All right. I think you got carried away in your previous post, when you said that the meaning of "negative dialectics" was "against dialectics", when obviously it just means dialectics of the negative variety. — Jamal

OK, but there is a little trick at play here. If we define "dialectics" as founded by Hegel, then anything which qualifies for the criteria of being named by the term, must fulfil the conditions. So, if synthesis is an essential aspect of Hegelian dialectics, and Adorno removes this from his philosophy, then we ought not call his philosophy "dialectics" at all, but come up a new term which distances it from dialectics, like "post-dialectics", or something like that would work. But then, I see that "negative dialectics" really could do that task, of distancing itself from dialectics, by being "against dialectics". And, I interpret Adorno's philosophy as actually being against dialectics (in the Hegelian sense), so this leaves the question of why he tries to characterize it as a type of dialectics.

This points back to that time when you called me scurrilous. What I said at that time was this:

The trickery is this. He implies that he and the thoughts he presents, originate from, or have been greatly influenced by ("contained") by Hegel, suggesting that he is Hegelian. In reality, he is not, but he knows that Hegel is understood as a powerful authority, and he desires to gain support for his project by appearing to be consistent with Hegel. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no reason for him to mention "The enormous power of Hegel", and speak as if he's awed by this mysterious force of ideology. How is that consistent with his project of negative dialectics? And he did this right after claiming we need to critique the hypostasis of mind. Instead, he's sucking up to it when he says that all his ideas are contained in Hegel. — Metaphysician Undercover

But he is still quite a lot closer to Hegel in method than he is to Plato, even using Hegel's terms and categories, e.g., mediation, determinate negation, moment, etc. — Jamal

I reserve judgement on that statement

I see how "determinate negation" may establish a relation (other than a critical, negative relation) between him and Hegel, but I really do not yet fully understand his use of "mediation". So far it seems a but ambiguous to me. If mediation turns out to be a sort of synthesis, then he would be Hegelian, but then he'd be reintroducing the synthesis he claims to avoid.

However, his rejection of synthesis, if true, really separates him. The question might be, is an attempt at synthesis necessary for dialectics. But again, it's just semantics, and we should focus on what he's actually doing, rather than trying to name it.

I had not realized until now that you actually believe Adorno is arguing against dialectics as such. That's an eccentric interpretation, to say the least. — Jamal

I wouldn't say that he's arguing against "dialectics" in the complete range of possible uses of this word, rather he is arguing against "dialectics" in the sense of Hegelian dialectics. And, since he positions Hegel as the founder of dialectics, then all conventional forms of dialectics are Hegelian dialectics, so he is arguing against dialectics as such. I would say that Adorno's "negative dialectics" is closely related to Hegelian dialectics, but he is very critical of Hegelian dialectics. And, since "dialectics" is defined in relation to Hegel, we ought to admit that Adorno is arguing against dialectics.

Here, let me explain using the following reference point, how we are really not far apart in our respective interpretations.

The false condition is wrong society, and it is not (only) wrong because a nefarious group of gangsters and psychos is oppressing and impoverishing everyone else, but (also) because all people, from top to bottom, are under the spell of ideology and coerced by the system, their individuality stunted. This is true even of those who do not suffer direct oppression and poverty. — Jamal

That very ideology, which you say constitutes "wrong society", is firmly based in the philosophy which Adorno calls identity-thinking, and it is a manifestation of Hegel's dialectics. So we are really not very far apart, we both see Adorno in the same way, fundamentally. However, I think that I see the philosophical implications more clearly than you do, so I extend "wrong society" to imply "wrong ideology", to imply wrong philosophy (Hegelian dialectics). Therefore I see Adorno as arguing against dialectics, as defined in relation to Hegel, and that amounts to all modern dialectics.

EDIT: I suggest you have a look at lecture 1 again. Now that you have some Adorno under your belt, it'll make more sense, and you'll get a better idea of his intentions. — Jamal

So, at your suggestion I did this, took a look at lecture 1. What I see is that Adorno is proposing a philosophy which is completely distinct from Hegelian dialectics and the consequent identity philosophy . He is clear to explain the difference. He calls it "negative dialectics" and a philosophy of non-identity. I am arguing that since "dialectics" is commonly understood under the terms of Hegelian dialectics, and Adorno dismantles Hegelian dialectics, his philosophy ought not be called "dialectics" under such a definition.

However, if we look at "dialectics" in a broader sense, and consider "Platonic dialectics", which is a completely different style of philosophy from Hegelian dialectics, so much so that they ought not be classed under the same word, "dialectics", then we have the premise for calling Adorno's philosophy "dialectics". The principal issue is "synthesis". Some would argue that the method of looking at opposing principles without the goal of synthesis, cannot be called dialectics.

Here's what I said at the beginning of the thread:

t's interesting that he positions Hegel as the founder of dialectics rather than Plato. It appears to me, like what Adorno is offering is a dialectics more closely related to Plato's than Hegel's. He dismisses "synthesis" completely, and focuses on a deconstruction of the concept. It may be characterized as deconstructionist. This is very similar to the Platonic dialectical method. Plato took varying definitions of the same term to break down the assumed concept, and expose contradiction within the supposed "concept", demonstrating its weaknesses. it is a skeptical method. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here's Adorno in the first lecture:

We are concerned here
with a philosophical project that does not presuppose the identity of
being and thought, nor does it culminate in that identity. Instead it
will attempt to articulate the very opposite, namely the divergence of
concept and thing, subject and object, and their unreconciled state.
When I make use of the term ‘dialectics’ I would ask you not to think
of the famous triadic scheme of θε′σις [thesis], αντι ′θεσις [antithesis]
and συ′νθεσις [synthesis] in the usual sense, as you encounter it in
the most superficial account of school dialectics. — LND, p 6

The question now. When Adorno makes use of the term 'dialectics', in his proposed "negative dialectics", does it even qualify as "dialectics" at all? Well, I think it's just semantics, and it really doesn't matter, so long as we can grasp what he is doing.

From my so far, brief introduction to Adorno, I have some difficulty accepting what you say here.

I think that in his theory of negative dialectics he is presenting philosophy, and is approaching sociology from a philosophical perspective. So we must respect that this is a philosophical work. And the philosophical perspective he has taken is decidedly not dialectical. "Dialectical" for Adorno is Hegelian, and by taking the position of negative dialectics (anti-dialectical) he is working to expose mistakes within the dialectical approach. Because of this, when he provides a description of specific conditions, we have to be careful to differentiate between what he is demonstrating to be wrongful thinking, concerning these conditions, from what is rightful thinking concerning these conditions. Furthermore, since Marx and Marxist thinkers mostly follow Hegelian principles, we must be very careful to distinguish the aspects of Marxist thinking which Adorno demonstrates to be mistaken, from those which might be acceptable.

As he says, "dialectics is the ontology of the false condition." The false condition is wrong society, and it is not (only) wrong because a nefarious group of gangsters and psychos is oppressing and impoverishing everyone else, but (also) because all people, from top to bottom, are under the spell of ideology and coerced by the system, their individuality stunted. This is true even of those who do not suffer direct oppression and poverty. — Jamal

I think, you are completely misinterpreting "dialectics is the ontology of the false condition". And, I believe you ought to reread the section assuming the following interpretation. What he is saying is that dialectics works from a false representation of "the condition". That is the representation derived from the dialectical approach, it is a false condition. It is a faulty ontology, the manifestation of an idealism which holds as a primary principle, a faulty generalization "Spirit". Notice what is said after that phrase, "a true one [ontology] would be emancipated from it [dialectics]".

I believe that in this closing passage he offers a little bit of (positive) guidance toward the possible utopia he is alluding to, with the following phrase "...so that life can continue to exist even under the ruling relations of production...". Notice that he has removed, abstracted "relations of production" from any particular circumstances, to stand alone, independent of all subjects, therefore all subjectivity, as an objective base for the ruling of all subjects. So we have, in this principle, the foundation for a society which is not ruled by any particular people (subjects), because this inevitably succumbs to particular interests, but tis society would be ruled by objective "relations of production".

As I mentioned earlier, the only true way to objectify "society" is to determine something beyond all individual subjects, as the guiding force of "society". This is something which transcends the collective of subjects, and stands for the unity of them, as validating that unity as an object, with the ensuing objectivity. Traditionally, in Christian society, this was God. Hegel proposed "the Idea", or "the Spirit", but this conception is inherently tied to God in its idealism. Marx attempted to remove the spirituality, replacing it with the material conditions of human existence. But this manifested in subjectivity, particular interests. Adorno wants to remove all that ungrounded idealism of Hegel, and avoid the mistakes of Marxism, to found an objective society in the material substance of human existence. It appears like he believes that "relations of production" will provide that base.

I think it's clear that he is, and that you're reading it wrong. It's a dialectical point: those most determined by the system also produce it, and those dominated by the system do not know how much they themselves constitute and maintain it. — Jamal

He's not talking about being dominated by the system, he is talking about those who are "most conditioned", and therefore have it at their disposal. Having something at your disposal is the opposite of being dominated by it, it is a case of dominating that thing. Therefore, as he says, they "own" the system, even if they do not fully grasp that.

But in the context in which he discusses the status of subjects and subjectivity in general, he would not suddenly restrict his referent to a particular class, so that's why I'm inclined to think he meant anyone of whatever class. — Jamal

This is his way of exposing the problem, which is the faulty generalization that reduces every subject "to the same common denominator". The very existence of that class, those who own the system, demonstrates that this generalization is faulty. He demonstrates how "subjects and subjectivity in general" is a faulty generalization in the context of social structures, due to this class difference. If "subject", in the classical sense of the word, refers to those who are ruled, then all the people in the social structure cannot be subjects, because we need to account for those who are the rulers, as other than subjects .

On the other hand, the ruling class are also dominated by the system, so…either way, I win :grin: — Jamal

I don't think so, he clearly says that these people have the system at their disposal, and they own it. If being "most conditioned" means conditioned by the system, this does not imply that they are dominated by the system, just like being conditioned by your parents and teachers as a child does not mean that as an adult you are dominated by them. It only means that these people are trained, or groomed to be in that position, to have the system at their disposal, and own it. Even in a monarchist system, in which the rulers are born into that circumstance, they still need to be conditioned through education to properly play that role.

I am not claiming it is Aristotelian, and I demonstrated it to you here in a former post:

The infinite divisibility of an object is not only possible but necessary. God is the only absolutely simple being (i.e., divine simplicity) and if God is the first member of the causal regress of the composition of an object (which would be the case if the composition is finite in parts) then there would have to be at least one part which is also absolutely simple which is impossible; therefore an objects composition must be equally indivisible and subsistent being of each member is derivative of God as the first cause outside of the infinite regress.

In short, if we have a causal series with God as the beginning for composition like [G, [P1], [P2], [P3], …, O] (where God is ‘G’, the ‘P’s refer to parts, and ‘O’ refers to the object/whole in question), then the immediate subsequent member of the causal chain from God must also be absolutely simple (which in this case is the set of parts containing one element/part, P1); for that part would be composed of either (1) God (which is an absolutely simple being so He would provide no parts to this part, P1) or (2) it’s own self-subsisting being (since nothing comes prior to it that has parts and is not from God). Either way, e.g., the set [P1] contains parts which have no parts. This is impossible because there would, then, be at least two beings that are absolutely simple; and two absolutely simple beings are indistinguishable ontologically. I am pretty sure you would disagree with the idea that ontological simplicity entails one such kind of being (as a possibility); but you get the point. — Bob Ross

What I deny is your premise, that God is absolutely simple. This mistake I attribute to Neo-Platonists who wanted to make God "the One". Christian theologists rejected this for the Trinity. And Aristotle refuted that conception of divinity as "the One" in his discussion on the meaning of "unity" and "one". To make God absolutely simple is to make God "One" in the sense of a mathematical Ideal, and mathematical ideals are potencies rather than actualities. So the Neo-Platonist's divinity turns out to be an absolute potency. But this infinite potential, by Aristotelian principles (cosmological argument) is actually in a sense, impotent, not having any actuality to be able to actualize anything, even itself. That is why Neo-Platonism has difficulty explaining emanation, it must be explained by principles other than causation. Then this is a sort of incoherent concept, which has things emanating from "the One", but not through causation.

He is referring not to an elite but to any and all members of society, particularly those dominated by it. — Jamal

Clearly he is noy referring to those dominated by it, but those who dominate it, having it "at their disposal", as "their own". He says:

"The system is not that of the absolute Spirit, but of the most
conditioned of those who have it at their disposal, and cannot even
know how much it is their own."

I believe, "the most conditioned" refers to the special few who have and use the system (as their own) for their own purposes.

Notice at the end of my quoted passage, the generality which Hegel called "the Spirit" is "the product of particular interests". This is why I believe that Aorndo thinks that the unity referred to by "the Spirit" is what I called a false object, the antagonistic whole.

I disagree. — Jamal

If that is not the point we disagree on then what do you think we disagree on?

However, I don't understand why one cannot equally say "therefore it's time cannot be arbitrarily chosen, there are real temporal parameters which limit the truth, and restrict the designation of time". When observed, as this particle can only exist at one time, its time has not been arbitrarily chosen. — RussellA

What would those real temporal parameters consist of? If you think about it, they are all reducible to relative positions. So your starting point, t1, is completely arbitrary. You choose a specific position, and begin. The time itself has nothing within it to indicate to you what position is the starting position.

I still don't see the difference you are trying to explain, in that distance is not arbitrary yet duration is arbitrary. — RussellA

I don't know, maybe I'm the one who is wrong, who misunderstands. But you haven't been able to explain to me why what I'm saying doesn't jive with your belief, so we're both just not making sense to the other.

Neither are arbitrarily chosen. The position is the position I observe it to be at, and the time is the time I observe it to be at. — RussellA

I don't believe this, you choose (arbitrarily) what time to observe it. What, do you believe, restricts your choice of when to observe?

Thanks for that quite explicit and exquisite interpretation of a very short section. I think this section will be pivotal in guiding us toward an understanding of the difference in perspective between you and I.

Let me go back to the disagreement we had right from the beginning of our reading, concerning the objectivity of society. I cannot apprehend "society" as an object in the normal sense of "object", as a material thing. You have said that society is "objective" in a different sense, and this sense appears to me to be nothing other than some form of intersubjectivity.

I think we agree that in the previous section Adorno has laid down the principle that contradiction, and consequently non-identity is proper to the subject. I interpreted him as saying that the law of non-contradiction applies to objects, but the subject along with its concepts does not necessarily adhere to this law, such that contradiction is proper to the subject. I also argued that Adorno implies that Hegel's dialectics allows contradiction into objects by making the primacy of the subject, a primary premise. I believe that Adorno treats this as a mistake, and believes that we ought to maintain the principle that contradiction is excluded from objects.

In this section, I believe we can see how Hegel's dialectics allows contradiction, which is proper to the subject, to come to be within the object. This is the mistake of idealism which assumes the "Spirit", or "the Idea" as the foundation of the State, or society. This makes "absolute Spirit", or "the Idea", an object with its material manifestation as the State, or society. In my opinion, this is a false object, and since it is simply a compilation of subjects, contradiction inheres within this supposed object. The false object here is the "antagonistic whole". So this is the means by which Hegelian dialectics allows contradiction within object, by falsely assuming that absolute Spirit, which has contradiction within what is referred to as "Spirit", is an object, the antagonistic whole.

The subjective constitution of reality must be retranslated as belonging to reality itself, which in effect means that contradiction belongs not only to the subject but to the object, i.e., the real world, or society. — Jamal

So this is a representation of our disagreement in a nutshell. I do not think that Adorno is so quick to turn contradiction over to the object, as you do. I believe that he is highly critical of Hegelian dialectics for doing this very deed, and he thinks that it is a mistake which needs to be avoid. I think he believes that real objects obey the law of noncontradiction. Therefore, if we have any desire to resolve this disagreement between you and I, we need to pay very close attention to how Adorno describes subject-to-subject relations, and how he concludes the section.

The system is not that of the absolute Spirit, but of the most
conditioned of those who have it at their disposal, and cannot even
know how much it is their own. The subjective pre-formation of the
material social production-process, entirely separate from its
theoretical constitution, is that which is unresolved, irreconcilable to
subjects. Their own reason which produces identity through exchange,
as unconsciously as the transcendental subject, remains
incommensurable to the subjects which it reduces to the same common
denominator: the subject as the enemy of the subject. The preceding
generality is true so much as untrue: true, because it forms that “ether”,
which Hegel called the Spirit; untrue, because its reason is nothing of
the sort, its generality the product of particular interests. — p21-22

Notice, the system is not absolute Spirit, but it is the property of an elite few who cannot even know to what extent it is their own. Further, the actual, "subjective pre-formation" of production process is completely separate from what it is in theory (objective in theory, I assume). There, in theory, each subject is reduced to the same common denominator, in some cases equality (in order to construct this theoretical whole), and this form of generality leaves "the subject as the enemy of the subject". [This is how contradiction inheres within this antagonistic whole, it is a faulty generalization.] Now, it is true [more appropriately, valid] in the context of Hegel's "Spirit", but in reality Hegel's "Spirit" is a faulty concept, so it is "nothing of the sort", only a generalization which is the product of particular interests.

Let's proceed to the conclusion, where he firmly rejects Hegelian dialectics:

In view of the concrete possibility of utopia, dialectics is the ontology of
the false condition. A true one would be emancipated from it, as little
system as contradiction. — p 22

The "condition" referred to here is the environment, the object. The false object is the one proposed by Hegelian dialectics, the faulty generalization which produces concepts like "forces of production", "use-value" concludes that they are objective principles relative to that false object, which is the false condition.

For analogy sake, consider Plato's criticism of Protagorean relativity, with its principle "man is the measure of all things". We can ask which man is the measure, and see that different men, with different perspectives, may provide contradictory measurements of the same thing. So we assume that "man is the measure" uses "man" in a general sense. But since there is contradictions within this generalization, it is implied that the generalization is faulty. So the generalization of "man" is faulty when used in this context.

We can also see a very similar thing with Wittgenstein's "meaning is use". Since every time a word is used, much of the meaning is dependent on the unique particularities of the context, then "use" must refer to particular instances. In this sense, the same word would have a different meaning in each instance of use, because its meaning is dependent on the particularities of context, so there would be no generalized meaning for any word. Because of this, people tend to interpret "use" in a general sense, such that the word would have an 'objective' meaning, dependent on this generalized sense of "use". However, due to the extent of difference between particular instances, even to the point of contradictory, this is a faulty generalization.

Now, we can consider Marx's "use-value" in the same way, it is a faulty generalization which assumes a specific use, without considering the uniqueness and differences between different possible uses. All such faulty generalizations relate back to Protagorean relativity, in the sense that they are an attempt to assign an absolute (objective generalization) to something which is conceived as subjective and relative. The conception is of something relative and subjective, 'man's measure', 'the use of a word'. 'use-value', yet that it is an absolute, objective generalization is assumed. This is also a problem in modern sciences which employ relativity theory. Sometimes, the scientists in speculation attempt to find something absolute in the physical world, when they've already excluded that possibility by using relativity theory to understand the physical world. When relativity theory is the principle tool used for understanding, it is impossible to conclude absolutes. Conclusions must be consistent with the premises.

Anyway, I'm really digressing now. The point where we disagree is concerning Adorno's attitude toward contradiction within particular objects. I think he rejects this, and all the examples he gives of such, are examples of mistakes induced by Hegelian dialectics which he is rejecting as the wrong approach.

There is a temporal duration between C and D. This temporal duration is also real, and therefore also not arbitrary. — RussellA

As I explain, that duration is arbitrary, because C and D are arbitrary points in time. You assume moments in time, but there are no real moments. Therefore, you could have chosen the duration between C and E or C and F or an infinity of other choices. That makes the choice, which determines th e length of duration, arbitrary in an absolute sense.

The supposed object, the particle, is a real empirically observable object, therefore it's position cannot be arbitrarily chosen, there are real spatial parameters which limit the truth, and restrict the designation of location.

Do you see the difference? The length of the duration is the product of choice in an absolute sense, because the supposed "moments" which constitute C, when the object is at A, and also D, when the object is at B, are inserted by choice (seemingly randomly). On the other hand, the supposed position of the object is restricted by real observations, i.e. truth.

(ignoring any debate in quantum mechanics) — RussellA

Quantum mechanics is actually very relevant because your chosen object was "a particle". Notice, that in quantum physics, the position of the particle is restricted by the truth of observation (where it is emitted and where it is detected). However, there is time between emission and detection when the particle cannot be said to have a location. This is because spatial location is restricted in the way I described. However, since temporal duration is not restricted in this way, we can still affirm that there is temporal duration during which the particle cannot be located. The arbitrariness of the temporal duration allows that there is a time period when the particle has no location, or every possible location, or however you want to interpret the consequence of this arbitrariness.

I think you're missing the point. It's not an issue of whether distance can escape from time. It obviously cannot, as things move therefore distances change, with the passing of time. Nevertheless, things in space have definable position, even if moving, and that provides the basis for spatial measurement. On the other hand, the points in time which serve as the boundaries for measurement are totally arbitrary. So, for example, 1/299 792 458 of a second is completely arbitrary.

A substance, in hylomorphism, is the form (act) and matter (parts) conjoined. — Bob Ross

Despite the fact that substance is the individual, which is a composite of matter and form, when you read his Metaphysics, you'll find that Aristotle determines that "substance" is properly assigned to form. This is because n the case of self-subsisting things, the substance of the thing cannot be separated from the thing's form. Therefore the thing's form and the thing's substance are one and the same.

however, as I noted before, it is equally necessary that an object is infinitely divisible. — Bob Ross

Why do you say this? It is definitely not Aristotelian, as he clearly demonstrates why it s incoherent to assume infinite divisibility of anything substantial. This is the reason you yourself stated " if each object gets its being from its parts and those parts from its parts ad infinitum then none of them would exist; for none of them have being in-itself".

So I'll ask you again, why do you insist that it is necessary that an object is infinitely divisible. I think this is incoherent, because such an object cannot exist, therefore it is contradictory to say that such a thing (anything which might be infinitely divisible) is an object.

Hyle (matter) + morphe (form) = substance. Neither are a substance themselves. — Bob Ross

This is incorrect. In the case of self-subsisting things, the form is the substance. For reference, this is discussed in Metaphysics Bk 7.

They both exist intertwined together. — Bob Ross

They are not intertwined together, that is a misunderstanding. This is discussed in his description of generation in Bk 7.

That doesn’t refute what I said: in principle, hypothetically, a being could exist which is never affected by anything and yet is not incapable of change. — Bob Ross

It does refute your hypothesis. With an infinite amount of time, which is what you allow, that being would necessarily affect and be affected, or else it would be false to say that it is capable of affecting or being affected.

The spatial measurement is not arbitrary because it must be determined relative to two empirical boundaries, as the distance between them, although the choice of things to measure from may be arbitrary, making the determination arbitrary in a relative sense.

The temporal measurement is completely arbitrary because there are no boundaries within time, so the choice, which designates a spatial positioning as starting and ending point is arbitrary in an absolute sense.

Your example doesn't show that, because "1.2 metres" requires two boundaries which are determined empirically, and "75 seconds" is designated arbitrarily.

The spatial boundaries are determined by empirical principles, while the temporal boundaries are stipulated arbitrarily.

And the point?

The most obvious objection here would be to say that there is no such thing as a conservation principle, but that objection does not seem overly plausible. — Leontiskos

Conservation principles, like the conservation of mass, and the conservation of energy, are ideals which are put to use in practice. However, in reality, the real physical world does not obey them. There is always energy lost as time passes, and the discrepancy is written off as energy which is lost to the system, or sometimes as entropy. So this is not an argument that there is no such thing as conservation principles, there clearly is, and they are very useful. However, the real world doesn't actually obey them, and to understand the secrets of the real world is to understand why it doesn't live up to these ideals.

This is similar to the ideal which the ancients held, and Aristotle discussed, eternal circular motion. The orbiting of the sun, moon, and planets, was thought to be eternal circles. However, the circles were later demonstrated to be other than perfect circles, therefore the logic which made these circles eternal (and the universe would be eternal if conservation laws ere true) was effectively refuted. And the true nature of the solar system was revealed by understanding how the orbits did not actually live up to those ideals.

So we can make the same argument against "prime matter". It's an ideal, which is not consistent with reality. We can employ it in theories etc., where it is useful, but we need to recognize that it is not an accurate representation of truth. And the path of metaphysics will lead us into these areas where such concepts fail, thereby guiding us toward understanding the secrets of the real world.

The infinite divisibility of an object is not only possible but necessary. — Bob Ross

Such an infinite regress is incoherent and therefore logically impossible.

Yes, but this does seem to posit that there is a real kind of being or substance, distinct ontologically from the parts of a thing, which has the capacity to receive form. — Bob Ross

We are talking about hylomorphism aren't we? The form of a thing is distinct ontologically from the matter of the thing. And, if we divide a thing into parts each part will have form and matter. Infinite regress in such division is incoherent because it implies that there is no substratum, therefore no substance, allowing for infinite possibility, but this is contrary to empirical evidence.

But this could be the stuff which is the parts of a thing—no? It fits the definition of “that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists”. The parts persist when the whole perishes and the parts are out of which the whole is birthed. — Bob Ross

You do not seem to understand what "parts of a thing" means. To be "the parts of a thing", the existence of the thing is necessary. Therefore the parts of a thing cannot preexist the thing. If certain things are used in the creation of a thing, and therefore become parts of that thing, they are something other than parts of that thing prior to becoming parts of that thing. And after the thing perishes they are no longer parts of that thing, but something else.

This distinction is very important in understanding the nature of "form". The things, which may through some creative act, become the parts of something, have a distinct form, which is completely distinct from the form of that possible whole. When they become the parts of that whole their forms are different than they were, now being parts of that whole.

This is why considering the priority of matter always leads to an infinite regress. Each time we say that a thing has been made by putting parts together, those parts cannot be pure matter, they must themselves, have forms, as prime matter is unintelligible. So as much as matter is prior to the thing which is composed of it, it cannot be prior in an absolute sense. The incoherent infinite regress is avoided by understanding the priority of form in the creative act, and positing form rather than matter, as substance. Then "matter" as a concept just stands in as a substitute, a place holder, for forms which the human intellect cannot grasp. Those are the independent, separate forms, which are prior to material existence itself.

I don’t see how this is necessarily the case. A thing could be made of some substance which is capable of receiving form, exist as the whole between the form and its imposition on that substance, have the potential to be affected by other things, and yet no other thing affects it; thereby remaining unchanged. It is metaphysically possible for a thing that is perishable to be in an environment where it will not perish. — Bob Ross

I think that your argument is refuted by what is known as the principle of plenitude. If given enough time, every possibility will necessarily be actualized. This is exactly the problem with your attitude of allowing for infinite regress. If we allow infinite time then we must allow the reality of all sorts of absurdities, like the infinite monkey theorem. That's one reason why infinite regress must be rejected as fundamentally repugnant to reason, therefore incoherent.

This is the same problem with space as there may be with time. — RussellA

I don't think these two are similar at all. When we look at things in space, we see all sorts of boundaries, the edges to objects, etc., but we do not find any such boundaries in time. All boundaries in time, except the boundary between future and past, are completely arbitrary. And the boundary between future and past is very indefinite because it's always changing.

I imagine Trump is pissed at Netanyahu. Hopefully this episode will further disentangle the US from that government. — NOS4A2

Trump distance himself from Israel? I sure as hell hope that happens, because it would mean that he's in the grave.

I am assuming by temporal duration we mean that time itself cannot be reduced to a moment in time. As the Planck length is the smallest measurable unit of length, there is a smallest unit of time. ie, a duration. — RussellA

There is a further problem involved, if we assume that time itself cannot be reduced to a moment. There is then the question of what exactly is a moment. If time itself is continuous duration, then "the moment" is artificial, fictitious, something just made up by us for practical purposes. For example, we assume "a moment" which separates before 7:00 AM from after 7:00 AM, and this moment provides the foundation for measurement. Therefore, if time itself is actually continuous, without moments, yet our measurements of time are dependent on the use of such moments, then our measurements are fundamentally flawed, because they employ a concept which is not representative of time in reality.

I look at the world and can see a tree, static at one moment in time. — RussellA

I am very skeptical of this statement, and I would ask you to reevaluate. If you saw a tree at a moment in time, how could you ever determine whether that tree is static or not? If activity requires passing time, and there is no passing time in a moment, you would not be able to determine whether the tree is static or active without watching it for a duration.

I do believe that if you reflect on your actual experience, you'd recognize that you do not ever see a tree at one moment in time.

However, I believe that we approach this from different philosophical positions. I assume that you support Direct Realism (though I may be mistaken), whereas I support Indirect Realism. — RussellA

This makes no sense to me.

The arrangement of the parts which makes the whole that whole of this type is the form imposed upon parts (actuality imposed on actuality); and if this is true, then the parts and their arrangement are what dictate potential that a thing has—not some substrate of potential (viz., matter). There’s no extra entity called ‘matter’ going on here. — Bob Ross

Aristotle showed how this is problematic. Each part, if it was divisible, would itself be an arrangement of parts, and that would lead to infinite regress. And, if we assume that things are composed of fundamental indivisible parts, like the atomists proposed, this is also problematic. There would be nothing to distinguish one indivisible part from another indivisible part, and all would be one.

In the sense of what I think Aristotle means, I would say that ‘having potential’ is to have a substrate that can receive actuality in some way — Bob Ross

I think it would be more appropriate to say that the underlying substrate has received actuality. We are talking about what actually is, and this means it has form already.

I believe the problem you are encountering is due to your jumping ahead, trying to understand "matter" as potential, without getting a fundamental understanding of how "matter" is defined. "Matter" goes into the category of "potential", but this is not how it is defined in the basic sense.

I still haven't been able to wrap my head around what 'matter' is if it does not refer to merely the 'stuff' which are the parts that are conjoined with the form to make up the whole. — Bob Ross

You'll find the answer to this question, in its most basic form, in Aristotle's Physics, where he defines "material cause", in Bk2, Ch 3 "that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists". Notice that the matter of a thing, is in a sense, independent from the thing itself. The matter precedes the existence of the thing, and it persists in existence after the thing perishes. I believe that this is important to understand, because it is the basis of "contingent being". All things made of matter were generated, and will perish, as their matter out lasts them.

So "matter" accounts for the perishability of things, and the fact that things have a beginning in time. But since "matter" cannot account for the reason why a thing is the thing it is, rather than something else, we need to posit "form" as well, to allow that things have whatness.

I know about my environment because I can see trees and mountains. But my experience of temporal duration only exists in my mind, and is not something that I can see in my environment.

Therefore, I cannot know about temporal duration in the same way that I know about my environment. — RussellA

When you look at a tree, do you not see the leaves moving in the breeze? When you look at a mountain, do you not see clouds moving? These activities are indications of temporal duration. In the very same way that you deductively conclude that you can see things called "trees" and "mountains", you can also deductively conclude that you are seeing temporal duration.

The problem here seems to be that you are not allowing that seeing activities qualifies as evidence of seeing temporal duration, yet you do allow that seeing something relatively static, an object, qualifies as evidence of seeing objects like trees and mountains. Therefore I insist that you are being inconsistent in the premises which you accept as true, in producing your deductive your conclusions. You allow that staticity is evidence of something, but you do not allow that activity is evidence of anything.

A sceptic may deny that trees and mountains exist in the world. However, a sceptic cannot deny that they experience a sense of temporal duration.

Even for the sceptic, there is a difference between what exists in the mind and what exists outside the mind. — RussellA

As explained above, you appear to be biased in your skepticism. You allow that perception of staticity is evidence of something real in the world, objects like trees and mountains, but you disallow that perception of activity is evidence of something real in the world, like temporal duration.

2. The parts of the apple expose the apple inherently to the possibility of change because it exposes it to having potentials that could be actualized. — Bob Ross

What does this mean, "it exposes it to having potentials that could be actualized"? How are you using "expose" here? What would be the difference between having potential and being exposed to potential? If the apple doesn't have potential, but is exposed to potential, where would that potential exist other than within something else. But if the something else has potential relative to the apple, then doesn't the apple also have potential relative to the something else. So doesn't this just amount to saying that the apple has potential, i.e. matter?

If I exist within a duration of time, how can I know that I exist within a duration of time? — RussellA

As I said, it's basically the same way that you can know anything about the environment which you live in. You can be an extreme skeptic, and deny that you can know anything, but what's the point?

My experiences being a part of me suggests that "I" could exist without them. But is this true? — RussellA

This isn't really true, if it is what is called an essential part. This means that it is a necessary part,

I am still interested in how we are able to perceive duration. — RussellA

I think it has to do with what I said about being composed of different parts, and comparison between them. The brain compares information from various senses for example. This is like comparing different, yet concurrent experiences. So for example, you see something in the distance, and hear the sound a bit later, you can know from watching your watch how long it took for the sound to arrive relative to the visual image.

It is true, however, that if I did exist at one moment in time, I could compare my memory of the object being to the right at time 2pm and being to the left at time 2.05. This would allow me to perceive that there had been a duration of time. — RussellA

That is not perception, it is a deduction. Deduction does not qualify as "perceive" in either of your definitions.

I can judge a duration from the viewpoint of one moment in time, but how can I judge a duration when I am part of that duration? — RussellA

"Judge" is a much better word to use here than "perceive". The problem is that your preferred definition of "perceive" allows ambiguity in the division between what is sensed, and what is produced by judgement. So for example, if you say that you perceive a tree, that there is a thing you perceive, and it is a tree, is actually judgement. Judgement inheres within the perception. The actual sensation is just information. However, the information is always mediated through the brain, and therefore some degree, or form of judgement applied, before it is even present to the conscious mind.

You may want to excluded all judgement from sense perception, and ask whether we can perceive temporal duration. But that is not a realistic version of perception. Then if we allow judgement to inhere within perception, we have the problem of drawing the boundary between judgement prior to conscious judgement, and posterior to conscious judgement.

In other words, it appears to me, that you want to design your definitions of "judge" and "perceive", to allow that you can judge duration if there are moments in time, and deny that we could perceive duration if there are no moments in time. What's the point to this?

He ends with his "utopia of cognition":

Whatever of the truth can be gleaned through concepts beyond their abstract circumference, can have no other staging-grounds than that which is suppressed, disparaged and thrown away by concepts. The utopia of cognition would be to open up the non-conceptual with concepts, without making it the same as them.

I think it's important to note that Adorno's cognitive utopia remains conceptual, i.e., it is not mystical or intuitive.

QUESTION: This description of philosophy as essentially paradoxical can look rather too irrationalist. Would it be a misrepresentation of Adorno to just say that philosophy seems paradoxical, but there might be a way to do it? I know he wants us to keep contradictions open, but this one to me is a bit on-the-nose. — Jamal

I think the answer here is to look at the process rather than the concepts themselves, or even the supposed relations between concepts and objects. If truth is a relation between concept and object, then the act which makes this relation is what produces truth, and that act is not the concept itself. Notice that it is a type of act, which is described by "open up the non-conceptual with concepts". This is the act of applying concepts to the nonconceptual.

So philosophy becomes paradoxical, even self-contradicting, when it totally envelopes itself in concepts, applying concepts to concepts (thinking about thinking perhaps). This "thinking" is said to be a type of activity, but it's not a real activity because objects are avoided instead of engaged with. Intentionally avoiding objects makes it the opposite of activity. Real activity engages concepts with objects, and this I believe is Adorno's proposal for avoiding paradox, a dialectics which consists of real activity.

Trying analogies: i) can one hand wash itself, ii) can a snooker ball at rest start to move without any external force, iii) can the mind be conscious of its own consciousness, iv) can something arise from nothing, v) can there be an effect without a cause, vi) does an evil person think that they are a good person. — RussellA

I would answer "yes" to some , "no" to others, so I don't see the relevance.

Suppose I experience an object moving from right to left. — RussellA

You are repeating the same basic mistake. You have an experience, within yourself, and you interpret the significance of that experience, as an object moving from right to left.

Notice how your description leaves out a key aspect, the means of sensation by which you drew that conclusion. So instead, your description would be more accurate if you said, I saw something move from right to left, or I heard something move from right to left, or I saw and heard something move from right to left.

When you include this, the means of sensation, you indicate that this part of your experience, seeing that, or hearing that, is not your complete experience. So "an object moving from right to left" is not what you experience, it's an interpretation of a part of your experience, what you saw, heard, etc. The interpretation itself is another part of your experience.

However, if "my experience" is internal to "me" but separate to "me" then this is the homunculus problem — RussellA

I didn't say it is separate, I said it is "is an intrinsic aspect of being a human being". This means that it is a part of being human, not something separate.

Therefore, "my experience" must be "me", in that I am my experiences rather than I have experiences. — RussellA

No, my experience is not "me", it is a part of me, just like my heart is, and my brain is, except it is a different type of part of me, a different category.

But that means there exists only one thing, "me" This one thing can be called either "me" or "my experience", as they are one and the same thing. — RussellA

Do you understand what "an aspect" means? It is impossible that the aspect is the same as the thing it is an aspect of, or else it wouldn't be "an aspect"?

My question is, accepting that one thing can be aware of a second thing, how can one thing be aware of itself? — RussellA

I really do not understand why you think that self-awareness is impossible. Are you not aware of yourself? If you think that you are not self aware, maybe you cold explain why?

This takes me back to my analogies, how can one hand wash itself.

How can a single thought think about itself?

How can a single thought that has a duration think about its own duration? — RussellA

A hand can easily wash itself, it uses tools, wash basin, scrub brush, etc.,. You may have experienced this if you've injured a hand. I really think you are placing undue restrictions, and trying to make a problem where there is none to be found. Why do you limit yourself to "a single thought" when you are thinking about duration?

Have you ever noticed that you can think a number of different thoughts at the same time? When you count the number of chairs in a room, you must think about what qualifies as a chair, and also count at the same time. That's how we measure, and make comparisons in general. So, you can see the object move from right to left, and also watch your clock, at the very same time, to measure how long it took. This is because the human experience is made up of many different aspects, all occurring at the same time.

I exist within a world of trees and mountains, but I am external to these trees and mountains.

The problem arises when I am not external to what I experience. — RussellA

You're really not making sense Russel. People are not external to their experiences. Experience is an intrinsic aspect of being a human being. It doesn't make sense to talk about experiences which you are external to, or which are external to you.

Can an experience experience itself. Can a thought think about itself. — RussellA

Sure, Aristotle claimed that thinking about thinking is the highest virtue. Why would you move to exclude the possibility of such activities?

Can a duration be aware of its own duration? — RussellA

Isn't this the only way that a duration could be accurately measured? The thing experiencing duration must be aware of its own duration in order to measure that duration. This is the case of all measurements, they are inherently subjective, being interpretations made by a subject, of the subject's experience.

That is what constitutes "empirical science", human beings being aware of their own sense experiences, and using conventional tools, established standards, to measure these sense observations. The conventional standards which are applied, are said to be "objective", because they have been justified, but the thing measured is subjective, as a sense observation, and the act of measurement is also subjective, as an act of the subject. So the subject is aware of its own subjectivity, and making measurements of that subjective experience, using objective standards.

Therefore we ought to conclude that a subject can be aware of its own duration, just like it can be aware of any sense experiences, and proceed to make measurements of that duration in a similar way to the way that it makes measurements of any sense observations, by being aware of them, and applying "objective" standards to measure them.

How can I perceive a duration if I exist within this duration? — RussellA

Why not? You have a multitude of senses, a brain, and all sorts of tools within your body, which could enable you to experience the very duration which you live in. Your question is like asking how can I experience the same world which I exist within?

But if I existed within a duration, then my awareness, which has a duration, cannot be aware of its own duration. My only awareness could be of a timelessness. — RussellA

I do not see the logic here.

I don't think there is any science which truly reveals how long the present is for a human being, but I've seen reports of lengths up to a couple seconds. This is not the duration of the present, in any objective sense, because human experience is. purely subjective.

Also, I think that when you speak of your awareness of an event which just happened, as part of your experience of the present, I think you need to include your awareness (anticipation) of an event which is about to happen, as part of your awareness of the present.

Very meta. I don't know what to say about it, except that I don't think the non-identical is a positively applied category so much as a limit concept, a negative name (a bit like noumena in kant). — Jamal

This is why I brought up the phrase "the identity of identity and non-identity". But to be clear, it is Hegel whom Adorno accuses of giving identity to non-identity, in that way, which I claim puts contradiction into the object. This is the means by which Hegel enables substantive thinking: " the determinate particular was determinable by the Spirit, because its immanent determination was supposed to be nothing other than the Spirit". The problem being what is indicated by Adorno at the beginning of the section, that the law of non-contradiction applies to objects, not to subjective thought (here as Spirit, which is in essence free). So when the determinate particular is nothing other than a determination of the free Spirit, this effectively avoids that law, allowing contradiction within the determinate particular, as the identity of non-identity.

Adorno I believe is rejecting Hegelian dialectics, recognizing what is described of Hegel at the end of the section as a mistake. Adorno is looking for a way to give primacy to the object rather than to the subject, but this would be a restriction to Spirit. Primacy of the subject is what I claim leads to contradiction within the object. So for Adorno, the non-identical is not a positively applied category (as you say, and I agree), as it is for Hegel. And, I think he is attempting to avoid any conceptualization of "non-identical", because conceptualization will inevitably be contradictory, as was the case when Aristotle tried to conceptualize "potential", and "matter". Nevertheless, it must be at the base of substantive thinking, as what enables it, the foundation.

So, as is the case with objects, we can name it without conceptualizing it. This provides a twist to Wittgenstein's bedrock, instead of a foundational certainty (which Adorno seems to think will always end up as a contradiction, such as the identity of non-identity), it is a foundational uncertainty. Even Wittgenstein's approach to the foundation is conceptual, an attempt "to say what cannot be said" and therefore contradictory. So Adorno's proposal, of a negative dialectics, seems to be to simply name it, so that we can speak of it, without actually conceptualizing it, which would be the attempt to give it identity.

It appears to me, at this point, like this will lead to a discipline of description, with Spirit being fundamentally free in its artistic endeavours, but discipline required for truth in representation.

It seems to me that we exist at one moment in time, including our mind and brain, as well as everything else in the world, including trees, tables and chairs.

That being said, I also feel that I am conscious of the persistence and duration of time. This raises the mysterious metaphysical problem of how a duration of time can exist at a moment in time. Kant thought it could, and he called it the Transcendental Unity of Apperception. — RussellA

I believe we actually perceive motion, activity, and this requires temporal duration, therefore we do perceive duration. I think that the "moment in time" is an artificial construct.

The multiplicity or polyvalence—which I've also described as diversity, difference, and richness—is currently experienced as hostile, as anathema to the subject's reason. This is because it reveals the subject's inability to fully capture it. In contrast to this failed mediation, genuine reconciliation would produce a happy mediation, a successful and non-dominating one. (This reconciliation is the ultimate secret goal of dialectics; see "dialectics serves reconciliation" in the next paragraph) — Jamal

Consider this passage, and the diversity of difference referred to. When primacy is granted to the subject, this diversity, which actually constitutes the richness and beauty of being, is lost into a category which we commonly hear as 'differences which don't make a difference'. For Adorno this is the category of non-identity, or non-identical. These differences can have no identity, because they do not fit into the categories imposed, trying to fit them creates contradiction, so they are simply left as unidentified.

However, this dialectical approach is actually based in an act of categorizing them, as non-identical. So there is an illusion created, that those differences which are impossible to categorize, have actually been categorized. But the category is really 'the contradictory', as the non-identical which have been given that contradictory identity.

Since I was struggling to understand that last sentence, I finally worked it out by putting it in the form of modus tollens: If Hegel's dialectics had not hidden the non-identical then philosophy would have collapsed into positivism and nihilism; but philosophy has not collapsed into positivism and nihilism, therefore Hegel's dialectics did hide the non-identical.

Adorno's idea is that although Hegel hid the non-identical by turning contradiction into reconciliation and subsuming difference—and did this with idealism, insisting on the identity of concept and object—it was in order to produce substantive knowledge. If he had not asserted this right of philosophy to find truth, then there would be no other philosophical tradition except those that resign themselves to the reduced role of handmaiden to science. — Jamal

So I generally agree with this, but I maybe wouldn't say it is a matter of hiding the non-identical. It's maybe even the opposite to that, as allowing the non-identical (as contradictory) right into the mind as if it has an identity. It hides it by making it so obvious that it's just ignored.

Consider this analogy. You go out in the morning, and take notice of all the minute differences around you, different shades of green in the leaves and grass etc., this is the richness of diversity. You can go out every day, and notice this richness within the non-identical. But if you just go out and noticed the identified things, your bike, your car, your mailbox, etc., you can completely ignore the non-identical. And it's not a matter of having hid the non-identical, it's just a change of attitude, attention, focus. All that diversity just becomes 'the other' so you ignore it all together, but that ignorance is actually a matter of accepting it into your mind, as 'the other'. and something to be ignored. So if it is a matter of hiding it, it's a matter of hiding it from oneself, within one's own mind, by designating it as insignificant. It is that act of recognizing it, classifying it, designating it, which actually hides it.

I did not interpret Adorno as criticizing Hegel for reading contradiction into the objects. Not saying you're wrong, just don't really get it. — Jamal

I'll try to explain to you why I see it that way. Notice the end of the last section. "Contradiction is non-identity under the bane [Bann] of the law, which also influences the non-identical." The "law" referred to here is the law of non-contradiction, and contradiction renders identity as impossible, resulting in non-identity.

Then in this section, "REALITY AND DIALECTICS", it is stated that "This law is however not one of thinking, but real." This is a bit off the normal interpretation of that law which would hold it to be a law of thinking. But Adorno is stating that it is a law about what is real, rather than about what we can think. We can in fact think in contradictions, yet the real object cannot exist in a contradictory way.

Later in the section he talks about the lack of substantive thinking, which results in "null and void forms of cognition". This type of thinking is the rejection of content, and the content is the representation of the object, and that is what supports non-contradiction. So lack of substance in thinking is lack of object, and without real objects there is nothing to prevent contradiction in thought.

Hegel however, allowed for substantive philosophizing, but he held the primacy of the subject. This results in "the identity of identity and non-identity". But notice how the identity of non-identity is itself contradictory. So this is what happens with Hegel's principle where "the determinate particular was determinable by the Spirit". "Identity" is the subjective side of the relation between concept and object, due to the primacy of the subject, in this sense of identity. So assigning identity to non-identity is to make non-identity (contradiction) into an object. Simply put. it assumes a contradictory object. And unless identity is assigned to the object itself, "non-identity" is required to make "identity" intelligible through the dialectical method. Therefore to make this type of "identity" intelligible it is necessary that contradiction inheres within the object, as the non-identical aspect of it. That's why I said Hegelian dialectics projects contradiction into the object.

I believe the context for the next section is set by the opening sentence, referencing non-contradiction: "This law is however not one of thinking, but real". That suggests to me, that contradiction is not within the particular objects which the subject approaches, but within the subject's approach, and this constitutes the difference, the separation between the two, object and concept. Dialects attempts reconciliation. The conclusion I draw is that the Hegelian approach, which forces the primacy of the subject, is mistaken, because it wrongly projects contradiction into the object, and finds its supposed reconciliation that way.

Well, I had to look that one up. I didn't know how to take it, but thank you. We'll see how the reading progresses, but the critical question seems to be what is the best approach toward a knowledge of the object. If, there is a natural separation between the concept and the object, and the effort to unite the two in some form of identity is a mistaken approach, because that identity is a mere illusion, then what are we left with? If we wanted to analyze the difference, how could we even start? I would say that each instance of failure of identity, is a demonstration of that difference.

Identity, centrally, is a failed mediation; and the non-identical, rather than a negation of identity, is the remainder of that failure. — Jamal

I believe Plato went through a very similar issue with his dialectics, i.e. the failure of identity as a mediation. This is why Aristotle made identity something other than a mediation, placing the identity of the object within the object itself (a thing is the same as itself). And that's the basis for Kant's separation. Notice that this is a relation of separation between object and subject rather than a relation of unity. It implicitly states that the identity which the subject assigns to the object can never be the same as the true identity within the object.

Hegel rejected Aristotle's law of identity, so post-Hegelian "identity" reverts back to this sort of mediation, which had already been proven by Plato, to be a failure. This is alluded to by Adorno when he speaks of the "Aristotelian critics of Hegel". The issue is, where the logic of contradiction fails, and Aristotle 'identified' this as "potential", the "matter" of a thing. He proposed violation of the law of excluded middle, to accommodate this category, where the logic of contradiction is inapplicable.

However, Adorno seizes on this form of "identity", what he calls "the appearance of identity", which is already a property of the subject rather than a property of the object, and he rejects it. It fails because the identity which the subject assigns to the object can never be "total", complete, or perfect. That leaves the part which cannot be apprehended by the human mind with its logic of contradiction, as unintelligible matter, or potential. For Adorno, it appears like the belief in the "totality" of this form of identity is what misleads us, in the primary sense. That totality of "unitary thinking", which assumes all (the totality of the object) can be represented as a unified system, is an illusion created by that sort of ideology.

The appearance [Schein] of identity dwells however in thinking
itself as a pure form from within. To think means to identify.
Conceptual schemata self-contentedly push aside what thinking wants
to comprehend. Its appearance [Schein] and its truth delimit
themselves. The former is not to be summarily removed, for example
by vouchsafing some existent-in-itself outside of the totality of thought
determinations. There is a moment in Kant, and this was mobilized
against him by Hegel, which secretly regards the in-itself beyond the
concept as something wholly indeterminable, as null and void. To the
consciousness of the phenomenal appearance [Scheinhaftigkeit] of the
conceptual totality there remains nothing left but to break through the
appearance [Schein] of total identity: in keeping with its own measure.
Since however this totality is formed according to logic, whose core is
constructed from the proposition of the excluded third, everything
which does not conform to such, everything qualitatively divergent
assumes the signature of the contradiction. The contradiction is the
non-identical under the aspect of identity; the primacy of the principle
of contradiction in dialectics measures what is heterogenous in unitary
thinking. By colliding against its own borders, it reaches beyond itself. — p15

I don't think "real" solves the problem. If our primary distinction is between concepts and objects, and we are talking about relations between concepts and objects, all three are "real", concepts, objects and their relations.

So my proposal was that since we understand such relations as concepts, the relations must be themselves concepts. You don't think Adorno would accept this, so he must have a third category, something which is neither concept nor object, but consists of the relations between these. Do you think that this is the case? Would we put "identity" in this category? Is the category itself "identity", or does "non-identity" fit into the category as well, as a relation which is not an identity relation?

This word for appearance, Schein, is the same as in appearance/essence, and it similarly suggests illusion. Here, the illusion is that thought has exhausted the object, that mind and world are united completely. But this is an illusion that arises from within, from the way we think: to think means to identify. — Jamal

Here's a good example of such a relationship, expressed here by the word "exhausted". But this relationship, which is a complete identity relation, is said to be an illusion. And this is why "real" might be misleading, to refer to these relations, because they may be true or they may be false.

In other words, we cannot (or ought not) deal with the mismatch between mind and world by appealing to a noumenal realm beyond concepts — Jamal

Here, the word is "mismatch", and this word is supposed to describe the reality of that false relationship which was an illusion. But "mismatch" described a supposed relation which may not even be a real relation. So it may turn out that what appears as an illusion of a relation, may in reality not even be a relation at all.

I think that this is what happens with "identity". Identity, as described by Adorno is a relation. But if we negate identity with non-identity, it may turn out that the thing which was thought of as a relation, because that's how it appeared to us, is not even a relation at all. I think we need to leave this open, as a possibility. When we critique the artificial unity it may be necessary to deny all relations, as potentially illusory.

The answer, I suppose, has to be that the claim that contradictions are inherent in the object is not a claim of metaphysical essence. Instead, it is a claim that contradiction is neither solely on the side of ontology nor just a subjective inadequacy, but is an objective feature of the relation between the two. There is more to be said here but I'll leave it for now. — Jamal

I find that this is a very confusing use of "objective". We have the subject on one side, and deficiencies in the approach of the subject are called "subjective". Also, we are discussing whether contradiction inheres within the object, and I would assume that such would be "objective". Now, you mention "an objective feature of the relation between the two". How can you classify a feature, which relies equally on the subject and the object, as "objective"?

I believe this is important, because when we seek to understand "relations", and this is key to understanding what Adorno calls identity thinking, we need to completely distance the relation from both sides of the related things, to understand the general principle of "relations". This becomes non-identity thinking. Then, from this perspective, I think that we find out that all relations which we talk about, are necessarily the products of subjects. And these relations are of two principal categories, those intended toward truth (correspondence), as representing supposed real relations, and those intended toward use (domination). All relations therefore, as understood, are subjective.

So don’t misinterpret me: the distinction is real. For example, beneath the ideology of employment—free contracts, the work ethic, meritocracy, etc.—there is exploitation. The former is the appearance that masks the latter essence. This is not imaginary, not mere highfalutin metaphysics, and this was Adorno’s original point. — Jamal

As far as I can tell that distinction is arbitrary. And from what I've read so far, Adorno treats it as such, regardless of whether or not he asserts that it is real. It is a tactic of philosophers, a ploy, to assert that something is real, "given", as a means of avoiding justification. This is "the postulate", which Adorno is very critical of, because acceptance of it makes one like a bleating sheep, and that stymies deep speculation. Read the beginning of the lecture very carefully, and you may come to agree with me, that Adorno is actually criticizing this postulate, that the distinction between essence and appearance is real. Consider that the claim to be "real", is what he refers to as "factuality".

I set aside here the consideration that one consequence of the postulate of
absolute certainty underlying the rejection of speculation – which is
itself the product of what we might call an inflated idealism, by which
I mean that we come to expect things of concepts that they cannot
possibly satisfy, namely absolute certainty – one effect of this postulate
is to muzzle thinking, thus preventing it from advancing beyond
the point warranted by supposedly certain facts. To the extent that
such concepts as certainty and factuality or immediate givens become
the object of philosophical reflection, they cannot be presented as
criteria for a priori thought. And it is the very ideas that are indigenous
in this realm, that is to say, the ideas that concern themselves
with the rightness or wrongness of such criteria which, looked at
naïvely from the standpoint of factuality or givenness, appear as
speculative. By uttering the word ‘appear’, I have arrived for the first
time in these lectures at a distinction that cannot be taken seriously
enough and that, if there is such a thing as a criterion of what is
philosophy and what isn’t, must certainly qualify as such. This is the
distinction between essence and appearance, a distinction that has
been sustained in almost every philosophy – with the exception of
positivist critique and certain invectives in Nietzsche – throughout
the entire philosophical tradition. I believe that it is one of the essential
motifs, I almost said one of the essential legitimating elements,
of philosophy – that the distinction between essence and appearance
is not simply the product of metaphysical speculation, but that it is
real. — p 99-100

Now, turn to the conclusion of the lecture, and see how it supports what I say about the opening:

Resistance means refusing to allow the law
governing your own behaviour to be prescribed by the ostensible or
actual facts. In that sense resistance transcends the objects while
remaining closely in touch with them.
Thus the concept of depth always implies the distinction between
essence and appearance, today more than ever – and this explains
why I have linked my comments on depth to that distinction. That
concept of depth is undoubtedly connected to what I described to
you last time as the speculative element. I believe that without speculation
there is no such thing as depth. The fact that in its absence
philosophy really does degenerate into mere description may well
seem quite plausible to you. This speculative surplus that goes beyond
whatever is the case, beyond mere existence, is the element of freedom
in thought, and because it is, because it alone does stand for freedom,
because it represents the tiny quantum of freedom we possess, it also
represents the happiness of thought. It is the element of freedom
because it is the point at which the expressive need of the subject
breaks through the conventional and canalized ideas in which he
moves, and asserts himself. And this breakthrough of the limits set
on expression from within together with the smashing of the façade
of life in which one happens to find oneself – these two elements may
well be one and the same thing. What I am describing to you is philosophical
depth regarded subjectively – namely, not as the justification
or amelioration of suffering, but as the expression of suffering, some
thing which understands the necessity of suffering in the very act of
expression. — 107-108

That basic illusion, the so-called "façade of life", is the fundamental claim to facticity itself, supported by that principal postulate, of a real distinction between appearance and essence, which justifies factuality at its base. Smashing that façade is what provides to the subject, freedom of thought, happiness of thought, and depth of speculation, to go beyond those conventional limits which formulate "what is the case", facticity.

Then we'll have to carry on disagreeing. Adorno believes there are beliefs and ways of thinking that obscure underlying social relations, and uses appearance/essence to frame this. In other words, the distinction is real, meaning that it's not something merely dreamt up by metaphysicians. But we can think of this as a re-purposing of the distinction in a new, dialectical context (which probably goes for all of the binary distinctions he uses). — Jamal

Due to the inconsistency in what you have written here, I interpret what you are really saying is that the distinction is not something real, it is merely metaphysical speculation, and that's the reason why it can be re-purposed by Adorno, because it's not fixed in anything real. If it was something real, it would be fixed by that reality, and not re-purposable.