When you work out what it is you are claiming, then your posts might be worth addressing. — Banno

If you want to look at the issue I brought up, as a civilized, rational human being, without resort to insult, then follow me here.

I was enquiring as to what Wittgenstein means when he suggests that a word could have a "home". It is implied that when a word is used in many different language games, one particular language game might be the game which is "home" to the word. How could we ever determine which game is the home game for any given word?

Don't take it personally.

When you work out what it is that I am claiming, then you might be capable of making an intelligent reply, instead of off the cuff ad hominem, like the following:

And this is another example of Metaphysician Undercover's congenital logical problem. — Banno

What kind of bullshit purpose is "congenital" supposed to serve here? Are you racist?

"Family resemblance" implies that they have family in common, just like Wittgenstein says: "Something runs through the whole thread—namely the continuous overlapping of those fibres". Therefore there is something in common, it's just in a way other than one might think. It's the overlapping which they have in common. So what you describe as "games held certain similarities and relations with each other", is what they have in common, these relations, like a family consists of relations. And we call this, what they have in common, "family".

That's actually the conclusion of my post above. Why don't you ever take the time to read my posts through to the end? Because of this you commonly misrepresent me.

Therefore the nature of "understanding" turns out to be comprehending how one instance of use overlaps, or relates to another, as the relationship between one game and another, as opposed to understanding the meaning of a word. — Metaphysician Undercover

Care to explain yourself?

Now, would you say that because a tool is being used differently in a different context that it's a different tool? — Sam26

Yes, I might say that the same object used in two different ways, is two different tools, like in the case of a multitool, and I'll explain further below. But what I was discussing is a word's "home". You referred to a word having a "home" in a particular language game. But if the word has a place in a number of different language games, like a tool has a number of different uses, how would we determine which language game, or use, is the "home" of that word, or which use is the "home" of the tool?

If it turns out that the word has a number of different "homes", wouldn't we have to say that these are actually different words? Homonyms are considered to be distinct words aren't they? Likewise, if a tool is defined by its use, then the same object could be two different tools, depending on how the object is used. Suppose a "saw" is what cuts wood, and a "knife" is what cuts meat. Then the same object could be both a saw and a knife, two different tools, depending on how it is used. And a multitool is a lot of different tools.

In case you're not following, here's a couple examples. I think most people would agree that "right", when it means correct, is a different word from "right" when it refers to one side of a person's body. But in the case of "see" they would say it is the same word whether it refers to seeing with the eyes, or seeing with the mind.

Obviously you wouldn't because that would be silly. — Sam26

I'm not making a pun, so don't consider this as silly. Homonyms are understood to be distinct words.

His argument is based on the idea that there must be something had in common by all uses of a word that make it a use of that word. The argument for family resemblance shows that this need not be so. — Banno

I don't see how "family resemblance shows that this need not be so". Obviously "family resemblance" implies having something in common. So how can the argument for family resemblance show that the uses need not have something in common?

And this is another example of Metaphysician Undercover's congenital logical problem. His argument is based on the idea that there must be something had in common by all uses of a word that make it a use of that word. The argument for family resemblance shows that this need not be so. — Banno

OK, so I'll ask you the question Banno. How would you distinguish between homonyms (in the case of two different words with the same sound and spelling), and one word having two different meanings? To take your analogy of "family resemblances", why would we say in the case of homonyms, "those two words are just like identical twins", but in other cases, "that's the same person"

So, when we think of meaning, think of how a word is used in the language-game that is its home. If for example, we’re talking about epistemology and how we justify a conclusion, then we’re using the word know in a way that’s determined by the logic of that language-game. The problem that arises, is when we take the use of a particular word in one language-game, and try to apply it in another language-game where the word is used in a completely different way, i.e., it has a different use, or it functions differently. This is not to say that a word can’t have the same use in a different language-game, but to say that it’s use maybe different; and thus, it may have a different sense. — Sam26

What you describe here is a sort of paradox, which might even be called a contradiction. If a word's "home" is its position within a particular language game, but the same word might be used in different games, then it has distinct homes. So we have the problem of the same word having numerous homes. To resolve this problem we ought not think of these numerous and distinct uses, of what appears to be the same word, as actually being instances of "the same word". Having different homes, therefore different meanings, ought to indicate to us that they are distinct words, despite having the same outward appearance. Therefore we ought to apprehend these words which appear to be the same, yet have different homes, as different words.

If we adopt this position, we have a new problem, which is the necessary boundary between a word with one home, and a word which appears to be the same word, yet has a different home, so is really a different word. Since both instances appear to be the same word, yet we conclude logically that they are not the same word, having different homes, we need other principles to distinguish them. It's kind of like they are identical twins. How we might distinguish the words is through context, the word's home, the two distinct games which are home to each, respectively. This means we must identify the game itself, and that's where the difficulty lies.

The various games of a language overlap, they share rules at some points and diverge at other points. And so a further problem develops. If the two distinct words, which appear to be the same, go by the same rule in two games, but different rules in another game, then why can't we say that they are actually "the same word" in those two games, and a different word in the third game. But if we adhere to the principle, a different game constitutes a different word, we must disallow this idea because the two games are distinct, constituting different homes, even though what is said of the two words, "appears to be the same" takes on an even stronger meaning.

What follows though, is that we lose all principles to distinguish one game from another, until we reach the point of "each particular instance of use must be viewed as a different game". Therefore the nature of "understanding" turns out to be comprehending how one instance of use overlaps, or relates to another, as the relationship between one game and another, as opposed to understanding the meaning of a word.

Yes, my point exactly. Yours is predicated on education, the qualifications above listed being more attributable to experience than mere education. One cannot even become properly educated without those qualifications. Or, in other words, becoming educated presupposes those qualifications. Either way, and however reduced. It is education that comes as a consequence, and never as an antecedent.

So any bias can be overcome, that's the nature of free will, and will power.
— Metaphysician Undercover

And that right there is the proverbial knife-in-the-heart of your predication on education. Will power cannot be taught. And while experience is a form of education, absent the stipulation that says otherwise, education as used herein indicates the formal, sit-down-shut-up-and-memorize brand of it. — Mww

What's with the inconsistency Mww? First you say that these "qualifications" are more attributable to experience than education, but then you proceed to say that experience is a form of education. If these "qualifications" are attributable to experience, and experience is a form of education, then such "qualifications" are necessarily attributable to education. What we cannot conclude is that they are attributable to all forms of education.

So you proceed to restrict "education" to a "sit-down-and-shut-up" form, attempting to deny that introspection and other forms of being self-taught are valid forms of education. And this is evident in your claim that "will power cannot be taught". In actuality will power is self-taught, through practise and exercise. We are given will, but the determination and persistence, which constitutes the will to succeed, will power, is developed through practise. And since this "power" can be freely transposed from one habit to another, it cannot be called a bias. It is the inclination to direct the will power in one direction rather than another, which is a bias.

.......the proposed counterargument suggests both a reevaluation of conditionals and a reassessment of the principle the conditionals endorse.

With respect to which, I offer, for your consideration: education in the minor and my experiences in the major determine the possibilities toward biases in general, my biases represent a rational determination from those possibilities, which is called persuasion, my innate predispositions judge a priori whether my biases conform to my nature, which is called interest.

Agree with any of that? — Mww

Inconsistency again? Above you said that experience is a form of education. This would put experience as the minor, and education as the major, education as logically prior to experience. You now look to reverse this, making experience the major, and education the minor. Are you now saying that education is a form of experience? Why not just equate the two? All forms of experience are education and all forms of education are experience.

If we take this position as a clean slate, I'd have to disagree with your proposal. I disagree because there must be a capacity which enables, or allows one to experience, or be educated. And this capacity is necessarily prior to experience and education. And, I believe it is quite possible that a bias could be inherent within such a capacity. In fact, upon analysis we might find that this capacity is best described as a type of bias in itself.

This is why, in philosophy we must doubt, or question this very capacity itself, the capacity which allows us to understand, because of the way that it may taint our knowledge. This is the tinted glass analogy used in theological metaphysics. It is proposed that the soul must be immaterial in order that it can understand and know all material things. However, since the intellect, which is the means through which the soul knows, is united with, and dependent on the material body, this material body acts like a lens through which the intellect "sees" the world. And since the lens is material rather than immaterial, it is as a tinted lens.

That the lens which we see the world through is tinted, does not necessitate that the world will be misunderstood by us. What is required is that we determine and understand the nature of the tinting in order that we can account for it, and adjust for it in our understanding. The "capacity to experience and understand" is that lens through which we "see" the world. And so we must learn to understand the biases which inhere within this capacity, in order to develop a true understanding. This is a matter of negating those biases.

The Platonist answer is that humans have a foot in both worlds - physically embodied beings who can by virtue of intellect peer into the realm of ideas. That is how we've been able to devise such amazing inventions. — Wayfarer

The past (observed) is the physical. The future (unobservable) is the realm of ideas. Human beings live at the present. However, it has become evident that the present, which the being occupies, is not a clean and precise, non-temporal point of division. In Peirce's words, it is a vague boundary, described by the ancient Greeks as the medium of "becoming", matter. This necessitates the conclusion that the human being, as composed of matter, has "a foot in both worlds", the past and the future, occupying a vague boundary between the two.

\It's quite clear that in physics a "wave" is a disturbance in a medium. Since the "wavefunction" describes waves, we can conclude that these waves require a medium (commonly known as the ether). Until this medium is identified and properly "observed", the wavefunction, and all the derivative principles in physics which depend on it, are based in unsubstantiated metaphysical speculation, and ought not be called "science".

The modern trend in metaphysics is to simple deny the reality of the ether. But since the ether is logically required, this trend is just bad (illogical) metaphysics, which many people like to pretend is science.

True enough, if one accepts that biases are innate. I don’t think I’d go that far, and apparently, neither do you, because you said, “inclined toward due to genetics or predisposition”. — Mww

Oh yeah, you can see right through me. Not. If one is naturally inclined in one way rather than another, that's a bias. But being inclined in one way or another does not necessitate behaviour in that way because we have the will power to resist such inclinations. So any bias can be overcome, that's the nature of free will, and will power. But just because these inclinations (biases) can be overcome, does not mean that they are not biases.

We naturally have feelings, but can certainly distinguish a good one from a bad one. It follows that how we feel about a bias may be exactly how we distinguish them from each other, by how the object of each affects us. — Mww

I don\t agree that we can "certainly distinguish a good feeling from a bad feeling". Sometimes the distinction is easy, other times not so easy. And if we start to analyze the criteria of what distinguishes the good from the bad, then sometimes we find out that some of the ones we have taken for granted as good or bad, have been misjudged.

And this prevents us from just going right back to a new bias, a new inclination of a different color, but inclination nonetheless? — Mww

Yes, but the decision is made from a more fully developed intellect, so it is more rational. That's the whole point. Biases developed when we are children are positions of judgement accepted by a juvenile mind, which has not necessarily developed the full potential of rationality. And innate biases are even less rational. So as we grow older, and develop the full capacity of logical reasoning, which is proper to an educated human being, we need to reassess any biases developed when we less capable of such reasoning. This is simply a matter of introspection, to distinguish bad habits from good, and use the will power required to reject the bad,

The problem is that one's own ways of thinking are always assumed to be good, or else the person wouldn't be thinking that way. And the same will power, or more, is required to break a good habit as is required to break a bad habit. But in the case of ways of thinking, the habit can only be judged as a bad way of thinking if one is not thinking that way at the time. So each way of thinking, be it good or bad, must be prevented before it can be properly judged as good or bad.

That we return to a "bias" after such a judgement is not an issue, because the practise of breaking the biases, and judging them has been developed, and this is what matters. So in a matter of time, the new bias will itself be blocked and reassessed, and this is what is important. This habit, of blocking the biases, and judging them cannot be said to be a bias itself. It is a way of thinking of a free willing mind, which cannot be called a bias because it is not directed in any particular direction.

True, but it serves no purpose to doubt ourselves into oblivion. If humans are naturally inclined to biases and cognitive dispositions, it seems rather futile to effect their collective demise. — Mww

It is not a matter of doubting oneself into oblivion. It is just the introspection of a healthy rational mind which does not want to be misled by itself, by trusting, and relying on, decisions it made when it was less capable. Once we realize that a mind keeps developing over a very long portion of one's lifetime, we ought to recognize the need to keep reassessing the principles we employ for making judgements.

Besides, I suspect there are some biases we refuse to over-rule, and in conjunction with them, the innate predispositions we couldn’t over-rule without destroying the manifest identity to which they belong. — Mww

Yes, most people refuse to judge their biases, that's why we call these people biased. But if you recognize that biases can be judged and over-ruled, then you'll see that this way of thinking, which engages in that procedure cannot be a biased way of thinking.

And the latter statement here is just a blatant denial of free will as an identifying feature of human beings. Are you determinist?

Doubt implies dismissal Without the opportunity for correction. — Mww

No, "doubt" implies indecision. This does not mean that the thing doubted, i.e. what the person is indecisive about, will necessarily be dismissed. Judgement is suspended, so the thing being judged (doubted) is held in a mental position where it is neither accepted nor rejected.

I get what you’re saying; I just think you’ve gone too far with it, in terms of practical purposes and the consequences for philosophy. — Mww

If the principles are reasonable, and there appears to be nothing wrong "in principle", then why not take them as far as one can go, in practise. If in practise, a brick wall is hit, where the principles have difficulty, and further process is prevented, then we need to reassess the principles to see what the problem is.

Go ahead, express something that is not already seated somewhere, somehow, someway. The notion of the ridding of all is absurd - impossible. One may attempt to identify biases and to work with, around or through them, but every gesture is biased is some way. Do you care to retreat from the categorical to something (more) reasonable? — tim wood

Obviously you are a very biased person if you are attempting to justify your biases in this way, instead of accepting the fact that you might be able to rid yourself of the bad ones if you would only submit to the process of doubting them all. This being required in order to identify all the bad ones as bad.

Not really, because quantum chemistry is energy based, while my description is mass based. This is a big difference because a molecule is understood to have distinct massive parts, therefore distinct "spaces" by my description. Even an atom is understood to have distinct massive parts. From the energy perspective, the interaction of electrons occurs in one space, rather than a number of different spaces according to distinct massive centers representing distinct spaces.

Actually my post was directed toward Bret and the op. I just inserted a line from your post. so I put quotations to give proper credit to you, for that phrase.

Still...can a innate predisposition, as such, be subjected to over-ruling, whether by education or otherwise? And what of a good bias? Should my innate predisposition to help the proverbial lil’ ol’ lady cross the street be educated out of me?

You made no distinction between the relative values of our individual biases, grouping them all as biases in general, the compendium of which we can be taught to overcome. To that alone, I make objection. — Mww

There is no doubt in my mind, that some innate biases can be overcome. The more pertinent question is as you say, "what of a good bias?" And of course the related question of how do we decide which are good, bad, or indifferent.

What you seem to object to is the idea that all biases ought to be overcome, even ones which might be good. The reason for this, and this takes us right to the foundation of skepticism, is that we cannot properly distinguish between good and bad biases, when we are already biased. This means we must rid ourselves of all biases, form an open mind, then reassess all those dismissed biases from this newly established position.

Skepticism instructs us to doubt everything, and this is because what appears to be knowledge appears to be knowledge, regardless of whether it is true or false knowledge. So we cannot distinguish between true knowledge and false knowledge by its appearance because it all appears to be knowledge. Therefore we must subject anything which appears as knowledge, to doubt. And this is a similar principle to rejecting all biases, because from the position of holding a bias one cannot properly distinguish which biases are good, and which are bad.

I suppose that's why they say "taste" is subjective.

My take: space is personal. Not just relativistic (fixed by reference frame), but rather each thing that exists has its own personal space. Interactions and correlations are couplings between these spaces that allow us to map one space onto another, approximately at least. These mappings enable a statistical projection of all these things going on in all these spaces onto a single hypothetical space constructed by the mind (or computer). So more like an infinite net, I suppose. — Kenosha Kid

That's good. Each "thing" has space proper to it. Now how would you relate this to the concepts of chemistry and physics, within which, things move relative to each other? We cannot use an artificial coordinate system representing one "space", because this would be a false representation. Now each thing has its own space, within which it moves and changes, and that space needs to be related to the various "spaces" of every other thing. So we are left with a very complex problem. We need to determine the way that each type of thing moves within its own space, and also we need principles to relate the space of one thing to the space of another thing.

Let's take an object like a chair, or a rock for an example of a "thing". We can say that it has "a space" proper to it. We might define the boundaries of that space with reference to gravity. Now, lets proceed to a molecule, as a "thing" which conventionally is a part of that thing, identified by the example as a chair. The molecule has its own "space" defined by its gravity, and obviously the distinct "spaces" of the molecule and the chair overlap in terms of occupying the same place. What means would you propose for distinguishing the space of the molecule from the space of the chair?

I proposed that the boundaries of a thing's space be determined by a thing's gravity, but what kind of space would be proper to a thing which has no mass? This sort of problem would reveal two distinct types of space, the type of space proper to a massive object, and the type of space proper to something which has no mass. Since the space which is proper to things which have no mass seems to permeate all the spaces of massive things, maybe an understanding of this space could be used to relate all the other spaces of the massive objects to one another. In the case of massive objects, gravity is the defining feature of the space. What features should we look for to define the space of massless objects?

Doesn't "vat-grown meat" moots the question of "justification"? ↪180 Proof (re: link to article) — 180 Proof

Vat-grown meat will undoubtably be similar to hydroponically grown vegetables, in the sense of extremely deficient in taste. We already experience a big difference between grass fed beef and grain fed beef. There is something very untasteful about producing growth (quantity) for consumption, with complete disregard for the quality of life of that which is consumed. The vat-grown meat will experience the lowest quality of life possible, and most likely have the least taste as well.

In the old days, when the opponent appeared to be gaining too much power, someone would execute.

How does the use of words (casting spells and stuff like that) enter into the concept of magick? Does Donald Trump

summoning wild animals — Tobias

qualify as an example of someone who uses magick?

I suppose if the causal connection between the person's will, and the occurrence could be established, then the person is legally responsible. But doesn't "magic" imply that the causal connection remains hidden? So I think "magick" is an oxymoron. You are saying that the person is necessarily the cause, in a situation where there is no evidence to conclude that the person is necessarily the cause. And the legal issue you raise is just a sham, because you are asking if the person ought to be held responsible in a situation where the person cannot be proven to be responsible. Of course that is a non-starter.

I wasn't making an appeal to consistency, although obviously consistency is important to any rational thought; I was merely pointing out that the various domains of inquiry in modern science form a consistent whole. — Janus

The various domains of science actually do not form a consistent whole. There is significant inconsistency between principles employed from one field to the next, and the same words are not always defined consistently from one to another. There isn't even consistency as to which fields qualify as "science" and which do not. For insistence, google the phrase "is mathematics a science", and you'll see evidence of disagreement.

That doesn't mean that theories in the various domains are not tested by observation. How else do you think they could be tested? — Janus

I think theories in the domain of "science" are tested by observation. But that doesn't mean observation is the only way to test premises. In mathematics for example, axioms are tested by consistency. That's why we generally do not class mathematics as a science.

However, many people seem content to blur the boundaries of "science". This is probably because science has a very good reputation. So if you can pass something off as "science" which really isn't science, and you don't get exposed, it will make you look like you know more than you really do

So the hard vacuum does a better job cleaning the rug.

So I can assume that you wouldn't have taken a spectator's seat at the guillotine in the French Revolution. Maybe what you've learned to over-rule is the inclination to enjoy beheadings.

From Wikipedia:

Outer space, commonly shortened to space, is the expanse that exists beyond Earth and its atmosphere and between celestial bodies. Outer space is not completely empty—it is a hard vacuum containing a low density of particles, predominantly a plasma of hydrogen and helium, as well as electromagnetic radiation, magnetic fields, neutrinos, dust, and cosmic rays — jgill

What do you think is meant by "hard vacuum" here? Is that as distinguished from a "soft vacuum"?

Does my individual psychology (which has accrued various arbitrary biases based on my genes, upbringing, books I've read, etc.) limit what philosophical theories I can consider to be good/true? — clemogo

This is why proper upbringing, and education are imperative. One's way of thinking is no less of a habit than other activities which we engage in. Learning to overrule whatever biases one is inclined toward due to genetics or predisposition, is part of a proper education. How to proceed with an open mind is something which must be learned, because it is impossible that it could be hereditary. This is the concept of free will, to free your decision making from such influences which force your decision making in one way or another irrationally.

I understand the concern. I think it's not just that they cannot be observed, it is my understanding that they can not exist independently. From the point of view of Gnomon's point, I'm not sure that it matters. — T Clark

The point is mainly directed at Janus, and anyone else, who argues that the theories employed in modern science have been "tested", or proven by observation. What constitutes 'proof by observation' seems to have lost all credibility in modern science.

Take the famous Michelson-Morley type experiments for example. What these experiments prove is that certain postulated relations between mass and the proposed ether of light transmission, are incorrect. What is commonly cited as "proven" by these experiments, is that there is no ether. You ought to be able to see that logically, the inability to properly represent the existence of something in hypotheses, is not proof that the thing is not real. In this case, what is demonstrated is that "ether" has not been adequately described (defined).

This is the big problem with the metaphysics of 'observation is the foundation of knowledge'. It doesn't account for the fact that in knowledge observation, as proof, is posterior to hypothesis. Therefore the usefulness of observation as a means of proving hypotheses, is limited by the formulation of the hypothesis.

To really understand the nature of knowledge therefore, we need to grasp the method by which hypotheses are produced. Focusing on observation as the source of knowledge, is to account for the a posteriori while remaining ignorant of the a priori. And to deny the reality of the a priori simply demonstrates this ignorance.

Only premises that are descriptions of physical things or the behavior of observable things can be tested, though — Janus

That's not true, logic is tested by consistency. That 4+5 equals 9 is tested by 9-5=4, etc..

The premise that the truth of premises can be tested only by observation is itself based on observation of how we test premises. — Janus

Obviously you don't actually know how premises are tested, so your premise is false. It's like you saw 20 black squirrels, and no other squirrels, so you claim as a true premise, "all squirrels are black".

You have actually given a very good example of how "observation" itself is very deceptive as the basis for validating premises. Without very good (immaterial) rules as to how one might derive a valid premise from observations, observations very often mislead us.

Moral premises are judged against standards of compassion, social harmony and against how we feel about things — Janus

Your missing the point. No amount of observations of compassion, social harmony, and such things, will justify the claim that we ought to support such things. Moral premises concern what ought, and ought not, be done. That people act in a specific way, and they say "this is good", does not justify the claim that what they say is good, is what ought to be done.

But quantum theory and particle physics is consistent with chemical theory, and chemical theory is consistent with geology, cosmology and biology. I see them as just being different domains or levels of description and explanation. — Janus

What happened to "premises can be tested only by observation"? The example of "quarks" described earlier, is clear evidence that the Standard Model is not supported by observation. So now you make appeals to consistency? That a quantity of energy moves from one place to another, in the form of a wave, and also in the form of a particle, is an example of inconsistency. So quantum theory is supported neither by observation nor consistency. It is supported only by its capacity to predict.

I don't associated the idea of the 'world soul' with Aristotle in particular, but definitely with the idea of 'animating principle'. — Wayfarer

The point (derived from Plato) which Aristotle demonstrates very well, is why the soul is necessarily prior to the material living body. Any living body is organized. Such a body is necessarily organized from the very first moment of its existence. Organization requires a cause. Therefore the thing which causes the living body to be organized (the soul) is necessarily prior to the body.

Then, in his metaphysics, Aristotle carries this principle further, to all physical existence in general. Since the very essence of physical existence, is to be in some way organized, then all physical existence must be organized from the very first moment of its existence. And since organization requires a cause, that cause must be prior to physical existence.

The modern trend in metaphysics is to posit some initial condition of absolute disorganization, from which organization emerged. This idea is what is demonstrated by Aristotle's cosmological argument to incoherent and unintelligible. But it has reemerged in modern metaphysics as a result of physicalist bias impairing the cognitive capacity of human beings.

Quarks have mass. I do remember reading that the mass of the quarks making up larger subatomic particles; i.e. protons, neutrons, and mesons; add up to less than the mass of the particle itself. — T Clark

I agree that quarks have some mass, but it's relatively small. The majority of the mass in a proton or neutron is accounted for by the energy of the gluons which are supposed to hold the quarks together. The problem is that individual, separated quarks, cannot actually be observed.

Logic, though, doesn't tell us anything about an inference other than whether it is consistent with its premises (validity); it cannot tell us whether the premises are true.

The only way to test the truth of any premise is by empirical evidence. — Janus

Premises need not be descriptions of physical things, whose truth and falsity is judged according to empirical evidence. We can make premises which are descriptions of how logic works, and also premises concerning moral issues. The judgement of truth or falsity of these premises is not based in empirical evidence, so it isn't really correct to say that the truth of a premise can only be tested by empirical evidence. That itself would be a premise which cannot be tested, so the truth or falsity of it could not be judged. Whether empirical evidence, or knowledge about the immaterial, provides a more sound judgement is another question. Plato was insistent on the latter.

Science is based on a method of testing the truth or falsity of immaterial principles (hypotheses) through reference to empirical evidence. What science does not provide for us is any real principles for testing the validity of empirical evidence. Sure there are guidelines as to what constitutes an "observation\", and principles as to how experiments ought to proceed in a way to produce objective observations, but these are all based in "ought", so they can only be supported by strong metaphysics. Weak metaphysics produces inconsistency between one field of science and another, as to what constitutes a valid observation.

Most of the mass=energy of a proton is from the gluons. — PoeticUniverse

Yes, gluons have no mass in themselves, but they are responsible for, as carriers of, the strong force. The strong force, which binds quarks into massive objects, is mathematically equivalent to mass. So if quarks are separated there is a freeing of energy which exists in the hadron (massive object) as gluons.

The problem is that the strong interaction force is not well understood. It is "observed" to be unrestricted by distance, and because of this, quarks cannot actually be separated in experimental practise. No matter how far apart they are supposedly separated, the strong force still acts to hold them together, and no real separation can be observed.

The strong force acts between quarks. Unlike all other forces (electromagnetic, weak, and gravitational), the strong force does not diminish in strength with increasing distance between pairs of quarks. After a limiting distance (about the size of a hadron) has been reached, it remains at a strength of about 10,000 newtons [N], no matter how much farther the distance between the quarks.[7] As the separation between the quarks grows, the energy added to the pair creates new pairs of matching quarks between the original two; hence it is impossible to isolate quarks. The explanation is that the amount of work done against a force of 10,000 newtons is enough to create particle–antiparticle pairs within a very short distance of that interaction. The very energy added to the system required to pull two quarks apart would create a pair of new quarks that will pair up with the original ones. In QCD, this phenomenon is called color confinement; as a result only hadrons, not individual free quarks, can be observed. The failure of all experiments that have searched for free quarks is considered to be evidence of this phenomenon. — Wikipedia

I think that the Higgs mechanism only accounts for a very small percentage of mass that is known to us.

It is worth noting that the Higgs field does not "create" mass out of nothing (which would violate the law of conservation of energy), nor is the Higgs field responsible for the mass of all particles. For example, approximately 99% of the mass of baryons (composite particles such as the proton and neutron), is due instead to quantum chromodynamic binding energy, which is the sum of the kinetic energies of quarks and the energies of the massless gluons mediating the strong interaction inside the baryons.[28] In Higgs-based theories, the property of "mass" is a manifestation of potential energy transferred to fundamental particles when they interact ("couple") with the Higgs field, which had contained that mass in the form of energy.[29] — Wikipedia

A Quark is invisible and un-measurable, so in scientific terms it exists only as a theory in a mind. — Gnomon

Yet quarks are supposed to be the constituent parts of massive objects. Where does all that mass actually come from?

How could a non-physical explanation ever be tested? — Janus

Non-physical explanations are tested logically. That's what logic gives us, non-physical explanations. Are you familiar with mathematics for example? Some people however, still do not trust logic, they have no faith in the non-physical, and so they must fall back onto the comfort and illusory security provided by their senses.

I think scientifically educated people will find it very difficult to honestly believe in things for which there can be no definitive evidence. — Janus

The problem with this statement is that you define "definitive evidence" as physical evidence. If you would allow that logic provides evidence which is just as "definitive", or even more so, than your senses, you would allow for "non-physical evidence".

If the explanation you are considering is a physical one then there is nothing wrong with it, — Janus

What kind of bias is that? If we are seeking the cause of physical existence, obviously the answer cannot be something physical.

That kind of question is not answerable in any verifiable or falsifiable manner in principle.. — Janus

I don't see how you would justify this claim.

As I already said the idea of "pure chance" is incoherent. If there is an explanation of the origin of life it will be in lawlike terms. To say something arose by "pure chance" is no more an explanation than to say it arose on account of "necessary being, also known as the unconditioned, unmade, uncreated and so on". — Janus

Since explanations concerning the cause of material being have always been incomplete, what is wrong with pursuing an explanation which would likely require a further explanation? I don't see the merit in your rejection of such a "rabbit hole".

It may have possible poetic value, but what explanatory value could it have, since it posits something about which nothing can be said, other than what it isn't? — Janus

The value it gives, is to tell us that to proceed in the direction of pure chance is to go in the wrong direction.

As I already said, any explanation you give will then require a further explanation as to why it is as it is; if you were able to go down that rabbit hole there would be no end to it. — Janus

To go down the road of "there is an explanation", even if that explanation may require a further explanation, and a further one after that, is a much more reasonable route than "there is no explanation".

There is a big difference between saying "if you go that way you'll never get to the end of the road", and saying "that is the wrong way to go". The way of "it is chance, it is unintelligible and will never be understood", is clearly the wrong way to go. But if someone says "your understanding will never be complete", this should not deter anyone.

I dare not say I am an intellectual; but, have been noticing in myself a desire to be consistent with who I read and adopt into my mental landscape of ideas and thoughts. I can give an example with Plato who I hold in high regards, and Wittgenstein who I also think is conducive towards clearer thought. There are clear inconsistencies with both theories of thought in many regards. — Shawn

I would say that in as much as people desire to be understood, they desire to be consistent. Plato, I think it is clear, had a desire to be understood, though he lived in a society full of inconsistencies which he sought to expose. Exposing the inconsistencies of others is a function of not being able to understand others. Wittgenstein, on the other hand received criticism for his early work, so he may have actually given up on the possibility of being understood by the time of his later work, which appear to me as demonstrations of the reality of inconsistency.

There are others, like Peirce, who assign inconsistency to the natural world, assuming the natural world to be fundamentally unintelligible.

We can get the impression a change has occurred, without being able to identify what, if anything, has changed. Thus there seems to be a feeling or sensation of change. For this would not be possible if, rather than having a sensation of change, we had instead to infer change from some kind of comparison between cases. — Bartricks

This really does not address the issue. Your claim that you can sense change through a single sensation without the requirement of comparing a number of sensations, is not justified by your assertion "that there seems to be a feeling or sensation of change".

Try looking at it this way. When we sense something, we can describe the feeling, as "a sensation", by distinguishing it from other sensations within the same category of type of sensation. So for example, in the category of taste, sweet can be distinguished from sour, in the category of hearing, loud from quiet, hard from soft in tactile sensation, red from green in vision, etc.. All these descriptions require a comparison

Now, what category of sensation would you put "change" into, such that we can consider it to be a type of sensation which can be apprehended and described without comparison to another sensation?

Yes there is. I suspect that, like most people here, you don't know an argument from your elbow. Here is the argument:

1. There is a sensation of change
2. A sensation can only resemble another sensation (and so if a sensation is 'of' something, then what it is of is itself a sensation)
3. Therefore, change is a sensation. — Bartricks

I think that premise 1 here needs to be justified. If you can explain how change can be sensed by one sensation, rather than needing a number of sensations to be perceived, then we might have a solution to your question of what is change. But if we find that there cannot be "a sensation" of change, and that it requires a number of sensations to perceive change, then your entire approach must be rejected.

Where does it say at 258 that he does not or cannot know what "S" refers to? What is it that "S" refers to that he does not or cannot know? — Luke

He doesn't explicitly say he cannot "know", but if you think 'whatever seems right to me is right', is a description of knowing what "S" refers to. then I suppose that the "private language" described at 243, where the person knows what the words refer to, appears coherent to you. Notice I use the word "appears" here.

Thinking he understands’ is not acting as if he understands — Luke

This is clearly wrong. When a person believes oneself to understand something, the person will proceed to act under the assumption that the thing is understood. This means the person will act in a way which appears like he understands when he does not understand.

Now, when we take into account the context, that we are talking about a private language, there cannot be a third person judgement as to whether the person actually understands or not. Your statement assumes such a judgement. The person is thinking himself to understand, and acts accordingly, and is judged to be misunderstanding, according to your statement. But because no one else knows the meaning of the words such a judgement cannot be made.

"In the second case one might speak of a subjective understanding. And sounds which no one else understands but which I 'appear to understand'' might be called a "private language".

Notice here, "no one else understands". This indicates that he cannot be judged to be misunderstanding, as you assume in your statement. He appears to understand because he acts as if the words have meaning to him, but he cannot be judged as to whether he actually understands or not.

You claim that 'thinking he understands' means acting as if he does understand, but at 269 Wittgenstein distinguishes between the criteria in a man's behaviour for 'thinking he understands' and for 'understanding the word correctly'. It is only the latter where the man shows that he understands.

Wittgenstein tells us that the man does not understand because he attaches a meaning to the word which is not the right one. That is, he misunderstands the meaning of the word. Here we might speak of a "subjective understanding", but Wittgenstein distinguishes this from the criteria in a man's behaviour for understanding the word correctly (i.e. right). — Luke

There are three possibilities outlined 1) does not understand at all, 2) misunderstands, 3) understands the word right. The second lends itself to the private language. However, in the case of the private language, no one knows the meaning of the words, so the person misunderstands but cannot be judged as misunderstanding. Therefore the person thinks he understands, and he acts as if he understands (a sort of pretense because he doesn't really understand), and so he "appears" to understand. However, he cannot be judged to be acting according to 2) (acting as if he misunderstands), because no one knows the meaning of the words which he "appears" to be understanding. Therefore "thinking he understands", in the case of the private language cannot be judged as misunderstanding, it can only be judged as "appears to understand".

If he understood the meaning of the word, then the criteria in his behaviour would be that he attaches the right meaning to the word and understands the word correctly. Alas, he does not. — Luke

You are neglecting the conditions of the context, the "private language". No one knows the meaning of the words. Therefore no one can judge whether his actions indicate that he attaches the right meaning or not. All we can say is that his actions are consistent with 'understanding the words', because he acts as if he attaches some meaning to the words, but we cannot judge whether it is "the right meaning". Therefore all we can say is that he appears to understand, he acts as if he understands.

How is the incoherence shown to be a result of the private language user’s knowledge at 258? — Luke

Luke, we've been through this. He has no criterion, there is no such thing as "right". Therefore it is impossible that he could identify and "know" the thing which "S" refers to.

Pretending one understands means appearing to understand without the belief one understands.
Thinking one understands means appearing not to understand with the belief one understands.
These are not the same. — Luke

I don't agree with these distinctions. Not all senses of "pretend" require intentional deception, And your explanation of "thinking one understands" doesn't make any sense to me, and is clearly not consistent with Wittgenstein's use.

What does the word “appear” have to do with the man attaching the wrong meaning to the word? — Luke

Are you serious? Because the meaning attached to the words by the person is not the right meaning, his behaviour is that of "appearing to understand" (he thinks he understands and therefore is pretending to understand) when he really does not understand.

If you think that we can talk about ‘not right’ or ‘wrong’ wrt a private language, then you don’t understand why we can’t talk about right. — Luke

Again this makes no sense to me. As I explained to you, the situation in which we cannot talk about right, is necessarily not right. How can you not understand this? When "right" is excluded as a possibility, such that we cannot even talk about the possibility of the person being right, then the person is necessarily "not right", meaning something other than right. How can you not understand this? When right is excluded, what we are left with is necessarily not right.

How we portray "not right" in this context is another matter. Wittgenstein portrays the 'not right understanding' as "subjective understanding", "thinking one understands". This is clearly not the opposite of being "right". I'd say it is categorically different from being "right". So what he has done is to place subjective understanding, which is the type of understanding associated with the private language, into a different category from "right" understanding, which is to be consistent with the common language.

f Wittgenstein is correct about meaning, viz., that it’s a rule-based use that happens in social settings, then it’s an error to think that one’s use of know is based on some internal mechanism of the mind. In other words, the association of the word know with some internal or subjective mechanism gives us the false idea that we have privileged internal access to knowledge. This idea removes the concept know from its social foundation where its meaning, again, is derived. — Sam26

I believe there is a very real problem with Wittgenstein's perspective on subjective understanding. In all writing and speaking there are elements of private meaning, idiosyncrasies which are unique to the individual, and these are the elements of subjective understanding. Now, when we go to interpret a piece of oration, or writing, it is the common opinion that we ought to try to determine what was meant by the author. This means that we must delve into, and make our best attempts to understand the private elements, to reach the "true" meaning, as the one intended by the author. However, Wittgenstein dismisses this "true" meaning, as not the "right" meaning, because it strays from the rule-based social conventions. Therefore "the right meaning", which is a strictly rule based interpretation, is not necessarily in tune with "the true meaning", which is what the author meant, including all of one's idiosyncrasies, which are the private aspects of the person's speech. It is often an individual's use of particular idiosyncrasies which makes one into a great orator.

What's your argument for this? — Luke

I went through this. At 243 "private language" requires that what the words refer to is "known" to the user of the language. This is shown to be incoherent by the example at 258. So at 269, it is suggested that we could call it a "private language" when the speaker has a "subjective understanding" of the words; when one attaches meaning to the words, but not the right meaning, and therefore appears to know the meaning of the words when no one else does.

How is the private language described at 269 completely coherent? — Luke

Well, I don't see any incoherency demonstrated by Wittgenstein for what he is calling a "private language", at 269. I suppose that if you think it's incoherent you ought to be able to demonstrate that. Do you not believe that attaching meaning which is not the right meaning, and having that 'meaning'. private to oneself, is a coherent concept?

The last sentence of 269 does not refer back to the earlier sentences. There are two separate descriptions here:

(1) We might speak of a "subjective understanding" in relation to the behavioural criteria of a man 'thinking he understands' the meaning of a word, but who does not really understand because he attaches the wrong meaning to the word.

(2) Sounds which no one else understands but which I 'appear to understand' might be called a "private language".

You seem to think that (1) and (2) both continuously refer to a private language. I disagree as I think that only (2) refers to a private language. — Luke

Yes, you've demonstrated to me very clearly that you enjoy removing statements from their context, to give them your own 'private meaning'. That, despite your appeals to authority, you have shown me consistently in this discussion. Why would you remove the final sentence of a paragraph, from the context of that paragraph, and place it into a different context? In some schools of formal writing we are taught to use the final sentence as a sort of summary of the paragraph.

I think it's very clear that "sounds which no else understands, which I appear to understand", is a form of what has been called "subjective understanding". What he is saying can be described in this way: these are words which no one understands (there is no 'right' here), but I pretend to understand. That's why i used the word "pretense" earlier, which you objected to. The person is "thinking he understands", and so is acting as if he understands, even to the point of exuding certitude, when he really does not understand.

When you apprehend that this sort of "subjective understanding" as a very real situation, (not necessarily in the context of 'private language', but in general) as for instance, your attitude toward Wittgenstein's use of "private language", then we can extrapolate and relate this type of 'understanding' to the possibility of a "private language". A person could have a "private language" which no one knows the meaning of the words, including the user of that language, but the person 'appears', or pretends to understand. "Pretends" is a good word here because it underscores the pretentiousness associated with that false attitude of certitude, when someone pretends to know what no one else knows.

We are told that the man attaches the wrong meaning to a word at (1), but not at (2). — Luke

What kind of nonsensical argument is this? Why do you think Wittgenstein uses the word "appear" here? We say that something "appears" to be a certain way, when we want to distinguish this from the way it really is, this is fundamental in German philosophy, from Kant. The person 'appears to understand', is a distinction from 'actually understanding'. In the context, that's very clear and ought not even be a point to be discussed.

Furthermore, Wittgenstein does not use the word "wrong" here, he says "attaches some meaning to the word, but not the right one". By removing this sort of understanding from that which is said to be "right", Wittgenstein is completely consistent with 258, "here we can't talk about 'right'", making the rest of your argument irrelevant gibberish.

Of course you don't actually know what Wittgenstein means by a private language. No wonder this has been so difficult. Here are two separate explanations: — Luke

Luke, I told you the way I feel about secondary sources. They are an invalid form of appealing to authority, because the only true authority is the author.

You continue to ignore the facts of what has been written in the text. What Wittgenstein "means by a private language" is distinctly different at 243, from what it is at 269. These two are incompatible as logically inconsistent with each other.

Now, just like you said to me, there is no point in proceeding with the discussion until I fully understand what Wittgenstein says at 243, I can now say that there is no point in proceeding until you come to respect the difference between 243 and 269.

I think we can look at two possible reasons for Wittgenstein's 'change of mind' We might decide that he is intentionally being ambiguous. As I explained earlier, if this is the case there would be no such thing as "what Wittgenstein means by a private language". Another possibility, and I believe this is what the evidence indicates, is that he changed his mind as to what would constitute a "private language". The example at 258 shows that a "private language" as described at 243 is completely incoherent. So he proceeded to offer another proposal, a more realistic proposition as to what constitutes a "private language". This is actually a common practise in philosophical writing, initiated by Plato. It's called Platonic dialectics. And Wittgenstein is known to have read some Plato. You'll see in the Theaetetus for example, that the participants in the dialogue move through a number of proposed definitions of "knowledge", demonstrating each to be unacceptable, for one reason or another.

Therefore I think you ought to recognize that it would not be at all unusual for a writer of philosophy, like Wittgenstein, to propose a definition of "private language", demonstrate the definition to be unacceptable, then proceed to offer another definition. If, in the end, an acceptable definition is not found, as in the Theaetetus an acceptable definition of knowledge is not found, this does not that there is no such thing as what is meant by the words. It means that we do not properly understand the meaning of the words. It is only if the ambiguity is created intentionally that it is actually the case that there is no such thing as what the words mean.

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