Enough idiocy. A biological system is closed for its materials and open for its energy flow. It sets up the metabolic turbine that an environmental entropy gradient can spin. — apokrisis

You are the one preaching idiocy. As a living, acting organism, I am a biological system. I eat my dinner, therefore this biological system is not closed for materials. Your proposed material/energy distinction is simply inapplicable here.

Life is agency in that it harnesses chance. It ratchets thermal randomness to sustain its organismic order.

The Universe wants to entropify. Life says here, let me help you over the humps. The second law gets served in the long run, but life gets to swim in negentropic loopholes it discovers. — apokrisis

Are you preaching vitalism? That's the way you are talking, "life is agency...it ratchets...", "life says...". You have simply replaced the ancient term, "the soul" with "life", to distance yourself from theology. We could effectively replace one for the other without a change in meaning. I'm not opposed to vitalism in general, and speaking of "life" or "the soul" as this type of agency, that is how Aristotle defined "the soul". But then there is the magical thinking you employ in an attempt to make vitalism consistent with the principles of physics, such as those "negentropic loopholes it discovers". This type of magical thinking is what I am opposed to. Do you not recognize a "negentropic loophole" as nothing other than magic?

All irreversible physical processes are entropic. That means any and every temporal process is entropic. What on earth are these magical, nontemporal, "loopholes" which life has discovered. I didn't see any of that magic in Pattee's material.

In terms of top-down constraints and bottom-up degrees of freedom, this is a direct demonstration of the balancing act that maintains Earth as a Gaian level superorganism. — apokrisis

Is the magic based in "bottom-up degrees of freedom"? Instead of portraying life as an agent which produces bottom-up constraints through a form of causation which escapes the principles of physics (which is consistent with classical vitalism), you propose magical loopholes that the soul discovers. But the magical loopholes are really nothing but mathematical sophistry, created from deficiencies in the way that mathematics deals with infinity. In other words, your boundary condition is infinite degrees of freedom, and this false boundary condition allows for the positing of magical loopholes anywhere that the system approaches the boundary.

I meant it is the general top-down constraint acting to shape the upwardly constructing degrees of freedom. — apokrisis

This statement you made to Wayfarer is inconsistent, somewhat incoherent. Constructions are constraints. "Degrees of freedom" cannot construct. This is why there is a need for an agent which produces bottom-up constraints, in the manner of bottom-up causation. With phrases like this, it appears to me that you recognize, and clearly acknowledge (being the very intelligent person that you are), this need for constraints which are caused, and created in a bottom-up way. But this logical need interferes with your naturalist bent, so you try to sweep it under the carpet. Then you are left relying on the magical thinking of discovering "negantropic loopholes".

The bacteria want exactly this kind of world so that they can thrive. And the world wants exactly these kinds of little organisms – ones that can both photosynthesise and respire – so that such an optimised planet can continue to be the case. — apokrisis

You have not shown how "the world", as an inanimate planet, you described as having an O2/CO2 Gaian balance, has taken on the magical agency of life (a soul), so that you can speak of it in terms of seeking those magical loopholes. This appears to be a huge problem in your metaphysics, you assign to life this magical power of agency (the capacity to discover negentropic loopholes), then you jump the gap to inanimate objects and assign the same magical power to them as well. Of course, that leaping of the gap is only provided for because the "negentropic loopholes" are a feature created by the mathematical axioms employed, and the same mathematics is applied to both the animate and the inanimate. This allows that the magical loopholes can be said to exist within both the animate and the inanimate. The statement that they have real existence is just a falsity though because the loopholes are a fault of the mathematical laws (the map), not the world itself (the terrain).

Individual organisms might seem to answer to your simplistic definition of openness. They transact raw materials with their environments. But then the environment itself is a Gaian superorganism. Life is now woven into the material cycles of the planet itself. — apokrisis

You clearly have no idea of what von Bertalanffy had in mind with the distinction between open and closed systems, therefore your understanding of general system theory is deeply flawed. Your categorizations are nothing but abuse of the theory, which makes it appear ridiculous. But the ridiculousness is not in the general system theory itself, as composed by von Bertalanffy, it is in your abusive application.

But the biological system is still constrained by the Second Law. — apokrisis

This is not an accurate statement. The biological system itself, being an open system, is not constrained by the second law. The second law is not applicable to biological systems, because they are open systems, and the second law is applicable to closed systems only. That is the defining feature of the open system. All irreversible processes within the open system are understood to be subject to the second law, but the system itself is not subject to that law. In the open system there is entropy and negative entropy which is imported, therefore the system is not subject to the second law. Read the quote I provided carefully.

Therefore, the change of entropy in closed systems is always positive; order is continually destroyed. In open systems, however, we have not only production of entropy due to irreversible processes, but also import of entropy which may well be negative.

From observation of the open system, there is evidence that the system itself violates the second law of thermodynamics. So von Bertalanffy describes it as importation from the system's environment. If open systems are modeled as dissipative structures, then it is incorrect to say that such a system is subject to the second law. Furthermore, the means by which entropy and negative entropy are imported into the system is not necessarily known, so we cannot conclude that it must be either upward or downward causation.

Now the issue at hand is the agent which imports the negative entropy into the system, or we could simply say "the cause" of that importation. You can write this agency off to "symmetry-breaking" or some such thing, but this is nothing more than just saying that chance is a causal agent. And that is not logically sound.

At least that is my story, you may prefer your story. — unenlightened

I don't like your story, it doesn't make logical sense to me. I don't see why a thing must make the reflective action of self-identifying, in order to have an identity. Why would you think that identity is dependent on reflection? Put it this way, how do you think that reflection could create identity, when the nature of reflection is just to throw back on itself what was already there prior to being reflected?

I think your contrivance here just continues the narrative and does not end it, just adding an extra identification "true" — unenlightened

Yes, you can, very clearly, think of things in this way. What I described to you, is done so with words, so it is impossible for me to end the narrative in this way, and it will appear to you that I practise self-deception, because I am trying to deceive you by preaching other than what I practise. That seems to be unavoidable.

Is a non-narrating narrator of a self-narrative not a straightforward contradiction? — unenlightened

When our attempts to say what we want to say end up in contradiction, even though there is no contradiction in what is meant, there must be a reason for this. The reason in this case is the nature of temporal existence. The narrator has narrated, and continues to be the narrator of that narrative which has been narrated, despite no longer narrating. So, the self-narrative has ended, and through the separation you described earlier, the narrator continues to be the narrator despite no longer being in the operative mode of narrating.

Again, the nature of temporal existence is pivotal here. The only true narrative can be of the past. But we can make fictional narratives of the past just as well, like you explained, counterfactuals. Likewise, we can make fictional narratives of the future. The narratives of the future are all fictional because the future is as of yet undetermined. Yet, they are "fictional" in a different way from the way that the counterfactual is fictional, because some could turn out to be true predictions.

Now, since all narratives of the future are necessarily fictional, in that sense, despite the possibility of a true prediction, "narrative" is unsuitable for use in describing one's position relative to the future. And, as you yourself indicate, one's relation to the future, wants and desires, is what is primary, the animalistic aspect of the human being:

Psychologically, they do not live in time, but in the continuous present; memories they have, and habits, and these present themselves by association as appropriate to the present moment. Thirst provokes the memory of the way to the water-hole, but there is no story, so no particular individual, no self, and no time. Such is paradise, there is no death, because there is no narrative to end. There is no good and evil, because judgement requires time and there is no time, only the present. — unenlightened

So when we apprehend the fact that animals, plants, and other things have "an identity" just as much so as the human being has an identity, we see that the self-narrative is not the identity of the thing. And, when we apprehend that the thing's position relative to the future is just as much a part of the thing's identity as it's position relative to the past, we understand that narrative is insufficient for identity. Now the narrative as self-identity must end because it is determined as insufficient. But the self, with its identity remains. Identity, and self, are simply understood in a way other than narrative.

But you are still stuck in the immediate post-medieval stage of theistic thought. Even Kant and Schelling are adventures yet to be undertaken. — apokrisis

Kant and Schelling are for the most part consistent with theistic thinking. top-down causation of intentional acts is not consistent. The problem is that since top-down models cannot account for the reality of "self-determination", since such acts are caused in a bottom-up manner, and top-down models do not allow for the reality of bottom-up formations, these models are left to represent such constructions as the product of chance, symmetry-breaking or some such thing. Kant and Schelling represented the bottom-up as unknown rather than pretending that it could be known as top-down. This is the problem i described here:

This is the deficiency of systems theory. Boundaries are used to distinguish what is part of the system from what is not part of the system. But there are no principles to distinguish a spatially external boundary from a spatial internal boundary, so anything which is not part of the system is generally understood as, "outside the system", or spatially external. A proper understand requires distinguishing between what is not part of the system by being across an internal boundary, from what is not part of the system by being across an external boundary. — Metaphysician Undercover

Systems theory, which is employed exclusively as the tool of such thinking, does not have the means to properly separate the external from the internal. You represent this as a resolution, a "correcting the faultiness of Cartesian dualism", but there is no resolution at all, just the bold, unsupported claim that the same "systems" principles can be applied equally to animate as well as inanimate systems.

This directly contradicts the position of the purported founder of "general system theory", Ludwig von Bertalanffy. He very explicitly distinguished between inanimate "closed systems" which are dealt with in physics, and "open systems" which are living systems. The distinction is primary to general system theory, and very significant. These two distinct types of "systems" cannot be reduced one to the other, as you seem to think, as they are fundamentally different.

Closed and Open Systems

Conventional physics deals only with closed systems, i.e. systems which are considered to be isolated from their environment.

However, we find systems which by their very nature and definition are not closed systems. Every living organism is essentially an open system. It maintains itself in a continuous inflow and outflow, a building up and breaking down of components, never being, so long as it is alive, in a state of chemical and thermodynamic equilibrium but maintained in a so-called steady state which is distinct from the latter.

It is only in recent years that an expansion of physics, in order to include open systems, has taken place. This theory has shed light on many obscure phenomena in physics and biology and has also led to important general conclusions of which I will mention only two.

The first is the principle of equifinality. In any closed system, the final state is unequivocally determined by the initial conditions: e.g. the motion in a planetary system where the positions of the planets at a time t are unequivocally determined by their positions at a time t°.
This is not so in open systems. Here, the same final state may be reached from different initial conditions and in different ways. This is what is called equifinality.

Another apparent contrast between inanimate and animate nature is what sometimes was called the violent contradiction between Lord Kelvin's degradation and Darwin's evolution, between the law of dissipation in physics and the law of evolution in biology. According to the second principle of thermodynamics, the general trend of events in physical nature is towards states of maximum disorder and levelling down of differences, with the so-called heat death of the universe as the final outlook, when all energy is degraded into evenly distributed heat of low temperature, and the world process comes to a stop. In contrast, the living world shows, in embryonic development and in evolution, a transition towards higher order, heterogeneity, and organization. But on the basis of the theory of open systems, the apparent contradiction between entropy and evolution disappears. In all irreversible processes, entropy must increase. Therefore, the change of entropy in closed systems is always positive; order is continually destroyed. In open systems, however, we have not only production of entropy due to irreversible processes, but also import of entropy which may well be negative. This is the case in the living organism which imports complex molecules high in free energy. Thus, living systems, maintaining themselves in a steady state, can avoid the increase of entropy, and may even develop towards states of increased order and organization. — Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General system Theory (1968)

https://www.panarchy.org/vonbertalanffy/systems.1968.html

The significance is clear. Maintaining the true status of "open" in a biological system, requires that the system's interaction with its environment cannot be modeled as top-down causation, which is the modeling of a closed system.

It is only by denying the reality of the agent, that the system can be presented as top-down causally, rather than the true bottom-up causation, which is indicated when the agent is included.

Try reading again and realising that biosemiosis doesn’t talk about agents who interpret but systems of interpretance. — apokrisis

That's exactly why the theory is faulty. We know that systems of interpretance are just tools used by agents who interpret. To remove the agent (therefore subjectivity) from the interpretation, and present the interpretation as if there is an automatic objective system of interpretance, doing the job on its own, denies the reality of subjectivity within interpretation, which is really an essential aspect of interpretation.

In conclusion, biosemiosis makes interpretation into something which is inconsistent with interpretation as we know it. There is an agent (subject) who applies systems, makes judgements, and produces an interpretation which is unique to that agent (subject).

At the core, that we do cooperate does not imply that we ought cooperate. — Banno

This is the base of the top-down/ bottom-up division. The description "that we do cooperate" produces a top-down perspective on morality. However, that "I ought to cooperate" is something that I must feel, and will myself, and this is the basis for a bottom-up perspective on morality.

I think "pseudoscience" is an appropriate word. It is a presentation of metaphysics which does not stand up to a critical philosophical analysis because the principles are lacking. So it is presented as if it is supported by science rather than metaphysics, which it is not.

... it is losing everything...
... would be I think to imagine self continuing beyond its own end. — unenlightened

Why do you think it is a matter of losing everything? This is not the necessary conclusion. And this is the conclusion which makes you think that there is nothing left of the self, to continue after the narrative ends. The way I described it, it is a losing of the narrative self, but the narrative self is not the true self, that is an illusion. So the true self is allowed to continue after the end of the narrative self.

Consider what you said about how the narrator is not a part of the narrative. The true self is the narrator, , the self in the narrative is the illusionary self. When the narrative ends, so ends the narrative self, but the true self, as the narrator remains.

I respect Pattee and have learned from him. I'm also cognizant that biosemiotics is a wide-ranging discipline accomodating divergent perspectives (that's why I linked to the Short History article, which is an overview.) — Wayfarer

Yes, he has a deep understanding of the workings of biological organisms, and many clear thoughts. However, his speculative theory of biosemiotics is deficient for the reasons I described. When you study biosemiotics further, in the future, keep in mind the issue I mentioned, and now that it's been pointed out to you, it ought to become evident that it's a very real problem, indicating that biosemiotics is quite insufficient.

But if you want to understand life 'from the inside', this is not enough. Thermodynamics does not explain that autocatalytic process, nor does it explain the steering and control instance that life implies. — Wolfgang

I've discovered that any attempt to explain this to apokrisis, who retracts into a shell of denial accompanied by random ad hominem attacks, is pointless.

This is the deficiency of systems theory. Boundaries are used to distinguish what is part of the system from what is not part of the system. But there are no principles to distinguish a spatially external boundary from a spatial internal boundary, so anything which is not part of the system is generally understood as, "outside the system", or spatially external. A proper understand requires distinguishing between what is not part of the system by being across an internal boundary, from what is not part of the system by being across an external boundary.

You'll want to read this to get up to speed on what apokrisis is referring to (but it's also a worthwhile study in its own right. Apokrisis is or was a student of Howard Pattee who is mentioned in the first paragraph.) — Wayfarer

Apokrisis has directed me to enough material for me to see that Pattee's theory is hugely deficient. Interpretation of signs, or symbols, to decipher meaning, requires an agent which does the interpreting. The agent interprets through what is loosely represented in language and communication theory (Wittgenstein for example) as "rules", conventions, or something like that. Pattee provides no separation between the signs and the reader of the signs (interpreter), to allow for the separate existence of such "rules" of interpretation.

When I asked apokrisis about where the rules for interpretation of meaning might exist in Pattee's theory, the reply was that the rules for interpretation exist within the sign itself. What was implied is that the sign itself (code or whatever you want to call it) consists of all three elements, symbol, agent (interpreter), and rules for interpretation, such that the sign self-reads, and self-interprets.

Obviously, this is a false representation because it leaves no room for error, and error we see as paramount in the existence of evolution. "Error" is better understood here as subjectivity in interpretation. This is because "error" implies wrong, or incorrect, when we assume that there is a "normal way" which is supposed to be the correct way. And, the "normal way" is supported by statistics as the common way, but it is also generalized in order to produce those statistics, so as to ignore all sorts of differences (subjectivities) which don't make a difference to the purpose at hand . The idea that the common way or normal way is the "correct" way is produced by an illusion that the statistics produce an objective truth as to how the symbol ought to be interpreted. Therefore anything outside the statistical norm is seen as an "error" in interpretation.

Such error, what I would prefer to call "subjectivity", is made impossible by Pattee's representation which provides no separation between the sign and the rules for interpreting the sign. If the sign, and rules for interpreting the sign are one and the same thing, then it is impossible to stray from the rules in the act of interpreting the sign.

The capacities to realize, to fail, are ontologically absolute, and cannot possibly be overthrown. — quintillus

You set forward an absolutism of the future. This is very deterministic.

Even if rights could be absolute (an assumption which in itself requires justification), how would that be relevant to the human capacity to realize intended future states?

Do you really think Trump walked into the white house and took documents? — NOS4A2

Isn't that exactly what he did? If not, how would you describe what he did?

Well, If you cannot grasp the fact that the human capacity to realize an intended future state is not "absolute", then go ahead and keep your daydreaming mind occupied by your fantasy world. But don't try to do anything strenuous please, that might shatter your illusion.

My apologies Meta. For all I know, you understand Un's message better than I. — creativesoul

Apology accepted, but I'm still trying to understand, maybe not even as well as you do. Unenlightened seems to talk about a losing of the self, I prefer to think of the same thing as a finding of the true self. So the self which gets ditched in what they call enlightenment was not the true self in the first place, and this allows the true self to emerge. And while Unenlightened and I seem to agree pretty much, we still manage to use words in opposing ways. What Un calls "completion", I think of as a beginning.

According to Sartre human freedom is an absolute capacity to intend a particular future, although, circumstances can and will obviate the realization of the intended state. — quintillus

Do you accept that the human capacity to realize an intended future state, is not "absolute" as you claim Sartre affirms? If so, then you will see that "obviate" is not an appropriate word to use here in the description of how circumstances relate to the realization of the intended state.

In reality, the circumstances indicate to us the real restrictions which exist in relation to our "capacity to intend a particular future", making this capacity far less than absolute. In general, we recognize the circumstances as limiting the possibilities. Possibility, often known as "potential" is how we understand the future. So the conventional understanding is that the future is not "nothing", it is what may or may not be (as potential), and this violates the law of excluded middle. So the future has some sort of real existence, but it is a type of existence which violates this fundamental "law" of logic.

Human consciousness nihilates, i.e., makes a nothing which is a particular intended future state of affairs, which is unrealized; absent; not-yet; hence non-being/nothing. — quintillus

For the reason explained above, this is not an accurate representation. The "particular intended state of affairs" is understood by the human consciousness as a possible, or potential state. Potential is not nothing, it is categorically distinct from being and non-being (existent and non-existent) as that which cannot be described by those terms. Further, the human consciousness apprehends circumstances, (describable in terms of what is and is not), as having a bearing on, or being somehow related to future possibilities. This relationship is understood in terms of "necessity", what is "necessary". That is why, despite what Sartre says, human freedom is not commonly understood as "an absolute capacity", and this is a misrepresentation of how human consciousness actually apprehends its own freedom.

I think what I was trying to show is that Sartre and the "current worldwide existential ontological thought", might be a little of the mark in how future is represented. If the future was really nothing, then our freedom would be absolute. But our freedom is limited, as I explained above. The future exerts a real force on us, which would kill us if we did not act to prevent it from doing that. Therefore the future is not noting, and Sartre's existentialism seems to have a mistaken premise.

However, I would appreciate it if you could provide for me a coherent interpretation of Sartre's "double nihilism" so that I might better understand the concept.

in fact I think that this identification with the past is the necessary first step to a projection into the future. — unenlightened

Yes, I think that's the point, without that first step, which is to relate the past to the future, all those past stories are pointless. They are only meaningful with respect to the future.

There can only be any idea at all of the future as a projection from the past. — unenlightened

This is where we disagree. I would take the opposite position, claiming that we get an idea of the future prior to getting any memory of the past. Wants and desires are the product of a being looking forward in time, toward the future. These are a manifestation of an intrinsic respect for the future. And, it is only when it becomes evident that past experiences may assist in getting what is wanted, that memory is produced, and goes to work. So a child for example is born with wants, but no memory. This is the nature of being in time, when a being comes into existence it has a future but no past. So in reality we are born with an inherent view toward the future, existing as wants and desires, and then the story or narrative of the past is derived from this view toward the future, as a tool to help us deal with the future which we already have respect for. That is why intention has such a big influence over the shaping of a narrative.

It seems to me that you're completely missing the point.

It's the stories we tell ourselves about ourselves and the world around us that constitute the self. — creativesoul

I think you are missing the essence of the self. The self is nestled within intention, which is a view toward the future, getting what is wanted. This means that the defining feature of one's self is one's decision making capacity, the way that a person selects. Story telling is nothing but an amusement, though a person might use it to help get what is wanted sometimes.

It is not an "absolutism" concerning the future, but proof that the future is real and therefore not as you claim, "nothing".

You are positing an absolutism of the future, while, all the while, consciousness is always free and unbound, to imagine its next future...You have become so totally deterministic in your world view, via living in a totally jurisprudentially deterministic world, that you absolutely insist there must always be something Other out there which, cinesiologically, is in motion forcefully moving you... — quintillus

This is not me at all, and it demonstrates that you did not understand what I said.

I was thinking that if there is some truth in the madcap interpretation, it isn't madcap — Ludwig V

I don't think we should use "truth" here. I tried to distinguish subjective and objective features, but since the subjective was described (by me) as primary, I don't think there is a good place for that word.

No. Tools do have a general or standard use. — Ludwig V

This is a very problematic position to take. Any claim of such a "general or standard use" will miss out on a whole bunch of non-standard usage which is just as real as that contained by the general description. Making such a claim, is just a generalization intended to facilitate some argument. "The standard use of a hammer is to pound nails". That statement, although one might agree that it is "the standard" use, does not validate any rigorous sense of "the use of a hammer", in a general sense.

In other words, we have invalid inductive logic at play here. Generalizations are produced through inductive logic, and exceptions are evidence that the induction is invalid. So every example of an exception to the rule of "general or standard use" is proof that the generalization is composed of invalid logic. In the case of word usage, the proof is overwhelming. Therefore the problematic position you propose is not at all philosophically useful because the invalidity of the inductive reasoning is very strong.

That exactly my bother about the "intent" criterion and why I can't accept the definition of a speech act in terms of intention. Plus there's the objection that "meanings just ain't in the head" - who was it who coined that?. — Ludwig V

That the intent is sometimes simply not there, is no reason why we ought to look somewhere else to find "the true meaning". The lack of intent only reinforces the claim that the meaning is subjective. That we ought to look somewhere else for the true meaning is completely unwarranted. Such a procedure, to seek objective meaning when the meaning is subjective, can only produce can only produce false or fictitious meaning.

You ought not think of meaning as in the head. It's far easier to understand meaning as being in the writing itself, but put there by the author. So for example, when the writing is judged as unclear, vague, ambiguous, incoherent, or inconsistent, this is a judgement against the artistic capabilities of the author. However, some of these features may be placed intentionally into the work, by the author, and if the interpreter does not apprehend this it is actually the capabilities of the interpreter which are at fault. The writing itself is the object, and meaning is in the object, as a representation of the author's objectives. That the meaning is subjective implies that it is "of the subject" as in from the subject, not in the subject.

Aren't you just distinguishing two different types of narrative here? One is intended toward telling the truth, the other, the counterfactual, is fictional. Whether you think that you ought to have done the counterfactual is irrelevant, because you have no choice at this time, it is in the past. The true application of "ought" is when we look toward the future, where we have real choice as to what ought to be done.

So I think that this state of conflict you describe is artificial, contrived, because there is no need to consider alternatives for the past narrative, like you suggest, because we have no choice at this time. However, my statement needs to be qualified, because when the past situation is relatable a the future situation, then there is benefit to considering these options, so that you do not make the same mistake twice. But that opens up a whole different problem for personal "identity".

If we look at the past, as a narrative, a true narrative, of what cannot be changed, and we look toward the future as possibilities where we need to apply "ought", then how does one relate the two to each other? If we assume a combination of past narrative and future possibilities, as constitutive of the person's identity at the present, you can see that there is a huge hole here, as this is completely insufficient to make up what we assume as personal identity. In fact, the essence of the identity is missing here because what we see as a person's identity is "the way" that a person relates the past to the future. Each of us has a particular way of relating the past to the future, applying the "ought", and I think that this "way" proves to be just as unique to the individual as one's physical appearance.

This is a sort of philosophical dilemma. "Ought" is one of the most general principles, there ought to be an "ought" for every possible situation that a person finds oneself in, a correct course of action for that person. And moral philosophers often want to say that no matter who the person is, and no matter what the situation is, the applicable "ought" (the specific correct action) ought to be the same for everyone. But this can easily be seen to be a completely wrong-headed way of looking at things. To create this counterfactual scenario which places a different person in the exact same situation as another, would be to deny that the two people are actually different, thereby negating personal identity, and creating a fictitious inapplicable scenario.

So in reality, each person is unique, each situation that a person is in is unique, and each correct action, or "ought" which is applicable at that time, is also unique. This fact of the true narrative, is what turns moral philosophy on its head. We ought not look at "ought" as a general principle, but we must look at it as unique to each and every different person, who all have a unique "way" of relating the past to the future. This is the only way to apply "ought" to the true narrative. That each person's spatial-temporal location is unique, is proof, through application of the special theory of relativity, that one's relation of past to future (one's present) is also unique. Therefore one's "ought" is unique and particular to that individual. The idea that there is a general ought is a false ideal created from the fictional narrative which looks at distinct individuals as the same.

The absent future does not, cannot, force free consciousness to do anything, for it is free consciousness which prefigures, imagines, makes the not-yet that is its future existence. Time originates via this nihilative capacity to conceive the absent future, whereby, the present is transcended and made past...
Nothing, nothingness, as consciousness, is real. — quintillus

But imagine if a person does nothing, the person would die of starvation or something like that. This dying, which would occur, would be the person being forced into the past, by the future, as the future becomes the past in the passing of time.. So the person must do things of necessity, or else be forced into the past by the future Therefore the force of the future makes it necessary for the person to do things. Our inclination to do things is a reflection of the reality of the future.

Contrary to what you say, the future is not absent at all. It is here with us, all the time, continuously making it necessary (forcing us) to act. If there was no future imposing itself on us, we would have no anticipation, no anxiety, no desire to eat, or desire for anything whatsoever for that matter, therefore no inclination to act.

But one always stands outside the story as narrator to tell the story. One is absent from the story one tells, because the story is related, and even the closest relation is not oneself, in the same way that god is outside his creation. — unenlightened

This is where you lost me. I don't understand why the narrator must be outside the story. Isn't there such a thing as a first person narrative, in which the narrator is part of the story?

It appears maybe you are distinguishing between a person's real life experience, and the story one tells of it, the narrative being a story and the real life which the person is in, being something other than a story. Is that what you are saying here?

The actual, authentic, true mode of origination of human action is consciousness; which proceeds via the double nihilation, wherein consciousness, on the one hand, makes the nothing that is an imagined future state which it wants to be; and, on the other hand, makes the present state nothing by transcending that state toward the not yet existing future which it wants. — quintillus

Surely the future cannot be nothing in any absolute sense, because the future is what forces the human being to act. If a human being did not act, it would be crushed by the force of passing time, (the future becoming the past). Accordingly that human being would be forced into the past, by the future, annihilated. So the future must be something very real, therefore not nothing.

Perhaps we should lump all madcap interpretations into the same trash-heap. — Ludwig V

The point though is that I do not want to throw all madcap interpretations in the same trash-heap. As I said, the madman still expresses glimpses of insightful intelligence. And different madmen express different forms of insight. So their interpretations cannot all be classed together.

I don't quite understand your last sentence. If it means that all interpretations must be mutually reconcilable, that undermines the point of different interpretations - unless the reconciliation is simply the original text, which all interpretations have in common. — Ludwig V

That's right, they are all reconcilable through the original text, as "the object". But this implies that I affirm that there is nothing absolutely random which is added by the subject. If the subject added something which was absolutely random, it would be unintelligible through reference to the text, as completely unrelatable to it. So as much as we have free will and freedom to interpret however one pleases, I deny the possibility of an absolutely random act of interpretation. You can see how this makes sense, because such an act could not be related to "the object" and therefore could not be an interpretation.

My dream that I can jump/fly over tall buildings makes sense, but isn't plausible. — Ludwig V

Sorry, but without some more information, such as the apparatus you would use to propel yourself, this idea of you flying over tall buildings makes no sense to me at all. How does it make sense to you?

Well, as usual, you have a coherent position. Revealing the incoherence of a text on its own terms is a perfectly coherent project. But would you say that Locke anticipated modern physics, or that Berkeley anticipated modern relativity theory? — Ludwig V

No, I would not say that at all, I do not use "anticipate" like that. But some people seem to use the word in a way which implies that this would make sense to them. I do not understand such a use of "anticipate". One can "anticipate" a defined future event, in the sense of prediction, but this requires that the event be defined. Also, one can have "anticipation" in a most general sense, without any definition of the future event which is causing the anticipation. This is better known as a general anxiety, and it can be very debilitating in some situations, because it is an anxiety which cannot be dealt with, as having a source beyond the usual "deadline" as a source of the stress.

But to mix these two senses of "anticipate" into some equivocated mess is just a category mistake. That is to name some particular event which was in the future at the time, "modern physics", or "modern relativity theory", and say that the person anticipated the particular, in the general sense of "anticipate". That, to me is an equivocated mess of category mistake. It is incoherent and makes no sense, even though some people like to say things like this.

But can we always divine the intent of the author? — Ludwig V

No, we can never "divine the intent of the author". That's why all interpretations are fundamentally subjective rather than fundamentally objective. We strive toward the objective interpretation, if truth is our goal, but we cannot deny the reality of the context of the interpreter, which is primary to the interpretation. The context of the author is primary to the object (written material), but the context of the subject is primary to the interpreter. Primary context is reducible, and simplified by representing it as intent. So the context which is primary to the author is the author's intent, and the context which is primary to the interpreter is the interpreter's intent. Since the interpreter's intent is primary in the act of interpretation, it is impossible for the interpreter to actually put oneself in the author's shoes, and "divine the intent of the author". This can never be done.

But I accept that the intent of the author, so far as we can divine it, is always important in interpreting a text. The same applies to the context in which they are written. But if that's the only correct way to read them, I'm left puzzled by the fact that some texts remain relevant long after times have changed, and we continue to read and discuss them. Your approach seems to consign all historical texts to a museum. — Ludwig V

I'll say that the author's intent is the "ideal". It is what we seek in "meaning", as meaning is defined as what is "meant" by the author, and this is defined as the author's intention. The problem is that there is no such thing as "the author's intent". "Intent" is just a descriptive word which refers to some unknown, vague, generality, rather than a particular "object". We can formulate simple examples of an "object", as a goal, like Wittgenstein does with "slab" and "block", etc.. If my intent, object, or goal is for you to bring me a slab, I will say "slab", and this expression represents a very specific, even particular goal (object), if it is a particular slab that I want. But these are very simplistic examples, which lend themselves well to simple fiction writing where the goal of the author is to create an imaginary scenario in the reader's mind. That's a very simple goal or object, which is easily determined as the objective of the fiction writer.

But when we get to philosophy, the intent of the author is not exposed in this way. This is because the intent of the author of philosophy, the author's goal, or objective, is often actually unknown to the author. We can express it in general terms like the desire for truth, or knowledge, or an approach to the unknown. But notice that since it is just a general "unknown" which the author is describing, or directing us toward, there can be no particular object which is being described by that author, so the intent remains veiled. This is the subjectivity of the author.

Notice the two forms of subjectivity, author and interpreter, and how they establish a relationship between "the object" in one sense as the goal or intent, and "the object" in the other sense as the physical piece of writing. Subjectivity of the interpreter is the veiled, unknown intentions of the interpreter, which influence the interpretation regardless of efforts to remove them; the interpreter cannot proceed without personal intention, and this will always influence the interpretation as subjectivity. Subjectivity of the author, is the veiled unknown intentions of the author, which influence the author's writings regardless of efforts made by the author to know, understand, and be true to one's own intentions; their are unknown aspects of one's own intentions (motivating forces) which cannot be apprehended despite all efforts of introspection.

Fair enough. But the catch is "how to apply that same intent today". That means interpretation in a context the author(s) didn't know about. There's a narrow line there between divining the intent of the author and speculating. — Ludwig V

The issue, I believe is that it is all speculation. There is no science of "diving the intent of the author". So the art of interpreting can go in two very distinct directions. Remember what I said about the madcap interpretation, that parts are intelligible and insightful. We can consider the work of the author in the same general way, as parts. We can focus on distinct parts which seem to have very clear and distinct intention (meaning), and bring those forward in the interpretation, and have as the goal of interpretation a very "objective" interpretation. But this would ignore all the author's subjectivity. Or, we can focus on the aspects where the intent of the author is not clear at all, because the author was not truly aware of one's own intent. This allows the intent of the interpreter to represent the intent of the author in various different ways, and the goal here is a subjective interpretation. Then we have many options in between these two extremes.

There's a notion of objective meaning at work there which philosophy would find troublesome, but nonetheless, lawyers seem to be able to work with it, and if meaning is use, that validates the principle, at least in the context of the law. — Ludwig V

I don't see how "meaning is use" validates that principle. The word "use" implies a user, and the user of the words is the author. If meaning is use, then we must look for the intent of the author to see how the author was intending the words to be used. Words are tools, and tools have no general "use", as use is a feature of the particular instance where the tool is put toward a specific purpose.

That's true. I'm happy to accept that a madcap interpretation is an interpretation, but only in the sense that a broken watch is a watch. — Ludwig V

I wouldn't even accept this analogy. A broken watch does not do what it is supposed to do, keep time, a madcap interpretation does what it is supposed to do, provide an understanding of meaning. The madcap interpretation is just different, in the sense of being outside the norm, so to make the analogy good, the watch would not be broken, but giving you the wrong time. In theory there would be a way to "translate" the interpretation, like relativity translates different ways of keeping time, because as a translation it must be ordered in some way and not completely rendom.

You are quite right, of course. But fiction is a particular context. Even so, Aristotle says that a story must be plausible. I think that's too restrictive, yet there's something in it. — Ludwig V

That depends on what you mean by "plausible". If it makes sense, it's plausible isn't it? But writing goes far beyond that, as lyricists in music and poetry for example string together disassociated ideas, to make a strange story. When interpreting a piece of writing we tend to look for consistency, and adhere to consistency as a principle, while overlooking the fact that the author could very easily stray from consistency even intentionally. So in philosophy for example, if we read something, and we cannot find a way to make it plausible, there is just too much inconsistency or nonsense, then we simply reject the material as unacceptable.

But even in these cases of rejecting the whole because it is incoherent as a whole, certain parts of the writing may be very insightful and illuminating. So the writing is rejected as a whole, but certain parts are very intelligible. And this can be reflected in the "madcap" interpretation. The interpretation itself is an expression, a piece of writing, and it is incoherent as a whole, but certain parts may be very intelligible. This is because the madcap interpreter releases the need for coherency, and this is actually very important because coherency is context dependent. We learn in school to think in certain ways. So when a modern person interprets an ancient writing, the person's ideas of coherency must be dismissed prior to proceeding, because the ancient people lived in a different environment of coherency. So the ancient person could very well be writing in a way which would appear incoherent to us today. Then the interpreter who tried to put things in coherent terms would br doing a faulty interpretation.

Another example (legal in this case) based on ancient memories of "The West Wing". Suppose a country has a constitution written more than 200 years ago. There is a provision that each geographical division of the country should send to the legislative body an number of representatives proportionate to its population. It is taken for granted that women do not count. It is further provided that slaves shall count as a fraction of a person (say 2/5th). Fast forward to the present. It is clear, isn't it, that something must be done. No-one is a slave any more, so perhaps that provision can be simply ignored. The provision about women was so obvious that it is not even mentioned, so perhaps one could simply include women. But it would be safer to delete the slave clause and add a definition of "person". You might not count that as re-interpretation, but it surely demonstrates that it is sometimes necessary to take account of the contemporary context as well as the historical context. — Ludwig V

I don't think this is a good example. This is not a matter of re-interpretation, it is a matter of rewriting the rule to better reflect modern values. What you seem to be saying, is that the rule as written is not applicable today, because of societal changes, so it needs to be rewritten.

A better example probably is the ongoing discussion around the second amendment in the US constitution, the right to bear arms. A common subject for debate is the intent of that amendment, and how that intent ought to apply in the modern day. It might seem sort of irrelevant to focus on th ancient intent, because we could simply change the wording if needed, as you suggest. But this is exactly where the problem lies, we look to these ancient laws as "authority", and so we make sure that it's not easy to change them. Therefore instead of looking to change them it just becomes a question of the intent behind them, and how to apply that same intent today. Once the intent is established it can be applied to the modern society. But to allow the condition of the modern society to influence how one interprets the intent of the authors would be a mistaken (subjective, because one's personal position would influence the) interpretation. The objective interpretation would be to look solely for the authors' intent, and not allow one's own intent to influence the interpretation.

I was trying to say that not every madcap idea counts as an interpretation. There are limits. The text is flexible, but only up to a point. — Ludwig V

Why must there be such limits? A madcap interpretation is still an interpretation. On what bases can you argue that just because the interpretation is so radically different from your interpretation, and the norm, it is therefore not an interpretation. Suppose for example that a person hallucinates and sees a tree as a monster. That is the person's "interpretation". The thing we perceive as a tree is perceived as a monster. We can argue that the interpretation is wrong because it's not consistent with the norm, but we have no basis for the argument that it's not an interpretation.

The readers' environment is another one, and of course that may break down into a number of sub-contexts; it may overlap, to a greater or lesser extent with the author's environment. — Ludwig V

I do not agree that the reader's environment ought to be allowed to enter as a factor in the interpretation. One must attempt to completely place oneself into the author's position, the context of the writer, to properly interpret, and this means negating one's own place. Of course this is impossible, in actuality, hence subjectivity enters the interpretation, but it ought to be held in principle because if it is not, then subjectivity is allowed into the interpretation, as a valid (your meaning of valid here) aspect. So, the reader's position, or environment is not a valid consideration in interpretation. For example, when interpreting your post, I would not assume that you must be using "valid" in the way that I would want you to, and insist that my interpretation is correct when I impose my understanding of " valid" on your writing, in my interpretation of your writing. For these reason's I would say that when interpreting the true meaning of an author's work, one's own environment must not be allowed to be a contributing factor. Incidentally, this is very evident in fiction, one must allow the author to describe the environment, and the reader must allow oneself to be transported to that environment, leaving one's own. In school we start by learning fiction, and it's good practice.

This is relevant because when the text is read in a different context different questions, issues, priorities may come up and lead to a need for interpretations that go way beyond anything the author could have meant or thought. But still, it is not the case that anything goes. — Ludwig V

This is the matter of subjectivity. it cannot be avoided. And this is simply the nature of language, interpretation is subjective. Further, there are two subjects, the writer and the reader, so subjectivity enters from both sides. Just like the reader must put oneself in the author's context to properly understand, the author must put oneself into the reader's context to be properly understood. Now, writing is not a one on one form of communication, but the author intends to be read by many, so the author's task is much more difficult.

Yes. But I don't think that anything goes. "Valid" is the word I think of as correct. — Ludwig V

I think you have this backward. Validity is logic based, and relies on interpretation. Definition is essential to validity, as the fallacy of equivocation demonstrates. So interpretation is prior to logical proceeding, as prerequisite and necessary for it. Therefore interpretation cannot be judged in terms of valid and not valid, which are standards of logic, it must be judged by some other standards.

Validity depends on context. By asking different questions, one sets a context. — Ludwig V

Based on what I said above, I think this is incorrect. Logic is designed to be context independent, that's the beauty of it. Definitions and such release it from the confines of context, and this is what gives it such a wide ranging applicability. Context serves to ground any premises which are not clearly defined. And of course, since we cannot have an infinite regress of words defining words, there will always be an appeal to context, ultimately, for complete understanding. But this has to do with the soundness of the logic, not the validity. So soundness may depend on context, but validity does not.

I would propose a distinction between two forms of context, primary and secondary context. "Context" in the primary sense refers to the mind of the author, what the author was thinking about. "Context" in the secondary sense refers to the author's surroundings, one's environment. We mut be careful not to conflate or confuse these two because this would leave us susceptible to deception. In general, we have access to the author's environmental conditions, to a large extent, through our sensory capacities, and we assume to an extent that the author's mind reflects one's environment to an extent. But this is really a mistaken assumption, because the author's writing is an expression derived from one's intention, which is not necessarily a reflection of that person's environment. Therefore it is necessary to establish the author's mind, with its intention, as primary context, and allow that there is no necessary relation between this and the secondary context, the author's environment.

It is as you say, a matter of human nature. We, as beings, are inclined to act, so it is in our nature to act. But the rule of government has two possible directions to take, either to encourage us to act, or to discourage us from acting. The latter is to go against human nature. But by enacting all sorts of boundaries, and threatening punishment to anyone who strays outside the boundaries, the government takes that direction of discouraging action. Instead, it ought to focus on defining what constitutes good in humane acts, and doing whatever it can to encourage such acts.

I am suggesting that we begin replacement by first uplifting the honor, honesty, and dignity of our legislators, judges, prosecutors and police, via assisting them to become reflectively free, and, thus, to lead them upward unto understanding the true structure of the origination of human action; which act-origination has nothing to do with law.
I have not fully envisioned a future. I expect that other intelligences, upon becoming reflectively free, may have some dynamite thoughts regarding future sociospheric possibilities. — quintillus

This is why "rule" works better by giving people guidance as to how to behave well, rather than telling them what not to do, and punishing them when they still do it. And so, The New Testament's "Love thy neighbour" (as positive direction) marks a vast improvement in the understanding of human nature, and human action in comparison to The Old Testament's "Ten Commandments" (as negative direction).

Hmm, are these two synonymous, in the sense of exchangeable with each other in usage, "faith" and "confidence"? Or, does one have a broader range of usage than the other? I would say that "confidence" is often directed towards oneself, internally, as an attitude toward one's own actions, while "faith" is most often directed outward, as an attitude towards what is external to oneself.

If that is the case, then how is it that the health of "the economy", which is an attribute of the community as a whole, can be dependent on an attitude which the individual has toward oneself? There is something missing here, a hidden premise or something like that, which links the attitude which the individual has toward oneself (confidence or lack of confidence) to the wealth of the community as a whole. "Confidence" is just as easily directed in competitive directions as it is directed in cooperative directions, so it could be destructive to the community. So it cannot be confidence alone which supports the economy, there is a missing ingredient. Therefore it's not only a loss of confidence which could make the economy go to hell, but confidence maintained, along with the other ingredient missing, will also make the economy go to hell.

What was at stake was whether a text could have meanings that were not intended, despite the writer having different, even incompatible, intentions - or rather, whether it is legitimate to attribute to the text meanings that the author did not intend. — Ludwig V

Intentional ambiguity is a common tool. In this case, what is intended is ambiguity, meaning that the author intends that multiple readers will produce a multitude of distinct interpretations, each interpretation suited to one's own purpose. It is useful because it allows the author to appeal to a wider audience. The various interpretations from the work may very well be incompatible with each other, but this does not mean that they are incompatible with what the author intended. The author intends that no particular meaning is the correct meaning, so it is only the attitude that my interpretation is the correct interpretation, or more precisely the belief that there is a correct interpretation, which is the incorrect interpretation.

But are you really telling me you didn't know what you intended to write, that you just had some kind of vagae association, when you were writing it? — Vera Mont

The vague generality of intention, along with the uncertainties associated with the media, combined, produce the great mysteries of art.

There is an experimental procedure which the artist can do, which demonstrates very clearly that what is produced is not necessarily what was intended. One can approach the canvas with no intent of painting anything in specific, and just start applying colours to it. There is of course, some degree of intent involved, but that is minimized to the point of allowing the nature of the medium (paint and canvas in this case, but it could be another form of art like music or rhyming) to dictate the outcome. This experiment demonstrates very clearly that it is possible for an author to not know what one intends to write, when it is written.

The unintentional results of an intentional act are known as accidents. In the artistic world accidents are very important, and have great significance because they teach us about the unknown aspects, the mysteries, of the medium. So in the specific artform you are discussing, the medium is a form of communication, writing. There are many unknown aspects, and much mystery inhering within this medium, and this allows great possibility for accidents. And since writing is a form of communication and communication gets granted a high degree of significance, in general, this allows the accidents to have great importance.

Your premise is wrong. — apokrisis

Which premise would that be? Do you disagree that organisms are generated, that they come into being, and they have a beginning?

Did you read the rest of my post, and get to the "specific problem" with your "desire" theory, or did you just get stuck on the irrelevant, if not arbitrary, distinction between evolution and development.

Evolution is one thing. Development is the other. Salthe covers this nicely. — apokrisis

That you think a distinction between evolution and development would solve the problem indicates that you haven't recognized the problem. To begin with, to evolve is what life does, it is essential to our nature. So if your theory of "desire" as a directing force within the microphysical aspects of living organisms, explains the reality of development, but cannot account for the reality of evolution, then it falls short of being an hypothesis which is consistent with the evidence.

But the specific problem I was trying to bring to your attention is the issue of generation, the coming-to-be of living organisms. Consider the nature of reproduction if you will. When the seed, or embryo, is being developed, it is a part of the parent, so according to your hypothesis, it is being directed by the desire of the whole, which is the parent. We could say that this is the desire to produce another similar organism, and this desire drives the mechanisms which produce the seed.

After the seed is separated from the parent and begins to grow on its own, as a separate individual, it is a distinct whole, yet it is still directed by the very same desire, the desire to produce a similar organism (similar to the parent). Now this desire, the desire to produce a similar organism, which directs the parts in their various activities clearly pre-exists the existence of the individual itself, this distinct whole, which is the growing seed.

This is the nature of all forms of reproduction. The desire which directs the parts (if we are going to explain their activity in this way) always pre-exists the individual whole which is composed of those parts. The "desire" comes from the prior organism and is imparted to the new organism in the act of reproduction. That it is the same "desire" is evident from the fact that the very same type of organism as the parent is produced, and that same "desire" is responsible for the organism coming into existence as the specific type of organism which it is. Therefore we can conclude that this "desire" which you talk about must always pre-exist the organism itself (the organism being the whole), because it is the reason why the organism exists as the whole which it is, an organism. Do you comprehend the logic, and agree with this principle, that the "desire" you refer to must pre-exist the whole, as the cause of the whole being the type of thing which it is?.

Nope. Only reductionists think that way. — apokrisis

It's scientific knowledge, often referred to as "fact", commonly known as evolution. Complex organized structures have evolved from less complex microscopic structures. Therefore it is well known that the complex organized structure is posterior in time to the microscopic organized structure, and so cannot be the cause of the organization which exists within the microscopic organized structure. You can call science "reductionist thinking", in a derogatory way if you like, but that in no way proves the scientific knowledge (knowledge derived from empirical evidence) to be wrong, it's just a type of ad hom. .