Why don't you get down to the task at hand, and demonstrate why you believe that dishonesty for the purpose of bettering mankind, is supposed to be some sort of oxymoron?

There's a reason I don't usually reply to your posts, Meta. It's because you are so comfortable with self-contradiction.

If you are happy to be dishonest to yourself, then then I will continue ignoring your posts. — Banno

Obviously, I am completely unaware of the purported self-contradiction within my posts. So where are you coming up with this idea that I'm being dishonest to myself?

I feel for you, you poor bastard.

The noble lie is told to others; of course, I had presumed you and I know the truth about the early years of Christianity. Or do you choose to lie to yourself? — Banno

The issue you brought up was whether or not honesty is necessary in the goal of the betterment of mankind. Those who believe in the value of the noble lie clearly believe that honesty is not necessary.

Whether or not you and I know the history of early Christianity, or whether we deceive ourselves in this matter is not relevant to the issue.

That's why Ennui Elucidator and @Metaphysician Undercover find themselves advocating telling lies. — Banno

I'm still waiting for justification of your opinion, that telling lies is bad, absolutely. Until you provide that justification, all you are doing is playing on the emotions of those who do not like to be told lies. Playing the emotions is not justification. We do not like to be punished either, but very few say that punishment is bad.

So until you provide an argument as to why the dishonesty, which is believed to be carried out for the betterment of human existence (the noble lie) is for some reason bad, I'll consider that you are just voicing an uneducated opinion. You're just like a little child, arguing with your parents, that they ought not punish you because you dislike it. You insist that the authorities ought not lie to you, because you do not like being lied to. Betterment often involves pain. That it hurts does not imply that it is bad.

IF a religion lies about its history then it may also lie about what it is doing now - it acts in bad faith. And indeed we see this in the many ways the various churches have covered over recent sins of maltreatment and pedophilia. — Banno

The noble lie is not an instance of bad faith so it ought not be compared with common instances of bad faith. Bad faith involves proceeding with an act which one knows to be wrong. The noble lie involves proceeding with an act which one believes to be right.

You seem to believe that the noble lie actually is wrong. Where's your proof? When the noble lie has been proven to be immoral, then we might class it as bad faith.

if one allows religion not to be factually correct, to consist in metaphor and allegory, for the betterment of mankind, then does that mean it need not be honest? — Banno

Your ideas about the value of honesty need to be supported. Being a philosopher, I'm sure you are aware of "the noble lie". That the noble lie is somehow wrong, or immoral, is a very difficult claim to support. We might support it with the principle of "equality", but equality isn't real so as much as it might provide a legal base, it provides no moral base.

We might try a Christian principle like love your neighbour, but for some reason we still see the efficacy in lying to those whom we love. Where do you derive the idea that the betterment of mankind might be accomplished without dishonesty?

You're implying that there are no natural human expressions or reactions. How are a tendency to say "ouch" or a tendency to withdraw from the perceived source [of pain] not natural expressions or reactions, but merely "something we construct"? Don't most animals tend to withdraw from perceived sources of pain?

Such general facts of nature (PI 142) are pivotal to Wittgenstein's work, especially his references to form of life and "shared human behaviour" (PI 206), or that we teach children sensation words on the basis of such shared behaviour (PI 257). — Luke

The distinction between natural and artificial is untenable in the modern world which has done away with the supernatural (God) as the support for the natural. So you are inclined to assign things like instinct and intuition to "the natural", even though they are more similar to "the artificial", by showing intention. The theist could attribute the intention displayed within "natural" things to God, "the supernatural".

Now we'd say that a human construction is artificial, but a bird's nest, or a beaver's dam is natural, though all of these ought to be classed as the same type, because they are purposefully created, therefore created intentionally. So instead of supporting all the intention which is evident within the natural world, with the supernatural, God, we have turned the other way, to say that human beings and their artifacts are a part of nature, natural. Clearly, the division you want, between the natural and the artificial is untenable in the modern world, where we see human beings and their artificial products as a part of nature.

Therefore your proposed division between natural (instinctual) reactions and learned reactions is not at all useful to the subject at hand. They are all intentional (purposeful), and your claim that "shared human behaviour" is somehow not natural is completely untenable without support from the supernatural, God. And to imply that such a division is "pivotal to Wittgenstein's work" is simply wrong. So it's time for me to turn the judgement you made against me, back at yourself. You have a very keen capacity to produce quotes, but ".I don't think you understand ... much of anything that Wittgenstein says."

In terms of PLA, isn't John's use is exactly a case of sensation S? Haven't we learnt to use the word pain appropriately by trial and error, I use it here it should do this...no, that didn't quite work out as I expected...perhaps here, like this...all the while watching other humans in our social group to see how they react. — Isaac

This is exactly what I've been arguing, but there's a tendency at this forum, to argue that certainty is prior to uncertainty, and that we cannot proceed with an action (such as speaking), without first being certain of what the outcome will be. But this is a complete misunderstanding of the nature of language use. It is the type of activity which if we make a mistake there is usually no serious consequence, or punishment. So there is no requirement of certainty in language use, and trial and error plays a significant role. In fact, the mistakes of young children are seen as humourous and entertaining, so they are encouraged to proceed in their trial and error of learning.

The whole idea that language use is rooted in some form of certainty which is produced from following rules, is simply a misrepresentation of language. And to say that Wittgenstein presents us with this model of language, as if it is a rule based activity, with all those rules being founded upon some rock solid indubitable rules, is a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein. He is actually exposing the flaws of this perspective, in order to discredit it, he is not supporting it.

This is a feature of philosophy which many people do not understand. To discredit an idea, refute an ideology, requires that one lay out for display the complete ideology, all of its features and aspects, in their entirety, revealing the faults. The trained philosopher will see the faults, as revealed, and understand that the person laying out the display is actually refuting the ideology by displaying its faults, rather than supporting it.

The way people relate to Plato is a prime example. Modern day "platonic realism" is really a replica of ancient pythagorean idealism. Plato laid out for display all the features of pythagorean idealism, complete with its flaws, and effectively refuted it. Aristotle formalized that refutation. But today, we learn pythagorean idealism through Plato's descriptions, and most people do not read Plato thoroughly enough to understand him, so they believe he is supporting that ideology, and we even attribute the ideology to him, as platonic realism.

Banno doesn't seem to understand that when there's a pile of crap out back you get rid of it. Sure, someone will tell you later that some of that crap actually had some value, but this doesn't mean that getting rid of the pile of crap was the wrong thing to do. If it's seen as a hazard the appropriate thing is to dispose of it.

You quote Wittgenstein saying that it is "possible for us both to have the same pain", but it could not be possible if there were no rule governing his use of "same". You seem to think that "same" must mean identical per the law of identity, otherwise it can have no meaning. — Luke

I don't see where you derive "it could not be possible if there were no rule governing his use of 'same'". That's utter nonsense. I can't believe that after so much time discussing this issue with me, you are still arguing such a lame point.

Anyway, I do not think that "same" has "no meaning" as you suggest. I think that it could have any meaning, depending on the context of usage, as Wittgenstein suggests. Do you apprehend the difference between having no meaning (meaningless), and having a vast array of different meanings depending on the context of usage? The latter is what Wittgenstein suggests happens to "same" when we reject the law of identity.

The vast array of different meanings is the result of the rejection of the rule (law of identity), i.e. it is the consequence of there being no rule. So the meaning in any particular instance of use is dependent on that particular context of use, not some sort of rule. Meaning is a feature of the particular context of use, not a feature of some universal rule. A rule might restrict the meaning, in the sense of providing a boundary, as a part of the context, but a rule is not a necessary part of the context. Therefore meaning is not dependent on rules. When you come to grasp this fact, you will see that context may provide all the restrictions necessary for the existence of meaning, without the requirement of any rules.

Then why did you say:

There is no criterion of identity (rule) by which we say that two things are the same. Luke supports this above with the quote from 216, the law of identity is a useless statement.
— Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think you understand PI 216 or much of anything that Wittgenstein says. — Luke

I don't think you understand the law of identity. According to this law it is impossible for two things to be the same. Only one thing can be the same as itself. Calling one thing, "two things", is contradictory. That's why I said "There is no criterion of identity (rule) by which we say that two things are the same", "Two things are the same" is a violation of the law of identity, and no new law has been proposed to take its place. So there is no other rule, or law which provides us a principle, or criterion, by which we can say "two things are the same", even though we commonly use "same" like this, in the vernacular.

Wittgenstein clearly understands the law of identity (216), and explains how he will use the word "same" in the vernacular way, which violates the law of identity (253-255), He even emphasizes this usage at 254 with "The substitution of "identical" for "the same" (for instance) is another typical expedient in philosophy." By this substitution, two "identical" things are said to be "the same" (in disregard for the law of identity).

He also alludes to the consequence of this action, that with this use of "same" which he has chosen, there is no criterion of identity by which the two things are said to be the same. Clearly, he is implying that since he has dismissed the law of identity, in favour of the vernacular use of "same", there is now no rule governing his use of "same".

253 In so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is
also possible for us both to have the same pain.

You agree with Wittgenstein that the law of identity is - as you call it - "a useless statement"? — Luke

I don't agree that the law of identity is a useless statement. I agree with Wittgenstein that there is no criterion of identity by which we say that two things are the same. The law of identity states that one thing is the same as itself. It is not a criterion for judging two things as the same.

And this is what is discussed at 253, the possibility of a criterion for judging two things as the same. Since there is no such criterion, and people use "same" to refer to things which are obviously different, but are in some way similar, then it would make perfect sense to say that your pain is the same as my pain.

Furthermore, I am no more justified, or correct, in judging that one instance of my pain is the same as another instance of my pain, then I am in saying that your pain is the same as my pain. This is because we have no criteria by which we can judge two distinct things as the same, so any instance of doing such is just as absurd, and unjustified as any other.

Anyway, Wittgenstein didn't believe that the law of identity is useless, he just didn't like the way that it was stated, so he offered his own interpretation. If you read the rest of that passage, you'll see that he just preferred to offer his own way of stating it, as "every thing fits into its own shape" or something like that

You definitely have a unique way of interpreting Wittgenstein. — Sam26

So do you, so does Banno, and also Luke. In this sense we are all the same. Go figure.

My view is that another way we justify beliefs is by linguistic training, i.e., we learn how to use words. How do I know that that is a cup and that it's red? First, we learn to use the words in social contexts, so (as I point to a cup) it's what we mean by cup, red, etc. Whether it makes sense to say "I know this is a cup," depends on the context. If someone was learning a language, we could imagine where one might appropriately doubt whether X is a cup or something else. In other words, the doubt is about the use of that particular word, and its referent. — Sam26

You are making a big jump here, thereby avoiding the problem of justification which Wittgenstein is pointing at. We need to justify our use of words, as you say, demonstrate that we are correct in saying that X is a cup. This is the only way to quell the doubt about the use of that particular word. Now you cannot jump to "we justify beliefs...by linguistic training", as your answer to the problem of justification, because, 'this is how I learned to talk therefore it is correct', does not suffice as justification. It's an appeal to authority, and is really nothing more than circular logic. Why is this use of words correct? Because it's what we were taught to do. Why were we taught to do it? Because its correct. It's just a circle which really says nothing about justification. To understand what justification really is, we need to really look at why we use words the way that we do, rather than just saying that we use words the way that we do because we were taught to use them that way.

Wow, that's some statement. Now I understand how it is that you can make some of the statements you put forth. — Sam26

If you saw some of my discussions with Luke, you'd see that I've been arguing this for a long time. Wittgenstein is the person who gave me this idea. Look at what is said in 253-255. There is no criterion of identity (rule) by which we say that two things are the same. Luke supports this above with the quote from 216, the law of identity is a useless statement.

Bear this in mind when you read 257-264. There is no rule followed when the person in the example names a sensation with "S" To be named S requires that the sensation be judged as "the same" as the prior one named by S. But the person has no criterion of identity by which to make that judgement. Furthermore, as explained in 253 -255, there is no criterion of identity in language use in general, by which people in general might judge two things to be the same, thereby justifying the use of the same word for two distinct things. So, the example presented at 258 is a representation, or description by analogy, of language use in general. We have no rule, no criterion of identity, by which we say that this object (which we are inclined to name as a "phone" for example) is the same as the last object which someone used the same name on, as these two are clearly different objects, not the same object, therefore using the same name is unjustified.

So, we proceed to 261, the use of a word stands in need of justification. This refers not simply to the private language, which serves as the example by analogy, but language in general. And this is where we turn to others, the public, to derive justification for our private acts of word use. The point we are at now, is that word use itself is not necessarily public, it may be something private, but justification of that use is something public. This is the premise which Wittgenstein will proceed to argue in the next section, that justification is necessarily public. He is not arguing that language use is necessarily public, because he's already demonstrated that private use is exactly the same as public use, by showing that neither employs a criterion of identity. (Notice the twist here, "demonstrated that private use is exactly the same as public use", when there is no criterion of identity.)

However, this exposes a much deeper philosophical problem. If a criterion of identity is not employed when we name two distinct things by the same name, (or designate them as "exactly the same"), then how is one's use of words justified? So justification becomes a very deep problem with no immediate solution.

A private linguist, each time they make use of a sign to represent a sensation, would be engaging in an act of ostensive definition. Each use would be novel. Hence, there is no rule being followed. — Banno

Each use of the sign "S" is a novel use, because each instance of sensation is a new sensation. These sensations are only said to be "the same" through that sloppy use of "same", which follows from the absence of a criterion of identity. This sloppy use of "same" which says that two identical things are the same, is an illness which pervades mathematics, requiring philosophical treatment.

254. The substitution of "identical" for "the same" (for instance)
is another typical expedient in philosophy. As if we were talking about
shades of meaning and all that were in question were to find words
to hit on the correct nuance. That is in question in philosophy only
wherewe have to give a psychologically exact account of the temptation
to use a particular kind of expression. What we 'are tempted to say'
in such a case is, of course, not philosophy; but it is its raw material.
Thus, for example, what a mathematician is inclined to say about the
objectivity and reality of mathematical facts, is not a philosophy of
mathematics, but something for philosophical treatment.
255 . The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment
of an illness.

As you say Banno, there is no rule being followed, because there is no criteria as to what constitutes an S, because each S, as a particular individual is different from every other S. But that's simply the way language is, it does not consist of rules. Each person decides, based on one's own experience, what to call any different object, or any different feeling. We don't follow rules, each one of us follows one's own personal inclinations. Who, (unless there is a God), has the power of authority to say one is correct and another incorrect?

I believe the key to understanding Wittgenstein's PLA is to grasp what he says about a "criterion of identity, 253-255.

253 Consider what makes it possible in the case of physical objects to speak of "two exactly the same", for example, to say "This chair is not the one you saw here yesterday, but is exactly the same as it"

It is important to acknowledge here that when we speak of "two exactly the same", we are not adhering to the law of identity, which stipulates that only one thing is the same as itself. So when we talk about two things which are the same, this is not "same" according to a strict criterion of identity like the law of identity.

Further, it is in using "same" in this way, which implies that two similar things are "the same", as they are said to be "two exactly the same", when they are really two which are very similar, which allows one to say that my pain is the same as your pain. It isn't really the same if "same" is defined by the law of identity, but since they are said to be "exactly the same" in that other sense of "same", which really means similar, then my pain is the same as your pain.

253 In so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is also possible for us both to have the same pain.

This is to use "same" without adherence to the strict criterion of identity, which is the law of identity. But since it is very common to use "same" in this way, and it makes complete sense to us to see it used in this way, because we are accustomed to it, then we can proceed in using it in this way.

Just be aware, when interpreting any supposed private language arguments, that "the same" for Wittgenstein, in the sense of 'the same sensation' really means distinct, but similar, sensations, in the way that we might say two different things are the same.

Wheatley's form of discussion, all talk, no listen. No wonder it is difficult for Wheatley to understand others.

Did you not read my posts? Metaphysics.

You said it is "self-correcting". It is not self-correcting, because the corrections come from outside science, as I explained, and this is allowed for by the fact that science is not self-contained, as T said. Is this difficult for you to understand?

It means that it is not self-contained. — Thunderballs

Where's the logic in that? — Wheatley

Exactly what Thunderballs says, science is not self-contained. The corrections to science don't come from science. Science has provisions for outside influence, in the form of hypotheses and theories which are not scientifically proven, they are metaphysical speculations.

Science is a self-correcting system. — Wheatley

Science isn't a self-correcting system though, because it needs guidance from theory and hypothesis, which are derived from sources non-scientific, like metaphysics.

My contention that Christianity was largely responsible for the destruction of classical literature, and culture generally, is that presented by Gibbon, and one or two others since. You will need something more than just naysaying. — Banno

Ever consider the possibility that what really happened is that Christianity provided people with the freedom to do what they wanted? And what they wanted was to destroy classic literature. The reason? Because it was full of lies, deception, and immorality, being the medium of a deprived culture..

So perhaps, what Christianity really provided was freedom from a corrupted, degenerative regime, by enabling revolt. And destruction of the medium through which the oppressors have operated was the final symbolic rejoicing, as they reveled in freedom. It's not mere coincidence that the acts you refer to coincide with the fall of the Roman Empire.

I also have a problem with the notion of an experiential state; there's a reification there that I find uncomfortable. Experiences are not always sufficiently static to count as individuals; or at least there are issues for consideration in the individuating of sensations. (@Metaphysician Undercover mentioned something along these lines above, but it made no sense.) — Banno

I'd go further than this, to say that experiences are never static things, but neither are physical objects in the world static things. However, this does not change the fact that we talk about both of these as if they are static things. So if there is an error here, in referring to one or the other as a static thing, it is not specific to one or the other.

What I think is that we recognize or apprehend certain aspects of both, experiences or feelings, and physical objects, which appear to be unchanging, and this provides the basis for talking about these as if they are static things. Perhaps it is more difficult to find consistency in experiences and feelings than it is to find consistency in the physical world around us, so this creates the illusion of a big difference between the two.

A common philosophical error is to assume that a grammar implies a state of affairs. In the phone example, the similarity of grammar is taken to imply that pain is some sort of individual, or thing, and so leads to questions of observation and identity and so on, all of them misplaced, all of them the result of not noticing that the grammar hides a distinction.

@Metaphysician Undercover in particular makes this sort of mistake often and repeatedly, but doesn't see it. — Banno

Really, it is simply you who is not following what analysis of the language is showing us, and you are trying to make a distinction which is unwarranted, unsupported by the use of language, and in error. It is not the case that the grammar is hiding something, it is the case that you are not accepting what the grammar is showing you, thereby assuming that there is some other reality inconsistent with the grammar, and hidden beneath the grammar.

The real distinction to be made is between the static and the active. Such a distinction can be carried through. But both, the internal feelings, and also the external physical objects, have each, active and passive elements. So to separate the two, internal feelings from external objects, on the premise that one is active and the other is passive, as the basis of this separation, is a mistake.

See the sentence immediately preceding this...

"So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?" – On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.

So "I have a pain in my neck" is the same as "ouch!"

and at the start of §244 ""How de we refer to sensations?" - the italics are in the original; the answer is that it is muddled to think of ourselves as referring to sensations at all. We express them.

Language cannot refer to a pain - it cannot get between a pain and its expression. — Banno

As demonstrated by my argument above, the fact that "ouch", or "I have a pain in my neck", can serve as a replacement for crying, indicates these cannot be the sensations themselves which are being expressed. They are a response to the sensation. And we apprehend them as representative of the sensation. In the one case we even refer to the sensation as "a pain". The idea that we express the sensation with these expressions, rather than respond to the sensation is rather ludicrous.

If you watch the Elton John movie Rocketman, it is implied that young Elton (or whatever his real name was) had the same sort of talent. He would just sit down at the piano and play a tune that he had heard, or seen played, without ever having practiced it.

Perhaps. But if we read the text as saying that it is, ∮245 works.

What's being rejected, and here I think I'm following Kenny, is that notion that talk of sensations takes the form of object and reference - see ∮293. So Kenny to:
To sum up: if by name one means "word who is meaning is learned by bare ostensive definition" then pain is not the name of a sensation; but if by name one means what is ordinarily meant by the word then of course "pain" is the name of a sensation.

The sensation has the same grammatical structure as an object: "I have a pain in my hand" against "I have a phone in my hand". The phone is a thing; the pain is not. We refer to the phone, but give expression to the pain.

So if one refers to a pain it is not in the way one refers to a phone, despite the superficial similarity int he grammar. — Banno

What you are missing, is that there is some form of judgement between the pain and the expression, as I described here:

What lies between pain and the expression of pain is some sort of judgement. The determinist will say that this is not a judgement at all, it's an automatic reaction, cause and effect; hit me and I will react. ,But using words as a form of expression is seen to sometimes consist of conscious judgement. So word use seems to cross the boundary between automatic reaction, and conscious judgement, consisting of some of each. — Metaphysician Undercover

That it is necessary to assume a medium, such as a form of judgement, is required due to the fact that there are many different possibilities for a single person's response to pain. The multitude of possibilities implies that there cannot be a direct causal relation between pain and expression. So, we must assume a medium which "chooses" from the possibilities.

We can see "pain" as the name of a type of sensation, just like "phone" is the name of a type of object. So I think your post displays ambiguity between naming a particular object, as one might do with a proper noun, and using a word like "phone" to refer to one object out of a group of things which could be called by the same name. Notice that 'the phone in my hand' would single out one phone out of many possible phones, but it is the context 'in my hand' which makes the word a name. You could have used any word to name the object. It's not necessary to call it "a phone", so that is not its name. However, if you held up a phone and talked about 'the cup in my hand', people would be very confused as to why you were referring a phone as a cup. This is why "meaning is use" is not straight forward, and actually somewhat deceptive. If meaning really was use, "cup" would be acceptable as being used to refer to the object. But "meaning is use" doesn't account for some preconceived notions that people have developed, which leads them to misinterpret other people's use.

You ought to recognize that "phone" is not the name of the object in your hand, though it might appear that way, when "phone" is given that context. In reality "phone" signifies a whole class of similar objects. Likewise, "pain" is not the name of the sensation in your big toe, after you stub your toe, it is the name of a type of sensation. Since both, "pain" and "phone" signify a type of thing, and are not properly the name of any one thing, .the proposed separation, or distinction between the two, which you describe is unwarranted.

Is it possible that he had seen it played before, remembered the process with a photographic memory, then practiced the finger movements without a piano?

Nobody taught you how to speak English? — Luke

Right, I'm self-taught, through the scientific methods of observation, and trial and error. Aren't you?

This must be hell for English teachers. Why is it impossible? — Luke

No English teacher I have ever known has attempted to teach me the correct use of a word. Such a thing is impossible because no two particular sets of circumstances are exactly the same and successful usage varies according to the circumstances. A word is like any other tool, and there is no such thing as the correct use of a tool, it is used differently by different people in different situations. That there is such a thing as "the correct use" is just a false assumption that some people make.

"Good", "bad", "worse", and "better", implying a variance by degrees is a completely distinct concept from the dichotomous "correct" and "incorrect".

I don't think this is what Wittgenstein wants to convey. — TheMadFool

Well I probably am not in total agreement with Wittgenstein on this point, but it is actually very difficult to decipher exactly what he has said to be able to determine such agreement. And, the fact that his use of words can, and is, interpreted in many different ways, is evidence that there is no such thing as "the correct way". In fact, if you pay very close attention to his use of words, you may notice that what he appears to be saying with his words, is something inconsistent with what he is doing with his words.

This is a form of hypocrisy which he presents us with, when you are doing something different with your words, from what you say you are doing. It's the foundation of deception. Take a look at the inverted form of the liar paradox ("I am not lying") for a very simple example of that type of hypocrisy.. The reason why it becomes a paradox upon inversion, is that we cannot find the principles to allow for the lack of consistency between what the person is saying and what the person is doing. If meaning is use, then saying something is doing something. But this presents us with a very peculiar problem of accounting for the real existence of deception. Deception is doing something different from what you are saying, and for this to occur there must be a separation between the meaning of what you are saying, and what you are doing. Therefore the two are different, as evidenced by the reality of deception. So deception successfully demonstrates that meaning is something other than use.

There is such a thing as correct usage of words. How else is this conversation taking place and how are we to read Wittgenstein's works if there were no such thing? :chin: — TheMadFool

I think I already sort of explained how this conversation can take place without such a thing as "the correct use of a word". We proceed in our actions, and have success in our actions without the need of determining "the best", or "the correct" way of doing things. Actions are the means to ends, and we have many choices as to the particular means to any end, which is something more general. So we choose and we proceed. If we are unsuccessful we might designate that particular way as "incorrect", as commonly happens in trial and error. But contrary to popular opinion, the fact that many ways can be designated as "incorrect", does not imply that there is one "correct way".. Actually it would be more likely that there are many correct ways. And if there are many correct ways, This rules out "the correct way", though some might still be better than others.

1. The referent of S is known only to you. So, no possibility that you might inform a second person of what S means. There goes your chance of being able to establish a corroborative backup in case you ever forget what S means. — TheMadFool

This is not an issue because the possibility of informing a second person of what S means is highly unlikely in the first place. "S" refers to one's own sensation, a feeling that a person has. How do you propose that you can show another person your own feeling, to inform that other person what S means? The idea that you might inform another person of what S means has no place here. So this is just a bad premise.

2. Suppose now you doubt what S means. You and you alone can clear this doubt (from 1) but you can't because you're in doubt. You can't expect a person, viz. yourself, who's uncertain what S means to tell you what S means. — TheMadFool

As I said, you can never completely rid yourself of this type of doubt, to be absolutely certain, but this does not prevent us from proceeding. In other words, it's impossible to clear this doubt, and that's just a fact of life, accept it.

What does it mean to use S correctly? Well, it means to never get its meaning wrong but from 1 and 2 (above), this is impossible. If you ever doubt what S means, you're in thick soup - only you know what S means but now you don't. What happens next is incorrect use of S unless you're grotesquely lucky and all of your guesses are correct. — TheMadFool

Right, it's impossible to ever know, beyond the shadow of a doubt, the correct use of a word. But contrary to what you are saying here, this does not entail that "incorrect use" is inevitable. It just implies that there is no such thing as the correct use of a word. Once you come to understand this, and accept it as a fact, your doubt will be quelled because you will no longer be inclined to doubt whether or not your usage is correct. You will see that you are free to use words however you please.

Can't a body, or matter, have quantities? Mass, charge, position, maybe velocity? — Philofile

These are all things we assign to the body, in predication. We might say that the body has something real, a property which corresponds to the concept assigned, but that all depends on the accuracy of the concept, in its capacity for modeling reality. That's why Banno's "instantaneous velocity" is a bad conception, when judged for truthfulness. Though it is a very useful concept, it's obvious that there is nothing real which corresponds with it.

"Mass" is similar, in the sense of being very useful, but not very truthful. It's like a magical power which we assign to a coherent group of particles which we observe to exist as a unified body. In theory, the massive object consists of a group of parts. But the theoretical parts, in summation, of each one's "mass" cannot account for the quantity of power that the unified whole is observed to have as "mass". So to be truthful we should represent this power which is attributed to "mass", as something which is produced by magic, or magically comes into existence, when parts are unified as a whole.

Every velocity is an average one. — Philofile

Your efforts are wasted on Banno. Some people think they know everything and refuse to learn anything.

To address your op, there is no such thing as a "physical quantity". "Physical" means of the body, where a body is a thing, or object. A quantity may be of one, or a multitude of objects. That's why quantity is an abstraction, or universal, and not something physical

Fair point but, from what I gather, the certainty Wittgenstein is concerned about regarding whether or not the sign "S" is being used correctly applied can be treated in a relative sense. We aren't as sure of the sign "S" and its referent as we are about the referent of "water", the former being private and the latter being public. Therein lies the rub. — TheMadFool

Some words, like "water", we are very sure about, other words, we are less sure about. It's generally a matter of being familiar with the word and its use. Why would "S" be any different? The use here, which one would become familiar with, is one's own use. But I don't see how the judgement of "correct" would be any different in principle. In the one case consistent with the use of others would be the criteria for the judgement, and in the other case consistent with one's own use would be the criteria.

Either way, if we assume that there is a first use of any word, there is no basis for a judgement of "correct" in that first use. And; if a following use is different, or what you'd call incorrect in relation to that other use, it is still a use, and serves as the basis for a further judgement of correct. So the word could then have two correct uses even though one of these began as incorrect . This I admit could pose a problem to the private user. But it's not a problem that couldn't be overcome, the person would just have to choose between the two.

You mean to say, a private linguist doesn't need to be certain what a sign S refers to in faer private, inner world? — TheMadFool

No, I mean in any use of language one does not have to be certain of what the words mean. That's just the way language is. It's that type of thing, something we can do, without being certain of what we are doing. There is no fatal consequence, for example, for making a mistake, so we can proceed rather carelessly.

So, S is like a variable and can stand for any sensation, this particular category of experience being chosen by Wittgenstein out of necessity? What S stands for can change at any time; a private linguist might, for instance, say, "oh, this feels right for S" and run with that. That's exactly what Wittgenstein claimed will happen - the notion of whether a word is being used appropriately/properly is N/A. What do you think this leads to? I'm curious. — TheMadFool

Looks exactly like what happens to language; word meaning evolves and changes as people are free to use words however they please.

I would be interested in what others think of this passage. What would be in between pain and the expression of pain? Is there something there that could be referenced? I would think not. I'm not sure what Wittgenstein is getting at. What is it that he's trying to get us to think about? — Sam26

What lies between pain and the expression of pain is some sort of judgement. The determinist will say that this is not a judgement at all, it's an automatic reaction, cause and effect; hit me and I will react. ,But using words as a form of expression is seen to sometimes consist of conscious judgement. So word use seems to cross the boundary between automatic reaction, and conscious judgement, consisting of some of each.

A private language user, if fae's not sure if fae's using the sign, say, S, correctly has only one option: ask faerself about whether S is being used correctly or not but fae doesn't know that; isn't that why fae's asking faerself. It's like a judge in court who's unsure about a certain article of the law and then consults faerself about it; fae doesn't know. — TheMadFool

You seem to be using the premise that one must be absolutely certain before judging something as correct. But that's really opposite to reality. There are degrees of certainty, but we never obtain to the level of absolute. Nor do we require absolute certainty before proceeding with an action. So fae can use a sign, and we can interpret this as meaning that fae has in some sense judged it as being correct for the situation, even while maintaining doubt as to whether it truly is the best sign for the situation.

There is an entire range of degrees of doubt which we could look at. Down at the base is trail and error. There is a judgement that the thing tried ought to be tried, so that is a judgement of "correct", even though the probability for success, from the trial is known to be very low. At the top, there is a healthy respect for the fact that even when we proceed with the highest degree of certainty , there is a faint possibility that things will go wrong, accidents do happen. So even when we proceed with the highest degree of certainty we ought to keep in mind the possibility of mistake.

So your example doesn't give us anything real to go on. The person using the sign doesn't need to be certain, and in reality ought to never have that attitude of absolute certainty. So the second guessing oneself, which you are talking about, though it does occur, is not a necessary aspect of using a sign, and it ought not be presented as if it is.

Wittgenstein then claims, for the private language user, the only possible means by which fae can know that fae is using a word/sign in that private language correctly is to consult oneself and that's problematic for the simple reason that whatever seems/is thought to be correct will be taken as correct. The notion of correct usage becomes meaningless as the verificatory process is, at the end of the day, circular: — TheMadFool

Why do you say that the notion of correct usage becomes meaningless? As Sam26 says, the verification is not circular. The individual applies one's own criteria and makes the judgement of "correct". Isn't that how any judgement of "correct" is made, by an individual applying what is believed to be the relevant criteria? Where's the problem? What makes such a judgement meaningless?

You would have to ask me if I am intending to point at the mirror, the imagine in the mirror, or am using the mirror to point my finger at itself. — Yohan

That's right. And this is an indication of the inherent ambiguity within "pointing". To clarify, and resolve the ambiguity, we need to ask, 'what are you pointing at, and the pointer must provide further context to ensure that the person being shown the thing interprets the pointing in the same way as the person pointing.

The part that refers cannot be referred to while referring. — Gobuddygo

Why is this a problem for you? I see no problem, as long as we maintain as reality, that there is always a medium between the person doing the referring, and the thing referred to. Point your left finger at your right finger, and say "I am pointing at my finger". You can be pointing at either your right or your left, because it is you who is pointing, and your finger, as the means is just a medium. When I say "I" the part that refers, myself, is doing the referring. The medium, the word "I" is just the means which I choose, like when I choose my right finger to point at my left finger. The ambiguity is a feature of the choice of medium..

I'm glad you agree. Now consider that there are a number of different forms of these crucial statements. I would say that they are definitional. So in the famous example from Aristotle: All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; Therefore Socrates is mortal, you can see clearly that "man" is defined as mortal, and "Socrates" is defined as a man. The way A explains it, the concept of "mortal" is within the concept of "man". I say "within" means a necessary part of the definition, "necessary" being relative to that specific logical proceeding.

The premise in your example is slightly different but similar. "Rain" is defined by "the ground will be wet" as necessary for the logical procedure. So you place the concept of "the ground will be wet" within the concept of "rain", as necessary. It is what I would call definitional.

I would say that the principal difference between the two examples above, is that the former defines a type of object (making that the subject) "men", through predication, "are mortal", while the latter defines an activity "rain" (making that the subject) through a causal relation "the ground will be wet". You could have stated something different as your definition, like "If it's raining there will be drops of water in the air". This is more like a simple predication. We replace the causal relation with a straight relation of predication, but the situation is the same, logically. Every time it is raining, there are drops of water in the air, but not necessarily every time there are drops of water in the air is it raining. The concept of "drops of water in the air" is placed within the concept of "rain" through this definitional act. And the definitional act enables the judgement of validity, relative to the conclusion.

When you use the mirror, doesn't the tip of your finger point at itself through the means of reflection? Can't a pointing be reflected?

I can use my finger to point at my body, but I can't point the tip of my finger at itself. — Yohan

What about that mirror thing? It's pretty freaky. Just remember to account for the inversion or you'll get all fucked up. The mirror image is said to be identical, because it has the same chirality, but's really not identical because it is a reflection.

The form of premise 1, as a conditional statement, is crucial to the validity of the conclusion, as what is used to determine the truth table. For example, if the premise was changed to a biconditional, the truth table would be different.

Aristotle,trying to show virtue is a middle way, said
1.In decorative arts such as pottery one seeks to stay in the middle ground between extremes
2.Since virtue superior to pottery etc. that must also be true for virtue too
3.therefore virtue is a middle way between extremes — Ioannis Kritikos

It's a bit more complicated than this. He gives examples such as eating, the correct amount being the mean between too much and too little, and courage, being the mean between cowardly and rash. So it's an argument from examples.

3 has to be true; no possible world exists where 1 and 2 are true with 4 false. — TheMadFool

Well that's not telling me what makes it true. You are just repeating that it has to be true, necessarily. What makes 3 true, when 2 is stipulated as true, is the relationship between P and Q which is stated in 1. The truth or falsity of 2, in your example of rain, is a direct empirical determination The truth or falsity of 1 is a logical determination. So we can ask what type of logic supports such premises.

As for temporal aspects of sufficient and necessary conditions and causality, we can forgo discussion on them for they muddy the waters. — TheMadFool

If you're just going to repeat over and over again, that 3 is necessarily true, if 1 and 2 are true, then there is no discussion to be had.