Not if the genetics of the brain are its own, dude. You aren't thinking clearly. The brain has an organic biological nature, derived from the process of evolution, encapsulated in the genetic code used to build the brain in utero, and then develop in accordance with that genetic code postpartum. It is a self-sustaining organ that is responsible for the maintenance of all other functions of the body. This is a fact whether or not you understand it. — Garrett Travers

Since you obviously think that this paragraph supports your claim that the brain is "self-perpetuating without fail", I see no point in discussing this further.

Actually it is an accurate representation of the human and all of its functions in relation to the brain that all those functions are connected to, and controlled by. That's why YOUR examples were stupid, THEY didn't accurately represent anything that was being discussed. I took your example and made one that worked out of it in relation to what we were actually discussing, so that you could understand. Instead, you've misunderstood and decided to critique the example YOU gave, that I modified for your clarity. — Garrett Travers

To comment further on this is obviously pointless as well.

No matter how much you want to fight with neuroscience and believe anything that comes to your brain, nothing is going to change the fact that the brain is the direct control center of all functions of the body, including your thought and expression. — Garrett Travers

You obviously do not take criticism very well, but I'll try once more to help you see how far from reality what you argue actually is. A very slight chemical imbalance in a person's body will drastically alter a person's so-called "control center". But this chemical change which alters and therefore has some degree of control over the so-called control center, does not originate from the brain. So your insistence that the brain is controlling the rest of the body is completely inconsistent with the evidence. You'll never accept this though, you'll just continue spouting irrelevant nonsense.

What Augustine is referring to is not the 'private good' as expressed by Aristotle. Augustine is separating the 'what is good for oneself' as oneself from the matters of self-interest involved with participation in human affairs. — Paine

This is the same distinction Aristotle makes then. What one sees as good for oneself is called the apparent good. The common good, or good from the perspective of participation in human affairs is called the real good. To separate the two forms of "good" is a mistake. The goal of Christian moral philosophy, following Aquinas, is to unite the two, such that 'what is good for oneself' is apprehended as the very same thing as 'what is good in one's participation in human affairs', the real good. The person in which these two are united as one and the same, is the moral person.

Point out a few of those places, please. — Paine

I haven't the will to engage in this pointless exercise. Plato definitely points to this issue in his attacks on the sophists. And Augustine spends a considerable amount of time pondering this point, how it is possible that a human being can go ahead and do what they know is wrong. I don't understand your skepticism concerning this. Do you not believe that it is true that people can behave in this way? Have you not ever yourself, done something you know to be wrong, cheated, lied, stolen, or something like that? Or do you claim to be an angel?

Sure, ignorance or lack of understanding is a condition of the soul, but this is not the issue I am talking about. What I am talking about is a human soul who is informed, and understands, yet proceeds to act in a way which they know to be wrong. Acting wrongly out of ignorance, and intentionally acting wrongly (robbing the bank for example), are two very different things. We are not discussing the former, ignorance, we are talking about the latter, intentional bad acting. The fact that people intentionally act wrongly constitutes the substance of Plato's attack on the sophists who claim to be teaching virtue, supporting that claim with the further claim that virtue is a sort of knowledge.

Conclusion: Because the term 'will' describes and encompasses all human emotions and actions. And because those emotions and actions are controlled by the brain in a vast interconnected system that is not regulated by the conscious mind, which has very limited capacity for agency. And because the brain is self-perpetuating without fail by it's own genetically determined laws. The term 'will' simply describes the emergence of human behavior and action as generated and regulated by the brain. There is no "you" outside of the brain's operation, there is no 'will' outside of the brain's operation. There is only the brain's operation and the emergence of brain associated activity. Thus, the 'will' describes the sum total of individual human emotion and action, the emergent expression of all of the brain's operations and the processes that contribute to them. — Garrett Travers

I'm sorry if this disappoints you, but I find your conception of "will" to be completely incoherent. Premises which are essential for your conclusion, such as the proposition "the brain is self-perpetuating without fail by it's own genetically determined laws" are completely unacceptable. Self-perpetuating, and determined by genetics, contradict each other.

And your propensity for classing together a wide variety of different affections as having the very same cause (will) is equally unacceptable. This is nothing more than a modern version of the ancient argument for a sixth sense. Basically, the argument was that the imagination can be creative, therefore we need some sort of extra "sense" distinct from the five senses, to account for the creation of images not caused by sense organ, but created. This would be the sixth sense, the faculty which creates fictitious images.

You make "the will" something very similar to the sixth sense. Notice that the fictitious image created by the imagination can be an image from any of the five senses, sound, sight taste, etc., and there is posited a single faculty (sixth sense) which can create an image from any sense. That's what you do with "the will", you take all the different bodily activities, which are creative in nature, and you class them together under "the will". But this principle of yours is based on an assumed separation between the passive reaction of receiving a sense image, and the active creation of causing activity; a separation which cannot actually be made. So in the case of the sixth sense, there is an assumed separation between the parts of the image received by the real sense organ, and the parts created by the sixth sense, which is not there in reality. There are created parts inherent in the sense image. And the same principle holds for your description of "the will". You describe the prefrontal cortex as a "control center", as if you can limit the creative aspect to one central faculty. This is what the concept of "sixth sense" demonstrates to us as a problem.

No, I didn't. The brain is controlling all of these "distinct" things, as explained above. — Garrett Travers

This is a very clear expression of the problem described above "the brain is controlling all of these 'distinct' things". Here's an example of why this is wrong. Suppose there's a person with hearing side by side with a person with out hearing, and there's a sudden noise behind them. The person with hearing responds and the person without does not. You say that the brain controlled that activity which I called the response, but obviously you are overlooking the role of the ears. Since the person without hearing did not act, then it is very clear that the ears of the person who had active ears instead of incapacitated ears, played a role in controlling the activity of the person. And if you deny the role that ears play in controlling that activity, you also must deny the role that the external thing, the noise itself, plays. Therefore you have isolated the prefrontal cortex as the "control center", as if it exercises control over the entire living body, as an unaffected cause of activity, "the will", when this is a totally improper representation.

...now imagine all humans connected to a central hub of control and regulation, that's your brain... — Garrett Travers

This is a very good indication of the problem I described above. Human beings which are connected to a central hub of control is not an acceptable representation of anything real. 'Connecting' humans in this way, so as to completely deny their capacity to decide their own activities would leave them as no longer human beings. So it is impossible to have human beings connected in this way. Any realistic description of the connection between human beings and a control hub, would allow back and forth communication between the individual and the controlling mechanism. This is because the "control" cannot be only one way, that would make the controlled individual something other than human, rendering the scenario contradictory. This is exactly the problem you have created with your description of "the brain", describing it as a one way control mechanism. You do not include the control which the individual parts have over the brain.

The will IS itself and cannot will itself to be anything else. — Garrett Travers

It easy to say "the will is itself", but unless we can demonstrate that there is actually something real which is being referred to as "the will", such an assertion is pointless.

I beg to differ, within the combined context of the historical views, linguistic common usage, and modern cognitive neuroscience I am 100% confident that we can agree that will is the sum total of all human thought and action, the emergent expression of the content of the information that the brain processes, integrates, values, and enacts, and all activities of the brain that contribute to that process. I will be happy to build my argument again for you, which.... again, still has not been attempted to be challenged by more than one person, or so. And hasn't been bested in argument. — Garrett Travers

This makes absolutely no sense to me, to say that "will is the sum total of...". How can you add up a whole bunch of distinct things and say the total of all those things is what is called "will". That's like saying the sum total of all living things is the soul. It makes no sense. If you were adding a bunch of the same type of things, like when we say the sum total of all human beings equals "humanity", it would sort of make sense. But you are proposing to add together a whole bunch of different things, thoughts, activities, values, etc., and say all these different things together is "will". You might as well just say the human being is will, but that makes no sense.

Why do you speak of a 'passage presented by me' rather than address it as what St. Augustine says? To my knowledge, it is representative of what he says in other places. If you find this statement of his problematic, should that not be taken up as a challenge to his intent? — Paine

It's been a long time since I've read any Augustine, and I'm not sure of the context of the passage you presented, therefore I am not able to address his intent. So I refer to the quoted passage as what is presented by you, through your intent.

I disagree that turning 'toward its private good' is equivalent to "turning inward towards the maintenance of one's own well-being." Augustine says, " It turns to its own private good when it desires to be its own master. The will wanting to be its own master is not a concept in Aristotle's practical art of distinguishing what is good from what only seems to be. Turning 'inward' for Augustine is accepting that one must choose one life or another. The experience of the conflict is given through Paul's terms in the Letter to the Romans: — Paine

Right, as I explained, "the will wanting to be its own master" is a faulty description, for the reasons I described. It is expressed in the passage with the distinction between "common good" and "private good", such that the "private good" is always sinful. This means that there is an inherent incompatibility between the common good and the private good. But this is faulty by Aristotelian principles, and those expressed by Aquinas, which were later accepted by Catholic moralists. According to this moral philosophy the apparent good may be consistent with the real good, and this is their stated goal of moral philosophy, to create such a consistency. So Augustine's expression here of a "private good" (described as the will wanting to be its own master) which is incompatible with the common good, is an unacceptable description, which was rejected by Catholic moralists, in favour of Aristotle's apparent good and real good, which are not a dichotomy, but may be compatible with each other. Then "wanting to be its own master" can be left as inappropriate because it's not the will itself which "wants".

Please give an example of that language in Plato. — Paine

In The Republic of Plato, the good is what makes intelligible objects intelligible, just like the sun makes visible objects visible. By that analogy, we can say that the good is what drives, or inspires understanding, as the will to understand, because understanding is what makes intelligible objects intelligible..

In so far as doing bad things is the result of ignorance, isn't a 'faculty of choice' an idea that Socrates makes problematic? — Paine

What Socrates demonstrated as problematic, is the idea that doing bad things is necessarily the result of ignorance. It is argued in many places by Plato, that we knowingly do what is wrong. This is his refutation of the idea that virtue is a sort of knowledge, and his method of discrediting the sophists who claim that virtue can be taught. Plato demonstrates that virtue is knowledge plus something else, and the something else turns out to be similar to will.

The distance between Plato and Paul on these matters causes me to think that the term "Christian Platonism" is an oxymoron. — Paine

Paul was Jewish, and Paul played a big role in early Christianity. Accordingly, early Christianity adopted its moral principles from the Jewish tradition, not from either Plato nor Aristotle. I think it wasn't until Augustine, that Platonist moral principles were starting to be introduced into Christianity, but Plato didn't provide a coherent ethics, just some general practical principles of guidance. And it wasn't until even later that Aristotelian principles were introduced. Even in an evolving society, moral traditions can be very slow to change.

Christianity appears to me, to have a special feature which allows for indeterminate ethics. Instead of having a vast code of 'ought nots' like the ten commandments for example, it has one simple 'ought', 'love thy neighbour'. This allows that a wide variety of moral principles may be compatible and integrated into the religion as required, producing an evolving ethic. The indeterminateness in the ruling ideology is consistent with, and allows for the influence of, the free will. I think it is only later Christianity, the Inquisition, etc., that strict adherence to doctrine was enforced.

This highlights the problem with making general rules for future acts. In producing such general rules, the particular conditions of future situations cannot be foreseen. So it is more productive to create a general outline of the good, than trying to list all the particular instances of bad.

Are you saying that Arendt’s own notion of freedom as action is deterministic, or that her representation of Enlightenment concepts of intellect and will that she is critiquing are deterministic? — Joshs

I haven't read Arendt directly, only the article referenced in the op, and I think that article definitely expresses a determinist perspective, because it rejects freedom of choice as not even worth considering as a valid form of freedom. Statements like "Freedom is not located within the individual, but rather in the systems, or community, within which an individual operates", are clearly deterministic. This states that human beings are inherently unfree, but may provide themselves some illusion of freedom through the creation of required institutions.

Much of our behavior is ‘habituated’ in that our desires are expectations projected forward from previous experience. But this is as true of motivation by ‘internal forces’ as it is of allegedly rote habit. In both cases, an into oak action is involved which implies both past history( habit) and a novel, creative element. Whether i eat out of huger for for some other reason, as long as the act is conscious, it matters to me in some way and has some sense to it. — Joshs

I agree, probably well over ninety nine percent of our activity is habituated in one way or another. Or, any given action is ninety nine percent habit. But to have a proper understanding of ourselves, we still need to account for that other creative aspect as well.

These assertions from Arendt are being informed by outdated notions of will and freedom, across multiple philosophical interpretations, without the context of modern neuroscience. — Garrett Travers

I don't know if the notions of will and freedom here are outdated, I'd say they're just heavily influenced by determinism. The best a determinist can do toward a proper notion of free will is compatibilism. But trying to make a concept of free will which is compatible with determinist principles will inevitably lead to problems like the apparent paradox expressed by Banno.

For the will to not necessarily be free, you will have to describe an instance where the brain is not in operation, integrating data, processessing stimuli, recalling memories of interest or value, regulating the body's core structure, organizing emotion, processing patterns for recognition, formulating values, anticipating threats, etc. The will is quite literally everything that the brain uses to contribute to cognition and action.

Meaning, freedom of will is going to be the natural state of the brain, without the trauma requisite to make it stop being applied. Thus, the principle to be integrated is freedom from the application of interpersonal force, or otherwise uninvited interference with the will's natural and independent expression. — Garrett Travers

I think you missed the point here Garrett. The reason why the will is not necessarily free, is that we are free to define "will" and "free" as we please. There is really nothing we can point to which "will" refers to, and nothing which "free" refers to, therefore the terms can be defined in a way in which "free" is not consistent with willed acts. Then the will is not free. However, some ways of describing will and freedom give us a better understanding of reality than others.

For example, eating. The reason why you eat when you do, is because you are hungry. — Garrett Travers

This is not actually true. Much human eating is just habituated activity. We eat at mealtime. And because we have designated mealtimes, we do not allow ourselves to get hungry. If you've ever fasted, you'd understand that the feeling of hunger is quite a bit different from the feeling you get at mealtime, before you eat. I believe that to understand the issues being discussed in this thread, it is necessary to differentiate such habituated activities, often learnt as societal norms (including education and ways of thinking) , from activities which are truly motivated by internal forces. When we assume that the habit is what moves the will, we deny our freedom to break a habit.

Your inclination to not have the same faculty at odds with itself certainly echoes a sensibility evident in the Greek philosophical tradition. The matter of sin being a choice between two possible lives is the source of the duality involved here. Otherwise, there is no choice. — Paine

The problem with the passage you presented is that it defines "sin" in such a way that turning inward towards the maintenance of one's own well-being, is by definition sinful. This is the problem inherent within the distinction between apparent good, and real good, first proposed by Aristotle. In your passage, the real good would be the common good (contrary to which is "sin"), and the apparent good would be the private good (necessarily sinful). However, you'll see that Christian moral philosophy does not accept such a dichotomy, as the goal is to make the apparent good consistent with the real good.

However, if we maintain Platonic principles, the good is what moves the will toward understanding and accepting intelligible principles. And since this is a personal act of judgement and acceptance, it must be the internal, private good. Therefore, since the reality of the situation is that "the good" which moves the will is the private good, this must be represented as the true, or real good. And "the good" which is presented to us as the common good, being presented from an external source, is the apparent good, requiring judgement in relation to the internal private good, which ais the true good, is the good which moves the will to accept such common goods.

It is necessary that we proceed in this way, with the true good being the internal private good, to account for the fact that human beings often act in a way which is contrary to what is presented as the common good. The private good is what moves the will, so this must be represented as the real good. But to let the private good move the will is to "sin" in the words of your quote. And, we might even say that in the vast majority of instances, if the private good is inconsistent with the common good, such an act would truly be a sin.

But there is in some cases a discrepancy between the common good, as understood and represented by the human mind, and the good as would be understood by a more powerful mind, the human mind having some inherent deficiencies. In these cases it is necessary that an individual, with one's own mind, recognizes and understands the deficiency in what is presented as the common good. And because this comes from inside the mind of an individual, it is necessary to say that the true, or real good, is the internal, private good. Therefore the common good must be conformed to be consistent with the private good.

The idea of self-control as not being ruled by external or internal compulsion is more of a Stoic idea.
That difference is the point of Arendt saying:

Yet the Augustinian solitude of "hot contention" within the soul itself was utterly unknown, for the fight in which he had become engaged was not between reason and passion, between understanding and Thumos, that is, between two different human faculties, but it was a conflict within the will itself. And this duality within the self-same faculty had been known as the characteristic of thought, as the dialogue which I hold with myself. In other words, the two-in-one of solitude which sets the thought process into motion has the exactly opposite effect on the will: it paralyzes and locks it within itself; willing in solitude is always velle and nolle, to will and not to will at the same time. — Paine

This is a good indication as to why Arendt is dealing with a faulty description of "will". It leads to contradiction in the description of the self-same thing, in the form of the "duality within the self-same faculty". This is why "will" needs to be defined as distinct from those other basic capacities, like desire and reason, so Augustine proposed a tripartite mind, as memory, understanding (reason), and will.

The ironic, or seemingly paradoxical thing about the will is that it is not necessarily free, we must will it to be free, by making freedom of will a principle which we choose to follow. That is because by its very nature it is not bound by necessity, so we cannot propose a principle such as "free", and claim that the will is necessarily such, that would be self-defeating.

More accurately, the universe is made of quanta; that definition covers more than atoms. So, anyway, all that forms is of quanta. — PoeticUniverse

This is the poverty of Pythagorean idealism, within which the universe is composed of 'mathematical objects'. It is a theory which lacks substance.

But all that can be made out of the elements of a quantum is a quantum, not a substance. — Aristotle, On the Soul, 410a, 20

Is your argument like this? Intelligence produced luxury. Luxury produced laziness. And laziness reduced intelligence.

If so, we start with the premise that there was intelligence thousands of years ago, and this intelligence produced for us, a degree of luxury. I think that proposition is reasonably well supported with evidence.

The second proposition appears intuitive, but it may not be true because of the complexity of the issue. Luxury is the privilege of an individual, and it is not in general evenly distributed amongst a group of people. Because of this inequality in distribution, luxury amongst some might actually increase competitiveness in others. Therefore we cannot hold the second premise as a general principle. Differences between individuals deny the validity of such a conclusion.

And this is the problem with your argument in general, it relies on invalid generalizations. "intelligence" is a capacity which, if we even had an acceptable standard for testing it, varies greatly between one individual and another. So even if we could measure it, we could not make the generalization, that at this point in time, human intelligence is at this particular level. There might for instance be a relatively small group of humans with a very high level of intelligence but that would just get lost into the average.

Consider for analogy, the proposition that human beings had better eyes, and could see better, thousands of years ago, than they can now. And we offer up as evidence, that now people use eye glasses, to argue that the eyes of modern human beings have gotten lazy, and can't see as well as they used be able to. We've now become dependent on eye glasses. Further, we could say that eye glasses factor into evolutionary forces such that weaker eyes now survive better, so overall, human beings have gotten worse eye sight. You ought to be able to see how the whole argument relies on faulty generalizations.

I think intelligence is very similar. We can name some principles whereby we can claim that intelligence has gotten weaker, but it's all based in faulty generalizations anyway, so it's really meaningless.

Much of the confusion here seems to be mistaking "Are you free to act against your own will?" for "Are you free to act against your own desire?". This is ↪Agent Smith's error, along with ↪Metaphysician Undercover and ↪god must be atheist. — Banno

The problem obviously, is that the author of the article has not provided a cogent definition of "will". It is this faulty description of "will" which produces the appearance of your "strange little paradox". In reality there is no such paradox, just the proposal of an unacceptable definition of "will".

And you continue in your usual habit of attributing to me ideas which are completely inconsistent with what I actually write. In two different posts, I explained that "will" consists of the power to refrain from acting. The capacity of restraint enables deliberation. This is completely distinct from equating "will" with "desire". So you completely ignore what I write, to class me in some category, (those who think "will" is equated with "desire"), through some predisposition to classify people in one way or another, for the purpose of inflicting your prejudiced attack on that person. You insinuate, 'Metaphysician Undercover is one of them', therefore MU thinks like them, without even paying attention to what I actually write.

Arendt's point here is that "it must appear strange indeed that the faculty of the will whose essential activity consists in dictate and command should be the harborer of freedom." In doing so she shows the tyranny of following one's will, and hence that will is contrary to freedom. The will, therefore, cannot be the source of freedom. — Banno

The activity of "dictate and command" is not proper to the will. This activity is proper to the faculty of reason. What is proper to will is action. And the will does not necessarily follow reason. That this is the case was demonstrated long ago by Plato, through reference to the fact that one can do what one knows is wrong. This was the principal argument of Socrates, against sophists who claimed virtue is knowledge, and professed the capacity to teach virtue. In reality, knowing what ought to be done does not necessitate that it will be done. Augustine considered this problem at length. Therefore we have a separation between reason, which dictates and commands what ought to be done, and will, which does not necessarily act according to reason, and is therefore free from the dictatorship of reason.

The implications of this reality are wide ranging. As demonstrated by Aristotle, the capacity to think and reason is a potential of the material organs of the human body. That the will is free from being causally controlled by the habits of this material aspect of the living being, is evidence that the will is truly free from material causation, and united directly to the immaterial aspect of the living being, the soul. Therefore the freedom of the will is what allows us to break free from bad habits of thinking, like what is displayed in your referred article.

I offer ↪Metaphysician Undercover's disagreeing with her, and you, as further evidence that she is right. — Banno

The usual, ad hominem instead of considering the principles presented, a decidedly uneducated practice.

The article relies on a false representation of freedom to produce its conclusion. True freedom, as the possibility to do anything can only exist when one is doing nothing, because as soon as one engages in action one's freedom is restricted by the activity that the person is presently engaged in.

So the author presents a false dichotomy: "We do not envy the freedom a prisoner possesses to retreat into the recesses of their own mind, we envy the person who is free to leave their home, and is safe in doing so, because a system has been politically and socially established to make it as such."

The freedom to leave one's home is not produced by having a political system in place, which allows one to do that safely, it is produced by the fundamental physical fact of the individual having not yet left one's home. And at this point, the person must "retreat into the recesses of their own mind", to decide whether or not it is a good idea to do that, regardless of whether there is an established political system. Whether or not there is an established political system in place is irrelevant to the fact that one must make one's own decision, prior to leaving one's own home, as to whether or not it is a good idea.

It's only when we take this primary, and necessarily prior, freedom for granted, "the freedom a prisoner possesses to retreat into the recesses of their own mind", and make one's own decisions, produce one's own conclusions, that we come up with the idea that the ability to move around in the open, is in some way more enviable than this ability to decide. The ability to prevent oneself from moving around, from going out the door, and make the decision as to whether I ought to move around, considering all relevant factors of safety and whether my needs require such, and decide for myself, when it is safe to do such, is actually far more enviable. This is a necessary requirement for the freedom to go out safely, the established political system is not.

I believe it's a big mistake to try and deceive intelligent people with such faulty arguments. It will only backfire and make them more distrusting of the established system.

In short, the elementary ‘particles’ are physical, and because they are directly field quanta the quantum fields that they consist of must also be physical. — PoeticUniverse

One big problem here. The waves which are described have no medium, substance, within which they can be observed, so that the true nature of the medium ('ether') might be described and understood. So the idea that the fields are physical is not supported with any empirical evidence. The fields are simply theoretical tools which enable prediction, with nothing corresponding to them in the physical world, because mathematical axioms are produced without any correspondence with the physical world. That's why debates about "collapse" will never be resolved, and are pointless, because there is really nothing corresponding to "collapse". The appearance of "collapse" is just the manifestation of the boundary of applicability of the theory.

It's really no different from "the big bang". People talk about "the big bang" as if it refers to a a real physical event. But it's really just the boundary to the applicability of the theory being applied. From within the confines of the theory, approach to the boundary appears like the world takes on some unintelligible form. In reality the unintelligible form is just a reflection of the deficiency of the theory. So the existence of the unintelligible thing, 'the big bang" or "the collapse", is just an illusion which is created when we adopt the belief that there is something physical which corresponds with the theory.

wasn't suggesting Socrates is superior to Christianity. That kind of hierarchical game I leave to zealots. My point was Plato's literature doesn't depend on historicity for its success. The method is what matters, not the biography. We can't really say the same about the Jesus stories. But whether Christianity (or The Rolling Stones for that matter) had a massive following and were hugely influential is scarcely the point. — Tom Storm

I see what you are arguing, that it's a different type of information then. I acknowledged this already, it's information relevant to the history of ideas. Would it be correct to call this ideological information? What I objected to, is Janus' claim that religious texts are not informative. So I think this is the point.

The first page or so brings out a strange little paradox for those who insist they have free will: Are you free to act against your own will? — Banno

The will is the power to resist any action which one is inclined toward. That's why it takes will power to break a bad habit. In this sense, every action is an act against one's will. But the fact that we can resist acting demonstrates that the will is in fact, free. It is the acts themselves, which are not free.

Exactly. It matters not one jot if Socrates was fictional. What we have in Plato's literature is a method of enquiry that transcends the potential truth value. Plato is not dealing in 'revealed' wisdom. The New Testament, by contrast leaves us nothing but myths - a series of whoppers written about an itinerant preacher, produced for the most part decades after he lived by mainly anonymous sources. Not all ancient writings have the same status. — Tom Storm

Plato's literature may display a method, but so do those "whoppers" which are called the gospels. These so-called "myths" demonstrate a method which created a massive following, a hugely influential religion. To me, that's an awesome method on display, and its significance far outweighs, Plato's method of enquiry "that transcends the potential truth value" (whatever that's supposed to mean).

Of course, if a Wiki article offends you, you ought fix it. I'm working on Philosophical Investigations. — Banno

Rather than add my own personal opinion to the melting pot of Wikipedia, I'd rather just be skeptical of its high degree of subjectivity. But I've heard about some fun games the youngsters play with editing Wiki. Be aware, what you read might be the product of a silly game.

If you think religious texts can be informative, give us an example. And of course the fact that people presumably believed what is written in religious texts is not an example of being informative in the terms I am asking for. — Janus

Let's start with the basics then, The Bible. Surely you cannot say that there is no information in there.

Take the gospels for example. How can you say that this description of the life of Jesus, and the society within which Jesus lived is not informative? You might reject it as completely and utterly fictitious, but that does not remove the possibility of it being informative. Compare the description of Jesus' life in the gospels with Plato's description of Socrates' life in The Dialogues. One might argue that Socrates is completely and utterly a fictitious character, but that does extremely little toward negating the value of the information found in Plato's dialogues.

So I'll repeat what I asked. Is the history of belief not a real part of your world? Do you exclude information about what people are believing at the current time, documented, and maintained for an extended period of time, from your category of "information"? Can you propose a better, more direct, and accurate way to access the ideas and beliefs of people who lived thousands of years ago, than through what they themselves recorded? Or does this not qualify as "information" to you?

It hasn't failed in its mandate. Do note what NATO's first and second Article are about: — ssu

I agree with what you are saying. My post was directed at Manuel who implied that Russia was the "enemy", and NATO was formed for the purpose of containing this enemy. Notice in the articles you've quoted. the mandate is international "peace", and I said if there becomes a particular "enemy" their mandate has failed.

What is important is the meaning of "enemy". Any rhetoric which refers to a particular entity as "the enemy" implies hostility toward that entity. And open hostility toward another state is not consistent with international peace.

Economic sanctions are a strategic tool developed under this mandate of "peace". They are applied without declaring war, and without declaring an enemy. They seem to be meant like a sort of punishment, like a parent would punish a child, banished to their room, grounded, no dessert. You punish your child without thinking of them as the enemy. But when you are on the receiving end of the punishment, you may interpret the punishment as a hostile act, and apprehend the inflictor as the enemy. With a harsh punishment the child might wish the parent dead, but at the same time, the deeper relationship of dependency is usually recognized. So in the application of such sanctions the assumed "peace" is not necessarily two-way, it may only be from the perspective of the one side. That this is just an illusion of peace has been demonstrated in the past by acts of guerilla warfare and terrorism.

Give me an example of some information that comes exclusively from a religious text. (And by 'information' I'm not talking about being informed about what was believed historically and so on, I'm specifically thinking about information about the nature of the world). — Janus

Why do you now attempt to qualify "information" with "exclusively from a religious text", and, "about the nature of the world". What you said was an unqualified, "it cannot be informative".

How is one to know whether the information derived from a text is exclusive to that text.? And, wouldn't the fact that the same information is in another text serve to corroborate, therefore enhance the value of that information? And what's with excluding what was believed historically, from being a fact about the nature of the world? Is the history of belief not a part of your world?

Religion, like poetry, in its own unique ways can be transformative; it cannot be informative; to think it can is a naive mistake. Those who think religion can be informative are fundamentalist; the worst scourge our society faces. That seems perfectly obvious to me and I can only hope that maybe one day you'll get it. — Janus

Are you saying that you believe that in all the reams of religious material which exists throughout the world, there is absolutely no information there? Have you read it all to confirm this, or is this just some prejudice of yours, moving your hands and writing this for you?

I like your approach to this discussion but I can't share this interpretation. The natural world has animals in it. They behave and do things. We can readily observe and explain this. Birds make nests. People make walls and houses. Not sure why we must accept intentionality (behaviour) as evidence of an enchanted world. — Tom Storm

Yes, you might say that all living beings, including us, are in a way "natural". But the matter I brought up, is what we, as natural human beings create. So the question is how is it possible that we as natural beings can create something unnatural. And we might see that all living beings behave and do things in a purposeful way, as rightly indicates, and this might incline one to think that they are all endowed with some sort of intention.

Now we have this principle, intention, which is not understood by science, but it is inherent within natural things, which are understood by science, biology. This casts doubt on your claim that science provides us with the best means for understanding natural things. We have a whole class of things, living beings, which have inherent within them, a principle, intention, which is better understood by moral philosophy rather than biology.

Because science has no approach to this immaterial principle, intention, it doesn't have the capacity to complete our understanding of these "natural" things, living beings. And, our principles of moral philosophy are greatly lacking in comparison with our principles of science, so our understanding of the immaterial intention, has lagged far behind scientific understanding. Since our knowledge of the immaterial has lagged so far behind, we cannot know whether or not it will give us a better understanding of the natural world, when it is provided with the chance to catch up.

The latter makes an unjustifiable jump from an extant world to God. Why God? Everything you argue could apply to the role of aliens in a creation story. Why could you not argue that aliens created the world using this reasoning? — Tom Storm

The jump is not unjustified if you understand it. All material existence is ordered, it is not just random parts in a random spatial-temporal order. So to be a material object means to be ordered. And to be ordered requires a cause of that order. This implies that there is a cause of order which is prior to all material existence, therefore an immaterial cause. It doesn't matter if you want to call this immaterial cause "alien", instead of the conventional "God", we'd still be talking about the same thing under a different name.

Well, the issue as I see it, is like this. The continued existence of the State is dependent on the continued existence of the ruling class, the purity of the aristocracy. The continuity of the ruling class is supposed to be provided for by the eugenics of the ultra elite, the philosophers. This is the noble lie, which even the members of the ruling class themselves get subjected to, because only the ultra high-up philosophers are rigging the lottery which is supposed to determine by chance, who breeds with whom.

You'll see that Plato uses the analogy of breeding dogs. So the continued existence of the ruling class is analogous to the continued existence of a pure variety within the human species, like we maintain pure breeds of dogs. Traits are selected for, and bred for, to maintain a pure ruling variety, and this selection activity is as much as possible hidden even from the ruling class itself, making the selection activity appear more natural, as if it is not fixed. So there is a type of self-deception which is occurring at the very highest levels of the ruling class. They simply follow some breeding practices which are a matter of tradition, and the true reason for the practice is lost in the tradition, hidden as the noble lie.

The second level in the State, next to the ruling class, is the guardians. The guardians are a medium between the rulers and the lower class, which are the craftspeople, artisans, manufactures, traders, farmers, those who provide for everyone. Honour is the top trait of the guardians. They are like the watch dogs of society, but they must remain true and loyal to the rulers in policing the lower class. So the honour of the guardians is what maintains the proper relationship between them and the rulers.

The State is designed by its constitution to last forever, or indefinitely, but as Plato says, like all natural living things, change will come about, and it will decay. He states that the State will start to break down when there is fault in the breeding practices, the rulers misunderstand the numerical principles. But Plato doesn't account for natural variations which are essential to modern evolutionary theory. So Plato proposes a great convoluted mathematical theory as to how the rulers fail in their breeding practices, which leads to the corruption of the State. I think he attributes the actual decline of the State to a mixing of the classes, without any reference to natural variation. Notice he talks about the gold, silver, bronze, and iron (each a variety of human being), mixing.

But the real issue is the position of honour, as the relation between the guardians and the rulers. What is evident in Plato's description is that strife develops between the rulers themselves. Whether this is the result of the described mixing, or something completely different like natural variation, might be irrelevant. When the rulers turn on each other, they must each appeal to the guardians for personal assistance, and the role of honour is reversed. The ruler now honours the guardian, because the guardian is needed for defense against other rulers. So this, I believe is the first step to the corruption process, it is disagreement amongst the rulers themselves, which causes a reversal of the role of honour, therefore the role of the guardians. Instead of policing the lower class, they must turn around and police the rulers.

Most of these debates end up arguing about what constitutes evidence. — Tom Storm

Yes, that is usually the problem. It involves how we interpret what is evident to us ( i.e. the evidence). Differences in interpretation allow different people to say that the very same thing occurring is "evidence" of distinctly incompatible things. Interpretation always involves reasoning and the application of some principles, so when this varies there is variance in the conclusions drawn from the same observations. The observations are made from a different perspective'

For example, an atheist might observe the material world, and conclude that there is no evidence of God, while a theologist would say that the material world itself is evidence of God. The difference is in the reasoning and principles applied in the interpretation. The former assuming there is nothing beyond what is directly experienced, the latter assuming that there must be a cause of what is experienced.

I understand this but semantics are not my thing. We are talking about the paranormal or extramundane, not the difference between a cliff face and a brick wall. — Tom Storm

I think that you are trying to impose a biased restriction by making this claim. You chose to replace "material" with "natural". If you did this with the intent of opposing the natural with the paranormal, so that you could leave the artificial in some vague area which is neither natural nor paranormal, then this is not an acceptable proposal.

The problem is that you described the natural as that which is best understood through empirical science, and intention does not fit into this description. Intention is best understood through moral philosophy. So the existence of a brick wall cannot be understood only through science, because science won't determine the reason why the brick wall is there. This is why social science developed out of moral philosophy, and not from natural philosophy like the science of nature did. Therefore we cannot class the social sciences with the natural sciences because they use different standards as to what sort of principles may be applied in interpretation, the former being derived from moral philosophy, the latter being derived from natural philosophy. And as explained above, such differences in interpretive principles produce vastly different conclusions.

Emoticons and ad homs. How can I deal with such rhetorical firepower? — Wayfarer

180 seems to have great difficulty with the English language.

See, the second definition has a flaw: It implies or may be taken to mean that something physical (matter) can create something non-physical. How can this be possible? Something physical can only participate in the creation of something non-physical by something non-physical. For example, consciousness (non-physical) needs the brain and other parts of the body (physical) to create a sensation, perception, experience, etc. for the person. Thus observation, thought, emotion, states of mind, etc. are created, which are non-physical. — Alkis Piskas

This is the issue which Mr. Storm's proposed switch from "materialism" to "naturalism" makes clearer to us. When we consider the reality of artificial things, in contrast with natural things, we see that human intention adds something to the material world, in this act which we describe as creative. Simple appeal to "the forces of nature" cannot account for the changes which the human mind have imposed onto the material world. These awesome changes are all around us, and we cannot ignore the fact that they are evidence of a great power.

So the proposition that the material world creates, or produces intention is completely backward and unjustifiable as inconsistent with the evidence. The evidence is very clear that the awesome power of human intention introduces something new to the material world, which was not there before. It is completely illogical to turn back to the material world, and try to see how intention came from the material world, and how the material world endowed it with such power, when it's very clear that intention is bringing something into the material world which was not already there. That's what the evidence of the artificial shows us, that intention creates something new. Therefore we have to look to some place other than the material world to see where intention comes from, to find out what enables it with the capacity to give to the material world something which it did not already have. This "place" where we need to look is the immaterial.

If I remember correctly, the biggest dispute between Leibniz and Newton was concerning the importance of Newton's "momentum", mass times velocity, which Leibniz called dead force, in relation to Leibniz's "vis viva" (living force), which he expressed as mass times velocity squared. It turned out that the two principles are not incompatible, but Leibniz's principle became far more useful, and central to the concept of energy.

546

No, I don't think they got the order confused, it seems reasonable to me. But I don't really understand the first degree of corruption; it's described as having a mathematical cause.

The first degree of corruption is honour. It is described as coming about through some mathematical principles which allow the prescribed principles of eugenics that keep the aristocracy pure, to be degraded. The rulers then trend toward infighting, civil war, and war opens up to them, the spoils of war, property and riches seized. The turning toward money pushes them into the second degree of corruption.

Naturally occurring versus the product of intention hence artificial - interesting. I've always assumed human activities are a subcategory of naturalism. Are you drawing on a particular source for this? — Tom Storm

As a source, look up artificial in the dictionary. The point though, is that if science is the way toward understanding the natural, then if we use something other than science, like moral philosophy, to understand intentional acts, shouldn't we conclude that these are not natural? Or would you say that we completely misunderstand intention, and we ought to use science to understand it, rather than moral philosophy. If so, I'd say that you suffer from the prejudice, "that the natural world is all which exists".

Jamalrob is right. And I think part of the argument is that the person best suited to rule is the one who least wants the job, because to provide the best rule is the hardest job there is. The philosopher would only be moved to take the job of ruler, if life under the present rule got so bad, that it was worse than having to rule would be. If there haven't ever been any philosopher rulers, we can conclude that the rulers have never gotten so bad for the philosophers, to drive one to be a ruler.

Naturalism is the term most educated skeptics and atheist philosophers would use. They would generally hold to methodological naturalism - that science is the most reliable tool we can use to understand the natural world and not hold to philosophical naturalism - that the natural world is all which exists. This latter claim being too totalising and unjustifiable. — Tom Storm

Let's reject the latter claim then, being to totalizing and unjustifiable. Now we are able to allow the possibility that there is more to reality than the natural world. And, if there is non-natural aspects of the world, we would probably be using something other than science to understand them, science being the means for understanding the natural aspects of the world.

So here's a proposal. The artificial aspects of the world are distinct from the natural aspects of the world, because they are created by human activities rather than by nature. And we know that these artificial things are not natural because they are caused through intention, which we understand through philosophy and ethics rather than science.

Does this work for you? Since there are these aspects of reality, intentional acts, which we understand through means other than science, does this give you sufficient evidence that the natural world is not all that exists?

That’s a totally unacceptable misrepresentation of what Aristotle is saying.

He is NOT saying that it is a view held a long time ago. He says it is an ancient tradition that has come down from distant ancestors to his own day: — Apollodorus

I think it is a very good analogy, just like today, many people believe in God and go to church. This is an ancient tradition which has come down from distant ancestors, just like what Aristotle refers to. The problem is in your claim that this religion is what was generally accepted, and even worse, your claim that Aristotle was promoting this idea which came down from distant ancestors.

You seem to be missing the basic facts of what Aristotle wrote. He refers to all these things, such as the heaven, and aether, as "bodies". He also demonstrates that although eternal circular motion is logically possible, anything involved in such a rotation, or revolution, must be a "body". Then he explains why each and every body, being composed of matter, is generated and will be destroyed. So it is very clear that he has indicated that although the "distant ancestors" believed these bodies to be eternal, he does not. Then, in De Anima he explains why anything truly eternal must be conceived of as non-spatial, immaterial.

This is precisely why Aristotle brings established view up, namely to justify his own view. — Apollodorus

He actually brings up such established views to refute them. But Socrates got put to death for speaking out against such established views, so Aristotle is much more careful. He produces all the evidence required to prove such views as unacceptable, allowing the student to draw the conclusion, without himself directly speaking out against the establishment.

Aristotle here is not concerned with the Gods, but with the divine (theion) as a principle the existence of which he regards as “certain” and beyond dispute: — Apollodorus

Right, maybe you're now catching on. He is not directly speaking out against "the Gods", he is demonstrating that there is a real need for a conception of "divine". But in the process he shows that the established conception of "divine" is unacceptable.

But we’ve been through this many times already and I’m not going to waste any more of my time. — Apollodorus

Yes we have already been through this, and you refuse to acknowledge what Aristotle actually wrote, skimming through the texts, quoting passages which appear to support your prejudice.

There is a very real and evident problem with the way that Wittgenstein describes obeying a rule, and that is that this way of looking at rule following pays no real respect to the internal mechanism of the mind of the person who is said to have obeyed the rule.

So for example, if we give two distinct people from two distinct parts of the world, the same division problem, they might use completely different mental techniques to come up with the same correct answer. Since they both have the same correct answer, we'd say that they both followed the same rule. But if we timed the activity, we might find one quicker than the other. And if we enquire as to the procedure, or give them a difficult 'long division' problem, so that we can observe their mental activity being expressed on paper, we'd see that they each followed a different mental procedure. Therefore there is a real issue of very distinct mental processes each leading to the same conclusion, and the observation of obeying the same rule, because each produces the correct answer, when the processes being followed are actually distinct.

So, I have this question: "Is there any meaning talking about 'materialism' to materialists, since they can't see or think that there's anything else than matter, anyway?" That is, it is something self-evident for them. You can see this also as a paradox: "Materialism has no meaning for a materialist"! — Alkis Piskas

I think that the same prejudice which constitutes the materialist attitude closes an individual's mind to the reality of how vast and truly unknown the unknown actually is. In other words, the proposition 'anything real is material' applies an artificial closure to the extent of the unknown, which limits a person's logical capacity to the confines of one's own conception of matter, and this restricts the person's capacity to learn. This act of restricting the unknown by assuming that a proposition like this, describing the unknown, is truthful, is very unphilosophical. Since this prejudice has become very deeply rooted in our society, and those who hold it are fundamentally unphilosophical, it is in most cases rather pointless to be talking to a materialist about materialism.

I actually think that's exactly what Wittgenstein himself is trying to get across. To not misunderstand one for the other.

It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact
that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after
another;(descriptive rule) but that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" (prescriptive rule)
— Ludwig Wittgenstein — Hermeticus

I don't exactly agree. For Wittgenstein, "obeying a rule" is to be observed and judged to be acting in a way which is consistent with the rule, hence his use of "exhibited". The need for a prescriptive rule really disappears for him. For a person to obey a prescriptive rule, in the sense of 'I should respect the rule and do what I ought to do', this requires that the person interpret the rule, then move to act according to one's interpretation of it. Notice that the interpretive part is what he is trying to avoid. So for him, "obeying a rule" is to be described as acting in a way consistent with the rule. And the means by which the person comes to act that way becomes sort of irrelevant. The person might just be copying the actions of others, or whatever.

It isn’t “someone else’s principle” at all. He presents it as generally accepted tradition!

As Aristotle himself says, it is a tradition “handed down from our ancestors” and he agrees with the idea, with the name, and even with the derivation of the name which he got from his teacher Plato: — Apollodorus

He presents it as what was believed by "all who believe in the existence of gods", what he calls "our distant ancestors". If someone were writing today, about what our distant ancestors believed about God, would you consider it a fair representation of what is generally accepted today? Would you look at the traditions of the Catholic church, and say that these are generally accepted traditions? We know that Socrates and Plato spoke out against "the gods" considerably.

The entire point of Wittgensteins argumentation was that "interpreting a rule" and "obeying a rule" are two completely different things. — Hermeticus

I believe this is a good interpretation, and the difference here amounts to the difference between a descriptive rule and a prescriptive rule. When we produce a descriptive rule, we come up with 'this is the way things behave'. That's a conclusion of inductive reasoning. There is nothing within the rule itself, to compel that a thing will behave like that in the next instance, so what causes the thing to behave like that, is a completely different issue.

If we say that being caused to behave according to a rule is what "obeying a rule" means, then we see the difference between "interpreting a rule" (as in understanding the described behaviour), and "obeying a rule", (as in causing oneself to act according to the described behaviour). On the other hand though, we can say that "obeying a rule" is to act in a way which can be judged as being consistent with the described rule.

The difference between these two interpretations of "obeying a rule" is the difference between judging the cause, and judging the effect. Wittgenstein opts for the latter, making "obeying a rule" something which is observed after the fact, rather than something decided prior to the act, in the sense of interpreting a prescriptive rule, and acting accordingly. So the prescriptive rule is not relevant to Wittgenstein's position on rule following, and we must be careful when reading him not to misunderstand.

What about -1?

You can write a condition on energies, say that the kinetic energy equals potential energy. The quantities are the same on both sides, Joule, that is. Dimensional analysis is, by the way, a useful tool if both sides of a = sign are consistent. In the equation of two energies, this is obvious but in complicated expressions it comes in handy and you can even use it to anticipate. — Cornwell1

The thing about equating kinetic energy with potential energy is that it seems to involve some kind of category mistake to describe the two as equal. One is a measure of the actual movement of a thing, while the other is a measure of a thing's capacity to move. Since a cause is required to transform the potential to actual, then if we express the two as equal we neglect the reality that one is temporally prior, and the other posterior. This temporal difference implies that the supposed equality between them neglects an important fact.

And so, implying that the primary body is something else beyond earth, fire, air, and water, they gave the highest place a name of its own, aither, derived from the fact that it ‘runs always’ for an eternity of time

Notice two things here. First, "they gave...". Obviously, this is someone else's principle being referred to. Second, it's a primary "body" being referred to. Therefore it is material, generated, destructible, and definitely not eternal. This is another principle which Aristotle is demonstrating as faulty. Nice try Appollodorus, but you're clutching at straws now.

Anyway, now that you finally admit that your claim is your own and not Aristotle's — Apollodorus

Finally admit it? That it's my own believe is what I stated at the very beginning.

I believe it is the soul itself which is the incorporeal element. And this is the same for all living things. This is the Aristotelian structure. — Metaphysician Undercover

and that you have zero evidence to back it up, — Apollodorus

This is false though. You're so stuck in your own prejudice that you refuse to look at the evidence. I know I won't "sell it" to anyone so extremely compromised by prejudice, that they refuse to read the material.

Well "equal" is a human conception, so equality is fundamentally artificial. I suppose that's the point of the thread. But if we say that there are symmetries in nature, then we assume some sort of true natural equality.

This is what I don't understand. It appears like there must be some sort of true natural equality, which would ground our judgements of equality in some sort of truth. But at the same time it seems like the judgement as to which similarities we accept, and which differences we overlook, in our judgements of equal, are somewhat arbitrary or subjective. So where does the truth of equality lie? Or is equality something we totally made up as a fictional, but also very useful principle? If so, then why does it appear like there is true natural equality in the world?

The fact is that this is YOUR conclusion, not Aristotle’s. — Apollodorus

That's right. As I explained, this is the way that many good philosophers like Plato and Aristotle write. They lay out all the evidence as clearly as possible, allowing the reader to draw the required conclusion. This allows that the conclusion is made by the reader, rather than being forced on the reader through stipulation, so that the reader truly believes the conclusion which is made.

Saying “read the book, the evidence is there!” is mere evasion and not an acceptable argument in any philosophical or logical method that I am aware of. Anyone can say that.

Aristotle clearly says “eternal” (aidios) when referring to heaven and its circular movement. — Apollodorus

There is a type of philosophical writing, well exemplified by Wittgenstein, in which the author asserts something, then proceeds to demonstrates that the opposite of what is asserted is what the truth is. This is the Platonic method. Plato has Socrates' interlocutor make the assertion, then Socrates will proceed with the demonstration that what is asserted is not the truth. With Aristotle, we do not have the luxury of an interlocutor, to indicate the assertions which are to be proven as false. Without a very careful reading, an individual such as yourself, might not recognize which assertions are being proven to be false.

The heaven is NOT "composed of matter and therefore not eternal". It is composed of ether which is a divine and eternal substance. Therefore it is ETERNAL by definition. — Apollodorus

You obviously did not read "De Caelo" Bk1, Ch9. It is very clear that "the heaven" is one, and is a material object.

The world as a whole, therefore, includes all its appropriate matter, which is, as we saw, natural perceptible body. So that neither are there now, nor have there ever been, nor can there ever be formed more heavens than one, but this heaven of ours is one and unique and complete. — De Caelo Bk1, Ch9

Notice that "one" "unique", and "complete" are the defining attributes of a material body, a "particular". And at the beginning of Ch9 Aristotle explains carefully the difference between a particular thing, and a Form, or essential formula. The latter allows that there is more than one of the said thing.

That the heaven is a material body is also supported by your other quotes in which Aristotle demonstrates that anything which revolves in a circular rotation must be a material body.

Clearly, Aristotle is talking about the traditional four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, as being generated and therefore not eternal. This is precisely why he introduces ether as a fifth, divine and eternal element that has circular motion! — Apollodorus

Let me get this straight. In this section, Aristotle discusses how the earth and heaven are made up of bodies, are generated, and are not eternal. But you are claiming that he introduces "ether" here to justify eternality. Where's the reference to ether? Aether is a Pythagorean principle, and Aristotle firmly rejects Pythagoreanism. You are now demonstrating again, your ability to stretch your imagination.

I wonder what definition of symmetry Noether was working with. Looks like basic algebraic equality of the left hand side (LHS) to the right hand side (RHS) of an equation. No sign to flip/not. A balance/scale type of symmetry with equal "weights" on both sides; yet even here too the "weights" act in opposite directions (rotationally, one is clockwise and the other is anticlockwise). — Agent Smith

In mathematics, it is often said that the left hand side of the equation represents the very same thing as the right hand side, a specific mathematical value, or object. In reality, the two sides express two distinct things, with an equality between these two. When two things which are different, are said to be equal, the difference between them has already been excused in that judgement of equal. So we now have a second level of excusing differences for the sake of symmetry, the excuse which exists right at the level of producing the equation.

We can place this as the highest level. In pure math, the two sides represent the same thing. But in application of equations, the two sides don't really represent the same thing, the differences are excused in order that the equation may be applied. Then the second level is specific to the type of application. So in the example of conservation of energy, there is energy excused to entropy, and this is the second level of excuse.