And the final step is to say that the shared model we each access just is the neighbourhood. — Banno

So, the big question. Isn't this Platonism, plain and simple? The entire universe is just a a model, a collection of ideas.

Ah, I see you have already done some critique. Excellent. Here you move towards my view; that there is no model. — Banno

That's right, there is no model. Even I might agree with you on this. But this is because each particular instance of use is unique to itself. Adhering to this principle leaves what is in the mind as very difficult to understand. However, the solution is not to deny that there is anything in the mind.

It seems, then, that the models must have something in common if they are to be considered models of the neighbourhood. We must be able to say that this house, in one model, is the same as that house, in the other. There must be some basis for our being able to translate between the models, if we are to say they model the neighbourhood. — Banno

I thought you were rejecting this talk about models. What giives?

And the final step is to say that the shared model we each access just is the neighbourhood. — Banno

Big mistake here. I thought you were rejecting models. But you just couldn't, you had to allow the model back in. Now, since you booted it out of the mind, it must be in the neighbourhood. What kind of nonsense is this? A model is artificial, constructed, fabricated, what do you make of all those parts of the neighbourhood which are natural?

I said "and", not "or". It must have both internal logic and consistent reasoning given as set of premises, but these premises need not be strictly true. If the internal logic is faulty, it cannot be rational even with consistent reasoning given a set of premises according to my definition. — ToothyMaw

OK, that should clarify this matter. You would say that the action is a logical action, even if it is based in false premises. So, for example, if I hold as a belief (a premise), that violence is an acceptable means for getting what I want, so I practise violence when I want something, then this is not acting irrationally?

I do not deny this. I'm saying that if we are talking about someone actually being rational and making a rational decision, they must eliminate all other possibilities because of reasoning - even if that reasoning is faulty. — ToothyMaw

This is not a fair representation of "being rational" at all. It is not necessary that we eliminate all other possibilities before acting, in order to act rationally. It is most often the case that many options are all rational, like noAxiom's right or left, and we must choose from a large number of equally rational options.

And what is rational could change and it would be relevant up until a course of action is selected. But while actions are limited by our intent to act rationally, act a is not free, or every action becomes rational. — ToothyMaw

Nor is this a fair representation. Intentional acts are limited by the intent, but the intent is not necessarily to act rationally. People have all sorts of different intentions, and many will supersede rationality, even forcing rationality right out of the picture sometimes. That's a big problem with morality, we even sometimes know that our acts are irrational yet we go ahead anyway, because the desire for something else is stronger than the desire to be rational.

So it is only by saying that we necessarily intend to act rationally that you can conclude here that the will is not free. But that is not a true premise, because obviously in the majority of our actions we do not even intend to act rationally. Our attentions are directed toward things other than being rational, and we just do them, rational or not, because acting rationally is usually not placed as the top priority.

I am discussing what is the case in a perfect instance of rational decision making. Considerations of whether or not humans make decisions irrationally is irrelevant. — ToothyMaw

I'm afraid that "perfect instance of rational decision making" is an oxymoron. Rational decision making is never perfect, that's why there is always a very strong probability that there was a better course of action than the one taken. We usually don't think about this though, unless there is a very serious, or injurious mistake. So we just take the consequences of our actions as they come, as satisfactory outcomes, not dwelling on the fact that the decision was less than perfect and that if we had taken a different course the outcome might have been even better.

Perhaps, but one need not consider every possible irrational course of action to come up with one that is while deliberating. I didn't say that p represents all irrational courses of action, but rather those considered. And even if one does not consider many irrational actions because irrational people don't think before acting, and thus are acting irrationally, people almost always deliberate and consider multiple courses of action if they are acting rationally. — ToothyMaw

I can't understand what you are trying to say here. Isn't it necessary for a person to deliberate on a possible action, to know whether it is an irrational or a rational act? If the person doesn't consider the possible action, the person will never have any idea as to whether it is the best possible action, or the worst possible action. So each possible action, rational or irrational, must be deliberated on, in order for the person to exclude a possible act as irrational. If a person does not consider all possible actions, the best possible action might be overlooked.

a. Humans are somewhat inherently rational and take some actions based upon reasoning and internal logic.

b. A rational action a need only have internal logic and consistent reasoning given a set of premises g to be rational to an actor x.

c. The reasoning supplied for the action a of actor x must necessarily preclude all otherwise possible courses of action p, which contains both rational and irrational decisions, based upon reasoning and/or considerations of internal logic.

d. If actor x has free will, they can choose combinations of courses of action that are subsets of p that are not otherwise available to actor x even with the intent to act rationally.

e. By necessity, all actions p + a that are considered with the intent to act rationally and those that are precluded by reasoning/faulty logic must be rational or action a is unfree depending upon whether or not free will exists.

f. If all actions p + a are to be deemed rational or not based upon merit, then each's premises must be differentiated in terms of subsets of the collection of infallible premises q. — ToothyMaw

I don't see that you have properly distinguished between rational and irrational. You seem to be saying that an irrational act follows from some kind of "internal logic", which is logic that may be faulty, and this is the means by which you can say that an irrational act is actually in some sense rational.

So, the fault in (b) is that what you call a "rational action", may actually be irrational, because the internal logic may be faulty, yet the irrational act qualifies as a "rational action" by your definition.

Then, in premise (c) you go way off track. The selection of a course of action, does not necessarily "preclude" all other possible courses of action. One may set out on a course of action, being somewhat unsure of oneself, and ready to change course at a moment's notice. And, the changes which occur at a "moment's notice" are often the most irrational. This is where stress, anxiety, and various emotions can quickly overcome the rationality of one's actions. When a person gets frustrated, angry, or experiences other emotions like these, one's actions may easily become very irrational.

In conclusion, I can say that your representation of "p", at (c), as "all otherwise possible courses of action", being precluded by one's decision, is completely incorrect. What you seem to be neglecting is that it is most often the case that an "irrational action" is one which occurs without due consideration of otherwise possible courses of action. So the proceeding into the irrational act occurs without considering all the other possible courses of action. and without the appropriate reasoning and internal logic, and this is what makes it truly "irrational".

Therefore "p" as the possible courses of action, in an irrational action, is completely backward in your representation. You represent the possible courses of action as having been considered by the acter, when in reality, the irrational acter does not consider those possible courses of action, hence the irrational act follows.

Going around in circles isn't helping at all. — Banno

This thread keeps circling back because Banno's dishonesty drags it down. And so it never gets anywhere. We can never progress in a discussion about truth when dishonesty interferes.

I also like this theory of truth quite a lot. I think that it accurately describes how we use the word "true", and avoids distinguishing between "What I think is true" and "What IS true". I don't see how we can know objectively what IS true, and I'm not even convinced that we even want to know what IS true. I also think that mindfulness and meditation can contribute to our understanding of truth. I think that meditation offers me a chance to experience the fundamental building blocks that everything else derives from, and any theory of truth must start from the meditative state of mind. — IntrospectionImplosion

This is why "truth" is best defined in terms of honesty. Except for a bunch of epistemologists, who are always looking for more, and are never satisfied, it's how the word is commonly used.

You get the idea. The truth flip flops with each revision. — Banno

Hegelian dialectics? This is called "becoming" and it's like a circle, except it's not a true circle because it's not closed in the sense of the Aristotelian description of a circle. It's more like a spiral.

. I reasoned to myself there's something fundamentally wrong with statements like p & ~p. It's snowing AND it's not snowing is "wrong" for the reason that the the second conjunct denies/negates the first - they cancel each other out and its as if someone who utters/writes a contradiction says nothing at all (+y + -y = 0]. — Agent Smith

If contradictions are just like equations which equal zero, then the conclusion from snowing and not snowing would be "nothing". So it couldn't be the case that "anything" follows from contradiction, because "nothing" is not the same as "anything". But "nothing" is really wrong, because snowing and not snowing are statements concerning "snowing", and negating that subject does not produce nothing in the most general sense, it leaves alone everything else except "snowing", where the contradiction creates a problem.

There's nothing in reality that is internal nor external; there's just the stuff we talk about. — Banno

Are you saying that the terms "internal" and "external" make no sense? How can that be? These are common terms used to refer to things which are inside of, or outside a proposed boundary. Internal/external is actually a very useful distinction, in subjects like systems theory for example.

Suppose we do away with this distinction. to just talk about "stuff". How would we ever understand the physical reality of "stuff", and the forces which act on "stuff", if we had no way of distinguishing between what is within a particular piece of stuff that we are trying to understand, and what is outside of that piece of stuff?

And yet, they are correct. I mean, you would not disagree that ('p' is true IFF p), would you?

So their use might be in providing some sort of grounding in relating meaning to truth. — Banno

I've already explained quite clearly why '"p' is true if p" says nothing about the meaning of truth, or even anything about the relationship between meaning and truth. To state it briefly, that is a simple repetition. Context is an essential aspect of meaning, and contexts are not repeated. They are each and every one of them, unique and particular. The expression you've given removes "p" from any and every context, so it effectively renders "p" as void of meaning.

What is important to note is that meaning is a feature of content. Content is material, in the sense of "subject matter", and it is dependent on interpretation. Formalizations (or formalisms) are intended to remove all content, to provide valid logic without the aspect of uncertainty inherent within content. But modern formalism attempts to apply formalizing tactics to content itself. This is a mistake, because we cannot remove the uncertainty from content, and the result is formalizations which are tainted with the uncertainty of the content which infiltrates. In other words, content, (which contains uncertainty), is imported into the formalization allowing uncertainty to contaminate the entire structure. The T-sentence proposed by Banno creates the illusion that we can have certainty with respect to meaning, or content, through exact repetition. But exact repetition is not a real aspect of meaning.

Now, if you folk could just agree as to where I am wrong... — Banno

I think consensus has been reached. The T-sentence does not do what you say it does.

1. "p" is X iff p

Does (1) tell us the meaning of "X"? If not then the T-schema doesn't tell us the meaning of "true". It sets out the condition under which "p" is true, but nothing more.

This, perhaps, is the point Sam26 makes when he says that the T-schema is irrelevant? — Michael

And, as I've mention before, this highlights the fact that Tarski didn't offer the T-schema as a definition of truth, but as a consequence of a correct definition. As I mentioned here, we still need an actual definition of "true". — Michael

OK, so let's say that, where Banno is wrong, is with interpretation. The T-schema doesn't say anything about the meaning of "truth", as a definition would. Nor does it provide a relationship between truth and meaning, because it removes truth from the context of meaning, thereby denying any meaning for truth. That is Banno's faulty interpretation.


It may be worthwhile to consider the relationship between "the correct definition of truth", and the T-schema. We may be able to produce as a valid conclusion, that "the correct definition of truth" is not possible, due to the relationship between truth and the particulars of the circumstances.

So instead of stating any one person is, "right" or "wrong", or even that it doesn't matter which is which, we can further simplify this by stating that there is is no right or wrong. There is merely that position which is different from another and is subject to change. — Universal Student

Think of "right" and "wrong" as being determined by the current norms of the society. In this sense, there is in many cases a valid right and wrong, what is consistent with conventional principles. However, when we seek what you call "ultimate truth", we have to have some way to go beyond right and wrong, because the conventional principles which constitute "right", in one's society, may not be consistent with the ultimate truth. In other words, we need to be free to question the current norms of our society, in the way of the skeptic

↪Metaphysician Undercover equates truth and honesty, which is to mistake the logic of truth for its illocutionary force. — Banno

There is no logic of truth, you ought to realize that by now. If there was a logic of truth, then truth would just be a form of justification.

And, the fact that we often cannot distinguish between when a person is being honest, and when the same person is being dishonest, is clear evidence that "illocutionary force" is irrelevant here. Telling a truth, or telling a lie may have the very same illocutionary force, so the difference between the two lies somewhere else.

Yes, that's a good way to put it, the learning process is a shaping. If one's mind is completely closed, as hypericin is afraid of in the op, then no shaping (learning) occurs. In Hegelian dialectics, which I briefly described, the synthesis called sublation is described as "becoming". What is proposed as "what is" is sublated with "is not", and this is synthesized into a new proposal of "what is" (like a compromise), to be sublated all over again, onward and onward, in a process which is not circular, but more like a spiral. This is very similar to what you described, except that position C is a synthesis of the opposing A and B.

Fascinating stuff Enrique. That's a lot of research. Here are a few things to think about, if you're interested.

CEMI theory thus holds potential to demystify the experience of volition, empirically countering questions raised by the well-known research of Benjamin Libet and more about whether conscious intention even exists, for the experience of our own willing would merely be the effect of especially large-scale and phase-locking saturated EM fields. — Enrique

To speculate about such a conclusion is premature. There is no discussion of the cause of such phase-locking, therefore no support to such speculation.

The problem as I see it, is that our understanding of electrical flow, as human beings, is extremely limited to the way that we use electrical flow, and that is as DC and AC. These modes of usage are represented as a modeling of the movement of particle, electrons. However, we also know that "the real" electrical flow does not occur through the movement of electrons, the energy is transmitted through the fields which are associated. So the modeling is not an accurate representation, only a useful one. And we will never properly understand the activity of the fields without the proper modeling of them, which would be without a dependence on a flow of electrons.

Entanglement is a process by which particle states such as spin in electrons and atoms or phase in photons correlate across distances at faster than light speed. — Enrique

This I believe is another premature conclusion, so it should be looked at as an unsound premise.

The model has faced criticisms from scientists who claim the brain is too hot and wet to support large-scale coherence of this kind, but recent experiments have aimed to assess whether light induces a coherent energy field in microtubules where molecular structure alone cannot. — Enrique

"Hot and wet" is not a beautiful image, let's just say that the brain is warm and moist, that's more appealing.

The brain is unique because electric currents likely found in all cells are so strong and compact in this organ that a robust EM field is generated which can coordinate the magnetic particles in large swaths of tissue as an individual unit. — Enrique

Isn't this a sort of backward way of looking at things? Instead of saying that electric currents generate an EM field (as if a current of electrons creates the field), we should say that the EM field causes what is observed as an electric current. Then we do not have the dual level of causation you describe, electric current causes EM field which causes ordered particle patterns. That dual level of causation creates undue complexity. Instead, we could say that the EM field causes coordinated particle patterns, some of which can be observed as electric current.

And now we're back on topic. — Srap Tasmaner

But the thread is very uninteresting. As usual for a thread on "truth", pages and pages with nothing conclusive, not even any agreement as to which direction to go. I'll take the road to Damascus. No! Don't go that way, the sun's too bright, and you might see the Way out of Plato's cave. No one knows what truth is, so they just make things up, whatever seems reasonable from their world view. How could made up stuff be the truth?

No wonder Pilate would not wait around for an answer, that would be an extremely long wait. Instead, he threw Jesus to the Jews, to let them decide "the truth" about him. Saul figured it out, didn't he? No, he was dishonest, he did not really believe that Jesus was Son of God. But at least his dishonesty was designed for compromise, which produced a semblance of peace amongst fractured theists.

If we somehow decide that subject A is right and subject B is wrong, and subject B yields to this and thus changes his position to match that of A, what then? What do you do with that? What is the function of this determination and the resulting shift. How many moments will pass before Subject C comes along and it is somehow determined that both Subject A and now B are wrong and Subject C is right. Then what? Positions change again, resulting in another shift. — Universal Student

It's not that one is right, and the other is wrong, the thesis and antithesis sublate each other, and the resulting synthesis creates something new. Hegelian dialectics.

Again, you really do not seem to have any understanding of the concept of "order". If you have no desire to consider such a concept, then go right ahead, and allow order to remain a meaningless regurgitation from your perspective.

I don't see how that's relevant. it has nothing to do with how we count. That it takes a quantity of eleven things to establish an order consisting of eleven things, does not imply that a person needs to know the quantity in order to know the order.

It seems to me that our culture is more into short-term feeling-good than long-term well-being, and there's a price to be paid for that preference. — praxis

That's called materialism. Material Girl: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6p-lDYPR2P8

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8......at each point in that series represented by a different numeral, the number of numerals, including the one selected and all those to the left of the one selected, is equal to the number represented by the numeral at the point selected. — Janus

No, the numerals on a number line do not represent the number of numerals, because there is zero, and negatives.

Sure, I'm not trying to establish a theory of teaching numbers, but counting is not counting without things to be counted. — Janus

What I said in the first post on this subject, is that what is said to be counted, is the number itself. That's why our methods of learning lend themselves very well to Platonic realism.

Two being after one means nothing without a notion of quantity. — Janus

You haven't learned about "order" yet? Do you read left to right? Take a look at a number line. There's no quantities on that line.

In my view the meaning of the words must be learnt by reference to numbers of objects. How would you explain what "two" means without showing two whatevers? — Janus

Two is after one, plain and simple, it's the number after one, that's the meaning we were taught. That's how we learned it, as an order, one, then two, then three, then four, ... "to infinity and beyond! ".

The issue of guilt is central to Christianity, especially with the idea of original sin. I definitely struggled with guilt at times, but I am not sure that guilt is the main problem in life and wonder if as Schopenhauer and Buddhists argue that the hardest aspect of life is suffering. — Jack Cummins

"Suffering" is a very broad term which is used to refer to anything which life's difficulties brings about. So "suffering" is not really the hardest aspect of life, it is just the general term for what all the different hard aspects of life may produce.

The numbers are usually shown to correspond with objects, like five fingers, ten fingers, two eyes and so on. — Janus

In my experience, the numbers were shown to correspond with quantities, only after the numbers were learns. That's the point, we learn the numbers (words) first, then we learn the correspondence. We counted to ten, then twenty, then learned how to get to one hundred. Fingers were not involved. Learning the concept of "quantity" came after learning how to count. Maybe we should ask a grade school teacher about this, for confirmation. Or, try some Google research:

1. Stable Order
The first principle of counting involves the student using a list of words to count in a repeatable order. This ordered or “stable” list of counting words must be at least as long as the number of items to be counted. — https://makemathmoments.com/counting-principles/

I suspect it will come down to whether one is susceptible to those arguments. — Tom Storm

I would say rather, it comes down to whether or not one understands the principles involved. Denial, and refusal to take the time and effort required to understand, intellectual laziness, renders one not "susceptible to those arguments".

But to be frank - I am not really in the explanation business. It's religions which seem to want certainty. — Tom Storm

You seem to have this backward. Faith is in no way certainty.

It was also when I saw some of the negative impacts of religious beliefs, especially guilt, and so many contradictions. — Jack Cummins

Ridding oneself of guilt is central to Christianity. Love thy neighbour, confessions, forgiveness, are all principles tailored to help free us from the burden of guilt.

For me god/s have no explanatory power. — Tom Storm

If you read the right philosophy you will see that the concept of "God" actually has great explanatory power. Understanding the nature of reality reveals that the Idea, or Form, of a material object necessarily precedes in time, the material existence of the object, as cause of that material object being the unique object which it is . We understand the reality of this process, as to how the Idea precedes the material existence of the object through the understanding of the human will, final causation. And since we understand the earth, and the universe as unique material things, which must have an Idea, or Form, which precedes them in time, as cause of their unique being, the Will of God provides that explanatory power.

Why doesn't everyone just sum up their views of truth in roughly two to three paragraphs — Sam26

Two or three paragraphs is not needed for me. To express your honest belief, to the best of your ability, is to tell the truth.

If you want to discuss what honest means, that would take more than two or three paragraphs.

That all said, being lost isn't a pleasant experience... — Agent Smith

It is a great source of anxiety. But... we can learn to embrace our anxiety, because anxiety is the source of motivation.

in fact it is by using objects that children are taught to count. — Janus

I don't agree with this supposed "fact". I was taught how to count by learning an order. We start with the word one, then two, then three, up to ten. A few repetitions and I had the order memorized. It was explained that each number represents a different quantity, but I was not shown those different quantities. I was shown some of the quantities, like one and two, to get the idea of what a quantity was, but that's not how I learned to count. I learned to count by learning the order.

I believe that this is why we readily accept Platonic realism, because when we learn to count in this way, by learning an order, the only objects counted are the numbers. But intuitively we believe that if we are counting, or if we are learning an order, then there must be something real which is counted, or ordered. That is, if one apprehends an order, there must be something which is ordered, and that something is the numbers. Therefore, numbers are real objects, which have an order, Platonic realism.

I think we argue a position to bring out all the fine details of that position, and also bring out the details of the counter position which someone else is arguing. The devil is in the details. We should be ready and willing to change our beliefs when the details don't work out right.

I think a distinction needs to be made between these two claims:

1. "p" is true iff p
2. "'p' is true" means "p"


Now Davidson pointed out that if you have a true T-sentence such as

1. "S" is true iff p

then you have in p, in effect, the meaning of S. — Banno

The problem here of course is that this doesn't really give you the meaning of S. You might say that "S" is true iff p, and replicate "S" with p, but that is just to repeat S, not to give it's meaning. You might make up something else, like "S" is true if q, but that would just be a subjective opinion of the meaning of "S". Or you might propose a justified meaning of "S", but that would just give you a justified meaning of "S", not the true meaning of "S". So the T-sentence really gives you absolutely nothing.

Good idea. A bit of depth.

We can perhaps see the difference most clearly if we look to the use of each rather than meaning. Let's look at an example in which it might make sense to separate truth from belief.

There's a tree over the road. Suppose Fred believes the tree is an English Oak. But it is a Cork Oak.

We might write, in order to show the bivalency of the belief:

Believes ( Fred, The tree over the road is an English Oak)
And
True (The tree over the road is a Cork Oak). — Banno

You haven't gotten very far yet. The difference between "it is a Cork Oak" and "it is an English Oak", is that the former is justified. Yet you say that the difference is that the former is true. This makes "true" nothing other than "justified", in practise. But in theory you insist on a difference between justified and true. How do you describe that difference? Where do you turn to place "true", to God's belief (absolute truth), or to the individual's belief (honest subjectivity)?

Indeed, we may protest in all and sundry ways but the tug of gravity - the force acting on you and a stone with equal mass to yours - will be the same. Nevertheless we maybe able to reduce counter gravity by increasing our air resistance via maximizing our surface area either by simply stretching out our limbs and assuming a prone/supine position or with the aid of a parachute or a wingsuit. — Agent Smith

The "force" is said to be the same, that's how the concept of "force" was created. But the effect of that force, on the stone vs. on the human being, is not the same, that's how we can walk upright. Since the effect is different, then we can say that the cause which is identified as the force of gravity is not the same in relation to you as it is in relation to a stone. Why this cause is different in relation to you, from what it is in relation to a stone, I don't know.

What be dasein? — Agent Smith

Heidegger's "Being and Time" is very difficult and there is as many interpretations of it as there are readers who claim to understand it. A quick glance at Wikipedia tells me that Dasein is "being-in-the-world". I believe he is commonly interpreted as saying that there are two types of things in the world, or more precisely two different ways of looking at things, those which are present-at-hand, and those which are ready-to-hand. Roughly speaking, things present-at-hand are all the things surrounding us which we are extremely familiar with, the day-to-day items we use on a regular basis, the things whose existence we take granted. Things we don't quite understand, and so we enquire into their nature, therefore things not taken for granted, are things ready-to-hand. You can see why I say, more precisely it's two different ways of looking at things, because the same items might be present-at-hand, or ready-to-hand, depending on one's perspective.

Here's food for thought: Gravity doesn't recognize a self - there's no difference in the way you fall and the way a block of stone of equal mass falls. With respect to physics at least, anatta. — Agent Smith

This is not so true, because at the time of falling there are many possibilities open to the human being which the stone does not have. We can flail around, scream, grab for things, reach for a parachute, whatever. A stone doesn't have these options.

I think Heidegger had a lot to say about fallenness. It appears like Dasein has fallen into the world, or something like that. I think this is the process whereby authenticity is replaced by inauthenticity, it has something to do with being present in time.

"p" is true IFF p, where p is the meaning of "p". — Banno

This is very problematic. Do you mean, 'where p is what is believed to be the meaning of "p"'? That would just make truth belief. Or what exactly do you mean by "the meaning of 'p'"? Since it appears to be very important to the truth or falsity of "p", according to your scheme, maybe you could give us some guidance as to how to determine the meaning of "p".

I'm a bit confused right now. The notion of a definition includes a word which can be any damn thing you want (arbitrary) although etymology-based ones tend to make sense and are more easily recalled + what the definiens lists are, conventionally, essential features (not arbitrary) of that element/set the word is assigned to. I think I'm making a noob mistake; sorry, I'm new to the game (of philosophy). — Agent Smith

One must be wary of "etymology-based" definitions. The definition employed by the logician will significantly restrict the word's usage in comparison to the common usage. However, the word still has all that baggage within the reader's mind, habitual associations. The dishonest logician (sophist) will employ that baggage (equivocation) to produce the appearance of valid conclusions which are really invalid. The conclusions are invalid because they require making associations outside of what is stipulated by the significantly restricted definition.

Michael provided an example:

“John is a bachelor” is true iff John is a bachelor

“John is a bachelor” is true iff John is an unmarried man

This shows us the meaning of “bachelor”. — Michael

There are no definitions provided here, but we must assume that "true" means the same thing in both instances. Also, "iff" signifies a special relation, and the second phrase on the right side of iff must have the same special relation with the proposition "John is a bachelor" as the first one does. This is stipulated by "is true iff", because the meaning of "is true iff" must remain static.

We can only conclude that "a bachelor" means something different from "an unmarried man" if we allow that the first "true" means something different from the second "true".

This is why the example shows us nothing about the meaning of "bachelor". It does not provide a definition of "bachelor" because a definition is to place the word into a wider context.. Here, the two "bachelor" and "unmarried man" are placed in the exact same context, so we have no definition. It is only if you allow your mind to wander, and think that "man", and "unmarried" have a wider context of meaning, that the illusion is created that something has been said about the meaning of "bachelor". But such a wandering mind is not allowed in logic, because it contaminates the soundness, and produces invalid conclusions by way of equivocation.

Don't fall to the idealist error of thinking truth is dependent on you. Down that path lies solipsism.

It could still rain without you noticing. — Banno

It could rain without anyone noticing it, but there would be no proposition without someone to produce it. And truth is of the proposition. Therefore no truth without someone noticing something.

I suppose when I speak of the potential defeat about authenticity it is not really the principle of authenticity but the underlying goals which have not been achieved. These are more about the tangible or practical implications rather than in practice rather than in theory. It is possible to seek fulfillment in an authentic way but end up unhappy with the reality of what occurs in real life. — Jack Cummins

I still think that the important and significant thing to recognize is the difference between what is possible and what is impossible. A person would not set a goal which one knows as impossible. The reality, in an ever changing world, is that those goals which are possible, and those which are impossible, are rapidly changing their status as time passes. This means that goals must be flexible, dropped or altered, at a moment's notice, as time passes, because an impossible goal is not a rational goal. In this way, the unhappiness of a failed goal cannot ever occur because as soon as failure becomes inevitable, that goal which is doomed to failure is rejected, altered or replaced, therefore no longer a goal. The point of failure is therefore never reached, because the failing goal is rejected and replaced with an obtainable goal before failure occurs.

Having flexibility, and the capacity to alter goals is very important to safety in a dangerous work place for example. The circumstances which dictate the degree of safety at any particular time, are never static. When the risk increases, and accident is possible, goals must be changed immediately. The capacity to perceive changes to circumstances which produce the need to alter goals, and to take immediate action on this need, I think is mostly derived from a type of intuition. However, the intuition may be honed, and is greatly increased through experience.

Here's the point at issue:
on the one hand we have the view that facts and true propositions are distinct, but related in that facts are what make true propositions true.
on the other hand we have the view that a fact just is a true proposition.

I take the latter, you the former, views. — Banno

Just so that I can understand how this "view" works, can you explain how you would distinguish between a proposition which is a fact, and a proposition which is a falsity. Please don't say something like the proposition "p" is true iff p, or I'll accuse you of being dishonest again. That's because '"p" is true iff p', is a statement which relates the proposition referred to by "p" to the fact referred to with p, which is what you just rejected.

If you make any changes to what p refers to (a bachelor), or to what q refers to (an unmarried man), such that they no longer both refer to the very same thing, you can no longer make the same "is true iff" statements. Therefore p and q necessarily refer to the very same thing.

This shows us the meaning of “bachelor”. — Michael

No it does not, that's the point I made in the other thread. It just shows that "bachelor" and "unmarried man" refer to the very same thing, but it shows nothing about the meaning of those terms. For that, we'd have to look at the meaning of "unmarried", and of "man". The attempt to avoid the infinite regress of definitions is an illusion, and really a farce because it's so obviously simple sophistry.