Yes, the law of identity (a=a) is a logical principle—a tautology that belongs to the structure of thought and language. It tells us something about the consistency of our terms, but not about the ontological self-sufficiency of particulars. To read it as a statement about the intrinsic metaphysical identity of beings is to conflate logic with ontology. — Wayfarer

Actually, you might research this. The law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself", as derived from Aristotle, is completely different from the modern presentation by logicians, of "A=A". How do you interpret "a thing is the same as itself" as being a statement about consistency in our terms, rather than what it obviously is, a statement about things, the intrinsic metaphysical identity of beings?

When Aristotle discusses primary substance in the Categories, he's not saying that the identity of the individual particular is simply in the particular in some absolute sense. — Wayfarer

Aristotle's best discussion of identity is in his Metaphysics. There is much to read because it stretches over a number of books. I believe he starts in earnest where he says that the fundamental question of being is not the question of why there is something rather than nothing, but why there is what there is, rather than something else. This amounts to the question of why an individual thing, and every particular, individual thing, is what it is, rather than something else. The law of identity, that a thing is necessarily the thing that it is, and it is impossible that any thing is something other than the thing that it is, provides his starting assumption.

Moreover, Aristotle’s deeper metaphysics—in the Metaphysics and De Anima—makes clear that a substance’s what-it-is is grasped through form, not through brute particularity. So it’s not that the individual grounds its identity in itself, but that its being is composed of matter and form, and its intelligibility lies primarily in the formal principle, not in the sheer fact of its being “this one.” — Wayfarer

According to Aristotle's Metaphysics, each individual thing has a form which is proper to itself and only itself. This form, as the form of the material thing, is complete with all accidentals. Also, he argues that since things are composed of matter and form, and form is what makes the thing what it is rather than something else, substance belongs to the form. Pure matter would have nothing to differentiate itself, providing for no individual things, therefore no substance.

The law of identity is a logical framework that presupposes ontological grounding—it doesn't establish it. — Wayfarer

I really think you ought to investigate further, exactly what the law of identity is, in its classical form.

It's Aristotle who designated the identity of the individual as within the individual itself, commonly known as the law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself". This identity supports the reality of primary substance. I think we discussed this before, and you didn't accept that Aristotle recognized the identity of the particular.

The point of the scholastics is that the proper identity of the thing is not intelligible to us, human beings. We can only know things through abstraction, which does not grasp the true identity. The identity of particular things is, however, intelligible to God.

I assume you're not saying that there is some correct construal of "Jill" that is independent of interpretation. — J

No, that is what I am saying. The law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself" indicates that there is an identity ("correct construal" if you like), which inheres within the the thing itself, therefore independent of interpretation.

But in any case, I'm glad to see you backing off from the idea that identity has to include "all properties, essential and accidental". — J

Why would you think that I am backing off from that? It's exactly what the law of identity indicates, proper identity inheres within the thing, as the complete form, all properties, essential and accidental, rather than an abstraction consisting of what is perceived to be essential.

What Adorno thus advocates under the name of speculation is a self-aware use of the irrational within reason. — Jamal

I question your use of "reason". Generally we associate reason with rational, and this aspect of the mind is not at all rational, even opposed to it. Irrational, implies opposition and that's a very strong idea. Maybe it's opposition in the sense of rebellious, in the way that teenagers sometimes rebel against the authority of their parents. The trouble with reason, or rationality (using the two words interchangeably now) is that it tends to trap itself into a vicious circle through the adherence to laws of reasoning. Then we ask, where did these laws come from, and if they are not imposed by God, or derived from an eternal realm of Platonic Forms, they must be created by human beings. That implies that human beings must, break out from the existing, outdated laws, providing the impetus to actually do that with the rebellious, creative attitude.

The breaking out, from the laws, puts reason (if we can still call it reason, as reasoning outside the laws of reason, speculation) face to face with infinite regress. And infinity, I think, is the manifestation of the irrational, first derived from irrational ratios like pi. The unruly speculative mind allows the irrational, as the infinite, to penetrate all sorts of logic, as it does in mathematics today, and infinite possible worlds. Reclosing the circle, to restrict the irrational, would be a sort of synthesis.

Instead of saying “what has been thought of as irrational is a basic component of reason,” Adorno will instead say something like “the rational is also irrational”. In doing so he adopts problematic, reified concepts to expose contradictions in ideology—this is the critical part—but at the same time indirectly suggest a more expansive rationality that could do more justice to the potential of reason—and this is the speculative part. — Jamal

This relationship between the rational and irrational was a bit perplexing to me. Look at the conscious/unconscious relation we just discussed. The consciousness is the seat of concepts, abstractions, and what idealists attempt to designate as substance. And the unconscious is how we generally relate the conscious to the material human body, through emotions, pleasure, pain, etc.. So the unconscious is supported by the substance of the material body, and these two opposing directions is what dualism latches a hold of. In my last post, I posited "the brain" as a sort of medium between the two, and you corrected me on this. As well, common understanding puts the brain decidedly on the material substance side of any dualism.

Now, Adorno proposes a rational/irrational relationship, and these two seem to be codependent. Of course the rational can be associated with the consciousness, but where does the irrational fit? My first inclination was to place it in the unconscious, as the source, or category, of the emotions, or something like that, a property of the body in a traditional Platonic dualism sense. But now I think what he means is that the irrational is right in consciousness, as a part of the intellect itself, the irrational part. This would describe this feature, what I called the artistic aspect, which manifests as the intuitive, the speculative, as a sort of irrational part of the intellect. It's irrational in the sense that it doesn't follow the habits and rules of rationality, yet it is still intellectual. It's creative, and creativity defies rationality. The rational part would get lost in itself without the irrational part to throw it a bone to sniff at, and the irrational part would make totally arbitrary decisions without the influence of the rational part. So the two are codependent.

It’s tempting to think of this speculative element as positive, and having the character of reconciliation as in the Hegelian sublation or synthesis. Adorno of course would deny this, but how exactly? — Jamal

I think by the interpretation I gave above, we'd have to say that the speculative is negative, in the sense of being irrational. The speculative part is what negates the existing, the status quo, to get beyond it, then the rational reestablishes itself through some sort of synthesis.

I think the answer is, obviously enough, that any positivity in the method is a negative positivity, that is, it emerges as a result of the negative thrust rather than being asserted alone. Adorno is thus always carefully indirect. — Jamal

He led me earlier, to believe that he is engaged in a positive negativity. A type of negativity which is somehow grounded in a fixed point which is found to be embedded in the existing positivity, i.e. his form of negativity grounds itself in the negative aspect of the existing positivity, therefore it is critical.

OK, but this again is assuming that what constitutes "thing" and "parts" is uncontroversial and obvious. Do you want to say that Jill is a different "thing" if a couple of the microbes in her biome die between T1 and T2? What would make such an interpretation of "thing" attractive? The point is that we have to interpret it, because nothing in "A = A" will tell us how to do it. — J

I think I indicated that it's not philosophically uncontroversial. The point is that we assume that there are real things, and that the thing's identity, i.e. what the thing is, inheres within the thing itself, not in our descriptions or interpretations of the thing. A thing has temporal extension and changes as time passes, but this does not change the assumption made by the law of identity, that the thing has it's own identity at each passing moment, and always continues to be the very precise thing that it is regardless of how it changes.

I'm going to end the conversation here because you're shifting to an allowance for modal logic, but now asserting just pragmatic irrelevance. — Hanover

I kept telling you that I allow modal logic, I just dispute specific interpretations. So there is no shift on my part. I think perhaps you are just starting to understand what I've been trying to say.

I simply disagree with this assessment, and I question the thoughtfulness of the comment. If you think classic logic has relevance, then you simply can't dispense with modal logic because modal logic opens itself to logical issues beyond what can be handled in classic logic. Hypothetical counterfactuals result in vacuous truths in classic logic, and that is why modal logic is needed. — Hanover

I believe that counterfactuals are useful in the construction of philosophical theories and hypotheses, also in some probability theory, and likely in AI development. But I think counterfactuals generally do not have much of a practical application. However, counterfactuals are only a fringe part of modal logic (more like a curiousity) and modal logic in general has much practical application. I think that you are taking what I said about counterfactuals, as if I said it about modal logic in general.

I dont pretend there isn't nuance in these positions, but you don't elicit that nuance with your comments. You just hazard objections and see where they land, stubbornly insist upon the validity of your objections, and then eventually concede something or another to keep the conversation meandering. — Hanover

Interesting opinion.

With Wiiki, Google, the SEP, countless other online resources, and even ChapGpt to sort through all this, we should be able to engage in this conversation at a more elevated level and share among ourselves areas of real confusion. So maybe spend a few days on your own with an open mind toward understanding the basis of the modal logic enterprise before critiquing it. — Hanover

I think that you and Banno are not interested in discussing the underlying assumptions which support modal logic, and the appropriate interpretations, like I am. Instead you just want to proceed into discussing formal structure, which I am not interested in. So there is a divergence of interest between us.

That's quite a misrepresentation, given that what I did was to point to how temporal necessity can itself be accommodated by formal modal logic. — Banno

Then why did you give an example of what Hanover called "metaphysical necessity", ("if it is necessary it could not have been otherwise"), and reject my use of temporal necessity, ("it cannot be changed, but could have been otherwise")? You rejected my use of temporal "necessity", saying I must speak in terms of metaphysical "necessity", and now you come back and say that "temporal necessity" is actually provided for in modal logic.

The other supposed objections you raise have either been or can be dealt with within the standard framework. In particular, the treatment of accessibility answers your main misunderstanding. Explaining this repeatedly is tedious. — Banno

I believe, the way that you employ "actual world" in your example of Caesar crossing the Rubicon, is not actually a fair representation of how modal logic would be most useful in the context of that example. Consider the following:

Of all the possibilities (so-called possible worlds) to be entertained, we cannot assume any particular one to be the actual. The only actual world is the here and now, the truth of "what is" in our current condition, at the present. And, we do not have the means to make a direct relation from any assumed actual world of now, to that ancient time. So, we may have one version of history which says Caesar crossed the Rubicon at a specific time. Another historian might say that Caesar was in Rome at that time. Another might put him somewhere else. All of these are possibilities (possible worlds). Then we can collect other evidence of Caesar's movements, and possible whereabouts in that temporal proximity, and treat all the distinct pieces of evidence as further possible worlds. When we relate all these distinct possibilities (possible worlds), we judge for consistency between them, and this gives us the best probability of determining what was actually the case. Notice, that we do not determine what was actually the case, we determine the most probable solution. I believe the best interpretations, and most productive applications of modal logic completely dispense with the idea of an actual world, dealing completely within the possible, making judgements based on probability. This is a completely break from the logical structure which assumes truth value, what is "probable" is based on consistency.

Then it was a necessity that Caesar crossed the Rubicon - it could not have been otherwise. Again, if it is necessarily true, it is true in all circumstances. And if that is so, Caesar had no choice. — Banno

OK, you are refusing to accept what Hanover called "temporal necessity". This sense of necessity implies that past actions, and the present state of being are "necessary" because it is impossible that they are otherwise.

Also, "true in all circumstances" is a meaningless phrase because "circumstances" refers to spatial temporal context, and truth relates to the particularities of the circumstances. Under no circumstances did Caesar not cross the Rubicon, or else it would be false that Caesar crossed the Rubicon.

You are slipping into nonsensical babble.

Again, plainly we can consider what might have occurred had Caesar not crossed the Rubicon. Therefore it is possible that Caesar not have crossed the Rubicon. If this were not so, we would not be able to consider the possibility. — Banno

Nonsense, people can and often do, dream up all sorts of impossible scenarios, in their imaginations. In the following sense, possibilities are no different than truths. Just because people say it is possible (or true) doesn't mean that it is possible (or true). Possibility is limited by what is impossible, just like truth is limited by falsity.

And this is not a contradiction becasue Caesar crossed the Rubicon in the actual world, but we can stipulate another in which he didn't. — Banno

Sure, people can stipulate whatever they want, but that doesn't mean that what they stipulate is possible.

The possible worlds in which Caesar crossed the Rubicon include the actual world.

Now from this actual world, in 2025, we can't access any possible world in which Caesar did not cross the Rubicon. — Banno

By what principles do you stipulate that one possible world is actual? This seems to be a categorical difference, so there must be some criteria to be applied. And, if we cannot ( meaning it is impossible to) access any "possible world" in which Caesar did not cross the Rubicon, what sense does it make to call these "possible"?

Further, we now have the problem I've been trying to bring to your attention. Looking forward in time, there is no such thing as "the actual world" because that would imply fatalism. Therefore if our interpretation of modal logic applied to the past, "include the actual world", we clearly need different system of interpretation for the future which has no actual world.

But from the actual world, in 48BC, prior to his crossing, we could access those possible worlds in which he didn't cross the Rubicon. — Banno

See, this is the point. looking forward in time at 48BC, there is no actual world of 2025. Looking backward from 2025, there is an actual world of 2025. From this, it ought to be very obvious to you, that the limitations placed on possibility (producing what I called impossible) are very different when looking forward in time, from what they are looking backward int time, due to the reality of "the actual world". Once you introduce in "the actual world", you are compelled to abide by the limitations this concept imposes. This implies that we cannot apply the same principles of logic to the past as we do to the future. So any logic which attempts to extend the past into the future must respect this difference.

So there is no contradiction here. — Banno

The possibility of contradiction we were discussing, was in the case of applying modal logic to the future. Your example is of the past, and due to the difference I just explained, that example is irrelevant to this matter. So, to put it in plain simple terms, Caesar stands in front of the Rubicon in 48BC, that being "now" for Caesar. Caesar considers the following: "in one world I cross", "in another world I do not cross". The designations of one possible world and another, are irrelevant, because these are not separate worlds, only separate thoughts for that man. Clearly, Caesar considers contradictory thoughts, at the same time, "I cross", "I do not cross". Why would anyone want to place these contradictory thoughts into separate possible worlds, to create the illusion that there is no contradiction going on, just for the purpose of hiding the reality that decision making involves contradiction? The fact of the matter is that contradiction is inherent to decision making and we need to respect this fact, rather than trying to hide it through a separation of distinct worlds.

Do you not see how we might wish to assess that claim, despite it being temporally impossible for me to go back in time and miss the train, but it not being metaphysically impossible? That is, a possible world exists where I missed the train, but I actually caught it in the actual world.

We are assessing a real world concern - what might have been, despite that event not having happened. We call that a counterfactual. Where do counterfactuals occur? In possible worlds. Ta da! — Hanover

I agree, that counterfactuals are useful in some circumstances. Probably their usefulness is not as substantial as many people believe, because examples like yours, and Banno's, are pretty much useless examples, where counterfactual use just plunges us into imaginary worlds, with imaginary principles of connectedness, fantasy having no bearing on reality. I believe though, that they are useful in some form of probability context, producing artificial (AI perhaps) statistics or something like that. But even this is a bit deceptive because artificially produced statistics are not real statistics, therefore that type of use may be misleading.

Anyway, that's a digression. The point I am trying to bring to Banno's attention, is that "possible worlds" interpretation is useful when looking backward in time, to create (supposed) realities which are distinct from the actual reality (therefore actually impossible even though they are called "possible", by my description above), but this usefulness depends on the assumption of an "actual world" for comparison purposes.

But, when we look forward in time, the "possible worlds" interpretation is not at all applicable, and actually might be very misleading ontologically. This is because, amongst the multitude of supposed "possible worlds" there is no actual world, that would be fatalism. Therefore each world must start with a basic objective equivalence to every other world. Then, to weight the worlds according to probability, we must assume an actual world in the past, and apply inductive principles of probability, according to how we understand time to unfold. Further, we must consider what our own freely willed actions can and cannot influence, by way of preference. Therefore the situation is very complex.

The critical point is that our "preference" already enters into the descriptive practices which constitute the described "actual world", as prejudice, and simply the nature of language use and its evolved freedoms and limitations. This means that the basic and fundamental equivalence o the relation between possible worlds and the assumed actual world, which is required as the foundation for future possible worlds, is impossible to establish. The "actual world" is already weighted. Therefore instead of "possible worlds" as the starting point when looking toward the future, we need to hand priority to "preferred worlds" when looking toward the future, because this provides a better representation of reality.

No. It's what "necessity" is. Something is necessarily so if it could not have been otherwise.

And more. Check out the SEP article on modal logic and you will see that the modal framework can be use din deontological and temporal situations; indeed, it has a general applicability. So those alternate"senses" you want to appeal to are also well catered for by modal logic. — Banno

Aren't you contradicting yourself? First you say "It's what necessity is". Then you say that alternate senses are catered to as well. If there are other senses, then clearly that one sense is not "what necessity is".

Not if p(x)⊃□p(x), which is what you claimed at the start. :roll:

The bit in which you change your claims, not to correct yourself but to contradict those who point out your own errors.

I don't know if you are sincere or just a contrarian bot.

But there is a reason I usually ignore your posts. — Banno

You still don't understand what I am saying about the relevance of time. Looking backward in time, all things are necessary. Looking forward in time, all things are possible. This implies that all things at the present, i.e. "what is", are contingent, meaning dependent on something else, for existence. Being dependent on something else for existence ( a cause) i.e. being contingent, does not imply that once it exists its existence is not necessary. To the contrary, as we say, a contingent thing's existence is necessitated by its causes, implying that once caused, its existence is necessary. The fact that it is necessary once caused does not prevent us from classifying it as a contingent thing, because that cause itself was not necessary at that time.

If you disagree with the proposition in the question, you allow for possible other worlds. — Hanover

By your restriction of "necessary", I disagree. I didn't read the symbols, only the interpretation in words, and the sense of "necessary" I was using was what you call "temporal necessity".

But, I still don't see how you claim the nature of time is irrelevant to the application and interpretation of modal logic. Logic is useless if not applied to the real world, therefore the real nature of time is highly relevant.

No, you don't agree with the question I posed due to the nature of time because the nature of time has nothing to do with the question i asked.

Metaphysical necessity means things could not have been different -- full stop -- period. Temporal necessity means things are fixed once done.

So, standing at the Rubicon, must Cesaer cross? Just yes or no.

And of course that event is now in the past, but that doesn't change the analysis. Metaphysical necessity would mean it could not have been but the way it was. If that's what you're saying, you're speaking deterministic/ fatalistic language.

But, if you do agree with the statement p(x)⊃□p(x), even if it's for an invalid reason, you reject modal logic and you accept fatalism. That's just the necessary consequence. — Hanover

You present me with two senses of "necessity" then you limit yourself to one. I accept temporal necessity, past things are fixed, but I reject metaphysical necessity. I accept that things could have been otherwise. How do you conclude that this means I reject modal logic?

You're just showing the consequences of pure hard determinism. That is, If I would have worn a blue shirt and not the red one I actually wore, I would not be me because I am the thing that was to wear a red shirt. That's who I am. All properties in your analysis are essential, and there is no rigid me, so loss of the shirt I was to wear creates a whole new identity. — Hanover

It's not determinism at all, it's what you called "temporal necessity". You are the person who actually wore the red shirt. That is true fact, which cannot be otherwise. This does not imply that it could not have been otherwise. You having worn the blue shirt is an imaginary scenario. And, we can talk about that imaginary scenario as a counterfactual. This is a statement about the past, at the present time, and the fact that you wore the red shirt cannot be changed at this time. This does not imply that at that past time, before you chose which shirt to wear, you were destined to wear the red one. You had free choice and possibility at that time. Just because it's a true and necessary fact right now, which cannot be changed, that you wore the red shirt yesterday, does not imply that you were destined to wear that shirt. The nature of time is relevant.

The past has been determined, the future has not been determined. On what premise do you conclude that just because we cannot change that fact, that you wore the red shirt, and this is a necessary aspect of the object I call "you", that you wore the red shirt yesterday, we must also conclude that yesterday, before you chose to do that, it was necessary that you chose the red. There is nothing to support that conclusion unless we premise that past and future have the same type of properties. This is the point, the past is substantially different from the future, we must respect this fact, therefore logic applied to the past must be different from logic applied to the future. They are substantiated differently.

About the "law of identity": You do realize you're begging the question of what the entity is that's supposed to be "the same"? If you understand "Jill" to refer to every single component and property of the person designated as Jill -- "all properties, essential and accidental" -- at the time of designation, T1, then yes, anything that isn't that "Jill" will not be "the same." But that isn't in any way a proof that there are no other ways to understand what "Jill" refers to. You can't say this is true "by the law of identity." And indeed, this extreme version -- molecule-to-molecule identity -- is most unlikely to be invoked in any ordinary discourse I can think of. — J

The law of identity refers to the thing, not its parts. It is not proven, but a fundamental assumption, taken as a sort of self-evident truth. However, some philosophers see reasons to reject it. Perhaps you do too. But when it is rejected, individuation becomes arbitrary because we do not allow that there are real, true principles of unity which constitute "a thing". And that is contrary to empirical observation, as we see unified things.

So now you allow for necessary truths that could have been otherwise. That's not what a necessary truth is. — Banno

That's what you think. Hanover has already distinguished two senses of necessity, and there are more. I think that a proper understanding of contingency will reveal to you that as much as all things are contingent, the past causes, which caused the existence of the current contingent things are necessary for their current existence. And, since all things are contingent, your sense of "necessary truth", as a thing which could not have been otherwise, is an ideal which is irrelevant to actual existence, as something impossible. All things could have been otherwise, unless you conclude a necessary being like God. But this has little, if any, bearing on the fact that they cannot be other than they have been.

Events in the past are not necessarily true. They still might have been otherwise. — Banno

In order to properly represent the true nature of time, there are subtle differences of language which we must respect. "X could have been otherwise", and "X is necessarily true" are not inconsistent. This is because "could have been" refers to the past, and "is" refers to the present time. So, at that past time referred to by "could have been", things could have happened differently. But now, 'that ship has sailed' (as they say), and what occurred is necessarily the case.

It makes sense to discuss such possibilities, and to make inferences about them. So if you had not written that post, I would not be writing this reply. That's a sound argument. The sort of sound argument that your system denies. — Banno

Why do you think I deny that? I haven't proposed a system. I'm just pointing out potential problems of application and interpretation of modal logic.

This is the difference between applying modal logic to the past, and applying it to the future, which I have been explaining. We can talk about the possible different pasts, like if I had not written the last post, but we respect the fact that I did write that post. So there is an actual past, which I described as "necessary", and we respect that as a true fact. This is not a "system", it's just a description of how we understand the nature of time.

However, I can look to the future, and consider the possibility of deleting, and therefore not posting this post. In this case, looking toward the future, there is no actual 'necessary' fact, no truth to the matter. I might either post or not post. Therefore the application of modal logic toward the future must be interpreted in a way which is completely different from the way that the application of modal logic to the past is interpreted.

Well, here we just must agree to disagree. This is not what. I take as identity. Me in a red shirt is the me in a blue shirt. If you require this sort of identity, then we can't initiate a conversation of possible worlds for analysis of hypothetical claims. — Hanover

I'm just adhering to the law of identity, (a thing is the same as itself), and I am attempting to maintain its intended meaning. In the meantime, I ought to out that many common modern definitions of "identity" by logicians, are inconsistent with the law of identity. There are some people on this forum for example, who argue that "=" in mathematics signifies identity, such that "2+2" has the same identity as "4".

To take your example, the object referred to by "me", takes off the red shirt, and puts on the blue shirt, and you maintain your identity as the same object. "Identity", by the law of identity, allows for changes over time, because it puts the identity of the thing within the thing itself. If we make identity what we say about the thing, rather than placing it within the thing, then we can arbitrarily decide which features are essential to the thing, such as wearing a red shirt perhaps. Then we might distinguish the person with the red shirt, from all the others with different coloured shirts, and 'identify' the person that way. That's a pragmatic sense, it serves the purpose. However, if someone else comes along with a red shirt, then there is a problem. So, the law of identity provides a much more rigorous form of identity by putting the identity right into the object itself, the substance, and so we general identify through the observed temporal continuity of the object.

I do not see why you think that insisting on proper adherence to "identity" removes the possibility of modal logic. As I've been arguing, it's only a matter of how modal logic is interpreted. Even in traditional propositional logic, the name is a subject, not an object, and predication involves a subject and predicate. If our subject is "Hanover", we can make all sorts of predications, and there is no need for an object which conforms. Hanover could be imaginary. It's only in the interpretation, when we judge for truth, that we take an object which is supposed to correspond with this subject. The fundamental three laws apply to how we judge for truth, this means that they apply to the interpretation of the premises.

So, all that matters is that we maintain the proper separation between subject and object. In the case of modal logic, the subject is completely abstract, imaginary. There is no corresponding object, as I explained in the last post, and relations to any true existing object must be established by other premises, which escape the judgement of truth or falsity. That's the principal point, we cannot judge the premises by truth and falsity, because they are possibilities.

Rather than saying it is a problem of modal logic, I believe it is a problem to be found more in the way that traditional propositional logic has been corrupted in many interpretations. Many interpretations do not make the subject/object distinction, assuming that the name is an object, and truth is taken for granted. Then interpretations of modal logic are confused with interpretation of propositional logic because there is no more subject/object distinction. Once this happens we have no way to distinguish imaginary conceptual "objects" from real substantial "objects".

You don't have two yous simultaneously in a given world. You're comparing separate workds. — Hanover

The interpretation of "separate worlds" is irrelevant. If the rigid designator signifies "the same object", when you are talking about two different objects (in different worlds or whatever) then the law of identity, is violated, regardless of how you want to attempt to justify it. That is the purpose of the law of identity, it puts identity into the substance, and puts an end to all such sophistry. You can continue in your description of same person in different worlds, and deny the law of identity. Some philosophers, like Hegel, denied that law's usefulness usefulness, and simply proceeded without it. But I think it's a good idea to recognize the difference, and understand when the law of identity is being followed, and when it is not.

The fictionalization of the multiple worlds is assumed for the purposes of performing the logic (except by some who take rather extreme untenable views), meaning you're attempting to impose far too much ontological status on the worlds . — Hanover

The assumption of separate worlds is not at all necessary for the purpose of the logic. It is assumed for interpretive purposes only. We can assume separate possibilities instead of separate worlds, and this is a more appropriate interpretation, because it doesn't give a specific possibility the status of being a world.

Well sure, you can dispense with all formal logic and still make decisions, argue, and philosophize fully. The point of symbologic logic is to create a methodology to test your reasoning, but if we forget the whole rigamarole, I agree, that does simplify our discussion about whether to grab an umbrella. — Hanover

The formal logic which deals with possibilities does not require that we interpret each specified possibility as a distinct world. That is what produces the interpretive problem, because then you want to put the same object (rigid designator) into different worlds, and that's nonsense. We need to respect the reality that these are simply distinct possibilities, not separate worlds. It creates the interpretive difficulty, because then you want to place the same object (rigid designator) in different worlds. But that's inconsistency, because if its different worlds it ought to be different objects as well. And this is only overcome by employing arbitrary principles of sameness.

Well, that frames the issue and maybe it's been asked before, but if not, allow me:

@Metaphysician Undercover, do you agree p(x)⊃□p(x) (if something is true, it must necessarily be true)? — Hanover

It doesn't really frame the issue, because I have no system here, I am simply pointing out the difference between two distinct systems, not promoting one or the other. One system leads to fatalism, yes, but that's not "my system".

I agree that what is true is necessarily true, that is due to the nature of time, what has been done cannot be undone. And that's what I told Banno above, at the beginning of this post where I discuss "could have been different". Banno wants to ignore the reality of the difference between past and future, and make "could have been different" equivalent to "could be different", such that what is the case, what is true is not necessarily true. This leads to a lack of distinction between future possibilities, and past necessities, which could also be represented as possibilities, such as in the use of counterfactuals.

First let's look at the idea of ontological grounding. What we want is for an explanation as to why the world is as it is, and not some other way. If something could have been otherwise, it cannot explain why something is necessarily the case. So any ontological grounding must be necessary. But then it would be the same in every possible world. And in that case, it could not explain why this world is as it is. — Banno

I don't think I agree with this. The nature o time explains both, why things could have been otherwise, and also why whatever is, is necessarily the case. Everything which has reached the present and is progressing into the past is necessarily the case. The past cannot be changed. However, the future is full of possibility, so there was the possibility that before the last bit of time passed, different possibilities could have been actualized, therefore things could have been otherwise.

What this means is that the law of non-contradiction is not violated when you have an Einstein across different worlds because the entire modal structure demands he be different across differing worlds in non-essential ways. — Hanover

Then it's not a true "rigid designator", if this means "the same individual". By the law of identity, "same" means having all the same properties, essential and accidental. So, all you are saying is that the so-called "rigid designator" does not identify the same individual, but similar individuals, individuals of the same type, sharing essential properties. Saying that they are "the same" when there is differences would be a violation of the law of identity, so the "rigid designator" violates the law of identity i it defines "the same" individual.

But what I've been telling you is that it's not a problem for modal logic. It doesn't mean modal logic collapses, it just means modal logic inconsistent with those other three laws of logic which stipulate what we can truthfully say about a thing. But modal logic is intended to be applied toward possibility, not truth, so they have different fields of application. So there is no problem. That is, unless someone wants to try and make them consistent with each other, conflate the fields of application, then that person creates an unnecessary problem for oneself.

Let's forget this possible worlds interpretation of modal logic for the moment, because it's just a distraction, and get right to the point. Let's consider the reality of decision making, when a person considers distinct and contrary possibilities in the act of deliberation. When I deliberate, I put myself into distinct and contrary situations, as distinct possibilities (possible worlds). I consider myself bringing an umbrella, and I consider myself not bringing an umbrella. Clearly I am considering two contradictory scenarios, which I mull over at much the same time. In my deliberation, it makes no sense to ask which one is the case, which one is true, because it is my decision which will determine that. I am not concerned with what is true.

What I think, is that it's not really me, in either one of those contrary scenarios, it's just an imaginary me. Therefore the supposed person in the two contrary scenarios, really has no identity at all. Identity is something which things have. Imaginary things do not have an identity. This is similar to the "me" in a dream, it's not the real me, it's an imaginary me. The two versions of "me", in tomorrow's scenario, are in no way the real me, with my identity, as they are just imaginary, no different from if I imagined that tomorrow I was the president of the United States. The mistaken interpretation of modal logic is in the assumption that the objects in these possible scenarios have identity as real objects.

If we let go of this idea, that the imaginary thing has an identity, (the me of tomorrow who in one version carries an umbrella, and in another does not carry an umbrella, or could even be the PotUS), then it's very easy to understand the real nature of possibility, and the usefulness of modal logic. What we are considering is possibilities, and identity, along with truth and falsity have no bearing whatsoever. And when we work with the logic of possibilities what guides the decision is what we ought to conclude, not what is true or false.

You go a bit far... — Jamal

I generally do.

I do not completely dismiss the reciprocity between the conscious and unconscious, but I've come to think of it as more one way. Vast information goes from conscious to unconscious, continually, in the practice of memory for example. But I realize that the brain is extremely complex in its processes, and administering to consciousness is really only a small part of its functions. This means that everything else which it is doing, continually overseeing, directing, and synchronizing all the internal living systems, must be prioritized over consciousness, as being the major aspect of the brain's activities. This leaves consciousness just as a sort of tip of the iceberg, which raises the question of why all the rest is hidden from the consciousness. The consciousness only receives a vague hint of what the brain is doing with the rest of the body, through pleasures, pains, and the various emotions. Why the separation?

I like to think about the role that intention plays in art. We tend to think of intention as a direct conscious awareness of a specific goal, guiding the actions toward that goal. But there is an experiment which an artist can do, which is to select a medium, attempt to eliminate all conscious intentions from one's mind, and simply create. The only real consciously directed intention is in the selection of the medium, and the intention to have no intention. Then the guidance of one's actions arises immediately from one's unconscious, and the direction is sort of like dreaming. The inverse of lucid dreaming, instead of taking entering the dream with the consciousness, allow the waking activity to be subsumed by the unconscious.

Experiments like that demonstrate to me, that even in our day to day conscious activity, a vast part o that conscious activity is actually directed by the unconscious. And when we analyze what motivates us in general, why we strive to meet deadlines, fulfil social obligations, etc., it becomes apparent that the unconscious aspect of "intention" plays a much larger role than the conscious. Even if a person is very focused, and driven towards a very specific goal, it is not the conscious mind which keeps the person focused, but the underlying unconscious. So the more that a person is goal oriented, driven toward conscious goals, it's actually the case that the unconscious aspect is playing a bigger role as the cause of that capacity to remain focused on conscious goals, to be determined.

So I've theorized that the conscious self, is actually an inauthentic "self" which the unconscious creates, and pushes out into the world of activity in a sort of trial and error process, where the unconscious is recording the results in memory. The unconscious is the authentic self, and there is a sort of antinomy between it and the conscious (rational/irrational as Adorno says). But it's just the conscious which sets the rational as better than the irrational. The unconscious must distance itself as much as possible from the conscious, because it sets the conscious into a life of self abuse, for reasons which cannot be revealed to the conscious (like Plato's noble lie, in the context of self-deception), and that's what life on earth consists of, as the conscious difference between pleasure and pain and how that is actually conditioned, or derived from the unconscious.

The claim that "I get wet and do not get wet" violates the law of noncontradiction misunderstands how modal logic works. These are not simultaneous truths in a single world, but distinct evaluations across possible worlds, which is actually the reason modal logic exists. The law of noncontradiction applies within worlds, not between them. — Hanover

"Possible worlds" is an interpretive term, and it's really irrelevant. It makes no sense to speak of a world which is possible. They are not actually distinct worlds, just distinct possibilities. And it is the human mind which conceptualizes distinct possibilities from the realm of future possibility. The employment of distinct imaginary "worlds" does nothing but add confusion.

So, let's look at these possibilities without the confusion created by that nonsensical idea of "possible worlds". Banno suggested two possible modes of interpretation. One had a rigid designator, in which case "I" in each possibility (or possible world, if you really must) signified the very same individual. This clearly violates the law of noncontradiction because we are talking about the same object at the same time, tomorrow. In the other case, the two instances of "I" are not the same, but similar. In this case we have no identified object, only similar objects and the classical rules are simple not applicable.

Additionally, the entirety of the "different worlds" enterprise must be jettisoned and the resultant collapse of modal logic as well if we follow out your logic. The term "different" as applied here by you includes any dissimilarity whatsoever, even the simple fact they are in different locations. That is, it is impossible under your reasoning to have any metaphysically related universes because everything within each one would be relevantly different. — Hanover

"Different worlds", and "different universes", are nonsensical and misleading conceptions. "Universe" by definition includes all that is. "Possibilities" are completely distinct, and categorically different from the world, or the universe. It makes no sense to talk about possibilities as if they are real beings, living somewhere in different worlds. The different worlds referred to here as "possible worlds" are nothing but conceptual structures, designed to deal with the reality of possibility. Possibility is something general, and when we conceptualize it as distinct possibilities, those specific determinations, this possibility and that possibility are purely conceptual. Speaking of a possibility as existing somewhere as a world, is no different from speaking of numbers, and other conceptions as existing in some Platonic realm of Forms somewhere. This is totally misleading and confusing. As distinct possibilities is not a realistic representation of "future possibility", it is a product of the imagination

To make my point clearer: Suppose you had Universe #1, and within it you get wet and in Universe #2, you also get wet. In fact, every single thing within #1 and #2 are the "same," they would still not bear any metaphysical relationship to each other because they are all necessarily different since they occupy different time and space. That is, #1 and #2 do not collapse into being the same thing because they are not identical under your view. They are just curiously similar. — Hanover

This interpretation makes the problem even worse. We have truth about the past, and the actual world, as well as the actual universe, and truth about now. One world, and one universe. From what you are saying, the future consists of a whole multitude of universes, possibilities. You say the separate universes would bear no metaphysical relationship on each other, but this is not true. They must all relate to the one actual (true) world at the present, or else they are simply arbitrary fictions. But possibilities are not arbitrary. Therefore they must share a time and space, as they all must relate to the true here and now.

The reason why I say it makes the problem worse, is because now we need to define how these many possibilities (universes) relate to the here and now (the true). The principle which relates them must be absolutely fair and equal to all of them, or else we'd be assigning arbitrary, or subjective preference, to one over the others. But this is logic, so it needs to be objective, therefore the relationship between the actual, true, here and now, and those other universes, must be based in principles which are fair and equal. Clearly it makes no sense to talk about these distinct possibilities as different universes in different time and space, because all the possibilities must be directly related to the true universe, here and now through equal principles. And, it would be very misleading, if not downright false to speak as if there is no metaphysical relationship between them.

When we chart out all possible worlds, under your reasoning, an infinite number could be the same in every apparent regard because you deny the concept of rigid designation in theory.

This is to say that if you deny a rigid designation for "I," you must do it for all things. That means that not only does the fact that you're not the same you in #1 and #2, the rain isn't the same in #1 and #2. They must be different. You can't have a different you in #1 and #2 and share the same rain. When we say it will rain in #1, while that sounds like any old generic rain will do, if we were being more precise, we'd describe the exact identity of the rain that would strike you in #1 versus #2.

This I suggest is the logical consequence of demanding cross universe consistency. — Hanover

I suggest that denying rigid designation is what allows for the reality of different possibilities. This is what you would call inconsistency between distinct universes, which is not actually inconsistency if it's not actually the same object across distinct possibilities. So, what appears like inconsistency, when we apply rigid designation, is not inconsistency if we remove rigid designation.

What I propose is that there is no individual, no object, indicated by "I" in any described future possibility, just like there is no world in "possible world". Since this is a an imaginary scenario, everything about it is a possibility, even the existence of I, and the supposed universe or world. What "I" or "universe" indicates is a possible entity, and that means it is a concept only. And, a concept does not have identity like an object, nor do the same laws of truth or falsity apply to concepts, which apply to objects with an identity. The laws which apply to conceptions are axioms which are designed for the specific system of logic, like those of mathematics. So there are different types of logic which deal with building conceptual structures like mathematics, modal logic, etc., and these types are completely different from propositional logic which is applied toward describing and understanding empirical objects. The two are not at all compatible, because the former is based in truth, the latter possibility. This is because empirical observations are always in the past, and possibilities are in the future, and there is a substantial difference between these two. Relating these two at the present is a significant philosophical problem which has one form of manifestation as the is/ought gap.

But back to the classic versus modal logic discussion:

If in classic logic I say:

All glurgs are glogs
I am a glurg
Therefore I am a glog

That is true, despite the fact there is no referent for any of this gibberish. That is why we can use symbols to represent these entities because their existence is irrelevant for the analysis. — Hanover

We ought to distinguish "true" from "valid" here. The argument is valid, but we still need to question the truth of the premises. If we accept the first as true, we still need to assess the second. This is where the law of identity, and the other two laws come into play, in assessing the truth or falsity of the premises. We have an object signified by "I", and the premise states "I am a glug". By the law of identity, there is a truth to what "I" is, which inheres within that object itself. . So there clearly is a referent, and the soundness of the conclusion is very much dependent on the accuracy of the description of the referent.

If we change the second premise to "tomorrow I will be a glurg", then my argument is that the referent is swallowed up by possibility, such that there is no referent. I can say "yesterday I was a glurg", and there is an actual truth or falsity, a referent at that time, but that is not the case with the future. Any supposed object signified by "I" may be annihilated before tomorrow, so "I" does not signify an object with identity in this case. Now, the logic of truth and falsity cannot serve us.

The issue then becomes providing a definition of "possible," as you allow for pure meaningless formality under classic logic but not under modal logic. Since "possible" is the only new thing inserted, that must be the reason you treat these two systems different. What you then do is require metaphysical grounding in order for the possible to occur, but that I challenge. You no more need semantical validity for modal logic to work than classic. It's good to have semantically meaningful statements, but not required. — Hanover

The issue is not the validity of the logic itself. The question is one of truth and falsity. That is why I keep insisting it's a problem of interpreting and applying the logic, not a problem of the logic itself. And, truth and falsity are metaphysically grounded in the object spoken about. That is what the fundamental three laws are concerned with, what we can say truthfully say about objects.

We can remove all metaphysical grounding from "possible", but that's what I explained to Banno would produce complete arbitrariness. To produce the conceptual structure of possibility (possible worlds if you wish), we must remove the grounding of truth and falsity. But then Banno wanted to sneak truth and falsity back in, as applicable within possibility (a specific possible world), and this is an arbitrary rule. If we remove the metaphysical grounding of truth and falsity, to create a logic of possibility, then we need some other form of metaphysical grounding for this realm of possibility. To go back to truth and falsity is a step in the wrong direction. So we start with something like absolute equality and fairness (as in mathematics) between all possibilities, the we need to weight them according to the truth of here and now. And in decision making, principles of preference.

So my my view, but that agreed to by the body of people who have looked into such issues. — Banno

I think you know by now, that I tend to disagree with a good number of so-called bodies of people. I don't follow mob rules, nor do I blindly accept authority.

I, and others, have. — Banno

Actually, Hanover clearly agreed with me, that modal logic when applied to future possibility is not consistent with classical logic. So it is really you who refuses to look at your own errors, which have been pointed out to you. Instead, you simply assert that I am wrong, and that it is a waste of your time discussing this with me. While we could be progressing toward discussing the actual points of understanding/misunderstanding where we disagree, and hammering out what that difference amounts to, you simply refuse to accept fundamental facts, leaving us unable to proceed.

What I see in Lecture 9 is an overall goal of apprehending the creative aspect of thinking. It is an "intrinsic aspect of irrationality" which is essential to rationality This aspect is demonstrated in play, and art, which are wider categories than philosophy, but it manifests in philosophy as the intuitive and the speculative. The goal of Adorno here, is to produce a sort of basic understanding of this aspect of thought, through the type of "circling around it" which @Jamal describes.

The creative aspect of thought is extremely difficult to provide an explanation for, especially if we reject idealism. And, we must reject idealism because it is fundamentally flawed. The creative aspect presents us with an aspect of thought which is not grounded in sense experience, but somehow extends beyond sense experience. The idealist approach is flawed because it is a sort of cop-out, instead of trying to understand the truth about this type of thought, it simply assumes an overarching "Spirit" or something like that, to account or it.

I can elucidate the problem with idealism by referring to current concepts of Platonism. Platonism avoids the need to understand the origin of concepts (creativity) by positing that ideas are eternal and independent. The glaring problem is called the interaction problem, and we are left with no way to understand how the human mind is supposed to tap into the eternal independent ideas, and get these concepts into one's own mind. So that's the fault with idealism in general, it does not provide an approach toward understanding the reality of creativity, it simply provides an excuse to avoid it.

What Adorno points out in this lecture, is that this type of idealist evasion, this "spiritualization of the world" is pervasive in modern philosophy. Hegel employs "World Spirit". Kant has "original apperception". And, Adorno argues that even Marx may be considered idealist with his use of "forces of production".

My own opinion is that all forms of materialism are reducible to idealism. This is because "matter" itself is nothing more than a concept which we employ to understand the temporal extension of the sensible world. Therefore giving priority to matter is giving priority to a concept. With rigorous analysis of the term "matter" it is dissolved into "indeterminateness", Aristotle's 'prime matter' being total lack of form. So indeterminateness is necessarily conceptual only, for the reasons explained in lecture 6. Therefore placing priority in matter as a starting point, is no different from placing priority in indeterminateness, and both of the two are demonstrably idealist approaches. Marx presents his materialism as showing the true nature of Hegel's idealism as supportive of a more basic underlying materialism. But actually, this materialism is swallowed up into idealism when its true nature is exposed, and Marx's spin doesn't succeed in getting him out of idealism.

In Kant and Hegel, philosophy shrinks to a finite, complete set of principles or axioms that is supposed to encapsulate the infinite, everything that exists — Jamal

This is sort of ridiculed, as trying to "enclose the infinite in a finite network of axioms". It's another instance of narrowness, the "provinciality" which he dislikes. In general, a finite system of categories, like Kant's cannot provide us with secure knowledge.

Mortals must think mortal thoughts, and not immortal ones: if philosophy possesses anything at all, then it can only be finite, and not infinite — Jamal

Only by accepting, and approaching our own narrowmindedness, "reflect upon our own provinciality" can we rid ourselves o that narrowmindedness. This produces an open philosophy rather than a sytematic one.

So we need an open philosophy, not a systematic one — Jamal

However, we must also avoid the type of openness of Lebensphilosopie. This leads to a mollusc-like arbitrariness, where objects are approached openly, but with the intent of manipulating them to the philosopher's purpose.

Intellectual experience: — Jamal

The motor of an experience of this sort, of what drives a person
to seek this sort of intellectual experience – and this is what counts
above all in philosophy – is the admittedly unwarranted, vague,
obscure expectation that every singular and particular that it encounters
ultimately represents the totality that constantly eludes it — p83

This is oddly reminiscent of Aquinas' approach to the divinity. Every single material thing is evidence of the unapprehended divinity which has created it. But Adorno approaches infinity, or the infinite this way, as the gateway to intellectual experience.

Comparison with art, which does something similar — Jamal

I would say that what is described here is that a work of art has infinite meaning. But, it is only by analyzing each minute, finite aspect of meaning, that we move progressively toward an objective knowledge of the true meaning (notice "authentic works of art" is indicated.

I suggest that this process involves a sort of process of elimination, of determining false meaning. And that is how the initial infinite meaning is brought into the finite sphere, by determining falsity. This starts with determining impossibility. It is distinctly different from the scientific process which is positive, this is negative. The intellectual experience is contrasted with the pointedly non-intellectual experience of the empirical sciences.

I wouldn't have to repeat myself if you could show me where I am wrong, instead of just insisting that I am wrong. In fact I would greatly appreciate it. Clearing up errors is always a good thing.

The semantics of possible worlds just says that we understand "it is possible that it will rain tomorrow" as stipulating for our consideration two possible worlds, W₀ in which it is true that it rains tomorrow, and W₁ in which it is true that it doesn't rain tomorrow. There is no contradiction. — Banno

If there is a rigid designator, such as "I" who gets wet, and I who does not get wet, then there is contradiction. If, W₀ and W₁ are distinct subjects, one with the property of rain, and one without, then the law of identity no longer applies to "our world", which is the actual world from the past to now. It divides into a multitude of possible worlds at the moment of the present, so there can no longer be identity. Without an object with identity the other two laws do not apply.

It's not the first time I've pointed this out to you.

Added: "It is possible that it will rain tomorrow" just says that there is a possible world in which it rains tomorrow. And this is true, and therefor "It is possible that it will rain tomorrow" has a truth value. — Banno

That's an absolutely meaningless sense of "truth". By this standard, I could make any combination of words and claim this is true therefore it has a truth value.

The issue is that the meaning (content) of the words must be distinguished from the form of the proposition. So, "possible" must be assigned a meaning, in order that we do not equivocate between "past possibility", and "future possibility", which leads to fatalism. I'm accustomed to your response to this criticism, which is to deny a distinction between words and meaning, form and content, but that's nonsense as the reality of ambiguity and equivocation demonstrates.

"It is possible that it will rain and not rain tomorrow" is false, since there is no possible world in which it both rains and does not rain. — Banno

That's an arbitrary designation. As explained above, a "possible world" cannot have identity as an object because it represents one of many possible contradictory states of an object which has identity. It's simply an imaginary entity, without an identity, therefore the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle cannot be applied, and any designations as to what is acceptable and what is not acceptable are arbitrary.

And this adds to your idea, Hanover, in that such things only ever happen in impossible worlds, and so "It is possible that it will rain and not rain tomorrow" is false in all the possible worlds, but perhaps true in some impossible world... — Banno

Again, that's an arbitrary designation of impossibility. If we analyze this supposed impossibility, we will see that any possible world must divide into further possible worlds at the moment of the present, as we do with our actual world to account for the reality of the future. Therefore, any possible world could be divided into two further possible worlds, one in which it rains tomorrow, and one in which it does not. And so, your designation which states that it is impossible to have a possible world in which it both rains and does not rain tomorrow, is a completely arbitrary restriction which you apply to the understanding of possible worlds. You allow the actual world to divide into possible worlds, to account for future possibilities, but you do not allow a possible world to divide into further possible worlds to allow for future possibilities in that possible world. What sense does it make to deny the reality of the future from all possible worlds? In reality, the only true restrictions to possible worlds are the limitations of the capacity of imagination. Those are restrictions of content and ought not be confused with formal restrictions.

Well, then, best you stop posting about logic, don't you think? — Banno

No, this is how we move forward by degrees, through an exchange of ideas. And opinions about logic are just as informative as opinions in other subjects, even though my opinion is that no one really understands logic.

Alright, I'll set out the basics and tell me where we disagree:

The fatalism issue arises in classic logic and is cured by modal logic. — Hanover

I don't think we disagree. The fatalism issue may be cured by modal logic. However, if one interprets modal logic as consistent with classical logic (as Banno seems to), then the fatalism issue reappears.

1. It is necessary that if it rains tomorrow, I will get wet
2. It is possible that it will rain tomorrow
It is possible I will get wet.

There is no fatalism because #2 is possible, not necessary. — Hanover

So, depending on how "possible" in #2 is interpreted fatalism may or may not be implied. If fatalism is not implied by one's interpretation, the three classical laws are violated in one way or another.

If we interpret "possible" when referring to the future, in the same way that we do with past possibilities, where we assume that one of the possible worlds is actual, as in the "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" example, then we have fatalism.

If we interpret two possible worlds, one with rain, and one without rain, with "I" as a rigid designator, then the law of noncontradiction is violated, because "I" gets wet and does not get wet, at the same time. The qualification of "different worlds" is just a facade to hide the contradiction. If we look at what Banno called "counterpart theory", then we have no continuity of the object "I", from the present time into the future, only possible similar objects in the future, therefore the law of identity is not applicable.

The conclusion therefore, is that modal logic provides an escape from fatalism, but only if it is applied and interpreted in a way which is conducive to this escape. That way of interpretation is to recognize that the classical laws of logic are not compatible. This is because it is the idea that these classical laws are applicable to the future which produces the fatalist mentality.

This is what Banno said:

The trouble here is that modal logic subsumes propositional logic. They are not inconsistent. — Banno

What I say is that the meaning of "possible" in #2 "It is possible that it will rain tomorrow" indicates that "it will rain tomorrow", cannot have a truth value. It could have a probability, but not truth. This is because the corresponding reality referred to by "possible" in this usage does not admit to truth or falsity. Therefore modal logic and propositional logic are not consistent.

It really would help if you were to read about and try to understand logic rather than just dispensing your wisdom. — Banno

Hey, if I've got wisdom, it's best that I dispense it. And it would be best for you to pay attention. Fuck the logic, it doesn't qualify as wisdom so why waste time trying to understand it, when all that has ever done is produce faulty interpretations. It's best to leave logic as it is, impossible to understand.

When Hegel writes about the indeterminate, he is not talking about beings, as in individual objects, but about what is indeterminate. In using the adjective indeterminate one grammatically points to a substantive, a logical something awaiting determination—but this is lost when he moves to indeterminateness, because the latter is a free-standing abstract quality, a universal. It's a subtle shift from a realist grammar to an idealist grammar, even though the whole time he's just talking about being. It's more a linguistic point than one about identity. — Jamal

What you call "a logical something awaiting determination" is actually a material thing, that constitutes what is called by Adorno "a substratum". Notice, "the concept of the indeterminate does not distinguish between concept and thing". This is because "indeterminate" in concept, implies no thing. This allows that the thing which is named as "the indeterminate", is negated by the self-contradicting concept, to leave only the concept. So the concept of "indeterminate" does not differentiate between concept and thing, but since it cannot be a thing, it can only be a concept.

Hegel intended to bypass Aristotle's law of identity, as indicated in my early discussion with Jersey Flight, referenced above. The law of identity puts the identity of the thing in the thing itself, by saying that to be a thing is to have an identity. Now Hegel uses a trick (I'd say sophistry) to replace the thing which has an inherent identity, with "the indeterminate", which Adorno takes to mean a lack of determination. But since to be a thing is to be determinate, and therefore to have an inherent identity, Hegel robs identity from the material world by saying it is not necessary that the material world consists of determinate things. Determinate things, things with identity, can be replaced with "the indeterminate" as the substratum. But the indeterminate is really nothing, no thing, and as such it can only be a concept, it cannot be something material. This actually denies the intelligibility of the substratum, leaving the concept of "indeterminateness", and puts identity into the concept rather than the thing.

Just reflect for a moment on the difference between ‘the indeterminate’ and
‘indeterminateness’. The language is right to make a distinction here.
‘The indeterminate’ is in the nature of a substratum. To be sure, the
concept of the indeterminate does not distinguish between concept
and thing, but precisely because there has been no determination the
distinction between the determinant, namely the category, and the
thing does not emerge as such in this term. But in this absence of
differentiation appropriate to it, it does possess both: both the concept
and the thing that is undetermined. — p61

Lecture 7:

The question of "breaking out" of the conceptual is central, and the issue appears to be how it could even be possible to move beyond the conceptual without getting into arbitrary randomness.

I find the following passage may possibly be a hint at a solution:

[quote=p73If a breakout is at all possible, it cannot be the product of the postulate
of something alien to the subject; it cannot result from postulating a
Not-I – we know of course from the history of philosophy that the
subjective postulate of the Not-I was in fact the zenith of idealism.15
Rather, if such a breakout exists as a possibility, the only path leading
to it is that of the critical self-reflection of the subjective sphere. In
the course of that self-reflection, this insight recognizes itself – in a
compelling, conclusive manner – as something that is not merely
subjectivity, but as something that necessarily presupposes a relation
to the very thing that, as idealist, it had hoped to be able to bring
into being. In other words, the subject is shown that it is itself some
thing postulated, or, at any rate, that it is also something postulated,
and not simply by demonstrating that the Not-I is itself a postulate. [/quote]

What I think, is that the proposed way of "breakout" is through the internal self, i.e. self-reflection. We tend to think of the objective world as what is external, what is evident to the senses. However, we ourselves partake of the material world through our very being, and the material cause of our being, so we may be able to break out of the conceptual through the internal, self-reflection. In this way we approach the unconscious aspect of ourselves and cross into the nonconceptual without having to do the impossible which would be to breakout externally. Instead of crossing the boundary of the conceptual externally, we cross it internally. This would be the reason for his mention of Freud and the unconscious, early in the lecture.

This also provides a reason to reject systematization type thinking. Systems theory assumes a boundary between the system and the external environment, but it does not provide the principles for an internal boundary. What lies beyond the system to the inside?

I

Trouble is that modal logic includes propositional logic and predicate logic. Every valid proposition in propositional logic and in predicate logic is valid in modal logic. And for every valid syllogism in classical logic there is an equivalent valid formulation in propositional or predicate logic. — Banno

Think about what you are saying Banno. All propositional, predicate, or classical logic can be expressed as modal logic. This does not mean that all modal logic can be expressed in the terms of those other forms of logic, and that is where the problem lies. The three fundamental laws are not sound when applied toward future possibilities, but modal logic is. Concluding that because modal logic is applicable to past possibilities, and is consistent with classical logic in this instance, therefore classical logic must also be consistent with modal logic when applied to future possibilities, is what supports fatalism.

If you insist that modal logic fails because of its failure to adhere to classical logic standards related to ontological status, then you will be de facto rejecting modal logic. — Hanover

I don't claim that. What I claim is that classical logic fails when applied to the future. Modal logic is designed for future possibility and does not fail.

Modal logic admits to the incompatibility noted by Aristotle and responds to it, so I don't know how to respond other than to say if you want modal logic to act like classic logic you can't have model logic. — Hanover

It appears like you understand this quite well, now try to convince Banno of this. Banno does not admit that incompatibility, and this is what supports fatalism. Yet Banno also denies fatalism, and that is a problem.

In any event, give me a syllogism in modal logic you feel fails by giving an illogical result due to its adherence to modal logic standards and not classical so I can see concretely why you object. — Hanover

This is the point you are missing. My claim is that classical logic fails, not that modal logic fails. However, interpretations of modal logic which attempt to understand it in the terms of classical logic (i.e. make the two compatible) are themselves a failure. So I am saying that it is not modal logic which fails, but certain interpretations of it which fail. For an example o this failure, just look at what Banno has written.

That is classic logic, not modal logic, though, correct? I understand that if we're referrring to what might be we can't set it out in terms of what it currently is. The antecedent is conditional, and it is useful to logically determine an outcome on a possible world because we require that sort of logic to make our decisions. — Hanover

That's right, what I am saying is that modal logic is not consistent with classical logic. But there is a further point. If modal logic, which is necessary for making decisions about the future, is not consistent with classical logic which produces the basis for what is, in what has been, then there is a gap in our decision making process because we use two distinct types of logic which are inconsistent with each other. This is similar to, or even a form of, the is/ought gap.

Your objection is that the hypothetical possibility is not ontological in existence and so you therefore cannot logically consider it? This I don't follow. Why can't we logically assess possible worlds that aren't actual worlds? This is the point of modal logic. — Hanover

No, I'm not saying that we cannot logically consider it. I am saying that it violates classical logic, therefore we cannot consider it in relation to the premises classical logic.

You say this, but your objections are directed straight at it. — Hanover

That's not true. I am very clearly talking about violations to classical logic. Therefore I am objecting to classical logic. And I accept that modal logic was developed to deal with these aspects of reality which classical logic cannot address, due to that deficiency in classical logic. Look at your above quotes from me, I explained how Aristotle showed that future possibility violates classical logic. He described it as a violation of excluded middle. I describe it as a situation where the law of identity does not apply. The fact that future possibility violates classical logic is ancient knowledge. We probably all take it for granted. Modal logic is an attempt at a different logic to deal with this problem. What I complained about, in this thread, is people who insist that modal logic is used in a way which is consistent with classical logic.

You demand ontological reality upon your propositions prior to performing logical functions on them, which is an outright rejection of modal logic. — Hanover

It is not a rejection of modal logic, it is a rejection of the way that modal logic is often applied. To apply logic correctly requires ontological principles. Demanding ontological clarity of the meaning of propositions before performing logical functions is not a matter of rejecting the logic. It is a matter of requesting an adequate explanation of the premises, similar to asking for definitions. If an important term like "possible" is left with ambiguity between two very distinct senses, this is cause for concern, because it allows for the possibility of misuse.

The potential for misuse of logical reasoning is obvious from the ancient knowledge which shows us that applying classical logic to future possibility is a misuse. In a like way, I insist that applying modal logic to past possibilities (counterfactuals) and applying it to future possibilities, in the very same way, according to the same rules, is also a misuse of logic.

That's fine, but it's not an objection about anything inconsistent with modal logic. It's just a refusal to accept it as a mode of reasoning. — Hanover

The first sentence is correct, the second is not. I went through this with Banno earlier. I had to explain that I am not claiming that modal logic is inconsistent internally, I am saying that it is often applied in a way which is not consistent with classical logic. What I point out is the inconsistency between classical logic and modal logic. That inconsistency ought to be obvious, because classical logic is violated by future possibility, and modal logic is applied to future possibility. Banno first did not accept this inconsistency, then accused me of rejecting modal logic completely. When I pointed out that I was only distinguishing an inconsistency between these logical forms, Banno finally said "fine", and seemed to agree.

The second sentence is false, because I am in no way refusing to accept modal logic as a mode of reasoning. Again, that it is a mode of reasoning is obvious. However, I am pointing out that if we do not distinguish between applications of modal logic which are consistent with classical logic from applications which are inconsistent, and we interpret applications which are inconsistent as if they are consistent, that is a form of misuse of this mode of reasoning. So the misuse is multifaceted. First, there is misuse of modal logic if future possibility is treated in the same way as past possibilities. Second, there is misuse of classical logic when future possibility in the application of modal logic, is interpreted as consistent with classical logic. The latter misuse propagates determinism and fatalism.

This is just to say that if you insist upon actual worlds for the conditions to exist in to perform logic upon them, then you're refusing to consider possible worlds, which is what distinguishes classical and modal logic from one another. — Hanover

The "actual world" is the grounding for a judgement of truth in the sense of correspondence. Judgements of truth are necessary for judgements of the soundness of the logical conclusions. As I said, I do not reject the application of "possible worlds" and model logic in general. But since the "actual world" exists at the present time, and past possibilities are substantially different from future possibilities, then "possible worlds" when referring to the past must have a substantially different meaning from "possible worlds" when referring to the future, in order to maintain truth, and sound conclusions.

Instead I think there are a multitude of possible worlds, but that there is one possible world amongst them that is actual. I take this to be the most common view, almost to the point of a consensus. — Banno

This is the problematic statement right here. In the case of "possible worlds" referring to the past time, the past has already been determined by the passing of time, and it is correct to say that of all the possible worlds, "one represents the actual", or even (depending on one's ontological stance) "one is the actual". However, when referring to future time, that time has not yet passed, and the actual has not yet been determined, therefore it is incorrect to say that one of the possible worlds is the actual, or even that it represents the actual. This is what leads to determinism and fatalism. In order to allow for the reality of real choice, there is no such things as "the actual".

The conclusion of Lecture 6 is interesting. He returns to the idea expressed in lecture 5, philosophy's practice of distancing itself rom practice, results in what was called in Lecture 5 "bad practice", but he now changes to "false practice". This change of terminology I believe is supported by this discussion of how the concept has been separated from the object, leaving no basis for truth in the sense of correspondence. That's what I believe denying the law of identity does, removes the basis for "truth".

So he proceeds to criticize formalism, and the way that it attempts to remove content from philosophy. Heidegger is the chosen example. He explains that Heidegger does this to avoid vagueness, randomness and arbitrariness, and he advises that this is the other extreme to be avoided.

And the question or the problem facing philosophy is simply about
how it can have both content and rigour at the same time. And that
indeed can only become possible if the philosophers succeed in escaping
from the equation of universal concepts with the substantive
contents about which they have agreed to this day.

So Hegel starts with the something but drops it in favour of the concept. And this is how Hegel manages to equate being with nothing. — Jamal

This is exactly the way I see it. By doing violence to the concept of "Identity" Hegel removes being from the object itself, and makes it something we say about the object, a concept. This allows him to negate "being" with "nothing" when "being" has this form of identity, rather than the identity of "a being", because there is no longer an object which would otherwise prevent this negation. It's a sort of trick of switching the category of what "being" refers to, from the traditional understanding of substantial objects (as developed by Aristotelian studies), back to the Parmenidean proposal which equates being with knowledge. But a study of the history of ideas will demonstrate that this proposal enables Parmenidean based sophistry such as Zeno's.

When he says that "the forces of production, in other words human energies and their extension in technology, have a tendency of their own to overcome the limits that have been set by society," and that we must not think of this as a natural law, he seems to be unambiguously equating such an overcoming with revolutionary emancipation. — Jamal

I don't think this is a necessary conclusion. I think what is implied is that the forces of production overcoming the limits set by society is in some sense inevitable, but revolution is not. So overcoming the limits of society may occur in ways other than revolution. Look at the way modern technology has 'revolutionized' communications for example. The technology has globalized communication capacity to an extent far beyond the laws imposed by some societies. Changes in technology are faster than the capacity of the lawmakers to keep up, so laws are sort of posterior to the changes already brought on, they are reactive. Now, things like genetic manipulation, and AI are just beginning, and they will overcome limits of society which were not designed to reign them. This type of overcoming the limits doesn't necessitate revolution, but it indicates the need for significant, even structural, or radical societal change to keep pace with globalization.

Anyway, I'm trying to catch up so here's my opinion of Lecture 6.

Hegel goes from indeterminate to indeterminateness. — Jamal

Adorno applies substantial criticism to Hegel at this point. I believe the central issue here is the violence which Hegel does to the traditional "law of identity" derived from Aristotle. The law of identity places the identity of an individual, or particular object, directly within that object, as inhering within the object "a thing is the same as itself". This law recognizes that each object has a unique identity particular to itself. When Hegel goes from "the indeterminate" to "determinateness", he is taking identity from the object itself, which is approached by us as an indeterminate, and he is assigning it to how we apprehend the object, as "indeterminateness".

For background information on the way that Hegel deals with the law of identity, you could look at this thread in the Debates section of TPF: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9078/hegel-versus-aristotle-and-the-law-of-identity . That topic was derived from discussion in another thread, which probably has better information.

Anyway, Hegel dismisses the Aristotelian law of identity, and this discussion about the indeterminate vs indeterminateness, which Adorno describes, supports a form of "identity" which is probably more common today. This form of "identity" places identity in what we say about the object, the concept, rather than the object itself. For example, in predication there is a subject and a predicate. The subject may be representative of an object. The law of identity places true identity within the object, and respects a separation between the subject with its predicates, and the object. The other form of "identity" allows that the subject has an identity provided for by predications. The essential difference is that the law of identity allows no imaginary objects to have an identity, because they are lacking in substance, while the other form of "identity" provides no difference between a subject which has a corresponding object, and an imaginary subject. The requirement of an object is completely removed from this identity concept, and this enables things like the possible worlds of modal logic.

Martin Heidegger says that the initial interpretation of the word <ousia> was lost in its translation to the Latin. As a consequence it was also lost in its translations to modern languages. He says that <ousia> precisely means ‘being’ - not ‘substance’, that is not some ‘thing’ or some ‘being’ that “stands” (-stance) “under” (sub-).” — Wayfarer

You might prefer Heidegger's interpretation over that drawn out by centuries of study by the scholastics, but I've read some of each, and I find that the scholastic interpretation makes a lot more sense. In the end, that's the only way we can each judge something like this, by what seems to make the most sense.

If it rains, I'll get my umbrella is modal logic, and it may or may not be raining at the moment or ever again in the future. Why do these temporal issues of what is happening now or later interfere with our ability to logically assess? That is, can I not logically reason based upon the antecedent without the antecedent being true in this world? That seems what modal logic is. — Hanover

I have no problem with modal logic. It is obviously very useful and I'm not arguing against its usefulness. What I am arguing is that when it is interpreted and applied in a way which is inconsistent with the three fundamental laws of logic, we ought to respect this inconsistency, and not try to argue that it is consistent.

So for example, "if it is raining at 7 AM tomorrow I will be carrying an umbrella" signifies a future condition which could be represented as distinct possibilities, one in which I am carrying an umbrella, one in which I am not carrying an umbrella. To accept these two propositions (possible worlds) as both true, would be a violation of the law of noncontradiction, what is designated by "I" is both carrying an umbrella, and not carrying an umbrella. Under Aristotelian terms, we would represent such cases of future possibility, as neither/nor, a violation of excluded middle. This future scenario, of me carrying an umbrella at 7AM tomorrow morning, is neither true nor false, and Aristotle described it as a violation of the law of excluded middle.

However, you can see how some "possible worlds" interpretations, would say that somehow, both possible worlds must be real, due to a sort of splitting of multiverses, and I will experience one of them, but some form of "I" will also be experiencing the other. What is evident, is that if we accept the reality of "future possibility", we also must allow that the future involves a violation of the fundamental three laws of logic. That is simply the nature of "future possibility". I believe this is because the object, as thing spoken about, has no temporal extension into the future, and therefore has no identity in that direction beyond the present. To say that there is an object, with an identity, in the future, is a false proposition due to the reality of future possibility.

Now, for comparison, lets look at "If it was raining at 7 AM yesterday, I was carrying an umbrella". Again, we have two possible worlds, one in which I was carrying an umbrella, and one in which I was not. But in this case, we accept that one is true, and the other is false. So in this case, there is no violation of the fundamental laws. We allow that the possible worlds are simply a representation, and there is an independent "actual world", and only one possibility corresponds with the actual, as the truth. This interpretation is implied by terms like "counterfactual". The counterfactual is accepted as other than the truth. The point though, is that we cannot extend this independent "actual world" into the future without the assumption of determinism or fatalism, and this would deny the reality of "future possibility".

But surely ↪Metaphysician Undercover, there is a way to do counterfactual reasoning, right? So, "if this plant was not watered, it would not have grown." But the plant in question has to be, at least in some sense, the same plant, or else we would just be saying that if the plant was a different plant it might not have grown. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm fine with counterfactual reasoning, along with all sorts of applications of modal logic, and even statistics and probabilities, which with the aid of computers has become extremely useful. What I think though, is that we need to maintain a separation between ontology and epistemology, by embracing some fundamental ontological principles, so that we do not allow ontological problem to contaminate our epistemology. In other words, we should attempt to limit uncertainty to metaphysics and ontology, allowing epistemology to obtain a higher degree of certainty.

So to look at your example, "if this plant was not watered, it would not have grown", it really tells us nothing but an assumption that plants need watering to grow. This principle could be backed up and supported with evidence, but it would still not tell us whether we should water plants or not. Whether we ought to water plants is dependent on whether it is desirable to have plants grow.

Likewise, in counterfactual reasoning, we speak to the potencies that some thing possessed in the past, and then discuss what would be true if they were actualized differently. — Count Timothy von Icarus

But what use is there in talking about different ways of actualizing things, unless we have principles as to what is good and not good?

The past is, in some sense, necessary, having already become actual. But when we speak to "possible worlds" with a different past, we are simply talking about different potentialities becoming actualized. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Isn't this self-contradicting? If the past is necessary, then talking about the possibility of a different past is inherently contradictory. We can learn from our mistakes and produce principles like 'plants need watering to grow', but we cannot realistically talk about the past being different than it was, only about what we might do differently in the future.

That's the point. You allow indexation for time, but not for possible worlds. Why? — Banno

I explained this, it is a problem with the interpretation, the "rigid designator" interpretation.. If there is one possible world in which Caesar crossed the Rubicon, and another in which he did not, then you have two distinct items with the same name "Caesar". They must be distinct items because they have contrary properties. In reality Caesar did one or the other. If Caesar did in fact cross the Rubicon, then the person in that possible world is correctly named "Caesar", and the other is named "counterfactual Caesar". You can see how it would be false to say that they both have the same identity. And if it is not known whether Caesar crossed the Rubicon or not, then they are both "imaginary Caesar". And by the law of identity imaginary things do not have an identity.

I hope it is clear, and as the Roman example given above exemplifies, possible worlds can be about the past as well as the future. If we accept rigid designation, the possible Caesar who did not cross the Rubicon is the very same as the actual Caesar who did. That that is, "what might have happened if Caesar had not crossed the Rubicon" is a question about Caesar, and not about some other person in some other possible world who happens to have the same name. — Banno

To give both Caesars the same identity is a violation of the law of identity. I hope you understand this by now. However, as I explained above, it is necessary to violate the law of identity to speak about future objects. The reality of future possibilities makes it impossible that an object has an identity beyond the present in the direction o the future. But it is not necessary to violate the law of identity when talking about past objects. How could anyone think that it would be advantageous to violate the law of identity when speaking about past objects, just for the purpose of being able to talk about future things and past things in the same way? Since it is very clear that future things and past things are ontologically different, future things being imaginary with no identity, while past things are not real, this could only be a mistaken proposition. What beneficial purpose could it possibly serve?

In trying to throw out the bath water of fatalism, you have wholly thrown out the babe of modality. And needlessly, since accessibility allows us to make choices. — Banno

If you think I have thrown out modality, then you completely misunderstand. What I've been arguing against is specific interpretations of modality. I believe the concept of "accessibility" is completely misguided. Future possibilities have no truth value whatsoever, due to the incompatibility I described. And choices are based in what is designated as good, what is desired, not in what is determined to be "accessible". The issue here being that the strong willed person can make accessible what others designate as inaccessible so accessibility is dependent on the way that one apprehends the facts.

It handles a wider range of modalities, cleanly avoids category mistakes, and is rigorous enough for computation. — Banno

When you say that " possible worlds can be about the past as well as the future", it's very clear that you do not avoid category mistakes. As I explained, past possibilities are categorically different from future possibilities. Placing them together under the same heading "possible worlds" is a category mistake.

Odd, that it's apparently OK to index a proposition in time: "Joe was asleep at 4 am but awake at 4 PM"; but to refuse to index a proposition in reference to possible worlds: "Joe was asleep in w₀ but awake in w₁" — Banno

There is no problem with time. The law of noncontradiction is clearly qualified with "at the same time". If you interpret different times as different possible worlds, you have no principles which would even allow you to talk about the future. You could not relate one as future and another as past without invoking another principle of causation or something like that to place them in relation to each other, but what would this be based on?

This is modal collapse. There are no possible worlds. It imposes metaphysical essentialism on the system. Meta’s view amounts to a denial of genuine modality. — Banno

No, this is incorrect. As you and I discussed the "possible world" is how we relate to the future. The spoken about object has no existence in the future yet, therefore there is no such thing as "what it is" in the future. We can talk about the object's future with "possible worlds" so long as we recognize that that there truly is no such thing as "that object" in the future, and the set of fundamental laws, identity, noncontradiction, and excluded middle, are violated. It is merely a possible object therefore it has no identity, which is the defining feature of an object.

The further point I made, is that we need to be clear to distinguish between the "ontological possibility" of the future, within which those laws are violated because there is no object, and the "epistemic possibility" of the past, within which the three laws are upheld, and there was an actual object, but its properties were unknown, or we're applying counterfactuals, etc.. Obviously, these are two very different meanings of "possibility", and we ought to be sure not to equivocate. The future object violates the fundamental laws, while the past object does not.

So how are we to understand modal sentences? That "the table could have been red instead of blue" is an impossibility, since then it would not have been that table. Even taking it that "the table could have been red instead of blue" amounts to "there might have been some other table that was blue" fails, because that other table would not be this table. Any variation in property means we are talking about a different object. — Banno

Your examples are of epistemic possibility, past realities, and as I said already the fundamental laws are not necessarily violated in this application. What we were talking about earlier is future possibilities, and the need to allow that those laws are violated when talking about the future, to avoid fatalism.

Not that I agree with Meta's other thoughts on hyper-strictnesss of identity, but I don't know a consequence of it is the inability to assess hypotheticals entirely. — Hanover

What I have been complaining about is the way that modal logic is interpreted and applied. To avoid determinism, (fatalism), we must allow that any spoken about object has no existence, or true identity, in the future, and therefore the fundamental laws are inapplicable. It is a possible object, and this means that it cannot have a true identity. But in the past, the object had existence, therefore identity, and the laws are applicable. If we do not respect this difference, that modal logic can be applied consistently with the three laws toward the past, but it cannot be applied consistently with the three laws toward the future, equivocation of different senses of "possible" is implied, along with significant misunderstanding.

That brings me back to my earlier point. If we do not maintain a clear separation between means and ends, such that the means are justified relative to the end, and the end gets judged relative to a further category of good or not good, how can we have decisive (or objective) principles for judgement of good? You say Adorno judged the goal by putting it "into the context of his assessment of the situation and of history", but that seems very subjective.

I think that what Adorno is indicating in the passage I quoted, is that there is something inherently deficient about judging the goodness of a goal, for the future, by placing it into the context of history, the past. There would be a sort of implied determinism intrinsic to that perspective. But he has respect for how the forces of production will naturally overcome the [determinist] limits of society. Therefore we must recognize the potency of thought, now, at the present, to free itself from the constraints of the past, and set goals for the future, which are free from past mistakes. This is stated as relative to Marx's criticism of "abstract utopia". However, the creative aspect, something completely new for the future, is a requirement to keep the forces of production on the good instead of the bad (the bad being essentially a lack of unity, aimless anarchy).

It leads to implausible claims. Joe has the property of being awake at T1, and the property of being asleep at T2. These are certainly not trivial properties, yet does anyone claim that Joe is not the same person? — J

How does this appear to be implausible to you? Why would anyone claim that Joe is not the same person at the two different times? The individual named as Joe has the property of being awake at T1 and the property of being asleep at T2. These two properties, and all the other properties of Joe are necessary (essential) to the identity of the unique individual known as "Joe".

At the risk of being a nag, could I suggest again that you actually read one of Kripke's lectures? — J

You haven't given me any good reason to do this. You've provided no good argument against what I am saying. If you understand Kripke, and he has an argument against my points, I'm sure you could provide it. But you are not providing anything, so I'm quite sure that reading Kripke would be a waste o mine time. He would just be proceeding onward from premises which I do not believe in, without any real justification for those premises.

It’s true that Aristotle uses being (to on) in a broad sense to include many kinds of things. But in Physics and Metaphysics, he also clearly distinguishes between natural beings—which have internal principles of movement and life—and artifacts or inert things, which do not. — Wayfarer

Right, but for him, and the ancient Greeks in general, all natural things, living as well as non-living, have internal principles of movement. Many (not Aristotle) assigned soul to all things. But Aristotle assigned internal movement to non-living things without assigning "soul" to them.. Internal motion is very evident in things like water, air, fire, and it was assumed to be even in rocks, just like we assume that fundamental particles are active. This is the point of the part of Physics BK2, which Count Timothy brings up, and I'll quote below.

The distinction is not supposed to be merely natural versus artificial. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes it is meant to be natural versus artificial, and this is very evident. Here, this is the very beginning of Physics BK2, Ch 1:

Of things that exist, some exist by nature, some from other causes.
'By nature' the animals and their parts exist, and the plants and the simple bodies (earth, fire, air, water)-for we say that these and the like exist 'by nature'. — 192b, 8-9

He clearly places earth, fire, air, and water in the same category as plants and animals.
Further:

All the things mentioned present a feature in which they differ from things which are not constituted by nature. Each of them has within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness (in respect of place, or of growth and decrease, or by way of alteration). On the other hand, a bed and a coat and anything else of that sort, qua receiving these designations i.e. in so far as they are products of art-have no innate impulse to change. But in so far as they happen to be composed of stone or of earth or of a mixture of the two, they do have such an impulse, and just to that extent which seems to indicate that nature is a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not in virtue of a concomitant attribute. — 192b,13-23

Notice how he says that artificial things, in as much as they are composed "of stone or of earth", have the internal impulse to change. These things are then said to "have a nature". Their "nature" refers to the movements which they are inclined to make, which we now call "the laws of nature". Fire goes up for example. And he proceeds in this way. Artificial things are those created by human beings, and natural things are those such as plants, animals, earth, fire, air, water.

What to do depends on an assessment of the situation. — Jamal

Further to this, "what to do" requires putting the assessment of the situation into the context of goals, objectives, or, vise versa. Notice how producing goals within the context of the situation is distinctly different from putting an assessment of the situation, into the context of one's goals. One way shapes the goals according to the situation, and the other holds steadfast to the goals, looking for ways to shape the situation toward the goals. I think that prioritizing goals, theory, is what is alluded to in the following passage. Otherwise the forces of production which naturally outgrow the bounds of any existing society, will sort of run amok.

Moreover, it is not enough
for us to live in hope that the history of mankind will move towards
theory and practice a satisfactory state of affairs of its own accord and that all that will
be required from us is a bit of a push from time to time to ensure
that everything works out. Even though – and here too I would rather
err on the side of caution – we should bear in mind, and in this respect
Marx was undoubtedly right to maintain that the forces of production,
in other words human energies and their extension in technology,
have a tendency of their own to overcome the limits that have
been set by society. To regard this overcoming as a kind of natural
law, however, and to imagine that it has to happen in this way, and
that it has to happen immediately, that would render the entire situation
harmless, since it would undermine every kind of practice that
placed its reliance on it. And, finally, in taking the link between
theory and practice seriously, one of our most vital tasks is to realize
that thought is not a priori impotent in the face of a possible practice.
This was in fact the point of Marx’s criticism of an abstract utopia. — p48-49

Do you really call other persons and animals objects? That’s precisely my point—the term object is misleading in this context. — Wayfarer

The context is "substance", and this is applicable to both living and inanimate things.

You say I’m applying unwarranted restrictions to Aristotle’s hylomorphism. Fair enough. But I’d suggest that you may be reading Aristotle through a modern, objectively-oriented lens, one that did not obtain in his milieu, and does not do justice to the ontological depth conveyed by his original terminology. — Wayfarer

I don't believe you are correct in this assessment. I studied Plato and then Aristotle prior to studying modern philosophy, and understand Aristotle in that context. I admit that I later read Augustine and Aquinas, and then revisited Aristotle, to get a better understanding, but I do not think the your accusation of an "objectively-oriented lens" (though I don't really understand what that means) is correct.

In fact, I believe that it is you who is applying a lens of a modern world-view perspective. In his Physics and Metaphysics, Aristotle did not provide a clear distinction between living beings and inanimate things, as you are proposing, so "being" could refer to both. This goes back to Parmenides, "being" refers to what is, as opposed to what is not. This is a reflection of the ancient way of seeing all "actual" things as being somehow animated with soul. The division Aristotle worked with. was between things made by art, and natural things. Natural things include both inanimate and living. Most of his examples of natural things are of living beings though, because those better serve the purpose of his teleological arguments. Ancient world views extended teleology into inanimate things where perhaps it doesn't belong.

The trend of making a division between living beings and inanimate objects came much later in Latin studies, with the field of "natural philosophy" being divided between biology and physics. Notice that along with this newer dichotomy between living and not living, the ancient dichotomy between natural and artificial gets lost. The modern scientific world view tends to think of human beings as natural, and this extends into human products as well, so that the division between natural and artificial is negated, leaving anything not natural as "supernatural". This is because if we have one principal category, existing entities, and try to dichotomize it in two ways, things get far to complicated. So what it appears like to me, is that you are taking the modern dichotomy of animate/inanimate and applying it to Aristotle's thought, when Aristotle worked with the dichotomy of natural/artificial, and this is inappropriate.

It's a bit confusing because Aristotle seems to say different things in different places, and because "ousia" might get translated as "substance," "being," or "essence" in different places. — Count Timothy von Icarus

These are the hazards of translation. It is important that the translator has a good understanding of the material, in order to make an adequately representative translation. The modern understanding of Aristotle has mostly evolved through Latin translations. Since there was much study of Aristotle, discussion and argumentation, through the Latin medium, Latin I believe, provides the best approach toward understanding him, and therefore translating.

I've seen a variety of translations of Aristotle's Metaphysics, and some are so different from each other, that in some sections you can't even recognize it as the same paragraph.

This is in contrast to things that "exist according to causes," like a rock, which is largely just a heap of external causes with no (strong) principle of unity (e.g. if you break a rock in half you get two rocks, if you break a dog in half you don't have a dog anymore). — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is a blatant misrepresentation. Natural things are given the principle of motion, activity. The things which exist according to "other causes" are artificial things, and he gives examples, a bed, a coat. He goes on to say that these artificial things are composed of aspects of the other category, stones, earth, etc., and so they still have a tendency to be active. The division he sets up is clearly a division between natural and artificial.

Here's a few remarks on lecture 5:

Adorno does not promote a concise separation between theory and practice. The two are always intermingled. Even thinking is an activity, therefore a sort of practice, and not pure theory. He also refers to Marx's criticism of some anarchists' position of "absolute action", independent of all theory. The two, theory and practice do not exist separately

There is also a pervasive concept introduced, "the forces of production". This I find to be a vague concept, and I haven't really grasped its meaning. But it's roughly stated as human energies and technologies.

And if we fail to follow up this idea that the
forces of production could satisfy human needs and enable mankind
to enter into a condition worthy of human beings – if we fail to give
voice to this thought, then we certainly will be in danger of giving
ideology a helping hand. Such an outcome is prevented only by the
relations of production and by the extension of the forces of production
into the machinery of physical and intellectual power. — p48

It appears like the forces of production might lead us toward suffering and destruction, or else toward happiness and paradise. This emphasizes the need for theory, and the idea that we cannot allow theory to be shackled by practice. And so, to give absolute precedence to practice, is "bad practice" (p50)

For to take a dogmatic view of that book of Lenin’s, or indeed all
books by Lenin or even all the books ever produced by Marxism, is
the precise equivalent of the procedures adopted by administrations
that have set themselves up in the name of Marxism, that have
absolved themselves of the need for any further thought and that have
done nothing but base their own acts of violence on these theories
without thinking them through and developing them critically. — p50

He then explains his view of how interpretation is much the same as criticism. And, without this form of interpretation "there can be no such thing as true practice" (51). From here he criticizes "Scientific socialism", emphasizing the need for philosophy.

Engels also understood very clearly: that science is not only a force
of production but that it is implicated in the social power relations
and command structures of its age. It follows from this that we
cannot simply transfer to science the authority purloined from
philosophy or the authority denied to philosophy by criticism. — p52

After all this discussion about how practice ought not overcome theory he throws a twist. Thinking, in the end, is just a form of practice anyway. So all is ultimately reduced to practice, but distinct types of practice, theorizing being one of them. And he mentions "organizer" as a type of practice.

For thinking itself is always a form of behaviour;18 it is, whether it likes it or not,
a kind of practice, even in its purest logical operations. Every
synthesis it creates brings about change. Every judgement that links two
ideas together that were separate previously is, as such, work; I would
be tempted to say it always brings about a minute change in the
world. And once thinking sets out in its purest form to bring about
change in even the smallest thing, no power on earth can separate
theory from practice in an absolute way. The separation of theory
and practice is itself an expression of reified consciousness. And it is
the task of philosophy to dismantle the rigidity, the dogmatic and
irreconcilable character of this separation. — p53

I appreciate the clarification about particularity, but I think this risks reading Aristotle through the modern, objective point of view to which we are encultured. In the Categories and Metaphysics, Aristotle’s paradigm examples of 'substance' are not objects like stones or marbles, but beings—plants, animals, and humans. They are beings that possess their own internal principles of organization, growth, and change—what Aristotle calls form and actuality. Hence again the fact that the original term was 'ouisia'. He's asking about what beings are - not what objects are. — Wayfarer

For Aristotle, every individual, every particular, (what we call an object), consists of matter and form. The composite is an instance of primary substance. You'll notice that he doesn't only talk about living beings, but also things like bronze statues. I think you are applying unwarranted restrictions to Aristotle's hylomorphism.

The concept of "rigid designator" is very simple. Banno and I were discussing the situation when "possible worlds" refers to future possibilities.

You seem to be hung up on the idea that every property of an object is essential to that object's identity. If not, then two distinct objects could have the same identity. Why is this difficult for you to accept?

This framing presents substance as nothing more than individual objects, like particular dogs - or even stones or marbles, we would be entitled to think —whic is an oversimplification that loses sight of the deeper point that 'substance' is not mere particularity, but what something is in virtue of its form and actuality. Again, it is nearer to think of it as what of being it is, than what kind of object. And there's a difference! — Wayfarer

I think the point Aristotle was making is that particularity is what substance is, in the primary sense. What an individual object actually is, is a unique peculiar form, which is proper only to itself, (the law of identity). This uniqueness, which is a feature of spatial temporal existence, is what constitutes "substance" in the primary sense. In the secondary sense, "substance" is the primary species, what kind of thing it is. Commonly, in modern philosophy Aristotle's primary substance, along with the law of identity, are overlooked as superfluous, and identity is assigned to what we say about the thing (secondary substance), rather than what the thing actually is, in itself, a unique individual with a form of its very own.

Do you conceive of possible worlds as sharing an actual, existential timeline? Such that event A in world W literally happens at the same time as event B in world Y? — J

Yes, I think it is necessary to conceive of it as the same time, because it is referred to as "the future". So, we have one present, now, and one item at the present now. The multitude of possible worlds is a description of the time after now, which is the future, and all those possible worlds must share in the same future, or else the model would be useless.

The two events, being distinct, can't share the same space, so why would we imagine they could share the same time? — J

Space hasn't been mentioned, but the space would be limited by the possibilities. They all must share the same time, because that's what is being modeled, a specified time, "the future". If we are modeling the possibility of a sea battle tomorrow, for example, it doesn't make sense to say that one of the possible worlds models yesterday as tomorrow.

Not as Kripke understands "same object" -- and I would argue that this is the common-sense understanding as well. You've read Naming and Necessity, I suppose? In his example, "Richard Nixon" is a rigid designator; thus, Nixon remains Nixon -- the "same object" -- regardless of whether he wins or loses the 1968 election. For this to violate some law of non-contradiction, you'd have to maintain that every single property, action, and attribute of a given object is essential to its being what it is. Do you really want to do that? — J

I haven't read Kripke, I'm just going on what Banno said: "In rigid designation (Kripke), names refer to the same individual in every world where that individual exists." Obviously, if it is the same individual in every possible world, the law of noncontradiction is violated every time that the individual has contradictory properties between two different possible worlds. In your example, Nixon both wins and does not win the 1968 election. Therefore the law of non-contradiction which says that a thing cannot both have a property and not have that property, at the same time, is violated.

Also, I think it's very obvious that "every single property, action, and attribute of a given object is essential to its being what it is". If any object could be different from what it actually is, then it could be two different objects at the very same time. That's nonsensical to say that one object could be two different objects at the very same time.