The best approach is to work out how LND and ItS can be consistent. Two comments of yours, one from your most recent post and the other from the previous one, stand out to me as possible obstacles along this path: — Jamal

Sometimes, it is good to look specifically at inconsistencies. This I think, is "critical" analysis, and that approach helps to reveal the evolving aspects of an author's thought. We can oppose this approach (perhaps as the negative approach) with the one which looks for consistency (the positive approach). I think that this is a very good way of reading Plato for example, but it requires much study. So Plato is commonly divided into 3 phases. My interpretation is that he works hard to elucidate Pythagorean idealism in the first stage. In the process he notices the interaction problem, so he proposes "the good", and also a medium between body and intellect (tripartite soul), as a remedy. Then by his late period he is firmly rejecting Pythagorean idealism. The defective interpretation produces "Platonism" as a rendition of Pythagorean idealism, and attempt, through misinterpretation, to make late Plato consistent with the early.

I admit, that when I look at an author like Aristotle, what I look for is consistency from one work to the next. The principles he sets out in one work, when well understood, are applicable toward understanding another work. The works sort of build on each other, and Aristotle clearly started with some principles which he would adhere to throughout..

But maybe this difference is the difference between a negative dialectic (Plato), which criticizes and deconstructs, and a positive system-building type of philosophy (Aristotle).

This is not how Adorno's logic goes. — Jamal

In that example, in LND, he explicitly brings up sociology as a means of exemplifying the essence/appearance distinction, and the claim that it is a real distinction rather than just an artificial division produced by metaphysical speculation. With the use of this type of example however, we must be very careful to judge how well the example actually portrays the purported principle. With Plato, for example, he'll provide a principle, then an example to portray it, and I am sure that the example is intentionally chosen to disprove the principle. Plato doesn't draw the conclusion though, that the principle has been disproven, but leaves the reader to make that conclusion. So, the dialogue will read as if the example provides proof of the principle, but careful reading reveals the exact opposite. This may be the case here in Adorno's LND.

Notice how the example really twists and turns, with the immediacy of subjective behaviour being an illusion, and society producing the illusion as a necessity, and this being ideology. But, ultimately the subject, through deep speculation can resist that supposed "necessary" illusion. So really, what Adorno has done with that example, is proved that the essence/appearance distinction is not real, because "deep" speculation can overturn it. So he proceeds through the rest of the lecture speaking about philosophical resistance, and deep speculation, which actually would be impossible if that essence/appearance distinction was real.

Specifically on society, it is better to think of society as the relation, the totality in which we can non-rigidly identify essence and appearance: social structures, modes and relations of production etc, on one side (essence); and beliefs on the other (appearance). If you force Adorno to say that society is essence and individuals are appearance, you are imposing your own framework, because Adorno says no such thing, and never would. — Jamal

I believe this passage indicates that you and I are now consistent in our interpretations. In the above, I accept that what Adorno is really doing is demonstrating the falsity of the claim that the essence/appearance distinction is real, it is actually a product of metaphysical speculation. This is consistent with your claim of non-rigid identity. Further, I indicated that "society" is a sort of gap filling concept, used to fill lapses in our understanding, so we can pass over them with that word, without requiring that we actually understand what the word refers to, allowing the supposed concept of "society" to be a shape shifting form, determined by context. This is consist also with your determination of non-rigid identity.

The key to making our interpretations consistent (and this I believe is more important than trying to make Adorno consistent), is the recognition that when he says that within the "entire philosophical tradition", "that the distinction between essence and appearance is not simply the product of metaphysical speculation, but that it is real", and he appeals to sociology to demonstrate this, what he is really doing is demonstrating the falsity of this principle. Then when he says that human beings are becoming ideology, this is not necessary, or essential, it may just be appearance, and therefore can be reversed without the need for the abolition of human beings.

Is this consistent with your interpretation or does it suggest an amended one? I'm thinking of course of your attribution of "separation" to Adorno (and me), and your either/or framework. — Jamal

I would say that it is just a little but amended. And that is very easy to understand, because "society" is an extremely difficult and vague concept, generally shaped and adapted toward the purpose of the discussion, in general usage. That's much like all the connotations of "ideology" you listed. The concept "society" is similar to "God" in that way, it generally fills a gap in our understanding, so the concept at play, changes form depending on the context.

As for the separation, the subject/object distinction is significant, and I do not see how it can be anything other than a categorical distinction. If for example, there was a difference of degree between subjective and objective, such that if a subjective idea became well enough justified, it would become objective knowledge, this would allow both to be of the same category. However, I do not think that this is what we're talking about here with the distinction between moral human subjects, and the objective structures of society.

So the difference I see is that in the LND "society" has a place of priority over the human subject, whereas in this "Introduction to Sociology" there is more of a balanced and equal relation between the two. That society has a place of priority in LND is evident from the beginning of the exposé on p100. The relation between society and human subjects is brought up to exemplify that the distinction between essence and appearance is a real distinction, not just a distinction of metaphysical speculation. So here, that relation between society and human beings, must fit that mold, of a real distinction. We can of course maintain the possibility that Adorno's actual intention was to doubt, and criticize claims that the essence/appearance distinction is real, and something more than just speculative. However, he goes on in that exposé to explain "that subjective modes of behaviour in modern societies are dependent on objective social structures", and this implies that human behaviour is mediated rather than immediate. Then he goes on with "the nature of society"... "to produce the contents of the minds... to ensure that they are blind...". So he is describing society as something with this described nature.

In this passage, "Introduction to Sociology", "society" is given a slightly different concept. Instead of having priority over human individuals, "to produce...", "to ensure...", society is said to be a "relationship between individuals". I believe the description in LND is somewhat dismissed with "On the other hand, it should not be seen as a pure, over-arching concept existing for itself", and also with the dismissal of "something existing, rather like an organism, in itself ". Those phrases I feel are applicable to how society is described in LND, because it is described as a thing with a specific nature, but that is rejected here.

So in this passage, society is robbed of its thinghood (which it has in LND), and described as a type of relation. The two, individuals and society, are said to name opposing categories, but they aren't really opposing, though they are clearly distinct categories. Truly opposing terms are usually within the same category. And, I can see another problem which could develop. This way of describing "society" doesn't necessarily produce a whole. And if there is a whole, it needs another name. There is human beings, and there is relationships (society), but what is the whole in this model? Normally, we'd say that the whole itself, human beings and their relationships, is society, and this is why we think of society as an object. Now, Adorno says there is human beings, and there is their relationships (society), but we do not have a whole, what the unity of human beings and their relationships produces. The other description in LND is more conducive to a interpreting society as that whole, therefore a describable object with its "nature".

Any way the you approach it, understanding the concept "society" is not an easy task. And, I think it tends to be a shape shifting sort of thing, which takes it form from the context of usage.

I have to say that for Adorno theory and praxis are two completely different things. — Pussycat

I don't think so. In that lecture he explicitly said that he does not accept a clean separation between the two.

But suppose there were indeed such a principle that would claim universality as to what meaning is, then I guess that would be a perfect example of identity thinking, as it would not fully represent the whole spectrum of meaning. Additionally, it could easily turn out to be and become totalitarian and dominative, strangulating other voices that think otherwise. Correct? — Pussycat

Yes, I think that's the point. Such a principle of universality of "use" would necessarily be false, because actual use is inherently formed to match the uniqueness of the circumstances. So this would in a sense, misrepresent each particular instance of use, in order to fit it into the universal. That's representative of "identity thinking", which neglects aspects of the true identity of the individuals, in order to identify the individual conceptually.

Rather than ideology producing the beliefs, a better basic understanding is: ideology is the beliefs. — Jamal

OK, so this difference of interpretation is rooted in the different ways that you and I apprehend "society". You have claimed that society is an object, and Adorno seems to accept this premise as well, with "objective social structures". And so Adorno sees society as essence (objective), and individuals as appearance (subjective).

Now, I do not see this separation of category, and my basic intuitive inclination is the opposite to this. I see things exactly the way that Adorno is critical of. I see society as an extension of human individuals, so that society might be called "inter-subjective" but this does not support the unity required for "object". This is what I explained at the beginning of this adventure, I have difficulty conceiving society as an object.

So, I make the attempt, to conceive of this object, society, with objective social structures, in order to read and properly understand the author. Accordingly, you should recognize that I have no basic principles (biases or prejudices) by which I would draw a boundary to distinguish properties of the object, society, from properties of the subjects, the human beings. So when Adorno says that this distinction between appearance and essence is real, that's just a subjective statement to me, and I continue to believe that all such distinctions are metaphysical efficacies. However, I have to accept this principle to understand the author, therefore I am prepared to apply it within his material, to determine whether he actually adheres to his own stated principles.

With respect to "ideology" then, I believe Adorno very clearly describes it as property of the object, society. To me, the entire object (society) is fictional, imaginary to begin with, so I have no problem with proceeding from this principle, to assign whatever fictional properties are required to understand this supposed object. You however, seemed to be inclined by "the reality" of the situation, and you cannot separate "ideology" from the beliefs of individual human beings, because that's what you believe is real. For me, I have already accepted what I consider a fictional object, "society", so I have no problem doing what Adorno proposes, and accepting ideology as a property of this fictional object. The critical point, for me, is that whether or not Adorno actually believes in this separation between human subject, and society as an object, is not relevant. What is relevant is that this is what he is proposing, for whatever reasons.

For you, you already accept this separation between human subject and society as an object, so the truth or reality of this is irrelevant to you as well, you accept it as a premise. However, Adorno uses a term, "ideology", which is very ambiguous, having many connotations, which allow it to cross the boundary, and refer sometimes to a property of the minds of subjects, and sometimes to a property of the object, society. And, since you already accept this boundary, between human subject and societal object, you already have a preconceived idea as to which side of the boundary this term applies, the subjective. Therefore you need to pay special attention, read very closely, to determine how Adorno is using the term, because if he is using it in a way which makes it refer to a property of the other side of the boundary, societal object (and I submit that he is), then to read it in the other way is a sort of equivocation.

Therefore I beg you please, consider the following: "it lies in the nature of society to produce the contents of the minds of human beings" -100. He does not explicitly define this as ideology, but do you not agree with me, that that this "nature of society to produce the content of human minds" is precisely "ideology"?

Well, I explained it already. Here you are conflating speculation and metaphysical speculation. I agree that he is promoting depth and a kind of speculation, but when he says that the distinction between appearance and essence is not just a product of metaphysical speculation, he means to oppose the more common position in the twentieth century that the distinction is metaphysical mumbo-jumbo. Note that it doesn't follow from this that he is 100% on board with metaphysical speculation, since by this he is referring vaguely towards the targets of contemporary sceptics of the distinction, targets like German idealism and earlier kinds of metaphysics like Leibniz. In other words dogmatic metaphysics. But I've forgotten why we're arguing about this. — Jamal

This is problematic. Adorno's claim that the distinction between essence and appearance is real, can simply be dismissed as itself metaphysical mumbo-jumbo. So he does not make any progress here with those metaphysicians like myself, who already deny that distinction. However, he appeals to people like yourself, who already accept a real categorical division between societal object, and human subject. But if you are in this position, of accepting this distinction, then you need to carry through with a complete understanding of what he proposes, and that is resistance to the societal object (as resistance to ideology).

The following is indicative and very powerful:

Resistance means refusing to allow the law
governing your own behaviour to be prescribed by the ostensible or
actual facts. In that sense resistance transcends the objects while
remaining closely in touch with them. — p 107

You can't get from the structural necessity of ideology, which is what "socially necessary illusion" refers to—you can't get from that to intentional deception without some additional premises. — Jamal

Aren't you just admitting here, that you actually believe that Adorno is using "ideology" to refer to a property of society? This statement clearly exposes the problem with the 'human subject/societal object' division. Once you put ideology into the 'societal object' category, as Adorno does, and you do here, then you separate it from intention, which is proper to the human subject. By doing this you separate it from moral value, leaving terms of moral reprehension like "intentional deception" as inapplicable.

Now, with that vague separation between moral human subject, and amoral societal object, immoral, blameworthy, intentional actions can be hidden as property of the amoral societal object. So you talk about "the structural necessity of ideology", but if this is a true objective necessity, distinct from human intention and moral value, how could a lowly human being, with subjective human values, ever obtain the authority to judge ideologies?

How the comparitively innocent "Yeah! Yeah!" has become intentional deception in your mind I really can't tell. — Jamal

Human actions are inherently intentional, and naivety, or claims of innocent 'going with the flow' (which leads to mob rule), do not absolve one from responsibility. If a human being rapes another, and "innocent" others are cheering, those "innocents" are actually complicit and not so innocent.

In neither case is there any intentional deception as far as I can see.

EDIT: Actually, there is a small space for intentional deception to get in there. I said the innocent bleaters "probably do not know it is false or illusory," which suggests that maybe sometimes some of them do. Certainly it's reasonable to believe that some of the cheerleaders know that the ideas they're cheering on are not quite true, that they prioritize the effectiveness of the ideas over their truth (this is obviously the case with a lot of deliberate propaganda, e.g., in times of war). But I don't think this is paradigmatic of ideology, and I think Adorno would say this makes it less ideological (in Minima Moralia I think he says fascism is less ideological than liberal capitalism). — Jamal

This is exactly the problem with the 'human subject/societal object' distinction, or 'division' I'd prefer to call it because it makes a categorical separation. The object, society, cannot have status of moral responsibility, because it cannot have intentionality, as explained above. The 'innocent onlookers' accept authority, having no status to judge principles of the society (ideologies), also alluded to above. The "bleating", Yeah! Yeah!, cannot be assigned the status of "unintentional", because then you allow that the individual acts of individual subjects are included into the amoral societal object. That would be analogous to saying that the democratic vote (the Yeah! Yeah!) is unintentional, whenever a voter didn't adequately understand the principles being voted for.

I have just a few last remarks before we leave this difference of interpretation, which may not be substantial anyway. It appears to me, like the difference is based in you attributing ideology to the subjective mind of the individual, and I attributing ideology to the objective social structure. The issue is "the facade". We agree that the facade is an aspect of appearance, beliefs in the minds of human subjects. Where we disagree is on the method required to break through the facade. I understand, that since ideology is an attribute of social structure, and ideology produces these beliefs, Adorno is promoting a resistance to the prevailing social structure, which may even be characterized as the abolition of human beings. You reject this, and seem to think that there is another way to break through this facade of human belief, but I do not understand what you are proposing.


Here's something from p 101 to consider:

This at any rate is what I understand by speculation:
it is hostility towards the ideological as an alternative to resigning
oneself simply to establishing facts, in very marked contrast to the
habits of a science based on such a statement of facts – while the
prevailing habit of thought is of course to conflate speculation and
ideology.

.

My interpretation is backed up indirectly by what he says on page 102: — Jamal

I don't see how 102 supports your interpretation. He says, that the attempt to deny the distinction between appearance and essence is the arch-ideology. And he says this right after he describes philosophy as resistance to ideology. So as much as the distinction between appearance and essence is commonly disputed, this is exactly the arch-ideology which deep philosophy must resist.

It doesn't follow that he's promoting metaphysical speculation in the sense he is using the term. — Jamal

How can you deny this? It is the conclusion of the lecture. He promotes "depth", and speculation is depth.

Thus the concept of depth always implies the distinction between
essence and appearance, today more than ever – and this explains
why I have linked my comments on depth to that distinction. That
concept of depth is undoubtedly connected to what I described to
you last time as the speculative element. I believe that without
speculation there is no such thing as depth.
— p 108

You describe it as intentional deception, but it's systemic, and is in fact also reciprocal. — Jamal

I think you misunderstand the meaning of "socially necessary illusion". This refers to an illusion which is needed by society. This necessity implies 'required for its ends'. Therefore it is intentional deception, just like a noble lie. It's an illusion which society needs, to fulfill its ends in its relation to its subjects.

I believe, that the reciprocation aspect is what actually makes it intentional. Ideology is produced from earlier speculation, but how it becomes ideology is questionable. There is either shallow acceptance in the form of innocent "bleating", or depth of further speculation, which is true resistance. The innocent "bleating" may be characterized as reciprocation, but it is described as a "self-aware form of bleating" therefore we can say it is intentional. And the more dangerous form of bleating, which he alludes to seems to be no less intentional. So I do not see how you escape "intentional deception".

The real problem is what I pointed to earlier. The supposed objective "society", or "social structures" is really a false objectivity. So the reality of ideology is based in this reciprocation. But reciprocation is actually nothing but human to human interactions, and when understood in this way, the supposed object, "society", is redundant. The object, society, is nothing but intersubjectivity.

Good morning Jamal, I see that you somewhat misunderstood what I wrote, so I'll clear up that aspect right away:

As for the abolition of human beings, here is Adorno:

If anyone objects that I am lending support to the claim that in a sense this [human beings becoming ideology] would mean the abolition of human beings, I can only reply by saying in good American: that’s just too bad.

And here is you:

What this passage means, is that if anyone objects to what he is doing, claiming that he supports the abolition of human beings, then that's just too bad (Indicated by the qualification of "good American" as —used in an ironic way to show that one is not sorry or does not feel bad about something).
— Metaphysician Undercover

He doesn't claim that he supports the abolition, but rather supports the claim of abolition. — Jamal

Oh, I see, I wasn't clear, and you misunderstood me. What I intended (meant), is that the person who objects, is claiming that Adorno supports the abolition of human beings, not that Adorno is claiming himself to support such.

In a nutshell, first you reify what is meant to be dialectical and fail to see that both essence and appearance are mediated — Jamal

Then what meaning do you give to the following?

I believe that it is one of the essential motifs,
I almost said one of the essential legitimating elements,
of philosophy – that the distinction between essence and appearance
is not simply the product of metaphysical speculation, but that it is
real. — p100

Is he saying that the essential motif of philosophy, which takes the distinction between essence and appearance as real, is a mistaken motif? Then why does he say, or "almost" say that it is an essential legitimating element of philosophy?

Ideology is in the realm of "subjective modes of behaviour" as that which is produced by the objective social structures (again with the caveat that this is too static a picture, a shorthand for a dialectical process). — Jamal

This is clearly backward. Ideology is a feature of objective social structures, which produces subjective behaviour.

On the other hand, however, this appearance is also necessary, that is to
say, it lies in the nature of society to produce the contents of the
minds of human beings, just as it is the nature of society to ensure
that they are blind to the fact that they mistake what is mediated and
determined for actuality or the property of their freedom, and treat
them as absolutes. It follows that since the immediate consciousness
of human beings is a socially necessary illusion, it is in great measure
ideology. — p100

Look, "the immediate consciousness of human beings" is an illusion, a form of deception which is "socially necessary". The means for this deception is ideology, and since it is said to be socially necessary, the goal or end inheres within society itself, as an entity. Therefore it is society which is using this means called "ideology". It is not the human beings who are deceiving themselves in self-deception, it is society which is deceiving them with ideology. As I've been saying, it's a form of Plato's "noble lie".

By "real" he means actually operative in the world. He does not mean to align it merely with essence. And he is saying that if you do philosophy you should believe that there is a distinction between appearance and essence, that it is not just an artifact of the conceptual or linguistic paraphernalia of metaphysical speculation as claimed in various ways by phenomenologists, logical positivists, pragmatists, and ordinary language philosophers. He is alluding to contemporaneous philosophies, explicitly going against the fashion of collapsing or rejecting the distinction. — Jamal

In that context, where he is distinguishing between essence and appearance, he does not at all say what you are saying here. I believe you are reading into it, extra baggage, for the sake of supporting your preconceived ideas, which support your faulty interpretation.

In this context of LND, he is using the distinction of subject/society, to apply to the distincton of mediated/immediate, to elucidate the appearance/essence distinction, as something real, not merely metaphysical speculation. So, the behaviour of individuals is said (as a primary assumption) to be dependent on objective structures of society. This validates '"structures of society" as operative in the world, real. Then he proceeds to assert (which I'll mention, is without proper justification, which "God" serves as in theology) that these structures of society are actually immediate, rather than the behaviour of individuals. The idea that the behaviour of individuals is immediate is claimed to be an illusion produced by those structures of society which are operative in the world, and this illusion is claimed to be "socially necessary". (As I explained in the last post, this social necessity is produced by the removal of God). Then he assigns the name of "ideology" to these structures of society process create that illusion.

Thus he embraces metaphysics more in a negative sense than intended by the term "metaphysical speculation". — Jamal

He simply points out a specific inverse relation involved with metaphysics. When a philosopher expresses disdain for metaphysics, that person is actually demonstrating the highest regard for metaphysics. This can manifest in many ways, even to the extent of the hypocrisy of Wittgenstein which I mentioned. So for Adorno, it appears like metaphysical speculation is this process, negative dialectics, within which metaphysics is criticized. It's a twist in the matter of "taking things seriously" (and this reflects back on "that's just too bad"). To simply praise something creates the illusion that you take it seriously, when in reality you are just going with the flow, and not taking any time to understand it. To criticize it requires that you actually take it seriously.

We could say, then, that an essential aspect of the concept of depth
is that the insistence on the idea of depth negates the average traditional manifestation of it. — p106

You are saying that Wittgenstein was a hypocrite? That the famous "meaning is use" is invalid, not because there isn't a correspondence between meaning and use, but because Wittgenstein's true intention was hidden behind this principle? — Pussycat

There is more to meaning than simple use. That is exemplified by ambiguity. The person who speaks, or writes, is the user of the words, and proper "use" is attributable to the author's purpose. The audience however must interpret, and this itself is an assignment of "meaning". This assignment of meaning s not a matter of "use". it is what Adorno would call a mediated act, whereby the immediate would be the social structures which trained the individual to interpret the way that one does.

What do irrational acts have to do with theory? — Pussycat

Theory is rational. It is through the means of theory that we avoid irrational acts.

As far as I understand, but of course I could be wrong, Adorno is saying that there are people whose thought system is deeply non-identical, like it is and feels natural for them, without much effort: these are the true artists. Adorno realizes that himself is no artist, for example he cannot write poetry or paint, however, he has a knack for theory. And so he wants to provide the theoretical framework. — Pussycat

I see no problem with this. And, think that it s likely that the non-identical here is the irrational.

I don't understand this interpretation of ideology as essence, since it undermines his whole point about breaking through the facade: — Jamal

It's actually a very subtle difference of interpretation, with significant consequences. First, consider all those different connotations of "ideology" which you provided. Think about things like " a body of ideas characteristic of a particular social group or class". Now, do you consider ideology to be a feature of the individual human being's mind (subjective), or do you consider it to be a feature of a specific society (objective)? I think you will accept the latter.

Further, the following phrase is easy to pass over, but really needs to be seriously considered: "the distinction between essence and appearance is not simply the product of metaphysical speculation, but that it is real". That line sets the context, of the distinction between what is real (the true essence) as the social constructs, and what is appearance, as metaphysical speculation. Don't forget though, that what he is promoting, is metaphysical speculation. Not any speculation, but that which is "deep", as opposed to shallow. So he is promoting an aspect of appearance (metaphysical speculation), which extends right to the essence, by being deep. This would be the boundary, where our metaphysical speculations about where the boundary lies, do not always line up exactly with the real boundary. And so it is with ideology itself, it may not itself be properly representative. And that's where the facade comes in, where ideology misleads the subjects.

Then he exposes the common misunderstanding between the immediate and the mediate. This common misunderstanding places behaviour of the subjects as immediate. This is because we see ourselves as acting subjects, interacting with others, and the empirical experience of human subjects is prioritized. So this behaviour is perceived as immediate, and the structure of society is apprehended as something which develops from these subjective interactions, therefore the social structure is understood as mediated by the interactions of the subjects. That is the illusion. Adorno proposes that a proper understanding requires that we turn this around, and we see social structure as the immediate, and the interactions of the subjects as the mediated. This puts priority onto the social structure, making it the cause of subjective interactions.

In the traditional, classical hierarchy, the immediacy of the state is easier to understand, because God is placed at the top, higher than the state. Then the ruling class, clergy and aristocracy, with their ideologies, are immediate to God. So the subjects are mediated. The modern society removes God, but this leaves no principles to support the superiority of society, or the sate over the subjects, so priority must be handed to the individual. Marxism does this, it makes the purpose of the state to serve the needs of the individual. And it does this by removing God, so that the priority is no longer that the individual serves God through the state, in the state's immediacy with God. Without God, the relation between state and individual is reversed, because the state no longer has the claim of closeness to God, required to maintain its priority over the subjects, and so there is nothing left but to prioritize the individual.

Now, since human subjects act with intent, ideas and goals, and this intent guides their actions, we need to interpret "ideology", (which shapes these intentions), as the immediate, a property of the social structure, which shapes and forms the intentions of individual subjects, making their behaviour a representation (as appearance) of the underlying essence, which is the society itself, with its ideology. I suggest you read the following very carefully, and apprehend what he is actually saying. This is representative of Plato's "noble lie". Notice that society produces the illusion of "the immediate consciousness of the human being", and for reasons unexplained, this is said to be a necessity for society. That is ideology.

On the other hand, however, this appearance is also necessary,
that is to say, it lies in the nature of society to produce the contents of the
minds of human beings, just as it is the nature of society to ensure
that they are blind to the fact that they mistake what is mediated and
determined for actuality or the property of their freedom, and treat
them as absolutes. It follows that since the immediate consciousness
of human beings is a socially necessary illusion, it is in great measure
ideology. — p100

So all that is just a sort of preamble, a setting up of the context, or conditions for this idea, "the abolition of human beings". We have the following two important principles. Ideology has created the illusion of the immediacy of the human being, and philosophy resists ideology. Third, we can say that Adorno is promoting philosophy, and not just any philosophy, but deep philosophy. Now, we can approach his mention of "the abolition of human beings from that perspective. Please read the following passage thoroughly:

If anyone objects that I am lending support to the claim that in a sense
this would mean the abolition of human beings, I can only reply by
saying in good American: that’s just too bad. By this I mean that this
abolition is being brought about not by the inhumanity of the idea
that describes it, but by the inhumanity of the conditions to which
this idea refers. And if you will permit me to make a personal remark,
it seems to me very questionable for people to take offence at
statements that go against their own beliefs, however justified and
legitimate these beliefs may be, simply because they find such statements
uncomfortable – instead of attempting to incorporate such statements
into their way of seeing things and where possible making use of
them to arrive at a correct form of practice. — p100-101

What this passage means, is that if anyone objects to what he is dong, claiming that he supports the abolition of human beings, then that's just too bad (Indicated by the qualification of "good American" as —used in an ironic way to show that one is not sorry or does not feel bad about something).

Then, he goes on with a "personal remark", about people who "take offence at statements that go against their own beliefs", simply because the statements make them "uncomfortable". He says it is "very questionable" that they take offense in this way, instead of attempting to include such statements into their own perspective, and try using such statements in their own practice.

Yes, and what he’s doing is claiming that, in a sense, human beings are being abolished. I don't see any support for the interpretation that he is promoting the abolition itself. It’s not “human beings are being abolished, and that's tough luck,” but rather “I’m claiming that human beings are being abolished, and that's tough luck.” — Jamal

What he is saying is neither "human beings are being abolished", nor "I'm claiming that human beings are being abolished". He is proposing a deep speculative philosophy that resists the current ideology which prioritizes individual human beings, and that proposal is an approach to the necessary abolition of human beings. And if this makes you feel uncomfortable, well that's just too bad. You ought to instead, consider the truth of his principles, and work with them to be consistent with your principles, and make them conducive to your own practices. Consider for example, that if human beings are inherently evil, then the abolition of them is the rational choice.

It's not that subjectivity is just ideology, but that it's becoming ideology. He marks a contrast between the era in which the ideology of liberal humanism had something real, or emancipatory, about it; and the late twentieth century, in which it has been entirely hollowed out. My way of putting this was to say that ideology has become all-pervasive due to the total absorption of the masses into the system by means of bureaucracy, all-encompassing commodification, mass media and the culture industry. — Jamal

I agree with your interpretation, and the import of historicity, process, becoming, but Adorno leaves significant ambiguity for interpretations which are inconsistent with yours. Since he designates the structures of society as "essence", and the behaviour of individuals as "appearance", then we have to assign priority to ideology, as an essential aspect. This makes the actions of resistance, assigned to the philosopher, non essential, therefore not-necessary, and free in that sense. So freedom of the individual is derived from breaking out of, or resisting ideology, but this has necessitated a response from the ideology, which has turned this freedom into an ideology itself. The idea of the freedom of the subject, as an individual distinct from society, has evolved from being speculative philosophy to being an ideological therefore essential aspect of society.

Imagine that the speculative philosopher in the past, has dreamed up ways to resist, and be free from the oppression of ideology. Then these speculative theories are accepted by others, until what was once speculation becomes itself ideology. This is why he rejects such philosophy as shallow. It's not speculative anymore, as such subjects were when they were newly speculated, it's just mimicking the prevailing ideology now. It's old hat, and that philosophy is now a matter of following ideology, rather than resisting it, even though it might bare the name of being new and innovative, "deep", because it was given that name when it was such.

He is not lending support to the abolition of human beings (in the sense of human subjectivity), but to the claim that human beings are being abolished. He doesn't mean he thinks it's a good thing; he means that we should not not be afraid to point it out. — Jamal

I believe that the ambiguity mentioned above, could allow the interpretation that he is lending support to the abolition of human beings, and I think that is the proper interpretation, what is intended by the author.. I suspect that this is where he turns things around, in a lecture which is rather twisted. First, it is fact, by the objective essence of societal structure, that the individuality of the human being is supported by the ideology of that structure. This is what our society has come to. The philosopher's position is one of resistance to the prevailing ideology of society, resist the essence. If the ideology is one which prioritizes the human being, then to resist this, is to negate it with the abolition of the human being. So I interpret Adorno as actually promoting the abolition of human beings.

"If anyone objects that I am lending support to the claim that in a sense
this would mean the abolition of human beings, I can only reply by
saying in good American: that’s just too bad.'

Notice, "that's just too bad" in this context, means something like 'tough luck for you, that's what I'm doing, and you won't be stopping me'. And he explains, this idea of abolition is not itself inhumane, but it is the conditions which produce it which are. Then he makes those remarks about people who "find such statements uncomfortable". Philosophers ought not reject such ideas outright, but understand them, and "incorporate such statements into their way of seeing things and where possible making use of them to arrive at a correct form of practice."

So, the "abolition of human beings" is not metaphorical, it's a speculative principle, proposed as possibly something to be pursued in practice. And, it's an example of philosophy which is very deep. We'll find that this principle is well supported by both science and theology, so it makes a good candidate for secular theology. Science has shown us the reality of evolution, and we can tunderstand the reign of humanity as just a passing phase in the evolutionary process. Further, sciences such as genetic manipulation, and perhaps AI, may bring such an abolition into the range of practicality. And theology, with its principle of a being greater than the human being (God), has long emphasized human weakness, and the deficiencies of the human intellect. So the abolition of human beings, as a deep philosophy has much support.

Here's a sort of example. In ancient philosophy, the human species is referred to as "man". Aristotle defined "man" as rational animal. It wasn't until the Latin greats, Aquinas and the scholastics, that "man" was replaced by "human being". This is actually a significant difference marked by a better understanding of our position in the universe. Most people do not see this as significant, but in actuality "man", the rational animal, was sort of abolished as inappropriate for the newer beings who wanted to distance themselves from the old. This allowed them to escape the traps of established ideologies. After abolishing "man", and creating this new identity for themselves, "human being", they were able to revisit the old, "man", as superior to man, and reject foundational certainties (Wittgenstein's bedrock) which man believed, but were found after this rejection, to be false and misleading. A specific example is the nature of the solar system, and the cosmos in general.

It seems that M absent F is a no-thing, because were it a thing, it would have F. But if M a no-thing, a nothing, a not anything, and not just an aspect of F, then, not being, how can it be? It apparently has by itself no substance and no predicates. As such, any proposition of the form M is x is nonsense on its face. Yes? No? — tim wood

That's right, withot form, matter would be a no-thing, pure potential. As potential, it neither is nor is not. That's what we were discussing earlier, whether possibility, under the Aristotelian conception, violates the law of excluded middle. This I argue, is what makes it unintelligible.

F without M seems also nonsensical. The distinguishing characteristic of both M and F would then be particularity. They require a particular something in which to be. But if every-thing is simply an instantiation of M and F necessarily together, than what does "is" mean? Where does being come from; what is being? And if M and F exhaustive of the constituents of everything, being cannot be a part of any thing. That leaves being itself as a predicate, which as such is only in the mind of the one predicating - a product purely of that mind, an idea and apparently useful fiction. — tim wood

I don't see how any of this is irrelevant. But form without matter is not left as nonsensical, because form is demonstrated to be prior to matter as cause of a material thing being the thing which it is. Matter is not necessary for particularity, as the essence of a thing is its form. This is what allows for the immaterial forms of Christian metaphysics. That the particulars appear to us as composed of matter and form, does not necessitate that they are not caused by independent forms, prior to material being.

it seems that none of these concepts is problem-free. Which is to say they don't actually work. — tim wood

Having problems is not the same as not working. Human knowledge and understanding will likely never obtain the level of perfection. That implies that even though the things we do have problems, they still work for us. We live with problems. One issue which Aquinas took up. is that because the human intellect is united. and dependent on matter, its ability to understand forms will always be impaired.

Then he says something strange: human beings are becoming ideology, and in a sense this would mean the abolition of human beings. — Jamal

What he says is that subjective behaviour of human beings is just the appearance, while the objective social structure which in a sense is the cause of that behaviour, is the essence. So what we take as the immediate, subjective behaviour, is really the mediated. He turns around the common perspective. Then, he says that this perspective, which we commonly hold, of the immediacy of consciousness, is just appearance, and actually an illusion. Further, this illusion is "socially necessary", so it is ideology.

I would interpret this as similar to Plato's noble lie. The idea of the immediacy of consciousness, and priority of the subjective human existence, is set up by the social structures, as an ideology of deception, because it hides from the individual subject, the reality that the individual being is just an extension of the true essence, which is society.

So, when he says that human beings are ideology, I think he means that the idea of individuality, that we are distinct individual human beings with that sort of freedom, is ideology. So, human beings are ideology. Further, I think he says that this ideology needs to be abolished, because it is an "inhumanity".

He goes on to say, that speculation is the "anti-ideological element". It is hostility towards the ideological, and philosophy is "the power of resistance". He actually proposes this as the only true definition of philosophy. But this resistance must not be irrational, it must develop within a theoretical framework.

That is what brings him to "depth". This is a tricky concept because of the connotations, especially in German thinking, and we must heed them. He reviews a definition of depth as the "theodicy of suffering", which he says is itself shallow, and this itself is viewed as an ideology.

We could say, then, that an essential aspect of the concept of depth
is that the insistence on the idea of depth negates the average
traditional manifestation of it. And the idea of a radical secularization of
the theological meanings, in which something like the salvaging of
such meanings can alone be sought, comes in fact very close to such
a programme of depth. The dignity of a philosophy cannot be decided
by its result. Nor can it be decided by whether it results in something
affirmative or approving, or by whether it has a so-called meaning. — p106

His conclusion: "the mark of depth nowadays is resistance". This is not a shallow resistance of "bleating".

" Depth means to refuse resolutely to remain satisfied with the surface, and to insist on breaking through the façade."

...

" Resistance means refusing to allow the law
governing your own behaviour to be prescribed by the ostensible or
actual facts. In that sense resistance transcends the objects while
remaining closely in touch with them." - p107

"What I am describing to you is philosophical
depth regarded subjectively – namely, not as the justification
or amelioration of suffering, but as the expression of suffering,
something which understands the necessity of suffering in the
very act of expression. " - p 108

Let's start with this: is M itself material or immaterial? Maybe this way: is M a something or a no-thing? It seems clear it must be a something. — tim wood

Strictly speaking, matter is potential. What gives it actuality is form. Matter without form, as "prime matter" which Aristotle pondered, is a no-thing, because things have a definite form. In my understanding, Aristotle rejected prime matter as an impossibility, but this is still debated.

To say that it is in itself unintelligible can only mean that by itself M is not any particular something. — tim wood

Yes, that is what Aristotle says. What you call "by itself" is what would be prime matter. Prime matter was proposed by some ancients, as the fundamental stuff which makes up all reality. It could have any form, infinite possibility, and as such, it cannot itself have any form. It's infinite possibility, and that's what makes it unintelligible. He also provided an argument to demonstrate that it is physically impossible.

F, apparently, is the what-it-is of a particular something. Thus F alone would appear to be simply a descriptive general term for that which every particular F has and is. In other words, no actual particularity, no actual F. It seems reasonable to accommodate this in the abbreviation by changing F to PF. — tim wood

I don't quite follow this. But I understand the law of identity as assigning the form directly to the particular, as in the thing itself. That's what Wayfarer seems to disagree with, saying that A was not interested in particulars.

So far, then, all things known by their admixture of M and PF. And for so long as the urge to translate M and PF into stuff and shape/form, i.e., into modern scientific concepts, is resisted, good. And that is the great problem that swims just below the surface breaching and breaking through the surface, devouring Aristotelian sense.

It is the scientific method against Aristotle's dialectic. In Kantian terms, Aristotle could do no better than to make the world conform to sense, sense being the final arbiter, while modern science tries to make sense conform to the world, the world being final arbiter. And that leaves Aristotle as an historical figure, his ideas enduring either as historical curios or vestigially. — tim wood

I don't follow this at all.

It is not the case that I see a tree and a moment later I see the same tree, but rather I see a tree persisting through time. — RussellA

That is what I dispute. We can only see at the moment of the present, so that there is something there which persists through time, a tree in your example, is a conclusion drawn with the aid of memory.

But I only exist at one moment in time, meaning that I can only be conscious of my present, my "now". — RussellA

That's not true, because we have memory. So we are conscious of the past. Also, we anticipate the future, so we are conscious of the future too.

All time-determination presupposes something persistent in perception. This persistent thing, however, cannot be something in me, since my own existence in time can first be determined only through this persistent thing.

I would question the truth of this proposition. What is perceived is change, not persistence, and the supposed "persistent thing" which is required for time-determination, could very well be something within the perceiver. The "thing outside me" represents the persistence which is supposed to be perceived. But it may be the case that this persistence is only within me, and projected onto the outside, creating the illusion of a thing outside me.

What to do about it is certainly different, Adorno is active, whereas (early) Wittgenstein is passive. — Pussycat

There's a type of activity, which is sort of passive, what Wittgenstein called idling. Wittgenstein criticized this, but he was wont to demonstrate in his use of words, what he criticized with the meaning of his words, in a sort of hypocritical way.

Now, as much as Adorno calls thinking and theorizing an activity, simply thinking is really not doing anything. So Adorno seems to request a balance between the Marxist's call for action, and the logical requirement of theory. To avoid irrational acts we must make rationality into an act itself, so that it can qualify as virtuous.

I don't really understand what you are asking but I'll try to answer your questions to the best of my ability.

That leaves the question, what is form - assuming the question is meaningful. — tim wood

Form is, as I said, what the thing is. And, since all things have a whatness unique to themselves, it is what individuates one thing from another. It doesn't make much sense to ask what is form because that's like asking what is the form of form. You could ask such a question, but since each form is different from every other form, there cannot be an answer because that would require that all forms are in some way the same. But form is a principle of distinction, not a principle of sameness, while matter is what all material things have in common, so it is the principle of sameness.

As all that is subject to sensation refers back to matter, form cannot be a matter of sensation. Not hard, soft, rough, smooth, hot, cold, etc. But form must be perceived. — tim wood

Form is what is perceived, we perceive differences. Matter is not perceived. We do not perceive sameness, we infer it through reference to memory, 'things have stayed the same', 'the same things are here that were here yesterday', etc.. However, what I was explaining to Wayfarer, is that we do not perceive the entirety of a thing's form, the complete form in its perfections which are proper to it being the thing which its, we perceive an abstracted form. This is why Aristotle has two distinct senses of "form" corresponding with primary and secondary substance. Form is "actual" and Aristotle outlines two very distinct senses of that word.

That leaves a question as to what is in or about matter that lends itself to discrimination due to form. And it would seem to me that whatever it is would lie in the matter itself. — tim wood

Matter is strictly potential, specifically the potential for change. Being the potential for change, it does not itself actually change. Think of concepts like inertia, and the conservation laws of mass and energy. The potential for change does not itself change. In reality, "matter" is purely conceptual, but I believe it refers to something real, something we do not understand, but we know it as temporal continuity. So I think, the fact that many things here in my room today, are the same things which were here yesterday, despite the numerous changes which have occurred in the meantime, is due to their matter. The matter being the potential for change, which does not actually change.

Thus a warm furry kitten is not a red brick, and this difference due to the differences in their matter. — tim wood

Clearly the difference between a kitten and a brick is a difference of form.

. To read Aristotle as if he were simply asserting the self-contained identity of particulars is to read him through a modern lens that doesn’t fit

...

Aristotle's position is that form is what makes an individual intelligible as a member of a kind. — Wayfarer

This is simply wrong, and not at all representative of what is actually found in Aristotle's Metaphysics. I've provided much evidence for you, in our past discussions on this matter, but you seem to have a strong bias which inclines you to ignore the evidence. It's well known that Aristotle's hylomorphism provides an approach to the substance of individuals, and the form of the individual is responsible for what it is, not just its type, but "what it is" in a complete sense. It would be a significant inconsistency, making Aristotle's metaphysics unintelligible, if form was responsible for the type, and matter was responsible for individual features. Notice that the suggested "prime matter" could have no features whatsoever, and would be absolutely unintelligible. This implies that all features of an individual, including those unique to the individual, which make a thing the particular thing which it is, must be formal.

What individuates one member of a species from another is matter, not form - matter is what individuates them. To suggest that each individual has a form unique to itself closer to nominalism. — Wayfarer

This statement demonstrates a misunderstanding of "matter". Matter itself cannot have any individuating features. That's what makes it fundamentally unintelligible. The separation between matter and form is what provides the distinction between what is in principle intelligible, and what is not intelligible. The fact that some features of an individual are not intelligible to the human intellect does not render them unintelligible in an absolute sense, because a higher intellect might grasp them. Therefore all the features of individuation, which make an individual what it is, whether its genus, species, variety, or the unique features of the particular, must be formal. To maintain consistency, all individuating features must be formal.

Yes, the law of identity (a=a) is a logical principle—a tautology that belongs to the structure of thought and language. It tells us something about the consistency of our terms, but not about the ontological self-sufficiency of particulars. To read it as a statement about the intrinsic metaphysical identity of beings is to conflate logic with ontology. — Wayfarer

Actually, you might research this. The law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself", as derived from Aristotle, is completely different from the modern presentation by logicians, of "A=A". How do you interpret "a thing is the same as itself" as being a statement about consistency in our terms, rather than what it obviously is, a statement about things, the intrinsic metaphysical identity of beings?

When Aristotle discusses primary substance in the Categories, he's not saying that the identity of the individual particular is simply in the particular in some absolute sense. — Wayfarer

Aristotle's best discussion of identity is in his Metaphysics. There is much to read because it stretches over a number of books. I believe he starts in earnest where he says that the fundamental question of being is not the question of why there is something rather than nothing, but why there is what there is, rather than something else. This amounts to the question of why an individual thing, and every particular, individual thing, is what it is, rather than something else. The law of identity, that a thing is necessarily the thing that it is, and it is impossible that any thing is something other than the thing that it is, provides his starting assumption.

Moreover, Aristotle’s deeper metaphysics—in the Metaphysics and De Anima—makes clear that a substance’s what-it-is is grasped through form, not through brute particularity. So it’s not that the individual grounds its identity in itself, but that its being is composed of matter and form, and its intelligibility lies primarily in the formal principle, not in the sheer fact of its being “this one.” — Wayfarer

According to Aristotle's Metaphysics, each individual thing has a form which is proper to itself and only itself. This form, as the form of the material thing, is complete with all accidentals. Also, he argues that since things are composed of matter and form, and form is what makes the thing what it is rather than something else, substance belongs to the form. Pure matter would have nothing to differentiate itself, providing for no individual things, therefore no substance.

The law of identity is a logical framework that presupposes ontological grounding—it doesn't establish it. — Wayfarer

I really think you ought to investigate further, exactly what the law of identity is, in its classical form.

It's Aristotle who designated the identity of the individual as within the individual itself, commonly known as the law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself". This identity supports the reality of primary substance. I think we discussed this before, and you didn't accept that Aristotle recognized the identity of the particular.

The point of the scholastics is that the proper identity of the thing is not intelligible to us, human beings. We can only know things through abstraction, which does not grasp the true identity. The identity of particular things is, however, intelligible to God.

I assume you're not saying that there is some correct construal of "Jill" that is independent of interpretation. — J

No, that is what I am saying. The law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself" indicates that there is an identity ("correct construal" if you like), which inheres within the the thing itself, therefore independent of interpretation.

But in any case, I'm glad to see you backing off from the idea that identity has to include "all properties, essential and accidental". — J

Why would you think that I am backing off from that? It's exactly what the law of identity indicates, proper identity inheres within the thing, as the complete form, all properties, essential and accidental, rather than an abstraction consisting of what is perceived to be essential.

What Adorno thus advocates under the name of speculation is a self-aware use of the irrational within reason. — Jamal

I question your use of "reason". Generally we associate reason with rational, and this aspect of the mind is not at all rational, even opposed to it. Irrational, implies opposition and that's a very strong idea. Maybe it's opposition in the sense of rebellious, in the way that teenagers sometimes rebel against the authority of their parents. The trouble with reason, or rationality (using the two words interchangeably now) is that it tends to trap itself into a vicious circle through the adherence to laws of reasoning. Then we ask, where did these laws come from, and if they are not imposed by God, or derived from an eternal realm of Platonic Forms, they must be created by human beings. That implies that human beings must, break out from the existing, outdated laws, providing the impetus to actually do that with the rebellious, creative attitude.

The breaking out, from the laws, puts reason (if we can still call it reason, as reasoning outside the laws of reason, speculation) face to face with infinite regress. And infinity, I think, is the manifestation of the irrational, first derived from irrational ratios like pi. The unruly speculative mind allows the irrational, as the infinite, to penetrate all sorts of logic, as it does in mathematics today, and infinite possible worlds. Reclosing the circle, to restrict the irrational, would be a sort of synthesis.

Instead of saying “what has been thought of as irrational is a basic component of reason,” Adorno will instead say something like “the rational is also irrational”. In doing so he adopts problematic, reified concepts to expose contradictions in ideology—this is the critical part—but at the same time indirectly suggest a more expansive rationality that could do more justice to the potential of reason—and this is the speculative part. — Jamal

This relationship between the rational and irrational was a bit perplexing to me. Look at the conscious/unconscious relation we just discussed. The consciousness is the seat of concepts, abstractions, and what idealists attempt to designate as substance. And the unconscious is how we generally relate the conscious to the material human body, through emotions, pleasure, pain, etc.. So the unconscious is supported by the substance of the material body, and these two opposing directions is what dualism latches a hold of. In my last post, I posited "the brain" as a sort of medium between the two, and you corrected me on this. As well, common understanding puts the brain decidedly on the material substance side of any dualism.

Now, Adorno proposes a rational/irrational relationship, and these two seem to be codependent. Of course the rational can be associated with the consciousness, but where does the irrational fit? My first inclination was to place it in the unconscious, as the source, or category, of the emotions, or something like that, a property of the body in a traditional Platonic dualism sense. But now I think what he means is that the irrational is right in consciousness, as a part of the intellect itself, the irrational part. This would describe this feature, what I called the artistic aspect, which manifests as the intuitive, the speculative, as a sort of irrational part of the intellect. It's irrational in the sense that it doesn't follow the habits and rules of rationality, yet it is still intellectual. It's creative, and creativity defies rationality. The rational part would get lost in itself without the irrational part to throw it a bone to sniff at, and the irrational part would make totally arbitrary decisions without the influence of the rational part. So the two are codependent.

It’s tempting to think of this speculative element as positive, and having the character of reconciliation as in the Hegelian sublation or synthesis. Adorno of course would deny this, but how exactly? — Jamal

I think by the interpretation I gave above, we'd have to say that the speculative is negative, in the sense of being irrational. The speculative part is what negates the existing, the status quo, to get beyond it, then the rational reestablishes itself through some sort of synthesis.

I think the answer is, obviously enough, that any positivity in the method is a negative positivity, that is, it emerges as a result of the negative thrust rather than being asserted alone. Adorno is thus always carefully indirect. — Jamal

He led me earlier, to believe that he is engaged in a positive negativity. A type of negativity which is somehow grounded in a fixed point which is found to be embedded in the existing positivity, i.e. his form of negativity grounds itself in the negative aspect of the existing positivity, therefore it is critical.

OK, but this again is assuming that what constitutes "thing" and "parts" is uncontroversial and obvious. Do you want to say that Jill is a different "thing" if a couple of the microbes in her biome die between T1 and T2? What would make such an interpretation of "thing" attractive? The point is that we have to interpret it, because nothing in "A = A" will tell us how to do it. — J

I think I indicated that it's not philosophically uncontroversial. The point is that we assume that there are real things, and that the thing's identity, i.e. what the thing is, inheres within the thing itself, not in our descriptions or interpretations of the thing. A thing has temporal extension and changes as time passes, but this does not change the assumption made by the law of identity, that the thing has it's own identity at each passing moment, and always continues to be the very precise thing that it is regardless of how it changes.

I'm going to end the conversation here because you're shifting to an allowance for modal logic, but now asserting just pragmatic irrelevance. — Hanover

I kept telling you that I allow modal logic, I just dispute specific interpretations. So there is no shift on my part. I think perhaps you are just starting to understand what I've been trying to say.

I simply disagree with this assessment, and I question the thoughtfulness of the comment. If you think classic logic has relevance, then you simply can't dispense with modal logic because modal logic opens itself to logical issues beyond what can be handled in classic logic. Hypothetical counterfactuals result in vacuous truths in classic logic, and that is why modal logic is needed. — Hanover

I believe that counterfactuals are useful in the construction of philosophical theories and hypotheses, also in some probability theory, and likely in AI development. But I think counterfactuals generally do not have much of a practical application. However, counterfactuals are only a fringe part of modal logic (more like a curiousity) and modal logic in general has much practical application. I think that you are taking what I said about counterfactuals, as if I said it about modal logic in general.

I dont pretend there isn't nuance in these positions, but you don't elicit that nuance with your comments. You just hazard objections and see where they land, stubbornly insist upon the validity of your objections, and then eventually concede something or another to keep the conversation meandering. — Hanover

Interesting opinion.

With Wiiki, Google, the SEP, countless other online resources, and even ChapGpt to sort through all this, we should be able to engage in this conversation at a more elevated level and share among ourselves areas of real confusion. So maybe spend a few days on your own with an open mind toward understanding the basis of the modal logic enterprise before critiquing it. — Hanover

I think that you and Banno are not interested in discussing the underlying assumptions which support modal logic, and the appropriate interpretations, like I am. Instead you just want to proceed into discussing formal structure, which I am not interested in. So there is a divergence of interest between us.

That's quite a misrepresentation, given that what I did was to point to how temporal necessity can itself be accommodated by formal modal logic. — Banno

Then why did you give an example of what Hanover called "metaphysical necessity", ("if it is necessary it could not have been otherwise"), and reject my use of temporal necessity, ("it cannot be changed, but could have been otherwise")? You rejected my use of temporal "necessity", saying I must speak in terms of metaphysical "necessity", and now you come back and say that "temporal necessity" is actually provided for in modal logic.

The other supposed objections you raise have either been or can be dealt with within the standard framework. In particular, the treatment of accessibility answers your main misunderstanding. Explaining this repeatedly is tedious. — Banno

I believe, the way that you employ "actual world" in your example of Caesar crossing the Rubicon, is not actually a fair representation of how modal logic would be most useful in the context of that example. Consider the following:

Of all the possibilities (so-called possible worlds) to be entertained, we cannot assume any particular one to be the actual. The only actual world is the here and now, the truth of "what is" in our current condition, at the present. And, we do not have the means to make a direct relation from any assumed actual world of now, to that ancient time. So, we may have one version of history which says Caesar crossed the Rubicon at a specific time. Another historian might say that Caesar was in Rome at that time. Another might put him somewhere else. All of these are possibilities (possible worlds). Then we can collect other evidence of Caesar's movements, and possible whereabouts in that temporal proximity, and treat all the distinct pieces of evidence as further possible worlds. When we relate all these distinct possibilities (possible worlds), we judge for consistency between them, and this gives us the best probability of determining what was actually the case. Notice, that we do not determine what was actually the case, we determine the most probable solution. I believe the best interpretations, and most productive applications of modal logic completely dispense with the idea of an actual world, dealing completely within the possible, making judgements based on probability. This is a completely break from the logical structure which assumes truth value, what is "probable" is based on consistency.

Then it was a necessity that Caesar crossed the Rubicon - it could not have been otherwise. Again, if it is necessarily true, it is true in all circumstances. And if that is so, Caesar had no choice. — Banno

OK, you are refusing to accept what Hanover called "temporal necessity". This sense of necessity implies that past actions, and the present state of being are "necessary" because it is impossible that they are otherwise.

Also, "true in all circumstances" is a meaningless phrase because "circumstances" refers to spatial temporal context, and truth relates to the particularities of the circumstances. Under no circumstances did Caesar not cross the Rubicon, or else it would be false that Caesar crossed the Rubicon.

You are slipping into nonsensical babble.

Again, plainly we can consider what might have occurred had Caesar not crossed the Rubicon. Therefore it is possible that Caesar not have crossed the Rubicon. If this were not so, we would not be able to consider the possibility. — Banno

Nonsense, people can and often do, dream up all sorts of impossible scenarios, in their imaginations. In the following sense, possibilities are no different than truths. Just because people say it is possible (or true) doesn't mean that it is possible (or true). Possibility is limited by what is impossible, just like truth is limited by falsity.

And this is not a contradiction becasue Caesar crossed the Rubicon in the actual world, but we can stipulate another in which he didn't. — Banno

Sure, people can stipulate whatever they want, but that doesn't mean that what they stipulate is possible.

The possible worlds in which Caesar crossed the Rubicon include the actual world.

Now from this actual world, in 2025, we can't access any possible world in which Caesar did not cross the Rubicon. — Banno

By what principles do you stipulate that one possible world is actual? This seems to be a categorical difference, so there must be some criteria to be applied. And, if we cannot ( meaning it is impossible to) access any "possible world" in which Caesar did not cross the Rubicon, what sense does it make to call these "possible"?

Further, we now have the problem I've been trying to bring to your attention. Looking forward in time, there is no such thing as "the actual world" because that would imply fatalism. Therefore if our interpretation of modal logic applied to the past, "include the actual world", we clearly need different system of interpretation for the future which has no actual world.

But from the actual world, in 48BC, prior to his crossing, we could access those possible worlds in which he didn't cross the Rubicon. — Banno

See, this is the point. looking forward in time at 48BC, there is no actual world of 2025. Looking backward from 2025, there is an actual world of 2025. From this, it ought to be very obvious to you, that the limitations placed on possibility (producing what I called impossible) are very different when looking forward in time, from what they are looking backward int time, due to the reality of "the actual world". Once you introduce in "the actual world", you are compelled to abide by the limitations this concept imposes. This implies that we cannot apply the same principles of logic to the past as we do to the future. So any logic which attempts to extend the past into the future must respect this difference.

So there is no contradiction here. — Banno

The possibility of contradiction we were discussing, was in the case of applying modal logic to the future. Your example is of the past, and due to the difference I just explained, that example is irrelevant to this matter. So, to put it in plain simple terms, Caesar stands in front of the Rubicon in 48BC, that being "now" for Caesar. Caesar considers the following: "in one world I cross", "in another world I do not cross". The designations of one possible world and another, are irrelevant, because these are not separate worlds, only separate thoughts for that man. Clearly, Caesar considers contradictory thoughts, at the same time, "I cross", "I do not cross". Why would anyone want to place these contradictory thoughts into separate possible worlds, to create the illusion that there is no contradiction going on, just for the purpose of hiding the reality that decision making involves contradiction? The fact of the matter is that contradiction is inherent to decision making and we need to respect this fact, rather than trying to hide it through a separation of distinct worlds.

Do you not see how we might wish to assess that claim, despite it being temporally impossible for me to go back in time and miss the train, but it not being metaphysically impossible? That is, a possible world exists where I missed the train, but I actually caught it in the actual world.

We are assessing a real world concern - what might have been, despite that event not having happened. We call that a counterfactual. Where do counterfactuals occur? In possible worlds. Ta da! — Hanover

I agree, that counterfactuals are useful in some circumstances. Probably their usefulness is not as substantial as many people believe, because examples like yours, and Banno's, are pretty much useless examples, where counterfactual use just plunges us into imaginary worlds, with imaginary principles of connectedness, fantasy having no bearing on reality. I believe though, that they are useful in some form of probability context, producing artificial (AI perhaps) statistics or something like that. But even this is a bit deceptive because artificially produced statistics are not real statistics, therefore that type of use may be misleading.

Anyway, that's a digression. The point I am trying to bring to Banno's attention, is that "possible worlds" interpretation is useful when looking backward in time, to create (supposed) realities which are distinct from the actual reality (therefore actually impossible even though they are called "possible", by my description above), but this usefulness depends on the assumption of an "actual world" for comparison purposes.

But, when we look forward in time, the "possible worlds" interpretation is not at all applicable, and actually might be very misleading ontologically. This is because, amongst the multitude of supposed "possible worlds" there is no actual world, that would be fatalism. Therefore each world must start with a basic objective equivalence to every other world. Then, to weight the worlds according to probability, we must assume an actual world in the past, and apply inductive principles of probability, according to how we understand time to unfold. Further, we must consider what our own freely willed actions can and cannot influence, by way of preference. Therefore the situation is very complex.

The critical point is that our "preference" already enters into the descriptive practices which constitute the described "actual world", as prejudice, and simply the nature of language use and its evolved freedoms and limitations. This means that the basic and fundamental equivalence o the relation between possible worlds and the assumed actual world, which is required as the foundation for future possible worlds, is impossible to establish. The "actual world" is already weighted. Therefore instead of "possible worlds" as the starting point when looking toward the future, we need to hand priority to "preferred worlds" when looking toward the future, because this provides a better representation of reality.

No. It's what "necessity" is. Something is necessarily so if it could not have been otherwise.

And more. Check out the SEP article on modal logic and you will see that the modal framework can be use din deontological and temporal situations; indeed, it has a general applicability. So those alternate"senses" you want to appeal to are also well catered for by modal logic. — Banno

Aren't you contradicting yourself? First you say "It's what necessity is". Then you say that alternate senses are catered to as well. If there are other senses, then clearly that one sense is not "what necessity is".

Not if p(x)⊃□p(x), which is what you claimed at the start. :roll:

The bit in which you change your claims, not to correct yourself but to contradict those who point out your own errors.

I don't know if you are sincere or just a contrarian bot.

But there is a reason I usually ignore your posts. — Banno

You still don't understand what I am saying about the relevance of time. Looking backward in time, all things are necessary. Looking forward in time, all things are possible. This implies that all things at the present, i.e. "what is", are contingent, meaning dependent on something else, for existence. Being dependent on something else for existence ( a cause) i.e. being contingent, does not imply that once it exists its existence is not necessary. To the contrary, as we say, a contingent thing's existence is necessitated by its causes, implying that once caused, its existence is necessary. The fact that it is necessary once caused does not prevent us from classifying it as a contingent thing, because that cause itself was not necessary at that time.

If you disagree with the proposition in the question, you allow for possible other worlds. — Hanover

By your restriction of "necessary", I disagree. I didn't read the symbols, only the interpretation in words, and the sense of "necessary" I was using was what you call "temporal necessity".

But, I still don't see how you claim the nature of time is irrelevant to the application and interpretation of modal logic. Logic is useless if not applied to the real world, therefore the real nature of time is highly relevant.

No, you don't agree with the question I posed due to the nature of time because the nature of time has nothing to do with the question i asked.

Metaphysical necessity means things could not have been different -- full stop -- period. Temporal necessity means things are fixed once done.

So, standing at the Rubicon, must Cesaer cross? Just yes or no.

And of course that event is now in the past, but that doesn't change the analysis. Metaphysical necessity would mean it could not have been but the way it was. If that's what you're saying, you're speaking deterministic/ fatalistic language.

But, if you do agree with the statement p(x)⊃□p(x), even if it's for an invalid reason, you reject modal logic and you accept fatalism. That's just the necessary consequence. — Hanover

You present me with two senses of "necessity" then you limit yourself to one. I accept temporal necessity, past things are fixed, but I reject metaphysical necessity. I accept that things could have been otherwise. How do you conclude that this means I reject modal logic?

You're just showing the consequences of pure hard determinism. That is, If I would have worn a blue shirt and not the red one I actually wore, I would not be me because I am the thing that was to wear a red shirt. That's who I am. All properties in your analysis are essential, and there is no rigid me, so loss of the shirt I was to wear creates a whole new identity. — Hanover

It's not determinism at all, it's what you called "temporal necessity". You are the person who actually wore the red shirt. That is true fact, which cannot be otherwise. This does not imply that it could not have been otherwise. You having worn the blue shirt is an imaginary scenario. And, we can talk about that imaginary scenario as a counterfactual. This is a statement about the past, at the present time, and the fact that you wore the red shirt cannot be changed at this time. This does not imply that at that past time, before you chose which shirt to wear, you were destined to wear the red one. You had free choice and possibility at that time. Just because it's a true and necessary fact right now, which cannot be changed, that you wore the red shirt yesterday, does not imply that you were destined to wear that shirt. The nature of time is relevant.

The past has been determined, the future has not been determined. On what premise do you conclude that just because we cannot change that fact, that you wore the red shirt, and this is a necessary aspect of the object I call "you", that you wore the red shirt yesterday, we must also conclude that yesterday, before you chose to do that, it was necessary that you chose the red. There is nothing to support that conclusion unless we premise that past and future have the same type of properties. This is the point, the past is substantially different from the future, we must respect this fact, therefore logic applied to the past must be different from logic applied to the future. They are substantiated differently.

About the "law of identity": You do realize you're begging the question of what the entity is that's supposed to be "the same"? If you understand "Jill" to refer to every single component and property of the person designated as Jill -- "all properties, essential and accidental" -- at the time of designation, T1, then yes, anything that isn't that "Jill" will not be "the same." But that isn't in any way a proof that there are no other ways to understand what "Jill" refers to. You can't say this is true "by the law of identity." And indeed, this extreme version -- molecule-to-molecule identity -- is most unlikely to be invoked in any ordinary discourse I can think of. — J

The law of identity refers to the thing, not its parts. It is not proven, but a fundamental assumption, taken as a sort of self-evident truth. However, some philosophers see reasons to reject it. Perhaps you do too. But when it is rejected, individuation becomes arbitrary because we do not allow that there are real, true principles of unity which constitute "a thing". And that is contrary to empirical observation, as we see unified things.

So now you allow for necessary truths that could have been otherwise. That's not what a necessary truth is. — Banno

That's what you think. Hanover has already distinguished two senses of necessity, and there are more. I think that a proper understanding of contingency will reveal to you that as much as all things are contingent, the past causes, which caused the existence of the current contingent things are necessary for their current existence. And, since all things are contingent, your sense of "necessary truth", as a thing which could not have been otherwise, is an ideal which is irrelevant to actual existence, as something impossible. All things could have been otherwise, unless you conclude a necessary being like God. But this has little, if any, bearing on the fact that they cannot be other than they have been.

Events in the past are not necessarily true. They still might have been otherwise. — Banno

In order to properly represent the true nature of time, there are subtle differences of language which we must respect. "X could have been otherwise", and "X is necessarily true" are not inconsistent. This is because "could have been" refers to the past, and "is" refers to the present time. So, at that past time referred to by "could have been", things could have happened differently. But now, 'that ship has sailed' (as they say), and what occurred is necessarily the case.

It makes sense to discuss such possibilities, and to make inferences about them. So if you had not written that post, I would not be writing this reply. That's a sound argument. The sort of sound argument that your system denies. — Banno

Why do you think I deny that? I haven't proposed a system. I'm just pointing out potential problems of application and interpretation of modal logic.

This is the difference between applying modal logic to the past, and applying it to the future, which I have been explaining. We can talk about the possible different pasts, like if I had not written the last post, but we respect the fact that I did write that post. So there is an actual past, which I described as "necessary", and we respect that as a true fact. This is not a "system", it's just a description of how we understand the nature of time.

However, I can look to the future, and consider the possibility of deleting, and therefore not posting this post. In this case, looking toward the future, there is no actual 'necessary' fact, no truth to the matter. I might either post or not post. Therefore the application of modal logic toward the future must be interpreted in a way which is completely different from the way that the application of modal logic to the past is interpreted.

Well, here we just must agree to disagree. This is not what. I take as identity. Me in a red shirt is the me in a blue shirt. If you require this sort of identity, then we can't initiate a conversation of possible worlds for analysis of hypothetical claims. — Hanover

I'm just adhering to the law of identity, (a thing is the same as itself), and I am attempting to maintain its intended meaning. In the meantime, I ought to out that many common modern definitions of "identity" by logicians, are inconsistent with the law of identity. There are some people on this forum for example, who argue that "=" in mathematics signifies identity, such that "2+2" has the same identity as "4".

To take your example, the object referred to by "me", takes off the red shirt, and puts on the blue shirt, and you maintain your identity as the same object. "Identity", by the law of identity, allows for changes over time, because it puts the identity of the thing within the thing itself. If we make identity what we say about the thing, rather than placing it within the thing, then we can arbitrarily decide which features are essential to the thing, such as wearing a red shirt perhaps. Then we might distinguish the person with the red shirt, from all the others with different coloured shirts, and 'identify' the person that way. That's a pragmatic sense, it serves the purpose. However, if someone else comes along with a red shirt, then there is a problem. So, the law of identity provides a much more rigorous form of identity by putting the identity right into the object itself, the substance, and so we general identify through the observed temporal continuity of the object.

I do not see why you think that insisting on proper adherence to "identity" removes the possibility of modal logic. As I've been arguing, it's only a matter of how modal logic is interpreted. Even in traditional propositional logic, the name is a subject, not an object, and predication involves a subject and predicate. If our subject is "Hanover", we can make all sorts of predications, and there is no need for an object which conforms. Hanover could be imaginary. It's only in the interpretation, when we judge for truth, that we take an object which is supposed to correspond with this subject. The fundamental three laws apply to how we judge for truth, this means that they apply to the interpretation of the premises.

So, all that matters is that we maintain the proper separation between subject and object. In the case of modal logic, the subject is completely abstract, imaginary. There is no corresponding object, as I explained in the last post, and relations to any true existing object must be established by other premises, which escape the judgement of truth or falsity. That's the principal point, we cannot judge the premises by truth and falsity, because they are possibilities.

Rather than saying it is a problem of modal logic, I believe it is a problem to be found more in the way that traditional propositional logic has been corrupted in many interpretations. Many interpretations do not make the subject/object distinction, assuming that the name is an object, and truth is taken for granted. Then interpretations of modal logic are confused with interpretation of propositional logic because there is no more subject/object distinction. Once this happens we have no way to distinguish imaginary conceptual "objects" from real substantial "objects".

You don't have two yous simultaneously in a given world. You're comparing separate workds. — Hanover

The interpretation of "separate worlds" is irrelevant. If the rigid designator signifies "the same object", when you are talking about two different objects (in different worlds or whatever) then the law of identity, is violated, regardless of how you want to attempt to justify it. That is the purpose of the law of identity, it puts identity into the substance, and puts an end to all such sophistry. You can continue in your description of same person in different worlds, and deny the law of identity. Some philosophers, like Hegel, denied that law's usefulness usefulness, and simply proceeded without it. But I think it's a good idea to recognize the difference, and understand when the law of identity is being followed, and when it is not.

The fictionalization of the multiple worlds is assumed for the purposes of performing the logic (except by some who take rather extreme untenable views), meaning you're attempting to impose far too much ontological status on the worlds . — Hanover

The assumption of separate worlds is not at all necessary for the purpose of the logic. It is assumed for interpretive purposes only. We can assume separate possibilities instead of separate worlds, and this is a more appropriate interpretation, because it doesn't give a specific possibility the status of being a world.

Well sure, you can dispense with all formal logic and still make decisions, argue, and philosophize fully. The point of symbologic logic is to create a methodology to test your reasoning, but if we forget the whole rigamarole, I agree, that does simplify our discussion about whether to grab an umbrella. — Hanover

The formal logic which deals with possibilities does not require that we interpret each specified possibility as a distinct world. That is what produces the interpretive problem, because then you want to put the same object (rigid designator) into different worlds, and that's nonsense. We need to respect the reality that these are simply distinct possibilities, not separate worlds. It creates the interpretive difficulty, because then you want to place the same object (rigid designator) in different worlds. But that's inconsistency, because if its different worlds it ought to be different objects as well. And this is only overcome by employing arbitrary principles of sameness.

Well, that frames the issue and maybe it's been asked before, but if not, allow me:

@Metaphysician Undercover, do you agree p(x)⊃□p(x) (if something is true, it must necessarily be true)? — Hanover

It doesn't really frame the issue, because I have no system here, I am simply pointing out the difference between two distinct systems, not promoting one or the other. One system leads to fatalism, yes, but that's not "my system".

I agree that what is true is necessarily true, that is due to the nature of time, what has been done cannot be undone. And that's what I told Banno above, at the beginning of this post where I discuss "could have been different". Banno wants to ignore the reality of the difference between past and future, and make "could have been different" equivalent to "could be different", such that what is the case, what is true is not necessarily true. This leads to a lack of distinction between future possibilities, and past necessities, which could also be represented as possibilities, such as in the use of counterfactuals.

First let's look at the idea of ontological grounding. What we want is for an explanation as to why the world is as it is, and not some other way. If something could have been otherwise, it cannot explain why something is necessarily the case. So any ontological grounding must be necessary. But then it would be the same in every possible world. And in that case, it could not explain why this world is as it is. — Banno

I don't think I agree with this. The nature o time explains both, why things could have been otherwise, and also why whatever is, is necessarily the case. Everything which has reached the present and is progressing into the past is necessarily the case. The past cannot be changed. However, the future is full of possibility, so there was the possibility that before the last bit of time passed, different possibilities could have been actualized, therefore things could have been otherwise.

What this means is that the law of non-contradiction is not violated when you have an Einstein across different worlds because the entire modal structure demands he be different across differing worlds in non-essential ways. — Hanover

Then it's not a true "rigid designator", if this means "the same individual". By the law of identity, "same" means having all the same properties, essential and accidental. So, all you are saying is that the so-called "rigid designator" does not identify the same individual, but similar individuals, individuals of the same type, sharing essential properties. Saying that they are "the same" when there is differences would be a violation of the law of identity, so the "rigid designator" violates the law of identity i it defines "the same" individual.

But what I've been telling you is that it's not a problem for modal logic. It doesn't mean modal logic collapses, it just means modal logic inconsistent with those other three laws of logic which stipulate what we can truthfully say about a thing. But modal logic is intended to be applied toward possibility, not truth, so they have different fields of application. So there is no problem. That is, unless someone wants to try and make them consistent with each other, conflate the fields of application, then that person creates an unnecessary problem for oneself.

Let's forget this possible worlds interpretation of modal logic for the moment, because it's just a distraction, and get right to the point. Let's consider the reality of decision making, when a person considers distinct and contrary possibilities in the act of deliberation. When I deliberate, I put myself into distinct and contrary situations, as distinct possibilities (possible worlds). I consider myself bringing an umbrella, and I consider myself not bringing an umbrella. Clearly I am considering two contradictory scenarios, which I mull over at much the same time. In my deliberation, it makes no sense to ask which one is the case, which one is true, because it is my decision which will determine that. I am not concerned with what is true.

What I think, is that it's not really me, in either one of those contrary scenarios, it's just an imaginary me. Therefore the supposed person in the two contrary scenarios, really has no identity at all. Identity is something which things have. Imaginary things do not have an identity. This is similar to the "me" in a dream, it's not the real me, it's an imaginary me. The two versions of "me", in tomorrow's scenario, are in no way the real me, with my identity, as they are just imaginary, no different from if I imagined that tomorrow I was the president of the United States. The mistaken interpretation of modal logic is in the assumption that the objects in these possible scenarios have identity as real objects.

If we let go of this idea, that the imaginary thing has an identity, (the me of tomorrow who in one version carries an umbrella, and in another does not carry an umbrella, or could even be the PotUS), then it's very easy to understand the real nature of possibility, and the usefulness of modal logic. What we are considering is possibilities, and identity, along with truth and falsity have no bearing whatsoever. And when we work with the logic of possibilities what guides the decision is what we ought to conclude, not what is true or false.

You go a bit far... — Jamal

I generally do.

I do not completely dismiss the reciprocity between the conscious and unconscious, but I've come to think of it as more one way. Vast information goes from conscious to unconscious, continually, in the practice of memory for example. But I realize that the brain is extremely complex in its processes, and administering to consciousness is really only a small part of its functions. This means that everything else which it is doing, continually overseeing, directing, and synchronizing all the internal living systems, must be prioritized over consciousness, as being the major aspect of the brain's activities. This leaves consciousness just as a sort of tip of the iceberg, which raises the question of why all the rest is hidden from the consciousness. The consciousness only receives a vague hint of what the brain is doing with the rest of the body, through pleasures, pains, and the various emotions. Why the separation?

I like to think about the role that intention plays in art. We tend to think of intention as a direct conscious awareness of a specific goal, guiding the actions toward that goal. But there is an experiment which an artist can do, which is to select a medium, attempt to eliminate all conscious intentions from one's mind, and simply create. The only real consciously directed intention is in the selection of the medium, and the intention to have no intention. Then the guidance of one's actions arises immediately from one's unconscious, and the direction is sort of like dreaming. The inverse of lucid dreaming, instead of taking entering the dream with the consciousness, allow the waking activity to be subsumed by the unconscious.

Experiments like that demonstrate to me, that even in our day to day conscious activity, a vast part o that conscious activity is actually directed by the unconscious. And when we analyze what motivates us in general, why we strive to meet deadlines, fulfil social obligations, etc., it becomes apparent that the unconscious aspect of "intention" plays a much larger role than the conscious. Even if a person is very focused, and driven towards a very specific goal, it is not the conscious mind which keeps the person focused, but the underlying unconscious. So the more that a person is goal oriented, driven toward conscious goals, it's actually the case that the unconscious aspect is playing a bigger role as the cause of that capacity to remain focused on conscious goals, to be determined.

So I've theorized that the conscious self, is actually an inauthentic "self" which the unconscious creates, and pushes out into the world of activity in a sort of trial and error process, where the unconscious is recording the results in memory. The unconscious is the authentic self, and there is a sort of antinomy between it and the conscious (rational/irrational as Adorno says). But it's just the conscious which sets the rational as better than the irrational. The unconscious must distance itself as much as possible from the conscious, because it sets the conscious into a life of self abuse, for reasons which cannot be revealed to the conscious (like Plato's noble lie, in the context of self-deception), and that's what life on earth consists of, as the conscious difference between pleasure and pain and how that is actually conditioned, or derived from the unconscious.

The claim that "I get wet and do not get wet" violates the law of noncontradiction misunderstands how modal logic works. These are not simultaneous truths in a single world, but distinct evaluations across possible worlds, which is actually the reason modal logic exists. The law of noncontradiction applies within worlds, not between them. — Hanover

"Possible worlds" is an interpretive term, and it's really irrelevant. It makes no sense to speak of a world which is possible. They are not actually distinct worlds, just distinct possibilities. And it is the human mind which conceptualizes distinct possibilities from the realm of future possibility. The employment of distinct imaginary "worlds" does nothing but add confusion.

So, let's look at these possibilities without the confusion created by that nonsensical idea of "possible worlds". Banno suggested two possible modes of interpretation. One had a rigid designator, in which case "I" in each possibility (or possible world, if you really must) signified the very same individual. This clearly violates the law of noncontradiction because we are talking about the same object at the same time, tomorrow. In the other case, the two instances of "I" are not the same, but similar. In this case we have no identified object, only similar objects and the classical rules are simple not applicable.

Additionally, the entirety of the "different worlds" enterprise must be jettisoned and the resultant collapse of modal logic as well if we follow out your logic. The term "different" as applied here by you includes any dissimilarity whatsoever, even the simple fact they are in different locations. That is, it is impossible under your reasoning to have any metaphysically related universes because everything within each one would be relevantly different. — Hanover

"Different worlds", and "different universes", are nonsensical and misleading conceptions. "Universe" by definition includes all that is. "Possibilities" are completely distinct, and categorically different from the world, or the universe. It makes no sense to talk about possibilities as if they are real beings, living somewhere in different worlds. The different worlds referred to here as "possible worlds" are nothing but conceptual structures, designed to deal with the reality of possibility. Possibility is something general, and when we conceptualize it as distinct possibilities, those specific determinations, this possibility and that possibility are purely conceptual. Speaking of a possibility as existing somewhere as a world, is no different from speaking of numbers, and other conceptions as existing in some Platonic realm of Forms somewhere. This is totally misleading and confusing. As distinct possibilities is not a realistic representation of "future possibility", it is a product of the imagination

To make my point clearer: Suppose you had Universe #1, and within it you get wet and in Universe #2, you also get wet. In fact, every single thing within #1 and #2 are the "same," they would still not bear any metaphysical relationship to each other because they are all necessarily different since they occupy different time and space. That is, #1 and #2 do not collapse into being the same thing because they are not identical under your view. They are just curiously similar. — Hanover

This interpretation makes the problem even worse. We have truth about the past, and the actual world, as well as the actual universe, and truth about now. One world, and one universe. From what you are saying, the future consists of a whole multitude of universes, possibilities. You say the separate universes would bear no metaphysical relationship on each other, but this is not true. They must all relate to the one actual (true) world at the present, or else they are simply arbitrary fictions. But possibilities are not arbitrary. Therefore they must share a time and space, as they all must relate to the true here and now.

The reason why I say it makes the problem worse, is because now we need to define how these many possibilities (universes) relate to the here and now (the true). The principle which relates them must be absolutely fair and equal to all of them, or else we'd be assigning arbitrary, or subjective preference, to one over the others. But this is logic, so it needs to be objective, therefore the relationship between the actual, true, here and now, and those other universes, must be based in principles which are fair and equal. Clearly it makes no sense to talk about these distinct possibilities as different universes in different time and space, because all the possibilities must be directly related to the true universe, here and now through equal principles. And, it would be very misleading, if not downright false to speak as if there is no metaphysical relationship between them.

When we chart out all possible worlds, under your reasoning, an infinite number could be the same in every apparent regard because you deny the concept of rigid designation in theory.

This is to say that if you deny a rigid designation for "I," you must do it for all things. That means that not only does the fact that you're not the same you in #1 and #2, the rain isn't the same in #1 and #2. They must be different. You can't have a different you in #1 and #2 and share the same rain. When we say it will rain in #1, while that sounds like any old generic rain will do, if we were being more precise, we'd describe the exact identity of the rain that would strike you in #1 versus #2.

This I suggest is the logical consequence of demanding cross universe consistency. — Hanover

I suggest that denying rigid designation is what allows for the reality of different possibilities. This is what you would call inconsistency between distinct universes, which is not actually inconsistency if it's not actually the same object across distinct possibilities. So, what appears like inconsistency, when we apply rigid designation, is not inconsistency if we remove rigid designation.

What I propose is that there is no individual, no object, indicated by "I" in any described future possibility, just like there is no world in "possible world". Since this is a an imaginary scenario, everything about it is a possibility, even the existence of I, and the supposed universe or world. What "I" or "universe" indicates is a possible entity, and that means it is a concept only. And, a concept does not have identity like an object, nor do the same laws of truth or falsity apply to concepts, which apply to objects with an identity. The laws which apply to conceptions are axioms which are designed for the specific system of logic, like those of mathematics. So there are different types of logic which deal with building conceptual structures like mathematics, modal logic, etc., and these types are completely different from propositional logic which is applied toward describing and understanding empirical objects. The two are not at all compatible, because the former is based in truth, the latter possibility. This is because empirical observations are always in the past, and possibilities are in the future, and there is a substantial difference between these two. Relating these two at the present is a significant philosophical problem which has one form of manifestation as the is/ought gap.

But back to the classic versus modal logic discussion:

If in classic logic I say:

All glurgs are glogs
I am a glurg
Therefore I am a glog

That is true, despite the fact there is no referent for any of this gibberish. That is why we can use symbols to represent these entities because their existence is irrelevant for the analysis. — Hanover

We ought to distinguish "true" from "valid" here. The argument is valid, but we still need to question the truth of the premises. If we accept the first as true, we still need to assess the second. This is where the law of identity, and the other two laws come into play, in assessing the truth or falsity of the premises. We have an object signified by "I", and the premise states "I am a glug". By the law of identity, there is a truth to what "I" is, which inheres within that object itself. . So there clearly is a referent, and the soundness of the conclusion is very much dependent on the accuracy of the description of the referent.

If we change the second premise to "tomorrow I will be a glurg", then my argument is that the referent is swallowed up by possibility, such that there is no referent. I can say "yesterday I was a glurg", and there is an actual truth or falsity, a referent at that time, but that is not the case with the future. Any supposed object signified by "I" may be annihilated before tomorrow, so "I" does not signify an object with identity in this case. Now, the logic of truth and falsity cannot serve us.

The issue then becomes providing a definition of "possible," as you allow for pure meaningless formality under classic logic but not under modal logic. Since "possible" is the only new thing inserted, that must be the reason you treat these two systems different. What you then do is require metaphysical grounding in order for the possible to occur, but that I challenge. You no more need semantical validity for modal logic to work than classic. It's good to have semantically meaningful statements, but not required. — Hanover

The issue is not the validity of the logic itself. The question is one of truth and falsity. That is why I keep insisting it's a problem of interpreting and applying the logic, not a problem of the logic itself. And, truth and falsity are metaphysically grounded in the object spoken about. That is what the fundamental three laws are concerned with, what we can say truthfully say about objects.

We can remove all metaphysical grounding from "possible", but that's what I explained to Banno would produce complete arbitrariness. To produce the conceptual structure of possibility (possible worlds if you wish), we must remove the grounding of truth and falsity. But then Banno wanted to sneak truth and falsity back in, as applicable within possibility (a specific possible world), and this is an arbitrary rule. If we remove the metaphysical grounding of truth and falsity, to create a logic of possibility, then we need some other form of metaphysical grounding for this realm of possibility. To go back to truth and falsity is a step in the wrong direction. So we start with something like absolute equality and fairness (as in mathematics) between all possibilities, the we need to weight them according to the truth of here and now. And in decision making, principles of preference.

So my my view, but that agreed to by the body of people who have looked into such issues. — Banno

I think you know by now, that I tend to disagree with a good number of so-called bodies of people. I don't follow mob rules, nor do I blindly accept authority.

I, and others, have. — Banno

Actually, Hanover clearly agreed with me, that modal logic when applied to future possibility is not consistent with classical logic. So it is really you who refuses to look at your own errors, which have been pointed out to you. Instead, you simply assert that I am wrong, and that it is a waste of your time discussing this with me. While we could be progressing toward discussing the actual points of understanding/misunderstanding where we disagree, and hammering out what that difference amounts to, you simply refuse to accept fundamental facts, leaving us unable to proceed.

What I see in Lecture 9 is an overall goal of apprehending the creative aspect of thinking. It is an "intrinsic aspect of irrationality" which is essential to rationality This aspect is demonstrated in play, and art, which are wider categories than philosophy, but it manifests in philosophy as the intuitive and the speculative. The goal of Adorno here, is to produce a sort of basic understanding of this aspect of thought, through the type of "circling around it" which @Jamal describes.

The creative aspect of thought is extremely difficult to provide an explanation for, especially if we reject idealism. And, we must reject idealism because it is fundamentally flawed. The creative aspect presents us with an aspect of thought which is not grounded in sense experience, but somehow extends beyond sense experience. The idealist approach is flawed because it is a sort of cop-out, instead of trying to understand the truth about this type of thought, it simply assumes an overarching "Spirit" or something like that, to account or it.

I can elucidate the problem with idealism by referring to current concepts of Platonism. Platonism avoids the need to understand the origin of concepts (creativity) by positing that ideas are eternal and independent. The glaring problem is called the interaction problem, and we are left with no way to understand how the human mind is supposed to tap into the eternal independent ideas, and get these concepts into one's own mind. So that's the fault with idealism in general, it does not provide an approach toward understanding the reality of creativity, it simply provides an excuse to avoid it.

What Adorno points out in this lecture, is that this type of idealist evasion, this "spiritualization of the world" is pervasive in modern philosophy. Hegel employs "World Spirit". Kant has "original apperception". And, Adorno argues that even Marx may be considered idealist with his use of "forces of production".

My own opinion is that all forms of materialism are reducible to idealism. This is because "matter" itself is nothing more than a concept which we employ to understand the temporal extension of the sensible world. Therefore giving priority to matter is giving priority to a concept. With rigorous analysis of the term "matter" it is dissolved into "indeterminateness", Aristotle's 'prime matter' being total lack of form. So indeterminateness is necessarily conceptual only, for the reasons explained in lecture 6. Therefore placing priority in matter as a starting point, is no different from placing priority in indeterminateness, and both of the two are demonstrably idealist approaches. Marx presents his materialism as showing the true nature of Hegel's idealism as supportive of a more basic underlying materialism. But actually, this materialism is swallowed up into idealism when its true nature is exposed, and Marx's spin doesn't succeed in getting him out of idealism.

In Kant and Hegel, philosophy shrinks to a finite, complete set of principles or axioms that is supposed to encapsulate the infinite, everything that exists — Jamal

This is sort of ridiculed, as trying to "enclose the infinite in a finite network of axioms". It's another instance of narrowness, the "provinciality" which he dislikes. In general, a finite system of categories, like Kant's cannot provide us with secure knowledge.

Mortals must think mortal thoughts, and not immortal ones: if philosophy possesses anything at all, then it can only be finite, and not infinite — Jamal

Only by accepting, and approaching our own narrowmindedness, "reflect upon our own provinciality" can we rid ourselves o that narrowmindedness. This produces an open philosophy rather than a sytematic one.

So we need an open philosophy, not a systematic one — Jamal

However, we must also avoid the type of openness of Lebensphilosopie. This leads to a mollusc-like arbitrariness, where objects are approached openly, but with the intent of manipulating them to the philosopher's purpose.

Intellectual experience: — Jamal

The motor of an experience of this sort, of what drives a person
to seek this sort of intellectual experience – and this is what counts
above all in philosophy – is the admittedly unwarranted, vague,
obscure expectation that every singular and particular that it encounters
ultimately represents the totality that constantly eludes it — p83

This is oddly reminiscent of Aquinas' approach to the divinity. Every single material thing is evidence of the unapprehended divinity which has created it. But Adorno approaches infinity, or the infinite this way, as the gateway to intellectual experience.

Comparison with art, which does something similar — Jamal

I would say that what is described here is that a work of art has infinite meaning. But, it is only by analyzing each minute, finite aspect of meaning, that we move progressively toward an objective knowledge of the true meaning (notice "authentic works of art" is indicated.

I suggest that this process involves a sort of process of elimination, of determining false meaning. And that is how the initial infinite meaning is brought into the finite sphere, by determining falsity. This starts with determining impossibility. It is distinctly different from the scientific process which is positive, this is negative. The intellectual experience is contrasted with the pointedly non-intellectual experience of the empirical sciences.

I wouldn't have to repeat myself if you could show me where I am wrong, instead of just insisting that I am wrong. In fact I would greatly appreciate it. Clearing up errors is always a good thing.

The semantics of possible worlds just says that we understand "it is possible that it will rain tomorrow" as stipulating for our consideration two possible worlds, W₀ in which it is true that it rains tomorrow, and W₁ in which it is true that it doesn't rain tomorrow. There is no contradiction. — Banno

If there is a rigid designator, such as "I" who gets wet, and I who does not get wet, then there is contradiction. If, W₀ and W₁ are distinct subjects, one with the property of rain, and one without, then the law of identity no longer applies to "our world", which is the actual world from the past to now. It divides into a multitude of possible worlds at the moment of the present, so there can no longer be identity. Without an object with identity the other two laws do not apply.

It's not the first time I've pointed this out to you.

Added: "It is possible that it will rain tomorrow" just says that there is a possible world in which it rains tomorrow. And this is true, and therefor "It is possible that it will rain tomorrow" has a truth value. — Banno

That's an absolutely meaningless sense of "truth". By this standard, I could make any combination of words and claim this is true therefore it has a truth value.

The issue is that the meaning (content) of the words must be distinguished from the form of the proposition. So, "possible" must be assigned a meaning, in order that we do not equivocate between "past possibility", and "future possibility", which leads to fatalism. I'm accustomed to your response to this criticism, which is to deny a distinction between words and meaning, form and content, but that's nonsense as the reality of ambiguity and equivocation demonstrates.

"It is possible that it will rain and not rain tomorrow" is false, since there is no possible world in which it both rains and does not rain. — Banno

That's an arbitrary designation. As explained above, a "possible world" cannot have identity as an object because it represents one of many possible contradictory states of an object which has identity. It's simply an imaginary entity, without an identity, therefore the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle cannot be applied, and any designations as to what is acceptable and what is not acceptable are arbitrary.

And this adds to your idea, Hanover, in that such things only ever happen in impossible worlds, and so "It is possible that it will rain and not rain tomorrow" is false in all the possible worlds, but perhaps true in some impossible world... — Banno

Again, that's an arbitrary designation of impossibility. If we analyze this supposed impossibility, we will see that any possible world must divide into further possible worlds at the moment of the present, as we do with our actual world to account for the reality of the future. Therefore, any possible world could be divided into two further possible worlds, one in which it rains tomorrow, and one in which it does not. And so, your designation which states that it is impossible to have a possible world in which it both rains and does not rain tomorrow, is a completely arbitrary restriction which you apply to the understanding of possible worlds. You allow the actual world to divide into possible worlds, to account for future possibilities, but you do not allow a possible world to divide into further possible worlds to allow for future possibilities in that possible world. What sense does it make to deny the reality of the future from all possible worlds? In reality, the only true restrictions to possible worlds are the limitations of the capacity of imagination. Those are restrictions of content and ought not be confused with formal restrictions.

Well, then, best you stop posting about logic, don't you think? — Banno

No, this is how we move forward by degrees, through an exchange of ideas. And opinions about logic are just as informative as opinions in other subjects, even though my opinion is that no one really understands logic.

Alright, I'll set out the basics and tell me where we disagree:

The fatalism issue arises in classic logic and is cured by modal logic. — Hanover

I don't think we disagree. The fatalism issue may be cured by modal logic. However, if one interprets modal logic as consistent with classical logic (as Banno seems to), then the fatalism issue reappears.

1. It is necessary that if it rains tomorrow, I will get wet
2. It is possible that it will rain tomorrow
It is possible I will get wet.

There is no fatalism because #2 is possible, not necessary. — Hanover

So, depending on how "possible" in #2 is interpreted fatalism may or may not be implied. If fatalism is not implied by one's interpretation, the three classical laws are violated in one way or another.

If we interpret "possible" when referring to the future, in the same way that we do with past possibilities, where we assume that one of the possible worlds is actual, as in the "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" example, then we have fatalism.

If we interpret two possible worlds, one with rain, and one without rain, with "I" as a rigid designator, then the law of noncontradiction is violated, because "I" gets wet and does not get wet, at the same time. The qualification of "different worlds" is just a facade to hide the contradiction. If we look at what Banno called "counterpart theory", then we have no continuity of the object "I", from the present time into the future, only possible similar objects in the future, therefore the law of identity is not applicable.

The conclusion therefore, is that modal logic provides an escape from fatalism, but only if it is applied and interpreted in a way which is conducive to this escape. That way of interpretation is to recognize that the classical laws of logic are not compatible. This is because it is the idea that these classical laws are applicable to the future which produces the fatalist mentality.

This is what Banno said:

The trouble here is that modal logic subsumes propositional logic. They are not inconsistent. — Banno

What I say is that the meaning of "possible" in #2 "It is possible that it will rain tomorrow" indicates that "it will rain tomorrow", cannot have a truth value. It could have a probability, but not truth. This is because the corresponding reality referred to by "possible" in this usage does not admit to truth or falsity. Therefore modal logic and propositional logic are not consistent.

It really would help if you were to read about and try to understand logic rather than just dispensing your wisdom. — Banno

Hey, if I've got wisdom, it's best that I dispense it. And it would be best for you to pay attention. Fuck the logic, it doesn't qualify as wisdom so why waste time trying to understand it, when all that has ever done is produce faulty interpretations. It's best to leave logic as it is, impossible to understand.

When Hegel writes about the indeterminate, he is not talking about beings, as in individual objects, but about what is indeterminate. In using the adjective indeterminate one grammatically points to a substantive, a logical something awaiting determination—but this is lost when he moves to indeterminateness, because the latter is a free-standing abstract quality, a universal. It's a subtle shift from a realist grammar to an idealist grammar, even though the whole time he's just talking about being. It's more a linguistic point than one about identity. — Jamal

What you call "a logical something awaiting determination" is actually a material thing, that constitutes what is called by Adorno "a substratum". Notice, "the concept of the indeterminate does not distinguish between concept and thing". This is because "indeterminate" in concept, implies no thing. This allows that the thing which is named as "the indeterminate", is negated by the self-contradicting concept, to leave only the concept. So the concept of "indeterminate" does not differentiate between concept and thing, but since it cannot be a thing, it can only be a concept.

Hegel intended to bypass Aristotle's law of identity, as indicated in my early discussion with Jersey Flight, referenced above. The law of identity puts the identity of the thing in the thing itself, by saying that to be a thing is to have an identity. Now Hegel uses a trick (I'd say sophistry) to replace the thing which has an inherent identity, with "the indeterminate", which Adorno takes to mean a lack of determination. But since to be a thing is to be determinate, and therefore to have an inherent identity, Hegel robs identity from the material world by saying it is not necessary that the material world consists of determinate things. Determinate things, things with identity, can be replaced with "the indeterminate" as the substratum. But the indeterminate is really nothing, no thing, and as such it can only be a concept, it cannot be something material. This actually denies the intelligibility of the substratum, leaving the concept of "indeterminateness", and puts identity into the concept rather than the thing.

Just reflect for a moment on the difference between ‘the indeterminate’ and
‘indeterminateness’. The language is right to make a distinction here.
‘The indeterminate’ is in the nature of a substratum. To be sure, the
concept of the indeterminate does not distinguish between concept
and thing, but precisely because there has been no determination the
distinction between the determinant, namely the category, and the
thing does not emerge as such in this term. But in this absence of
differentiation appropriate to it, it does possess both: both the concept
and the thing that is undetermined. — p61

Lecture 7:

The question of "breaking out" of the conceptual is central, and the issue appears to be how it could even be possible to move beyond the conceptual without getting into arbitrary randomness.

I find the following passage may possibly be a hint at a solution:

[quote=p73If a breakout is at all possible, it cannot be the product of the postulate
of something alien to the subject; it cannot result from postulating a
Not-I – we know of course from the history of philosophy that the
subjective postulate of the Not-I was in fact the zenith of idealism.15
Rather, if such a breakout exists as a possibility, the only path leading
to it is that of the critical self-reflection of the subjective sphere. In
the course of that self-reflection, this insight recognizes itself – in a
compelling, conclusive manner – as something that is not merely
subjectivity, but as something that necessarily presupposes a relation
to the very thing that, as idealist, it had hoped to be able to bring
into being. In other words, the subject is shown that it is itself some
thing postulated, or, at any rate, that it is also something postulated,
and not simply by demonstrating that the Not-I is itself a postulate. [/quote]

What I think, is that the proposed way of "breakout" is through the internal self, i.e. self-reflection. We tend to think of the objective world as what is external, what is evident to the senses. However, we ourselves partake of the material world through our very being, and the material cause of our being, so we may be able to break out of the conceptual through the internal, self-reflection. In this way we approach the unconscious aspect of ourselves and cross into the nonconceptual without having to do the impossible which would be to breakout externally. Instead of crossing the boundary of the conceptual externally, we cross it internally. This would be the reason for his mention of Freud and the unconscious, early in the lecture.

This also provides a reason to reject systematization type thinking. Systems theory assumes a boundary between the system and the external environment, but it does not provide the principles for an internal boundary. What lies beyond the system to the inside?

I

Trouble is that modal logic includes propositional logic and predicate logic. Every valid proposition in propositional logic and in predicate logic is valid in modal logic. And for every valid syllogism in classical logic there is an equivalent valid formulation in propositional or predicate logic. — Banno

Think about what you are saying Banno. All propositional, predicate, or classical logic can be expressed as modal logic. This does not mean that all modal logic can be expressed in the terms of those other forms of logic, and that is where the problem lies. The three fundamental laws are not sound when applied toward future possibilities, but modal logic is. Concluding that because modal logic is applicable to past possibilities, and is consistent with classical logic in this instance, therefore classical logic must also be consistent with modal logic when applied to future possibilities, is what supports fatalism.

If you insist that modal logic fails because of its failure to adhere to classical logic standards related to ontological status, then you will be de facto rejecting modal logic. — Hanover

I don't claim that. What I claim is that classical logic fails when applied to the future. Modal logic is designed for future possibility and does not fail.

Modal logic admits to the incompatibility noted by Aristotle and responds to it, so I don't know how to respond other than to say if you want modal logic to act like classic logic you can't have model logic. — Hanover

It appears like you understand this quite well, now try to convince Banno of this. Banno does not admit that incompatibility, and this is what supports fatalism. Yet Banno also denies fatalism, and that is a problem.

In any event, give me a syllogism in modal logic you feel fails by giving an illogical result due to its adherence to modal logic standards and not classical so I can see concretely why you object. — Hanover

This is the point you are missing. My claim is that classical logic fails, not that modal logic fails. However, interpretations of modal logic which attempt to understand it in the terms of classical logic (i.e. make the two compatible) are themselves a failure. So I am saying that it is not modal logic which fails, but certain interpretations of it which fail. For an example o this failure, just look at what Banno has written.

That is classic logic, not modal logic, though, correct? I understand that if we're referrring to what might be we can't set it out in terms of what it currently is. The antecedent is conditional, and it is useful to logically determine an outcome on a possible world because we require that sort of logic to make our decisions. — Hanover

That's right, what I am saying is that modal logic is not consistent with classical logic. But there is a further point. If modal logic, which is necessary for making decisions about the future, is not consistent with classical logic which produces the basis for what is, in what has been, then there is a gap in our decision making process because we use two distinct types of logic which are inconsistent with each other. This is similar to, or even a form of, the is/ought gap.

Your objection is that the hypothetical possibility is not ontological in existence and so you therefore cannot logically consider it? This I don't follow. Why can't we logically assess possible worlds that aren't actual worlds? This is the point of modal logic. — Hanover

No, I'm not saying that we cannot logically consider it. I am saying that it violates classical logic, therefore we cannot consider it in relation to the premises classical logic.

You say this, but your objections are directed straight at it. — Hanover

That's not true. I am very clearly talking about violations to classical logic. Therefore I am objecting to classical logic. And I accept that modal logic was developed to deal with these aspects of reality which classical logic cannot address, due to that deficiency in classical logic. Look at your above quotes from me, I explained how Aristotle showed that future possibility violates classical logic. He described it as a violation of excluded middle. I describe it as a situation where the law of identity does not apply. The fact that future possibility violates classical logic is ancient knowledge. We probably all take it for granted. Modal logic is an attempt at a different logic to deal with this problem. What I complained about, in this thread, is people who insist that modal logic is used in a way which is consistent with classical logic.

You demand ontological reality upon your propositions prior to performing logical functions on them, which is an outright rejection of modal logic. — Hanover

It is not a rejection of modal logic, it is a rejection of the way that modal logic is often applied. To apply logic correctly requires ontological principles. Demanding ontological clarity of the meaning of propositions before performing logical functions is not a matter of rejecting the logic. It is a matter of requesting an adequate explanation of the premises, similar to asking for definitions. If an important term like "possible" is left with ambiguity between two very distinct senses, this is cause for concern, because it allows for the possibility of misuse.

The potential for misuse of logical reasoning is obvious from the ancient knowledge which shows us that applying classical logic to future possibility is a misuse. In a like way, I insist that applying modal logic to past possibilities (counterfactuals) and applying it to future possibilities, in the very same way, according to the same rules, is also a misuse of logic.

That's fine, but it's not an objection about anything inconsistent with modal logic. It's just a refusal to accept it as a mode of reasoning. — Hanover

The first sentence is correct, the second is not. I went through this with Banno earlier. I had to explain that I am not claiming that modal logic is inconsistent internally, I am saying that it is often applied in a way which is not consistent with classical logic. What I point out is the inconsistency between classical logic and modal logic. That inconsistency ought to be obvious, because classical logic is violated by future possibility, and modal logic is applied to future possibility. Banno first did not accept this inconsistency, then accused me of rejecting modal logic completely. When I pointed out that I was only distinguishing an inconsistency between these logical forms, Banno finally said "fine", and seemed to agree.

The second sentence is false, because I am in no way refusing to accept modal logic as a mode of reasoning. Again, that it is a mode of reasoning is obvious. However, I am pointing out that if we do not distinguish between applications of modal logic which are consistent with classical logic from applications which are inconsistent, and we interpret applications which are inconsistent as if they are consistent, that is a form of misuse of this mode of reasoning. So the misuse is multifaceted. First, there is misuse of modal logic if future possibility is treated in the same way as past possibilities. Second, there is misuse of classical logic when future possibility in the application of modal logic, is interpreted as consistent with classical logic. The latter misuse propagates determinism and fatalism.

This is just to say that if you insist upon actual worlds for the conditions to exist in to perform logic upon them, then you're refusing to consider possible worlds, which is what distinguishes classical and modal logic from one another. — Hanover

The "actual world" is the grounding for a judgement of truth in the sense of correspondence. Judgements of truth are necessary for judgements of the soundness of the logical conclusions. As I said, I do not reject the application of "possible worlds" and model logic in general. But since the "actual world" exists at the present time, and past possibilities are substantially different from future possibilities, then "possible worlds" when referring to the past must have a substantially different meaning from "possible worlds" when referring to the future, in order to maintain truth, and sound conclusions.

Instead I think there are a multitude of possible worlds, but that there is one possible world amongst them that is actual. I take this to be the most common view, almost to the point of a consensus. — Banno

This is the problematic statement right here. In the case of "possible worlds" referring to the past time, the past has already been determined by the passing of time, and it is correct to say that of all the possible worlds, "one represents the actual", or even (depending on one's ontological stance) "one is the actual". However, when referring to future time, that time has not yet passed, and the actual has not yet been determined, therefore it is incorrect to say that one of the possible worlds is the actual, or even that it represents the actual. This is what leads to determinism and fatalism. In order to allow for the reality of real choice, there is no such things as "the actual".