity. What is a priori in the mind is some structure of universals by which the mind categorizes incoming information. So the form of the thing which the mind knows is fundamentally different from the form which inheres within the thing itself, as a representation produced from placing the information within the conceptual structure. The mind knows what it apprehends of the particular as the essentials of the thing, while the thing itself consists of accidentals. So even the appearance of the thing to the mind, the sense image which the mind works with, has been created in this way, as essentials rather than accidentals.

There is no problem with "first instances" so long as we maintain the reality of the a priori which exists prior to the first instance, and makes the first instance possible. As you can see though, the first instance would be extremely vague, and not what we would call a good representation of the particular at all, because the receiving mind would not have built up a good catalogue of information (memory), and so would not produce a good representation. However, the question remains now, as to how good the representation produced by human perception really is. Science tells us that the world is actually quite different from the sense representation that we get of it, with things like atoms interacting to make molecules, etc.. So we may not have really progressed very far from the first instances of sense appearances.

Does this answer the original question, or does it remain?

Abstracts….from what? The thing itself? This presupposes the form is already contained in the sensation, and that the senses have some sort of self-contained deductive power. I usually resort to the ol’ tickle on the back of your neck scenario to refute such description. A tickle is a sensation, and if the form of the thing which causes the tickle is abstracted from it, it would seem we would know immediately what causes the tickle. But we do not. In fact, it is the case we sometimes sense a tickle not caused by any object at all. — Mww

The mind would abstract from the information received through sensation. Remember, I am portraying the senses as tools of the mind in its creations. You might call the senses information collecting tools. The information is received as formal, but it consists of forms created by something other than the mind which receives it, so the meaning inherent within must be interpreted, like interpreting someone else's language. And the mind receiving creates its own meaning according to what it knows in its interpretation. That there is independent meaning, and Forms, not created by human beings or other known life forms results in the need for something like God.

So the act of abstraction which occurs in the feeling of a sensation as per you example of a tickle, is an act of creation within the receiving mind. The mind classifies the information received, according to conceptions which it already has, and creates what appears to you as a conception of that particular instance. But it is really just a particular instance of categorization, whereby the essentials are determined and a representation of a particular is produced. The conception, or categorization appears to be a true conception or abstraction from the particular, because of the vast multitude of possibilities which the mind allows for, but it isn't really a conception of a particular. That is evident from Wittgenstein's example of the chair. When you come into the room and see a chair, where there was a similar chair yesterday, you tend to think it is the same chair. However, someone could have switched chairs overnight. Therefore we can conclude that the abstraction is not really of the particular, but of some sort of universal, and we designate "the same particular" based on some sort of ideas of similarity, or continuity of temporal existence. We cannot properly conceive a particular.

The categorization of the particular according to an already held conceptual structure, isn’t the same as conceptualizing the particular sensation. — Mww

A quick reply in response to reading the first couple lines. The particular is never conceptualized. That is why there is a distinction between the thing itself (the particular) complete with accidents in Aristotelian terminology, and the phenomenal appearance, concept, as consisting only of what is apprehended as essential. So "a sensation" is not a particular. Wittgenstein visited this is the so-called private language argument, in the question as to how one could determine a reoccurrence of a sensation, at a later time, as "the same" sensation.

Is philosophy even searching for "God"? I've always thought philosophers seek wisdom (i.e. greater understanding). — 180 Proof

But "God" is one of the greatest mysteries of human existence. So if a philosopher seeks wisdom, then knowing about God would be a high priority. It's the mystery outlined by unenlightened above. What makes people stand up for, and defend in faith until the bitter end, something they know through probability to be incorrect, yet they still have hope for. The common portrayal is that these faithful people are being deceived by someone else, some higher-ups. This is a deception which builds the faith so that the people can be herded like a flock. However, "deception" implies that the deceivers, those "higher-ups", know something which the deceived do not. So to uncover those secrets is fodder for the philosopher.

Does form exist without substance (matter)? — ucarr

It may. Form is what is actual, and matter is potential. The argument from Aristotle is that if there ever was a time when there was potential without any actuality (what is called "prime matter") there would always be potential without actuality because potential with no actuality would not have the capacity to actualize itself. Therefore this would never result in anything actual. But what we find is potential with actuality, matter with form, so pure potential (prime matter) is ruled out. as impossible. Therefore anything eternal must be actual, and form may be prior to matter.

That form is prior to matter is understood in the following way. Each and every occurrence of an object, or material thing, is not a random occurrence of matter, a thing is an organized state of matter, it has a form. By the law of identity a thing is necessarily the thing which it is. It is impossible that a thing is not the thing that it is. So when a thing comes into being, the form of the thing is necessarily prior in time to the material existence of the thing, as the cause of, or reason why the thing is the thing which it is, and not something else.

However, if this is the case, then a given form, once destroyed, could never reappear at a later time. By this line of reasoning, destroy but one wheel and forevermore the wheel can never reappear. You don't believe this do you? — ucarr

Of course I believe that. Each object, wheel in your example, is unique, with a proper identity all to itself, as indicated by the law of identity. When one material object is destroyed it will never reappear, time does not repeat itself.

Talk to just about any Christian and she will tell you God exists outside of time. — ucarr

There is a little trick of equivocation in respect to the meaning of "time" which might help to understand this problem. By materialist principles the concept of "time" is tied to the activities of material things. If material things are moving, time is passing. Therefore under this conception of "time" there is no time without material things. God however, being the creator or cause, of material things, must be prior to material things and is therefore "outside of time" according to this conception of "time". That of course appears to be incoherent, to have something (God) which is prior in time, (as the cause of time), to time itself.

But this just demonstrates that there is a problem with the materialist conception of "time". When "time" is tied to the material existence of things, in that way, the possibility of time which is prior to the occurrence of material things is ruled out. Then the actuality (form) which is necessarily prior to material objects as the cause of their existence, is rendered unintelligible, as "an act" without time is incoherent.

Therefore to understand the theological conception of "God", as creator of material existence, it is necessary to dismiss that faulty conception of "time" which places God as outside of time. Aristotle's arguments showed God to be eternal, as outside time, by that conception of "time". This made it impossible to properly apprehend or understand God, "God" being incoherent, as an activity or cause which is outside of time, i.e. prior to time. However, the logic which places activity, or actuality, (Form) , as prior to the material existence of things, is sound. This indicates that the conception of "time" which ties it to the material existence of things is faulty. Nevertheless, that conception of "time" persists in most technical usage of "time", and "God" remains unintelligible to most educated people.

Quantum mechanics is the most accurate physical theory ever devised. What is at issue in all the interpretations is the meaning of the theory, not what it actually predicts will happen. — Wayfarer

That itself is a matter in need of interpretation. What quantum mechanics predicts is probabilities, not what is actually the case. That's exactly the problem I discussed above. What is actually the case, is what is, right now, the zero point in time. And that's when uncertainty is maximum. So quantum mechanics can accurately predict the probabilities of what could happen if..., the odds of X, the odds of Y, etc.. But it's absolutely uncertain about what is happening right now, and that's why it needs the "if", because those are the temporal conditions which introduce degrees of certainty.

Not sure where you get this idea. PoR is defined in a few places
In physics, the principle of relativity is the requirement that the equations describing the laws of physics have the same form in all admissible frames of reference. — noAxioms

Try this:

Galileo formulated the principle of relativity in order to show that one cannot determine whether the earth revolves about the sun or the sun revolves about the earth. The principle of relativity states that there is no physical way to differentiate between a body moving at a constant speed and an immobile body. It is of course possible to determine that one body is moving relative to the other, but it is impossible to determine which of them is moving and which is immobile. — https://www.tau.ac.il/education/muse/museum/galileo/principle_relativity.html#:~:text=The%20principle%20of%20relativity%20states,moving%20and%20which%20is%20immobile.

Sorry noAxioms, but we're just too far apart in terminology to carry on any meaningful discussion. I spend all my time just having to show you that you don't know what you're talking about. First we spent forever on the meaning of "inertial frame", now we're stuck on the meaning of "the principle of relativity". It's pointless, we can't discuss anything significant.

Some claim matter is neither created nor destroyed. How do you go about refuting this? For example: do you think caused and created are two different things? — ucarr

That might be true, but under the Aristotelian conceptual structure matter has no existence without form. Matter without form is an unintelligible and incoherent idea. So what some claim about matter, that "matter is neither created nor destroyed" is completely irrelevant, because when we talk about material objects we are talking about matter with form, and form is what is created and destroyed.

Do you think the {cause ⇒ effect} relationship always implies a temporal sequence? — ucarr

Yes.

If someone claims God is self-caused, how would you refute this refutation of {cause ⇒ effect} is always temporal? — ucarr

I would say "God is self-caused" is incoherent because it would mean that God is prior to Himself in time, and that seems to be contradictory.

Outstanding critique. Well-thought, and asks pertinent questions, not all of which have answers. — Mww

Thanks Mww. It's difficult to do. It's easy to take what another says and disagree with it because it's somehow counterintuitive, so it doesn't make sense. But it's actually quite difficult to take apart what another has said and determine the reasons why it doesn't make sense. So on this forum, we tend to do the easy thing, and just disagree with each other and never make any progress in finding out why. Anyway, I'll answer your question, but sometimes its even more difficult to take apart one's own intuitions, then to take apart the statements of others.

.what happens in the very first instance of a perception or an idea in a particular human cognitive system? By first instance I mean the very first observation of something in Nature, or the very first flash of a possibility a priori? The implicit ramification being of course, there is no experience on which to draw, therefore there is nothing in memory, re: consciousness, therefore the representation by already present conceptions is quite impossible. — Mww

That the conception is prior to the sense perception is what validates the idea of "a priori". What is implied is that there is some sort of conception which is prior to sense perception. You could look back at an individual person's first sense perception, or the first human being's first sense perception, or even the first sense perception of a living being, and ask the same question, how is it possible that there is a conception prior to sense perception. But even if we look only at the physical aspects of sensation, I think we would find that not only is a sense organ required for sensation, but also some sort of brain.

Notice the way that conceptualization works, consisting of universals, categories, etc.. So it is not necessary that there is a conceptual representation of each thing, prior to it being perceived by sensation, it is only necessary that there is a sort of conceptual structure of universals, which gives the mind the capacity to categorize the information received from the particular. Therefore I wouldn't say that perceiving a particular is an instance of conceiving the particular (that would be contradictory), it's more like an instance of categorizing the particular according to an already held conceptual structure..

The point being that on the other side, the sense side, the image which we are able to get. via the sense, is limited by the capacity of the mind to support the sense. But we tend to think that the senses are giving us a direct representation of the thing sensed, when in realty what the senses give us is greatly restricted by what the mind has the capacity to apprehend.

This is why the Aristotelian description was that the mind abstracts the form of the thing, through the means of the senses. It is the mind which is creating the form or image, through the means of sensing. But we commonly attribute the production of the image or form, to the sense. This is because of the pervasiveness of the physicalist mind-set, in our current society. This mind-set apprehends a chain of causation from the thing itself. The thing causes an effect in the sense, which causes an effect in the mind. From the dualist perspective, the mind creates, using information received by the senses. So what is produced as "a sensation" is restricted by the capacity which the mind has to create. Therefore it is possible that the senses received a whole lot more information than what we receive as a sense image, but if it doesn't fit into the mind's capacity to represent it, it doesn't get represented within the representation which the mind creates.

The base of the problem is found in Zeno's paradoxes, and manifests in the way that calculus resolves the issue with the concept of approaching the limit, or approaching zero. When this concept is applied to the temporal existence of waves, the uncertainty principle rears its ugly head.

To determine the features of waves requires a period of time because waves are activities. As the period of time utilized becomes shorter and shorter, the capacity to determine the wave features is debilitated, and the result is an increase in uncertainty. As the zero point in time is approached, uncertainty approaches infinity. In classical mechanics this was the problem of infinite acceleration required for a change in motion . Any body at rest, if it began to move, would require a time of infinite acceleration at the point when it was caused to move. The problem transposes to relativity theory when a body at rest is replaced with a body with uniform motion, and we consider changes to that motion.

So we have a fundamental incompatibility between "position" which refers to a object's rest spot, and "velocity" (or any wave features) which implies no rest spot. What is demonstrated by the need to employ the concept of "infinite" in the calculus which relates these two, is that our way of plotting an object's position, and our way of plotting an object's movement, are fundamentally incommensurable. This basic incommensurability demonstrates that our mathematics of "space" is fundamentally inadequate. Zeno demonstrated this very well with the tortoise and the hare. And the issue remains as the uncertainty principle.

But it is important to realize that, while the behavior of the smallest particles cannot be unambiguously described in ordinary language, the language of mathematics is still adequate for a clear-cut account of what is going on. — Werner Heisenberg, The Debate Between Plato and Democritus

The problem though, is that mathematics really does not give a "clear-cut account of what is going on". The uncertainty principle is produced by the application of the mathematics, in an attempt to understand elementary particles. The uncertainty is not resolved by the mathematics. So this statement from Heisenberg is not true at all.

And the conclusion drawn from that statement, that the elementary parts of material objects are "Ideas, which can be unambiguously spoken of only in the language of mathematics" is not a sound conclusion either. The reality of the situation is quite the opposite, that quantum theory demonstrates to us that the elementary parts cannot be understood through the application of conventional mathematics. The uncertainty principle is obviously a failing of our mathematics, in its capacity to understand the reality of space, time, and material existence, not a success of our mathematics.

The concept of God is inherently unprovable and unverifiable. — gevgala

Every material object has a cause. The cause is prior in time to the object. Therefore the cause of the first material object is not material. This immaterial cause is what is known as "God".

In the sense that “house” includes glass, wood, metals, it does, yes. One cannot cognize without these antecedents, but one can have those antecedents without being cognizant. This is partially why cognition regards perception alone, insofar as to say we are cognizant of our thinking, is quite superfluous. — Mww

I don't quite understand this, so let me put an example to you. Suppose I look around me. What I perceive with my eyes is a bunch of different colours around, and I also somehow see a separation between some of them, as a difference in distance. Because they appear separated, I think of them as distinct things, and I have a name for many of them, "house", "car", etc.. The latter part is all conceptual, me seeing them as things, and as specific things. And the former part is supposed to be perceptual, seeing the differences.

The problem I have, is that to talk of them as "colours" and "separations", or "distance", is also conceptual. Now I have to keep reducing the type of differences I am sensing, to a most basic concept, "differences", which is still conceptual, but as close as possible that I can get to making a separation between the perceptual (of the senses) and the conceptual (of the mind). But when I do this, I deny myself the capacity to even distinguish between what is being perceived by one sense, and what is being perceived by another sense, because "colour" and "sound" are conceptual separations. All the senses are just demonstrating "differences" in general, and they are completely uncategorized because categorizing them is conceptual.

Since this distinction, between sound, coulour, taste, etc., appears to me to be done at a level prior to any form of conceptualization as I would understand "conceptualization", it doesn't look right to me. It appears to me like there is some form of relating sensations inherent within the act of perception, which already categorizes them prior to even relating them to any conceptions. So I think that your proposed division between 'of the thing' (cognition) and 'of the conception' (reason) doesn't make any sense to me because the two seem to contaminate each other right from the most basic levels and one cannot be said to be prior to the other. So sense perception has inherent within it a fundamental relating of percepts and classification, because I naturally distinguish between colour and sound. Likewise, the objects of reasoning always seem to have a sense aspect, as they seem to always be representations of something sensed, like words, symbols or images. I am incapable of reasoning without employing some sense images.

Yes, given the fact cognitions are of things, from which follows we are not conscious of the relating of conceptions, nor are we conscious of the judgement itself. We are conscious only of the relation of one cognition to another, which is reason. On the other hand, in aesthetic judgements having to do with conceptions alone, we are conscious of these as to how they make us feel, but we cognize nothing by them. It is easy to see that how we feel has no predication on logic, in that it is true we do in fact sometimes feel very differently than the judgement warrants. Like….the guy who fell off a ladder should have caused consternation, but you laugh because it looked so funny when he landed. — Mww

Here is where the problem I had above, manifests into a bigger problem. You say there are cognitions of "things" which is at a sub-conscious level. I assume these "things" would be the differences I referred to above, as I explained "differences" to be the fundamental object of the senses. So when you say "cognitions are of things", you mean cognitions are of differences according to the description I provided above. "Things" is reducible to "differences". Also, within the act of "cognition", there is some sort of relating of differences to each other, and a basic classification going on, and this is the "judgement" you speak of, which we are not consciously aware of.

Now, there are what you would call "cognitions". And reason relates cognitions one to another. However, and here's where the problem lies, you now have another separation, within the conscious level of reasoning, and this appears to be between aesthetic judgements, involving the relations of cognitions, and logical judgements, involving purely abstract conceptions. So the problem is, where do these purely abstract conceptions employed in logic come from? You provide a big description (which I find to have problems) of how a cognition can come to a reasoning mind, being 'of things', but no description of how purely abstract conceptions come to a reasoning mind. And, I explained how each of these, cognitions, and purely abstract concepts, are both fundamentally contaminated by each other, so this renders that whole division as ineffectual. In reality, it appears like both cognitions and abstract concepts are produced in the same way within the sub-conscious, so that when they come to the reasoning mind, they simply come as different categories similar to how colours and sounds come as different categories, but they are actually created in much the same way.

I’m ok with that. Except that my example is concerned with form, but yours is concerned with content. I’m saying the kid stacks numbers, gets a result, you’re saying the kid stacks 5 over 9 and gets 14. I’m saying the kid will necessarily get a result from any stack whatsoever, you’re saying the kid will only get a certain number contingent on the numbers he stacks. I’m constructing the math, which is not itself an experience, you’re using the constructs, which is. — Mww

I was emphasizing the process, which must be learned. So yes, the kid stacks 5 over 9, and gets 14, but more than this, the kid puts 4 below the 5 and 9, and carries the 1 to the next column. So what I am saying is that what you call "the math" is just a learned process without any necessity to it. The kid does not have to write down the 4 and carry the 1, if it's a simple case, it might be all kept in the mind. Then there would be some other way to remember the digits, rather than writing them down. So your determination of necessity is completely meaningless. It's like saying, put some numbers in front of the kid, and the kid will necessarily do something, but you can't make any statement of necessity as to what the kid will actually do. What point is such an assertion of necessity? It's like saying something will necessarily happen, but it could be absolutely anything.

Yes, as long as the stipulation of being taught applies, because there are two distinct methods involved. In such case as being taught, the things being learned about are given to him, the method is presupposed, re: addition, also taught to him, which eliminates him having to exercise his pure a priori conceptions for the construction of them, an entirely different method. In other words, he needs not think what a two is, or how it came to be a two, nor does he need to understand the cause/effect of succession, but only that he should conform to an expectation.

A question of….why is it, that which is known by rote practice makes far less impression than that known from self-determination. Stands to reason it is because the mental effort of the former is far less stringent than the latter. If far less, which effort is not used, as opposed to when it is. — Mww

This conclusion you make here, ought to serve to demonstrate to you the problem with your division between cognition and reason which I explained above. What you describe is the two different ways of learning a rule, explained by Wittgenstein. You can be taught the rule, or you can observe activity and learn the rule simply from observation. As you describe, the two produce a fundamentally different understanding of what is here called "the rule". Both means of acquiring "the rule" are sense based. In one case you acquire the instructions through language, as a prescriptive rule, and in the other instance you observe, and make a descriptive rule.

The problem is that the two are fundamentally different. The rule that you learn from being taught will not be the same as the rule that you learn from observation, as you say, the latter involves a deeper understanding. But does it really? In reality, the other way, being taught the rule, involves a whole lot of purpose, meaning, which the observational way does not reveal. So prior to even being able to understand the rule in language, a whole lot of other education is required, and this is implied already when one is taught the rule, so there is a whole package of understanding purpose, and meaning, inherent within learning the rule through language. So really we cannot say that one is a better understanding than the other because they are both completely different, and understand completely different aspects. To have a complete understanding requires both.

How this bears on the division you proposed, between cognition and reason, is that both these ways of understanding "the rule", prescriptive and descriptive, are based in cognition, recognition of things. However, they involve completely different ways of looking at things. In the descriptive way you look at the activity of "things", people in this case, and notice that their activity is patterned and intelligible, and you thereby make some conclusions about those patterns, allowing you personally to replicate them. In the prescriptive way, you look at "things" as carriers of inherent meaning, like words and symbols, and you learn some understanding about what these things are supposed to represent.

So I would say that the division here is not between cognition (of things), and reason (of concepts), but a difference in the way that we look at things. So each "way" is cognitive in the sense that it deals with things, but in one way the thing is seen as something which you must personal assign meaning to, in your attempt to understand it, and in the other way you see the thing as having meaning already inherent within it, and this is taken for granted.

The phenomena in your mind are representations of physical words, just as in any perception. In the sense that you already know a language, you don’t need to conceptualize the words, you’ve already done it when you learned the words that constitute the language. All you need now is to judge the relation of the word you’ve learned, to the word you perceive. If you cognize a sufficient correlation, you understand what’s been said. In some cases, though, if you cognize a necessary correlation, you know what’s been said is true.
(Guy says…I just went to Home Depot. Ok, fine, you understand how that could be the case. Guy shows you a garden rake, says…I just went to Home Depot and bought this rake. Now you understand he more than likely actually did go to Home Depot. Guy says….I just went to Home Depot and bought this gallon of ice cream. Now, you understand he might have gone to Home Depot, but he more than likely didn’t buy the ice cream there, because yo have no experience of any Home Depot ever selling ice cream. Guy says…I just went to the bank and got a cashier’s check. Now you understand he had to have gone to a bank, because you know for certain there is no where else to get a cashier’s check.)
———— — Mww

This further demonstrates the two different ways of cognizing things. Once we understand that there is meaning inherent within the thing, get a fundamental grasp on this meaning and take it for granted, we can move on toward understanding further meaning which is within the context of the thing. What context is, really, is the assumption of a larger thing ( eg. instead of a word, a sentence) with meaning inherent within that larger thing. But if we cognize a thing without inherent meaning assuming that we must assign meaning to the thing through some act of reasoning, then we allow for the existence of unintelligible "things". That ends up being like the ice cream at Home Depot. If the things cognized, "ice cream" and "Home Depot" in this example have no inherent meaning, then we allow any form of relation. But such a judgement would render everything unintelligible because there would be no inherent rules for relating things.

So we must allow that within cognition, which is the first interaction between mind and thing, there is already assumed by the apprehending mind, that there is meaning already inherent within the percept. So perception presents all things to the reasoning mind as if they are symbols or representations of a concept already. And that's why I do not like the division between cognition and reason, because there would reasoning already inherent within the cognition, because the meaning of the thing cognized has already been understood, just like after we learn to speak, we recognize words as things because we understand the meaning which inheres within.

Yeah but I still thought it was pretty good. — Wayfarer

That's the way poetry rolls. There's no need to follow any particular rules. And if certain styles become conventional, often it's stretching the bounds of the convention which makes the poetry good. Or, like in your example it's good for other reasons, and going outside the conventions really doesn't matter, because that 's the way poetry rolls.

This is the problem with telling people it is "a game". Then the psychology of game play, competition and all sorts of things, enters the picture. And we'll try all kinds of tricks, strategies, to get as much advantage as possible, on the other, without crossing the line of cheating, upon which one would be expelled from the game.

This is the problem with the op, as expressed. It doesn't make clear whether the "players" are told whether they are playing a game or not. If they are simply told the rules, and proceed, that means one thing. If they are told that they are playing a game, that sets completely different stakes. And even just giving the players a set of rules implies that they are playing a game, so that it's a game, and there's different stakes, is unavoidable. And because "the game" is an entity itself, distinct from the person's real life existence and association with money, the person's way of dealing with money will differ. This is probably how gamblers come to feel comfortable with high stakes games, they disassociate the money in the game from their real life relation to money.

So if you pull out the Monopoly board and say we're going to play this game of Monopoly, and the starting amount is 70/30 in your favour, I'd say fuck you, put your game away, I'm not playing. That the game of the op uses real money is just a ruse thrown in by the creators of the game, intended to create ambiguity as to the objective of the game. The stakes are unrevealed. So you urge me on, and say come on play Monopoly with me, it's real money we're playing with, so you really can't lose. I'd be even more inclined to say fuck you, you deceptive bastard, quit messing with my head, I'm losing just by agreeing to play.

Tell that Chat bot poetry composer that "how" and "know" do not rhyme. Neither do "stars" and "ours" for that matter. Where does that thing get its sense of rhythm? Send it back to school. and tell it to work with sound waves rather than letters, if it wants to write poetry.

Incidentally, that is the reason why the physical universe doesn't reduce to mathematics properly, the difference between numbers and waves. Mathematics cannot accurately represent waves because human geometry uses ideal representations of space which are unreal (evidenced by irrational ratios), and the result is the Fourier uncertainty principle. In reality the physical universe would only be accurately reducible via temporal concepts like frequency and rhythm. But this reduction doesn't get very far because division of the octave has always been fraught with problems.

Succinctly, we have not yet solved the problems exposed by the Pythagoreans. Nor have we solved Zeno's problems. Modern mathematicians have created elaborate structures which merely hide 'unsound' foundations. We see immense elegant mathematical structures and simply assume that they must have sound foundations, or else they couldn't be sustained. But sustenance of these just requires endless maintenance.

Cognition is only of things, thus things, re: real spacetime objects, are always involved, albeit indirectly, as representations in the form of phenomena. Thing is…imagination, which is the matter of relating conceptions, and judgement, which is the relation of conceptions**, do not require things that are immediately sensed; as parts of understanding, these work on mediate things, re: prior experience, or, without any thing of sense whatsoever, re: fantoms, magic, or just possible experience. — Mww

OK, so this is how you lost me. "Cognition" for you, does not include imagination, judgement, or relating concepts. But isn't "cognition" generally used to refer to all forms of mental activity, thinking, and understanding? And I was earlier talking about logical processes being an activity of relating conceptions. Do you exclude logic from cognition then?

**the adding of numbers, in the way kids are taught in school, put one number above another, draw a line under both, the implicit operation in the arithmetic above the line is analogous to the mental operation in understanding, called imagination, whereby numbers are exchanged for conceptions, regarding mere thought of things without the immediate presence of them, or even without any real sensed thing at all. This method is all a priori, and no experience is forthcoming from it. — Mww

And this I do not understand either. How can you say that learning to do mathematics does not provide one with "experience"? I think that's exactly what practising things like that does, gives one experience.

That which is below the line, regardless of which combination is above it, after the analogous arithmetic operation as sum, is the mental operation of judgement. And this for just a single perception, or a single thought. There are gazillions of them both but only one at a time, some of which we are conscious some of which we are not; reason is how they all relate to each other, how they are kept organized…..how we are not in a constant state of utter confusion yet still sometimes in a minor state. How we know things or not; how we remember things or don’t. — Mww

This gives me something to talk about. The kid puts two numbers, and draws a line underneath. Let's say each number has multiple digits, so the student has to employ a method, understanding how to carry over from one column to the next for example. If the student is to be successful, the method must have already been learned. The student was taught by a teacher, or read how to in a book, but at that time, when the student learned, this is the time when understanding occurred. Now the student relies on this understanding, which has already occurred, to practise what is already understood.

Through the practise of what is already understood, the student makes judgements about what digits to write below the line. The digits written are a representation of those judgements. And the judgements come from employing the method which has been learned earlier through experience. There may be some underlying a priori principles involved in the learning process, but the method itself, which is what is employed in the judgements is learned through experience. Do you agree?

Just as all the number operations of different forms grouped together is mathematics, so too the entirety of the mental operation, is understanding, and thereby is it deemed the faculty of rules. It should be easy to see, that just as adding two numbers is exactly the same as adding a whole series of numbers, each stacked on top of the other in arithmetic form, two conceptions synthesized to each other is a simple, problematical, judgement, many conceptions synthesized all together, is a hypothetical judgement.
(Pointy ears may give the cognition of a dog, but pointy ears in conjunction with a bushy tail gives a more certain kind of dog. Pointy ears, bushy tail and brown spots yet a more certain kind. And so on. Sooner or later, the synthesis of sufficiently many conceptions whether from appearance or mannerisms, may very well end being the cognition of one single dog, YOUR dog, an apodeitic judgement.) — Mww

But where is cognition in relation to all of this synthesis? You separated cognition off, at the beginning, to be only about things, and not about relating conceptions, and judgements. But aren't these mental operations you describe really about things? The numerals which the student works with have a real physical presence on the paper. Likewise, "pointy ears", "bushy tail", and "dog" are real physical symbols in front of me. And if I think by mulling them over in my mind, I am using a representation of the physical symbol. This is phenomena isn't it? I cannot form those conceptions of those dogs without using those words. And the words in my mind are representations of physical words. So why isn't such conceptualizing, cognition, as working with things?

….to which I meant to offer…..“reasons, i.e., thinks about things”….. just doesn’t say enough. I went on to distinguish what a thing is, such that thinking as a whole does not necessary include them. In other words, reason concerns itself with everything we think, whether of real tangible things of perception, necessarily conditioned by space and time, or abstract intangible conceptual objects which understanding thinks for itself, conditioned only by time. — Mww

You have set up two parallel forms of thinking. one concerning real tangible things, the other concerning abstract intangible concepts. But I do not see that this separation is warranted, or even sustainable in application. The real tangible thing itself does not enter into the thinking itself, only the representations of it. But by the time the representation gets into the conscious mind, it's already tied up with so may abstract conceptions, judgements already made (prejudice), that I do not see the advantage of trying to separate the thing (as phenomenon) from the concepts. I think this just gives an unreal representation which may mislead.

If the slave can claim his right to freedom, or in the case of natural rights, already has it, why is he in chains? — NOS4A2

Some people don't respect the claims that others make. That does not mean that the person is wrong. So if the slaver does not respect the claim of the slave to have a right to freedom, this does not make the slave wrong about this claim.

In any case, when it comes to asserting rights, the slaver’s right to own the slave has won out over the slave’s right to freedom. — NOS4A2

Again this does not hold up logically. That something is done in a particular way, does not produce the conclusion that it is the right way. One's actions do not necessarily display one's rights. If a person lives one's life as a thief, and gets away with it, this does not mean that the person has the right to live that way.

Your so-called balance and equality is might makes right. The slaver has the right to own the slave so long as he can claim and take the right. The slave has the right to freedom so long as he can claim the right and make an exit. — NOS4A2

Oh, so now you change your tune! You said rights had to be given. I said what is given had to be balanced with what is taken. Now you say rights are taken. Which do you really believe? Or do you really believe like me, that rights are a balance between the two?

As i said, I am not very familiar with Schopenhauer.