546

No, I don't think they got the order confused, it seems reasonable to me. But I don't really understand the first degree of corruption; it's described as having a mathematical cause.

The first degree of corruption is honour. It is described as coming about through some mathematical principles which allow the prescribed principles of eugenics that keep the aristocracy pure, to be degraded. The rulers then trend toward infighting, civil war, and war opens up to them, the spoils of war, property and riches seized. The turning toward money pushes them into the second degree of corruption.

Naturally occurring versus the product of intention hence artificial - interesting. I've always assumed human activities are a subcategory of naturalism. Are you drawing on a particular source for this? — Tom Storm

As a source, look up artificial in the dictionary. The point though, is that if science is the way toward understanding the natural, then if we use something other than science, like moral philosophy, to understand intentional acts, shouldn't we conclude that these are not natural? Or would you say that we completely misunderstand intention, and we ought to use science to understand it, rather than moral philosophy. If so, I'd say that you suffer from the prejudice, "that the natural world is all which exists".

Jamalrob is right. And I think part of the argument is that the person best suited to rule is the one who least wants the job, because to provide the best rule is the hardest job there is. The philosopher would only be moved to take the job of ruler, if life under the present rule got so bad, that it was worse than having to rule would be. If there haven't ever been any philosopher rulers, we can conclude that the rulers have never gotten so bad for the philosophers, to drive one to be a ruler.

Naturalism is the term most educated skeptics and atheist philosophers would use. They would generally hold to methodological naturalism - that science is the most reliable tool we can use to understand the natural world and not hold to philosophical naturalism - that the natural world is all which exists. This latter claim being too totalising and unjustifiable. — Tom Storm

Let's reject the latter claim then, being to totalizing and unjustifiable. Now we are able to allow the possibility that there is more to reality than the natural world. And, if there is non-natural aspects of the world, we would probably be using something other than science to understand them, science being the means for understanding the natural aspects of the world.

So here's a proposal. The artificial aspects of the world are distinct from the natural aspects of the world, because they are created by human activities rather than by nature. And we know that these artificial things are not natural because they are caused through intention, which we understand through philosophy and ethics rather than science.

Does this work for you? Since there are these aspects of reality, intentional acts, which we understand through means other than science, does this give you sufficient evidence that the natural world is not all that exists?

That’s a totally unacceptable misrepresentation of what Aristotle is saying.

He is NOT saying that it is a view held a long time ago. He says it is an ancient tradition that has come down from distant ancestors to his own day: — Apollodorus

I think it is a very good analogy, just like today, many people believe in God and go to church. This is an ancient tradition which has come down from distant ancestors, just like what Aristotle refers to. The problem is in your claim that this religion is what was generally accepted, and even worse, your claim that Aristotle was promoting this idea which came down from distant ancestors.

You seem to be missing the basic facts of what Aristotle wrote. He refers to all these things, such as the heaven, and aether, as "bodies". He also demonstrates that although eternal circular motion is logically possible, anything involved in such a rotation, or revolution, must be a "body". Then he explains why each and every body, being composed of matter, is generated and will be destroyed. So it is very clear that he has indicated that although the "distant ancestors" believed these bodies to be eternal, he does not. Then, in De Anima he explains why anything truly eternal must be conceived of as non-spatial, immaterial.

This is precisely why Aristotle brings established view up, namely to justify his own view. — Apollodorus

He actually brings up such established views to refute them. But Socrates got put to death for speaking out against such established views, so Aristotle is much more careful. He produces all the evidence required to prove such views as unacceptable, allowing the student to draw the conclusion, without himself directly speaking out against the establishment.

Aristotle here is not concerned with the Gods, but with the divine (theion) as a principle the existence of which he regards as “certain” and beyond dispute: — Apollodorus

Right, maybe you're now catching on. He is not directly speaking out against "the Gods", he is demonstrating that there is a real need for a conception of "divine". But in the process he shows that the established conception of "divine" is unacceptable.

But we’ve been through this many times already and I’m not going to waste any more of my time. — Apollodorus

Yes we have already been through this, and you refuse to acknowledge what Aristotle actually wrote, skimming through the texts, quoting passages which appear to support your prejudice.

There is a very real and evident problem with the way that Wittgenstein describes obeying a rule, and that is that this way of looking at rule following pays no real respect to the internal mechanism of the mind of the person who is said to have obeyed the rule.

So for example, if we give two distinct people from two distinct parts of the world, the same division problem, they might use completely different mental techniques to come up with the same correct answer. Since they both have the same correct answer, we'd say that they both followed the same rule. But if we timed the activity, we might find one quicker than the other. And if we enquire as to the procedure, or give them a difficult 'long division' problem, so that we can observe their mental activity being expressed on paper, we'd see that they each followed a different mental procedure. Therefore there is a real issue of very distinct mental processes each leading to the same conclusion, and the observation of obeying the same rule, because each produces the correct answer, when the processes being followed are actually distinct.

So, I have this question: "Is there any meaning talking about 'materialism' to materialists, since they can't see or think that there's anything else than matter, anyway?" That is, it is something self-evident for them. You can see this also as a paradox: "Materialism has no meaning for a materialist"! — Alkis Piskas

I think that the same prejudice which constitutes the materialist attitude closes an individual's mind to the reality of how vast and truly unknown the unknown actually is. In other words, the proposition 'anything real is material' applies an artificial closure to the extent of the unknown, which limits a person's logical capacity to the confines of one's own conception of matter, and this restricts the person's capacity to learn. This act of restricting the unknown by assuming that a proposition like this, describing the unknown, is truthful, is very unphilosophical. Since this prejudice has become very deeply rooted in our society, and those who hold it are fundamentally unphilosophical, it is in most cases rather pointless to be talking to a materialist about materialism.

I actually think that's exactly what Wittgenstein himself is trying to get across. To not misunderstand one for the other.

It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact
that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after
another;(descriptive rule) but that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" (prescriptive rule)
— Ludwig Wittgenstein — Hermeticus

I don't exactly agree. For Wittgenstein, "obeying a rule" is to be observed and judged to be acting in a way which is consistent with the rule, hence his use of "exhibited". The need for a prescriptive rule really disappears for him. For a person to obey a prescriptive rule, in the sense of 'I should respect the rule and do what I ought to do', this requires that the person interpret the rule, then move to act according to one's interpretation of it. Notice that the interpretive part is what he is trying to avoid. So for him, "obeying a rule" is to be described as acting in a way consistent with the rule. And the means by which the person comes to act that way becomes sort of irrelevant. The person might just be copying the actions of others, or whatever.

It isn’t “someone else’s principle” at all. He presents it as generally accepted tradition!

As Aristotle himself says, it is a tradition “handed down from our ancestors” and he agrees with the idea, with the name, and even with the derivation of the name which he got from his teacher Plato: — Apollodorus

He presents it as what was believed by "all who believe in the existence of gods", what he calls "our distant ancestors". If someone were writing today, about what our distant ancestors believed about God, would you consider it a fair representation of what is generally accepted today? Would you look at the traditions of the Catholic church, and say that these are generally accepted traditions? We know that Socrates and Plato spoke out against "the gods" considerably.

The entire point of Wittgensteins argumentation was that "interpreting a rule" and "obeying a rule" are two completely different things. — Hermeticus

I believe this is a good interpretation, and the difference here amounts to the difference between a descriptive rule and a prescriptive rule. When we produce a descriptive rule, we come up with 'this is the way things behave'. That's a conclusion of inductive reasoning. There is nothing within the rule itself, to compel that a thing will behave like that in the next instance, so what causes the thing to behave like that, is a completely different issue.

If we say that being caused to behave according to a rule is what "obeying a rule" means, then we see the difference between "interpreting a rule" (as in understanding the described behaviour), and "obeying a rule", (as in causing oneself to act according to the described behaviour). On the other hand though, we can say that "obeying a rule" is to act in a way which can be judged as being consistent with the described rule.

The difference between these two interpretations of "obeying a rule" is the difference between judging the cause, and judging the effect. Wittgenstein opts for the latter, making "obeying a rule" something which is observed after the fact, rather than something decided prior to the act, in the sense of interpreting a prescriptive rule, and acting accordingly. So the prescriptive rule is not relevant to Wittgenstein's position on rule following, and we must be careful when reading him not to misunderstand.

What about -1?

You can write a condition on energies, say that the kinetic energy equals potential energy. The quantities are the same on both sides, Joule, that is. Dimensional analysis is, by the way, a useful tool if both sides of a = sign are consistent. In the equation of two energies, this is obvious but in complicated expressions it comes in handy and you can even use it to anticipate. — Cornwell1

The thing about equating kinetic energy with potential energy is that it seems to involve some kind of category mistake to describe the two as equal. One is a measure of the actual movement of a thing, while the other is a measure of a thing's capacity to move. Since a cause is required to transform the potential to actual, then if we express the two as equal we neglect the reality that one is temporally prior, and the other posterior. This temporal difference implies that the supposed equality between them neglects an important fact.

And so, implying that the primary body is something else beyond earth, fire, air, and water, they gave the highest place a name of its own, aither, derived from the fact that it ‘runs always’ for an eternity of time

Notice two things here. First, "they gave...". Obviously, this is someone else's principle being referred to. Second, it's a primary "body" being referred to. Therefore it is material, generated, destructible, and definitely not eternal. This is another principle which Aristotle is demonstrating as faulty. Nice try Appollodorus, but you're clutching at straws now.

Anyway, now that you finally admit that your claim is your own and not Aristotle's — Apollodorus

Finally admit it? That it's my own believe is what I stated at the very beginning.

I believe it is the soul itself which is the incorporeal element. And this is the same for all living things. This is the Aristotelian structure. — Metaphysician Undercover

and that you have zero evidence to back it up, — Apollodorus

This is false though. You're so stuck in your own prejudice that you refuse to look at the evidence. I know I won't "sell it" to anyone so extremely compromised by prejudice, that they refuse to read the material.

Well "equal" is a human conception, so equality is fundamentally artificial. I suppose that's the point of the thread. But if we say that there are symmetries in nature, then we assume some sort of true natural equality.

This is what I don't understand. It appears like there must be some sort of true natural equality, which would ground our judgements of equality in some sort of truth. But at the same time it seems like the judgement as to which similarities we accept, and which differences we overlook, in our judgements of equal, are somewhat arbitrary or subjective. So where does the truth of equality lie? Or is equality something we totally made up as a fictional, but also very useful principle? If so, then why does it appear like there is true natural equality in the world?

The fact is that this is YOUR conclusion, not Aristotle’s. — Apollodorus

That's right. As I explained, this is the way that many good philosophers like Plato and Aristotle write. They lay out all the evidence as clearly as possible, allowing the reader to draw the required conclusion. This allows that the conclusion is made by the reader, rather than being forced on the reader through stipulation, so that the reader truly believes the conclusion which is made.

Saying “read the book, the evidence is there!” is mere evasion and not an acceptable argument in any philosophical or logical method that I am aware of. Anyone can say that.

Aristotle clearly says “eternal” (aidios) when referring to heaven and its circular movement. — Apollodorus

There is a type of philosophical writing, well exemplified by Wittgenstein, in which the author asserts something, then proceeds to demonstrates that the opposite of what is asserted is what the truth is. This is the Platonic method. Plato has Socrates' interlocutor make the assertion, then Socrates will proceed with the demonstration that what is asserted is not the truth. With Aristotle, we do not have the luxury of an interlocutor, to indicate the assertions which are to be proven as false. Without a very careful reading, an individual such as yourself, might not recognize which assertions are being proven to be false.

The heaven is NOT "composed of matter and therefore not eternal". It is composed of ether which is a divine and eternal substance. Therefore it is ETERNAL by definition. — Apollodorus

You obviously did not read "De Caelo" Bk1, Ch9. It is very clear that "the heaven" is one, and is a material object.

The world as a whole, therefore, includes all its appropriate matter, which is, as we saw, natural perceptible body. So that neither are there now, nor have there ever been, nor can there ever be formed more heavens than one, but this heaven of ours is one and unique and complete. — De Caelo Bk1, Ch9

Notice that "one" "unique", and "complete" are the defining attributes of a material body, a "particular". And at the beginning of Ch9 Aristotle explains carefully the difference between a particular thing, and a Form, or essential formula. The latter allows that there is more than one of the said thing.

That the heaven is a material body is also supported by your other quotes in which Aristotle demonstrates that anything which revolves in a circular rotation must be a material body.

Clearly, Aristotle is talking about the traditional four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, as being generated and therefore not eternal. This is precisely why he introduces ether as a fifth, divine and eternal element that has circular motion! — Apollodorus

Let me get this straight. In this section, Aristotle discusses how the earth and heaven are made up of bodies, are generated, and are not eternal. But you are claiming that he introduces "ether" here to justify eternality. Where's the reference to ether? Aether is a Pythagorean principle, and Aristotle firmly rejects Pythagoreanism. You are now demonstrating again, your ability to stretch your imagination.

I wonder what definition of symmetry Noether was working with. Looks like basic algebraic equality of the left hand side (LHS) to the right hand side (RHS) of an equation. No sign to flip/not. A balance/scale type of symmetry with equal "weights" on both sides; yet even here too the "weights" act in opposite directions (rotationally, one is clockwise and the other is anticlockwise). — Agent Smith

In mathematics, it is often said that the left hand side of the equation represents the very same thing as the right hand side, a specific mathematical value, or object. In reality, the two sides express two distinct things, with an equality between these two. When two things which are different, are said to be equal, the difference between them has already been excused in that judgement of equal. So we now have a second level of excusing differences for the sake of symmetry, the excuse which exists right at the level of producing the equation.

We can place this as the highest level. In pure math, the two sides represent the same thing. But in application of equations, the two sides don't really represent the same thing, the differences are excused in order that the equation may be applied. Then the second level is specific to the type of application. So in the example of conservation of energy, there is energy excused to entropy, and this is the second level of excuse.

But as soon as children are taken as living, thinking, interacting beings (beings-in-the-world with language ready-to-hand, as distinct from having language merely present-to-hand, to use the Heideggarian lingo), there simply is no poverty of stimulus. Attention-directedness, social-cues, semantic constraints, memory of previous social interactions and so on, all serve to account perfectly well for the so-called surprise at 'ungrammatical' statements. — StreetlightX

This type of description misses one very important aspect, and that is the will to learn. The distinction between "ready-to-hand" and "present-to-hand" is dependent on practice. That distinction takes practice for granted. But practice requires will. Because the nature of "will" remains in the category of the mystical, the mystical aspect cannot be avoided in this way.

In Aristotelian terms, from his On the Soul, the child is born with a "potential". Also, the grown and learnt human being, has a "potential". But these two senses of "potential" are obviously very different. We might say that the latter is an "informed potential". And the problem we have with this type of analysis is that providing a description of the "informed potential" does not give us a method toward understanding the uninformed potential, because a description always refers to the formal part. So taking the descriptive aspect of informed potential, "grammar", and applying it toward the uninformed aspect is actually a step in the wrong direction.

The issue present at hand though, is that the deeper we move toward the more raw, or uninformed potential, the bigger the gap we get between our principles for understanding, which are posterior to practice, and how well they are suited toward understanding what we are trying to understand, what is prior to practice. So we have to turn around, and start from the very bottom, and consider the principles required to describe the most raw potential possible. This is metaphysics. But such a start leaves absolutely no direction for the will. Therefore we must conclude that the will is directed by something completely other than "informed potential", being in some way the cause of informed potential, and this conclusion provides no way out of mysticism.

The 1st law of thermodynamics: energy can neither be created nor destroyed (the law of conservation of energy). This doesn't feel like symmetry as there's no polarity reversal even though there's conservation of magnitude. — Agent Smith

Symmetry, in its modern conception of mathematics, involves exact equivalence, invariance. Any such reversal is not a part of the symmetry, but evidence of asymmetry. A difference is not a part of the symmetry.

Anyway, symmetry, mirror symmetry to be precise, is about, mathematically speaking, magnitude and sign. The magnitude is conserved (there's a similarity between left and right), but then there's a difference too, the sign flips (left becomes right and vice versa aka lateral inversion). — Agent Smith

We went through this already, a mirror image is not a symmetry under this definition. If we were to apply symmetry principles to the mirror reflection, then the difference between the two images would be exposed, as what is not symmetrical.

In the case of conservation of energy, the loss of energy from a system, to things like friction, or any other unaccountable places, constitutes that difference. This forms the efficiency of the system. However, the symmetry (law of conservation), is maintained in principle, with the proposition of "entropy". The concept of entropy allows that the difference between the two, (amount of energy prior to and posterior to the activity), is simply energy which is lost to the system, i.e. unavailable to the system. So the law of conservation is maintained, in theory, and the lost energy (as the difference) is excused by "entropy". In the mirror analogy, the difference, left becomes right, would be excused, and we could say that 'the law of conservation of the image' is upheld through this excuse.

The circular movement of the heavens was a long-established view going back to the Babylonians. For Aristotle, the system is geocentric, and he thinks of the universe as a sphere revolving around the earth.

So everything is based on spheres and circles, these being said to be perfect geometric figures. Even in Plato, the universe is said to be created according to a perfect divine paradigm and therefore constitutes an image or reflection of divine perfection. — Apollodorus

Yes, this is where the problem was, the idea that the movements of the heavens could be represented as "perfect geometric figures". In a nutshell, this is Pythagorean idealism, the activities of the universe are composed of such Ideals. Plato demonstrated the deficiency of such idealism. And it is evident in the Timaeus that the orbits are not perfect circles. Exceptions to the "perfect geometric figures" were well known. So Aristotle moved even further in the refutation of this Pythagoreanism. You clearly misunderstand both Plato and Aristotle, when you claim that they support this notion that the universe is composed of perfect geometric figures. They were actually both working to expose the problems with this idea.

Clearly, this is NOT an argument Aristotle takes up for refutation, but one the facts of which he positively asserts and the truth of which he urges the reader to convince himself of. — Apollodorus

I honestly don't think that you even read the material, Appollodorus. You seem to just skim, in search of quotes to support your prejudice.

Read "De Caelo" Bk1 Ch9 please. He clearly defines "the heaven" as a particular material thing. It is perceptible and therefore consists of matter. It is one, and it consists of all physical or sensible bodies. No body is "outside" the heaven. Nor is there place, void, or time outside heaven.

But then he states what can be outside the heaven:

It is clear then that there is neither place, nor void, nor time outside the heaven. Hence whatever is there, is of such a nature not to occupy any place, nor does time age it; nor is there any change in any of the things which lie beyond the outer most motion; they continue through their entire duration unalterable and unmodified, living the best and most sufficient of lives, As a matter of fact, this word 'duration' possessed a divine significance for the ancients, for the fulfilment which includes the period of life of any creature, outside of which no natural development can fall, has been called its duration. — Aristotle DeCaelo 17-25

Notice how he places the divine, the unalterable, outside the material "heaven". He then proceeds for a number of chapters to discuss the concepts of "generated", "ungenerated", "destructible" and "indestructible, in relation to "eternal". He considers the possibility that something generated could be indestructible, or that something ungenerated could be destructible. So we have to consider "eternal" in two senses, of two temporal directions. Plato for example, he says, thought the heaven was generated but indestructible.

We see then, in Ch12, 283a 25-30, the conclusion to Bk1, that anything destructible will at some time be destroyed, and anything generable was at one time generated. And we can conclude, that "the heaven", as defined by Aristotle, as a particular material thing, is therefore not eternal. Matter, of which the heaven is composed, is the potential for change ("Physics"). So he closes the book with: "Whatever is destructible or generated is always alterable. Now alteration is due to contraries and the things which compose the natural body are the very same that destroy it..." 292b 21. Of course, in Ch9 he describes "the heaven" as "one", a particular, being a natural body composed of matter. Therefore we must conclude it is not eternal.

On the other hand, why does NATO need to expand? What for? It was founded on the idea of "containing" the Soviet Union. Well, that fell, but NATO is still here.

Who's the enemy for the US and Western Europe? Russia and China? Yeah, maybe. But with nuclear weapons involved, all this becomes very silly. — Manuel

Wasn't NATO more like a response to the second world war? So it's purpose is to deter any rogue state from becoming too aggressive. Therefore it has no particular enemy, as its mandate is to prevent the arising of an enemy. So if there becomes a particular enemy it has failed in its mandate.

If "the observer" is real, then "the observer" is "observer"-independent; if "the observer" is not real, however, then the question is moot. — 180 Proof

Are you saying that a thing must be independent from itself to be real? Isn't it sort of contradictory, or at least in violation of the law of identity, to say that a thing might be independent from itself? Or, are you promoting a distinction between "the observer" as a particular, and "observer" in general? Wouldn't that still be contradictory, making "the observer" not an "observer"?

Th idea of "Universal Grammar" seems analogous to the idea of "inter-subjectivity". People take a variety of very wide ranging activities, which are quite difficult to understand the true nature of, and class them under one name. This facilitates reference to these activities, as a group, for the purpose of arguing a philosophical position. But it creates the illusion that there is a real, justifiable category of well-defined activities which is being referred to by the terms.

In reality such usage of terms is a symptom of a philosophical laziness, a declination from properly understanding the activities which get classed together, and apprehending the differences between these activities, recognizing the incompatibilities between them which make such categorization logically impossible.

Even the word "language" is used in this way. It's used to class together a wide ranging variety of activities which are so different from each other, that some of them ought not ever be placed together in any rigorously defined logical category. Hence the argument that there is no such thing as "language". That word does not name any sort of justifiable category of activity.

Your denying this is for me of a par with MU's denial of instant velocity; it leaves me nonplussed. — Banno

There's no rigour in modern word usage. Rigor mortis has set in.

The issue is not "common procedures in philosophy" at all. It is what Aristotle does or does not say in his treatises. He does NOT say that eternal circular motion is "unacceptable" anywhere in the corpus. — Apollodorus

Yeah sure , "unacceptable" is an English word which Aristotle would not be in the habit of using. Logically, he proves that the principle is definitely a logical possibility. Then he demonstrates that the principle is not true, it doesn't correspond with anything real, neither in relation to the material nor the immaterial aspects of the universe.

Of course Aristotle says that "the heavens certainly revolve, and they complete their circular orbit in a finite time", as this is what he believes the heavens do. But he doesn't say that once the orbit is completed the heavens stop in their tracks and disappear. According to him the revolving motion continues eternally. — Apollodorus

Spin it however you like Appollodorus, but what is described is that one finite orbit completes. You might insist that it is followed by another, but the next is different from the first, and the differences are described in Plato's Timaeus. And this is completely incompatible with "eternal circular motion" as the logical possibility described by Aristotle, which requires motion in a perfect circle, where one revolution is indistinguishable from another as exactly the same, forever.

Your claim can only stand if you insist that Aristotle "didn't write Metaphysics" and dismiss half of the corpus as mere "oversight" and "mistake". — Apollodorus

As I said earlier, "Metaphysics" is a bunch of separate pieces of writing, collected together long after Aristotle's death. I took a course on this text in university, and the professor said that it is debatable whether Bks10-12 were actually produced by Aristotle. It was his opinion that this part was written by some unknown Neo-Platonist. Evidently there is a difference in style.

An eternal circular motion is clearly defined as without beginning or ending.
— Metaphysician Undercover

That's exactly what Aristotle is saying! — Apollodorus

Look closely at your quote Appollodorus:

The heavens certainly revolve, and they complete their circular orbit in a finite time … — Apollodorus

"Complete" here implies ends. And "ends" is incompatible with "without beginning or ending". It is very clear that he is arguing against the idea that the orbits of the heavens are actually eternal.

Aristotle’s main intention is to present a picture of the universe as a perfect, eternal, and divinely ordered reality the contemplation of which enables man to elevate himself to the higher realms of pure intelligence. — Apollodorus

This is exactly opposite to the reality of what Aristotle was doing. He is arguing that we ought to contemplate "truth", as explained in "Nichomachean Ethics". Therefore we ought to reject the idea that the universe is a "perfect, eternal, and divinely ordered reality". This idea is inconsistent with the observed reality, as described in Plato's Timaeus 35-37. And being inconsistent with observed reality implies that it cannot be "truth".

And if you follow the thread you will see that Metaphysician Undercover started by claiming that Aristotle proposed the principle of “eternal circular motion” (page 6) after which he said that this principle is unacceptable and ought to be rejected (page 9) and ended by claiming that Aristotle himself describes the “unacceptability” of the same principle! — Apollodorus

Yes, this is a common procedure in philosophy. One proposes a principle (like eternal circular motion for example), which may be widely accepted in certain circles of society, then proceeds to demonstrate the falsity of that proposition. If you haven't read enough philosophy to recognize this fact, I am not to blame for that.

There's a chapter on Newton's 3rd law: — Agent Smith

Excellent example Agent Smith. I don't know why we didn't bring this up earlier. As the basis for conservation of momentum, and conservation of energy, this law is integral to the grounding of "symmetry" in modern physics.

We know that this is a very useful principle, but the issue of course, is whether or not it is really a true principle. What we observe in reality, is that there is always some degree of loss of energy, due to friction or something like that. This is what makes conceptions like perpetual motion, eternal circular motion, etc., unrealistic, energy naturally gets lost.

In thermodynamics this is accounted for with the second law. By this law, the conservation of energy described by Newton's third law, the action/reaction principle, is upheld by assuming that the "lost energy" is energy which still exists, but is unavailable to the system. This may be expressed as entropy. How the lost energy is accounted for in description, depends on how one formulates or defines "the system". In the context of "entropy", it is assumed that the energy is not actually "lost", it is simply made unavailable to the system, thereby upholding Newton's third law.

So we can see that in reality, the action/reaction of Newton's third law may not be completely true. Since the energy which is lost to "entropy" cannot, in principle, be accounted for, because this would mean that it's not really lost to the system, we cannot truthfully say that it actually remains, but in an inaccessible form. because this would be an unjustifiable assumption.

For their to be time, there would have to be a change of some kind, and that change has to be measurable in some way. — Sam26

This makes "change" dependent on measurability. But measurability is dependent on the human capacity to measure. If you remove this requirement, measurability, you can allow for the reality of change which is imperceptible to the human being, therefore unassailable to the human capacity of measurement.

This is why it makes no sense to talk of persons outside of time, timelessness is completely static, because there is no measurable change. I don't think we could make any sense of a universe outside of time or change. — Sam26

Actually the opposite of what you say is what is really the case. If we tie time to measurability, then all the changes which we are unable to measure, appear as if they are outside of time. Therefore it makes a lot of sense to talk about things outside of time. This could be the case with some of the issues in quantum physics. And not only does it make sense to talk about things "outside of time", to account for all those aspects of the universe which are completely outside the realm of our understanding, when understanding is derived from our empirically based capacities, it actually becomes necessary to assume something outside of time.

This is why the Christian "God", as eternal (outside of time), is fully comprehensible, and even necessary, when we limit time to our capacity to understand and measure. All those aspects of the universe which are prior to the physical reality which we perceive (this perception grounding our empirical sciences), yet are still very real, as the cause of, or the reason for, the way that physical things are, lie outside of time, when "time" is restricted in this way.

No, I'm tired of it.

Aristotle states very clearly that, though finite, the whole universe is spherical and consists of spherical bodies revolving in circles with an eternal motion:

The movement of that which is divine must be eternal. Such is the heaven, viz. a divine body, and for that reason to it is given the circular body whose nature it is to move always in a circle (De Caelo 286a). — Apollodorus

That's a position he's refuting at that point. I'm tired of your false references.

He also explains why: — Apollodorus

There is no explanation there, only confused bits and pieces of a writing, which appears contradictory. Look at the contradiction, it says anything which moves in a circular motion must be finite. Then it says "the heavens" have a circle which completes and is therefore finite. So, the heavens have a finite circular motion which completes. Then it says the heavens have an eternal circular motion. An eternal circular motion is clearly defined as without beginning or ending.

I really think you are very sloppy in your referencing Appollodorus, And, I noticed in our discussion concerning Plato that you do not take the time to distinguish the ideas which the author is promoting, from the ideas which the author is condemning. You seem to be doing that again here. I fully realize that this form of judgement is much more difficult with Aristotle than Plato, because Plato generally had Socrates making the statements he agreed with. But you had trouble with "The Sophist" where we do not have the luxury of having Socrates making the statements. Aristotle however, will go to great lengths, paragraph after paragraph, describing someone else's principles, which he ultimately disagreed with. This is what Plato did in "The Sophist", described as thoroughly as possible, the position, to the reader, allowing the reader to apply rational thought to reject what needed to be rejected.

This sloppy reading of yours reflects in the overall attitude you expressed earlier in this thread. You tried to push the idea that Aristotle is completely consistent with Plato, and Neo-Platonism is consistent with both of these two. Of course, if you fail to distinguish whether a particular philosopher agrees, or does not agree, with the ideas of another philosopher which are being described, then you'll come away with the idea that everyone agrees with each other. However, you'll have to deal with multiple inconsistencies and contradictions within the writings of one philosopher, as you demonstrated in the quote above.

Your failure to understand this prevents you from correctly understanding Aristotle (and Plato) and you get bogged down in unfounded and futile "interpretations" that can only lead to materialism in the best case and to psychological issues in the worst …. :smile: — Apollodorus

When I have been taking great care to distinguish between the material and the immaterial, according to Aristotle's principles, how can you think that this can only lead to materialism? A circular motion is a description of an activity of a material thing. An eternal thing, being prior to time, therefore outside of time, (when time is a conception derived from material activity), is immaterial. It is your assumption, that a material body could have an eternal existence through circular motion, which is what is conducive to materialism. That's why many who interpret in ways similar to you claim Aristotle to be materialist, the self-moved mover becomes prime matter, with its fundamental activity of eternal motion. But this idea of associating "eternal" with circular motion is what Aristotle flatly rejected in "De Anima". It is rejected because it hinders us from producing a proper conception of "immaterial" because it associates "eternal" with something material.

Plato says that the heaven moves in a circular motion and so does Aristotle. — Apollodorus

I agree with this. Now, do you agree that when we describe a motion as a circular motion, it is not necessarily eternal? And this is where the problem is, with the idea of an eternal circular motion. Eternal circular motion implies that the circle is absolutely perfect, and every point on the circumference, is the very same as every other point on the circumference, such that the motion can never have a variance, and no point can ever be the beginning or the end. You'll see in Plato's Timaeus, 35-36, how he refers to the orbits of the heavenly bodies under the categories of the Same, and the Different. The latter are the ones which are very obviously not perfect circles.

The impossibility of an actual, infinite circular motion, is discussed by Aristotle at "De Caelo" 272a, 272b. We see that such a motion would require an infinite amount of time, so it exists in potential only. And so it is an Idea only. As Aristotle demonstrates in "Metaphysics" Ideas have existence as potential.

At "De Anima" Bk1, Ch3, he looks at the immaterial "soul", and "mind", and explains why these things cannot be described by eternal circular motion, nor can they be said to cause an eternal circular motion.

However, this has NOTHING to do with eternal circular motion. He says that he proved it in his treatises on physics, and so he has if you take the time to read the many statements to that effect that I quoted above. — Apollodorus

Have you read Aristotle's "Physics"? He says rotary motion "can be eternal" Here: "Again, a motion that admits of being eternal is prior to one that does not. Now rotary motion can be eternal: but no other motion...can be so." Physics Bk8, Ch.9, 265a,25.

[quote=Aristotle Physics, Bk8, Ch9, 6-9 "Our present position, then, is this: We have argued that there always was motion and always will be motion throughout all time, and we have explained what is the first principle of this eternal motion; we have explained further which is the primary motion and which is the only motion that can be eternal: and we have pronounced the first movement to be unmoved." [/quote]

Notice two points here, "our present position", implying that this position is not necessarily to be firmly adhered to, and also, that circular motion "can" be eternal, implying potential.

So when he moves forward to discuss the reality of the immaterial, in "De Anima", and "Metaphysics" he finds that this "present position" which was adequate for physics, is no longer adequate when discussing the principles of the immaterial, i.e., the non-physical. In Metaphysics, the cosmological argument demonstrates that anything eternal must be actual, and this excludes the eternal circular motion, as being described in his "Physics" and "De Caelo", as being potential only. And, at the referred part of De Anima Bk1, Ch 3, he provides a very good explanation as to why the idea of an eternal circular motion is truly an unacceptable idea.

Anything eternal must be truly immaterial, as matter is the principle of contingency. Any sort of motion, including circular motion, involves matter. So we see the material circle expressed here as a "spatial magnitude", and Aristotle explains why such a description, of a spatial magnitude, cannot be applied to something like a soul, or a mind, which is supposed to be truly immaterial, and truly eternal.

Therefore we can conclude that infinite circular motion, is an ideal only. Motion which exists "throughout all time", is a conceptual idea which forces us to reconsider the meaning of "eternal", which cannot refer to a sort of motion. And if we do not dismiss this Ideal, 'motion which exists throughout all time", and allow that there is "a time" for the immaterial; the immaterial being necessarily prior to the material; and therefore "a time" when there is no motion (motion being a material concept), then we are forced to make "eternal" refer to that which is outside of time, rather than that which exists throughout all time.

I believe it is a mistake to understand "language" as one coherent whole, as if we could have a concept of language which would encompass all aspects of it. What is evident, is that there are two distinct aspects of language, the vocal and the written, which initially evolved to serve very different purposes. The vocal evolved with a social purpose of communication. And this type of language has been around for a very long time. There's no point to discussing the age of it, because evidence shows that even dinosaurs used sounds to communicate. The written evolved with the purpose of a memory aid, make a mark, a sign to remind yourself of something at a future time. This is a very personal purpose, and due to competitive motives, the memory aid, sign, might be designed with a view towards being difficult to understand by others. Therefore we have fundamentally incompatible elements of "language" if taken as a whole.

It is only when these two very distinct aspects of language became united in actual use, or used together, that there was any sort of "rapid" evolution of language. The rapid evolution can be described as due to the increased ability to pass the contents of one memory to another memory through written symbols, when marking symbols is adapted to a social context rather than a personal context. This implies a shift from making the symbols difficult to understand by others, for the purpose of hiding things from others, toward a universal intelligibility.

Further, it is wrong to characterize these two aspects as one internal, and the other external. As you can see, they both have internal aspects as well as external aspects. The difference between them is in the intent, or purpose, for which they evolved in the first place, one being communion oriented, the other selfish. The incompatibility between these two types of intent make "language" as a whole, unintelligible. When language is characterized as fundamentally communicative, the roots of the selfish aspect, the personal use of signs, is commonly excluded from "language" because it is not consistent with the communion oriented aspect. So those who take this view are prone to simple denial of this aspect. But this renders understanding of the selfish aspect of language, what a sign actually symbolizes, as completely unintelligible, such that any attempt at representing this, is filled with misunderstanding, such as Platonic realism.

Of course I have access to the texts and I have read them many times over. — Apollodorus

Well then read De Anima Bk1 Ch3, and tell me what you think it says, if you disagree that he is obviously arguing against the rationality of eternal circular motion.

He even says that he has proved that the planets have eternal circular motion:

The first principle and primary reality is immovable, both essentially and accidentally, but it excites the primary form of motion, which is one and eternal. Now since that which is moved must be moved by something, and the prime mover must be essentially immovable, and eternal motion must be excited by something eternal, and one motion by some one thing; and since we can see that besides the simple spatial motion of the universe (which we hold to be excited by the primary immovable substance) there are other spatial motions—those of the planets—which are eternal (because a body which moves in a circle is eternal and is never at rest—this has been proved in our physical treatises) … (Metaphysics 1073a) — Apollodorus

This part of Metaphysics, I told Paine, is debatable as to whether it was even written by Aristotle. The "Metaphysics" is a collection of writings put together after Aristotle's death, and I have been told that there is good reason to believe that this section is not even his writing.

As I said, there is inconsistency in Aristotle on this matter of eternal circular motion. I do not at all deny that he talks about it it in many places. What I claim is that he discredits this idea especially at the place I refer to. You can see this clearly at the referred place in De Anima, if you would care to read it.

Exactly. The soul. Aristotle does NOT reject eternal circular movement. He rejects the notion that the soul moves in a circle as part of his wider argument that the soul does not move itself but is caused to move by God.

He is clearly talking about the soul, which is why the whole book is called “De Anima” or “Peri Psyches”, i.e., “On the Soul”: — Apollodorus

He is questioning how the soul moves the body. He doesn't say the soul is caused to move by God, nor is the soul a self-moved mover. He says that the soul does not move; "... it is an impossibility that movement should be even an attribute of it." 406a2

The reason why the soul cannot be described by terms of motion, is explained. Motion is spatial, therefore bodily, and the soul is immaterial. Therefore, the idea of a soul or a mind moving in an eternal circular motion is unacceptable.

Further, he explains that there is no bodily evidence that any soul, or mind, causes any body to move in a circular motion, nor is there any reason (the good, the sake of which), given by those who profess this idea, why any soul, mind, or God, would cause a body to move in a circular motion.

Obviously, “circular motion” here is meant as a metaphorical image (eikon) which is said to most resemble or evoke the ordered activity of soul or reason.

It follows that Aristotle's criticism is directed at those who take Plato's metaphor literally. — Apollodorus

Are you saying that when Aristotle rejects this idea of eternal circular motion at "De Anima" Bk1, Ch 3, he just misunderstood Plato's meaning? Plato wasn't talking literally about the circles of the heavens, in Timaeus, but metaphorically, and Aristotle took it literally in his rejection of it? Are you serious?

And since you have provided zero evidence for your spurious claim, there can be only one conclusion …. — Apollodorus

The evidence is clearly there, De Anima Bk1, Ch3. You just refuse to read it, in your continued denial.

When we take the present as "thick", it is inevitable that some part of "now" is future, and some part of "now" is past. I think this is what refers to. If we describe this as tripartite there is two distinct ways of doing that. One would be to say that this part of past, along with this part of future, is a unity which we call now. In this case we need to determine the principle which unites into a "now", to determine how "thick" the now is. In this sense, the past and future are not actually separated from each other, as having a real difference from each other, because they are united in one "now". The other way is to assume that the unity is artificial, arbitrary, or not real, and that within the appearance of a thick "now", there is some real past, some real future, and a divisor, which is the true "now".

Which side of these two ways looks more plausible to you? Is there a real distinction between past and future, or not?

Aristotle in De Caelo simply states that there is no circular motion of an infinite body. Finite bodies like the universe can and do have circular (or apparently circular) motion as Aristotle himself says!

The real issue is who or what moves something that has circular motion or motion in general. In the case of the heaven, it is God a.k.a. the Unmoved Mover who causes that movement. — Apollodorus

Right, what is discussed here in "De Caelo" is the possibility of an "infinite" motion. And it is shown that "the infinite cannot move". This supports the common interpretation of Aristotle, that any infinite must be potential only, and cannot be actual. Simply put, an actual infinite would require traversing an infinite amount of time, and that is impossible. Therefore any infinity is a potential infinity.

This is not relevant to the discussion of "eternal" circular motion in "De Anima", unless we establish some relationship between "eternal" and "infinite". If "eternal" is conceived as a type of infinity, then we see that by the discussion in "De Caleo", eternal circular motion is impossible, as an infinite motion (i.e. a motion which traverses an infinite amount of time).

But the issue is not so simple. In his "Metaphysics" Aristotle demonstrates that anything eternal must be actual (cosmological argument). This drives a wedge of separation between "infinite" (potential) and "eternal" (actual). What we can conclude, is that any actuality which is supposed to be "eternal", cannot be described as a "motion", because this would constitute an infinite motion which is impossible. Infinite motion is demonstrated as impossible in "De Caelo". So when he discusses the supposed eternality of the soul, or mind, in "De Anima", the idea of an eternal circular motion, as an actual infinite motion, is discredited as such.

Aristotle himself concludes that “it is the soul (of the universe) which causes the motion of the body (of the universe)” and that “the reason why God made the soul (of the universe) revolve in a circle is that this form of movement is better than any other” (407b 21). — Apollodorus

This passage is not at all as you present it. It is not what Aristotle is concluding here. He is presenting this as what is implied by those (Platonists) who present this position, and he presents this as an absurdity which must be concluded from that position.

If the circular movement is eternal, there must be something which mind is always thinking; what can this be?
For all practical processes of thinking have limits; they all go on for the sake of something outside the process, and all theoretical processes come to a close in the same way as the phrases in speech which express processes and results of thinking. Every such linguistic phrase is either definitory or demonstrative. Demonstration has both a starting-point and may be said to end in a conclusion or inferred result; even if the process never reaches final completion, at any rate it never returns upon itself again to its starting-point, it goes on assuming a fresh middle term or a fresh extreme, and moves straight forward, but circular movement returns to its starting-point. Definitions, too, are closed groups of terms.

Further, if the same revolution is repeated, mind must repeatedly think the same object.

Further, thinking has more resemblance to a coming to rest or arrest than to a movement; the
same may be said of inferring. It might also be urged that what is difficult and enforced is incompatible with blessedness; if the movement of the soul is not of its essence, movement of the soul must be contrary to its nature. It must also be painful for the soul to be inextricably bound up with the body; nay more, if, as is frequently said and widely accepted, it is better for mind not to be embodied, the union must be for it undesirable.

Further, the cause of the revolution of the heavens is left obscure. It is not the essence of soul which is the cause of this circular movement -- that movement is only incidental to soul -- nor is, a fortiori, the body its cause. Again, it is not even asserted that it is better that soul should be so moved; and yet the reason for which God caused the soul to move in a circle can only have been that movement was better for it than rest, and movement of this kind better than any other. But since this sort of consideration is more appropriate to another field of speculation, let us dismiss it for the present. — Aristotle De Anima Bk1, Ch3, 407a,23 -407b,13

Notice, that Aristotle is saying that if it is true that the soul moves in this way, then the reason why God caused the soul to move "can only have been that movement was better for it", yet those (Platonists) who claim this, do not even assert "that it is better that soul should be so moved". So absolutely nothing supports that assumption, no logic, nor proposed good.

This is completely different from your representation, that Aristotle concludes "the reason why God made the soul (of the universe) revolve in a circle is that this form of movement is better than any other”.

Please Appollodorus, read the entire chapter, and quit with the false references. The fact hat you resort to false references to support your interpretation does not bode well for you. And I do not want to reproduce the entire section here, when you clearly have access to it, and the capacity to go read it for yourself.

How is a conversation about an author's intent to go forward under these conditions? — Paine

I do not see how you can reduce a philosopher's intentions to one "intent". At any point in writing any particular passage, we might say that the author has a particular intent as to what is to be expressed by that paragraph, or even by a particular sentence. We might assume that each passage ought to fit together into a coherent whole, and from this coherent whole we might be able to produce an interpretation of the author's overall "intent".

But philosophy is not so straight forward. A particular individual might produce volumes of material over an extended period of time, and one's belief and understanding of fundamental principles can change considerably over that time. This is very evident with Plato for example. Such changes will produce inconsistencies when we view the philosopher's overall work as a whole, trying to determine the author's intent. Because of this, it might not be at all realistic to try and discuss the "author's intent", as if it were to be some principle which would unify the whole, in consistency.

However, if we look at Aristotle's "Nichomachean Ethics", we see that he considered the highest activity to be contemplation, and the highest form of contemplation to be contemplating "the truth". This is somewhat different from Appollodorus' proposal that the highest activity would be contemplating contemplating. But from this we might conclude that Aristotle's overall intent is "the truth".

When a philosopher contemplates "the truth", and the truth is not immediately evident to that person, then the person must consider all possibilities, prior to making a judgement. Such a philosopher, in the contemplation of truth, might continue to consider, and present in written form, numerous possibilities, constituting multiple proposals, without necessarily making any judgement of "truth".

This is why, for us in interpretation, it is of the utmost importance to determine inconsistency. Inconsistency is an indication that truth is not there, something is amiss. If the author's intent is "the truth", and we find inconsistency, then we know that there is some sort of mistake.

Time needs initial conditions. — Raymond

Can you put quantitative parameters on the initial conditions of time? If you can do this in an acceptable way, you might be successful at demystifying time.

Yes. There is the clock time and entropic time. I understand both. The clock time truly existed before inflation. The state of the universe back then constituted a perfect clock. A perfect periodic state, which has no temporal direction yet. — Raymond

This "state" prior to your claimed "inflation" would be the state which you need to put such parameters to. Obviously it cannot be a "periodic state", because "period" is a word which refers to directional time. Can you explain what it would mean to have time passing, with no direction to that passing of time? It really doesn't make sense to me, Is time supposed to be passing in all directions at once, prior to inflation?

It just fluctuates. — Raymond

A fluctuation, just like a period, is a directional thing. You cannot have a fluctuation without a direction.

Then, when the conditions on the 4D substrate were right, the closed 3D Planck volume, containing virtual particles only (represented by Feynman diagrams of closed propagators, circles with an arrow, so the virtualcparticle rotates in space and time), "bangs" into real existence and the perfect clock is gone, replaced by the irreversible process of entropic time. These processes can be quantified by introducing a clock, which can never be realized, as there are no perfectly periodic reversible processes. — Raymond

What does "'bangs' into real existence" mean here? Is it your image, that virtual particles are floating around in all directions at once, and suddenly one crashes into "real existence", and "bang", time changes from going in all directions at once, to going in one direction only?

Yes. Yes — Raymond

Is that yes to both questions? If so then start providing your explanation as to why the past is different from the future. Perhaps we can demystify time through this procedure.

In the summary of the Nicomachean Ethics that I'm reading from Bertrand Russell's perspective it's said that Aristotle maintained a view in accordance of the magnanimous man standing in higher regard than other men for being virtuous, as defined by Aristotle. The question to rephrase, would be that why does it seem so important that someone who is in higher standing with regards to ethics, should be treated any differently. — Shawn

This is like asking why should a law respecting man be treated differently than a criminal. Isn't it obvious to you why a person who adheres to a code of ethics ought to be treated differently than one who simply acts in random ways? The former is more dependable, trustworthy, and reliable than the latter.

A better question might be to ask why we ought to follow this ethics (Aristotle's) rather than some other ethics. Aristotle would say that ethics must be 'intuitive' as intuition is the highest guide to practical knowledge. If you agree with this, then you are already inclined toward following his intuition based ethics. If you disagree, then you need to propose another principle to base a code of ethics in, or else you become the unprincipled, undependable, untrustworthy, unreliable person, acting in random ways.

Time can't go backwards. — Raymond

Why can't time go backward? Isn't this a mystery?

I think there are two kinds of times, mutually exclusive. Entropic time and perfect clock time. — Raymond

How can there be two "mutually exclusive" types of time? Doesn't this really mean that there are two incompatible conceptions of time? And, doesn't that mean that the real nature of time is a mystery?

It's frustrating if you see so clearly what time is and no one understands what you mean — Raymond

Obviously, you see two mutually exclusive types of time, so you really do not see what time is.

In your everyday life, do you recognize a difference between past and future? Can you explain the reason for such a difference?

This ignores the distinction between heavenly bodies and the "combined beings" of the sublunary sphere. The life of the latter is "ensouled" in a material basis that does not apply to eternal substances. The references to serial order of thinking relates to the distinction being made. — Paine

This is not a distinction made by Aristotle in "De Anima". He is asking about how the soul is supposed to move its body. He describes the Platonic explanation of how the soul moves its body as being the same way that the heavenly bodies are supposed to be moved by a 'mind soul'.

3. We must begin our examination with movement; for, doubtless, not only is it false that the essence of the soul is correctly described by those who say that it is what moves (or is capable of moving) itself, but it is an impossibility that movement should be even an attribute of it. — Arostotle De Anima, Bk1, Ch3, 405b, 31

It is in the same fashion that the Timaeus also tries to give a physical account of how the soul moves its body; the soul, it is here said, is in movement, and so owing to their mutual implication moves the body also.
...
All this implies that the movements of the soul are identified with the local movements of the heavens. — Arostotle De Anima, Bk1, Ch3, 406b, 26 - 407a,3

Notice that he describes the Platonic perspective as identifying the movement of the soul with the movement of the heavens. He is not trying to separate these two, make a distinction as you say, but to reject the entire description.

He does not deny the possibility that the same principle which acts as the soul in the living being could also be what acts as the cause of movement in the heavens. In fact, we can still make that comparison. The first actuality of the living body (the soul) is the cause of the material body, just like the first actuality demonstrated by the cosmological argument is the cause of the material universe.

So Aristotle is not making a distinction or separation, he is rejecting the whole idea, the description of the soul, as self-moved mover, and the cosmological description of eternal circular motions, which supports this description of the soul.

The references to serial order of thinking relates to the distinction being made. What the actuality is for living animals does not completely include how nous is an actuality for those creatures. Aristotle says that the soul, as what makes creatures alive, is not self-moving. Something else causes it. Nous is said to be different in a way that requires more than the celestial model of Timaeus to explain. As Aristotle says: "The case of the mind is different; it seems to be an independent substance implanted within the soul and to be incapable of being destroyed." — Paine

There is no such distinction being made. It is an imaginary one you are trying to force onto the interpretation. But if we assume such a distinction, for the sake of argument, then we'd have to look for the means by which the mind is implanted into the soul. We would now have something immutable, the mind, implanted into something, the soul, which cannot move or be moved i.e., is also immutable. And that makes no sense at all. If adding mind to soul makes no change to soul, then soul must always be united with mind as one mind soul. But this is exactly what you are claiming, that he is making a distinction between.

What Aristotle is showing here is that the Platonic conception of "soul" which has the soul move the body, in a way which is analogous to the way that the ancient Greeks believed that a "mind" moved the heavenly bodies, is mistaken. But we cannot proceed from this to make the distinction you claim.

This view does not conform to the either/or you see in Book 1. The insufficiency noted by Aristotle in Book 1 is now accounted for as a distinction of causes: These distinctions are used to clarify the different ways that desire and practical reason can said to move the living animal. — Paine

I can't see the point you are making here, Paine. Aristotle clearly says that thoughts are dependent on images. It's at the end of your quote. And images are derived from the senses. So we have no basis for a "nous" which is independent of the senses, sense organs, and material body. It's true that Aristotle, at some points alludes to the appearance of a separate, independent mind, but such a thing is inconsistent with the principles he clearly states.

He doesn’t say that. So you couldn’t have “quoted” it. You got it all backward as usual. :smile: — Apollodorus

Obviously you haven't read it yet. So I'm still waiting for an intelligent reply from you, concerning this.

Therefore, it doesn't make sense to claim that he describes the “unacceptability of eternal circular motions” in De Anima or anywhere else. — Apollodorus

What do you mean? Your quote does exactly that, describes an infinite circular motion as impossible: "an infinite circle being an impossibility, there can be no circular motion of an infinite body". That is what he is proving here, the impossibility of an infinite circular motion. Notice in your quote: "Yet our eyes tell us that the heavens revolve in a circle". That is a fundamental principle from Plato, knowledge derived through the senses can be misleading. So when logic demonstrates that something which the senses leads us to believe, is actually impossible, then we must reject what the senses are telling us.

The accepted principle of the day, was that the orbits of the planets were eternal circular motions. This was supposed to be empirically proven, scientific knowledge. But Socratic skepticism taught us to doubt any knowledge dependent on the senses. The Copernican revolution was spawned by the revelation that the orbits were not circular, but elliptical. The slight discrepancies in timing which until then could not be figured out, were figured out to be the result of elliptical orbits, and the truth was revealed. This simple revelation made the solar system intelligible, but it had to be figured out. The first step was to reject the accepted science, that the orbits are eternal circular motions.

t is perfectly clear that Aristotle here does not object to eternal circular motion per se but only to that motion as a property of the soul, and he states in unambiguous terms that the soul causes the circular movement (without itself moving):

It is not clear [from the Timaeus account] why the heaven revolves in a circle; seeing that circular motion is neither implied by the essence of soul [of the universe] nor due to body [of the universe]: on the contrary it is rather the soul which causes the motion of the body ... (De Anima 407b)

This is precisely why Aristotle introduces the idea of "Unmoved Mover". The Unmoved Mover (God) is unmoved yet is the cause of the movement of the universe .... — Apollodorus

One big problem with your account is that the orbits of the heavens are not circular. And this idea, that they were eternal circular motions is what Aristotle was rejecting. Look at your quote, circular motion is neither implied by the soul nor by the body. We ought to conclude therefore that it is unjustified, and likely, a mistaken idea.

Do you have any other evidence to support this observation? — Paine

It's common knowledge that Aristotle's "Metaphysics" is a compilation of writings put together after his death. The part which supports the idea of eternal circular motions and the divine mind, directly contradicts what is said in "De Anima" Bk1, Ch3, where he devotes the entire chapter toward explaining why this idea, drawn from Plato's Timaeus, is unacceptable. Have you carefully read this section? It exposes and deals with the problems inherent in this conception, very explicitly.

The principal problem is the spatial representation of a "circle". Thought, Aristotle explains has a serial order, rather than a spatial order. It is evident to me, that "serial order" is based in "priority", which is substantiated by time. This is why there is a difference between cardinality (implying the spatial separation required for quantity), and ordinality (implying logical order) in modern mathematics. Therefore we must consider that "eternal", which is a description of the immaterial, relates to the material world through "time" rather than "space". (Did you read the passage from Aquinas on aeviternity which I referenced?) So the spatial representation of a circular motion, which is a material representation, is insufficient to describe an eternal being which is immaterial.

After explaining this problem, Aristotle proceeds to address the problems involved with the idea of a self-motion caused by self-thinking.

For all practical processes of thinking have limits---they all go on for the sake of something outside the process, and all theoretical processes come to a close in the same way that the phrases in speech which express processes and the results of thinking. — De Anima Bk1, Ch3, 23

Notice the reference to Plato's "the good". Aristotle expresses "the good" as "that for the sake of which". When Plato describes "the good" as that which illuminates the intelligible objects, like the sun illuminates visible objects, it is because "the good" is what directs the process of thinking which causes the intelligible objects to become intelligible (discovered). (I bring this to your attention because Appollodorus accuses me of attacking Plato rather than accepting his principles).

The entire section "De Anima" Bk1 Ch3, is a refutation of the idea that the soul is a type of motion, or even a self-moving sort of thing. Motion is a spatial conception, consisting of a body (therefore matter), space, and time. If "the soul" is to be properly understood as the cause of existence of the material body, therefore prior in time to the body, and immaterial, it cannot be represented by a concept which is a material representation.

In this passage, Plotinus seems to be ignoring the clear reference to the importance of necessity in Plato's Timaeus. Nonetheless, it does undercut the idea that the Metaphysics was advancing a view of the cosmos that the Neo-Platonists were eager to support. — Paine

The "necessity", as I see it, is the logical necessity produced by Aristotle's so-called cosmological argument, explicitly Bk9 "Meatphysics". Through this demonstration he shows that if it were ever the case that there was a pure, absolute, infinite, or eternal potential, there could never be anything actual. Something actual is required to actualize any potential, so such a pure potential could not actualize itself, and it would forever be, pure potential. Pure potential is contrary to empirical observations. What we observe is actual beings. Therefore such a pure potential is really impossible. This effectively refutes both Pythagorean idealism (because Aristotle has demonstrated the ideas to exist as potential prior to being discovered), and also materialism which assumes a prime matter (matter is defined as potential). Materialism and such idealism are one and the same in principle.

So the necessity implied, is the logically necessary actuality produced by the cosmological argument, (what we call God, as per Aquinas' five ways). It cannot be a material actuality (matter & form), because it is prior to matter, therefore an immaterial Form. It's a bit of a tricky sort of necessity to understand.
Because of its temporal base, it is not a two way street, but only one way, as the conception of dependent, or "contingent", demonstrates. An effect necessarily has a cause, and this necessity is solidly substantiated in observation. This is the nature of contingency, or contingent existence, a cause is required, as a necessity, for the existence of any contingent being. But when we take the perspective of the cause itself, adopt that position of being prior in time to the contingent thing (as the perspective of a free willing being for example), then the nature of potential allows that the contingent thing is not necessary. Therefore this "necessity" is only applicable in a backward way of looking at time.

Plotinus did not quite seem to grasp the necessity of Aristotle's cosmological argument. In my opinion, Plato actually dismissed Pythagorean idealism prior to Aristotle's cosmological argument, replacing "the One" with "the good". I discussed this extensively with Appollodorus in another thread. Appollodorus refused to accept that Plato classed "One" as a mathematical form, and placed the good as prior to all forms. Therefore we have a separation between the good and the One. Appollodorus equates these two.

In placing "the One" as the first principle, Plotinus maintains its status as an idea, and therefore a potential. The One then, is a pure, absolute potential. But this is no different from prime matter, because as much as he posits all immaterial Forms as emanating from, or proceeding from, the One, he has no first actuality. This actuality is what has been demonstrated by the cosmological argument, as the necessity which is required as the first cause. Looking backward in time this cause is a necessity. So Aquinas firmly establishes the first Form, God, as an actuality, absolving the Neo-Platonists from the misrepresentation they propagated.

This corresponds to the perfect clock present before the inflationary phase in big bang cosmology. His eternal circular motion is a related concept too. The unmoved mover is considered a person though. Considering his view on motion, he would have been a hot theoretical physicist in these days. — Raymond

You might compare the eternal circular motions to the Hartle-Hawking No Boundary proposal. It's a materialist/idealist representation which avoids the problem of having to accept a first cause to avoid infinite regress, through sophistry. It's really contradictory though, because it proposes a 'time' prior to time. So instead of going backward in time forever, we can talk of a cyclical repetition which makes the 'time' prior to time seem to dissolve into a different "time". This is the manifestation of the problem with representing the temporal concept "eternal" with a spatial representation, described by Aristotle at Bk1, Ch3, "De Anima". If time is not understood as prior to space, the problem cannot be resolved.