You are repeating the same error that I pointed out to you before.

Does it turn out that the person does not know that the proposition, p, is true (i.e. ~Kp), or does it turn out that the person knows that the proposition, p, is not true (i.e. K~p)?

That is, does it turn out that they don’t know p, or that they know not-p?

If the former, then it’s irrelevant to what Srap said. If the latter, then what does it mean that they claim to know p but it turns out they know not-p? How is that possible? — Luke

Your two options do not contain the correct choice. What is correct, is that what is at one time called "knowledge", is at another time not allowed to be called knowledge. So the same ideas at one point in time qualify to be called "knowledge", yet at a later time are said not to be knowledge. The person knew proposition p as true, then later decided proposition p is not true.

This implies that "knowledge" is a product of judgement, not a product of "what is the case". And, when we recognize the following two premises, knowledge is a product of human judgement, and that human judgement is fallible, we can conclude logically that knowledge may consist of some faulty judgements.

Knowledge is a feature of one's attitude. There is nothing unusual or strange here, just a recognition of the fact that people can change their minds. At one time the person knows "p", and at a later time the person knows "not-p". This demonstrates the need for skepticism. We must always revisit our knowledge, and keep abreast of the need for change.

That is why we ought to define "true" in the way that I proposed, as related to honesty rather than "what is the case". Then we can accurately represent Knowledge as justified true belief, because "true" would then signify the position of the ideas which comprise "knowledge" as relative to an honest attitude, rather than some pie in the sky absolute, referred to as "what is the case".

So there is no need for us to enquire as to what does "what is the case" signify, just a need to enquire as to what does "honesty" signify. The modern trend is to completely ignore the importance of honesty in knowledge, and replace it with something which no one can understand, "what is the case". Then we can endless discuss the meaning of "what is the case" thereby avoiding the true issue which is honesty.

So, what does the paper say about factive verbs?

That is how knowledge is ordinarily defined. As the following sources show: — Andrew M

Yes, that is how "knowledge", as the subject of epistemology, is normally defined. But we were not talking about "knowledge", the epistemological subject, we were talking about normal use of "know" as an attitude. And the fact is that people often claim to know things, which turn out to be not the case. So the definitions which epistemologists prescribe as to what "knowledge" ought to mean, do not accurately reflect how "know" is truly used.

But this is all irrelevant, because the point was that without the premise being stated, the logic is invalid.

So let's state it:

     Kp ⊢ p     Kp ⊢ p

Which is to say, if it is known that p is true then p is true. And from which follows, by modus tollens: — Andrew M

So here you have the premise stated. But in Srap's rendition of the propositional attitude, this is not stated as a premise, it is presented as a valid conclusion. Srap also extended this invalid logic to other attitudes, to conclude if it is remembered it is what is the case, if it is seen it is what is the case, and if it is regretted it is what is the case. The point is that one might state these as premises, as you have, to be judged for truth or falsity, but to present them as logically valid conclusions without providing the premises required to make the conclusion, is a mistake.

That knowledge entails truth means only that if someone does know X then X is the case. — Andrew M

You can state this as a premise, in which case I would reject the premise as unsound, because much knowledge ends up not properly representing what is the case, and therefore requiring revision, but you have not yet shown the premises required to make this ("if someone does know X then X is the case") a logically valid conclusion. That is the point I've been making.

The problem I believe is in how you relate "true" to "is the case". If "true" means what is the case, and if knowledge entails truth, then knowing X means that X is the case. However, as I explained above, in common usage knowing X does not mean X is the case. So there is a problem here. But if we conceive of "true" as I proposed earlier in the thread, to be a representation of one's honest belief, then knowing entails truth, as commonly said by epistemologists, but truth does not necessarily mean what is the case.

As Srap Tasmaner has pointed out, know is a factive [*] term while imagine is not. — Andrew M

The point is, that for the logic to be valid :"know" must be defined as a "factive" term as a premise. Other wise, this notion that knowing something logically implies the existence of the thing known is an unstated premise which is required for the claimed conclusion. Conclusions which require additional premises other than those stated are not valid conclusions.

The required premise (Kp ⊢ p) comes from observing how the term know is ordinarily used in language. — Andrew M

That's not a premise in Srap's proposal, because it's not stated as a premise. If it were stated then we could judge the truth or falsity of it. This is the problem, relying on unstated premises denies us the capacity to judge the soundness of the premise. Then the unsoundness of the unstated premise is allowed to contaminate the validity of the logic.

Also, there is very much ambiguity in the normal use of the term "know", so that premise, if stated ought to be judged as false (dishonest sophistry). Much more often than not, |know" is used in a fallible way, as I said much earlier. When people say "I know that X is the case", they are most often not claiming absolute certainty, that it is impossible for things to be otherwise

Having no philosophy is not a disqualifier. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Your lack of training in philosophy really shows. And, it is very annoying for a philosopher, when a person without philosophy comes to a philosophy forum, and enters into a philosophy of math discussion, insisting that philosophers ought not discuss the metaphysical principles upon which mathematical axioms stand, if they have not first studied mathematics. Clearly, it is philosophy which is being discussed in the philosophy of mathematics, not mathematics.

I am reasonable in forums. — TonesInDeepFreeze

The above is unreasonable behaviour. And, you personally increase the degree of unreasonableness with the use of insult. When you do not understand the philosophical principles being discussed, because you have no philosophy, you simply hurl insults at the philosopher. Try some introspection, to reveal to yourself, your unreasonableness. You may find the way toward respect.

Srap is talking about knowing something that is not the case. — Luke

No, Srap is claiming that if someone "knows" something, "remembers" something, "sees" something, or "regrets" something, then without a formal definition of these words, it is logically implied that what the person knows, remembers, sees, or regrets, is necessarily the case. Of course this is clearly invalid logic. We cannot produce any deductive conclusions from a word or symbol without any defining propositions.

You mean if I wrote something like this?

     Kp ⊢ p     Kp ⊢ p

Like stating that kind of premise? Or would you prefer something like this?

     ∀p(∃xKxp → p) — Srap Tasmaner

Sorry, I don't understand the language. Try English, please.

But then, honestly, I'm not sure what there is to talk about if your position is that one can know things that are not so, see things that are not there, remember things that did not happen, and regret doing things you did not do. — Srap Tasmaner

It's very common, I claim to know, see, remember, or regret something, which turns out not to be so. Remember, logic deals with propositions, and a proposition is what is claimed, it is not what is so. And you agreed that human beings are fallible. So the proposition "I know X" does not mean that X is the case. "Jack knows X. Therefore X is what is the case." Wait, something is missing. Can't you see that we are missing a premise, the one which says "if someone knows something then it is what is the case"? And as I said, you might state such, as a proposition, or premise, but it would be rejected as false, because of that fallibility; especially with the other terms, see, remember, and regret.

It's only sophistry, your claim that knowing something, seeing something, remembering something, or regretting something, implies that what is known, seen, remembered, or regretted is what is the case. Just like in my examples of feeling something, or intuiting something, these do not imply that what is intuited or felt, is the case. Since you still don't seem to get it, let me add "imagining something". Does "imagining something" imply that the imagined thing is what is the case? How does "knowing something" elevate itself to a higher level than "imagining something", without the required premise, or definition?

Yes, we're a wicked bunch intent on the corruption of the intellects of youth in order to bring them to the alter of our Satan, Paul Erdos RIP. All bow. — jgill

Not all mathematicians are the same, just like not all theists are the same. It's just that some are fanatics with a cultlike attitude, who are inclined toward professing absurd ontologies to support their beliefs.

I had to look up Paul Erdos, to see that he is famous for his work on Ramsey theory. Seems like Erdos was very socially active. Is he responsible for the famous notion "six degrees of separation"? Or was he just paranoid about aliens? I see you can still earn money by solving Erdos' problems. Have you ever managed to get any reward?

You cannot know what is not so. You cannot see what is not there. You cannot remember what did not happen. You cannot regret doing what you did not do. — Srap Tasmaner

All of these examples, "know", "see", "remember", and "regret", require another premise establishing a relationship between each one of them, and "what is", in order to produce a valid conclusion.

There is no premise which states that if you "know" it, it is. No premise which states that if you "see" it, it is, nor for "remember", or "regret".

I could just as easily say, "if I feel like it's going to rain this afternoon, then it is going to rain", or, "intuition tells me so". What makes "regret", "remember", "see", or "know" produce a more valid conclusion than "feel" or "intuit"? Or, we could take the example from . If I say "pass me the kettle" does this imply that there actually is a kettle? Validity requirements do not allow us to make such conclusions. That's why a definition of sorts is a required part of the premises.

Logic doesn't guarantee the truth of what you say, but connects one truth to another. — Srap Tasmaner

Logic guarantees that properly derived conclusions are valid. Your conclusions for the attitudinal propositions are not valid, because they depend on unstated definitions for terms like "know", "see", etc.. Valid logic uses premises which state something necessary, or essential about a term ('man is mortal' for example), and then it proceeds to utilize that necessity stated, to produce a valid conclusion.

You have not stated the necessary premises concerning the terms, "know", "see", etc;, to produce a valid conclusion. And, if you did state those premises, "if you know it then it is true", "if you see it then it is true", they would just be rejected as false propositions. So it's as if you believe that by not stating the required premises you can avoid having them rejected as false, and simply proceed to produce a valid conclusion without the required premises through some sort of sophistry. But you cannot, because the premises are required to produce a valid conclusion.

In modus ponens, the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. The conclusion, that today is Joe's birthday does not follow necessarily from the premise "I remember that today is Joe's birthday", because there is no premise to relate "I remember", to what "is".

Now the nature of infinity is an interesting topic to explore! — Real Gone Cat

I stated earlier in the thread, what I believe to be the reason for the concept of infinite:

What I think, is that we allow "infinite" so that we will always be able to measure anything. If our numbers were limited to the biggest thing we've come across as of yet, or largest quantity we've come across, then if we came a cross a bigger one we would not be able to measure it. So we always allow that our numbers can go higher, to ensure that we will always be able to measure anything that we ever come across. In that way, "infinite" is a very practical principle. — Metaphysician Undercover

But it may surprise you to know that many mathematicians today believe that actual infinite sets exist in math! — Real Gone Cat

That doesn't surprise me at all. I've had numerous discussions in this forum with mathematicians, and I've already been well exposed to the absurd ontology which seems to be exclusive to that cult.

The issue, as I see it, is that observational data and evidence should inform our philosophy. When there's a conflict, that's a signal that we need to check our premises. — Andrew M

Yes, I agree.

Allows you to conclude p from Kp, but doesn't tell you whether Kp is true. It is indeed just a logical principle along the lines of modus ponens, which also can't tell you that your premises are true. Does that make modus ponens useless? — Srap Tasmaner

It's not like modus ponens though, because unlike modus ponens, the premises do not necessitate the conclusion. The proposition "I remember that today is Joe's birthday", does not necessitate the conclusion that today is Joe's birthday, without the added premise that my memory is infallible. But that proposition is not stated, nor would it be acceptable as a premise if it was stated. So it's like modus ponens with a hidden premise, which if it were stated, would be rejected as false. Therefore conclusions drawn in this way are unsound.

Then you didn't. Nobody's talking about infallibility here. You thought you did, you could've sworn it was today, whatever. But "I remember that I put my keys on the table," if true, entails that I did. No more than any other sort of statement, propositional attitude reports cannot vouch for their own truth. — Srap Tasmaner

Ok, I just wanted that clarification the qualifier, "if true". If we have no way of knowing for sure whether what we honestly believe "is true" or not, then what good is the "propositional attitude"? It cannot be an acceptable logical principle, to allow us to draw any valid conclusions.

It's poor philosophy to reject well-established facts about the world. — Andrew M

No, it's called skepticism, and that is by no means "poor philosophy". Only uninformed philosophers would call it that.

Yet again you repeat your false claim that is refuted by content of the posts. — TonesInDeepFreeze

The claim was not false, as I showed with a number of explanations. You would not even address the content of my replies, insisting they're too confused, obfuscatory, rambling, dishonest and ignorant.

In other words, you could not understand what I wrote, and instead of asking for clarification you decided that it must be contradictory, so you just kept repeating that it is contradiction. That's not only disingenuous, it's bull shit!

You skipped what I wrote about that. That is your M.O., in true crank style: Skip responding to points that don't support your own position and instead just keep reiterating your position. — TonesInDeepFreeze

How familiar. Now I can call you a "crank", by your own description.

Ultrafinitism is usually defined as the belief that really large FINITE numbers do not exist because of constructive limits - what is physically realizable in the universe. And what does the OP posit? That there is a maximum number needed to describe the universe. Anything bigger doesn't need to exist. Did I get something wrong? — Real Gone Cat

There's a very simple ontological principle to employ. Potentialities do not "exist". To "exist" requires actuality. So when I say tomorrow I might build myself a new chair, that chair does not exist because it's only an idea, a potentiality, or possibility, without actual existence.

First, as I've said ad nauseum, (with exceptions of figures of speech) mathematics doesn't have a noun 'infinity' but rather an adjective 'is infinite'. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Many mathematicians freely make use of infinite sets. — TonesInDeepFreeze

OK, let's see if you can clarify what is meant here to make sure you are not contradicting yourself. "Infinite" is an adjective. There is something which is said to be "infinite" and that is a "set". Now, a set is not an object, otherwise the set would be an infinite object, and this would be an infinity. But "infinity" as a noun, is not a word used in mathematics, so a set is not an object.

So what type of existence does a set have? It's not an object, or else it would be an infinite object (referenced by the noun "infinity"). What is this 'thing'?, called a "set", which we cannot say is a thing, referenced with a noun, otherwise it would be an infinite thing, i.e. an infinity. How is it that "infinite" can be predicated without a thing to be the subject of that predication?

Stating my own argument about it.

Whether you reply to my statement of my argument about your contradiction is entirely your own prerogative. — TonesInDeepFreeze

There was no argument made by you, just a blatantly false accusation, that my previous post was contradictory.

And, since you seem now to be leaning toward a claim that I called you back to defend your argument, I withdraw my comment that I might have taken you too literally. — TonesInDeepFreeze

You clearly demonstrated that you never even understood what I said, calling it obfuscation. Now you confess to not knowing whether you took it literally or not. Admit the facts, you have no understanding whatsoever, concerning the ontological principles I stated. So you decided your best course of action was just to publicly state that what I said is contradictory, (even though it clearly is not), instead of asking me to clarify. That is bull shit!

If I remember that today is Joe's birthday, then today is Joe's birthday. When I see that a package has been delivered, a package has in fact been delivered. If I regret leaving my car window down, it's down. — Srap Tasmaner

What about all the times you end up being wrong? I remember that today is Joe's birthday, but that turns out to be wrong. The thing I though was a package turns out to just be a piece of trash. It starts raining, and I regret that I left the car window down, yet it turns out that I actually didn't leave it down.

But I did not call on you, or call you back, to defend what you wrote not did I call on you, or call you back, to do anything at all. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Ok, so just out of interest then, If you were not calling me back to defend my statement, then what were you doing with that false accusation (two months later) that I contradicted myself two months earlier?

But maybe what you meant is that you felt, upon your own sense that you should defend what you wrote. Not that, as you literally wrote that I called on you to do that. In that case, fair enough. If I should not have taken you literally, then you may consider my previous comments about now scratched. — TonesInDeepFreeze

When someone publicly accuses me of contradicting myself, I take it that I am being called on to defend myself. If you were not calling on me to defend myself, then what was the purpose in your false accusation, simple defamation?

If I should not have taken you literally, then you may consider my previous comments about now scratched. — TonesInDeepFreeze

There was no contradiction. Go back and reread please. And only reply when you can demonstrate that you have understood what I wrote. No more of your whiny behaviour, please. You poor pathetic baby, my writing is just too confused and "obfuscatory" for you to understand, so you'd better just dismiss it as contradictory. Come on, grow out of the diapers.

And if you cannot understand philosophy don't bother replying please. Go read some books first!

You're putting words in my mouth again. — TonesInDeepFreeze

No, i never said you "asked", or "suggested" that I reply. It's actually you putting words in my mouth, just like in your false accusation that I contradicted myself

And now you're flat out lying about my posting. — TonesInDeepFreeze

This is what you always end up saying to me. You're a liar! Let me remind you of your own words:

Yes, your obfuscation seems to be inexhaustible. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Indeed your confused, ignorant and intellectually dishonest postings are a waste of your time, as you'd do so much better for yourself by reading a book on the subject. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I predict that now you'll write yet more rambling, obfuscatory paragraphs in which you elide your own posted words. — TonesInDeepFreeze

And my words:

confused, ignorant, dishonest, rambling, obfuscations. — Metaphysician Undercover

Looks like I quoted your words correctly, unlike your lame reply.

I gave specific analysis, quoting you, and arranging my argument about it in conspicuously clear formatting. — TonesInDeepFreeze

No, all you did was falsely accuse me of contradiction through a stupid strawman. You never even considered what I actually wrote.

ndeed your confused, ignorant and intellectually dishonest postings are a waste of your time, as you'd do so much better for yourself by reading a book on the subject. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Tones! Your audacity is unbelievable. You took two months to reply to my post. After two months, you called me back to defend what I wrote. After two months! Then, you never once addressed my defense, which I wrote in the last couple days, only referring to it as confused, ignorant, dishonest, rambling, obfuscations. What the fuck is the point? If I'm wrong, show me where!

You practice nothing but bull shit! Please, for the love of all who participate in this forum, shut the fuck up!

I actually can't see the UNIVERSAL advantage of unifying objects and terms of measurement. Sailors still measure velocity in knots; Americans still measure weight and volume in ounces and gallons and pounds. If there were an advantage to unification, everyone would be using the same system, and yet we don't. — god must be atheist

It would free us from the need for conversion, translation, in communicating with each other, which would of course be an advantage.

Rather, no matter how you define it, you contradicted yourself about it, as I quoted you doing that. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Oh, if that's how you interpreted what I said in all those posts, it's very apparent that you did not read what I said. I conclude that I was wasting my time.

I said that snow was white 200,000 years ago, as scientists would tell us. That's common knowledge - if you disagree, perhaps you could provide a scientific source. — Andrew M

Obviously, what I disagree with is what you say "science" tells us. So clearly I will not be producing a "scientific" source to back up my disagreement. The "science" is what I disagree with. So, I produced a philosophical source, this being a philosophy forum. I don't think we should be moving toward "scientific" sources..



You and Banno, are both, slowly coming around to see that the important and significant factor in relating truth to meaning is "honesty".

The problem for Banno is a preconceived notion of "truth" expressed by the T-sentence, and the insistence on the faulty principle that there is some sort of meaning expressed by repetition of the same phrase. But that is not consistent with any of your descriptions of meaning. It is even contrary to this:

Said of a bit of language, generally a request for different words amounting to the same thing, but more readily understood by the audience. — Srap Tasmaner

From Banno's refusal to reject the notion that the same phrase stated twice expresses some sort of meaning, or something about meaning, and insistence that truth is just this, stating the same phrase twice, we cannot get a bridge from "truth" to "meaning". The faulty representation of "meaning" prevents the possibility of such a relation.

However, if we turn things around, and start from a serious representation of meaning, we see that there are numerous ways to create a relationship between meaning and truth, such as the following:

I am resolved, and what I said was said in all seriousness. Closely related to

            (6a) He didn't mean it.
            (6b) You don't mean that.

Speech that should not be taken at face-value, as serious and honest, and suggesting it was said with some other purpose than honest expression. Also a wish that this is the case.

            (7) That's not what I meant.

(i) I spoke with one meaning in mind, but you interpreted my words as having another. (ii) I spoke with a particular intention, but you took me to have another. Occasionally part of an acknowledgement that my speech was ambiguous.

            (8a) I meant to ...
            (8b) I didn't mean to.
            (8c) I meant to do that. — Srap Tasmaner

But of course, Banno's steadfast refusal to dismiss this idea that the T-schema says something about a relationship between between truth and meaning, despite having been advised of this from just about everyone here, stymies any progress on this matter.

Yes, your obfuscation seems to be inexhaustible. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Sure, but your refusal to define and adhere to a definition of "object" is inexcusable. It can mean nothing other than that you rely on the game of equivocation as your mode of persuasion.

So which should we take to be the highest number we allow?

Mathematics should be limited to only the numbers you will personally allow? — TonesInDeepFreeze

This is relevant to our discussion of how to define "object". Let's assume that mathematicians might define "object" in any way that one likes. This means that there is no necessary consistency between one mathematician's "object" and another's. Therefore, we could have contradiction, incompatibility, and incommensurability between one mathematicians idea of "object", and another's.

Now suppose that we agree that there is an advantage to providing consistency in what qualifies as an object, such that measuring quantity could proceed in a standard way, by some agreed upon convention. Do you not agree that this would be advantageous? And do you not agree also that we need a definition of "object", and we need to adhere to that definition, to ensure that inconsistency between one mathematician and another, in the measuring of quantity is avoided?

I take it that you don't take it that the only objects are abstractions, because you went on to say why you don't take it that the only objects are abstractions. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Right, but as I said, I was willing to restrict my definition of "objects", to mean abstractions exclusively, for the purpose of proceeding with this conversation if that's what you desire.

There is a problem with using ambiguous terms in deductive logic. It leads to equivocation. So I wanted to make sure that this problem was avoided.

Or, are you now saying that the only objects are abstractions? — TonesInDeepFreeze

I told you, I can go either way, you seem to be having great difficulty with that idea. So long as we adhere to one definition or the other, I'm ready to proceed. But equivocation is a waste of time. My inclination, through my habit of common use, and therefore preference, is to say that abstractions are not objects, and define "object" in a way which is consistent with the law of identity, as I explained. But an abstraction, as an "object" is not consistent with the law of identity, because what we call "the same" concept exists in many different minds, with accidental differences. So if we proceed by defining "object" so that abstractions are objects, we must forfeit the use of the law of identity as a defining feature of an object.

You seem to be having difficulty with this proposal. Could you explain the problem you are having?

Yes, I knew you would reply by shifting back around again from your own words but pretending that you haven't. This will go on indefinitely with you, as you play a silly game that is the forum equivalent to a child's peek a boo. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Yes, so long as we reach no agreement as to how to define "object" to ensure that neither of us will equivocate in our arguments, this situation could go on indefinitely without any progress.

So I take it that restricting 'object' to refer only to abstractions is not acceptable to you. Thus, indeed you do not agree that abstractions are objects. Thus, indeed you contradict yourself when you also said: — TonesInDeepFreeze

Why do you conclude that? If I said, I'll only agree to call that type of thing which we sit on "a chair", if that's the only type of thing we will call "chair", would you conclude that it is not acceptable to me to call that type of thing a chair? What I said, is that we can call an abstraction an "object" if that's the only type of thing we call by that name. It's not uncommon to restrict definitions in this way, it makes deductive logic more productive by avoiding equivocation.

"I cannot agree that abstractions are objects" is tantamount to "abstractions are not objects".

"We restrict 'object' to refer only to abstractions" is tantamount to "only abstractions are objects".

So what you said is tantamount to: Abstractions are not objects unless only abstractions are objects. But you also deny that only abstractions are objects. Thus you affirm that abstractions are not objects. — TonesInDeepFreeze

This is a complete misunderstanding. Abstractions are a very specific type of thing. I have no objection to saying that abstractions are objects, if I reject other senses of "object" which I am familiar with, thereby naming a category "objects", and placing abstractions within this category. Just like in my example, we can name a category "chairs", and place the things we sit on in that category, and we can name a category "objects" and place abstractions there. However, since abstraction are such a unique, and very specific type of thing, I do not see how anything else could be placed in this category.

Or, we might realize that just like chairs are only one type of thing that we sit on, objects are just one type of abstraction. But if this is the case, then all objects are abstractions, but not all abstractions are objects. And we still don't have anything other than abstractions as objects.

I will though, on reconsideration allow the possibility that we could have a category "objects" and there might be things other than abstractions, which may be similar to abstractions in some way, which might also be placed in that category, "objects". So if you believe that there are other things similar to abstractions, which you believe ought to be placed in that category of "objects", you might demonstrate to me the reasons why you believe this.

Not at all. Just like a 'race' is any kind of activity which has a start, a finish, and some competitive element, a 'belief that the pub is at the end of the road' is any mental arrangement which results in a tendency to go to the end of the road when wanting to get to the pub. — Isaac

I don't see your point. You weren't talking about a race, or any other form of activity, in the passage where I took the quote. You were talking about "states", specifically "hidden states". A state is not an activity, like a race is, and that's the point I made. What constitutes a state is incompatible with what constitutes an activity. So I don't see why you'd be trying to change the subject from "states" to "activities". Saying a state is like an activity is comparing apples to oranges.

So truth is about how language is used, and far wider than just reference. — Banno

We're getting closer and closer to agreement. All you need to do now is to acknowledge that truth is about nothing other than the honest use of language, and we'd be in agreement.

Since the world is all that is the case, there is no escape from our language games. — Banno

Sure, there is no escape from our language games, but there is such a thing as cheating. Why is cheating a reality in this world which only consists of what is the case? A dishonest statement, eg. a lie, has a real place in the world, just like cheating has a real place in a game.

But I might go so far as to say that the exact circumstance in which it is correct to deem that "the kettle is boiling" is true are that the kettle is boiling... — Banno

You say, truth is about meaning, but here you demonstrate otherwise. You are not saying anything about meaning here. You are saying that "the kettle is boiling", if true, means that the kettle is boiling. Can't you see that this says absolutely nothing about the meaning of "the kettle is boiling".

If you would make the slight adjustment, and say, that the exact circumstances in which it is correct to deem that "the kettle is boiling" is true, are when you honestly belief that the kettle is boiling, then you'd actually be saying something reasonable, and realistic about "truth", and consequently, about meaning as well. The correct circumstances in which to deem "the kettle is boiling" is true. is when you honestly believe that the kettle is boiling.

Yes, but naming it doesn't affect what it is. 200,000 years ago, snow wasn't named "snow", and the color white wasn't named "white", yet snow was still white. At least, so the scientists tell us. — Andrew M

This is a mistaken supposition, explained well by Kant. The name "snow" does not refer to some sort of object which preexisted the appearance within the mind, as you seem to think scientists claim. The name refers directly to what appears within the mind, the phenomenon, as does the description of it, etc.. That is what is named, the phenomenon, not the assumed noumenon, which we assume as necessary for the existence of the phenomenon. We do not have the premises required to conclude that the phenomenon (what appears within the mind) is an accurate representation of the noumenon (the supposed thing itself).

What I think Michael is insisting, is that the truth of one's description of the phenomenon requires that the phenomenon accurately represents the noumenon.

Redundancy doesn't reject realism, nor need it be relativistic. You might say, as I do, that some hidden state constrains our neural models of it. You might also say, as I would, that we have an interest in those neural models being at least similar in function so that we can cooperate over manipulating those hidden states. You might also say that language is used (among other things) as a tool to this end. But since all of this goes on subconsciously, most of the time, and, most importantly, those putative 'hidden states' are simply hypothetical matters used in a scientific model of how brains work, there's simply not a mechanism by which they can act as truth-makers for sentence in English, without being entirely subsumed by simply 'the kettle is black'. — Isaac

This is a problem, your attempt to reduce mental activity, to "states". As I explained earlier in the thread, Aristotle demonstrated long ago, that there is an unresolvable incompatibility between a state of "being", and the activity which constitutes change, known as "becoming".

The issue seems to be that we need a source for the stability which constitutes a "belief", used as a noun. So you posit a stable neural network, or some such thing, as a stable "thing", which would support repetition of the same, or similar mental activity, constituting the thing which others might call a "belief".

Jesus, this thread is getting boring.

Indeed, you need it to be raining. Which is already to interpret the world, to use language.

That is, for "it is raining" to be true, it needs to be raining.

Which is the exact point made by the T-sentence.

SO what, if anything, is our disagreement? — Banno

This is incorrect Banno. The T-sentence says "it is raining is true iff it is raining. This does not say anything about the meaning of "to be raining".

Either "it is raining" is always, already interpreted, as you assert, in which case "to be raining" is something completely different from "it is raining", or it is not already interpreted.

Having it both ways, which you demonstrate over and over again is your desire, is a matter of dishonesty; the claim that you can eat your cake and have it too.

P1: if God exists, nonresistant nonbelievers would not exist
P1: nonresistant nonbelievers do exist
C: God does not exist

Defense of P1:

A relationship with God would be the highest good in the world if God exists, and God would want to, and have the power to achieve this good. The reason this is the highest good is the same reason why any relationship is good, (because it is intrinsically good, or mutually beneficial etc.) And surely a relationship with good would be the best relationship of all. — aminima

A relationship with God is not the highest good. This is because possessing a good is higher than knowing it (having a relation with it). God gave us free will for a good which is greater than the good of knowing Him (having a relationship with Him). This is justified because possessing a good falls into a category of more benefit than knowing that good.

So the possession of free will, (as a good), which allows us to freely judge the evidence, is more important for God to grant us, as a higher good for us, than the good of us knowing Him, or having a relationship with Him. That is the nature of love, it must be freely chosen rather than imposed. Incidentally, this is also the case with all the suffering and evil in the world, which comes about as the result of human beings having free will. Possessing the good, (free will), is superior to knowing the good. And not knowing the good results in suffering and evil.

This is the value of introspection. It allows us to make these distinctions such as the difference between an expectation and a belief. Sure, we can simply define then as having the same meaning, but then we need to come up with different terms to describe the differences which are very real within us.

Look at the difference I described, instead of trying to make the difference go away. To expect is an attitude toward the future. A belief is an attitude toward what is, and that implies at the present. If you do not like the terms used, "expect" and "belief", perhaps they bring unnecessary baggage, then we can just talk about the different attitudes without laying any names on them. The distinct attitudes are one toward what will happen in the future, and the other toward what is the case, now. We could add another distinct attitude toward what happened in the past.

The point is, that in learning how to ride a bike, or knowing how to ride a bike, we do not rely on the attitude directed toward what is the case, now. We rely on an attitude concerning what will happen, in the future, if we perform a specific act, and proceed in that way. Do you agree that there is a distinction to be made between the attitude toward what is the case , now, and the attitude toward what will happen, in the future.

Yes of course, there is a big difference. To expect is to think of a future event, that it is likely. A belief is a strong conviction concerning what is.

Really? Not the belief that bikes are for riding? The belief that one sits on the saddle and pushes the pedals? That the brakes are for stopping? ... We've no idea at all what beliefs people might have? — Isaac

I know how to ride a bike, and I don't think I've ever held the belief that bikes are for riding, or the belief that one sits on the saddle and pushes the peddles. Nor was I ever taught these beliefs when I learned to ride a bike. It was demonstrated to me how to do it, and I was given guidance and assistance. Now, I just jump on the bike and go. Sorry to disappoint you, but I've never accepted these beliefs, and I am being very honest. You might ask me now, if I believe in those things, and I could consider them, and give you an honest answer. But that would be after the fact. I haven't considered those particular questions before now, so I've never made those judgements nor developed those beliefs.

Those trivial, mundane things are not the type of thing that I believe in. When I want to go, I just jump on the bike and it goes. and when I want to slow down I grip the brakes. without actually believing in things like chains, sprockets, and gears, handle bars and seats, etc.. Just like when I want to walk, I don't rely on beliefs about the capacity of my legs to hold me, or their ability to move me.

And when I get in my car, I do this without believing in the roles of driveshafts and transmissions, flywheels, crankshafts, cam shafts, connecting rods, pistons, and numerous parts which I can't even name. I can't even honestly assert that I hold the belief that turning the key will start the engine. I just turn the key, with the expectation that the engine will start, anticipating. Sometimes it doesn't start and I'm left disappointed. Then, when I have trouble with the car, I might develop the belief that turning the key will not start it. That's very odd because I never developed the belief that turning the key would start the car, it's just something I learned how to do. But when it doesn't work, I'm quick to develop the belief that it doesn't work. And that belief is what reminds me not to do what I was previously in the habit of doing (turning the key for the purpose of starting the car). So the belief is used as a reminder for me, when activities which I normally engage in habitually, without associated beliefs, are not working properly. I need to use the belief to deter me from trying to do something which my intuition says ought to work, but I've found out, actually will not work. I use the belief to counteract my intuition.

Why? Not all Oak trees are the same, that doesn't suddenly raise problems with us deciding that some trees are more similar to each other and calling that group 'Oaks'. But knowing you I expect you've got some problem with that too. — Isaac

I said that different people observed to be acting in a similar way does not produce the conclusion that they have a similar belief. Now you come up with something about naming similar trees. That is not relevant. I wasn't talking about naming the similar acts, like we name similar trees, I was talking about the assumption that there is a similar belief associated with those similar acts.

For example, many things will fall if dropped from a height, due to the force of gravity. We would never conclude that since these things act in a similar way, they must hold a similar belief. Nor would we conclude that plants which grow in a similar way hold similar beliefs. So why would we conclude that if different people act in similar ways they must hold similar beliefs?

Well there's our first mistake then. 'Honesty' is the good and honourable thing. 'Truthfulness' is a game used to convince people your beliefs are better than theirs. Often honourable, often not. — Isaac

I don't see any sense in your proposal, to separate "honest" from "honourable" (considering the family resemblance), such that being honest might often not be an honourable thing. I suppose that since there is no logical necessity to these relations, there might be a few instances when being honest is not honourable, but I would not say "often not", as you did.

So I'll dismiss your reply as not a serious attempt to address the issue. In fact, I would classify it as a dishonest attempt. To characterize the problem I described, as a problem with associating "honest" with "honourable" (saying that being honest might not be the honourable thing), instead of facing that problem I described, to deal with it properly, is just a dishonest denial of the problem.

Do you know the type of dishonesty I'm talking about? If someone shows you a bad habit of yours, which has a bad effect in the work place for example, and you rationalize the bad effect as the result of someone else's actions rather than as the effect of your own bad habit, in an attempt to avoid addressing your own bad habit. That's the kind of dishonesty I'm talking about here. Instead of directly addressing the problem I described, you are trying to characterize it as the result of something else.

I don't have any trouble with a neural correlate for beliefs - "tendency to act as if", seems to work. If your neural network has a tendency to act as if X then we can say it has a belief that X. It's a bit of a bastardisation, but I think it's not too unfair to the proper meaning. — Isaac

This is exactly the type of correlation which I described as problematic. The existence of dishonesty demonstrates very conclusively that "the tendency to act as if X", cannot be correlated directly with "has a belief that X". And so, as I described in the following passage, the outward manifestation does not provide a dependable representation of the mental "belief'.

So, the mental, if prior to its outward expression, cannot be dependent on the outward expression. And this is why the issue is thorny. Being independent from its outward expression, means that there is no necessary relationship between the mental and its outward manifestation. The outward manifestation therefore does not necessarily provide a reliable representation of the mental. That's the problem, and why dishonesty may be allowed to thrive. — Metaphysician Undercover

You and I both know how to ride a bike, but the proof of this has nothing to do with our having similar neural paths in our brains, and everything to do with not falling off. — Banno

This provides a good example of the disconnect between the outward manifestation, and the inner "mental". If we look at numerous people who know how to ride a bike, we really cannot make any conclusions about any particular "beliefs" which are involved with this activity. Each person learned under different circumstances, and so has different mental correlations involved.

Now, someone like Creative would state that a child will not touch a fire, so this behaviour demonstrates a certain "belief". But this is just a reflection of how we generalize similar behaviours. We observe human beings behaving in similar ways, so we posit a common "belief" which is responsible for such similar behaviour. But that's really just a naive over simplification. Each individual human being is particular, and unique, having learned one's "how to" under circumstances distinct from every other human being.

However, we see great benefit in conforming these particular circumstances of learning, creating institutions like schools, which provide similarity in learning circumstances. So this indicates that there is some sort of correlation between the process of learning, and the mental capacity which is developed through the learning. From this, we can say that there is some sort of similarity in the mental capacity of two distinct individuals who know how to do the same thing (ride a bike), but to conclude that these people share "beliefs" associated with this activity is not justified by this. There is a similarity in mental activity, not a similarity in belief.

The further problem, is that when we create a definition of "belief", and validly talk about beliefs, there is likewise a disconnect between the belief and the mental activity. So it can be true that two people have the same belief, but this does not necessitate that they have the same mental activity associated with that belief.

The question was why associating the meaning of the word 'truth' with a pragmatic concept of utility caused this increase in deception. — Isaac

Oh really? You should be more clear with your questions, I didn't get that out of it at all. The point was that associating "truth" with utility renders truth as the means to the end. The end is what is wanted, the goal. Therefore truth becomes whatever it is which successfully gets a person what is wanted. Often, deception successfully gets one what is wanted. Therefore deception may be truth.

Are people more able to deceive you because they can use the word 'truth' to describe their most pragmatic models. If we banned them from using the word that way, would they somehow be shackled in their deception? — Isaac

Yes, that sums it up nicely. First, we are taught that truthfulness is a good and honourable thing. But, if from childhood, we also learn that "truth" is used in the pragmatic way, such that truth is the means for achieving one's goals, then the means to the end are always good and honourable, and there are no bad, or dishonourable means. We will then go about our lives deceiving people, believing that we are being truthful, good and honourable people, telling the truth, because we honestly believe that this is what "truth" is. We were taught that this is what truth is. And a person who honestly believes that what they are doing is right, is much more difficult to rehabilitate, and prevent from doing what they are doing, than one who believes that what they are doing is wrong, feels guilt, and wants rehabilitation. So, by giving people free reign to deceive without guilt, by using "truth" in this way, we enable them to deceive us.

I agree, if there wasn't some outward manifestation of the mental, then what would a mental life entail? Even if we exclude language, what's mental would have to seep out in some outward act (linguistic or otherwise). The mental, in order for us to call it mental, has to manifest itself in some way. We could say the same thing for what it means for something to be conscious. — Sam26

The mental manifests outwardly in many different ways, artefacts, bird's nests, beaver dams, etc.. However, the question as to whether the mental depends on an outward manifestation, for its very existence, is not so easily answered. That's the thorny issue. Experience shows me that the intent to act is prior to the act itself, therefore the mental is prior to its outward expression. So, the mental, if prior to its outward expression, cannot be dependent on the outward expression. And this is why the issue is thorny. Being independent from its outward expression, means that there is no necessary relationship between the mental and its outward manifestation. The outward manifestation therefore does not necessarily provide a reliable representation of the mental. That's the problem, and why dishonesty may be allowed to thrive.

It wasn't a rhetorical question. — Isaac

It wasn't a rhetorical answer either.

How so? — Isaac

But I do not believe that you don't already grasp the answer to this question yourself, so I can't help but think that you are being dishonest here. Anyway, I'll answer it for you, and you can tell me if it's consistent with what you believe.

Through deception a person can make me think that they are helping me to achieve my goals, and get me to do things I wouldn't otherwise do. Then it will turn out that the person had no real intention of helping me achieve any of my goals, and those things I have done for that person will prove to have been a waste of time and money, and this is actually detrimental to achieving my own goals, counterproductive. That's how deception provides the means for one to take advantage of me.

Surely if two of you (assuming even one of you is right) can be wrong about how minds work as a result of their introspection of their own mind, then introspection delivers both wrong as well as right impressions of how your own mind works, about two thirds of the time, at least? — Isaac

You should acknowledge that this is extremely faulty logic. Two out of three people being wrong once, out of an unspecified number of judgements, does not produce the conclusion of being wrong two thirds of the time. The number of judgements could be millions, with only two instances of them being wrong.

In other words, you completely misrepresent introspection, as producing a one time judgement, when in reality it is an ongoing process with multitudes of judgements.

So if introspection delivers both correct and incorrect answers as to how the mind works, what motivates the methodology here? By what means do you propose the results of introspection are tested to see which are right and which are wrong? More introspection? That's just going to deliver about the same proportions of right and wrong answers. — Isaac

The methodology can be described as faith in logic. We take simple principles of logic, and apply them with faith in them, without the need to test the conclusions. We have faith in the logic so we accept the conclusions without testing. These are simple principles like the law of non-contradiction. Through introspection a person can determine whether one holds contradictory beliefs, such as when one applies one principle in some situations, and a contradicting principle in other situations. Introspection is the only way that we reveal these internal contradictions to ourselves. Then we proceed with faith in the law of non-contradiction, to rectify the internal contradiction, which can be called an instance of self-deception.

I think going into this would derail the thread. — fdrake

Not necessarily, introspection is very important to truth as honesty, which is what I've been arguing. Introspection is the means by which we determine consistency and inconsistency within our own beliefs. We must continuously apply principles of logic to the beliefs which we have developed over the years, to compare old beliefs with new beliefs, and rid ourselves of inconsistency.

This is also the means by which we determine potential deception from others. We have to compare what the person has said in the past, with what the person is saying now. However, unless we search for written material, we only have our own minds (memory), as the means to access what the person has said in the past. So the process whereby we apply logic to determine inconsistency in others is simply a form of introspection, except we must necessarily distinguish the beliefs of another from one's own beliefs.

Jesus said "I am Son of man". Others said "he is Son of God". To claim "I am Son of God" was blasphemy, a punishable offence. The Jews wanted Pilate to judge Jesus as guilty of that offence, and apply punishment. Jesus said I am here to witness the truth. Pilate said what is truth. Then Pilate said he found no basis for a charge against Jesus, expressing his honest opinion, and turned Jesus over to the Jews, washing his hands of the matter. The Jews afflicted punishment.

And the problem with that would be...? — Isaac

You see no problem in allowing deception to be truth? Personally, I like to keep my truths free from deception. That is my preference, and I think it's because I have a will of my own. And, I do not like to be taken advantage of. For me, that's where the problem is, if we allow deception to reign as truth, it provides the means for others to take advantage of me.

But if you don't mind your honest beliefs being the product of deception, I really don't mind that. Do you have a free will?

Right, but q could become an endless string of proposals for the necessary conditions of "truth", as we're already experiencing in this thread anyway.

To the extent our model of the world is "true" – pragmatically useful – we gain power over the entropy flows of our environments and can bend them to our collective will. — apokrisis

Oh my God! "True" is being defined as "pragmatically useful" now. This gives free reign to dishonesty, sophistry, and deception, because when these intentions are the prevailing interest (Trumpism for example), they rule as the truth under this definition.

So it seems to me at least that he doesn't endorse the correspondence theory but does endorse the Aristotelian theory, which he thinks of as different. — Michael

This description of the Aristotelian theory of truth does not delve deep enough to reveal the serious problem which Aristotle exposed.

"Truth" speaks of "states of affairs", as you say, "what is", and "what is not", being and not being. But reality has many examples of becoming, change. And what Aristotle demonstrated is that becoming is fundamentally incompatible with the descriptive principles of "what is", and "what is not". This results in the need to relinquish the law of excluded middle, allowing change, or "becoming" to occupy that place where this law is violated, the place of "neither is nor is not". The inclination to enforce the law of excluded middle, without exception, allows sophists to produce all sorts of absurd conclusions about what is real.

The demonstration provided by Aristotle goes something like this. If state of affairs A changes, and becomes state of affairs B, then we need to propose something intermediate between A and B which would refer to the change itself. If this were another state of affairs, we could describe it as C. And C would be the state which exists between A and B as the change from one to the other. But then we would need to propose states between A and C, and between C and B, to account for the change from state A to state C, and from state C to state B. Then we'd need to place other states between A and C, etc.. As you can see, this need to place another state between the two described states, to account for the change from one state to another, would proceed infinitely, and we would never actually be describing "the change" from one state to another, we'd only be describing a progression of states.

The conclusion is that change, or becoming, is fundamentally different from "states of affairs" and cannot be properly described in terms of "what is", and "what is not". This exposes the need for a dualism, and Aristotle's proposal of hylomorphism, in which "form" is the category for states of affairs, and "matter" is the category for becoming, or change.

Considering everything that's been discussed, I think the focus on truth is a red herring. We take as a starting point "snow is white" is true iff p and then argue over p. I think we should instead take as a starting point snow is white iff q and then argue over q. — Michael

Sure, but if we remove "true" from the equation, then we are off topic of the thread, which is a discussion of truth.

And the final step is to say that the shared model we each access just is the neighbourhood. — Banno

So, the big question. Isn't this Platonism, plain and simple? The entire universe is just a a model, a collection of ideas.

Ah, I see you have already done some critique. Excellent. Here you move towards my view; that there is no model. — Banno

That's right, there is no model. Even I might agree with you on this. But this is because each particular instance of use is unique to itself. Adhering to this principle leaves what is in the mind as very difficult to understand. However, the solution is not to deny that there is anything in the mind.

It seems, then, that the models must have something in common if they are to be considered models of the neighbourhood. We must be able to say that this house, in one model, is the same as that house, in the other. There must be some basis for our being able to translate between the models, if we are to say they model the neighbourhood. — Banno

I thought you were rejecting this talk about models. What giives?

And the final step is to say that the shared model we each access just is the neighbourhood. — Banno

Big mistake here. I thought you were rejecting models. But you just couldn't, you had to allow the model back in. Now, since you booted it out of the mind, it must be in the neighbourhood. What kind of nonsense is this? A model is artificial, constructed, fabricated, what do you make of all those parts of the neighbourhood which are natural?

I said "and", not "or". It must have both internal logic and consistent reasoning given as set of premises, but these premises need not be strictly true. If the internal logic is faulty, it cannot be rational even with consistent reasoning given a set of premises according to my definition. — ToothyMaw

OK, that should clarify this matter. You would say that the action is a logical action, even if it is based in false premises. So, for example, if I hold as a belief (a premise), that violence is an acceptable means for getting what I want, so I practise violence when I want something, then this is not acting irrationally?

I do not deny this. I'm saying that if we are talking about someone actually being rational and making a rational decision, they must eliminate all other possibilities because of reasoning - even if that reasoning is faulty. — ToothyMaw

This is not a fair representation of "being rational" at all. It is not necessary that we eliminate all other possibilities before acting, in order to act rationally. It is most often the case that many options are all rational, like noAxiom's right or left, and we must choose from a large number of equally rational options.

And what is rational could change and it would be relevant up until a course of action is selected. But while actions are limited by our intent to act rationally, act a is not free, or every action becomes rational. — ToothyMaw

Nor is this a fair representation. Intentional acts are limited by the intent, but the intent is not necessarily to act rationally. People have all sorts of different intentions, and many will supersede rationality, even forcing rationality right out of the picture sometimes. That's a big problem with morality, we even sometimes know that our acts are irrational yet we go ahead anyway, because the desire for something else is stronger than the desire to be rational.

So it is only by saying that we necessarily intend to act rationally that you can conclude here that the will is not free. But that is not a true premise, because obviously in the majority of our actions we do not even intend to act rationally. Our attentions are directed toward things other than being rational, and we just do them, rational or not, because acting rationally is usually not placed as the top priority.

I am discussing what is the case in a perfect instance of rational decision making. Considerations of whether or not humans make decisions irrationally is irrelevant. — ToothyMaw

I'm afraid that "perfect instance of rational decision making" is an oxymoron. Rational decision making is never perfect, that's why there is always a very strong probability that there was a better course of action than the one taken. We usually don't think about this though, unless there is a very serious, or injurious mistake. So we just take the consequences of our actions as they come, as satisfactory outcomes, not dwelling on the fact that the decision was less than perfect and that if we had taken a different course the outcome might have been even better.

Perhaps, but one need not consider every possible irrational course of action to come up with one that is while deliberating. I didn't say that p represents all irrational courses of action, but rather those considered. And even if one does not consider many irrational actions because irrational people don't think before acting, and thus are acting irrationally, people almost always deliberate and consider multiple courses of action if they are acting rationally. — ToothyMaw

I can't understand what you are trying to say here. Isn't it necessary for a person to deliberate on a possible action, to know whether it is an irrational or a rational act? If the person doesn't consider the possible action, the person will never have any idea as to whether it is the best possible action, or the worst possible action. So each possible action, rational or irrational, must be deliberated on, in order for the person to exclude a possible act as irrational. If a person does not consider all possible actions, the best possible action might be overlooked.

a. Humans are somewhat inherently rational and take some actions based upon reasoning and internal logic.

b. A rational action a need only have internal logic and consistent reasoning given a set of premises g to be rational to an actor x.

c. The reasoning supplied for the action a of actor x must necessarily preclude all otherwise possible courses of action p, which contains both rational and irrational decisions, based upon reasoning and/or considerations of internal logic.

d. If actor x has free will, they can choose combinations of courses of action that are subsets of p that are not otherwise available to actor x even with the intent to act rationally.

e. By necessity, all actions p + a that are considered with the intent to act rationally and those that are precluded by reasoning/faulty logic must be rational or action a is unfree depending upon whether or not free will exists.

f. If all actions p + a are to be deemed rational or not based upon merit, then each's premises must be differentiated in terms of subsets of the collection of infallible premises q. — ToothyMaw

I don't see that you have properly distinguished between rational and irrational. You seem to be saying that an irrational act follows from some kind of "internal logic", which is logic that may be faulty, and this is the means by which you can say that an irrational act is actually in some sense rational.

So, the fault in (b) is that what you call a "rational action", may actually be irrational, because the internal logic may be faulty, yet the irrational act qualifies as a "rational action" by your definition.

Then, in premise (c) you go way off track. The selection of a course of action, does not necessarily "preclude" all other possible courses of action. One may set out on a course of action, being somewhat unsure of oneself, and ready to change course at a moment's notice. And, the changes which occur at a "moment's notice" are often the most irrational. This is where stress, anxiety, and various emotions can quickly overcome the rationality of one's actions. When a person gets frustrated, angry, or experiences other emotions like these, one's actions may easily become very irrational.

In conclusion, I can say that your representation of "p", at (c), as "all otherwise possible courses of action", being precluded by one's decision, is completely incorrect. What you seem to be neglecting is that it is most often the case that an "irrational action" is one which occurs without due consideration of otherwise possible courses of action. So the proceeding into the irrational act occurs without considering all the other possible courses of action. and without the appropriate reasoning and internal logic, and this is what makes it truly "irrational".

Therefore "p" as the possible courses of action, in an irrational action, is completely backward in your representation. You represent the possible courses of action as having been considered by the acter, when in reality, the irrational acter does not consider those possible courses of action, hence the irrational act follows.