I have thought about it, that's why it took me three days to reply. The thing is that I am not a strong proponent of democracy, for the reasons outlined by Plato in The Republic. The vast majority of the citizens in any society, do not have the education required to choose a good leader. So the politicians of a democracy behave like they are offering candies to children, for the sake of getting elected. Allowing the general population to vote produces a bad government. Therefore Plato thought that democracy was a corrupted form of government. My opinion is that we cannot fix the problems inherent within democracy by applying some standards of education by which we can distinguish a class of eligible voters from a class of non-eligible.

And regardless of what you think, I am not in favour of discrimination on the basis of education. This is because a person can only truly prove one's level of education in any particular respect, through one's actions. And to deny a person the ability to act, thereby prove one's education in that respect, because you believe that the person does not have the education required to carry out the act, is a form of prejudice. So if you want an educational test as to who can and cannot vote, you might as well just ask who the person would vote for, and if they make what you consider a stupid decision, deny them the right to vote, based on their education level.

Are you anti-discrimination? — tim wood

I am against discrimination on the basis of education. One's capacity to be educated is somewhat dependent on socioeconomic conditions so an individual's level of education is not completely a matter of choice.

While the notion has general use, it's metaphysics that is my main interest here. Stealing blatantly from my Rutledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, a realist may hold to things like that correspondence to the facts is what makes a statement true; that there may be truths we do not recognise as such, do not believe and do not know; that the Law of excluded middle holds for things in the world; and that the meaning of a sentence may be found by specifying it's truth-conditions. An ant-realist may in contrast hold that truth is to be understood in sophisticated epistemic terms, perhaps as what a "well-conducted investigation" might lead us to believe; that there can be no unknown truths; that we need include "unknown" as well as true and false in our logical systems; and that the meaning of a sentence is to be found in what it might assert. — Banno

The reason why this is a difficult subject, with a lack of consensus as to the nature of reality, is because we have a very deficient understanding of the nature of time. Time is the central issue here. If we view future events as having no determinate reality, they are merely possibilities, Then there is a difficulty in reconciling the future with the three fundamental laws of logic. Aristotle recommended that we suspend the law of excluded middle for future (undecided) events, but that's not the only possible proposal. One might say that the law of non-contradiction does not apply to future (non-existent) things, or even that the law of identity could not apply. The different ways of violating the three laws to allow for the appearance of an indeterminate future produces completely different metaphysics.

The form of metaphysics depends upon one's approach to this issue. In relation to events of the past, we find strong justification for the three fundamental laws, and this supports realism. So the realist wants to take the reality of the past, and extend it into the future (like the block universe for example), and to apply the three laws equally to the whole universe of past and future. The anti-realist sees this as wrong, and in a sort of overreaction, takes the indeterminateness of the future and argues this as a feature of the whole. As you can see, what is left out here is a description of the way that we relate to the present, and this is why there is a problem. Our descriptions of our own positions, at the present, are productions, artful creations, derived from the metaphysics of how we view the past and future. And since we have no way of describing the present which is consistent with either the realist or anti-realist perspective, we might produce an endless number of such descriptions, not one ever being completely acceptable..

Thanks for the link, but as soon as I read this "Plato, primarily as a proponent of Pythagorean philosophical doctrines,2 was very careful with what he did and did not reveal, being under an apparently severe oath of secrecy", I was really turned off.

Plato attempted to explain things in the most descriptive and explicit way possible. He has volumes of writings and founded his own Academy which did not charge admission. There is no oath to secrecy there. The idea that he was a member of some type of Pythagorean cult is nonsense

Thanks Wayfarer, I thought I was reading the thread, but I must have skimmed over, or forgotten that part. I'm going to express my opinion below.

In the Philebus Plato raises the problem of the “indeterminate dyad” . The limited (peras) and unlimited (apieron) is, as Aristotle called it, an indeterminate dyad. The two sides of an indeterminate dyad are dependent on each other. There is not one without the other. The two together are one.

The Forms are each said to be one, of which there are many things of that Form. The Forms and things of that Form are an indeterminate dyad, but the Forms are presented as if they stand alone and apart. There is, however, no ‘X’ without things that are ‘x’.

Each Form is one, but Forms are many. How many? In addition, each Form is both self-same and other. There is the Just itself and the Beautiful itself, but the Just is not Beautiful of the Beautiful the Just. The Forms themselves are an indeterminate dyad, same and other.

Becoming is supposed to be understood in light of being, things in light of Forms, the unlimited in light of the limited. Formulated in this way, the problem comes to light. How can the limited encompass the unlimited? When the many are reduced to one what it is that makes them many cannot be taken into account.

The Forms falsely represent the part as the whole. The undetermined as determined. The open-ended nature of philosophical inquiry as if it is completed and closed to further inquiry. — Fooloso4

I believe that what Plato expresses here in the Philebus, is a simple, or basic version of Aristotle's hylomorphism. Simply put, the "unlimited" is matter and form is the limited. In the world, we observe a combination of these two, particular things which are composed of matter (understood as inherently unlimited), and form, which is the limit. Existing things are a sort of balance between these two, and that balance Socrates describes as a third category. Then he proceeds to propose the need for a fourth category. The fourth category is the cause of this balance, the cause of the mixture, the cause of the existence of particular things which are each am individual balance, or equality within. He demonstrates why the cause, as the fourth category, must necessarily be conceived of as distinct from the third category , the mixture of unlimited and limited (matter and form).

I believe that this is an extension of the problem he addressed in the Timaeus. There he faced the problem of how a particular thing receives the precise form which it actually has. The "form" is conceived of as something general, a universal, or type. And it is obvious that in living things the form or type of being precedes and predetermines the type which will come from the seed or embryo. The issue which must be grappled with is that the form which appears to predetermine, is a universal type, but the thing which comes to be has a particular form, unique to itself. So there is an unexplained, and apparently unintelligible, gap between the universal form which is supposed to predetermine, and the actual form which comes to be, as a particular form.

Aristotle closes this gap with the concept of "accident". The universal form is somewhat deficient because it does not account for the accidentals. But this proposal creates a clear separation, a division between the two senses of "form". The form of the particular is necessarily unintelligible, due to this division, and this is due to the role of "matter" in the composition of the particular (matter being what is inherently unlimited). There is debate even today, as to whether accidents are properly attributed to matter or to the particular form, but understanding of this will only be produced by referencing what Socrates called the fourth category, the cause of the union between matter and form.

This so-called "fourth class" or fourth category is the point which Aristotle comes to by way of his cosmological argument as well. Matter provides the potential for substantial being, and it appears to be unlimited, it could be potentially anything. In actual fact, all the matter we encounter is limited, having a particular form. Our minds designate matter as unlimited, but material existence demonstrates that it is always limited. In other words every instance of material existence is as a particular form. This implies that there is a cause, a further type of actuality (beyond the actuality of material existence), which is prior in time (as cause), to material existence, to account for this fact that matter always has a form..

The indeterminate dyads. — Fooloso4

I studied Plato a lot, and never heard of an indeterminate dyad. What is it, like "matter" in Timaeus?

[

A token does not refer to how many times you see something. — Luke

For "every day" on which he has the sensation means more than once. He is not talking about a single instance which would be a token of the sensation. — Luke

So, which is it? Can a person encounter the same token more than one time or not? Or are you saying that a person can see the same token more than one time, but a person cannot 'sense' the same token more than one time?

The point I’ve unsuccessfully been trying to make is that Wittgenstein is talking about establishing the name of a sensation. This means not only establishing the name for a single token, but for a class of tokens, i.e., a type. Wittgenstein is debunking the idea that a name or word can be established in the way he describes. — Luke

And, the point I 've been trying to make (unsuccessfully it appears), is that this is a misreading. Wittgenstein proceeds from a brief description of a problem which concerns the lack of a criterion of identity, to ask how do we talk about our inner experiences, and then provides an example of naming a sensation.

There is no talk here about a class, or a type, or tokens of a type. You are apparently approaching what he says with this preconceived notion that he is going to talk about a type,, and this influences the way you are reading him. If, in the end, it turns out that he successfully proves that a word or symbol cannot be used in a certain way the that way he is demonstrating in his example, then we can walk away with that conclusion. However, we need to follow the demonstration through, and understand it as it is presented, to see what it actually does demonstrate, rather than interpreting the writing in relation to a foregone conclusion. When there is ambiguity in the words used (as there always is to some extent, especially in philosophical writing), the latter is very conducive to misreading. This is a danger which is amplified by reading secondary sources prior to the primary source.

You appear to have the preconceived notion that language cannot be used without rules. So when at the end of 258, Wittgenstein says that there is no right or wrong in relation to the diarist's use of S, you conclude that a word cannot be used in this way. That's a faulty conclusion though because your preconceived premise is unstated and unsupported.

The “proof” is that it is assumed by the scenario that the diarist writes ‘S’ “every time”, for each token or instance of the sensation. What prompts the diarist to write ‘S’ is the recurrence of the sensation. — Luke

Clearly we must dismiss such a proof as contrary to the evidence. If what you claim as "proof" was true, then every distinct time that I see a chair, it would necessarily be a different token, and it would be impossible that I could see the same chair (token of the type chair) twice. I do see the same token, the same chair, on a multitude of distinct occasions, therefore the evidence disproves your supposed "proof", and what you claim as proof must be rejected as invalid.

On the other hand, I have cited further context to support that he means a particular type. — Luke

Of course that's BS. It is I who have cited support. In all your great capacity to quote Wittgenstein (which I admit is absolutely fantastic), you've come up with nothing except support for what I say: . That's because there is no support for your position, it's a misread based in a preconceived notion. All I have to do is point at 258 where Wittgenstein uses "the sensation" four times to stress that he is talking about a particular sensation rather than a type. Why would you use "the chair" when referring to a chair, if you were talking about a type rather than a particular chair? There is no evidence to support your claim that the diarist is naming a type.

The type/token distinction is used to clarify the distinction between a particular class and its instances, so it is senseless of you to question which instances belong to which class. — Luke

That is utter nonsense. You are saying that it is senseless to question whether an object (token) has been wrongly classed. If it was senseless to do such questioning, I could present you with absolutely anything, and claim it is a token of absolutely any class, and you'd say that it's senseless to question this.

This is what comes up at 261 now. " 261. What reason have we for calling "S" the sign for a sensation?
For "sensation" is a word of our common language, not of one intelligible to me alone. So the use of this word stands in need of a justification which everybody understands.—"

In the private language "S" stands for an internal experience which the diarist has identified and named as S. In the common language "sensation" is a type. Now the diarist must justify that the thing referred to by "S" is a token of that type.

Because it isn't the same token of the sensation, obviously. If you have a sensation and it goes away, then it's not the same token of the sensation when you have it again. — Luke

Where is your proof? You continue with this unsupported assertion. If I see a chair, and someone takes the chair away, then brings the very same chair back, obviously it is the very same token. Would you assert that because it went away and came back, it is obviously not the same token. Your assertion, that if a sensation goes away and comes back it cannot be the same token, makes no sense because it is completely unjustified. I get a pain in my toe sometimes at night, I can get it many nights in a row, or some nights I don't get it. It wakes me up when I'm sleeping. I cannot see what causes it to come and go. But the fact that it comes and goes does not give me reason to claim that it is not the same token of the type "pain" every time it occurs .

You have changed the subject to talk about memories. — Luke

Wittgenstein is talking about private experiences in general. 256: "what about the language which describes my inner experiences and which only I myself can understand?" He uses sensation as an example. If what you assert about sensations is only true about sensations, and not true about other inner experiences, such as memories and ideas, then sensation would not serve as a good example of inner experiences. Obviously, Wittgenstein has chosen sensation as a good example of inner experiences, so he surely is not expressing what you are asserting, as you seem to be admitting that what you are asserting about sensation, does not hold for other inner experiences.

That could be either a particular token of the sensation or a particular type of sensation. Unless you can provide an argument for why 'S' must be the name of a particular token of the sensation (only), and not the name of a particular type of sensation, then stop mindlessly repeating this. — Luke

I don't need to provide an argument, it is what Wittgenstein explicitly stated, "a particular sensation". You are fabricating something else, that Wittgenstein is talking about a type of sensation rather than "a particular sensation", so it is who who needs an argument to show that your interpretation which switches in "type" for Wittgenstein's "particular" is consistent with what Wittgenstein intended to demonstrate, and not a category mistake. All you have is repetitive assertions, that Wittgenstein could not have meant anything other than the interpretation which you've fabricated. But I've shown very clearly how he could have intended exactly what he stated, a "particular", not a "type".

You said there was no problem with naming a token! But there is a problem with the diarist scenario, right? — Luke

No, there is no problem inherent within the diarist's scenario. the problem arises when the diarist wants to justify the use of "S", to the public.

An instance of a sensation or an instance of a chair is not how many times these things appear to your consciousness or your memory, or whatever rubbish you are spouting. I already explained to you that a token or an instance of these things is their entire existence or "lifetime". It is one unit or one instance of a class of objects, which is what 'S' denotes with regards to a sensation. The word "sensation" does not apply to one token only; it applies to a class of objects - a type. — Luke

Sure, but "S", as Wittgenstein uses it, does not refer to a type of inner experience called "sensation", it refers to a particular sensation, a single token of that type of inner experience called "sensation". And if my tooth-ache goes away and comes back, depending on drugs sleeping, internal conditions, etc., all these reoccurrences are part of the "entire existence or 'lifetime'" of that one single token of sensation, my tooth-ache.

I said it was senseless to question whether two distinct tokens are of the same type. — Luke

How is this senseless? Every object is a token of some type or types. Why would it be senseless to ask what type is that object a token of? It seems it's who who misunderstands the type/token terminology. You are just requesting that we use it, even though Wittgenstein did not, because it provides you with sufficient ambiguity to create the confusion required to make your fabrication look acceptable.

. Sensations typically have a duration; they start and end, or come and go. A particular instance or duration of a sensation is a token of that sensation. Like the chair, the token of the sensation is a single (instance/duration of the) sensation that can only be the same as itself. — Luke

You appear to be missing the point Luke. If the same token of a chair can come and go many times, relative to my conscious experience, then why can't the same token of sensation come and go many times, relative to my conscious experience? One comes from ,and goes to; an external source which is outside my conscious experience, and the other comes from and goes to an internal source which is outside my conscious experience How could your memory work, if it wasn't the same token coming and going, to and from your mind, each time that you remember the same event? A memory of an event comes and goes from your conscious experience, coming from and going to some internal place. Why would you think that each time the memory occurs to you, it is a different token? If it was a different token, you would not remember it as the same event, it would occur to you as a different event each time. And if each time the idea of two came into your mind, that is the number two not the symbol, it was a different token, how could you do any mathematics?

What is assumed in Wittgenstein's scenario is that the diarist will write 'S' in their diary for each instance or token of the sensation. — Luke

You are still refusing to acknowledge Wittgenstein has explicitly said that the diarist is naming a "particular sensation" (270), therefore the very same token. He says absolutely nothing to indicate that the diarist is naming a type. This fabrication of yours is misleading you, causing you to misunderstand, and miss the whole point of the example, the criterion of identity What happened to "let's suppose you are right..." , and proceeding from there? we didn't get anywhere because you just jumped back to your old fabricated reading.

First, it is impossible to have two of "the same token", by definition. — Luke

I'm not arguing "two of the same token". I am arguing that the same token can occur to the conscious mind, two, or a multitude of distinct times. This is extremely common in the case of external things. Yet you are insisting that in the case of internal private things this is impossible. But you have provided absolutely no justification for this assumed difference, only repeated assertions.. I have provided examples of when we commonly speak of the very same internal private token, recurring to the mind a multitude of times, the tooth-ache, and the ideas, or concepts of mathematics. Now I offer you memories as another example.

Second, tokens are of the same type, by definition — Luke

False. a "token" can be a token of any type. I am only using "token" as a term here instead of "particular", "individual" at your insistence, because you do not seem to have the capacity to understand this subject by other terms. But I'm not going to allow you to redefine terms as we go. Many different types of tokens occur to a person, and the person must decide which type they are tokens of. You are just spouting nonsense to insist that two tokens must be of the same type. If this were the case then there would only be one type, because all tokens would necessarily be of the same type.

It is sensible to question - as you did earlier - whether it is the same type of chair that only looks similar to the one you saw here yesterday, or whether it is the same token of chair - in fact, the same chair - that you saw here yesterday. This is how the type/token distinction can help to clarify the matter. — Luke

That is the very question which Wittgenstein asks. Why would you think it is senseless to determine the identity of a particular token? Suppose you and I have the very same "identical" chairs, the same type. Yet mine has five times as much use, so it is weaker and more worn. Why do you think it's senseless to distinguish which token of that type is which, which is mine and which is yours? Would you readily trade? What if it was something more valuable like a car. Would you trade yours for one of the same type with five times as much distance on it?

My access is not the issue. — Luke

Of course access is the issue, that's what makes the private language "private". How can you say such a thing and claim to have any understanding of the PLA? If it wasn't the issue why make an example of a "private language" in the first place? It's the beetle in the box thing, you can't see into another's box.

To say that you can't vote if you don't have high school equivalence is discrimination based on education.

Pass good for life. — tim wood

Why good for life? What about the senile old agers with dementia, don't you think we should discriminate against them as well?

The list of unknowns, innumerable. — Banno

You mean the unknowns have been listed? Are you sure of that?

But maybe it's time - long past time imo - for voters to earn the right to vote by passing a basic test. — tim wood

How can you think that such discrimination could be democratic? We'd have a 'democracy', but only those who pass a specially designed test would be allowed to vote. What would that test consist of?

What is supposedly being named is a type of sensation, not a token of the sensation. That’s my point. — Luke

Well we're right back to the same point. I thought you said "Let’s suppose you are right and that Wittgenstein is talking only about a single particular token of the sensation." Under this premise, what is named as "S" is a single particular token. You are completely unjustified in saying that it is a type of sensation being named. If the person was wrong in the naming practice, in your judgement, because you think that it's impossible that two distinct occurrences could be of the same token (an opinion which of course is disproven by the chair), and the two occurrences are actually different, being different still doesn't make them the same type. And you have no way to judge what is being named as the same type, because it's private. You have two unjustified assumptions here. First that it's impossible that the same token could appear to a person at two distinct times, and second, that two distinct tokens must be tokens of the same type.

Likewise, the sensation the diarist had last week and the sensation the diarist has today are different tokens and are both named ‘S’ because they are (seemingly) the same type of sensation. There is nothing nonsensical about this. — Luke

There is nothing nonsensical, it's just a completely unjustified conclusion, doubly so, as explained above. First, the two occurrences might very well be two occurrences of the same token. I can see the same chair last week and this week. Why can't I have the same sensation last week and this week? Second, and this is a significant point to the PLA, if you assert that the person is wrong in naming it the same token, because you insist that it must be two different tokens, then you have no capacity to judge the two as the same type, having no access to the person's private inner feelings which are being named.

To make your point, you need to ask the diarist to justify his judgement of "the same". And that's why Wittgenstein takes us to the device which reads blood pressure as an example of justification. But then the person's sensation becomes irrelevant, and the symbol signifies a rise in blood pressure instead. And if the diarist argued that there is a corresponding sensation, which is always "the same" sensation, you could argue that it is just the same type, the type which causes the blood pressure to rise. But this only a feature of the justification, which makes "rise in blood pressure" the definition of "S", and the sensations which the diarist refers to are judged by you as the type which coincide with the rise in blood pressure. You still wouldn't know for sure that they weren't the very same token occurring at a different time, like the chair.

This is correct. I could be picky and say that it is not possible for a sensation to be "the same" in the sense of being the same token you had before. A different token of the sensation that seems identical to the previous token is supposedly what would prompt the diarist to write 'S' again. — Luke

Right, but the diarist believes that the sensation is the very same what you call "token". That's why it receives the same name. It's not a type being named, it's the sensation itself. If the diarist believed that it was a different token it would be nonsensical to give it the same name. because the diarist is not naming a type.

That's right. So I take it you no longer view what Wittgenstein is trying to do with the passages on the private language argument in this way: — Luke

I don't see why you're saying that, I still see it the same way. I just refer now to the sensation which is named as "a token", to suit your way of speaking. The diarist (Wittgenstein) is marking the recurring sensations as the very same token. It is only you who is judging that they are different, and that somehow there is "a type" involved here.

So I have a sensation and write ‘S’ in my diary. How is this problematic? — Luke

That is not problematic. What's problematic is the criterion by which you say that the next sensation is the same sensation. It's just like the example with the chair. How do I know it's the same chair, or just a different one which appears to be "identical"? So when the second occurs, you judge it as "the same" ,and this is why you call it by the same name, but the only real reason for it being the same is that you have called it the same.

But Luke does not believe that it is "the same", as you've argued. And I agree with you, that it really is not the same. So, if the only thing which supports the second occurrence being named with the same name as the first occurrence is your belief that it is the same, and you really do not believe it is the same, then this use of the symbol is just a sham (260 - the note has no function whatsoever). You could call anything "S", the decision might be totally arbitrary.

The tricky part to understand is his move toward "a justification which everybody understands", at 261. This need, for such a justification is produced when he introduces a common (public) word , "sensation" to replace "S" (private symbol). How can we say that "S" refers to something which is "a sensation"? At this point the private word "S", has to get introduced into, integrated into, the public language, so its use need to be demonstrated (justified). .

That is, I presume it is a different token of the sensation a week later and not the same token of the sensation that you have had continuously all week, otherwise there would be no need to question whether it was the same. — Luke

That is what you presume, But it is not what Wittgenstein was saying. He is drawing our attention to a way of speaking in which we refer to internal, "private" feelings, sensations, and even ideas, as individual, particular things, like objects. That's why "S' refers to "the sensation". I refer to the recurring pain in my tooth as my tooth-ache, a particular thing. We refer to the recurring idea which is associated with "2" as the number two. This is what Wittgenstein is questioning, this way of speaking. The example he produces where "S" refers to a particular sensation is an example of this way of speaking

I'll refer you back to what Banno said near the beginning of the thread:

↪Luke A common philosophical error is to assume that a grammar implies a state of affairs. In the phone example, the similarity of grammar is taken to imply that pain is some sort of individual, or thing, and so leads to questions of observation and identity and so on, all of them misplaced, all of them the result of not noticing that the grammar hides a distinction.

@Metaphysician Undercover in particular makes this sort of mistake often and repeatedly, but doesn't see it.

We do use language to refer to pains and to phones. But pains are quite different to phones. Paying attention to the difference allows us to identify and explain certain philosophical errors - — Banno

I agree with you both, Luke, and Banno, that this is not a very good way of speaking. It would be better to refer to such inner experiences as types or something like that as Luke suggests. However, this way of speaking abounds, and it is this way which Wittgenstein is demonstrating with "the sensation", that is named "S". He is talking about the sensation as if it is an individual, some sort of thing. And he is talking this way deliberately avoiding calling it a type, or anything like that, to demonstrate the problems involved with talking this way. Look at 270 again Luke:

And what is our reason for calling "S" the name of a sensation here?
Perhaps the kind of way this sign is employed in this language-game,—
And why a "particular sensation," that is, the same one every time?
Well, aren't we supposing that we write "S" every time?

Obviously he is not saying "a type" of sensation he's saying "a particular". What justifies that "S" refers to a particular sensation? Nothing but the way S's use in the language-game, "S" is used that way. The sensation referred to by "S" is one particular sensation (not a type), because that's what we say it is by naming it this way. What justifies that "2" refers to an individual thing called a number, nothing but the language-game. The idea referred to by "2" is an individual, particular thing a number, because we use "2" this way.

Now look back at 254- 255:
"Thus, for example, what a mathematician is inclined to say about the objectivity and reality of mathematical facts, is not a philosophy of mathematics, but something for philosophical treatment.
255 . The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness."
Wittgenstein sees this way of speaking, which refers to features of our inner experiences as individual things, as an illness which needs to be treated.

EVERY TIME implies more than one time. A token occurs only one time, so W cannot be talking about a singular token of the sensation. If he was talking about a singular token then the diarist would make only a single entry of ‘S’ in their diary, but W says “we’re supposing, aren’t we, that we write “S” every time.” EVERY TIME. — Luke

You don't get it Luke, Wittgenstein is not talking about types or tokens. "Every time" is clearly meant as every time the person has the sensation, just like every time I see the chair. The same chair, occurs to me many times, and it is only one token.. Therefore your claim that a token only occurs one time is false

He never makes that type/token distinction anyway, so I don't see why you're bent on applying it. . You are trying to apply that distinction to what he has said, and this misleads you because it is not applicable.
There is no "type" mentioned.. The result is a misreading. He is not talking about a singular token of a type of sensation, he is talking about "the sensation", as a named thing. How can you not apprehend this? Why must you apply this type/token conceptual structure when he makes no reference to it, or even implies that it is relevant.. You need to take what is written, as it is written, and quit trying to apply some type/token bullshit which is totally inapplicable.

He talks about criteria of identity (253 -256), then asks what it means to name a sensation (257), then he proceeds to describe the problems involved with this, trying to name a sensation (258-270).. There is no type/token distinction made. you are fabricating.

Do we at least agree on what is very clearly stated at 257, that he is talking about naming a sensation? If so, how do you jump from "naming a sensation" to "naming a type of sensation". This change is unjustified and is a clear category mistake.

In case you don't understand the type/token distinction, "the same one every time" implies it is the same type of sensation every time. A token of the sensation is a particular instance of having that (type of) sensation on one of those occasions, or at one of those times. — Luke

I'm fully aware of the type/token distinction, and as I said you are incorrect. You didn't seem to notice that he says "a particular sensation", which is the same one every time. I hate to have to inform you of this Luke, but "a particular sensation" can in no way be interpreted as a number of different tokens indicating a "type of sensation", unless he qualifies the statements as "a particular type of sensation". He never mentions "type" of sensation. He talks about naming a sensation, and then refers to it as "the sensation" "The same one every time" refers to "the sensation", a "particular sensation". There is absolutely nothing to indicate that he refers to a type of sensation. You are simply fabricating this idea. You're wrong in your interpretation because it is based in your own fabrication, not in what was actually said. And I've tried to help you to understand what Wittgenstein is actually saying, but you refuse to be helped. I'm not surprised, you've demonstrated your helplessness many times.

I'm mystified as to why you come in these Wittgenstein threads, especially given that you see through the "sham of Wittgenstein." I'm genuinely curious, are you trying to convince us of your particular interpretation? You seem to be privy to some special knowledge of W. that none of us possess. I know I create these threads because W. really interests me, and sometimes I get new insights into his thinking. Sometimes I even revise my interpretation because my interpretation is just incorrect. — Sam26

I enjoy Wittgenstein's little word games, they make you think. I call his games a sham, because that's what they are a pretense. He pretends to be saying something which he is not saying, so one must be very careful to determine what he actually says. He intentional states things in ambiguous ways to trap people within their own preconceived meanings for words, meanings which are inconsistent with the way that he is actually using the words, leading people into traps which he has carefully laid. I call it a form of hypocrisy. What he is doing with the words is not the same as what the words mean to us. That's the basis of dishonesty and lying. When a person lies to you, what the words mean to you is something completely different from what the person is actually doing with the words.

So, you might say he has led me into a trap, and I would say that he has led you into a trap. However, as I disclosed to Banno above, my way has led me toward a vast problem involving identity and the Platonism which inheres within mathematics today. This is the illness which Wittgenstein mentions at 254-255. All I see from your way is a never ending argument as to what Wittgenstein really means, therefore a dead end.

When I use "the" in front of the word, in normal conversation, such as "the hammer", "the chair", as Wittgenstein does with "the sensation", I am referring to a particular thing which has been named by the word, I am not referring to a type.

In none of the references I have read in the subsequent discussion has the 'noble lie' been said to describe the arguments for the immortality of the soul.

Is it argued elsewhere that these arguments in the Phaedo and Meno can be taken to be examples of a 'noble lie'? — Wayfarer

I think that because the precise nature of "the noble lie" is not well established by Plato, it is just sort of allowed for in principle, through mention, this inclines people to judge anything in Plato which they think might be a dishonest representation (even if this determination might be produced from misunderstanding), as "the noble lie".

r. I don't see any reason to believe that Wittgenstein is talking about a single instance of a sensation over an extended period of days and weeks. — Luke

Then why does he repeatedly say "the sensation", and he ends this section with "And why a 'particular sensation,' that is, the same one every time?"? He says absolutely nothing to indicate that he is talking about types or tokens here, and he explicitly says that he is talking about one particular sensation "the same one every time". You are simply adding in this type/token change to what he says, so that the PLA makes sense to you and produces the meaning which you want from it. But that is to disregard what Wittgenstein is actually saying, and substantially change the nature of his demonstration.

Continue with your misinterpretation if you like, I am just trying to be helpful by pointing to the words he is actually using, what he actually said, to pull you away from what you think he is saying, which is incorrect, being inconsistent with the words he used.

So, consider his example at 257, a "tooth-ache". Is the tooth-ache I had yesterday not the very same tooth-ache that I had the day before, and the same tooth-ache I have today? I might sleep in between, so that my tooth is not aching at that time, or it might go away for a few days, and come back. Why would you assume that Wittgenstein is talking about distinct tokens of the same type, when he is very explicitly talking about naming something? "But what does it mean to say that he has 'named his pain'?" He is very clear, and repetitive in his statements here. He is talking about naming something. Yet you infer that he is talking about classifying distinct tokens of the same type. Why are you inclined toward this incorrect understanding (misunderstanding)? I suggest that you are inclined toward this incorrect reading because it produces the conclusion you desire from the so-called private language argument.

↪Metaphysician Undercover has long had issues with identity, numerical equivalence, and material equivalence. Better not to go down the garden path with him. — Banno

Well, you know I'm in good company, because Wittgenstein has the same issues with identity. He's the one who got me started down that garden path. And it is evident that in order to understand what he is doing with the so-called private language argument, it is necessary that we go down the garden path where he is pointing. Have you yet come to grips with 253-255? Why is the substitution of "identical" for "the same" expedient? This substitution renders what mathematicians are inclined to say about the "reality of mathematical facts", as an illness which needs to be treated by philosophy.

I don't see your point, he's differentiating between one object which is the same, and two objects which are identical. So he's talking about both, and the difference between them.

I did, the same chair recurs to me day after day, week after week. There is no impossibility here.

He is talking about the same type of sensation; not the same token of sensation. This is evident because he speaks of the recurrence of the sensation. It is not possible for the same token of a sensation to recur. If it did recur, then it would be a different token (of the same type), instead of the same token. — Luke

His terms are "a certain sensation", "the sensation", "a sensation", "a particular sensation". Imagine if he started with "a certain chair", and proceeded to discuss "the chair". How could you ever believe he was talking about a type of chair. Nowhere does he refer to a type of sensation, he is talking about "the sensation". Your interpretation is completely unjustified, and obviously wrong.

Why do you impose this condition, that it is impossible for the same sensation to occur many times over and over again. Don't we see the same objects over and over again day after day, week after week. No one assumes that it's impossible that the chair you see here today is the same chair that was here last week. What support do you have for your claim that it's impossible that the sensation I have today is the same sensation I had last week? You are just making up, this so-called impossibility, as an attempt to justify your wrong interpretation.

You are talking about one exactly the same, so you have misread. — Luke

That's exactly what I'm talking about. Suppose I say this chair here is the same chair which was here yesterday. And you say, no it's not, it's exactly like it, but it's not the same chair (you think someone switched the chair for one exactly like it, I do not, I think it's the same chair). This is what you are saying about "the sensation", it's not the same sensation, you are saying, it is one like the other. But Wittgenstein is very deliberately calling it "the sensation", so he intends that what is meant is 'the same sensation', just like I say the chair is the same chair. He even ends this section at 270 with the passage I quoted already:

And what is our reason for calling "S" the name of a sensation here? Perhaps the kind of way this sign is employed in this language-game,— And why a "particular sensation," that is, the same one every time? Well, aren't we supposing that we write "S" every time?

There is nothing else to say, except that you are very clearly misunderstanding this section if you think he is talking about "the same type of sensation". He is very explicit, I think he uses "the sensation" about four times in 258 alone.

In my view, this captures Plato’s intention much better than translations that insist on indiscriminately using “lie” to make Plato sound like Lenin or Stalin.

Once the meaning of pseudos has been clarified, the correct reading becomes obvious from Socrates’ own answer to the question “What sort of story?”: “Nothing new. A fairy story like the one poets tell”.

Clearly, what he has in mind is a story (literally, “a Phoenician tale”) to replace the existing one. Hence, “nothing new” (meden kainon).

If you take a look at the Talk pages where editors discuss Wikipedia articles you’ll get an idea of what’s happening behind the scenes. Below is a comment on “Noble Lie”: — Apollodorus

The actual format of the noble lie is a little difficult to distinguish, because Plato wants everyone to be fooled by it. I understood it as supporting his proposed eugenics. Breeding of human beings was to be controlled, like we would control the breeding of dogs. However, in order to be successful, the controlled breeding needed to be hidden from the public. The proposal was some sophisticated lottery system which would be held to determine who got to mate. The lottery would be rigged.

The difference is this: In these examples, Wittgenstein is referring to the PLA, as you correctly pointed out, and the point of the PLA is that one cannot privately create a language that correctly identifies sensations (of course it's more than sensations that goes terribly wrong). Hence, the doubt, but in this contrived situation (viz., the PLA context), which is, it seems to me, logically impossible. — Sam26

But we disagree on "the point of the PLA". I think the point is that no language can correctly identify sensations, not just the private language. Surely the demonstration which Wittgenstein makes shows that the doubt concerning "a particular sensation" goes beyond the private language, to language use in general. Look what happens when the person tries to justify, publicly, that "S" refers to a sensation, through readings of blood pressure measurement, at 270. If the justification is successful, then "S" simply refers to a rise in blood pressure, and the supposed "sensation" is now irrelevant.

What does "S" really refer to, the supposed sensation, or a rise in blood pressure? That "S" refers to "a sensation" is dubious privately and needs justification. Publicly, the justification of the usage, the rise in blood pressure, replaces the sensation, as what "S" refers to. Consider that at some time the blood pressure might rise, but the person does not have the sensation, and does not mark S. Then we must say that the person is not using S correctly. And the person cannot argue this because correct usage was dependent on that justification. So S really refers to the rise in blood pressure, not a sensation

So Wittgenstein's PLA demonstrates, as you say, that a person cannot assume to be able to correctly identify a particular sensation. But that is just the beginning. He then proceeds to demonstrate that if a person attempts to identify a particular sensation, justification of the usage of the symbol will be required. And if the usage of the symbol can be justified, then the symbol does not refer to the sensation anymore, it refers to whatever the means of justification is. Therefore we can conclude that a symbol cannot refer to a particular sensation.

For example imagine you have a sensation you are inclined to call "pain". To begin with you cannot be sure that the sensation you have is the real one which is supposed to be called "pain". But the use of the word can be justified publicly, so you show others your wound, to justify your use of "pain". Now "pain" doesn't refer to your sensation, it refers to your wound.

Now the contrast - the PLA must be seen against, and in the light of how we normally learn a language. So, in our normal everyday language-games about sensations and/or pains, which is not by the way, the PLA, can we doubt we're in pain? Emphatically, No! We can see how far out such doubts are, especially if we compare this with what Wittgenstein is doing in the OC. If we compare Moore's proposition "I know this is a hand," at least Wittgenstein gives a reasonable example of how a doubt can occur here, although one has a difficult time understanding how a doubt could arise in Moore's context. However, in the case of doubting one is in pain, Wittgenstein constructs a contrived example (the PLA), which cannot be done (a totally private language cannot be done), as he rightfully points out. It's only done to point out how language logically works, and how that logic falls apart in the PLA. — Sam26

I really think you are missing the point of the PLA here. Notice that the PLA is concerned with identifying a particular sensation, a certain sensation, or what Banno called a specific sensation. "Pain" is a very general class which consists of all sorts of different sensations. The problem which Wittgenstein is talking about in the PLA is the uncertainty involved in saying that this sensation I have today, is the very same as the sensation I had last week. This is the same type of doubt as in his example of the chair. The chair here today seems to be identical to the one here yesterday, but I can't be sure that they are the same chair, because they could have been switched in the meantime. So, the question is, what justification do I have in calling these distinct instances of sensation by the same symbol "S", in my judgement that they are "a sensation". I cannot appeal to the universal, and say that I know beyond the shadow of a doubt that these are instances of "pain", because there are many different types of pain, and the issue here concerns identifying one particular sensation, not a general class of sensations..

Also, I don't think it's likely that you have created a model that shows we can doubt being in pain. — Sam26

According to what I described above, Wittgenstein's PLA, 253-270, demonstrates very clearly that one can never be certain concerning one's own sensations, if certainty requires justification. Do you not agree, that Wittgenstein has created a model that shows we can doubt being in pain?

Consider the beetle in the box. Is a person not justified in doubting whether the thing in one's own box is really a beetle? Suppose we say that the person has named the thing "beetle" therefore it is impossible that the thing is other than the thing called "beetle". We could say that there is necessity here, so the person is certain. But what Wittgenstein is arguing, and Isaac as well, I believe, is that each time one looks into the box, the thing is a little different, so how is one certain that it is still the same thing in the box? Look at 253, how do you know that the chair in front of you today is the same chair that was there yesterday. That it is identical is just a judgement you make, which is fallible. Someone could have switched chairs over night.

So this is the issue at 258, and what Isaac brings attention to, the sensation from one day is not the same as the sensation of another day. They are similar but not the same. Therefore we do not have a thing named "beetle" in the box anymore, each day you look in, there is something different, yet similar in the box. Now, we cannot be certain that it is a beetle, (or "pain") because justification is impossible, as Wittgenstein describes.

Btw, thanks for the compliment above. I'll try not to push your buttons, to make you cranky. That kind of thing is really detrimental to constructive discussion, but sometimes it takes a long time to understand how to avoid it, especially with people who have very different perspectives.

Religions - and ideologies - can be confirmable and influential; hence they may be judged.

↪Metaphysician Undercover too, for what it's worth. — Banno

I'm sure that religions can be influential, and that they can be judged, but I'm not sure as to what you would mean by "confirmable". The point I was alluding to is that the process for judgement of religious ideology is completely different from the process for judging something like a scientific theory. That's why I asked you to prove your expressed principles, that books ought not be burned, and that rulers ought not lie to the subjects. We know that scientific theories are judged according to the scientific method, but did you know that religious ideologies are judged according to metaphysical principles? We don't judge religions according to our emotional feelings, we establish rational moral principles based in solid metaphysics, and this is how we judge them.

We are lucky to live in a society where we can choose our religions, or ideologies. So we are allowed to make our own judgements, and we are not necessarily born into a religion. But still our governments impose boundaries, preventing us from crossing the borderline into hate, for example. That would be a case where judgement is based in emotion. So the governing forces always must have the power to prevent transgressions which they apprehend as substantial. And, what constitutes a substantial transgression is not consistent through time, due to changing historical conditions, changing ideologies, and the relationship between the ideology and the historical conditions.

However, it is very clear that the ideology of an oppressed people, which leads them in revolution is not in the same relationship with the historical conditions as the ideology of a ruling class is. And "facts" will mislead us if they are related to ideologies in an unreal way. This misunderstanding is the result of the inaccessibility of intention, to the observer. What you do not seem to be recognizing is that early Christianity is an ideology of an oppressed people, not a governing class, Therefore the actions promoted by the ideology were revolutionary in nature. Early Christianity is very intensely revolutionary, (that's why Jesus was crucified), and this 'fact' must be respected when judging the actions of these people. The intent of a revolutionary is on the flip side in relation to the intent of a ruler.

Consider now, later Christianity after factions have been consolidated and central ruling power has been established. Here we find the Inquisition. This is a case of a ruling class enforcing ideological boundaries on the members of its society. Notice though, that the rulers only have the capacity to enforce these boundaries inward, as punishment, against their own members. So they have no real means for dealing with competing ideologies, as they stand alone, only the means for preventing the competing ideologies from intruding or infiltrating into their own ideological system. This ideology of exclusion is contrary to fundamental Christian principles of compassion, forgiveness, and accepting the differences of others, it has now become us against them.

Can we agree that "a religion" might be defined as "an ideology"? How can an ideology be something factual?

It is an inherited denial of historical fact. — Banno

I really don't see any sort of systematic "denial of historical fact" which you are so bent on. We do not need to go back, 1500, or more years to find abhorrent misdeeds carried out by those in the higher levels of Christian religious organizations, as you say right here. But I really don't see the denial of fact. They tend to rationalize the incidents or refuse to speak about them, which is still not quite denial.

I see The Inquisition as probably the worst institution established by The Church, but at the same time, I see the terribleness of it as having the reverse affect of that intended, as propelling the downfall rather than sustaining The Church. But where is the denial of fact in all this?

Pretending that religion is not factual leads to the denial of the results of religious belief.

I've pointed to the discussion of Confirmable and influential Metaphysics previously. Religious beliefs can be assessed by their outcomes. Christianity resulted in charities, hospitals, schools, persecution and oppression.

We've previously agreed that it behaves much as any other human institution. — Banno

I really cannot even imagine what you mean when you say "pretending that religion is not factual". How do you propose that an institution, a set of laws, or a code of ethics (which are all things similar to a religion), is something factual? How do you step across the ought/is divide as if it didn't even exist?

Of course it could be that MU is right and everyone else is wrong, it's logically possible. — Sam26

This is the root of the problem right here. "Correct" is determined through public justification, making "correct" whatever obtains social consensus. However, there is no consensus as to what Wittgenstein is actually saying. Therefore there is no "correct" reading of Wittgenstein. You, and your buddies, can argue endlessly about who's reading is "correct", and there will never be a resolution. Wittgenstein intended it this way. There's a way of speaking, an oratory skill, which employs parables, and ambiguity is essential. To be appealing to a wider audience one can choose words which different people will relate to in different ways, allowing that everyone might find something favourable in the same expression. But I see through Wittgenstein's sham, to see that true principles are derived from the minds of individuals, not from the public judgement of "correct".

When we think or talk to ourself, or perceive our surroundings, we know when an event is recognizable or unrecognizable, coherent or incoherent , consistent or inconsistent , with respect to our expectations. Aren’t these forms of correctness? — Joshs

Not in Wittgenstein's conceptual structure. Remember, to think that oneself is following a rule is not the same as actually following a rule. We must be capable of judging one's actions as being consistent with the rule, to be able to say that the person follows a rule. This is fundamental to Wittgenstein's form of justification.

So, for a person to recognize something as similar, or to make a judgement of consistency, this is not sufficient for justification. And if it is not justified we cannot say that it is a form of being correct. In other words if the person cannot be judged as following a rule, then "following a rule" is not justified, nor is "correct".

I really don't think that Wittgenstein intended to deny the reality of these forms of judgement, he is just not interested to move on toward describing these personal forms of judgement. He classes them as outside justification, and moves toward understanding the justification side, epistemology, rather than the metaphysical side. In the tradition of Plato and Aristotle, such personal judgements are judgements of "good". You can see that "good" has a pragmatic base, very much dependent on the particular circumstances, whereas "correct" is rule based, depending on universal laws. The two meet in moral ethics, morality being concerned with the personal decision of good and bad, whereas ethics is concerned with rules of correctness, though many do not care to acknowledge the difference.

This difference i reading has to do with what to make of rules, grammar, concepts , criteria. Do they have any existence outside of actual, contextual situations? This question would seem to apply equally to terms like model and representation as they are utilized in free energy approaches. Put differently, do you understand and concur with Antony’s objections to Luke’s reading of Wittgenstein on grammar and rules? — Joshs

The problem I see with Luke's reading of Wittgenstein, and Sam26's to an extent, is that they give priority to rules, as if rules are foundational to language, as required for language. But a careful reading of the first part of PI reveals that Wittgenstein intended something completely different. Rules are not foundational, and only come into existence as a feature of language. You might say that rules are the result of the public use of language.

Misunderstanding of the PLA leads one to believe that a private language is impossible. But this is not at all what Wittgenstein has demonstrated. What he has demonstrated is that a private language cannot consist of rules, so right and wrong within a private language is nonsensical. This does not mean that a private language is nonsensical, it just means that the ideas of right and wrong cannot be supported by the private language. So we have a deep division here, a fundamental divide between two very distinct types of language-games, the private game within which there is no such thing as correct and incorrect, and the public game, within which "correct" and "incorrect" appear to form the substance.

Yeah, I lose a lot of people at that point. — Isaac

However, it is the place where you find me.

You're still assuming that there's a physiological/mental state that answers to the term 'in pain'. What if there wasn't? How would that change things? — Isaac

This is the scourge of Platonism. We refer to things like Ideas, and sensations, as if they are things, mental states, subject matter, content, what Banno calls mental furniture. But this is a complete misrepresentation. It is a misunderstanding of the mind, and how the mind works, which Aristotle attempted to dispel us of, when he formulated the law of identity. The law of identity states what a thing is in a way which excludes ideas, and other subject matter from being classed as things. This is the category separation between universals and particulars. To understand a universal as a particular is the classic category mistake.

The issue which is alluded to at 270, in the quoted passage above, is that this way of speaking, because it provides us great convenience for speaking about internal feelings and thoughts, is very deeply rooted in our language-games, pervading them all. Aristotle proposed the law of identity as a way to exclude this type of speaking from formal logic, but as Wittgenstein implies at 254-255, it is an illness which has reestablished itself through mathematical axioms.

Wittgenstein suggests at 255, that philosophy needs to treat this illness. The illness consists of convenient falsities, and is therefore a form of pragmatic dishonesty, rooted in intellectual laziness. But how is it possible to treat such an illness, when these expressions provide us with such a high degree of convenience for talking about internal conditions? This illness, which has been allowed to establish itself at the highest intellectual levels, is allowed to permeate in a top down manner throughout all the different games. In the other thread Banno insists that burning books is not a good thing, it burns a hole into the culture. But how else can we destroy such a cancer?

But to them that's like burning a pile of trash. Ie., not a bad thing, not at all, but something useful.

Where you and the Christians differ is in the qualitative evaluation of some past events. — baker

This is what Banno doesn't seem to understand. He seems to think that he can make universal value statements such as 'burning books is bad', 'dishonesty from the rulers is bad', and since they are emotionally charged subjects which will elicit agreement from others, he believes these statements must be correct. However, he seems to have no capacity to support these value judgements with principles or logic.

I think we should rename Banno "Moses", and let him shout out his commandments. Thou shalt not burn books! Thou shalt not lie to the subjects! etc., as if they are facts.

And we have the hole in our literary heritage. — Banno

I can almost sympathize. I lost my copy of "Goodnight Moon". I think my evil brother left it out in the rain. Oh well, we're all grown up now, and we learn to get over such loses. As my mother used to say if I cried over such things, "it's not the end of the world". Get over it, Banno.

No; he's using "certain" in the attributive sense, as about a specific sensation. — Banno

I agree he uses "certain sensation" in the way of "specific sensation", or "particular sensation". The point being that any time he has an instance of a sensation, which he is inclined to label with "S", as the specific sensation, that it is the specific sensation cannot be justified. Therefore he can never be certain that the sensation he has, is that specific sensation. And his attempts to justify it reveal in the end, that he is not even justified in saying that "S" refers to a "particular sensation", or even "a sensation", according to the quote I provided.

Notice Wittgenstein's peculiar word usage at 258: " I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation." With the use of "certain" here it is implied that he might have certainty concerning his sensation. But as explained by Isaac above , there is no such thing as certainty in relation to sensations.

Further, Wittgenstein proceeds with "To this end I associate it with the sign 'S' and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation...". Notice his reference here to "the sensation" as if every time that he judges a sensation as being similar to a previous one, he might conclude that it is that very same, "certain" sensation.

What he has done here is set up a scenario, which appears to the untrained mind, to be a completely normal and acceptable scenario, the person is going to mark down every time they experience the same sensation. However, in reality it is an impossible scenario. No two sensations are the same, as Isaac explains, so in reality, he could not ever be using the sign "S", if he could only use it when he was certain that it was "the sensation".

Of course Wittgenstein knows of this impossibility, and he has set up this impossible scenario intentionally, because he knows that many people might believe the scenario to be really possible, and might picture someone in that scenario actually using "S" to signify a "certain sensation". So, he proceeds to question how one might justify the use of "S" to signify that a sensation on one day is the very same sensation as the sensation on another day. Of course this cannot actually be justified.

Now, justification he says, requires an appeal to something else, something independent. So it is a type of comparison, a matter of establishing a relationship. So we see at 270 a correlation between his use of "S" with a rise in blood pressure, as a possible justification for his use of "S". However, as described, this is not a true justification.. So long as his use of "S" is judged as coinciding with a blood pressure rise, his sensations become completely irrelevant. So his use of "S" to signify a "certain sensation" cannot be justified in this way.

In conclusion, that "S" signifies a certain sensation is just a faulty idea created by the language-game.

270 And what is our reason for calling "S" the name of a sensation here? Perhaps the kind of way this sign is employed in this language-game,— And why a "particular sensation," that is, the same one every time? Well, aren't we supposing that we write "S" every time?

Banno demonstrates a very strange and unacceptable notion of "fact", as if a fact could be separate from the knower who knows it. But we all know that facts are known bits of information, truths, which do not exist separate from the knower who knows them. And Banno is just is trying to force some philosophical hogwash on us.

Banno's narrative is "fact". Any narrative which Banno doesn't like is "non-factual".