Seems to me that he explicitly defines the content as the non-conceptual. — NotAristotle

Yes, that's right, he does. But the question we are looking at is the approach to the non-conceptual. Is the non-conceptual which is spoken of, an external material object, or is it the irrational, or material aspect of the conscious thinking mind. I believe Adorno is talking about the latter. This is because he designates it unmediated.

To summarize, we have 3 putative theories of "content." 1. Philosophical content. 2. Material kernel of consciousness. 3. The non-conceptual. — NotAristotle

The problem is that the non-conceptual, by its name, is fundamentally unintelligible. So trying to understand it, or conceptualize it, is sort of self-defeating. The three putative theories here are each just as correct as the others, but in a deeper sense, they are all equally incorrect.

5. If consciousness were not naive -- taking the immediately perceived as the real-deal rather than a phenomena -- then thought would not think of itself. There would be no negative. Thought would get on with the task of perceiving reality and never think of itself. Thought here would be a "dim copy" of the perceived. — Moliere

I generally agree with your summary Moliere, but I think you might have gotten something turned around here. The immediately perceived, as content is the real deal, hence the naivety of idealism in believing that the conceptual is the real deal.

6. The immediate reflection on the object which reflects upon the non-conceptual beyond the intuitions laid about the object is the least subject-like experience of all, and yet even here we must acknowledge that our experience is not the object as per paragraph 5. — Moliere

So in this paragraph, he is saying that the aspect of the object which extends beyond conceptual grasp and comes to the subject as something immediate, is the most subjective.

That which is most subjective of all, the immediately given, eludes its grasp."
Our experience is the object, but thinking only grasps a part of it, i.e the conceptual.

7. That confidence in the immediate is an idealistic appearance. — Moliere

So here, the confidence in the immediate is the idealistic approach, but it is a false confidence due to a false immediate. It is a false confidence because "the immediate" is wrongly characterized as the conceptual, the abstract. In a sense, the idealist approach is to take the conceptual for granted as immediate, instead of portraying it as mediated through ideology, education etc..

These may be minor points, sort of nitpicking, but it does make a bit of a difference to the overall interpretation.

Perhaps I'm not grasping this, but if someone is perceiving "something" then that is "objects" broadly (and in the way i suggest it be used here - I'm not suggesting there are (or that we could know that there are) actual, physical objects beyond the senses). These could simply be that which is required as an assumption for hte perception to obtain. I content roughly that — AmadeusD

"Required as an assumption" implies that the assumption is a necessary aspect. That is why the sensation is commonly called a representation. It is assumed to represent something.

Consider what Paine says:

The "physical objects" we experience in our sensations and judgements are representations made possible through combinations of our intuitions of space and time. — Paine

If these representations are false, it may be the case that the person is not actually perceiving objects, despite believing oneself to be perceiving objects.

What are the criteria? — Patterner

I would say that the single most important criterion for "object" is temporal extension.

Surely the non-immediacy, i.e., the mediatedness, of content is the whole point of this section: the appearance is the bad positive and behind it lies some internally contradictory thing, which I take to be the content. Despite this terminological difference I suspect we agree more than disagree.

What do we even mean by "content"? The content is surely what Adorno is referring to with "the thing" here: — Jamal

The meaning of "content" is the difficult part. I suggest you pay attention to Marx who was explicit in separating form and content. The distinction Adorno makes is between concept, and content. After a number of readings i believe it is quite clear that he believes the concept is mediated, and content is immediate. This is the reverse of Hegel, but he thinks Hegel is mistaken, and it is Hegel's supposed immediacy of the concept which provides for its absoluteness.

Since Hegelian logic always had to do with the medium of the
concept and only generally reflected on the relationship of the concept
to its content, the non-conceptual, it is already assured in advance of
the absoluteness of the concept, which it was bent on proving.

"Content" is difficult to understand, but I believe it is that part of the subject which is material, therefore non-conceptual, the true object as it inheres within, being an intrinsic part of the consciousness. I believe this is the point which Marx makes, and how he differs fundamentally from Hegel. Hegel makes the idea pure, absolute, but Marx adheres to Aristotelian hylomorphism which necessitates a duality of matter and form, which manifests as content and form within the idea itself. The notion that there must be a "kernel" of content (which from the pure idealist perspective would be a contamination) within any idea, being 'matter' within the idea, I believe is the ontology which supports Marxist materialism.

So in this context, content is that part of the consciousness which escapes intelligibility, being material in nature. But I believe that Adorno argues it is what is immediate to the conscious subject. Consider that the content comes from within the subject, one's own feelings and passions, while the concept comes from an exterior source, as that which is taught, ideology, formalisms.

Adorno, being interested in the the non-identity of concept and thing, reveals through the analysis of mediation a different thing (different from the appearance). So the content here is not something like sense-data or the given, i.e., the content of experience in AP terms, but the content of philosophy (philosophy as it should be, i.e., negative dialectics). — Jamal

The non-identity of concept and thing (thing being the object which is a subject) is the difference between the subject's own idiomatic thinking, and the concepts of ideology. As Adorno implied in other parts, the individualist ideology has propagated a widening of this gap allowing for 'free thinking'.

I believe it is only from this perspective that the closing paragraph makes sense. By making the content something material which inheres within consciousness itself, the content, the kernel (seed of potential) within the idea, then we have the required principle to account for evolving and changing ideas. Otherwise we are left with the idealist absolute forms, which are invariant and eternal, but this is demonstrably false.

Yes. They are perceiving something. Things are objects. That fact we can't know what/which (and similar questions) doesn't change that part of the position. (and, as above, Kant knows this too). — AmadeusD

The thing perceived is not necessarily objects. The person may judge oneself to be perceiving objects, but if "objects" doesn't fulfill the criteria for what the person is actually perceiving, then that judgement is wrong. the person is mistaken, and is perceiving without perceiving objects.

I found this section difficult, and what I've said here avoids getting caught up in the details, which I didn't really untangle—so I'd be interested in what others think. — Jamal

I'm afraid I probably can't help to untangle this mess. However, I'll give it a try. I believe there is a number of conceptual relations being discussed, and it is intended that they all relate to each other in some way. There is "solid", "whole", "emergent", "invariant", "immediate", and "mediated", to name some important ones.

The central issue seems to be a criticism against Hegel's categories needing to be both emergent and logically invariant. Adorno see these two descriptions as incompatible. So the section tries to untangle becoming, changing, evolving, from the invariant, immutable, eternal concepts of idealism.

He makes the distinction between concept and content. It appears to me, that the concept is always mediated, and content is immediate, also the medium. This puts solidity, being "that which holds together", and the ensuing whole, the concrete, as something mediated, conceptualized, or provided by conception. Content on the other hand is nebulous, and this leaves subjective experience, along with that which is immediate, content, in the strange situation of being unable to understand itself. "That which is most subjective of all, the immediately given, eludes its grasp."

In the final paragraph then, he attempts at an explanation of how the whole, as the concept, and mediated, emerges out of the immediate, the content. The two extremes, the immediate content, and the invariant concept, are described as "moments" rather than as "grounds". The supposed invariance however, is revealed as an artificial, or even false invariance, being "produced", created. We can see that the "immutability is the deception of prima philosophia", and the concepts gain the appearance of invariance when "they pass over into ideology", where they are solidified as part of the whole.

Here's what I think is the pivotal passage, in the middle of the section:

Since Hegelian logic always had to do with the medium of the
concept and only generally reflected on the relationship of the concept
to its content, the non-conceptual, it is already assured in advance of
the absoluteness of the concept, which it was bent on proving. The more
the autonomy of subjectivity is seen through critically, the more it
becomes aware of itself as something mediated for its part, the more
conclusive the obligation of thought to take up what solidity has
brought to it, which it does not have in itself. Otherwise there could not
even be that dynamic, by which dialectics moved the burden of that
which is solid.

Notice the solidity is only an appearance, because if it were true, dialectics could have no effect. So referring back to the beginning of the section, this is why solidity, and even the whole itself, are the bad positive.

It occurs to me that rather than induction or deduction, there are two alternative ways of characterizing his reasoning: abductive reasoning (inference to the best explanation) and transcendental argument. In fact, looking at the SEP entry for transcendental arguments, I notice the suggestion has been made that transcendental arguments are abductive rather than deductive as they are commonly taken to be. This means that abductive reasoning and transcendental argumentation might be two ways of describing the same process of reasoning. — Jamal

i understand "abductive reasoning" as a broad category encompassing a number of different types of informal reasoning processes. Some people want to restrict "logic" to formal deduction, and class inductive as distinct, "reasoning". Therefore it's best to class them both as forms of reasoning. The difference is in the format of the rules. Deduction has formal rules, induction does not. If we proceed further, into the category of reasoning with formal rules, we meet the highly formalized modal logic. If we proceed further into the category of reasoning without formal rules, we meet abduction where judgement is according to some vague principles.

It is necessary to allow the validity of abductive reasoning, which I agree transcendental reasoning is a type of, because we need to allow for a process whereby the rules of formal logic come into being. In other words, this type of reasoning, which produces the conditions for formal logic, must be afforded some form of validity. The basic example is that informal inductive reasoning often produces the premises required for the formal deductive argument. But we must be able to judge and assign some type of validity to the premises. This is commonly known as soundness which is distinct from deductive validity. So when we proceed into forms of reasoning which are even less formal, abductive reasoning, we need to devise principles for judgement, and those principles come from even less formal reasoning. The appearance is a sort of groundlessness, and the apparent infinite regress of justification which Wittgenstein looked at in On Certainty.

1. The entrepreneur

Adorno begins with the fact of objectively necessary false consciousness: a capitalist must believe in a fair exchange between himself and the worker, even though this belief is objectively false. The transcendetal question is "What must be the case for this illusion to be—not just possible, but necessary?" Or "What must be the case for the maintenance of this paradox to be possible?" And here is where the abductive reasoning comes in to hypothesize the social whole as the best explanation, completing the transcendental argument by identifying the conditions. (Obviously this is just an outline) — Jamal

i suppose one could come to that conclusion, but I see the opposite conclusion, that the social whole is impossible. That's the thing with abductive reasoning, we don't always come to the same conclusions. And this supports relativism, so it would be very difficult to disprove relativism through abduction.

2. Free time — Jamal

I really enjoy Adorno's outlook on freedom in general. He sees it as very paradoxical. We get so enamoured by this idea of freedom, without even having a clear understanding of what freedom is, that we rapidly become enslaved by an illusory "freedom". So we really restrict ourselves with our own understanding of 'freedom".

it is this intertwining of contraries which allows me to make the opposite conclusion to you, in the case of the social whole, above, and in abductive reasoning in general. Notice that Adorno says, that we can see through all this, and find that philosophers speak as if they are opposing each other, when they are really saying the same thing. Maybe what they are saying is "I don't know". So they waffle back and forth and some interpret one thing, while others the opposite thing.

This inference has no implication at all as to the characteristics of this (so called) God. All we know is that this "God" is some thing that kicked off the sequence of universe states. — Relativist

Sure, how does that mean that what I said makes no sense? It seems to make complete sense to me. There is something which caused the reality of the universe which we know and understand, but we do not know anything else about this cause.

Non-sequitur. Even if the universe was created by Yahweh, it entails an initial state of Yahweh (and nothing else). So it's self-defeating to rule out an initial state. — Relativist

This supposed conclusion is contrary to the argument. The argument demonstrates that the "thing" you refer to as prior to all the physical states, is explicitly not a state. That is why God is understood as immaterial. To characterize it as a state is to demonstrate that you are either failing to understand it, or refusing to accept it. Judging by the rest of our discussion, I think you are refusing. I think you actually grasp the force with which the argument disproves the physicalism of your faithful devotion, and so you practise denial because you are not prepared for apostasy.

But my argument is that time is generated from rotation. — apokrisis

But rotation is an activity which requires time. This puts time as prior to rotation. Rotation cannot get started without the passing of time. Therefore it is impossible that rotation is the cause of time, or that time is generated from rotation.

The logic I use above is the same type of logic by which Aristotle demonstrates that eternal circular motion is physically impossible in De Caelo. He starts by showing how eternal circular motion is logically possible. All the mathematical principles, the Ideals, are consistent and sufficient to support the reality of eternal circular motion. However, he then goes on to explain how any circular motion would involve a body which is moving in that motion. And, the body would consist of matter. The material body, would have been generated in the past, and would corrupt in the future, therefore the eternal circular motion is physically impossible.

The same logic can be applied to your claim that time is generated from rotation. Rotation is an activity which requires something which rotates. The thing which is rotating is a physical thing, a temporal object, existing in time. Therefore time is prior to rotation, rotation occurs within time, and it is impossible that time is generated from rotation.

This is of course the quick and dirty account. But it’s based on the maths of the symmetries underpinning quantum field theory. How SO(3) breaks down into its double cover of SU(2). You can get the fluctuation that is a vector gauge boson. A particle that exists as it has the dimensional structure that is an action in a direction. A translational degree of freedom which carries with it a transverse plane of rotation - a spin that cashes out an intrinsic energy. The constant field strength of a quantum oscillator. — apokrisis

All this happens in time. it is not an account of how time is generated.

So even if you can’t follow these details, you can see how time is an emergent description of what the universe is doing as a material system. — apokrisis

No, i don't see how it is possible that time is emergent from something material. And, you should be able to understand this as well. All material things are temporal, having their beginnings and endings in time. As demonstrated by Aristotle's argument in Bk 9 of metaphysics, which I referred to, anything eternal must be actual.

Some people develop areas of expertise, e.g. auto mechanics and MDs — wonderer1

But these are specifics, this type of thing, or that type, according to the area of expertise. What we were talking about is why things (in general) behave the way that they do.

Do you really think that is an accurate claim about yourself? Or do you recognize that an MD is apt to know more than most people, about why your body behaves the way it does? — wonderer1

Yes, I really think it is an accurate claim. And, I do not think that an MD knows more about why I behave the way that I do, then I do.

That's an unjustified conclusion. The evidence implies either an infinite series or something unique to initiate the series. — Relativist

This is not true. Evidence indicates that becoming, or change, is a process of transition. Therefore the series ends, but it does not end abruptly at a point, it transitions to something else. This is neither an infinite series nor a unique point which initiates the series, it is a process of change.

Because an initial state (a unique thing) with potential to produce a subsequent state is also consistent with the evidence. So you need a rational reason to rule this out. — Relativist

I explained the rationale behind ruling out the "initial state". An "initial state" is an ideal which is arbitrarily assigned in the application of systems theory. As an "ideal" it has nothing which directly corresponds with it in the physical world. Take the eternal circular motion referred to above, in my reply to apokrisis, as an example. It is a logical possibility, and an ideal, but it is actually physically impossible. It is common that ideals are actually physically impossible, because the physical world lacks the perfection of the ideal. But that does not make the ideals useless. Many are extremely useful, for all sorts of purposes. However, when it comes to cosmology, and we assign the ideal as a fundamental property of the universe, when the ideal is actually physically impossible, this is a mistake which is very misleading. It is sometimes called the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Both you and apokrisis make this same mistake, of designating an ideal which is actually physically impossible, as a fundamental property of the universe. I believe this type of mistake is common to all forms of physicalism.

The presence of the social whole in his thought ties things together. Without it, things in all their contradictory nature just don't make sense. Thus, the social whole is a valid inference. I admit, of course, that he nowhere deduces it. — Jamal

Ok, suppose "the social whole" is assumed as a means to tie things together. That could be a bit of a mistaken interpretation, uncharitable you might say, because it would represent it as something posited, or taken for granted. That would portray Adorno as having a system approach, guided by that intention of creating a whole, casting Adorno in the hypocritical light.

Notice however, if we pay close attention to the qualification in "preestablished whole", we can produce a slightly different interpretation. Instead of creating "the whole" with the intent of holding things together, we can say that "the whole" has been produced from observation and inductive reasoning. It is preestablished as an observed fact. But this implies that we ought to be able to analyze and judge the inductive reasoning involved in concluding the "preestablished whole".

I don't understand this interpretation. I mean, I can accept that Adorno inherited the very idea of a totality from Hegel, but he explicitly distinguishes it from Spirit. — Jamal

The problem is, that he can assert over and over, that his "preestablished whole" is distinct from "Spirit", which is the whole as established by Hegel, but if they are both taken for granted, and posited as a means to tie things together, to produce a philosophical system, then they are actually the very same thing. Then he falls into the category of hypocrite which the relativists get exposed as.

Notice also, that the subjective, intentional, act of assuming X for the sake of Y, where X represents the relationships between human beings, and Y represents the intent of the subject, is the essence of relativism by Adorno's description. Therefore the act of positing "Spirit" as absolute, is itself a hypocritical act, being relativistic. Then this act, by its nature, turns out to support the relativist position through what it demonstrates.

This is why I think it would be very important to determine how Adorno induces the "preestablished whole". Without appropriate inductive reasoning, "the whole" falls into that category of intent for the purpose of system, undermining Adorno's negative dialectics.

Or, does criticality towards capitalism not imply Marxism? — NotAristotle

Critical of capitalism is the larger category in relation to Marxism. Therefore the latter may imply the former, if the former is judged as an essential property of the latter, but the former does not imply the latter. .

In other words, Adorno is saying that relativism is, not logically self-refuting, but hypocritical. It makes use of thoughts inherited from the social world to produce the thought that thoughts are entirely the product of the individual. — Jamal

I agree, he basically says that the actual consequences of relativism are what refutes it. The problem i find is that the social "whole" which he refers to is not well validated.

In truth divergent perspectives have their law in the structure of
the social process, as one of a preestablished whole.

We can talk about preestablished social conditions, but the relativist will claim that they are relativistic conditions. Adorno needs the "whole" to support his objective law. This objective whole is really nothing other than Spirit in principle, as that which unites.

I'm finding it hard to work out how he makes this leap from the thesis of relativism to the contempt for Spirit. I understand the distinction he means, which is that between (1) useful productive work and the financial, class, in general materialist (in the popular sense, as Adorno says, "vulgar") concerns that go along with it; and (2) art and ideas, love and beauty, and God if you're so inclined. But how does relativism produce the exclusive focus on (1) and dismissal of (2)? — Jamal

Relativism dissolves the whole, and that means breaking down the social relations which are commonly understood under the conception of Spirit. Therefore it shows a contempt for Spirit. Referring back to earlier sections, I would say that Adorno would like to validate the whole under relations of production, or forces of production, which would unite people under principles of cooperation for production rather than Spirit.

Some people clearly know more about why things behave as they do, than do other people. — wonderer1

How so? Do you mean that you know more about why you behave the way that you do, than I know about why you behave the way that you do? But we're talking about "things" plural, and that would only be knowing about the behaviour of one thing.

Do you think that someone who knows about laws of gravitation, and knows how to apply some universal laws of gravitation, knows more about why things fall, then the person who only knows that they fall because of gravity?

But these days AI can take the labour out of refuting your theological nonsense. — apokrisis

The only thing that this demonstrates is that whatever AI you selected clearly hasn't read or understood Aristotle, and is probably relying on some less than mediocre secondary sources. Somehow that doesn't surprise me in the least.

Exactly, potentiality is without constraint. But events demonstrate that constraints can emerge in conjunction with their degrees of freedom – the actualising step that creates now a sea of concrete possibilities.

Once you have the thing of a fluctuation – an action that also has some direction – then everything starts to get going.

No action, no direction. No direction, no action. But actions in a direction? A whole flood of them. Complexity can start evolving. — apokrisis

You haven't addressed the problem which I explained as the issue of the cosmological argument. In the condition of absolute potentiality, (infinite degrees of freedom if you prefer), there can be no actuality whatsoever, because any particular actuality would be a constraint, therefore the potentiality would be less than absolute. Aristotle affirms that if this situation ever existed, it would always exist, because any material actuality requires a prior actuality as the cause of it. Since we currently observe the reality of actuality, we can conclude that it is impossible that there ever was a situation of absolute potentiality.

That is a summary of the argument found in Bk 9 of Aristotle's Metaphysics, where he demonstrates that actuality is prior to potentiality in an absolute sense. This rules out the possibility of "prime matter", through reference to current observations of actuality. If there ever was prime matter, matter (potentiality) without form (actuality), there would always be matter without form, but this is inconsistent with what we observe today, matter with form, actuality.

If this is not what is called "the cosmological argument", then maybe you can ask your AI to point me to where i can find the true version of it. I see your current report is quite vague, saying "The argument is primarily developed in his works Physics and Metaphysics". I've read all of those referred works more than once, and find the cosmological argument, as I've stated, in metaphysics Bk 9. I'm sure the AI has not read those works even once.

Time would evolve as cosmology tells us. It develops complex structure through the growth of topological order. As the Big Bang expands and cools, it undergoes a rapid sequence of thermal changes. — apokrisis

I think highly of you apokrisis, and I conclude that you are very intelligent. But statements like this just make me wonder if you actually think about what you are saying sometimes, or if you just want to fill some space with ink. Can't you see that this doesn't make any sense?

You have a number of temporal concepts here "evolve", "develops", "growth", and "rapid sequence". All of the things referred to here require time for their occurrence. How can you seriously propose that time is generated from something which requires time.

I mean maybe cosmology tells you that, as you claim, but don't you read your cosmology with a critical mind? Cosmology is speculative, you can't just read some random articles, and conclude that it is the truth. You need to approach cosmology with a very critical attitude, to determine logical inconsistencies in the speculative hypotheses. When you see self-contradicting propositions like "time emerges", doesn't this make you want to dismiss the entire cosmology which proposes this?

In the beginning, all the fluctuations are stuck at the speed of light. They experience maximum time dilation and length contraction – or rather, this relativistic dichotomy can't even apply yet.

Then you get the Higgs mechanism breaking this relativistic symmetry. Now suddenly it is meaningful to talk about objects at rest. Particles that move slower than c. Mass that lags behind the radiation setting the pace. A new topological phase where time has gained a whole new complex structure.

Time changes character quite radically. And it passes through other topological stages too with inflation, or when it is a quark-gluon plasma that may have Higgs mass and yet is still effectively relativistic.

So what is time when you step right back from the physics? It is a duration. A beat that lasts the distance of a cycle. A Planck-scale rotation in its Planck-scale expanse. The fundamental unit of ħ or the quantum unit of action. The spinning on the Poincare invariant spot that defines the gauge fundamental particle. The first moment defined in terms of the symmetry breaking of rotation from translation and thus the birth of concrete dimensionality itself. — apokrisis

Here you go, a fine example of spilling ink. What's the point?

All the empirical evidence is for states that were preceded in time by another state, so this pattern would not apply to a hypothetical initial state — Relativist

Then obviously, the concept of "initial state" is not consistent with physical reality. Truly it's just an ideal. This concept is a hypothetical tool. it's used in systems theory, arbitrarily applied as a boundary. It really does not correspond with anything that is actually first in reality, because there is a continuity which extends from it into the preceding state. So "initial state" is only an ideal which is arbitrarily applied in practise, depending on the purpose. When applied, we always know that something preceded the proposed "initial state", but the initial state is applied as a boundary, because what is posterior to it is what is being studied.

I suggest it's because of deterministic* laws of nature that cause the prior state to become the next state. — Relativist

This doesn't even make sense to me. We describe and understand the activities of natural things through the use of laws. But laws cannot cause natural things to behave the way they do, because this would require that the things could read, interpret, and feel inclined to obey the natural laws. How does this make any sense to you, to think that natural things are somehow deciding to obey some set of laws, and act accordingly?

Do you agree? If not, then give me your theory. — Relativist

Why do i need to present you with a theory about this? Isn't it just sufficient to say that human beings simply do not know why things behave the way that they do? And, that it would be foolish to pretend that they did? What would be the point of me offering up a theory, when I readily accept as fact, that me, nor any other human being, has even the vaguest idea, or any sort of knowledge at all, concerning why things behave the way that they do.

The absolute potential is the potential for the emergence of a hylomorphic order in a co-arising fashion. — apokrisis

This is the point I take exception to, by way of Aristotle's cosmological argument. With the cosmological argument he denies the concept of "prime matter", as physically impossible.

If the potential is truly absolute, then there is nothing actual, as anything actual would be a constraint to the possibility. But without something actual, to act as the cause, the emergence of something, anything, is impossible.

Time can get going as changes can be made that are also constructing a collective history. — apokrisis

How could time emerge? Isn't emergence a temporal concept, something which happens over time? It seems self-contradicting to talk about time getting started as changes happen.

I hadn't discussed "state of affairs" ontology with you, so had not used the term that way. — Relativist

You definitely discussed "state of affairs" ontology with me, in your reference to an initial state of affairs. You even defined it for me:

By "state" or "state of affairs", I am referring to the the totality of existence at a point of time.

...

There are various ideas about what it means to exist. My position is that existence entails objects which have intrinsic properties and that has relations to all other objects (at least indirectly). — Relativist

See, "state of affairs" implies objects and relations, two distinct fundamental ontological concepts. Then you go on to talk about the potential for change, in the future, which implies another fundamental ontological concept, the passing of time:

A brute fact initial state would have properties that accounted for its potential to develop into subsequent states of affairs. IOW: it initiates (=causes) the subsequent causal chain that you misinterpret. — Relativist

How can you deny what you yourself wrote?

I noticed.

State of affairs (so defined) is the most fundamental concept in the ontology. — Relativist

Your definition of "state of affairs", as stated in your reply to me, does not support your claim that it is the most fundamental concept in ontology. Your definition can be broken down in analysis into two distinct aspects, objects and their relations. These are two very different concepts, and since "state of affairs" is made up of these two, they are each more fundamental than "state of affairs".

Further, you determined another feature of reality, the potential for change, which was necessary for your ontology. This implies that time is another fundamental concept in ontology. You have provided no argument to demonstrate that "state of affairs" is more fundamental than "time".

I think this is all pretty thoroughly incorrect. You could start with just understanding Hegelian dialectics. — frank

I actually did a post graduate course specifically on Hegel's dialectics of being. The professor refused to give me the mark I needed, even after I defended my thesis in person. It seems like there is dogmatic principles concerning "the correct" way to interpret Hegel. The concept of "matter" is not allowed to enter into, or even be compared to Hegel's "becoming". I suppose this is due to an inclination to maintain a separation between Hegel and Marx.

But you appear to want to defend some version of ontic idealism. — apokrisis

You, yourself, actually "defend some version of ontic idealism". I'm surprised that you still haven't come to recognize this. Your first principle, absolute potential, the symmetry which is the foundation for symmetry-breaking, is nothing but an ideal. Therefore you place the ideal as prior to everything. That is common to physicalism, as physics leans heavily on mathematical ideals.

This is actually what happened to "materialism" over the years. People would grasp "matter" as the first principle of the material world, without realizing that "matter" was simply an ideal, as Berkeley demonstrated. Then materialism was reducible to idealism, and Marx demonstrated that the inversion of this is also true. The result is that materialism and idealism are actually equivalent. Aristotle demonstrated this as well.

Interesting point. I think it might be a bit misleading, and this hinges on whether such a fixed point can act as, or is equivalent to, a ground, foundation, or first principle, in the traditional philosophical sense that Adorno is addressing. I'm not sure it can. Determinate negation as fixed point is not so much a foundation—it is not a positive proposition on which a system can be built—but is more like method, critical orientation and commitment. — Jamal

The "fixed point" in negative dialectics which Adorno refers to in lecture 3 is definitely not a foundation or first principle. He explicitly says this. Rather it is an aspect. Nevertheless I would argue that it is a grounding, as grounding is not necessarily the first principle of a philosophy. Further, I would argue that since the true grounding must be the object itself, the grounding point must be just as variable as the variability of objects. This variability may even prevent the possibility of a fixed point which is first principle, or foundation.

I mean, you could take the fixed point to be the ground, but is it interpretatively useful to do so? — Jamal

It is useful, as a rebuttal to the accusation of groundlessness.

This is what turns around the objection of groundlessness. In lecture 3 he shows the deficiency of Hegelian sublation. When the thesis is defined by the antithesis this is what renders the concept as free-floating. The definition is within the concept, thesis defined by antithesis. But in so doing this does violence to the concept because it removes the concept from its true defining aspect, which is its relation to the object. This produces an evolving concept, but it is not a true representation.

So this process of becoming, by which the concept is supposed to evolve through Hegelian sublation is really a falsity. That is what Adorno expresses here

Moreover, one of the most astonishing features of the Hegelian
dialectic and one that is especially hard to grasp is that, on the one hand,
categories are ceaselessly promoted as things that are changing and
becoming, while, on the other hand, they are logical categories and
as such simply have to retain their validity, as in any traditional logic
or epistemology.

When the process which is the evolution of a concept is described as Hegelian sublation, the only thing which stays the same, is the process itself. This produces the groundlessness, as an endless process. That this therefore is a false representation, is the grounding of that aspect of negative dialectics which criticizes it. The falsity of Hegelian sublation is the object of that specific aspect of negative dialectics, and the truth of that falsity is a grounding point.

EDIT2: And there's another candidate for the ground of negative dialectics: material reality, or "the object" as in "the priority of the object". As he has been saying in the Frigility of Truth section, ND starts in the concrete and works out from there. So why not that? I happen to think this is wrong or misleading too, but I won't go into that now. — Jamal

The precise meaning of "object" is vague. As you say, ideology, and social structures, are objective, while I would say they are purely conceptual. Because of this, "object" might refer to ideology. In the case of Hegelian sublation, "the concrete" is that ideology. The jettisoning process described allows the concept to be free-floating, thus an "object". The supposed object must be approached as if it is the object, even though it may be a false object.

Psychology could be brought to bear to answer how this happened, but what Adorno focuses on is something that should have been obvious from reading Hegel: synthesis is not subject to the intellect. It's not that it's wrong, it's that the mind only deals with a dismantled world. — frank

I think the point is that "synthesis" in the Hegelian representation, is the subject of the intellect, and it is wrong. To make the representation work, requires that we do violence on the concept, falsely represent it. Synthesis falsely represents the 'logical' evolution of the Idea, as something free-floating, independent from the material world, manipulated by human reason. However, as experience demonstrates to us, the Idea does not evolve in a logical way, that is due to influence of "the irrational", which is the true reality of the material world.

So you're just making the modest claim that the argument convinces you of god's existence. You are not claiming that it constitutes undeniable proof that no rational person could deny. — Relativist

Of course, I said the proof is "irrefutable", I didn't say it was "undeniable". As you've aptly demonstrated, anyone can deny anything, no matter how irrefutable it is. All they need to do is fabricate a completely fictitious, imaginary "logical possibility", claim that they believe this "possibility" instead, and start denying. But denying it does not refute it, so I continue to believe that it is irrefutable.

Nevertheless, I did explain why it might be false: the possibility that there was an initial state of affairs that was physical (no gods). So there are at least 2 logically valid explanations for the existence of the universe: (A) God ; or (B) a physical initial state. — Relativist

I'll repeat myself. All empirical evidence indicates that any, and every, "physical state of affairs" is posterior in time, to the potential for that state. Since this is known with the highest degree of certitude possible, then we can conclude that any proposed "initial state of affairs that was physical" (simply interpreted as 'first physical thing') necessarily had a cause which was actual, and prior to it in time. That's a nonphysical cause. This conclusion requires the further premise that something actual is required, as cause, to produce any actuality from potential.

You haven't proven (B) false, so you should acknowledge that it is possibly true, and that this implies God possibly does not exist. Do you acknowledge this? — Relativist

I don't dispute (B), the "physical initial state". The point though, is that the argument demonstrates that an actual cause of such a thing is necessary. The potential for that initial physical state, by itself, does not suffice as the cause of it. That actual cause is something nonphysical, and what is commonly referred to as God.

Apokrisis will insist that a cause is not necessary, that the physical initial state just sprang into existence from infinite potential, as a quantum fluctuation, or some type of symmetry breaking. But this is irrational for the reasons I explained above. In a realm of infinite possibility there would be nothing which could actualize (select) one possibility (quantum fluctuation or symmetry breaking) instead of the others, all possibilities being balanced and equally possible.

When the argument of "chance occurrence", random event, abiogenesis, etc., is taken to the extreme, such as when it is taken to explain the very existence of "the physical universe", its irrationality becomes extremely evident. It's a matter of saying that something comes from nothing, where "nothing" is replaced with "potential". The physical universe comes from the potential for it. But this requires that we make "potential" into something real, and the only way to do this is to assign to it some degree of actuality, which is not physical. So we assume the actual existence of the nonphysical.

I feel like Adorno is saying, "they say that negative dialectics (or critical theory in general) lacks all foundations, but really it's their ontologies that don't have a leg to stand on, so you could say that it's their thinking which is groundless." They are looking for something that isn't there. Heidegger comes up against groundlessness but doesn't acknowledge it or only acknowledges it as a problem to surpass; he tries to uncover the meaning of being and doesn't realize that the groundlessness he wants to get beyond is itself the truth the philosopher ought to be looking for.

It was the alternative translation that put me on the right track: — Jamal

That's similar to the way I see it. But I think Adorno goes further, and demonstrates that negative dialectics is actually grounded, and that the other philosophies which absolutize thought and Spirit are really groundless. Those philosophies assume a foundation which is false. Those falsities assumed by the other philosophies, is the truth of negative dialectics. This truth, that their foundations are false, and that they are actually groundless, is the grounding of negative dialectics.

I'll refer to the Lectures, lecture 3, "Whether negative Dialectics is Possible", where he discusses Hegel's concept of the determinate negation. I believe that Adorno demonstrates the falsity of Hegel's conception of "synthesis". This falsity becomes the true determinate negation for Adorno, therefore a fixed point, a grounding for negative dialectics

But I believe that precisely
this aspect of positivity, which acts as a corollary to negativity, is
conjoined with the principle of negativity because it resists being fixed
once and for all in an abstract, static manner.

...

Hence, to make this quite clear, the issue is not to deny the existence of a certain fixed
point, it is not even to deny the existence of some fixed element in
thought; we shall in due course, I hope, come to discuss the meaning
whether negative dialectics is possible of such a fixed
element in dialectical logic in very concrete terms. But
the fixed, positive point, just like negation, is an aspect – and not
something that can be anticipated, placed at the beginning of every
thing.

...

At the same time, I should
like to draw your attention to the fact that the status of synthesis in
Hegel is actually somewhat anomalous. The fact is that, when you
read the texts closely, you find that there is much less said about such
syntheses, such positivities, than you might expect initially. And I
believe that if you were to trace Hegel’s use of the term ‘synthesis’
[Synthese] purely lexically – as opposed to the concept of ‘Synthesis’,
as used by Kant in his epistemology – you would find that it occurs
very rarely indeed, in contrast to such concepts as ‘positing’ [Setzung],
‘position’ or ‘negation’ – and this tells us something about the situation.
It is grounded in the subject matter; it is no merely external trait
of Hegelian language. In the three-stage scheme – if we allow for once
that such a thing is to be found in Hegel – the so-called synthesis that
represents the third stage as opposed to negation is by no means
simply better or higher. If you consider an example of such a three
stage dialectic – we might look at the famous triad of Being, Nothing
and Becoming16 – you will find that this so-called synthesis is actually
something like a movement, a movement of thought, of the concept,
but one that turns backwards and does not look forward and produce
something complete to be presented as a successful achievement on
a higher plane. Hegelian syntheses tend – and it would be rewarding
to follow this up with detailed analysis – to take the form that the
thesis reasserts itself within the antithesis, once this has been postulated.
Thus once the identity of two contradictory concepts has been
reached, or at least asserted in the antithesis, as in the most famous
case of all, the identity of Nothing with Being, this is followed by a
further reflection to the effect that, indeed, these are identical, I have
indeed brought them together – Being, as something entirely undefined,
is also Nothing. However, to put it quite crudely, they are not
actually entirely identical. The thought that carries out the act of
identification always does violence to every single concept in the
process. And the negation of the negation is in fact nothing other
than the α¸να′µνησις, the recollection, of that violence, in other words
the acknowledgement that, by conjoining two opposing concepts, I
have on the one hand bowed to a necessity implicit in them, while
on the other hand I have done them a violence that has to be rectified.
And truth to tell, this rectification in the act of identification is
what is always intended by the Hegelian syntheses.

On the contary. You assumed the burden of proof when you said: — Relativist

I have the proof which I believe is irrefutable. You dispute the truth of one of my premises. The burden is on you to demonstrate that the premise is false.

An "irrefutable proof" can't simply establish that the conclusion is possibly true; it must show that the conclusion is necessarily true. My burden is easy: I merely need to show that one of your premises is possibly false. — Relativist

You are speaking nonsense. To show my argument is unsound you need to demonstrate that the premise is not true, that is your burden. Otherwise, any argue may be refuted with the proposal of an imaginary "possible" premise which contradicts that of the argument. That is extreme skepticism, which you've already rejected as irrational. Therefore, if you desire to refute the argument, the burden is on you to show that the premise is in fact false, not just insist that there is a possible world in which the premise would be false.

If you don't understand that, then you don't understand logic. — Relativist

I understand refutation, and I also understand sophistry, which is what you appear to use logic for.

I profess to be a "law realist": that laws of nature actually exist, and this explains why we see regularities in nature. — Relativist

In no way does assuming that laws of nature actually exist explain why we see regularities in nature. This is because "explanation" requires that you show how natural things would have access to these "laws", would be able to read and interpret them, and have the urge to obey them.

To claim that there are laws of nature out there somewhere, and I don't have to say where they are, or how it is that things can understand these laws and obey them, does not explain anything about the regularities of nature. All you appear to be saying is that we describe natural activities according to laws, therefore there must be prescriptive laws which correspond with our descriptive laws, and natural things are obeying these prescriptive laws.

An infinite set of possibilities could fit any probability distribution. — Relativist

That's incorrect, it fits every set of probability distribution. If one is the correct distribution, the others are excluded as impossible. Therefore it is necessary to understand that it fits "every" set of probability distribution, not "any" one set. Other wise you misunderstand the meaning of "infinite set of possibilities". It is every possibility, not any possibility.

This is clear evidence of the way you behave. A small, intentional ignorance, turns everything around for you. Then you hope that I don't notice your sophistry. Just like above, you try to turn the burden of "refutation" around onto the person making the argument, by claiming that the criteria for "refutation" is to assert that the person making the argument hasn't demonstrate with absolute certainty that all the premises are impossible to be false. Your sophistry knows no bounds, as you've enabled yourself to refute any argument you want, with that simple assertion, simply through your sophistic manipulation of the meaning of "infinite set of possibilities".

There are various ideas about what it means to exist. My position is that existence entails objects which have intrinsic properties and that has relations to all other objects (at least indirectly). A brute fact initial state would have properties that accounted for its potential to develop into subsequent states of affairs. IOW: it initiates (=causes) the subsequent causal chain that you misinterpret. — Relativist

You state "what it means to exist", as a state. Then you propose "potential to develop into subsequent states". But this "potential" is not included in your definition of "exist", it is dependent on something else, time. However, "time" is not included as something which exists. Therefore you have a hidden premise, "time". We have "exist" according to your position, and also time, which is something which according to your position does not exist, but it is still necessary for you to account for the reality of things. Therefore you sneak it in as a hidden premise. This is the sophistry which you practise.

The initial state is causally linked to everything that exists. — Relativist

Sure it is, through your hidden premise of time, which according to your definition of "exists" does not exist. How do you account for the reality of time? You clearly need it for your argument, yet it escapes your definition of something which exists.

Yes that's what I believe too, it's not given, it is derived through the inner intuition. And that's why the knowledge of the object, as myself, is subjective rather than objective, as I explained, even though it is knowledge of the object (the subject is the object). We still cannot bypass the medium which is the inner intuition.

So the object is not directly given, it is understood through the temporal order of internal things, just like the outer object is understood through spatial relations. However, I do believe that since the inner intuition is a part of the object to be understood, there actually is an aspect of the object which is given, that's the inner intuition. But the inner intuition is proper to this specific type of object, a subject, and that's why our knowledge of the object (as the subject, oneself) is subjective.

Putting the two together is pragmatism/semiosis. — apokrisis

Putting the two together is ambiguity and equivocation.

You don’t seem to get the neat logic of what Peirce was actually up to here. — apokrisis

Peirce, like Wittgenstein whom some say derived ideas from Peirce, was a master of ambiguity.

My assertion was modest: an initial state of affairs is possible. — Relativist

That does not affect the argument. You just switched terminology from the existence of a physical thing, to a "state of affairs". By the inductive principle, the potential for each "state of affairs" is prior in time to that state of affairs. And, it needs an actual cause. Therefore even the proposed "initial state of affairs" has an actual cause which is prior to it.

Apokrisis avoids the cosmological argument by claiming that an actual physical state of affairs can come into existence from infinite possibility, as some sort of symmetry breaking. But this is illogical to believe that something actual could all of a sudden pop out of infinite possibility, a random fluctuation could suddenly occur in an infinite symmetry.

The nature of possibility is that each distinct possibility is possible. In infinite possibility each must be equally probable to allow that all are possible. Therefore not one could ever come into existence over another unless something selects, and actualizes one rather than the others. This is the issue, an actuality which causes one rather than the others is necessary. If possibility was infinite, then every possibility would be equal in that sense, and not one actual state of affairs could ever arise over the others, because that infinite possibility denies any actuality, and an actuality is required as cause.

By presenting an alternative you hadn't considered, I conclusively proved your conclusion false. — Relativist

You haven't presented any alternative. You only irrationally denied the inductive logic as black swan fallacy. However, there is no black swan fallacy here, because all experience and all physical evidence points to the truth of the premise. I agree that we can never know anything with absolute certainty, as you've been arguing, but this inductive conclusion we know with the highest degree of certainty of anything. You could argue that all knowledge concerning the physical world falls to the black swan fallacy, but you've already denied extreme skepticism, indicating that we can believe some facts. So if you reject this inductive premise, you're a hypocrite, rejecting it only because you do not want to face the reality of the conclusion it produces.

However, an initial state is also conceptually possible: we can conceptualize something just existing by brute fact*. — Relativist

This is false. We have an idea of what "existing" means. And, it is derived from our observations of the physical world. If we move to "conceptualize something existing by brute fact", then we violate, or contradict the meaning of "existing" which is supported by observations of our world.

Of course one might stipulate, like in the case of mathematical axioms, what "existing" means, and proceed to a conceptualization of something which exists simply because it is posited as existing, but what good would that do? This conceptualized existing thing, which exists because it is posited as existing by brute fact, would be something completely distinct and unrelated to the actual physical existence which we know. That is the problem with the difference between axiomatized ideals, and the real physical world, which 've been describing.

How is that ideal "something existing by brute fact" in anyway useful to this argument? It's like saying that you can posit a "possible world" which is completely different from the actual world, and use this to refute my description of the actual world. But this possible world is completely irrelevant, unless you can demonstrate some relation. That's the thing with fiction, we can make up whatever we want, including something which exists just by brute fact. But the fiction is irrelevant to our knowledge of the actual world, until you can show it to have some bearing.

So we have two contradictory metaphysical claims. Both are conceivable, neither is provable (short of making additional assumptions*), but one must be false. Reasoning can take us no further - so you can't rationally claim to show an initial state is metaphysically impossible. — Relativist

Again, this is false. Yes, we have two contradictory metaphysical claims. However, mine is proven through reference to the actual physical world, and the strongest inductive principle which we can know. Yours is just a fictitious "possible world" which has no bearing on our actual physical world, which you only proposed as an alternative to mine because you are afraid to face the reality of the actual world.

I could go further and show that an infinite past is logically impossible, but it's not necessary since I've already thoroughly refuted your claim. — Relativist

Your supposed refutation is like this: I can imagine a possible world which is completely different from your description of our actual world. Therefore your description of our world lacks the necessity required to be a true description, and your argument based on this descriptive premise is thereby refuted as unsound.

What you actually need to do to prove that the premise is untrue, is to demonstrate how it is inconsistent with the actual world. Thinking up an imaginary world which is different from my description, and claiming that the actual world could be like this instead of like my description, does not show my premise to be untrue.

Your understanding of the big bang theory is flawed. The theory of the big bang is based on general relativity: the size of the (currently) visible universe approaches zero at increasingly earlier states. So there's a mathematical limit of 0 size and infinite density. This entails a mathematical singularity - from which physicists infer general relativity breaks down. They also note that below a certain radius, quantum effects would dominate. This is currently unanalyzable because there is no accepted theory that reconciles general relativity and quantum mechanics. — Relativist

i don't see the flaw. You've just said almost the very same thing as me in a different way. The mathematical singularity is the mathematical ideal i referred to.

I quoted the Critique of Pure Reason here where the reality of time is discussed. The expression of "inner versus outer objects" is seen strictly as the activity of the intuitions as the possibility of our experiences. — Paine

Do you see that your quote supports what I said? Time has reality in regard to "inner experience". As such it supports the reality of "myself" the being which is I. This is the means by which the subject becomes the object. The intuition of time is a condition of "all our experiences" therefore it is the essential aspect of the being which is I. The intuition of "space" on the other hand is a condition of outer experience.

Notice that by making the subject the object, we allow intelligibility of the object. But it is done under this condition, the intuition of time. Therefore the reality of time, and the subject as an object, can be apprehended, but only intuitionally, not in an absolute sense because absolute objectivity is denied by the subjective nature (which is the nature of intuition) of this object, i.e. the type of object which has the intuition of time as an essential aspect.

The implication, I believe, is that the only true way to understand the nature of an object, is to understand its temporality. And this we can only achieve by understanding ourselves, not by understanding other things, because time is the inner intuition. The reality of that is due to the fact that intuition is always the medium between subject and object. But we can understand the object which is the subject, when we apprehend the intuition of time as the essential aspect of that object. That dissolves the medium, but renders the understanding of the object as necessarily subjective, limited to that type of object which is a subject.

Extremist magnet. — jorndoe

He was bought, for his ability to speak, and would speak about whatever he was paid to speak about, regardless of whether he had any real belief.

You just get angrier as the years go past. — apokrisis

You confuse a sense of humour for anger. Perhaps it's not a socially acceptable form of humour, but how does poking fun at someone, or ridiculing them, imply anger to you?

Again, just check out what I already told you seven years ago. Long before AI was around to deal with one's more mundane intellectual chores. — apokrisis

That statement really doesn't support your case. And repeating the same assertion you made seven years ago only indicates your unwillingness to adapt, and that your prejudice is well entrenched.

You are simply assuming the reality of the mathematical ideals which physicists apply (symmetries etc.). And you show complete disregard for the fact that the world which physicists apply these ideals to, reveals itself through empirical observation, to be fundamentally incompatible with those ideals. This has been pointed out to you many times, but you continue in ignorance.

it's just another form of physicalism, which by its very nature, ignores large tracts of empirical evidence, in an attempt to stuff the square peg (reality) into the round hole (physicalism).

The fact that the language of mathematics treats abstractions as "existing" does not entail that they do. — Relativist

Are you saying that the axioms of mathematics are irrelevant to the meaning of mathematical symbols, that mathematicians can interpret the rules however they want?

A physicist making a claim about the ontological status of mathematical abstractions is doing metaphysics, not physics. It's a question that cannot be settled by empirical evidence or scientific methodology. — Relativist

But you said explicitly ""physicalism defers to physics the identification of what exists". Therefore you (as physicalist) are assigning to physics, the responsibility of judging whether mathematical objects exist or not.

If you now claim that the physicist steps outside the boundaries of one's discipline, into metaphysics, in doing this, and ought not do this, then this implies that physicalism is absolutely incapable of making that judgement. The metaphysician who is physicalist leaves that judgement to the physicist to make, but then admits that the physicist is not qualified to make that judgement.

Agreed. — Relativist

i don't see how you can agree with me on this point, yet still believe that "physicalism" is the best ontology. By admitting that there is not one single ontology which supports physics as its grounding, you also allow that "physicalism" as an individual ontological base, will have internal incompatibility. That implies incoherency between various factions, but intrinsic within the overall "physicalism". Don't you think it would be better to choose one or the other form of physicalism, and adhere solely to those principles to avoid incoherency, or even better, to avoid physicalism altogether?

This actually relates directly to what you said above, about "the language of mathematics". We commonly allow interpretive variance in relation to mathematical axioms, as if interpretation is irrelevant. This allows for a wider range of applicability, that's what intentional ambiguity is useful for, a wider range of interpretation, therefore extended applicability. But it is ambiguity, and ambiguity is problematic when it comes to grounding. i suggest that you consider that this ambiguity contributes to the fact that there is a wide range of incompatible ontologies which consider themselves each to be a form of physicalism. This is because there is a range of different ways we can interpret the axioms which are indispensable to our understanding of the physics of the world.

And once we admit potential as ontologically real, we also re-introduce the idea of inherent directionality — Wayfarer

This "inherent directionality", within ontological potential, is why apokrisis' claim that physics speaks of "pure chance", and absolute necessity, is false. Physics never gets to "pure chance", nor do physicists assume such a thing. Apokrisis does, and some other cosmologists do, but that's not physics. Physicists have to deal with the reality of the less-than-ideal, which confronts them at every event. Pure chance and absolute necessity is never a part of that. The mathematics applied, of course, assumes ideals, but this does not equate with "the ontology of modern physics", it would be more properly called "the ontology of modern mathematics". But it's not common to base ontology solely in mathematical axioms, because these deliberately do not account for the reality of less-than-ideal physical world.


Are you claiming that some AI told you that Ontic Structural Realism is the ontology of modern physics? I think that AI needs some fine tuning in relation to its biases.

You're really not making any sense apokrisis. If you have an intelligent reply to my post, then please present it.

Until then I have only your demonstration that you know nothing about what physicists do. That is, your ridiculous claim that "the ontology of modern physics is pretty straightforward. It speaks of pure chance in interaction with absolute necessity".

But it does help to at least know the physics, wouldn’t you agree? — apokrisis

Are you suggesting that the metaphysician ought to be instead a physicist, and that being a physicist instead of a metaphysician would make the metaphysician a better metaphysician?

But it does help to at least know the physics, wouldn’t you agree? — apokrisis

Help who, the physicist?

The way I took it is that addition of numbers is sequential - first, 7, then 'add 5' giving the result '12'. It is the fact of the sequential order of mental operations that assumes time. The spatial representation (writing the numbers down) is only a useful aid; the grounding of number itself is in time, not space. — Wayfarer

Yes, I believe that's pretty much what Kant intended with the distinction between the inner and outer a priori intuitions. Internal ideas, as pure intellectual objects, are grounded in temporal order, therefore not requiring spatial features for understanding. The appearance of phenomena, on the other hand, requires that external, spatial aspect as well as the temporal aspect.

in terms of Kant's language. He made a claim of how little we can know about it since it is how we experience what we do.

Perhaps Kant is not accepting the speculation of your model. — Paine

I think that if you read Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, you'll find that he characterizes space as the outer intuition (required for the appearance of outward sensations I assume), and time as the inner intuition (required for the appearance of inward sensations I assume).

Claims about "how little we can know about it" do not equate with 'we can know nothing'. And, Kant did make this distinction between inner and outer. I'd look it up for you, but you could Google it if you are interested. I believe the important point which Kant makes with this distinction is that even though both space and time are a priori, the intuition of time is in a sense prior to space. Time is fundamental to the being itself, as essential to internal processes, required for all types of experience, whereas space is necessary for a specific type of experience, the one we understand as the separation between myself and what is other than me.

So physicalism defers to physics the identification of what exists. IMO there's no epistemically superior means of doing so. That deference doesn't entail an ontological commitment to the specific things physics identifies. — Relativist

This is why physicalism is a very problematic perspective. Mathematical axioms assume the existence of mathematical objects. This is implicit in set theory. But physicists do not identify a number, or a set, as an object which exists and which ought to be studied in the field of physics. Yet physicists use mathematics. Therefore physicists in the application of mathematics, assume the existence of mathematical objects, which they do not identify and study as existents.

This indicates that what you state as the approach of physicalism, "physicalism defers to physics the identification of what exists", is mistaken.

So the ontology of modern physics is pretty straightforward. It speaks of pure chance in interaction with absolute necessity. — apokrisis

This is not true. Physicists do not work with pure chance and absolute necessity. That is simply your personal ontological interpretation of modern physics. It is not the ontology which actually underlies the work of physicists. In fact, the issues which are evident in the interpretation of quantum observations clearly indicate that there is no specific "ontology of modern physics". So how anyone portrays the ontology of modern physics is just a matter of personal preference.

That is very helpful - it helps me understand much better Kant's connection of time with number and space with geometry. :100: — Wayfarer

Simply put, Kant associates space, as the outer intuition, with external objects, and time, as the inner intuition, with internal objects. So, I would understand Mww's example like this. Time is already required, as the internal intuition, prior to writing a number, then when it is written, it is apprehended through the external intuition as having a spatial presence. This specific example is consistent with Plato's cave allegory, where the external object (sensible in Plato's terminology) is posterior to, and a reflection of the internal, which is the higher degree of reality.

Of course there's ways he could be unaware! — Relativist

He managed to get rich. I suppose maybe he thought all that luxury just fell at his feet.

On January 5, 2021, the day before the Washington, D.C., protest that led to the January 6 United States Capitol attack, Kirk wrote on Twitter that Turning Point Action and Students for Trump were sending more than 80 "buses of patriots to D.C. to fight for this president".[51][52] A spokesman for Turning Point said that the groups ended up sending seven buses, not 80, with 350 students.[51][53] In the lead-up to the storming, Kirk said he was "getting 500 emails a minute calling for a civil war".[54] Publix heiress Julie Fancelli gave Kirk's organizations $1.25 million to fund the buses to the January 6 event. Kirk also paid $60,000 for Kimberly Guilfoyle to speak at the rally.[55] — Wikipedia

But God is not an idea. And I am a rational human being who does not rebel against God. God is simple in being, yes, but I should think the creator of all things is even more complex than the greatest complexity found in creation. — NotAristotle

Good point, but for many rational human beings, God is just an idea. In that case God is very simple. So , amongst rational human beings there is discrepancy as to the meaning of "God". And many deny that "to love God with all your heart, mind, and soul and to love your neighbor as yourself" is the objective law.

This calls into question the relationship between rational human beings and objective law. Since human beings are subjects, and rationality is a property of subjects, rationality is fundamentally subjective. This implies a sort of gap between rational human beings and objective law, perhaps the ought/is gap.

It’s your prerogative to intensely dislike people, and to say as much. — Roke

The pivotal point being the ambiguity in "dislike people". To dislike a person, and to tell them this, is socially acceptable. To do this to multiple "people" is also in principle ok, though it may indicate that you have a problem, and you are not actually ok. To dislike people, and tell them this, is definitely not ok.

I hate you.” (Not hate speech?)

“That girl I made out with at the bar turned out to be a tranny!” (Hate speech?)

The word “hate” is a generally well-functioning word. Intense dislike. It’s your prerogative to intensely dislike people, and to say as much. — Roke

I think that the difference you are pointing to here, is the difference between how we speak to another individual, and how we speak to a group of people. There is a big difference here because it is necessary that we continually have interactions with individuals on a regular basis, daily, while we much more rarely need to address groups.

In our day to day interactions with individuals, our emotions influence us immensely, and often we are inclined to say hateful things to another. Because of this influence of emotion, and passion of the moment, the tolerance level, what is socially acceptable to say to another, is quite high. That is simply because most of us do not have complete control over our emotions, and we cannot punish everyone who loses a little control over one's tongue in the spur of the moment.

On the other hand, when we address groups and types of people, our actions and words are usually well thought out in advance, premeditated, and planned. Emotion does enter into this form of "speech", as this is what constitutes an impassioned orator, but the tolerance level of what is socially acceptable is much stricter due to the fact that the speech is deliberate.

The reason why the tolerance level of acceptability in prepared, deliberate speech, addressing a multitude of people, differs from the tolerance level of acceptability in the spontaneous speech of day to day interactions between individuals, ought to be obvious to you. There is no difference in the meaning of "hate" here, just a difference in the social acceptability of different types of demonstrations of hate.