But let me explain that it is quite difficult to have motivation for (let's say) participating in the joy and happiness of others. I don't think this is a matter of envy or jealousy. It is just that a person under the spectrum of pessimism is hard to find joy beyond the way he sees the world. — javi2541997

Maybe this is where reading has a role to play. In the case of books, we get a very lucid description of the character, and the feelings, and this inclines the reader to develop a very special empathetic relation with the character. However, we ought to understand that this special connection between reader and character is artificial, created and designed by the author. The author uses descriptive terms which can easily draw the reader into a fantasy of knowing, and empathizing with, a person, but the person is not a real person.

You seem to be attracted to reading material which has negative content, stories with suffering. And you empathize with those characters. But this is not likely to be real suffering, it's a fictional description, produced by the author, so that you are actually empathizing with fictional suffering. We might say, and argue, that the author draws on real life experience, and represents some real instances of suffering, but the descriptive terms, which form the basis of your feelings of empathy, are words of the author's choice, chosen with the intent to draw you in. This is not how you actually perceive any real situation, it is a description created by the author. Therefore, it is not an empathy toward any real suffering, it is a creation of the author, designed to feed on your inclination toward sympathy. For example, you are younger than I am, but years ago we used to get UNICEF commercials on TV, where they would show children in horrible conditions of starvation. These pictures are designed to evoke feelings of sympathy, and encourage donations to the cause.

The reason why I suggested reading Plato, is that this is a person who tried very hard to describe human feelings and emotions objectively, to truly understand them. Because of this true approach to human feelings, we can learn from Plato that the good feelings are just as much, or even more, a real aspect of human existence as are the bad.

Don't you believe that happy people should be the ones who have to empathise with the rest? We are talking about putting some kind of responsibility on someone's shoulders. — javi2541997

What validates this proposal? Human beings have freedom of choice, to choose how to culture their feelings, so long as they are not hurting others. Why do you think that people ought to have a responsibility of empathizing with suffering? That's very counterintuitive. If suffering is harmful, unwanted, therefore bad, why should people have an obligation to partake of, or share in, the badness of others. It makes far more sense for the people who possess the good, joy and happiness, to share this with the less fortunate. And this in no way requires empathizing or sympathizing with the suffering. It just requires acknowledging the fact that those who suffer could enjoy some happiness, and this is something which a happy person such as myself could share with them.

It appears to me like campaigns such as the UNICEF one mentioned above, believe that the way to get people to share the goods with those less fortunate, is to make these people feel, through empathy or sympathy, the pain of the others. And from the effects of campaigns like this, people like you come to believe that you have a responsibility, or obligation, to feel the suffering of others. But this is not at all the case. Your responsibility is only to share your joy, pleasure, and happiness with the others, and this way we all get to feel the happiness. You have no obligation or responsibility to share in the suffering. The problem is that campaigns like the one mentioned, lead us to believe that people will not be inclined to share these goods unless they first feel the pain. In reality though, people are fundamentally reasonable, and naturally inclined toward all forms of human intercourse, and the shared pleasures of life, so there is no need for them to feel pain in order to deliver pleasure to others.

My seek is more focused on human behaviour and personal circumstances which lead us to an incomprehensible suffering. — javi2541997

The focus on human behaviour, and personal circumstances, is good. But why the focus on those which lead to incomprehensible suffering rather those which lead eudaimonia, pleasure and joy? These are the two very different sides of human behaviour.

You might enjoy reading some of Plato's dialogues. He was very well educated in human feelings and behaviours, and wrote about these in a style which is quite entertaining. A couple dialogues which I particularly enjoy, that deal with human relations which are pleasurable interactions, are "The Symposium" (love), and "Lysis" (friendship). After you get a feel for his writing style, you might be inclined to move on to more sophisticated dialogues, such as Gorgias, and Protagoras, where he inquires about the meaning of terms like pleasure, pain, good, and bad in general.

I can’t buy that some suffer and live miserable lives while others have fun just because the dice were thrown to the air and the numbers decided the will of different children. For this reason, I think it is a good exercise to do an act of empathy with them [the people who suffer]. But exactly here is when the paths crossed. If they suffer because they were born in a place where you can’t live (objective suffering) and I suffer because I realise what the human condition is (subjective suffering), then people tend to face dramatic situations rather than happy ones. Accepting that this is the case, I believe it is plausible to wonder why children die rather than why it is raining. The first is a pattern intrinsically human; the second is just trifling. — javi2541997

I think your conclusion here isn't sound. You empathize with people suffering, but not with people who are happy. Why does the one type of person deserve empathy more than the other? And, it is only by choosing this one type to empathize with, that you reach the conclusion that people tend to face dramatic situations rather than happy ones.

Why will you not empathize with people who are happy? Would this make you feel bad (jealous perhaps), because these people are better off than you, truly happy, and you would only be feeling that happiness through empathy? To see others happy, when I am not happy, seems to emphasize my unhappiness, so I direct my attention toward the miserable. Misery loves company. Would empathizing with those who are suffering somehow make you feel good, because they are worse off than you, truly suffering while you only feel that suffering through empathy? If this is the case, then this is not true empathy. True empathy allows you to feel what the other feels. Therefore you ought to see no reason not to empathize with those who are happy. Why not share in that joy?

I maintain that all war is evil. — Pieter R van Wyk

That's a completely unjustified, and I will add unreasonable, assertion.

Please tell me, who or on what authority, can a decision be made that any particular war is good? — Pieter R van Wyk

The authority who declares war on any particular occasion, obviously, decides that this particular war is necessary, and the right thing, therefore good thing, to do.

You may, from a perspective other than the authority who declares the war, decide that that particular decision for war, is a bad decision, and evil, but what would make your decision more authoritative and correct than the other decision that the war is necessary?

I have addressed the point you made. I am patiently waiting for you to explain to the thousands killed in the Gaza war that their deaths was for a good cause. They died for something good, something deeper. — Pieter R van Wyk

I don't see how one particular case is relevant. Your faulty generalization implies that all instances of war and revolution are bad. I gave a clear explanation why your generalization is faulty. No matter how many examples you provide, and claim that they are consistent with your generalization, this does not address the problem I pointed out.

Citing particular instances which support your generalization does not prove that the generalization is correct. All you are doing is providing further demonstration of the flaw in your reasoning. You seem to believe that finding particular examples which support your generalization is all that is required to prove it correct. To prove such a generalization requires demonstrating that it is impossible for things to be other than as described by the generalization. But I have already demonstrated to you how it is possible for things to be otherwise. Yet you continue with your insistence.

I would submit the following argument: "Any decision on what is good and what is evil is made based on what is politically expedient. There is no Law of Nature that provides a basis on which a determination about good and evil could be made. It is, therefore, determined simply by Rules of Man." — Pieter R van Wyk

This definition of "good" does not support your generalization that all war and revolution is bad. In fact it supports what I've been trying to explain to you. Such things are sometimes "politically expedient".

Aquinas, as far as I understand, did think the mind is immaterial. It is not half material and half immaterial (or something like that). In fact, he forwards many arguments for why it is immaterial. Aristotle vaguely alluded to it being immaterial in De Anima, but didn't explicate it like Aquinas did. — Bob Ross

I don't think the answer is as simple as you make it out to be. As a power of the soul, the intellect is immaterial, as the soul is immaterial. However, the human soul is united with the material body, and the human intellect is dependent on this union.

The whole point of the analogy is that if we have a proper intellect (that can apprehend forms with clarity), then it cannot be material AT ALL. — Bob Ross

The problem is that the human intellect is deficient, due to its dependence on the material body. Therefore it is not a "proper intellect (that can apprehend forms with clarity)". Human beings understand forms by abstracting from "phantasms", which are sense impressions derived through corporeal organs. So our understanding of the immaterial is derived from the phantasms produced by corporeal organs.

Q 85 Art 1

I answer that, As stated above (I:84:7), the object of knowledge is proportionate to the power of knowledge. Now there are three grades of the cognitive powers. For one cognitive power, namely, the sense, is the act of a corporeal organ. And therefore the object of every sensitive power is a form as existing in corporeal matter. And since such matter is the principle of individuality, therefore every power of the sensitive part can only have knowledge of the individual. There is another grade of cognitive power which is neither the act of a corporeal organ, nor in any way connected with corporeal matter; such is the angelic intellect, the object of whose cognitive power is therefore a form existing apart from matter: for though angels know material things, yet they do not know them save in something immaterial, namely, either in themselves or in God. But the human intellect holds a middle place: for it is not the act of an organ; yet it is a power of the soul which is the form the body, as is clear from what we have said above (I:76:1). And therefore it is proper to it to know a form existing individually in corporeal matter, but not as existing in this individual matter. But to know what is in individual matter, not as existing in such matter, is to abstract the form from individual matter which is represented by the phantasms. Therefore we must needs say that our intellect understands material things by abstracting from the phantasms; and through material things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things, just as, on the contrary, angels know material things through the immaterial.

You still haven't addressed the points I made. The fundamental flaw in your reasoning is your generalization, that "strife, civil disobedience, revolution, and war" are always bad, and therefore blameworthy.

In some circumstances, the suffering of "strife, civil disobedience, revolution, and war" may be good, as I've demonstrated. If specific instances of these are apprehended as good by philosophers, then these will be promoted by philosophers, and philosophers will see no reason to eradicate them, as you believe they ought to.

This provides a completely different approach to "the human condition". The human condition is fundamentally good, not bad as you assume. And the effects of philosophy have guided the human condition even further toward good, and away from bad. Since the human condition is good, there is no need to assign "blame", as you do, and your project is misguided.

Then on to the reason for me stirring up this debate, getting to my fundamental question: Why is the world as it is? One of the questions that has been bugging philosophers for as long as humans have had the capability of abstract thought. Leading to the question whether I have a solution to this problem? — Pieter R van Wyk

See, you present the basic goodness of the world as a "problem". "Problem" implies that resolution is necessary, because failing to resolve the problem would leave people in a bad condition. This attitude, of the need for a resolution to this question "why is the world as it is?" will create stress and anxiety, if the question cannot be answered. That is bad. The 'bad' is created by you classing the question "why is the world as it is?" as a "problem" which therefore needs to be resolved.

If, on the other hand, we approach the question of "why is the world as it is", with the attitude that the world is intrinsically good, then the question is merely a curiousity, a point of interest, which philosophers may address in their spare time. It is not a "problem", so there is no urgency to find an answer. Then, there is no stress or anxiety created by this question, which is more like a rhetorical question now, and the 'bad' that supports your desire to blame, which you have created intentionally, with your will to debate, is completely annihilated.

Speculative Moment.

It appears to me, that the principal point of this section is stated in the final paragraph.

The power of the existent constructs the facades into which the
consciousness crashes. It must try to break through them. This alone
would snatch away the postulate from the profundity of ideology. The
speculative moment survives in such resistance: what does not allow
itself to be governed by the given facts, transcends them even in the
closest contact with objects and in the renunciation of sacrosanct
transcendence. What in thought goes beyond that to which it is bound
in its resistance is its freedom. It follows the expressive urge of the
subject. The need to give voice to suffering is the condition of all truth.
For suffering is the objectivity which weighs on the subject; what it
experiences as most subjective, its expression, is objectively mediated.

Here's an attempt to understand that paragraph.

The consciousness must try to break through the facades which have been constructed by the power of the existent. This would release (snatch away) the postulate from its relation to the profundity of ideology. That is a conscious resistance, which allows the speculative moment to persist, by not allowing itself to be governed by the given facts [ideology]. This produces transcendence in close contact with objects, through the renunciation of sacrosanct transcendence. When thought, in such resistance, goes beyond that which binds it [the ideology of given facts], this is its freedom. Thought can then follow the expressive urge of the subject. And, since suffering is the weight of the object on the subject, the need to give voice to suffering is the primary condition for all [objective] truth. Therefore what the subject experiences as the most subjective, the expression of suffering, is actually the experience which is most objectively mediated.

Aristotle seems to be regarding the mind (viz., the thinking aspect of the soul) as 'unmixed' with the matter and that, for some reason, this mind is not real prior to knowing something.

It seems like Aquinas picks up on this and leverages it as epistemic points in favor of the mind being immaterial.

I have two questions:

1. What is Aristotle's view of the mind here? Is it a nothingness, a negativity, like Hegel? Is it pure form that is immaterial?

2. How does Aquinas argue for the soul being immaterial? Is it just that thinking cannot have a sense-organ? — Bob Ross

The reason why the mind must be immaterial, is illustrated with the tinted glass analogy. The mind's apprehension of the material world, is like seeing through a glass lens. If the lens is tinted, the person seeing will not correctly see the colour of things. So the person will not correctly see every aspect of the world, because the colour will be incorrect. Likewise, if the mind is in anyway material, it could not correctly know the entirety of the material world.

The analogy is good, but there is more than one way to look at it. If it is the case that the human mind cannot correctly know the entirety of the material world, this may be because the mind is not immaterial.

If the mind is immaterial, then it has to be pure form because there is only form and matter. Are you suggesting an immaterial 'matter' that the intellect would be of? — Bob Ross

No, I'm suggesting that for Aquinas, (following the lead of Aristotle), the human intellect is not purely immaterial, it is dependent on the material body. This is actually the reason Aquinas gives for why human beings cannot adequately know God, and separate Forms. The human intellect is deficient in this sense, and that is why we cannot adequately know God until the soul is disunited from the body.

From my understanding, something that is pure form is not necessarily purely actual; — Bob Ross

I would say that this is a misunderstanding of Aristotle, and Aquinas.

Perhaps you are denying the distinction between potency and matter; but I would say passive vs. active potency are different, and beings with matter have passive potency. — Bob Ross

No, I do not deny that distinction. Matter is a type of potency, or potential, it is placed in that category. This means that potential defines matter, in a way similar to how animal defines human being. All matter is potential, but not all potential is matter. Notice that Aristotle defines the essence of human ideas as potential also. So potency, or potential, is the broader term, such that not all potential is matter. In a similar way "actual" defines form, such that all form is actual. But not necessarily all actualities are form. Aristotle distinguishes two very distinct senses of "actual", one being "what is the case" (the form, or formula), the other being active, activity.

In terms of distinguishing soul and mind, I agree; but that doesn't explain if Aristotle thought the mind is pure/substantial form like Aquinas; and if he does, then how does this not entail a sort of interaction problem even if it is not the same problem as Cartesian dualism? It would be an immaterial mind interacting with a materially body even if the soul is the form of a living being. — Bob Ross

I believe that Aristotle thought the soul is pure substantial form. Aquinas also thought the soul is pure substantial form. However, maintaining the already mentioned distinction between soul and mind, the mind is not necessarily pure substantial form. Aristotle distinguished passive and active intellect, and Aquinas upheld this distinction. Since form is actuality, and the intellect has a passive aspect, I think it is impossible that the intellect is pure form.

The original geological concept makes more sense to me: it’s when a mineral replaces another mineral but takes the first one’s shape. — Jamal

Here's another possible interpretation.

First, this is Spengler:

By the term ‘historical pseudomorphosis’ I propose to designate those cases in which an older alien Culture lies so massively over the land that a young Culture, born in this land, cannot get its breath and fails not only to achieve pure and specific expression-forms, but even to develop fully its own self-consciousness. All that wells up from the depths of the young soul is cast in the old moulds, young feelings stiffen in senile works, and instead of rearing itself up in its own creative power, it can only hate the distant power with a hate that grows to be monstrous.

https://jnnielsen.medium.com/permutations-of-pseudomorphosis-8afafb6771f4

Adorno's use is difficult to understand. But pay attention to the role of the heterogenous in his description. The heterogenous is the content, and both art and philosophy "keep faith" with their content, through a conduct which forbids pseudo-morphisis. Notice, Spengler's 'historical pseudomorphosis' propagates hate therefore it must be forbidden. Each, art and philosophy, keeps faith with its content through its own form of intrinsic opposition. Art will make itself obdurate against its own meaning, while philosophy distances itself from the immediate, by putting the concept in between, as a wall. These forms of negating itself, should actually be considered as keeping faith with its content..

What's interesting is that the geological concept may make more sense in the case of art, because art uses a material medium. But notice in the case of philosophy, the medium (the wall) is the concept, so I think the social concept of pseudo-morphisis makes more sense in the case of philosophy. So ‘historical pseudomorphosis', in Spengler's sense, is forbidden through that use of the wall, the concept, ideology, by which philosophy distances itself from the immediate.

The point is just that the infinite can play a role suggestively, referring to philosophy's inconclusiveness and the endless variety of experience. — Jamal

Point accepted. As I said it's confusing to me, but if it's not too important, that's good. So I assume that he' turns around what "infinity" refers to, so that it's not just a concept, but something real in itself. And that real thing, the real object which "infinity" refers to is demonstrated by philosophy itself, or the traditional way of doing philosophy, which proves to be endless.

"Infinity" is not a concept which philosophy holds in completeness, having it at its disposal, to apply at will. "Infinity" ought to be understood more like a descriptive term which describes the philosophical process. Therefore philosophy is contained by infinity, rather than infinity being contained by philosophy.

So philosophers attempts to apprehended the infinite manifest as philosophy getting lost to the infinite:

The concept cannot otherwise represent the thing
which it repressed, namely mimesis, than by appropriating something
of this latter in its own mode of conduct, without losing itself to it.

That would explain the part about canceling itself out, and "pseudo-morphosis". A quick Google search tells me that this is a concept proposed by Oswald Spengler in "The Decline of the West".

I find this section very confusing and difficult to understand. To me, Adorno misrepresents the concept of "infinity", and misrepresents philosophy, in general, and this leaves it very difficult to understand what he's trying to do.

Since he has already described philosophy as being concerned with the non-conceptual, he now approaches "infinity" which is purely conceptual. Therefore, he has to write it off, as not a proper subject of philosophy. In the lectures he implies that this purely conceptual thing, "infinity", ought to be left to the mathematicians. And, perhaps he believes that mathematics rather than philosophy ought to have sole purveyance over pure concepts. But I think that this would be naive.

Plato thought that the true subject of philosophy is intelligible objects. But Aristotle showed how philosophers (especially metaphysicians) must work toward understanding all aspects of reality, both conceptual and non-conceptual.

Now it appears to me like Adorno is trying to dismiss infinity as a part of reality, because it is purely conceptual, and if we allow that there are things which are purely conceptual, we will be lead into idealism. But this according to Adorno is what philosophy needs to avoid. Adorno's way of describing concepts, is as representing, or having a relation with something non-conceptual, like true art is supposed to represent something. But this leaves the purely abstract, the purely conceptual, as impossible to understand, being in some way untrue.

I believe Adorno's attitude toward philosophy and infinity is well summed up here:

Thinking by no means protects sources, whose freshness
would emancipate it from thought; no type of cognition is at our
disposal, which would be absolutely divergent from that which disposes
over things, before which intuitionism flees panic-stricken and in vain.

So he ends the section with:

What is incumbent on it, is the effort to go beyond the concept, by
means of the concept.

And I do not believe that this is realistic, to go beyond the concept with the concept. It's sort of self-contradicting.

In reality, he ought to accept what is demonstrated by the concept "infinity", is that the concept must go beyond the non-conceptual. This is a fundamental necessity for measurement. In order that all things might be measured we need to allow that the concept (infinity) extends beyond all things. The problem is that this reality is consistent with idealism, and Adorno wants to reject idealism.

Then Adorno describes what spurs philosophy in the direction of infinity in the first place:

What spurs philosophy to the risky exertion of its own infinity is the unwarranted expectation that every individual and particular which it decodes would represent, as in Leibniz’s monad, that whole in itself, which as such always and again eludes it — Jamal

I take this as a misrepresentation of philosophy. I believe that philosophers have always recognized "infinity" to be a concept used in measurement. I don't believe there has ever been an expectation such as the one described here by Adorno.

How does the concept of something not being a multiplicity entail it is a multiplicity that is one? — Bob Ross

Sorry, I don't understand what you're asking here.

For the point in space, assuming it is real, it would be comprised of three parts: location, form, and matter. — Bob Ross

You can describe the point as having these three parts, but it is still indivisible. Therefore your description is false. Those three, location, matter, and form, refer to concepts, which are not actually parts of the point itself, but concepts used to understand its existence. That is like the "spin" of a virtual particle, it's simply conceptual.

This is a common problem with "divisibility". We often assume that a thing can be divided in a way which it actually can't. This problem comes form the mathematical approach, within which we assume that things can be divided any which way, and infinitely, just like we assume with numbers.. So for instance, we assume that a thing can be divided infinitely when it actually can't. Or we assume that we can make perfectly even halves, and things like that. There are real physical restrictions on division which we do not adequately understand.

So then we do agree that two purely ontologically simple beings are impossible, — Bob Ross

No, we do not agree. I think your proposed concept of "complete and perfect simplicity" is incoherent, and itself an impossible, or self contradicting concept. It requires that a multiplicity be one.

However, I am referring to something that is perfectly indivisible by it being ontologically simple. E.g., I am referring to perfect circularity. — Bob Ross

If "perfectly indivisible" is what you are referring to, then why can there not be more than one of these things? Imagine a point in space. It is perfectly indivisible, but there could be a multitude of different points, each at a different place, at the same time, therefore distinguishable from each other, by having a different place of existence, yet each perfectly indivisible.

or Aristotle, apart from an obscure passage in De Anima, thinks of the soul as the form of an organism in virtue of which the organism is alive. It is the self-actualizing principle that unifies the organism into the kind of alive thing it is. This seems to suggest that the soul is not substantially distinct from the body insofar as it is analogous to the imprint of the ring on the wax which makes wax a wax seal. Thusly, it seems like the soul does not survive the body and is not immaterial in the sense that it is pure form (although it isn't matter either: it's the self-actualizing principle of matter in virtue of which makes it alive). — Bob Ross

You say, Aristotle says it is "the form". Then you go on to say it is not "pure form'. That is contradiction. For Aristotle, as "the form", it is pure form.

1. What is Aristotle's view of the mind here? Is it a nothingness, a negativity, like Hegel? Is it pure form that is immaterial? — Bob Ross

I think that the key to understanding this is that Aristotle distinguishes between the soul, and the intellect, or mind, which is a capacity of the soul. He explained that prior philosophers. like Plato, did not properly distinguish between soul and mind, and often used the words interchangeably.

Obviously, I don't understand what you are proposing as "complete and perfect simplicity". If this means "all is one" then obviously there cannot be a multitude of complete and perfect simplicities, because by definition this would all be one.

But that is not what we were talking about. We were talking about being ontologically simple in the sense of being indivisible, And, for the reasons given, I do not see why there cannot be a multitude of ontologically simple (in this sense of being indivisible) things.

Something being ontologically indistinguishable from another thing entails that they are the same thing because the concept of ontological (as opposed to epistemic) indistinguishability is that there is nothing ontologically different about the two things in question. — Bob Ross

But things which are ontologically simple, are not necessarily ontologically indistinguishable.

I don't see why you think that there could not be a multitude of ontologically simple things, which are distinguishable through spatial temporal principles. Why do you think that two ontologically simple things would necessarily be ontologically indistinguishable?

The question is a serious one, but I wish it to be considered imaginatively, such as whether the end of time suggests 'nothingness' for eternity. — Jack Cummins

Nothing suggests "nothingness for eternity" like "death" does. The "death of the universe" is an anthropomorphism.

But then I realised your strawman is actually quite useful: Of course some pain is useful, it is how our bodies tells us that there might be a problem, a danger, something bad. So, if I transpose this strawman back to my statement it would read: strife, civil disobedience, revolution and war is good because it tells us that there is a problem, a danger, something bad; not so? — Pieter R van Wyk

Right, this is what I meant by "something deeper". Now, how do you conclude that there is "a problem, a danger, something bad"?

Consider my example of "no gain without pain", and the athletes who subject themselves to pain for the sake of a further goal. There is not a problem here, not a danger, nor something bad. It is just a matter of a person who wants to better oneself with respect to a specific goal, and this requires pain. Therefore the pain is good under these circumstances Why couldn't this be the case in some instances of strife, civil disobedience, revolution, and war? Then it wouldn't necessarily be the case that these are telling us that there is a problem, a danger, or something bad, it could just as likely be the case that these are indicating to us that there is something good, a specific goal, and these 'pains' are required to achieve that end.

Also, I never suggested that philosophy should put an end to these bad things - this is exactly my point: after 2,600 years of philosophical endeavour, we humans has not been able to put an end to these bad things and because of THAT I do not expect any useful solution to these bad things from philosophy. So, thank you for your agreement that my question is a valid one. — Pieter R van Wyk

Again, I reject your premise that these things are necessarily "bad" things, by the reasoning presented. Philosophy may be useful in helping us to understand the difference between bad things and good things. A little bit of philosophy could help you to understand that your premise that these things are necessarily bad is false. I suggest that you read some Plato, he's very educational toward understanding the difference between, as well as the various relations between, good, bad, pleasure, and pain.

Again, I defined it as something which contributes to the whole but is not identical to it. Nothing about a part in this sense is restricted to something with tangible parts. — Bob Ross

That's not a very good definition. People contribute to things without being a part of the thing which they contribute to. The contribution itself becomes the part of the whole, not the thing which contributes it, as the person who contributes may remain separate. Furthermore "contribution" is about giving, and it is not even necessary that a part is given, as a thing may take its parts.

Here's the first definition from my OED: "some but not all of a thing, or number of things". Notice that what you call "the whole", is here called "a thing", or "number of things". To me, this implies a material object, or a group of material objects.

Because two ontologically simple things are ontologically indistinguishable from each other. — Bob Ross

How do you support this claim? Why can't two ontologically simple things be distinguishable from each other through time and space, like one simple thing here, and another simple thing over there, at the same time? What would make these two things which are clearly distinguishable from each other, by being at different locations at the very same time, necessarily not ontologically simple?

Dear Metaphysician Undercover, I would like to ask you a big favour: please explain your understanding of "something deeper" to the more than 1,400 Israelis that was killed and abducted on 7 October 2023 and the 56,000 Palestinians killed as a consequence of this. Also, please explain this "something deeper" to the thousands that die every day due to hunger and preventable diseases. Please explain to all of them that their deaths are, in fact, "for the sake of a higher good." — Pieter R van Wyk

Did you not understand what I wrote? I suggested that you need to separate good pain from bad pain, and not class all different forms of suffering together as bad.

I don't care how many examples of pain you provide, and insist that the pain in your examples is bad pain, that still does not prove that there is no such thing as pain which is good. As the saying "no gain without pain" suggests, many athletes subject themselves to pain, in their training exercises, for the sake of a higher goal. That pain is good pain. In other words, we often understand that we must put ourselves through pain and sometimes even suffer, to get to where we want to be.

So, I suggested that the things of your examples "civil disobedience, revolution and war" are sometimes like this, good. Sometimes we must put ourselves through the pain and suffering of civil disobedience, revolution, or war, intentionally, for the sake of getting where we want to be. One form of suffering for what is good is known as martyrdom.

I admit that I have not read your book, but you seem to class all pain and suffering together as bad. Therefore you imply that philosophy ought to be trying to put an end to it, and has not been able to do this. I think that this is a faulty premise which amounts to a fatal flaw in your reasoning, making that reasoning unsound. As the saying "no gain without pain" indicates, pain is necessary for us to achieve what we believe is good.

, most definitely, do not blame philosophy or philosophers for the woes of the world - merely pointing out the 'fact' that these problems have not been solved. — Pieter R van Wyk

I think you need to justify your assumption that "strife, civil disobedience, revolution and war" are "problems". These may also be understood as the means of overcoming problems. From this perspective, the real problems are something deeper, more significant, and these activities which you name as problems, are actually the way in which we free ourselves from those deeper problems.

Accordingly, I believe the "fatal flaw in your thinking" is a faulty generalization, and categorization. You place all "suffering" in the same category as "bad", not recognizing that some suffering is good, according to the saying "no gain without pain". Then you fault philosophers for not eradicating suffering, when in fact the good and proper goal of many philosophers, and philosophies, is to encourage us to endure some form of suffering for the sake of a higher good.

Aquinas has it that angels and demons are composed in a sense. They have both essence (what they are) and an existence given by God (that they are). — Count Timothy von Icarus

If I remember correctly, God is eternal, and angels are aeviternal. I believe that this means God's existence is completely outside of time, whereas angels have a beginning in time (being created by God), but no end in time.

Another step toward "The Disunited States of America".

My answer is simple: the world is as it is because that is how the world and we humans evolved. Which then begs the question, how did this evolution took place? — Pieter R van Wyk

This seems to be your real question. You see fault in human nature, and you are inclined to ask how (or why) is it the case that evolution produced this.

I believe that one can take two very distinct approaches toward answering this, and they are distinguished by the way that one understands "intention". One is to position intention as pre-evolution, and the other positions it as post-evolution.

The latter restricts "intention" to a property of human beings, and something which was produced, or emerged from evolutionary processes. If this is the case, then we cannot place blame or fault on the evolutionary process which produced human beings. Human beings were produced by some random process and it is inappropriate to judge that activity as good or bad, which are properties of intentional acts. This renders 'there is fault in human nature' as a categorical mistake. We cannot direct any blame toward the evolutionary actions which produced human nature, we simply make subjective, fallible human judgements about that nature.

On the other hand, if intention is apprehended as prior to evolution, then it may be involved in evolution, and we have the premise required for judging these acts which have led to the current state of human nature as good or bad. This produces the common question about how good could God be, if He allows evil in the world.

I always play nice. In my mind, if it's not nice, it's not play.

How many of you are willing to share and post in this thread the initial email you sent to Jamal, the very message or part of it at least, that granted you passage into this “invite only” collective? — Kizzy

As javi2541997 has indicated, in the olden days we didn't need an invite. I think Jamal initiated that invitation only practice to keep out malicious bots and things like that.

I see that I have the lucky number "7" beside my name. I take that as a good sign.

Are you prepared to go into the deep end? — Kizzy

Personally, I think maybe you've gone off the deep end. Have you got nothing better to do with your life?
Hmmm, I guess that could be asked of any of us who hang around here.

So the response to such a question is abuse? — J

I don't see why you call my response "abuse". I merely pointed out a common personality trait which was indicated to me by the op's claimed use of PM. That trait was identified as "insecurity". Do you generally interpret constructive criticism as abuse?

So let me see how this works. I say, "In my opinion, that's a beautiful painting." And you are "bound to reply", "You aren't very smart"? — J

I don't see the analogy. You provide no indication as to how you draw this conclusion. I very clearly explained how I came to the conclusion of "insecurity". Further, I did not state that I believe the conclusion to be necessary. I asked, (with a question mark in case you missed it) if it was a sound conclusion.

Therefore, I was suggesting it as a topic for discussion. And, judging by the replies, it appears like more people agree with me than disagree.

Some people appear to be missing the bigger picture. What would be the point in having TPF if we all decided that it is better to discuss our philosophical ideas through private messages? I mean, this suggestion that we use PM to discuss philosophy instead of the public forum is absolutely contrary to the very reason for being of TPF. Why does it upset you when the suggestion is scoffed at?

That is, after all, the purpose of a place like this. — Hanover

Patience is a virtue which I do not have. If someone joined the chess tournament, and recommended that we play by special rules crafted by that individual, I'd literally lose it. Then @J would see what constitutes "abuse".

I believe the point of this thread is not to be philosophical but to ask us if we use private messages to interact privately with other members. — javi2541997

Good morning javi. I don't mean to be overly pedantic, but I think it's important to note that the op is clearly and specifically concerned with "discussing philosophical ideas in Private Messages".

Your response shows exactly why Banno might prefer a PM discussion. He poses a perfectly reasonable question to the members, and you slam into him. Why? What are you hoping that will achieve? If you think his ideas about PMs are open to some concerns, can't that be said civilly and respectfully? Sigh . . . I guess it's the world we live in today. — J

The op lacks any real philosophy. It states a personal opinion. The replies are bound to be opinions about the person, because the person stated something personal. I simply met the op's invitation.

This thread ought to be in The Lounge.

It's much easier to follow a deep discussion without interjection.

It's also easier for practical reasons. I don't have to flick back and forth between pages, and scroll up or down through irrelevant or even counterproductive material.

It cuts down quite dramatically on the bullshit. Quite a relief, actually. — Banno

In other words, by using PM it's easier to avoid the masses who disagree with you, allowing you to escape into a fabricated world of illusion, with a close buddy. Avoid the distractions which reality forces upon you, and really build your own little dream scene.

When I want to escape into my own little world of creativity, I just pm myself. It's all done in the privacy and secrecy of my own mind, commonly known as thinking.

What's with the need for a buddy in your private and secret world of creativity? Do I detect a little insecurity?

I'm pretty sure that every day there are more discoveries that do not defy science. But they are not so newsworthy. Your sample may be a bit biased. — Ludwig V

Well, we still have the unpredictability of human actions to account for.

But isn't it fair to say that this is, precisely, the "world doing as advertised", including the unpredictability of people? I don't mean this just as a smart comeback, but something deeply true. Our scientific view of the world allows us to predict with confidence that our views will be regularly upended by new insights and discoveries! We didn't use to know that, but now we do, and that is now "how the world works." — J

You can interpret unpredictability as a form of predictability if that makes you feel good. I'd prefer not to enter that world where contradiction is the norm.

Folk want the world to be unpredictable in order to suit their heroic philosophical narrative, but predictably go to the shop to buy their sausages. — Banno

Not me.

They type on their device fully expecting a reply from Banno, and sometimes get one. — Banno

Wrong again.

Zero out of two is not very good.

Do we want to discuss these things, or make drive-by shots on each other? — AmadeusD

Drive -by shots are likely the best way to deal with someone like Banno who never listens. The more noise those shots make, the better. Maybe that would wake him up. Banno's certitude has dulled his senses to the point that he's now just daydreaming about how it is impossible for him to be wrong.

Sure, the world is sometimes not as expected. But we can see this only becasue overwhelmingly it is coherent. Chairs do not turn into cats, chalk is not democracy and so on. — Banno

The vast majority of what you observe tomorrow, will be totally unexpected from today's perspective. The fact that you can provide a few general examples of what you can expect tomorrow, means very little when there will be thousands, maybe millions, of particular occurrences which you will observe, and will be completely unexpected.

The point being made is that doubt takes place against a background of certainty. — Banno

It's very obvious that you have this backward. We tend to be certain of a very few things, generalities, which are correct, against a background of a vast multitude of particularities which we are uncertain about. If you believe that the passing of time, provides for you, a background of certainty, then you are well practiced in the art of self-deception.

That no disaster has occurred yet is luck, not justification. — Benkei

It is evidence that the nuclear facilities are not as significant as claimed, kind of like Saddam's WMD. If you bomb the facility before it's a danger to bomb it, it's a lot safer, but justification is a lot more difficult. If it isn't justifiable, it's oppression.

Overwhelmingly, the world appears to do much as advertised. — Banno

Not according to the pop-up headlines I get on the internet. Every day there's new discoveries which defy science. Furthermore, there's a whole range of human activities which are completely unpredictable.

I wouldn't say that this constitutes miracles, only that science doesn't really have the capacity to predict what the world will do.

Even if you accept that there can be a being of pure form, they would have immaterial parts — Bob Ross

Parts are what a material object is composed of. I don't think it makes any sense to talk of the parts of an immaterial form. Neither does your argument make any sense.

3. Two or more beings without parts cannot exist. — Bob Ross

Why not?

Now we can see what the section title means. The disenchantment of the concept intentionally mirrors Weber's disenchantment of the world. Where the latter described the demystification of the world through the erosion of religious worldviews and sacred hierarchical bonds, the disenchantment of the concept means to erode its sacred power, to root it in material reality without casting it aside completely---bringing the concept down to Earth. — Jamal

The interpretation I offered above is quite convoluted, and you may not understand it properly, but it is very consistent with yours. So here's a sort of paraphrase. The identity thinking, which Adorno criticizes is a movement of the concept attempting to become consistent with the object (such as representationalism). But this produces a division between concept and object (classic dualism), requiring a mediator between the two. (Plato's tripartite soul posits spirit as mediator between body and mind.)

As explained above, any proposed mediator must always be on the side of the concept, because that is what appears as immediate to the subject as actively manipulating the concepts. But this is a sort of bias which prevents a true representation of mediation. So the project is ill-fated as trying to do what its bias prevents. In this ill-fated project, the object, as well as concept, are in essence static, while an agent (Spirit) is required for the activity which moves the concepts shaping them to be consistent with the objects.

Adorno's proposal puts the foundational activity in the object itself, as the cause of concepts. This assigns to the object the position of mediator between the contraries of the concept. That might make the object, as active, immediate to the intellect, (which is Adorno goal, the priority of the object). This effectively replaces Spirit as the immediate active agent of mediation with the object as the immediate active agent of mediation.

That would be the form. But form is complex (not in the sense of having material parts though), and not simple. If you do not accept the categorical difference between matter and form you'll be forever stuck in the same rut.

He counters that "in truth," all concepts are produced by and point back to material reality (whether they do the latter well or badly is a different matter). That is part of what a concept is. This flat assertion of materialism is similar to that in the earlier paragraph. — Jamal

I see this as the key point to the section. And, there are two key words to Adorno's description of this, which I am trying to get a handle on. The words are "moment" and "mediation". The following are the passages with that usage:

In truth all concepts,
even philosophical ones, move towards what is non-conceptual,
because they are for their part moments of the reality, which
necessitated – primarily for the purpose of controlling nature – their
formation. That which appears as the conceptual mediation from the
inside, the pre-eminence of its sphere, without which nothing could be
known, may not be confused with what it is in itself. Such an
appearance [Schein] of the existent-in-itself lends it the movement
which exempts it from the reality, within which it is for its part
harnessed. — p 22

Meanwhile, the insight that its conceptual essence would not be its
absolute in spite of its inseparability is again mediated through the
constitution of the concept; it is no dogmatic or even naively realistic
thesis. — p23

The concept is a moment like any
other in dialectical logic. Its mediated nature through the non
conceptual survives in it by means of its significance, which for its part
founds its conceptual nature. It is characterized as much by its relation
to the non-conceptual – as in keeping with traditional epistemology,
where every definition of concepts ultimately requires non-conceptual,
deictic moments – as the contrary, that the abstract unity of the onta
subsumed under it are to be separated from the ontical. To change this
direction of conceptuality, to turn it towards the non-identical, is the
hinge of negative dialectics. — p 23

Now, "mediation" implies a medium or mediator, and this is something in between the two features which are distinct, and may be opposites, or two extremes. So we have three aspects, the two distinct features which we can say are mediated, and the medium/mediator. As far as I can tell, Adorno keeps the medium/mediator not well described or defined, and somewhat ambiguous. And, since I cannot understand "mediated" without some understanding of the medium/mediator, I am left to speculate.

Generally, a medium is understood to be passive, and a mediator is understood to be active, so I think we can eliminate the former as unlikely to be what Adorno talks of as mediation. This means that "moment" is used not as a passive instant, or point in time, but more like the use in physics, where the moment is an active force of causation. Following this exclusion, I see two principal possibilities for the meaning of mediator. The first is that the two opposing features are concept and object, and the mediator mediates between these two. The second is that the two opposing features are both conceptual, (contradictories such as is and is not), and the mediator between these two is the object.

I'll start with the first possibility. Since Adorno speaks of a separation between concept and object, it appears like the mediator lies between these two as a mediation of both. However, this leads to the problem outlined. Any description of the mediator is necessarily conceptual, such that the mediator is not a proper mediator, but is actually on the side of the concept and therefore not a proper mediator. For example, we might say that in general, the mediator between concept and object is the human being, but this is purely conceptual. And if we get more specific, we could say that the mediator is human activities, knowledge, or philosophy, but this is still conceptual. In the attempt to avoid this, we might think of the individual philosopher as the mediator, and the philosopher's actions under one's material conditions (historical context), as mediation between concept and object. But an important aspect of the material conditions is ideology, and again, the conceptual side takes priority.

So we ought to proceed to the second possibility. And since Adorno explicitly speaks of the mediation of conception, I believe that this is how he wants us to understand mediation. The object acts as mediator in the formation of concepts. Conception deals with opposing terms, contraries, and the objects act to mediate the conception of these contraries. So this, I believe is what he proposes as the "hinge of negative dialectics", to turn one's attention onto the particular objects which mediate the concept, instead of turning one's attention toward the identity relation, which is actually purely conceptual.

I have one problem with what Adorno says in this section, and that is how he distances himself from Hegel. He states the following:

Concepts such as that of being in the beginning of Hegel’s Logic
indicate first of all that which is emphatically non-conceptual; they
signify, as per Lask’s expression, beyond themselves. — p 23

I believe that this is a misrepresentation of Hegel. In his logic, "being" is a concept, which along with the opposing "not being" represents a logical form. "Being" does not represent the non-conceptual, it represents the opposite of not being. That's what supports its identity in that logical form. However, "becoming" in its classical form is a representation of the material world. So Hegel's dialectics can be interpreted as showing the (conceptual) logical contraries as being subsumed by the material world of changing objects (becoming) in a process known as synthesis.

This puts Hegel's dialectics as very similar to Adorno's. The difference I see is that Adorno's "mediation" is active in the production of the concept, which consists of contraries, whereas Hegel's "synthesis" is the result or effect of conception. Furthermore, Hegel's "synthesis" is a bit problematic in comparison to Adorno's "mediation", because it requires an active agent, which ends up being Spirit. Adorno can assign causal activity to the mediator, which is the active, objective reality of the material world, thereby avoiding the need for an active agent as cause of the concepts, while Hegel needs an agent to cause synthesis.

That could be the change of direction, the turn around that he speaks of for negative dialectics.

This isn't a direct counter to my point. If you have finite divisibility, then you will end up with multiple absolutely simple beings (even if they are just 'atoms') and this is impossible. To hold your view, you have to accept that two absolutely simple beings are not ontologically indistinguishable from each other. — Bob Ross

That's a faulty conclusion. All we need to do is accept that form is categorically different from matter, therefore formal causes are categorically different from material causes. No being is simple, as each is a composition of matter and form. And, the priority of form (such as God, and the soul, who are not properly "beings" but Forms) allows that matter is created (not from nothing, but from form) according to the specific purpose intended.