Then as an example, free will (according to the libertarian) is incompatible with both determinism and quantum indeterminacy. — Michael

OK, this would be acceptable. but this leads to a further problem in defining "libertarian free will". You now have two conditions stated here: #1 incompatible with determinism, #2 incompatible with quantum indeterminacy.

I believe that free will is incompatible with determinism, which is consistent with condition #1. I also believe that free will is compatible with quantum indeterminacy and this is inconsistent with condition #2. So now we have two conceptions of "free will" which are both incompatible with determinism. I always thought that my conception of "free will" is compatible with so-called "libertarian free-will", but according to your stated conditions, it is not.

Are you able to help me to expose the difference between these two conceptions of "free will" which are both incompatible with determinism? Can you explain to me what are the features of the libertarian conception which make it incompatible with quantum indeterminacy, and in exchange I will explain why my conception avoids this incompatibility?

Free will requires that there is some third mechanism (e.g. agent-causation) for action, and the libertarian's task is to make sense of such a thing and show that such a thing is possible. — Michael

Agent causation is not a problem for my conception of free will, and it ought not be sufficient to impose condition #2 on the libertarian conception, but maybe you can demonstrate otherwise. The "agent" involved is an immaterial act, as described by classical dualist metaphysics, and commonly known as the soul.

Material existence occurs at the present as time is passing. It is what "is", implying "now" which is commonly known as the present. The immaterial cause is always prior to, i.e. in the future of the present "now", so it is never observable to us. It is known only by its effects which manifest at the present. As time passes, the immaterial cause may act as "agent" to influence what unfolds as observable material existence, at the present.

For further explanation, consider this. The principles of quantum physics apprehend a shortest possible period of time, which is represented as the Planck length. Now suppose two material, or physical states which are supposed to be separated by a Planck length duration of time. These are the describable situation at T1, and the situation at T2. These two situations are not the same, so something must happen in that short duration of time to "cause" a difference between the the situations.. But whatever happens in that time between T1 and T2, it cannot be referred to as a material, or physical occurrence, because it occurs during a period of time which the principles of quantum physics dictate that a material or physical change is impossible. Therefore, the change which happens between T1 and T2 is an immaterial, or nonphysical change. This is where the immaterial, or nonphysical "soul" may be active, as an agent, and influence what becomes at T2, from what was at T1.

I described the immaterial soul s acting "in the future of the present moment" because we measure time as it passes, so all measured time is in the past. Therefore, as we attempt in our experimental endeavours to produce a shorter and shorter period of time, what we are really doing is reducing the amount of past time, within the measured duration, to get a more and more accurate pinpoint positioning on "the present moment". The pinpoint positioning appears to be impossible, hence the limitation of the Planck length, and so the Planck length substitutes for the pinpoint position of the present, as "the infinitesimal". However, there is necessarily change which occurs during this time period (the infinitesimal) which serves by substitution as "the present moment", as demonstrated logically above. This is the change which occurs between T1 and T2, as these are different situations. This activity must be apprehended as occurring prior to the present, outside (as prior to) the boundaries of "measured time", which is past time. So any agent which acts to cause change within this infinitesimal time period, must be acting in the future of the present moment.

For me change is a property of potential. — Benj96

Not true from my personal perspective/rationalisation. The changing thing is changing. The constant it abides by in doing so - change - is permanent in its phenomenonology.

In this case your statement would be a conflation of the actor (change) with the acted upon (the changed) - they are a dichotomy. — Benj96

You are making a category mistake. You state that change is a property. but then you make change the thing, the actor. At one point change is the predicate (property), and at another time it is the subject (actor). That's equivocation. Then what you say afterward is incoherent to me because of this equivocation.

I hope i am articulating the concept well. Forgive me if it isn't unclear I'm happy to further elaborate if need be. It's a tricky subject one I've been thinking about for years now — Benj96

You'll have to clear up that issue, stated above, before we can proceed any further toward a mutual understanding.

It might be that free will is impossible if either determinism or some other X is true. — Michael

This is a misleading statement, because if it "might be", means it is still possible. So "it might be impossible" means that it is possible. To say that it is "impossible" rather than that it is possible that it is impossible, would require another demonstration to show the required necessity. if determinism is shown to be necessarily false, how would you proceed with that demonstration, when the only other premise we have is that determinism is inconsistent with free will? Since these are the only two premises, the appropriate conclusion is that free will is possible.

A demonstration that determinism is false isn’t a demonstration that this other X is false, and so not a demonstration that free will is possible. — Michael

We have two premises. One is that determinism and free will are incompatible, the other is that determinism is false. From these two we conclude that free will is possible. There is no "other X", so your premise concerning "other x" is irrelevant. If there is something else, "other x", which forces the necessity that free will is impossible, this would be a completely different argument. And until that "other X" is identified and shown logically to make free will impossible, the conclusion from the other two premises, that free will is possible, stands. From the premises stated we can conclude that free will is possible, and "other X' has not been shown to be relevant.

It is not sufficient that determinism be false for free will to be possible according to libertarians. — Pierre-Normand

Why not? I think that if free will is inconsistent with determinism, then the demonstration that determinism is false is exactly what is required to demonstrate that free will is possible. A and B cannot both be true. A is false therefore B is possible. I know that this does not necessitate free will, but you're talking about the possibility of free will here. The problem is that free will is fundamentally inconsistent with necessity. So free will can only be accurately related to possibility, not necessity. it would be self-contradictory to say that free will is necessary.

Imagine, someone says "prove to me that libertarian free will is a reality". Then you attempt to make an argument which would produce the necessary conclusion. That would mean that the person that you are presenting the demonstration to would have no choice but to accept the conclusion of the reality of free will. But that instance of having no choice would be impossible if free will is the reality. Therefore, when an anti-free-willie asks a free-willie to prove the reality of free will, it's a loaded question, because if free will is the reality this is fundamentally impossible. Sure, the air is cold and thin at the top of the mountain, but enjoy the view, there is no reason to come down until some kind of need makes the decision to descend "necessary", as the means to the end.

Ok, let's suppose Hume is wrong. Then try to solve the following problem: A billiard ball rolls toward a second billiard ball. Try to figure out (before they meet) what will happen when the two balls meet and state what method you used to do it.

By what reasoning do you find out whether the balls will attract each other, whether they will bounce off each other and in what direction, whether they will penetrate each other, or disintegrate, or explode, or ... or ...? — Jacques

If I'd never played pool before, I could read some books, and learn how the balls ought to behave through geometrical principles, and physics, then apply deductive reasoning to say that the balls on my table will move that way. Those principles I would study would have been developed from inductive reasoning. Or someone could tell me these principles. If I've played pool before, and learned from experience rather than being taught principles, I'd use inductive reasoning more directly.

Broadly, we may say that the doctrine of determinism entails that all the facts about the past together with the laws of nature uniquely determine the future. — Pierre-Normand

It doesn't but quantum indeterminacies often are seen to provide no help to libertarians. — Pierre-Normand

I don't see any consistency between these two statements. If, following the laws of nature is a requirement for determinism, and "stochastic" refers to actions describable by probability rather than law, then it would definitely be true that the stochasticity of quantum indeterminacies supports the rejection of determinism.

And his thesis is that one cannot derive an effect from a cause by thinking alone. This is only possible by observation. — Jacques

Well sure one cannot derive causation from thinking alone. That would be rather nonsensical because something has to stand in, within the thinking, as the cause and as the effect. That is known as the content of thought, and most of the content is derived from observation.

But that is not the issue here. The issue is whether the concept is derived from thinking, (better stated as "reasoning") or some other living process like a simple propensity to associate one thing (the cause) with another thing (the effect). Hume's claim is that our capacity to predict, through the use of the concept of causation, i.e. to say that a certain outcome (effect) would be necessitated by a certain action (cause), is not based in reason, but in some sort of propensity toward seeing things in this way.

The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it. Motion in the second billiard-ball is a quite distinct event from motion in the first; nor is there anything in the one to suggest the smallest hint of the other. — Graciela De Pierris, Michael Friedman

This is the heart of Hume's mistake. He misunderstands how we sense and observe things. We actually observe things as continuous in time, not as distinct events. there are no natural divisions observed between events or motions, as motion is observed as continuous. It is the mind which separates, or individuates distinct events, or distinct motions, within the flow of time. So we observe a multitude of billiard balls rolling and bouncing off each other as one event. This is very evident with the opening shot which breaks the pack, and the balls are rapidly moving around bouncing off each other. It is the mind which separates the action of one ball from the action of another ball, and the mind numbers these individuated events as motion #1, and motion #2, in a temporal order, assigning cause to the motion of one, and effect to the motions of the other.

This is evident in all such activities which are divided in this way to assign cause to the earlier part of the event, and effect to the later part. For example, a rock flying through the air hits the window and the glass breaks. That is sensed as one continuous event. But the mind of the observer separates the flying rock, as cause, and the breaking glass as effect.

So Hume's thesis is incorrect, by starting from a false premise. He assumes that we must somehow associate cause with effect, and so inquires as to the means by which we establish a relation between these two. in reality though, the temporal process which constitutes cause and effect is perceived by us as continuous, without natural divisions, and we separate cause from effect. So the proper inquiry should have been to inquiry how the mind separates cause from effect, rather than how we relate cause to effect..

What Hume meant to say is this: when you observe an unknown process for the first time in your life, say the encounter between two unknown creatures from the deep sea, you cannot predict by any reasoning what will happen. The only way to find out is to observe what happens. — Jacques

And that's relevant?

Consider this. The fact that reasoning cannot provide us with an absolutely perfect and omniscient capacity of prediction, does not imply that our capacity of prediction is not based in reason. That conclusion would require the premise that reasoning provides us with absolutely perfect and omniscient knowledge.

This is why the Stanford article you quoted says about Hume's argument, "what he calls 'reasoning'''. Hume consistently mischaracterized, poorly described, or incorrectly defined (if we can call descriptions definitions), the capacities of human beings.

I have no doubt that some kinds of animals have a capacity to reason, and I don't believe that reasoning is necessarily carried out, even by humans, in the form of "explicit thoughts". — Janus

I tend toward believing that many animals perform some sort of processes which are very similar to "reasoning", if not actually reasoning. The issue here is in how one would define "reasoning". If we limit "reasoning" only to those formal processes like deduction and mathematics, which produce a high degree of certainty, in the way that Hume wanted, then I think we decisively exclude the mental processes employed by other animals from the category of "reasoning". I don't know Hume well enough to say this for certain, but this may have been his intention, to produce a clear separation between the mental capacities of human beings, and the mental capacities of other creatures.

I like to think of "reasoning" as being defined by the use of symbols in the thinking process. And, there are formal ways of using symbols in thinking, being defined by convention, and also informal ways of using symbols in thinking, and these could be called private ways. We need to allow for the reality of private ways of thinking, in order to account for creativity; the reality of growth and expansion, evolution in the thinking process. Private ways may be taught, and adapted by others, becoming new conventional ways.

If, as I propose above, we use the use of symbols as the defining feature of reasoning, we might in some sense exclude other animals from the category of "reasoning", but this depends on how one would define "symbol", and exactly what type of mental images other types of creatures employ. In many ways, an aural or visual imagine can qualify as a "symbol", so the exclusion of other animals is not so simple.

This problem of definition is very common when analyzing the capacities of living creatures, and it is the principal reason why deductive reasoning does not provide us with the high degree of certainty which many people believe it does. The results of deduction are only as sound as the premises employed, and definitions constitute a large part of the premises. Each definition creates a sort of internal boundary as to what is essential, necessarily inhering within, the defined term. And this is known as logical priority. So, in the example above, I define "using symbols" as necessarily inhering within "reasoning", such that using symbols is an essential aspect of reasoning, and therefore logically prior to reasoning. Then "using symbols" is the broader category and may include other activities which are not properly "reasoning".

The problem is that the thing which inheres within, that which is "logically prior", as essential to the defined thing, is always the broader and less well-known category, therefore receiving a less clear and concise definition. So the effort to produce certainty in our deductive reasoning requires that we go further and further inward in our quest to understand and define the prerequisite terms employed, and as we proceed in this way, the terms are less and less well defined, decreasing the desired certainty accordingly. And since this is how defining works, uncertainty inheres within conception.

That is the principal reason why "systems theory" is not at all suited for the understanding of "living systems". Systems theory relies on the use of boundaries, and the boundaries define the external limits of the proposed system. But a living system is defined as "open" and this implies that the boundary is not a true boundary. The reason why the boundary is not a true boundary is because it does not provide a good definitional base for distinguishing the status of some things as to 'part of the system' or 'not part of the system'. And the issue, or deficiency, is that the model puts the boundary around the outside of the system, while the true opening, or weakness (which is really a weakness of definition) is to the inside of the system. Therefore the opening in the boundary of an "open system", a living system, ought to be represented as on the inside.

Let me make an analogy. Let's suppose a model of thinking which is a neurological representation, is presented as a system. As wayfarer states above, this "brain-mind identity theory" is defective. The neurological system model puts a boundary on the system which is an external limit to the system. Things which have a causal effect on the system as a whole, which cause change to the system, must come from outside the system and pass through the external boundary in order to be apprehended as having an effect. However, as I demonstrated above, the mental process of thinking and reasoning employs symbols with defining boundaries to the inside. In this process, the weakness of the whole, the location where things are not clearly defined and therefore may be either part of, or not part of, the whole, thereby having causal influence on the whole, is to the inside of the whole, not the outside. Systems theory, since it is based in empirical observations from the outside of the system provides no means for apprehending the cause of changes which pass through the principal weakness of the whole, the internal opening.

If two or more parties agree by experience that it is currently hot then that is truth.

How do you get conspiracy out of that? — invicta

What if what these two agree to, is contrary to what everyone else is claiming? For example, if two parties conclude by their own experience that the earth is flat, or that the sun revolves around the earth, while most other people are telling them otherwise, does that make it true? Sounds like the beginnings of a conspiracy theory to me, because then those two would have to explain why everyone else is conspiring against them.

Finally I understand that you are not criticizing my interpretation of Hume, but Hume himself. I am so relieved because I am sure he does not need my help. — Jacques

I'm criticizing both, your interpretation, and Hume himself. Your interpretation is bad because you interpret Hume's argument to be demonstrating that the conception of causation is not based in reason, when he clearly shows that it is based in reason. The reason for your bad interpretation though, is that Hume's argument is incoherent, so you can blame Hume if you will. Notice that the quote from Stanford which you provided says that Hume concludes that the relation between cause and effect has "no foundation in what he calls 'reasoning'". The authors at Stanford notice that Hume is working with an unconventional idea of "reasoning".

You do not seem to have noticed this, and that's why I am criticizing your interpretation. What you're not noticing is that Hume describes this relation between cause and effect as being based in reason, when "reason" is understood in the conventional way. But, he proposes that we restrict our use of "reason" according to a private definition which he is outlining, so that the type of reasoning by which we commonly relate cause to effect, does not qualify as "reasoning" under this private definition. The issue here is that faulty or invalid reasoning is still reasoning.

The further point I made, is that by Hume's own argument, his conclusions concerning the relation between cause and effect cannot be "reasoned" conclusions, so his conclusions are fundamentally unjustified. Therefore Hume undermines his own argument, so his argument is self-defeating. The same premises by which he argues that the concept of causation is not derived from reason, ensure that his own conclusion is not derived from reason. That you do not apprehend this is a further indication that your interpretation is poor.

And as the truthfulness of such a statement depends on mutual agreement between two or more subjects then it’s no longer subjective (context dependent) but objective (context independent) for certain statements only which are subject to change such as current heat level. — invicta

Hmm, agreement between two or more subjects produces truth and objectivity? That sounds like a conspiracy theory to me.

Hume concludes that this inference [from cause to effect] has no foundation in the understanding - that is no foundation in what he calls 'reasoning'. — Graciela De Pierris, Michael Friedman

I explained quite clearly already, why such a conclusion is self-defeating. Notice that even this statement is self-contradicting. The word "inference" implies reasoning. An inference is what is derived from reasoning. So if a supposed "inference" has no foundation in reasoning, it cannot be called an "inference" because that would be contradictory. Yet it is called an "inference", because it is recognized that it actually is founded in reason, and Hume's attempt to portray it as not founded in reason is just incoherent hypocrisy.

Hume attempts to limit the meaning of "reasoning" to exclude inductive reasoning from the category of "reasoning", because of the deficiencies found to inhere within this form of reasoning. However, that leaves Hume's own conclusion, that the relation between cause and effect is not founded in reason, as itself not founded in reason. Therefore unjustified. That's why Hume's conclusion is self-defeating.

I do not find that it is an inductive inference, because it is not an inference from particular cases to the general case. It is more likely to be a case of analytical reasoning. — Jacques

An inference from the particular to the general is exactly what the quoted conclusion is. Look:

"The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination.

Hume gives many examples of particular instances of why the mind cannot find the effect to be implied by the cause. These examples of particulars are supposed to be representative of what observations of the "most accurate scrutiny and examination" could provide for us. Then he states the general (inductive) conclusion "the mind can never possibly find...".

Analytical reasoning involves judgements concerning relationships of meaning. Hume could not produce that conclusion of impossibility, "the mind can never possibly..." through analytical reasoning because there is no premise or axiom to support that inference of impossibility, only Hume's observations of what the mind can and can't do. Then the general principle "the mind can never possibly...", is produced; clearly inductive reasoning.

Hence it is sentences that are "context driven"; not truth. — Banno

What could this possibly mean? Are use suggesting that context "drives" the sentence like a person would "drive" a car, a team of horses, or a herd of cattle? What exactly is context doing here which qualifies your use of "driven", to say that the sentence is driven by context?

it seems to me, that it would be more appropriate to propose that it is what the sentence says (it's meaning) which is true or false, and this, "meaning", is dependent on the context. Doesn't that make more sense to you?

(Note that Plaque Flag is taking one of his regular breaks from Forum participation.) — Wayfarer

We ought to take that time to get this thread back on track.

The hiddenness of nothing is what allows movement and interaction. Thus the more one fills the emptiness of awareness with the images of self, the less emptiness remains for the world to unfold itself in.

We join spokes together in a wheel,
but it is the center hole
that makes the wagon move.

We shape clay into a pot,
but it is the emptiness inside
that holds whatever we want.

We hammer wood for a house,
but it is the inner space
that makes it livable.

We work with being,
but non-being is what we use.
— Lao Tzu — unenlightened

I like this proposal, there is something which is hidden, and that is what we call "nothing". This place where nothing is real, and possibilities for movement and interaction emerge from, is the future. Possibilities are "what we use", and they are derived from the nothingness which has reality as the future.

So "possibility", sometimes called "potential", is how we view the medium between the emptiness of the future, and the fulfillment of the past. Respect for this medium provides us with the capacity for "use". But if, in the imaginary world within our minds, we allow the nothingness of the future to become filled by self-confidence, or if we allow that nothingness to seep into the fulfillment of the past, as is the case with regret, then confusion reigns in this imaginary world.

The issue here is that animals also seem to have inductive expectations. So maybe what we think of as inductive reasoning consists in rationalising our instinctive expectations. — Janus

I remember once, you described to me what you thought qualified as inductive reasoning carried out by other animals, and it did not appear to be anything like the way that I understand "inductive reasoning". And I think it's clear that this would not qualify as a concept of causation, like Hume was talking about. I do not think that things like Pavlov's conditioning qualify as analogous with the predictive capacity of the human concept of causation. I mean, there may be some underlying base capacity which is common to both, but the latter qualifies as prediction based on inductive reasoning, while salivating at the sound of a bell does not, it is just a basic form of association.

Another line of thought is that the idea of causation derives from our direct experience of ourselves as both causal agents and as being subjected to the effects of other things like the sun, wind and rain and so on. I can push, pull, cut and smash things and in doing so feel the force I am exerting. — Janus

I agree with this to an extent, and it is why, as I explained already, the concept of "necessity" which we associate with causation is based in "necessary" in the sense of what is needed, as the means to an end. This is why it is misdirected to attempt to ground the "necessity" of the relation between cause and effect, in some sort of logical necessity which is supposed to be grounded in certainty. Instead, logical necessity, which is supposed to produce certainty is grounded in "necessary' in the sense of the means to an end. So the "necessity" which we assume for the sake of logical proceeding is the means (as necessary for) the end which is understanding, or knowing. Therefore "logical necessity" is grounded in "necessary" in the sense of what is needed for an end, hence the archaic phrase for logical necessity "must needs be", as signifying "necessary for".

...but I am not imagining that animals actually have such explicit thoughts.

Without the explicit thoughts, we cannot classify this as "inductive reasoning". So, we must look for some other form of process similar to rational thinking, but not rational thinking, which rational thinking may be based in, as a manifestation or growth from this process, but is completely different from rational thinking, as we think of cause as being distinct from effect.

I agree, but I don't think inductive reasoning involves any deductive certainty, or necessity. — Janus

That's right, but inductive reasoning is still a form of reasoning, so we cannot deny, as Jacques does, that causation is based in reason. We just have to respect the fact that this type of reasoning, which currently provides us with our understanding of causation, cannot provide that high degree of certainty which deductive reasoning does.

However, the problem which arises, which Jacques exposes with the skillfully selected quote above, is that Hume makes an inductive conclusion about causation which expresses the exact form of certainty which he insists that inductive reasoning cannot provide, i.e. "the mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause".

It is this faulty conclusion of Hume's which leads us toward the the equally faulty assumption that there is no such necessary relation between cause and effect, rather than the more appropriate conclusion that the human mind's application of induction, does not provide the capacity required, to properly understand the necessary relation between cause and effect. In other words, it is the deficiencies of inductive reasoning which make it so that we cannot find necessity here, as is the case with inductive reasoning in general. But this does not mean that necessity is not there hidden within the concept of causation, such that we can conclude with certainty, as Hume does, that the mind can never possibly find that necessity.

I am sorry to say that I cannot see any connection between Hume's thesis on causality and your post. — Jacques

Yes, it has become very evident that your understanding of Hume is quite sorrowful.

I mean you provided the clinching quote from Hume himself, and you still don't understand the predicament which Hume put himself into.

The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination — David Hume An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

If that is not an inductive conclusion which asserts the exact form of certainty, (with "never possibly find..."), which Hume insists that inductive conclusions cannot provide, then how do you explain it?

Another thing to recognize here is the difference between "custom" and "habit". What I explained in the other post is that we can take actions which are directly contrary to custom. Such an action was represented as "pretense". It is the fact that such acts are contrary to custom which makes the various forms of deception and misleading possible. In the case of intentional misleading or deceiving there is a conscious effort to be contrary to what is customary. This is what is required for that type of action to be successful.

These acts which are contrary to custom may even become habitualized, so that we have instances of habitual liars for example. That some habits may be according to custom, and some might be contrary to custom indicates that "habit" is the wider category, and that "custom" in its relation to "habit" only refers to a specific type of habits.

This means that we cannot understand habits by referring to custom, but we can get some understanding of customs by referring to habit. Therefore we must proceed to principles completely independent from custom if we want to understand habits, and this would be necessary if we want to understand customs in their relation to habit.

Inductive reasoning is really just custom and habitual expectation at work according to Hume. — Janus

Yes, and this is why Jacques' claim is a strawman representation of "Hume's argument" when he describes Hume's view of causality as "based neither on logical necessity nor on inductive and deductive reasoning, but on custom or habit". Hume's view is that causation is based in inductive reasoning.

Hume actually supports what I described, that all forms of causality are reducible to forms of necessity by reason. Hume then goes even further in the analysis (or reduction), to represent reason as habits of thinking which are formed through custom.

But instead of going further in this analysis, to describe "habit" in the Aristotelian terms of potential and actual, as was customary in prior philosophies, Hume suggests, as indicated by Jacques' quoted passage ("By employing that word, we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity."), that there is no further to go in such an analysis. See, Hume is claiming that the idea that we can proceed further in the reduction, toward an understanding of things like "habit" and "custom" through application of the Aristotelian ontological structure, is just a pretense. This I would call a sort of intellectual laziness.

I believe this is representative of a very important bifurcation in the understanding of biology, which was developing at that time. Lamarckian evolutionary theory placed great importance on "habit" as formative, i.e. having a causal role in the process of evolution. And Lamarck's evolutionary theory became widely accepted in the east of Europe, being well-suited to Marxist materialism. The idealism, and scientism of the west however, had no place for this idea, that the activities of the living organism could actually be causal in shaping the form of the material body.

So we, in the west, became immersed in the custom of thinking that the cause of change in evolution was random chance mutations. This custom, the idea of "chance" as a cause, remains paramount in the concept of abiogenesis, though mainstream biology is now moving more and more toward removing chance as the reason (cause) for the genetic mutations deemed necessary for evolutionary change. In general, when "chance" is stated as a cause, it is just a stop-gap (God of the gaps), which serves as a placeholder until a better understanding is developed. Those who adhere to this idea of 'chance as a cause', refusing to acknowledge that it is just the stop-gap that it is, resist and deny the need to look further for the true cause, and this incapacitates the philosophical will to know. This is very evident in the concept of "spontaneous generation" which was widely accepted by the unphilosophical right up until the nineteenth century and the work of Louis Pasteur.

In my understanding, "can never" is a negation and is equivalent to "can not". How you can interpret "can never" as an affirmation is a mystery to me — Jacques

If you place a quote like this, in the context of what Hume says overall, the bigger picture, which is represented by Janus' quote above, "Inductive reasoning is really just custom and habitual expectation at work", you will see why I assert that Hume's position is self-defeating, as self-contradicting and inconsistent.

He clearly argues that causation reduces to reason as Janus indicates, it is a matter of inductive reasoning. But then, as you show, the problem of inductive reasoning, which Hume exposes, forces the conclusion that there is no "real" necessity here. The "necessity" is an inductive necessity which does not provide any absolute certainty, therefore not the requirements of a true objective necessity. This opens the door to "chance" as the filler of that gap, when we deny the "Will of God" as the filler of the gap.

The reason why this move by Hume is self-defeating, and contradictory due to inconsistency, is that it starts by attributing causation to reason. The reasoning involved is inductive, as Janus presents. Then, the deficiencies of inductive reasoning are exposed, and from this Hume concludes what you present, "the mind can never possibly...". But this itself is an inductive conclusion, and the form of the conclusion "can never possibly..." is exactly what is denied by Hume's exposé concerning the problems of inductive reasoning.

So Hume's conclusion exactly contradicts his premise. And it is this inconsistent move which opens the door to "chance" as having a real place in causation. Instead of accepting what he has exposed, a deficiency in human reasoning, which might be improved upon in the future, to close this gap in certainty caused by the problem of induction, he wrongly concludes that this deficiency cannot ever be rectified.

Then, from this false necessity which he has produced ("the mind can never possibly..."), we can go on to assume that the gap in certainty is a feature created (caused) by the independent material world, rather than a feature created (caused) by deficiencies in the habits of the human mind. But this is to proceed on the foundation of that very false premise of necessity. And when we apprehend this gap in certainty as a feature of the independent world, rather than as a deficiency in the habits of the human mind, we are wrongfully convinced in our belief that this gap cannot ever be closed. From this misdirected position, we tend to attribute to "chance" these features of the world which we incorrectly believe cannot ever be understood. And of course, we assume that we cannot ever understand them because they are chance, in this extremely vicious circle which circumvents the philosophical desire to know.

Hume does not say that custom or habit is the cause of something but rather he is saying that our knowledge of the relation between cause and effect is ...

... founded on the supposition that the course of nature is sufficiently uniform so that the future will be conformable to the past.
— David Hume (EHU 4.21)

But demonstrative reasoning (concerning relations of ideas) cannot establish the supposition in question,

... since it implies no contradiction, that the course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects. — Jacques

OK, but "that the course of nature is sufficiently uniform so that the future will be conformable to the past" is a principle derived from inductive reason. Therefore Hume is saying that causation is founded on reason. So why did you clam that Hume's view is "that causality is based neither on logical necessity nor on inductive and deductive reasoning, but on custom or habit". Clearly, "that the course of nature is sufficiently uniform..." is an inductive principle, so causality is based on reason according to Hume.

I am sorry to say that by speaking of "hypocrisy in Hume's words" you show that you have not understood his argument at all. — Jacques

Judging by the problem stated above, I think it might be you who does not understand Hume very well. It appears like you have created an argument which is not consistent with what Hume actually said, and you have presented it as Hume's argument.

I disagree. I tend to follow Hume's view that causality is based neither on logical necessity nor on inductive and deductive reasoning, but on custom or habit (as stated in his "Enquiry on Human Understanding"): — Jacques

To say that custom or habit is the cause of something, is just to avoid the question of what is the the real cause of that thing. "Real cause" here referring to what a proper analysis and understanding of the situation would uncover. These words are just used to facilitate communication, when a deeper philosophical understanding of the situation is not required. So if we say X did such and such out of "Custom" or "Habit", we are really saying that we do not properly understand why X did that, but there is some reason there, for the action, which we do not properly understand. So "Custom" and "Habit" here are terms that stand for something which is not well understood, but understanding those things is not necessary to the conversation, so the use of them allows use to breeze over those not-understood aspects of reality. We use many words like this.

Hume alludes to this in the quoted passage with the statement "By employing that word, we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity". But of course this really is not a pretense, and the quoted passages gives us no reason why we should assume that it is a pretense, just an assertion that we should think of some actions as the custom of pretense.

Notice the inherent contradiction, or hypocrisy in Hume's words. It is our custom to believe that we do not give the complete reason when we say that custom is the cause. But if custom really is the cause, then we would have to accept that custom is the cause of us believing this. Therefore he could not truthfully say that this is a pretense, he must say it is a custom. Pretense is a cause other than custom, because it runs contrary to custom by causing one to express the opposite of what that person would customarily express, in order to "pretend". To be customary is to be consistent with the acts of others, but to pretend is to make your act (which is consistent with others) inconsistent with your mind. So it's self-refuting for Hume to say that we pretend otherwise, when he says that custom or habit is the real cause, because pretense implies a cause which is inconsistent with custom. If custom was the real cause it would be impossible for us to pretend anything, because to pretend is to do something contrary to what custom inclines us to do.

I did not equate the two kinds of causation, because I do not attach any reality to the "causation by reasons". Causation by reasons belongs to a metaphorical way of speaking, which has nothing to do with reality. Indeed, we often give the wrong reasons for our decisions and actions because we are often mistaken about the real reasons. — Jacques

I think, as explained in my post, that you have this backward Jacques. All causation is causation by reason, and any other form of "causation" is fundamentally wrong, for the reasons explained.

The wheel was invented by someone who found dragging stuff a drag. — unenlightened

I cannot disagree with that portrayal. Physical laziness inspired mental ambition. So that person, if it was just one, found oneself some mental purpose, even though that ambition was inspired by physical laziness. But if that person happened to get run over by pulling that first wheel laden with heavy stuff downhill, the difference between goodness and danger wasn't well respected in that lazily inspired ambition. The physical laziness may have seeped into the mental ambition resulting in a mental laziness.

Sub specie aeternitatus ... Deus, sive natura ... ~Spinoza

People like us who believe in physics know that the distinction between past, present and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion. ~Einstein — 180 Proof

That does not address the issue of prediction, possibilities, and probabilities, which I described. An issue which is very real to science, regardless of what those who put their faith in physics believe.

for my own part, I have long felt i was here on holiday, and the real work will begin post mortem. — unenlightened

That's called 'leaving the work for someone else" better known as laziness.

Average has already confessed to being very ambitious. The problem I find with pure ambition is that it needs to be directed. Properly directed ambition is what is commonly called "goodness", and wrongly directed ambition can produce all different sorts of evil, so I'll just say in simplification, that it's dangerous.

It appears like Average is very ambitious, and also has an innate will, or inclination to avoid the dangerous side of things, assuming "a purpose", yet does not know "the purpose" which will ensure proper direction.

The world is all that is the case — plaque flag

How would someone who takes this proposition as a true premise, understand future possibilities as a real part of the world? We know that future possibilities are grounded in reality somehow, because some are acknowledged as highly probable and some are highly improbable. Therefore the art of prediction, in the world of future possibilities, may be supported by the science of "all that is the case", yet prediction deals with what will probably be the case rather than what is the case.

Nothing is hidden, — plaque flag

The next question therefore, is how can anyone hold this premise as true and also accept the reality of future possibilities? How is it possible to conceive of the reality of the future as not hidden, when we talk about it in terms of what is possible rather than what is the case?

This touches upon a point I've been debating ever since joining forums - of reason understood as 'the relations of ideas'. The tendency of reductionism is to conflate the two kinds of causation, physical and logical: which is what we do when we say that 'the brain' acts in a particular way, and so 'produces' thought, because of physical causation. The 'because' of reasons - the 'space of reasons', it has been called - can't be explained in those terms, because it belongs to a different level of explanation. — Wayfarer

A careful analysis of the two principle forms of causation reveals that the necessity of "because of physical law" is reducible to a form of the necessity of "because of reason". Simply put, the laws of physics are principles of reason, and the necessity which supports them is a logical necessity, inductive and deductive reasoning.

So, Newton's first law for example, does not describe any real necessity in the physical world, it states something which we employ as necessary for our understanding of the physical world. The "necessity" here is supported by inductive reason which itself suffers from "the problem of induction". When we understand the necessity of the first law, in this way, we see that the temporal continuity described by the concept of "inertia", would not really be necessary in a truly independent (from the human mind) physical world. That this "necessity" is just made up, created by the human minds which attempt to understand the physical world, and does not obtain to a true independent necessity as demonstrated by that stated problem, is the reason why Newton said that the truth of his first law is dependent on the Will of God.

There is an even more fundamental way of looking at the two principal senses of "necessity", which reveals this reduction even better. The two senses would be "logical necessity", because of logic (this includes physical causation), and, "what is needed", or necessary for an end. The former, logical necessity, is reducible to a form of the latter, necessary as the means to an end. Logical necessity can be seen as what is necessary, or needed, as the means toward the goal of understanding. So logical necessity describes what is needed for understanding, just like food is needed for subsistence. The relation between these two senses can be understood in translations of the old Latin expression for logical necessity "must needs be".

In this way, logical necessity, along with the necessity of the laws of physics and other scientific laws which are derived from logical necessity, are subsumed under the category of necessary for the sake of a goal, needed as means to an end. This greatly simplifies one's understanding of causation and necessity, allowing these to be tools of the mind and ultimately subservient to the free will.

However, the physicalist trend, to make the reduction in the inverted way, a way which it is impossible to make because it is incorrect, is a misunderstanding which casts all sorts of confusion onto the issue. But for anyone who has an adequate understanding of the nature of scientific laws in their relation to human thought, and the reality of the physical world, that misunderstanding ought to be obvious.

If change was not a stable or constant property then change would stop. — Benj96

I really do not think that change can be said to be a property, because change is the process whereby something loses or gains a property. So, you must have a different idea of "change" than I.

But for the sake of argument, suppose "change" is a property which is stable and constant, then we would have to say that the changing thing is unchanging. That's directly contradictory, the same thing has the property of changing, and unchanging at the same time. Your way of speaking Benj96, is incoherent and unintelligible.

Btw, I think Nicko got banned.

organismically — invicta

Really?

I'll leave you to your monologue. — plaque flag

As you wish, simpleton.

Not in the libertarianist sense. Either our decisions are determined by some prior cause or they occur spontaneously, neither of which seem to satisfy libertarian free will. — Michael

What's wrong with the idea of free will choices occurring spontaneously? That looks like an adequate descriptive word for libertarian free will to me, though I suppose you might have a different idea of what constitutes libertarian free will. Wouldn't it be necessary for the will to act spontaneously, in order for one to be quick witted? Spontaneity appears to be very consistent with free will. So, of your two choices, let's go with "spontaneously", and that seems to satisfy libertarian free will.

We might not even have it in the compatibilist sense. See unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain: — Michael

"Determinants" is not a problem to the concept of free will. It is well known that there are numerous determinants, but free will takes numerous determinants and produces one act which is not determined by any one of those determinants, nor is it the sum of any number of determinants. That is why it is proper to say that our freely willed actions are affected by these determinants, but we cannot say that they are the effect of these determinants. We must look elsewhere for the cause of these actions.

From what I can see, the article you linked doesn't seem to have any real evidence against the reality of free will. I could decide today, what I will do tomorrow, and that's a lot longer time span than ten seconds. But that time span is irrelevant. The critical point in time is when I spontaneously move to act on what I previously decided to do, that's when the will acts. That the will to carry out the act does not occur at the same time the decision to act is made, is evident from the reality of procrastination and changing one's mind.

That's why Augustine divided the intellect into three parts, memory, reason, and will. The will, being free, does not necessarily follow reason. That is why a person sometimes does what one knows ought not be done, and has even decided not to do it, in the case of bad habits and temptations for example.

I am a very ambitious person. — Average

I think that's a good quality, and in itself could provide you with a whole lot of purpose.

To me that looks like superstition. — plaque flag

Why would you think that free will, the capacity to make a choice, is superstition? Do you really believe that you do not have the capacity to choose?

I'm surprised that you would say so. The obvious next question is : 'why did that intentional agent make such a choice?' One does not explain something relatively simple (a natural world without life in it yet) in terms of something hopelessly complex (the psychology of a superior being, perhaps of a god.) This is anti-explanation. — plaque flag

Oversimplification of that which is inherently complex, is not a way toward understanding. It is misunderstanding. The problem with your approach, obviously, is that there is no such thing as "a natural world without life in it yet". So this counterfactual proposition is completely misguided. You propose this as a means of simplification, to produce the logical conception of a simplified world. But it's based on a false premise, a counterfactual.

However, what this counterfactual reveals is that this simplification renders "the world" as unintelligible, incoherent. "Emergence" fails as a rational proposal for understanding the becoming of the universe, and we are left to accept the reality that the proposition of "a natural world without life in it yet" is fundamentally flawed.

The issue here, and the obvious deficiency, is that you cannot remove the observer from the observation. So, "a natural world without life in it yet" is not a true proposition which a life form can make. Therefore this does not give us an acceptable, true ontological starting point. Instead, we must take as the staring point, the perspective of the life form making the observation. And, since choice and intention are fundamental aspects of this life form, we need a thorough understanding of these before we proceed toward any hypothetical removal of the observer from the observation. This is because to remove the observer from the observation requires that we remove all the influence which the observer contributes to the observation. And, we know that choice and intention have great influence on observations.

But why do some think it is a genuine explanation ? Because it makes them feel good. It gives them an emotional orientation. Fine. Let people have their religion. But I like explanation and clarification, which is joyful sober hard work. For me this is essentially social / normative. Serious critical minds come together to tell a truer and truer story about our shared world. — plaque flag

That's pathetic. You reject "feeling good" and choose "hard work", and you pretend there's something "joyful" about this choice. Where are your priorities? That your "explanation and clarification" is directed toward a "truer story" is demonstrably false, as analysis of your counterfactual premise displays. Therefore you ought to realize that any such hard work of explanation and calculation will be misdirected, fruitless and endless. Where is the joy in fruitless hard work? Next, you will need to direct this hard work toward hiding the deficiencies of your metaphysics, rather than toward a truer understanding. So not only will you be claiming to be enjoying the fruitlessness of your hard work, but also the hard work of covering up that fruitlessness. That becomes deception. So the honourable course here is to admit to the mistake of oversimplification, and get back on track toward understanding the true complexities of reality.

Mind is the capacity to grasp meaning and is present in very rudimentary form even in the simplest organisms. In rational sentient beings it attains the capacity for reason and self-knowledge. — Wayfarer

This is consistent with Aristotle's description, but the issue which necessitates dualism logically, comes down to what we might call the first living organism. Such a material body came into existence as an organized body, with that rudimentary capacity. Now there must be a cause of that organized body with that capacity, and this cause must be an actuality. This supports the concept of an immaterial soul, as the actual cause of existence, 'the first actuality" of that organized body. As the actual cause, it is necessarily prior to it, and in that sense not dependent on the material body.

The same principle is shown to be applicable to the entire universe through the cosmological argument. Since all material things have some degree of organization (form or actuality) in order to exist as a "thing", and matter itself without form would be pure potential without the actuality required to cause actual organized existence, we must conclude an actuality which is prior to all material things, as cause of them. In theology this is God.

As I see it, the reason why dualism is called for is that the forms which we come to know in our minds, as intelligible objects, are derived from the material objects, through the means of sensation. But the forms which are shown logically to be independent from material objects, are prior to the material objects as cause of them. This leaves a medium of "matter" which lies between, and separates the forms within the human mind, as dependent on the material body, from the truly separate, immaterial forms which are prior to and not dependent on material bodies.

As far as I can tell, the only 'mystery' (and I think 180 Proof agrees ?) is that of any postulated origin, because we can always ask but why ? Why this and not something else ? — plaque flag

Notice how this comes down to a question of "why". And questions of "why" are readily answered when intention is the cause. So when the question "Why this and not something else" is asked, it is easily answered with, that was choice of the intentional agent. When we overcome the physicalist prejudice, which inclines us to believe that all causes must be physical, then we can understand the reality of intention and free will as truly non-physical causes. And when we come to understand that this type of non-physical cause is very real, and prior to, rather than posterior to the activities of material objects, we can apprehend how this sort of cause must pervade the entire physical universe.

Have I ever discussed this article with you - The Indispensability Argument in Mathematics? It makes reference to a 1963 paper by Paul Benacerraf which is apparently canonical. The maths experts on this forum generally know it and judge it accordingly. But some of the statements made illustrate what I see as the basic philosophical point, to wit:

Standard readings of mathematical claims entail the existence of mathematical objects. But, our best epistemic theories seem to deny that knowledge of mathematical objects is possible.

Why is this? Because apparently our 'best epistemic theories' include the assumption that

human beings [are] physical creatures whose capacities for learning are exhausted by our physical bodies.

Whereas,

Some philosophers, called rationalists, claim that we have a special, non-sensory capacity for understanding mathematical truths, a rational insight arising from pure thought.

The basic drift of the remainder of the article is this:

The indispensability argument in the philosophy of mathematics is an attempt to justify our mathematical beliefs about abstract objects, while avoiding any appeal to rational insight. Its most significant proponent was Willard van Orman Quine.

What am I not seeing here? Why would it be that one of the purportedly major 20th c philosophers wants to 'avoid any appeal to rational insight?' — Wayfarer

There is a 'compromise' to this problem with "rational insight" which allows for both of these positions, it's called dualism. This is the position presented by Thomas Aquinas. The immaterial soul, in its present condition, as united with a material body, in the human being, is restricted in its capacity to know the truly immaterial Forms (God and the angels) because of that union with matter, and the human being's dependence on the material body. The soul itself is not dependent on the material body, but the human being is, so it is not the immaterial soul itself which is limited in it's capacity to know immaterial Forms, but the human being is.

The human being, in its present condition, as an immaterial soul united with a material body, is limited in its capacity to truly know immaterial objects because human knowledge is dependent on the material body. So the human being's knowledge of the immaterial is always through the means of material representations. In the case of mathematical objects and other logical forms, the material representations are symbols. The need to use material representations, and therefore the material body with its sense organs, in the human mode of understanding, greatly hinders our capacity to grasp the reality of the truly immaterial. Monist materialists for example will refer to these material aspects as evidence that there is no need to assume anything immaterial, thus hindering the advancement of this knowledge which is already restricted.

For Aquinas there is a proposed condition of the soul posterior to the existence of the human being, when the soul is freed from this dependence on the material body. It is only in this condition, when the soul is freed from the human being's dependence on the material body, that the soul can truly know the immaterial Forms. You'll notice how Faith is a requirement here. If we cannot truly know the reality of the immaterial Forms when we are immaterial souls united with a material body, in the human condition, then the whole reality of such Forms within the human conceptual structure, therefore the "rational insight" which you refer to, is subject to skepticism. Materialism, (physicalism included), which is best characterized as a radical skepticism, undermines faith, and the capacity of the immaterial soul to know itself as such, consequently the capacity to know all immaterial Forms is corrupted.

Augustine goes on to call the light, God, and went from being a libertine to a saint. It seems like his experience was something more than "seeing stars." — Art48

I told you earlier in the thread, this is a reference to Plato's "the good", which he compared to the light of the sun. What "seeing the light" means is to gain an apprehension of the importance of "the good". This is commonly cited as the reason why one changes from misbehaviour to good behaviour, the person claims to have seen the light (apprehended "the good"). That's why Augustine went from libertine to saint.

I first define the concept of ultimate ground of existence as that which underlies physical existence. The table’s ground of existence is the wood; the wood’s ground of existence is its atoms; etc., etc., down to the ultimate ground of existence which underlies the entire universe. At this point, it’s a philosophical concept, not unlike Kant's Thing-in-itself or Schopenhauer's Will. I'd say the concept of ultimate ground is harmonious with science, which is looking for a theory of everything.

Does the concept of ultimate ground of existence refer to something real? It may not. But mystics often describe their experience as experience of ultimate reality, which gives some support for the idea. And others who ascribe their experience to some God may be guilty of what I call “gratuitous attribution.” For instance, Pascal had an experience of FIRE and attributed it to "the God of Abraham."

I assume in the article that the ultimate ground of existence is an objective reality. At this point, I believe I’m still doing philosophy, not theology. — Art48

The ultimate ground of existence is very simple actually. It is "the good". Philosophically "the good" is very significant "The good" answers the question of why there is what there is. The answer is because it is good. This is why monotheists tend to establish an equation between existence and good. Why did God create the universe? Because He saw that it was good.

Then there is no sufficient reason to think….. — Mww

The reason is produced by logic, not by empirical observation. I went through that already. You wrongfully apply a requirement of "empirical observation".

If a process is not empirically observable there’s no reason to look for the initial premises sufficient to find it. It isn’t observable, so how would it be known what to look for? — Mww

So says, the person with no philosophical desire to know. Your claim amounts to: 'What I cannot see I have no desire to know anything about'. We venture into the dark without necessarily knowing what we're looking for, but still looking for what we want to know. That is the philosophical desire to know.

An effect has a cause, even if the cause is not observable. This is how we can know God, Who is not observable. Through observation of His effects, and application of logic such as the cosmological argument, we can conclude the necessity of God, without ever observing Him empirically.

I add 12 to 30, get 42. You add 18 to 6, get 24. We got different results, but used exactly the same process. — Mww

if you really think so, then I'm sure you could describe this process in detail, which we both used. I'll be waiting. And, I'm just as certain that I will assert that you did not describe the process which was used by me.

All you say here is uncontested, but says nothing with respect to origins. — Mww

Do you not understand the meaning of "prior to"? It means before, therefore it says something about the origins of that which it is before.

And how we generalize from observation, is in fact, how the observation, and by association, the real thing, is understood. From which follows that the premises used for logical conclusions, arise in understanding, therefore whatever flaws there may be in the construction of our premises, also arise in understanding. — Mww

This is the heart of our disagreement. I do not agree with your premise, that how we generalize from observation is how the real thing is "understood". I believe that such generalizations, especially the most fundamental ones (such as my example, the sun rises, the sun sets), which are things we take for granted, cannot be spoken of in terms of "understanding", because if we use this term many would have to be misunderstandings. That is known as the problem of induction.

To state it succinctly, a description does not qualify as an "understanding". So we need to apply a distinction between the application of reason, including deductive forms of logic, which provides understanding, and observation, which provides description. We see this in the scientific method of experimentation. Experiments are designed to test an hypothesis. So the descriptions which are provided by the observations are only conducive toward "understanding", when employed in the proper way, the way of the design of the experiment. I.e., the method must be followed in order that the observations are conducive to understanding.

Now, this casts doubt on this whole proposed structure of understanding, which holds that the premises are derived from observation. What we can see, from the example of the scientific method, is that the premises are derived from hypotheses rather than observations. Then, the observations (descriptions) are formulated in such a way so as to either confirm or deny the hypotheses. This indicates that observations, are fundamentally biased, or prejudiced, as directed purposefully toward the underlying hypotheses which form the basic premises. That the observations have the possibility to support confirmation, or support rejection, of the hypothesis, and therefore appear to be unbiased, does not negate the fact that they are fundamentally directed toward the underlying hypothesis and are therefore biased in that way.

For me to misjudge is merely for me to think conceptions relate to each other when some other judgement or some empirical observation, shows my error. — Mww

I find that to be a very strange way of looking at "misjudgement". It is impossible that you have misjudged unless someone demonstrates your error?

Sense observations give reality... — Mww

This is where I strongly disagree. Like I said last post, sense observations provide only possibilities. All of them. That's why we have a multitude of senses, to allow cross-checking. You thought you heard something for example, but when you look you see it was very likely other than what you thought. And, it's very obvious that observations give only possibilities, when a number of people describe the same event in conflicting ways. So logic demonstrates very clearly that it is impossible that sense observations give reality, they give possibilities.

Given a representational human cognitive system, these descriptions taken by the thinking mind….properly understanding itself….are not the observation, which gives nothing but phenomena, but are conceptions, as possibilities for how the phenomena are to be thought. Logic is employed with respect to judgements made on the relation of conceptions understanding thinks as belonging to each other (plates over holes should be steel and round, re: manhole covers), or, the relations of judgements understood as belonging to each other, in the case of multiple judgements regarding the same cognition (plates over ditches should be steel but must not be round, re: ferry ramps). — Mww

As explained above, you and I have strong disagreement on this matter.

Yes, there are flaws possible in the conscious decision-making process, but that does not say the process is flawed, but only the use of it, is. — Mww

This makes no sense. The process is what is carried out, what actually occurs, and this is the use. If you propose a separation between the process and the use, then one would be either a description of the process, or a prescription for the process. Either way, these are not the process, which is what actually occurs.

And whatever “hidden premises” there are in conscious decision-making cannot be the responsibility of the conscious agent making the decisions, insofar as it is contradictory to arrive at a conscious decision grounded by premises of which I am not conscious. — Mww

Legally, ignorance is no excuse, and you are responsible for the "hidden premises" which you employ in your decision making. And, it is not contradictory "to arrive at a conscious decision grounded by premises of which I am not conscious", this is simply called invalid logic, unstated premises required to reach the conclusion. The reality of this is very clearly exposed with issues of defining terms, and equivocation.

Through what I wrote above, I can bring the nature of these "hidden premises" further into the light. One form of such premises would be the underlying hypotheses which guide and influence descriptive observations, as explained above. We can refer to these underlying hypotheses as the person's "attitude". So for example a specific type of laziness may incline a person to think that easy money means a good, happy life. Then the person may be inclined to observe the existence of money with the attitude of looking to get it easily, and may be inclined toward fraud or theft, for example. Such "hidden premises", which we call the person's "attitude" influence the person's observations, as well as the person's use of reason, and this is not at all contradictory. Nor is it correct to say that the person is not responsible for decisions which are base in these subconscious premises. One is clearly responsible for such actions.

To simply take for granted bias and prejudice as premises for conscious judgement, is a flaw in the subject’s character, not in the process the agent employs in his decision-making. — Mww

Obviously, flaws in character which affect the decision made, are flaws in the decision-making process. Furthermore, we all have flaws in character, therefore we all employ flawed decision-making processes. We cannot avoid that, and we must face it as reality.

One can be tutored in correcting erroneous judgements, but if he is so tutored, yet decides to disregard the corrections, he is called pathologically stupid. If tutored, and receives the corrections and thereby judges in accordance with them, that is called experience, and serves as ground of all empirical judgements. — Mww

The problem is that what you refer to as "pathologically stupid", is very real. And, it exists in all sorts of grades or degrees, such that we all resist education to some degree, then we all qualify as pathologically stupid to some extent. It's very evident here at TPF. What produces this pathological stupidity is what we commonly call "intuition". When we are taught something which is counter-intuitive, we automatically reject it because it is counter to the hidden premises (attitude) which we already hold.

So I proposed to you, that this is a flawed attitude which you are displaying here. We cannot continue to posit "experience" as the ground to everything, because this would create an infinite regress of experience, as if we've all lived forever. That is the problem Plato exposed with the argument of recollection in the Meno. The capacity to learn something new must come from something other than experience, or else we get the absurdity of the infinite regress of "recollection", and all knowledge has existed in each person's soul eternally, as grounded in prior experience.

Therefore we must accept something other than experience as the grounding of empirical judgements, to avoid that absurdity. In modern times there is a tendency toward a proposed division between nature and nurture, what comes to us by instinct, and what comes to us by experience. The instinctual is prior to experience. This is the basis for "intuition", which we are born with to some degree, as innate, prior to experience at its base, and consequently prior to a person's empirical judgement.

Now, if we seek to analyze this "intuition" which is prior to, and the grounding of empirical judgements, we must divorce ourselves from the notion that experience is the grounding of empirical judgement. That would imply that experience could judge itself. So instead, we look for a judgement which is the judgement of experience. And, to be able to appropriately act as a judge of experience, it must be grounded in something independent from experience. Now you should be able to see very clearly, the logical necessity to conclude that there is a type of judgement which is prior to empirical judgement (judgement based on experience), enabling us to judge experience itself. The premise that experience needs to be judged is derived from the inconsistency which is inherent within described experience, that is described above.

No, I don’t. Logical certainty may not require empirical proof, and indeed, may not have any at all afforded to it, this being a limit of forms, re: A = A. But for any logical certainty, using constructed objects of its own manufacture and representing empirical conditions, only observation can serve as proof of those constructs, re: the sun doesn’t rise or fall as the appearance from certain restricted observation warrants. — Mww

Well look. You allow for logical certainty without any empirical proof, as "forms". Then you add the condition of "constructed objects" and this we may call the "content". Now you say that this content can only be verified by empirical observation. Do you see that what adding this condition of content does, is reduce the certainty of the conclusions? So it is exactly as I say, the stuff verified by empirical observation only reduces the certainty of logic. In its pure form, logic is extremely certain, but adding content, objects constructed from empirical observation, reduces that level of certainty. Therefore it is exactly as I say, empirical observations have a lower degree of certainty. And, we employ logic in an attempt to reduce the uncertainty which inheres within empirical observations.

Logic, on the other hand where observation is not presupposing anything because there’s nothing to observe, dictates the possible reality of things. — Mww

This is done through the use of the concept of "impossible". Logic dictates the impossible with laws such as non-contradiction, thereby limiting the field of possibility with the elimination of the impossible. That is known as the process of elimination.

Now when you say "Empirical observation presupposes the thing", this is incorrect. As I explained, "the thing" is only a possibility, and this is what Descartes painstakingly demonstrated. With the application of logical principles, such as the law of identity, demonstrated by Aristotle, we rule out as impossible, that there is not "the thing". Many modern philosophies reject Aristotle's law of identity, and the necessity of "the thing". Therefore "the thing" is not given by empirical observation at all, it is given by that logical process which demonstrates that it is impossible to be otherwise, rendering "the thing" as a necessity by showing it is impossible that there not be "the thing". But of course freedom of choice allows us to reject even that demonstrated impossibility (necessity).

You continue to give "empirical observation" undue credit. This has been the issue since the beginning, your assertion that sense observation cannot be wrong.

Interesting. I've never heard the argument that past and future are different substances. Substance is generally supposed to be able to undergo change though, so doesn't that presuppose that it exists through time? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Our understanding of change is based in empirical observations which are always of past time, observations are memories. We have no observations of the future yet we have observations of the past, so we produce an understanding of change based on these memories, which are our observations of the past. it might appear, and you might think, that these observations are made at the present, but they are not, they are always in the past, always existing as memories. So our understanding of change, and consequently the associated understanding of time is restricted to past time, and this is the type of "change" which substance is said to undergo.

On the other hand, our understanding of future events, future changes, and future time, is merely a logical projection. We take our memories, our observations of the past, and apply a premise of continuity, and project into the future. But this is really insufficient, because that supposed continuity is a determinist principle which denies the possibility of free will, and real change.

Notice I've introduced a new concept "real change". This type of change is inconsistent with the determinist premise of continuity, and it allows for the reality of free will. When we allow that there are real possibilities for change, at any given moment in the passing of time, we must deny that the continuity of substance, as time passes, is necessary. Then "substance" as it is in the past, according to empirical observations, is inconsistent with whatever it is in the future.

Here's an example. Suppose that a free will act could annihilate a substance at any moment of passing time. This act of annihilation could be chosen at any passing moment. If this were the case, then the substance could have no real temporal extension into the future, because it could be annihilated at any moment. if it could be annihilated at any chosen moment, then it is impossible that it has any actual existence in the future of any moment at all, even if it isn't annihilated at any moment, because the possibility of it being annihilated is always there.

This is the way we ought to look at the possibility of real change. Anything which might be changed by a free will act, cannot have any temporal extension into the future. If the free will act can end its existence as it is, at any moment of passing time, then its existence as it is, cannot have any extension into the future. So if it's possible that you could smash a glass at any moment of passing time, it is impossible that the glass has any real existence in the future of any moment of passing time.

I'm not talking about formal logic. I'm talking about largely tacit norms that govern what follows from what as a way to understand meaning. — plaque flag

You referred to an "inferential nexus". The "largely tacit norms that govern" the use of this term "inferential", generally dictate that "Inference" refers to what is deduced from the application of reason. "Deduced" implies according to strict formal rules.

he master-idea of semantic inferentialism is to look instead to inference, rather than representation, as the basic concept of semantics. — plaque flag

This is a deceptive use of "inference", which is outside the "largely tacit norms". It is a use manufactured for sake of sophistry. To say that the meaning which one derives from a word or a sentence is an "inference", rather than simply an "association" or "relation", implies that there is some form of logic behind this derivation of meaning, when in reality there need not be any logic involved at all. Obviously, that is a very misleading use of "inference" which leaves no separation between the consequences of emotional feelings and the results of reasoning, suggesting that emotions produce inferences.

That to me is an unclear and uncertain concept. Selves are normative entities. I'll give you that. We are held responsible. But that's all the 'freedom' I'm confident about at the moment. — plaque flag

I see you want your cake back, after you've already eaten it, plaque flag. You give "inference" the most vague of meaning, by allowing that the basic semantic association of a words is "inference", then you complain about free will being "an unclear and uncertain concept". If you do not want to delve into the world of unclear and uncertain concepts, then restrict your use of "inference" please, so that the vague associations and relations of emotions are not classified as equal to what is inferred from formal logic, as "inferential".

Even thermostats respond differentially, categorize. — plaque flag

Thermostats don't seek and avoid. Any categorizing involved with a thermostat is done by the engineers who produce the design. Categorizing is a distinguishing of different types. A thermostat is designed to work within the parameters of one type.

As I see it, anything we can make any sense of is for just that reason 'part' of the same inferential nexus — plaque flag

A whole lot of reality we cannot make sense of, as physicists have found out.

The principles of modal logic fail to make a true separation between what is necessary and what is possible, leaving the necessary as a subcategory of the possible. This renders formal logic as inapplicable to a wide aspect of reality, what happens at the present time, when possibilities are actualized (become necessities). By designating the necessary as already a subcategory of the possible, there is no place in that structure of logic for that act which occurs in reality, which actualizes a possibility, rendering it as a necessity. This aspect of reality is not included within the "inferential nexus", meaning that the inferential nexus is not applicable to it.

Because we do have the capacity to, and we can actually make sense of this act, which mediates between the possible and the necessary, (the freely willed choice for example), yet we know not how to allow for it in the "inferential nexus", your statement is false. There are things we can makes sense of, acts of free will for example, which are not included in the "inferential nexus".

We can abstract (yank out) entities from their context. — plaque flag

The true context is temporal, therefore we must understand entities within that context, not yank them out of it. And, as I explained we cannot make an acceptable unity out of time because the actualities of the past are incommensurable with the possibilities of the future. The two cannot be measured by the same principles. Therefore the "unity" you refer to, is nothing but a false premise, a deficient metaphysics which results in a whole lot of reality ending up in the category of "what we cannot make sense of'. However, if we ditch that idea of unity, and accept a better metaphysics, we bring that part of reality into the fold of "what we can make sense of", by providing us the means to understand why such a unity is false.