The same way two different people may share the same name. — creativesoul 
Actually, what I described is how "cell" refers to two distinct concepts, in one case a whole living organism, and in the other case a part of a living organism.
They are both called by the same name. They are not said to be the same thing. You've already said as much directly above. One is an entire living organism, and the other is but a part thereof. Sometimes "cell" is used to pick out an entire organism, sometimes it is used to pick out parts of an organism. — creativesoul 
The point was that if a word refers to an external thing ("picks out a thing" as you said), then "cell" would pick out "a thing", not a multitude of different things.  Then the whole living organism, and the part of a living organism, which "cell" refers to, would be the same thing.
Sometimes "cell" is used to pick out an entire organism, sometimes it is used to pick out parts of an organism. — creativesoul 
OK, this is a better way for you to say it.  The word doesn't pick out a thing, the person uses the word to pick out a thing. But what you don't seem to understand, is that the thing which the person uses the word to pick out, is a concept.  In one case the person uses the word to signify the concept of a whole living organism, and the person may produce supposed external objects to exemplify this use, and in the other case, the person uses the word to signify the concept of a specific part of an organism, and may produce supposed external objects to exemplify that use.
Why are you abruptly changing your claim?  You said a word picks out things.  I said a word picks out types. Now you agree with me. Do you not see the difference between a supposed external thing, as a particular or individual, and a supposed internal type of thing, as a universal or generalization?  Failing to see that difference is what caused Janus' equivocation, in our discussion concerning the proposition "thought does not need words".
Folks, that is what philosophy amounts to - finding a good way to say tricky things. — Banno 
Perhaps, but when philosophy is reduced to simply being concerned with 'the way things are said', then "good" is removed from your proposition, and it is simply "finding a way to say tricky things".  That is sophistry.  So we must maintain "good" here, and determine exactly what qualifies as a good way.  Of course a bad way of saying tricky things is deception.  The problem is that there is a multitude of bad ways, and the "good way" gets narrowed down toward the ideal, the best way, which is the goal of perfection in understanding.
The following is a good example of a bad way:
When a community uses words in certain ways..., — creativesoul 
This is an example of a bad, or deceptive way of using words, because individual people use words in particular instances of usage.  So there is no such thing as a "certain way" that a community uses any particular word, because a community is a collective, consisting of a multitude of persons, each using any specific word in very distinct ways in the various different circumstances that the person might find oneself in. These differences are referred to as accidentals.
We might generalize, and say that a particular person uses a certain word in a specific type of way, removing the accidentals.  But then we'd have a type of way, and this does not provide us the certainty of knowing the particular way, which would be the way of a particular instance, complete with accidentals.
But to jump from that type of generalization made about an individual person, to a generalization about "the community", requires a different sort of generalization, which would render a multitude of distinct individuals as one "community". This sort of generalization is logically invalid. It is invalid because individual people are the ones who use words, and as explained above, an individual's particular way of using words is an accidental property of the individual, and therefore cannot be transposed so as to be a property of the generalized whole community, unless it is done through valid inductive logic.
Being accidental properties, rather than essential, such inductive logic could not proceed unless every person in a specific community used words in the very same way.  For example, it's like saying "the community has red hair".  This would only be true if every person in the community has red hair. If its only ninety nine per cent, who have red hair, we can't truthfully say that, because it's a statement supported by faulty inductive logic.
This thread is full of such faulty inductive logic. which is a bad or deceptive way of using words.  I've been working to point out some of these occurrences, but the guilty parties tend to use tactics like accusing me of sophistry, when in reality I am just exposing their sophistry.