Seems like we’re approaching a common ground in respect to the hylo-morphology of concepts. Cool. — javra

I used to hold a very similar understanding, but I've progressed toward what I consider to be a deeper understanding. If we maintain that concepts have a material aspect, then we need to account for the manifestation of that material aspect. In Aristotle's hylomorphic structure, matter accounts for the temporal continuity of the object, its capacity to persist, and therefore its identity as a continuation of being the same object. This is described as mass or inertia. This is also the aspect of the object which is unintelligible to us, in physical objects we simply take it for granted.

The temporal continuity of a concept can be seen to be provided for by the physical existence of the symbols. This is how we communicate, allowing the same concept to exist for generation after generation, and amongst different individuals. Also, we can see a similar situation within the mind of an individual, where memory relies on symbols, or some other sort of representation such as an image. The representation is essential to the temporal continuity of memory. However, this implies that the symbol is an aspect of the concept itself, as its material element. It is an accidental, as we see that the symbol may be arbitrary, but still the medium employed (as the matter) has an effect on the essence of the concept through the capacity for temporal continuity. So for example, there is a big difference in the potential for temporal continuity, between written symbols (as we find in mathematics), and spoken words. The idea that mathematical symbols represent eternal objects is derived from this capacity for extended temporal continuity. But when we look at spoken words we find that the concepts represented by symbols are actually quite fluid. So the forms (concepts) are changing as time passes, and even the mathematical ones change as knowledge evolves, but through a slower process.

Regardless of those revelations, as philosophers we may have a commitment toward further analysis of "the concept". If a concept is composed of matter and form, then to fully understand the nature of a concept we need to produce a proper separation between the matter and the form, so as to distinguish the intelligible from the unintelligible Matter has been designated as fundamentally indefinite and unintelligible.. Allowing the unintelligible (matter) to enter into the intelligible in our apprehension of "the concept", assuming that it is an inherent part of the intelligible (as a concept is fundamentally intelligible), is to provide for misunderstanding. So we still need a technique to identify and expel misunderstanding. Therefore we still need to proceed toward separating the material aspect (the representation), out, and attempting to understand strictly the immaterial, intelligible aspect of the concept.

BTW, to me there’s a parallel between Aristotle’s prime matter and today’s notion of zero-point energy. Both seeming to hold the properties of pure potentiality and unintelligibility while underlying all that is intelligible matter. As we were previously discussing, the intelligibility of actualized identity is always brought about by forms - including the forms of intelligible matter. And, in Aristotelian terms, the ultimate form is that of the teleological unmoved mover, which is singular as form in being devoid of constituents and, therefore, devoid of matter. Please remind me if there were any disagreements between us in the aforementioned. — javra

The cosmological argument, and the teleological unmoved mover, are the means by which Aristotle brings matter itself into the realm of the intelligible. In Bk.7 Metaphysics, the part I referred to already, you can see how he begins this process by showing how the matter is a part of the formula in creative art and production. Ultimately, in the cosmological argument, Bk.9, it is shown that actuality must be temporally prior to potentiality, therefore form is prior to matter. This is the form of final causation which determines the matter in creation. Accordingly, there is no such thing as "prime matter", because matter is created as required by the purpose, so all matter is inherently formed by the purposeful act which creates it, therefore it is fundamentally intelligible. The fact that matter is by definition indefinite, and unintelligible, is an epistemological fact. The deficient human intellect does not have the capacity to understand temporal continuity, so this part of reality is designated as indefinite and unintelligible (matter). But this is the fault of the human intellect, temporal continuity, matter, is actually quite intelligible to a higher intellect, according to Aristotelian principles.

What criticism would you give to the proposition that every intelligible form is, and can only be, cognized as a whole (for context, where every whole - save for the unmoved mover - is itself a hylomorphic holon). Thereby making the concept of a whole, i.e. of an entirety, and the concept of a form fully synonymous. — javra

This I think, is the problem evident in the hylomorphic approach to concepts. In the case of conception, such a whole is never quite complete, therefore an invalid "whole". This is the example I provided with the regress into unclarity: the concept of "Socrates" refers to "man", which refers to "mammal" which refers to "animal" which refers to "living being", and so on. The more specific is defined by the more general, and the more general becomes increasingly vague and ill-defined, such that we can never claim completion of a whole in conception. And, we see the same thing in describing the existence of physical objects. An object on the earth requires reference to the earth, and the earth requires reference to the sun, the milky way, etc.. We do not get the closure of a whole, even in our descriptions of physical objects.

So we might produce an Ideal, "the One", as a proposal of a valid whole. The One is what both closes the conceptual expansion into vagueness, and also validates a particular physical whole as everything, the universe. Aristotle proposed circular motion, and the divine thinking, which is thinking on thinking, as the closure of wholeness, but this proved to be insufficient. Aquinas stipulates "God", but it is asserted by him, that the human intellect, being dependent on the material body, cannot obtain a proper understanding of God.

So I would say that wholeness is what is required by the intelligible form in order to be completely and absolutely intelligible, but human conceptions lack this. This is quite evident in the most fundamental mathematical principles. The natural numbers are infinite. The spatial point is infinitely small. A line is infinitely long, etc. This is evidence that human conceptual forms, as intelligible objects, are fundamental lacking in wholeness. This is why I prefer not to call them "objects". However, as I said above, in our attempts to understand physical objects we are met with the same deficiency of wholeness. But this might just be due to the deficiency in our capacity to understand. We clearly sense boundaries of closure, we see objects as closed wholes. So it may be the case that we simply misunderstand what we see, and there may actually be some truth to the wholeness of an object which we perceive, but we just have not developed a proper understanding of it.

It’s not irrelevant according to the constitution of the United States of America. Representatives swore an oath to support and defend the constitution, and to bear true faith and allegiance to the same. These lawmakers are impeaching their political opponent for a “high crime” they just invented. They’re setting a very dangerous precedent. — NOS4A2

It's irrelevant to the question of whether President Trump is guilty of inciting insurrection through criminal negligence. If you want to argue that this is a crime which the lawmakers "just invented", that's really irrelevant as well. Inventing crimes is what "lawmakers" do, so they're just doing their jobs. We live in a changing world, with the development of social media, and laws need to be invented to keep up with the capacity to commit new crimes. In no way does finding Trump guilty of inciting insurrection through criminal negligence violate the constitution. Now you've just resorted to outright lying, like your protege.

f you want to argue that speakers who neither practice nor preach violence can be held responsible for the violent conduct of others, try to incite me to agree with you just to see how far you can get. — NOS4A2

Did you read the Wikipedia quote on criminal negligence which I provided? There is no question that Trump's actions of disputing the election, and various absurd claims concerning the election, were a contributing cause of the insurrection, regardless of the few words you are able to provide in his defence. His "failure to foresee and so allow otherwise avoidable dangers to manifest" makes him guilty of criminal negligence, at the very least. The question now is not whether or not he is guilty, it is a question of the extent of his culpability. So, we must apply a "reasonable-person standard". And since there was much discussion and speculation, prior to the violence, that Trump's actions could very well lead to violent uprising, we can conclude that a reasonable person would have foreseen the danger, and Trump can be held accountable for a high degree of culpability.

No, it came to my mind too, but I just don't think you can negligently incite an insurrection. — Kenosha Kid

Then I don't think you understand the concept of "criminal negligence". The issue, is whether Trump's actions are contributive to the insurrection, as inciteful. If you understand the nature of criminal negligence you will see that for a person in the position of political influence, like the president, inciting an insurrection is the very type of thing which one could negligently do.

Here's Wikipedia:

The distinction between recklessness and criminal negligence lies in the presence or absence of foresight as to the prohibited consequences. Recklessness is usually described as a "malfeasance" where the defendant knowingly exposes another to the risk of injury. The fault lies in being willing to run the risk. But criminal negligence is a "misfeasance" or "nonfeasance" (see omission), where the fault lies in the failure to foresee and so allow otherwise avoidable dangers to manifest. In some cases this failure can rise to the level of willful blindness, where the individual intentionally avoids adverting to the reality of a situation. (In the United States, there may sometimes be a slightly different interpretation for willful blindness.) The degree of culpability is determined by applying a reasonable-person standard. Criminal negligence becomes "gross" when the failure to foresee involves a "wanton disregard for human life" (see the definitions of corporate manslaughter and in many common law jurisdictions of gross negligence manslaughter). — Wikipedia on Criminal Negligence

I would say that Trump's criminal negligence clearly obtains to the level of "gross", as defined above.

At zero point did he tell rally-goers to commit violence or break the law. — NOS4A2

So, what's that prove? "Incite" does not mean 'told them to do it'. Nor does "incite" imply 'conspired with'. Your arguments are simply irrelevant. Under any reasonable understand of "incite", coupled with a reasonable understanding of Trump's actions, it's very evident that he's guilty of inciting that violence.

You are simply ignoring the concept of "criminal negligence".

Seems pretty consistent with the dictionary definition to me: — Kenosha Kid

OED, incite: "urge or stir up". Where is there a mention of the need to intend the specific action resulting from the urging or stirring up?

But protest is not insurrection. — Kenosha Kid

Again, to "incite" does not require that the specific outcome is intended by the one who incites. This is due to the nature of inciting in general. The person inciting cannot be fully aware of the effect that the incitation will have. Inciting is by nature an unpredictable thing to do. But such ignorance of the possible outcome is not an acceptable defense in a criminal trial.

But ignorance that one's actions would lead to someone else being inspired to commit crimes is a perfectly reasonable defense, and the one Trump's people will employ. — Kenosha Kid

If the person's actions are inciteful, and are criminal, as I have demonstrated through the concept of false pretenses, then ignorance of the final outcome is not "a perfectly reasonable defense" against the charge of inciting, regardless of the seriousness of that final outcome.

Indeed, how could he? — Kenosha Kid

You don't seem to understand, that to be guilty of a specific crime, the person need not have intended the particular outcome which is described by the specific charge. This is known as "criminal negligence".

If it can be shown that the outcome was a likely one, maybe. — Kenosha Kid

There is no need to show that the outcome was a likely one. The outcome could be completely accidental, unforeseeable, and even improbable, as is often the case in manslaughter for example. That the consequences were unforeseen, or even unforeseeable, does not absolve one from criminal responsibility for the consequences of one's criminal acts.

Not at all. If I incite someone, that's a teleological action on my part, irrespective of its consequences. If I inspire someone, that's an interpretation on their part. — Kenosha Kid

I think that's a false representation. There is nothing intrinsic to the concept of "incite", which necessitates that the person who incites must intend the specific action which is incited. If we say that the person who incites must intend some action, in a general sense, by those incited, then Trump is guilty of inciting, because he clearly intended for his followers to take action, in the form of some sort of protestation.

Yes, and I think that'll have to be the crux of the matter: Did Donald do what Donald did in order to set up a violent insurrection by his supporters in the Capitol? And the answer ought to be that this cannot be established, further is unlikely to be the case. — Kenosha Kid

In a criminal trial, it is not necessary to establish that the actual outcome was the one intended by the perpetrator. Therefore it is not necessary to demonstrate that the specific intent of the Donald was violent insurrection. All that is necessary is to show criminal intent. And in some cases this is not even necessary, as ignorance is no excuse. His use of false pretense in an attempt to get what is not rightfully his (the presidency), is criminal intent. And, it is this criminal intent which led to the violent uprising. Therefore the Donald may be held criminally responsible.

Trump thrives on attention and adoration. He lives for it. He's a moron and a narcissist, which 100% explains his actions. He lost an election to a corpse, so he has to rationalise that both for himself and his millions of cult followers. So naturally it was a fraudulent election.

The impeachment is floating a very different version of Trump, one who is blessed with understanding of others and the cunning to use this to deliberately guide his mob into violent insurrection without ever explicitly stating that this is what he wants: Trump as master manipulator, shadowy Bond villain, astute strategist and a man of subtle means. That isn't Trump. He has none of those qualities. And yet if we wish to convict him on the impeachment charges, in the absence of an overt call to arms, we have to pretend that is what Trump is.

Incitement is what Rudy did: "trial by combat". — Kenosha Kid

Neither way that you represent him, ignorant, or knowing, can absolve him from his crimes. Criminal law is designed so that ignorance cannot be used as a defense, because this would allow the criminal who is a proficient liar to walk free, under the pretense of ignorance. We know he's a great pretender, and the chameleon is not necessarily intelligent, so this distinction is just a distraction.

By the way, Rudy was hired by Trump (regardless of whether he pays him), so there's another argument required to separate his actions in this matter, from Trump's responsibility.

You have to separate the President inspiring an insurrection from him inciting one. I don't think his rally speech is solid evidence. — Kenosha Kid

That's a mighty fine line to draw, between "incite" and "inspire". The inciteful, or inspirational (however you want to say it) activity was the false pretense of a stolen election. And that had been going on for months, so there was preparations made for the event. The event was carried out under the false pretense of a stolen election, a false pretense which the president perpetrated, propagated, and perpetuated.

I think I agree with Jack here. Studying when you're that deprived of sleep is a lost cause, you simply won't get the desired effect because you'll lose the ability to concentrate on the reading. This means that you're asking the wrong question. You ought to be asking how to care for your baby in a way which allows you to get better sleep.

Using the notion of holons, then, to me each concept is itself a holon - constituted of parts that are themselves holons, and is itself a part of greater concepts that are themselves holons. — javra

I'll see if I can interpret this in a way which is consistent with what I said in the last post. Let's say that there are two aspects of the holon, one which makes it in some sense an individual, free and independent, and another aspect which makes it necessarily dependent on a larger whole, so that it is united to other concepts by this aspect. You can see that these two aspects are fundamental incompatible, the one making it a distinct individual with its own independent identity, the other wanting to negate this existence as a distinct individual, giving it an identity, as a part of a larger whole. So they must be distinct aspects of the concept. This would mean that the holon partakes in both the categories I described, as a material individual, and also as part of a type, receiving meaning from a higher order. This is comparable to Aristotle's matter and form.

If a concept is an object, as a holon, then it cannot be purely immaterial, it must also have a material aspect, which is responsible for it being, in some sense, an independent individual. If a concept is strictly formal, then its complete existence is dependent on the larger whole. If it has any sort of individual, independent existence, then it must have a material aspect to account for this separate identity.

What Aristotle does, is seek the source of this material aspect, as that which accounts for the existence of individuals. In many ways, the material aspect is indefinite and therefore unintelligible. So the concept, being essentially something intelligible, must also have an aspect of it which is unintelligible, just like any material thing. This is the deficiency which Aquinas spoke of. Due to the fact that the intellect is united with the material body, and is not properly a separate substance, the intelligible forms which it deals with are also deficient.. I don't mind looking at concepts in this way. It makes more sense than saying that a concept is a completely separate, and immaterial object.

His speech is not considered incitement by any American law, state or otherwise. So why would they keep claiming that he incited violence? — NOS4A2

There's still the matter of the false pretense for you to come to grips with. This is the claim that the election was fraudulently stolen. It is precisely this claim, and nothing else, which incited the violence. And, it was the president who keep repeating this claim over and over again, countless times.

So, are you ready to demonstrate either that it was not this claim, made by the president, which incited the violence, or, that the claim was not a false pretense? Until you do, you're just blowing smoke, and the president is obviously guilty of inciting the violence.

You sound wicked smart. — Xtrix

Do you think? I can't make heads nor tails of it.

So tell me how is it possible that the most admired man in America (according to a Gallup poll) had fewer votes than Joe Blow, who couldn't bring fifty people together at a rally? — Rafaella Leon

These are things they cannot explain. They can only explain it away. — NOS4A2

Isn't this argument amazing? Simply stupendous! I hear the Flat Earth Society is recruiting members and looking for donations. You two would probably fit right in. Go for it!

If that's the sort of logic which is capable of inciting violent uprising, God help us. Bring on the revolution! Let the animals roam freely. Anarchy is inevitable.

Given this distinction - and the plasticity of the term "thing", which can reference a concept – how is your own concept of “griffin” not numerically identical? — javra

I cannot locate, or in any way, point to this supposed concept, within me, to demonstrate to myself, it's existence as a thing. I might conjure up an image, but that's not really a concept. The closest I can come to finding a concept, is definition. I might assume the definition is "a thing", but the definition is just a bunch of words, which in that form is a multitude of things, each needing to be interpreted as signifying a concept itself. So this is really going in the wrong direction. It's heading toward an infinite regress of words associated with an assumed "concept", but no actual concepts. To find "the concept", if it exists as a thing, I need to take a different approach.

I could look for the boundaries of that thing, and this is how we distinguish things with our senses, or I could look for a unity of meaning, signified by the definition, or just the unity of meaning signified by the word "griiffin". Each of these, boundaries and unity, can be an indication of "a thing", and ultimately the most conclusive evidence would be to find both. But based on my understanding of the difference between sensible objects and concepts, I think the latter would be the most productive course. This is regardless of the modern trend in philosophy to look at definitions as boundaries created by rules of language, which I think is a dead end route. It is a dead end for the reasons stated above, the rules need to be interpreted, which would require rules for interpretation, resulting in an infinite regress of words, without finding any real boundaries. So the proper course appears to be to seek the unity of meaning, if I want find the object which is "the concept".

This is where the real difficulty begins, requiring an understanding of the use of words to signify meaning. Notice that we have to differentiate between using words to name a thing, as proper nouns, and using words to signify meaning. So to make a long story short (I could give you a vast multitude of examples of words referring to properties, which indicate meaning rather than an object), it is my understanding that when we use words to indicate meaning, what is signified is a type, rather than a thing. We might signify a type of property, or a type of thing.

So, we have a unity principle indicated here, which designates a type, as a category, a classification principle, like a "set" in mathematical terms. To understand this unity, and determine whether it is "a thing", we need to grasp the meaning of the principle which is supposed to render the unity. I suggest that the intent of this unity principle is to group numerous things together, which have some property in common, to aid in understanding. We could say that we attempt to create "a thing" in this way, and the thing which would be created exists as the category itself, which allows us to group numerous other "things" within that category.

Notice that I have determined two very distinct usages of "thing" now. One refers to the category itself, the principle of classification, the other refers to the objects to be classified. In effect, I have developed a principle of classification to distinguish two very different types of "thing". Therefore I need principles which distinguish them as separate. The one category I assign "identity" to. The things which will be classed, and categorized have an identity. The other category, the principles by which things are categorized, or classified, I cannot assign "thing" to, nor can I assign "identity" to, because I've already used those terms in the other category, and this is a philosophical endeavour, and my goal is to maintain logical rigour. It is true that there are many conventions in common vernacular which would call these categories "things", and say that they have "identity", but the goal here (being philosophy) is to maintain the validity of logic, and therefore avoid the equivocation and category mistake, which would inevitably result from such a duality of meaning.

The conclusion now, is that those so-called 'things", which I've now excluded from the category of "things", those concepts, which are more properly referred to as principles by which a unity is to be created, are not themselves properly called unities. This is because each one fits into a higher unity, and is not itself a proper whole, receiving meaning from the higher whole. So Socrates refers to man, man refers to animal, refers to living being, etc.. Therefore no individual concept is a complete unity, it always refers to something outside as a source for meaning. It is a part which is not itself a whole, because it is wholly dependent on something external to it for its meaning. I believe this is the point of the op, the meaning of the axiom is always derived from something else, so the object is not complete as an object until we determine the whole.

This is why we need the highest unity, "the Ideal", what the Neo-Platonists called "the One", to allow that a concept is a thing. This highest unity, this Ideal, is supposed to be the complete conceptual unity, being deferred to no higher whole to complete its meaning and unification. It is by that assumption, "whole", and therefore a thing with identity. This Ideal, "the One", is assumed as a concept which is also a thing with identity.

By comparison, the concept of “griffin” is one thing - a given whole that as form is undivided - and not two or more. It is a hybridization of different animals – an eagle and a lion – true; but the hybridized given is nevertheless singular. — javra

I don't think this is quite true though. You are simply assuming that the griffin concept within your mind is one thing. But if you analyze this concept within your mind, you'll see that "griffin" refers to a type of thing. And if you assert that this "type of thing" is a thing itself, that assertion needs to justified. That is what I tried to do above. It leads to an infinite regress of meaning, requiring the assumption of a fundamental unity such as "the One", which unites all conceptual structure as one united whole. This is why we ought not allow any contradictions within knowledge, no matter how far apart the fields of study are, it negates the possibility of a united whole,

The weird dreams are kinda cool though. — Hanover

You might try some Datura then---when you're feeling better.

Wow, what a change in Trump's demeanour today. For four years it's been 'I'm higher than the law'. Now suddenly it's 'I'm afraid of the law'.

Javra, I understand if you no longer wish to discuss this subject. But please read through my post, specifically where I discuss the two senses of "identity". I believe we haven't been properly separating these two distinct senses, and this is at the root of our disagreement.

The conceptual form of "griffin" is not the same as the conceptual form of "unicorn". I take it we agree in this. How could this be so if neither has an identity? (an issue further addressed below) — javra

There's a very straight forward answer to this. A conceptual form is not an "identity", by the law of identity. That's what I've been arguing is the intent of the law of identity, to elucidate this difference.

My belief is that the law of identity puts "same" into a different category from "different". Identity, which is indicated by "same", allows for difference, so that "same" in the context of this law, does not mean lack of difference. This is evident, because the same thing undergoes changes, becoming different from what it was, while still maintaining its identity as the same thing. This is the temporal extension of a thing, and the law of identity allows it to have the property X at one time, and not have the property X at another time, yet still be the same thing. So difference is allowed within the meaning of "same", not excluded by it.

Relating this to your example, what is dictated by the law of identity is what 'same" means, not what "different" means, and different is not opposed to "same" in this definition. So in your example, the fact that the two forms are different, doesn't say anything about identity. Difference is a concept which is related to something other than "same", when "same" is defined by the law of identity.

You would need to establish how the concept of "one" holds a different meaning in each of these systems to make this affirmation. What I find is that - even though they use the foundational concept of "one" in different ways - the concept of "one" remains the same. It's a given whole, a concept requisite for any such system of mathematics to manifest. — javra

That's very simple as well. For instance, in the natural numbers "one" is not divisible, in the real numbers it is. It's easy to say "one" represents a "whole", but the divisibility of that whole is part of the concept. And then there is the possibility of having a negative whole, which is part of the concept as well. It's very clear that the meaning of "one" is quite different in these different systems, and you do not accurately represent the concept of "one" when you say it represents a whole. Using "one" in different ways implies necessarily different meanings, because the meaning is dependent on the use.

You are conflating identity with primary substances (with empirically known to be physically existent givens).

If I were to ask you for an example of a thing language can refer to that is devoid of any identity, you would likely identify givens that are not "empirically known to be physically existent" ... but you would be identifying them all the same, i.e. disclosing their identity. This in the same breath with which you'd affirm that they lack any identity.

If you believe you can sidestep this contradiction, please provide an example. — javra

It appears like you are not quite grasping the law of identity clearly, and you are equivocating between two senses of identity, sometimes known as "numerical identity" and "qualitative identity" (check Stanford for an explanation). A type is identified by qualitative identity, but that is not what the law of identity refers to, which indicates one and the same thing. When language refers to 'a thing' which is devoid of identity (by the law of identity), it is referring to a type of thing, so it has qualitative identity, but this is distinct from "identity" as signified by the law of identity. So there is no contradiction, only a misrepresentation as to what "identity" means according to the law of identity, and possibly replacing this with "identity" in the sense of qualitative identity.

What is real is regardless of whether or not it is known. — javra

Ok, maybe we have grounds for agreement here, and if we try we might be able to proceed. Do you believe, that just like "what is real is regardless of whether or not it is known", a real thing also has an identity regardless of whether or not the thing is known. This is what I am arguing that the law of identity states, the identity of the thing is within the thing itself, regardless of what is known about the thing. Can you agree with that? Further now, when we use "identity" in reference to what we know about a thing, this is "identity" in the other sense, qualitative identity. We describe the thing in terms of qualities, which are types.

This forms two distinct uses of identity which are consistent with the two distinct senses of "same". We might say that two different people have the same car, meaning the same make, model, year, colour, etc.. This is qualitative identity, reducible to type, really meaning the same type of car. On the other hand, we have to maintain that each car is distinct, because we know that the two cars are not the same car. This is numerical identity, what the law of identity refers to. If we are allowed to say, in strict logic, that two things are the same thing, because we have described them both in the same way, this creates many false conclusions.

For me they apply to all forms, including fictional ones, and not only to that which is physical. That Harry Potter is not a unicorn is true - addresses a reality that stands in its own context of fictional concepts - this via the laws of thought, including the law of identity. — javra

We're right back to the initial problem. If we apply the law of identity to all forms, we see that universal forms cannot have an identity. And by that law, "identity" is something that "things" have, so we can use the law to exclude universal forms from the category of "things". This is the intent of that law, to distinguish two distinct types of form, and this is why Aristotle is properly called dualist. There is a categorical separation between primary substance and secondary substance. In your example, the "reality" you refer to is that of secondary substance. Not being "a thing", secondary substance has no identity.

"Oneness" can be readily defined as the state of being undivided, of being a whole. As to 1's infinite divisibility, remember that I take the concept of one to be a hylomorphic whole, a form endowed with constituents. But one constituent does not of itself equate to the given whole. A whole given is taken to be undivided as form, hence - for me at least - can be represented by the number 1. As one example, one horse can only be represented by the number "1", and not by any division. Yes, a horse can be divided into parts ad nauseam, all the way down into zero point energy. But its multiple parts are not the horse as a whole, which is in a state of being undivided. As a more abstract example, one grouping of two or more givens is, as a grouping, itself one whole. As one example, "animal" can be conceived of as a grouping of givens, yet the concept of "animal" is itself one whole - distinct, for instance, from the concept of "plant". — javra

The issue here, is whether the numeral 1 can represent a unified whole, which is not a physical object. In your example, I assume one horse is meant to be a physical object. As I explained when we refer to one horse, we are stating something about it, that it is one, so "one" is used as a property of that thing. Now you need to justify your assertion that the symbol "1" refers to a unified whole, independently of the object which is said to be one. My argument is that since there are numerous number systems, natural numbers, rational numbers, real numbers, imaginary numbers, and so forth, there are numerous different conceptions of "one", and no single mathematical system unifies these into one concept. Therefore one as a concept, is not a unified whole.

Again, the law of identity pertains to all conceivable givens, and not just those of physical reality. — javra

You don't seem to be grasping the fact, that when we apply the law of identity to forms which are other than material particulars, we are forced by the precept of that law, to exclude certain forms from the category of having an identity. This is because we can use language to refer things without any identity. You don't seem to be grasping the intent of the law, which is to prevent the situation where we assume that just because we can talk about it, it is a thing with an identity. You completely misinterpret the law if you claim that a fictitious thing has an identity, because the law of identity puts the identity of a thing into the thing itself, rather than what we say about the thing. The fictitious thing has no existence independent from what we say about it, therefore it cannot have an identity.

Sure, you can say that "the law of identity pertains to all conceivable givens", but unless you abide by that law, and acknowledge that some conceivable givens do not have an identity, then you step outside that law and you enter into hypocrisy.

One three-headed dragon - say one that a person saw in an REM dream - cannot at the same time and in the same respect be both green and not-green. This, to my mind, is so because it would then break with the law of identity. At any rate, a three-headed dragon holds an identity despite it not being a physical given. — javra

This is not a breaking of the law of identity, it is an issue with the law of non-contradiction. And, if we do not limit what we can logically predicate of a subject, to what is actually possible in the physical world, there is no need for a law of non-contradiction at all. If relevance to the physical world is completely unnecessary, why not allow all sorts of contradictions?

Hence, I maintain that awareness, and not that which is empirical, is fundamental to knowledge. — javra

"Awareness" implies being aware of something. I believe that being aware of the external is prior to being aware of the internal, and being aware of the external requires some form of sense. Of course this is a difficult issue to discuss logically because the terms are naturally slanted in my direction. To "be aware of" implies being informed, and this seems to refer to information from the external. But if we allow that information may come to us from an internal source, then ultimately the empirical is not fundamental. This is why Aristotle defined "the soul", as the first principle of actuality, or first form, of the living body. But if the soul is the first principle of actuality, and it is also the inner most thing, as well as the thing which is "aware", then there is nothing more inner that it could be aware of, and primary awareness is necessarily of the external.

Secondly, knowledge of metaphysical realities has nothing to do with whether or not these metaphysical properties occur. Same as with physical reality. Take a preadolescent child or a lesser animal as example. Their awareness operates via the law of identity without them having any knowledge of the law of identity. Or else take adult humans prior to Aristotle's formulation of the principle. They too where governed by the law of identity thought they had no propositional knowledge of it. — javra

I don't agree with this at all. I think it is incoherent, so perhaps I misunderstand. First, how could one have knowledge of something which is independent of whether that something occurs? If the something does not occur, yet someone is claimed to have knowledge of it, this is not knowledge at all. It is misunderstanding masquerading as understanding. Second, the law of identity is extremely difficult even for human beings to understand (as evidenced by this thread), it is set up as a defence against sophism. So I don't see how children or lesser animals could be applying the law of identity as a defence against sophism. I believe you continue to misrepresent "the law of identity".

That said, to me these metaphysical realities are intrinsic aspects of awareness - again, irrespective of whether the awareness addressed has propositional knowledge of them. We do not, and cannot, create them. We can only discover them. As such, we do not govern metaphysical realities, this just as we don't govern physical realities. We, as aware beings, are predetermined by the former. And, though in different ways, we are likewise determined - bounded/limited - by the latter. — javra

This is the pivotal point of how Aristotle applies the cosmological argument against Pythagorean Idealism (and some forms of Platonism). He analyzes what is involved in "discovering" such principles. Would you agree with Aristotle, that when the geometer produces geometrical constructs, and discovers geometrical principles, this is an act which is properly described as the mind actualizing the principles. The principles exist in potential, prior to being actualized by the mind.

Giving the game away, MU. No Platonist - or Aristotelian - worth his/her salt ink would say such a thing. — Wayfarer

You've already demonstrated how you misinterpret Aristotle. This is quite understandable because he has a massive volume of material and some is quite difficult. I was in the same position until I read Aquinas, and found that his interpretation of Aristotle was inconsistent with mine. Then I had to go back and read much of Aristotle (Metaphysics, On the Soul) all over again, some of which I had already read two or three times, to see what I was missing.

Have you looked at any of that material which I referred you to in Aquinas, how the human intellect is united with the body, and how this union with the body effects the way that the intellect understands? These principles are taken directly for Aristotle's "On the Soul". The intellect is a power of the soul, just like the other powers of the soul such as self-subsistence, self-movement, and sensation. As such, it operates through the means of the bodily organs. Therefore there is necessarily a privation in the knowledge which the human intellect holds. We can say that the bodily organs taint out knowledge because the intellect is dependent on them for the acquisition of knowledge.

If we ignore, or circumvent this reality, we can assert that the human intellect has direct access to the independent, immaterial Forms. But then we have no principles by which we might demonstrate that any claimed a priori knowledge is actually, truly deficient. We can understand this in Kantian terms. The a priori intuitions of space and time are responsible for the tainting of our knowledge. These are manifestations of the physical constitution of the human body, which serve as the conditions for any ideas, concepts, or knowledge in general. Unless we acknowledge that what Kant calls a priori intuitions are properties of the human body, and are therefore fallible principles rather than eternal, immutable, truths, we have no approach toward arguing the deficiencies of them.

Plato himself demonstrated the deficiencies of the theory of participation, which provides the ontological support for the independent Ideas of Pythagorean Idealism. This is why he turned to "the good" to support the existence of Ideas. Notice that it is "the good" which supports intelligible objects for Plato, not "the idea of good", as often represented. It is sometimes argued that Plato himself was not a Platonist, and this is due to the common misrepresentation of Plato's philosophy in modern discussion which produces the common notion of "Platonism". It is very important to approach this ancient philosophy, as much as possible, without bias, if one is intending to develop a true understanding.

It is the universal view of ancient philosophy that the 'empirical realm' which is taken by moderns as the sine qua non of the real, is in fact a treacherous illusion, which the hoi polloi do not see as their minds are contaminated by worldly passions, which blind them to the higher truths. The real can only be grasped by reason, and its truths are invariant and never subject to decay. Whereas everything in the sensory domain is subject to constant change and degradation through the ravages of time. — Wayfarer

In this passage you demonstrate significant ambiguity. The "empirical realm", if we use Kantian terminology, is phenomena. And this is how the mind apprehends the sensible objects. However, this refers to all ideas, and concepts which may be employed by reason toward apprehending truths. So all understanding is necessarily "a treacherous illusion" according to what you have stated. Therefore if a philosopher desires a true understanding, one must find a way out of this trap. The way out has been discovered by Plato, through the means of "the good", (implying final cause), and it has been developed by Aristotle, and carried forward by others like Augustine and Aquinas.

You ought to accept that "reason" refers to an activity, not a thing. It is carried out by the human intellect through the use of tools, ideas, and concepts. The human intellect is fundamentally deficient, necessarily so, because it is dependent on the human body. Therefore the ideas and concepts which the human intellect grasps are not the real, higher, invariant truths, which we might assume are out there somewhere. The things which the human intellect grasps receive their intelligibility relative to "the good", which is not necessarily the truth.

For what it’s worth, I personally don’t take the laws of thought, the law of identity included, to be grounded in anything physical. I instead interpret these to be grounded in metaphysical aspects of reality that then, via awareness, govern how we interpret that which is physical. — javra

OK, this is a good starting point. What has the capacity to govern how we interpret "that which is physical"? Suppose we could interpret the physical in absolutely any possible way. Then our interpretations would be arbitrary, or random. But we want to say that there are real constraints on the way that we may interpret the physical, so that our interpretations are truly consistent with the physical reality. So we proceed to make some metaphysical or ontological conclusions about physical reality. These are what we use to govern how we interpret the physical. Don't the three fundamental laws of logic qualify here, as fundamental conclusions concerning "that which is physical"?

for instance, the absolute unity which can be conveyed by the numeral “1” cannot be found in physical givens — javra

But "1" does not signify any absolute unity. It is divisible, and infinitely so, by the accounts of many. So how could it signify an absolute unity?

In short, to me, the law of identity isn’t substantiated by physical reality; instead, it of itself governs, and in this sense substantiates, that which we deem to be integral wholes within physical reality. — javra

I can't understand what you're trying to say here. If I said that the law of identity is substantiated by physical reality, I would mean that it is made true by the conditions present in the physical reality. So, if you say that the law of identity governs us as to what we can deem "a whole", aren't we really both saying a very similar thing, in slightly different ways? You are saying that the law of identity governs what we can say about physical reality, and I am saying that the reason why it governs what we can say about physical reality is that it already says something true about physical reality. The only difference is that you are not moving along to see the reason why the law of identity has the capacity to govern what we say about physical reality. It gains that capacity to govern, by saying something true about physical reality.

The only main, but subtle, disagreement would be that the empirical itself is, to me, governed by metaphysical properties (these including what is formalized as the law of identity, in addition to other Kantian categories such as those of space and causation): thereby making the empirically known reality of the physical itself, in one sense, substantiated by that which is purely metaphysical. — javra

I don't see how you can say this. The "empirical" is fundamentally sense experience. Therefore it is a very base level of knowledge. How could it be "governed by metaphysical properties" which is a principled, and therefore higher level of knowledge? The most basic must always govern the higher, as the most basic has a higher degree of certainty. The lower substantiates the higher, and the empirical is the lowest. So the metaphysical cannot substantiate the empirical, it must be vise versa.

The president calling for a protest is one thing, but calling for or inciting an insurrection is quite another, especially in the land of the 1st amendment. Blaming him for the actions of others will require more evidence. — NOS4A2

Do you understand what :"false pretense" means NOS4A2?

What you don't seem to be grasping, is that "calling for a protest" is a false pretense. The president never produced any real evidence of any conspiracy, or any acts which could constitute stealing the election. The rally was not called for as a protest, because there wasn't anything to protest. That there was something to protest was a false pretense. It was not a protest at all. Therefore we need to look elsewhere for a motive for that rally, along with a motive for the false pretense.

The big problem is there is no evidence of any plan for violent insurrection. — NOS4A2

There is never conclusive evidence of a plan, only actions consistent with one. This is the tweeting and the rallies.

Might he be lying and, unbeknownst to everyone but a bunch of Q-tards, plotting a violent insurrection? — NOS4A2

The big problem is with this statement. It was not unbeknownst to everyone. To most, it was very clear that Trump's tweeting and rallying was very consistent with the intent of plotting violent insurrection. Most of us could see very clearly that unless measures were taken to prevent it, this would be the outcome.

What the media never showed was Trump’s explicit desire to do it legally and according to the constitution, which is his right, and which many have done before him. Perhaps if they did, there would be no such violence. — NOS4A2

The media judged Trump by his actions, not by his explicit desire. This is because he is a known liar, deceiver, and con artist. Therefore his explicit desire is inconsistent with his true desire. Sorry to shatter your illusion NOS4A2, but you just cannot judge a proven lying, deceiving, con artist, by his explicit desire.

Donald Trump said he wanted to contest the results legally and peacefully. — NOS4A2

But he also stated that he had gone as far as he could go legally. Then he continued to hold rallies during which he spoke about fighting to take back the country. Yes, he wanted to change the results legally and peacefully, and before that he wanted to win the election. What is consistent in his intent, is that he wanted to continue to be president.

Because of this consistency, we can say that his overall intent is to continue being president, that is his priority. Plan A, was to win the election. Plan B was to go to court and win the legal challenge. Notice that in all the time that he was working on plan A, he was also sowing the seeds of discontent concerning mail in voting, preparing for plan B in case plan A failed. Evidentially, plan A failed. Then, plan B became plan A, top priority. At this time he needed a new plan B in case the legal attempt failed. So, he held rallies, drumming up support for plan C, violent insurrection, which was now plan B. When the plan B, legal challenges, failed, plan C became plan A, top priority.

See, you must account for the occurrence of, and the intent behind those rallies. They are not election campaigning, so the original plan A is ruled out. They are not part of the court challenge, so plan B, the legal challenge is ruled out. They can only be part of a plan C. And we saw the results of that plan.

What Trump said could be completely irrelevant to what Trump's intentions were, we know this from his propensity toward lying. We must judge his intentions by his actions, and we need to account for those rallies. They are not a part of an election campaign, nor are they a part of contesting the results legally and peacefully. They did have significant consequences. Trump's only defense is ignorance, 'I didn't expect this to happen', as if he had no plan C. But ignorance is no defense in criminal trials.

“I know that everyone here will soon be marching over to the Capitol building to peacefully and patriotically make your voices heard.” — NOS4A2

Like I said, criminals who are proficient liars will be allowed to go unpunished, if we allow intention to be substituted with ignorance. Notice your quoted statement indicates absolutely nothing about Trump's intentions, so it provides no argument for a lack of intent. It's only a statement about what he claims to know about the intent of others. And we know he's a proficient liar. So his claimed ignorance of the intent of the others is nothing but a lie intended to substitute intent with ignorance.

Mathematics is not the entire reality but only an minor aspect of it. Trying to define the concrete reality as made up of numbers is as dumb as defining it as colors. Thanks Kant for that.

Any "mathematical model" of anything - and especially regarding human society - is just a metonym, not a substantive description. Those who do not realize this, even if they have a Nobel Prize, are illiterate. — Rafaella Leon

That's the problem with Platonic Realism, in general, which is more appropriately called Pythagorean Idealism. Unless we provide the required separation between the model, and that which is modeled, then we are misguided into the rather silly and naive notion that the universe is constituted of mathematical objects.

We cannot provide for the separation simply by referring to the symbols, as if the symbols themselves are the model. In reality, we have the two levels of separation. We have the reality, we have the mathematical model which represents reality, and we have the symbols which represent the model. So, we have two levels of interpretation to work through, 1) to understand the model based on an interpretation of the symbols, and 2) to understand how well the model represents reality. We cannot deny the importance of either one, nor can one be reduced to the other.

Maybe if it was 'Putin is a gangster', then 'Putin is a gangsta', it would have gone unnoticed by the mod bots.

You're using substance to denote something different than what I'm denoting by it: for you, it seems, substance is only that which is empirically cognized via the physiological senses. For me it is any whole that can be cognized - perceptually or otherwise, such as via the understanding - which is constituted of parts, any hylomorphic given. In this latter sense, then, every concept is itself a substance. This as per Aristotle's philosophy, wherein concepts are secondary substances. Even so: — javra

I think "substance" has its meaning relative to logic, and it refers to whatever grounds any particular system of logic, as what underlies it to support it. So it is quite clear to me, that "any whole that can be cognized" is not an acceptable definition of substance, because it allows that fictitious objects may be substance, or have substantial existence. And this is clearly inconsistent with any logically rigorous definition of "substance", as that which provides truth to the logic.

In Aristotle's logic, secondary substance is what grounds the logic as the most specific within the system. So if we claim a concept, the genus, "animal", that genus might be grounded in the more specific, concepts "man", and "horse" for example. That is secondary substance. The primary substance is the individual, the particular horse or man, while the secondary substance is the type that the individual is. If, for example, there was proposed a species, like "man" and no particular example of that species could be found, the proposal would be unsubstantiated (in the sense of primary substance). Likewise, if someone proposed a genus, "animal", and no species could be shown to be a member of that genus, the genus would be unsubstantiated (in the sense of secondary substance).

Aristotle's conception of "secondary substance" does not allow that "every concept is itself a substance". Only a more specific concept, which grounds a more general concept is a secondary substance. But the secondary substance itself still needs to be grounded in particular individuals, which is primary substance.

I don't yet understand why you presume that basic numbers are not substantiated via that which is empirically cognized? We perceive quantities. And we express these perceptions of quantity via numbers. Thereby making basic numbers (e.g., 2), as well as their basic relations (e.g., 2 + 2 = 4), non-arbitrary. — javra

It is only when you disavow the object to which "2" is attributed as a property, that numbers are necessarily arbitrary. That's what you've been talking about isn't it, claiming that there is not need for the physical object which substantiates the number? Didn't you mention bundle theory? Physical groups of two things, is what substantiates the non-arbitrariness of 2, just like physical instances of animals substantiates the genus "animal". The physical group, which consists of two, is the physical object, the particular, the substance in this instance, and "2" is a property of that physical object.

If we remove that object, that physical group of two, as the primary substance, we might substantiate the concept "2", in secondary substance, with the concept of "1", and the concept of "+", or something like that, like we might substantiate the concept "animal" in the species of "horse" (secondary substance). However, we still need to substantiate "1" in primary substance, like we need to substantiate "horse" in individual horses, or else any designations of one, or unity, or whole, are arbitrary. And, since "2" as a concept has been grounded in the secondary substance of "1" as a concept, and "1" is arbitrary if it's not grounded in primary substance, then so is "2"

How did you figure that out?

Because none of those things can be shown to reasonably expect as a consequence a violent coup in the Capitol. It's not about causality -- the 25th amendment option has been rejected. It's about criminal culpability. — Kenosha Kid

I disagree. I think anyone who can't see the intent is closing their eyes, willingly ignoring, and making a judgement based in ignorance. What was the purpose in repeating over and over again, that the election was stolen? It was to make his followers think that a criminal act was carried out against them. That's the key point, the deception employed to make others think that a criminal act had been carried out against himself, and against them. That's Trump's MO, we saw it in his fight against Clinton, "lock her up". To "steal" has strong implications, as necessarily criminal. So then he proceeded as far as possible, to demonstrate to those followers that he had attempted every legal course to get what was criminally taken, back. He went to state supreme court and federal supreme court. He had demonstrated, with intent, to those people who had come to believe that the theft occurred, that the legal system had failed them.

At this point he has four significant possible choices. 1) He could accept the legal judgement and tell all his followers that he was wrong in claiming that the election was criminally stolen. 2) He could continue to believe that the the election was stolen (if he even believed that in the first place), and suffer in silence. 3)He could continue to talk about it with resignation that there is nothing which can be done. 4) He could rile up his followers to fight the legal system itself. He chose 4), because 1), 2), and 3), are all inconsistent with what his intent was..

You might claim that 4) does not imply inciting insurrection, because if you or I were to fight the legal system because of some perceived unjust judgement, this would not constitute insurrection. But we need to account for the nature of the thing which was said to be stolen, and the nature of the "fight" which was called for. If you or I were to fight against an unjust judgement, we would be fighting within the bounds of the legal system. We might take it right to the supreme court, but then we reach the end of our possible fight. What more could we fight against, the legal system itself? In Trump's case the "fight" has already gone to the supreme court. So any fight at this point would be outside the law. Furthermore, the thing stolen was "the country", and the "fight" was to take it back.

In the context of an election rally, 'let's fight to take back the country' is not an incitement to insurrection. In the context of a stop the steal rally, after all legal options have been exhausted, 'let's fight to take back the country', cannot be associated with any possible intent other than. to incite insurrection. If you or I were to stand on a grand and elaborate stage, in front of thousands and thousands of people, after a favoured candidate had lost an election, and tell those people, march to the Capitol and fight to take back our country, and those people proceeded to violently attack the Capitol, how could you conceive of a defense involving lack of intention? Even if you insist, you were speaking metaphorically and you didn't expect the people to take you literally, you need to account for the intent behind your metaphorical speech. And there is no other possible intent evident for such a speech, no matter how metaphorical the language, except to incite mob violence. You might simply appeal to ignorance.

See the simple fact? He did not tell the participants at the rally, that there was nothing short of insurrection which could be done now, and advise them to go home in peace. No, he riled up their anger and frustration and told them to march to the capitol and fight. He might claim that he had no intent because he was truly ignorant, but criminal law does not allow you to substitute intent with ignorance because it would be a loophole allowing criminals who are proficient liars, to go unpunished.

Given what we've been through in terms of prime matter being pure potential and all givens being identified by their forms, why would the abstract form of "2" be deemed arbitrary rather than a "true (abstract) object"? Seems to me that basic numbers are not arbitrary, despite their very abstract nature; else, for example, 2 + 2 could equal 5 in certain cases. — javra

Any concept which cannot be substantiated (grounded in substance) is an arbitrary concept. Unless we have a principle as to what constitutes a whole, an entity, or an object, all concepts with numbers would be arbitrary. If there is nothing to distinguish one object from two objects, then 2+2 might just as well equal 5 as 4, or any other random number, because it really doesn't make any difference, as number itself would be fundamentally meaningless.

The difficulty was on my part, finding something so clear, without ambiguity.

An individual number's identity (say, the number 2) would then likewise be the gestalt that results from all of its properties: this gets far more tricky due to the degree of abstraction, but maybe including those of duality, its placement within the appropriate context of other numbers (e.g., greater than 1 but lesser then 3), and so forth.

Edit: I'm aware that the Wikipedia article on bundle theory makes a skimpy mention of "bundle theory of substance". More musings on this issue can be found here https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/#BundTheoTheiProb . All the same, if anyone is interested in debating the notion of identity as a gestalt form emerging from a bundle of properties as parts, I'm curious to see in which ways this would be critiqued. — javra

The problem here is that the number 2 is a property itself. We take a group of two and look at it as a single thing, and say that this thing has the property of consisting of two. There's no fundamental problem in saying that the group is not a true object, it's arbitrary, and arguing therefore that the only true object is the property which is assigned. However, if we have no way to distinguish a true object, then the number 1 is invalidated as a false property because it cannot be truthfully assigned, and so the falsity of 2, as a property follows, being dependent on the truth of 1.

A very similar problem will appear with bundle theory. If an object is a bundle of properties, then there is no real principle whereby we might judge if this property is part of a specified bundle, or another bundle. Then we could not claim any objects as real objects, except perhaps a property itself. But this will prove to be completely incoherent because contradictory properties, as objects themselves, will be all over the place, and if the contradictory properties are not properties of the same thing, then we can't reject them by way of the law of non-contradiction. So we'd have all sorts of contradictory properties with no way to reject contradictions.

It can't, of course. His more moderate language was undoubtedly through gritted teeth, but nevertheless is less ambiguous than "fight like hell" which doesn't necessarily mean violence. I'm sure Trump was delighted that they took him literally and seriously, but that's not a case. — Kenosha Kid

Let's see, he's been fraudulently claiming for months now that the election was stolen from him. Then he makes a statement that he's exhausted all legal avenues. So he recognizes that further moves would be illegal. Nevertheless he moves on to the infamous phone call. Then he tells his supporters to fight like hell to take back the Whitehouse. Where's the ambiguity?

We don't need to go back that far. Up until the 1990s, mass media was limited to very few people and journalistic ethics were self enforced. — Hanover

I was just responding to your mention of 1000 years. In that time, there was a lot of enforcement.

I agree that the journalistic industry was quite a bit different before the nineties. There was independent companies and real competition, especially going back further from this. Now they've all been bought up by big companies and merged into conglomerations. The dollar is the driving force and so long as each of the big companies gets its cut, there is no need for quality journalism. People do not develop loyalties to their news source because of quality journalism .

The enforcement was voluntary before and it seemed to work, so we were in a position where we could expect truth to be the goal of reporting. — Hanover

I think the "enforcement" you refer to here is a feature of competition in the market place. Healthy competition helps to keep the quality up. But it's a very complicated issue here, because journalistic endeavours border on entertainment, and the same company which brings you journalism will also bring you entertainment. But entertainment is not bounded by, nor does it pretend to be, truth. And entertainment brings in a lot more money than truth.

So the boundary between entertainment and news is much blurred. And when the goal is to provide entertainment, because that's where the money is, who needs the news? But what if the news becomes your entertainment? Then they get doubled together and it's even better money. There's something really sick in this, but I think we reached a turning point with 9/11, as millions of people watched planes destroy buildings, over and over again for weeks. Why? If that was just a movie I'd say it was great entertainment. Then we got some "shock and awe" in Iraq. It's clearly been down hill, as our news has sort of become our entertainment. Remember when Trump was running for election? Wasn't that the best entertainment? When the news is your entertainment, I don't think bringing you the truth is a top priority for the so-called journalists.

That conclusion cannot be inferred from anything I've said. What I indicated was that there have been editorial standards for over 1000 years, and there's no reason to abandon standards entirely simply because mass media is now generally available to the public. — Hanover

Yes, it's easy for you to say that standards have worked in the past, but until you take a good look at what was going on in the past, that statement is rather doubtful because you don't consider how the standards were enforced. For most of those 1000 years the standards were strictly dictated by The Church, and if you would have stepped out of line, or even perceived to have possibly stepped out of line, you'd be subjected to The Inquisition.

Journalistic ethics can be arrived at and they ought be enforced if we wish for our journalism to be ethical. — Hanover

And who would be doing this enforcement, the president, some political party which happens to be in power at the time? The capacity to enforce such standards is what leads to the suppression of political opponents.

If we can demand that the medicine we take will cure us, that the cars we purchase start when we turn the key, that our computers properly link us to the internet, then we should similarly be able to expect the news reports we read to reflect what actually occurred. — Hanover

The difference here, between a government enforcing standards on medications and car sales, and a government enforcing standards on news reporting, is that the political party in power does not stand to benefit from that type of enforcements. But that would not be the case if the government could enforce standards on news reporting, because there would a conflict of interest.

In any event, the power of mass media has always rested in the hands of the few. Historically, you first must have had a printing press, then the ability to print large scale newspapers and fliers, then access to the radio waves, then to the television waves and then to cable and such. Because market entry was difficult, the owners generally held to an ethic to be truthful, at least in the West.

This modern problem of giving every Tom, Dick, and Harry access to mass media via Twitter, Facebook and the like is something that must now be grappled with. The solution, as is now evident, is not to allow a free for all. I have no problem with the owners of mass media doing as they always had in the past: publishing only that which meets proper editorial standards. Such worked for probably 1000 years prior to tweets and insta posts. — Hanover

You think we should go back to how it was hundreds of years ago? Not long before the arrival of the printing press, speech, education, and even gatherings, in the western world, were strictly controlled by The Church. Any suspicious activity and you'd be subject to The Holy Inquisition.

Do you think we need to return to that type of scenario? It doesn't sound like fun to me. What about the scenario described by Plato in "The Republic"? He thought that art ought to be censored, and particular types, which he thought bad, ought to be disallowed . The worst for Plato is what has been commonly translated as "narrative". Wouldn't that include all media reporting of "The News"? The reason why narrative appears to take on such an evil character seems to be that it is often stated as, and received as, 'the truth', when the producers of it do not have the capacity, or will, to create a true narrative.

Now is the machine 'free' to make decisions on its own without its origin, or programmers, or other physical baggage getting in the way? Well no, its a physical object in the physical world, governed by the laws of nature... So its not free to do any computation it wants, just the ones confined to the universe we live in. That might seem like no restriction, but it IS a restriction. — Mick Wright

The machine is confined to its universe. It has a particular physical structure, and this is its confines. There is also the confines of the universe, the universe's physical structure. There is a relationship between these two which we can refer to in describing the machine's capacity for freedom.

So this argument of our hypothetical programmer holds up until around 2008 and then it doesn't any more. It didn't before obviously but you'd need to understand how technology that would arrive in the future was going to work to argue anything else. Add if we top this with quantum computation and no programmers where are we? Its still a 'machine' and likely now freer in scope than a human brain. As far as we know we do not use quantum computation as a primary source of thought. The latest from neuroscience is that the brain is simply a machine where the combined output and system of the agents within it is greater than the sum of those agents. (A complex adaptive system CAS, as opposed to an MAS or multi agent system, like umm... a car or bicycle) — Mick Wright

I don't think we know the physical structure of the universe well enough to make a judgement like that. Furthermore, we don't even know the physical structure of the human being well enough to try to make such a comparison.

However a machine that was maxed out even a few decades from now would be operating many times faster with much higher capacity than any human brain, or likely our entire population and then some. It might not be infinitely free in terms of compute.... but it would be freer than any human is. — Mick Wright

Faster does not imply freer. In reality free will requires preventing occurring activities from having an effect (as efficient cause), and creating the activities deemed necessary. Since there appears to be a stopping and starting of motions involved with free will, we cannot judge faster as freer.

And the programmer now, who built this system, has a lower compute capacity, lower knowledge, lower everything than the fruits of his/her labour. It wouldn't matter now how they determined anything or their capacity for doing so.... such a machine would beat them every time and operate at greater levels of freedom. But unless the universe is infinite it can not operate at infinite degrees of freedom. So says the math.... there will always be a limit in a finite universe... hence the word 'finite'. — Mick Wright

Again, faster does not mean better, so the slower cannot be said to have lower knowledge, and especially not "lower everything". The rest of this paragraph indicates that we do not have enough knowledge about the universe to make the sort of judgements which you are trying to make.

To address this via example, if a wooden table’s burnability holds as its material cause the wood out of which the table is constituted, what duration occurs between a) the material cause of wood and b) the table’s intrinsic potential to burn?

So far, to me (a) and (b) seem to be necessarily simultaneous, with no duration in-between, while standing in a bottom-up relation. — javra

Matter being potential in Aristotle's conceptual structure, I think that (a) and (b) are just different ways of saying the same thing.

There is an issue with matter, which I sort of explained earlier. When we start saying anything about matter, we are always referring to a specific form of matter. That is because matter is defined as an indefinite aspect of things. We can try to get away from this by making the most general statements possible about matter, but since matter is indefinite such attempts would still end up being in a sense statements about forms. For example, "an object is composed of matter", and "matter has inertia", each in its own way states something formal, despite being attempt to say something strictly about matter. Even when I say "matter is the indefinite aspect of things", I say something formal, by referring to a privation of form.

What's also true is that "all politicians lie" is not that unreasonable of a claim. Not perfectly true in every instance, but true enough often enough that it can't just be swept off the table. — Hippyhead

We all lie, I think it's impossible to avoid this unpleasant fact. But a lie is an act which can be judged in relation to consequences, and intention, just like any other act. Therefore a lie which has criminal consequences, and criminal intent, is clearly a criminal act. This is called fraud. And it's not hard to see that Trump's actions after the November elections are acts of fraud.

So, to me, there is a type of temporality involved with a telos. This to me stands in contrast to both bottom-up and top-down determinants, both or which strictly occur in the specified moment of time without any temporal extensions into the future. — javra

I don't think we can correctly say that anything occurs in a moment of time without any temporal extension. All occurrences require duration. Therefore I do not think we can exclude "bottom-up" and "top-down" from a temporal analysis.

The problem I see is in the way that we commonly represent space. In simple conception we see space as representable with a 3-d coordinate system. This makes the thing represented, (i.e. the reified space, and there necessarily is a reified space to allow for the reality of motion), the same everywhere. So all of space is fundamentally exactly the same everywhere, under this conception, no matter how big or how small, and it might be infinitely big or infinitely small. This is a problem because it provides us with no principles to distinguish the real spatial difference between inside and outside, which is implied by the concept of spatial expansion. And, such a principle is required if we want to validate the real existence of objects. An object is defined by its boundaries, and this allows us to distinguish properties of the object itself from what is external to the object, in order to maintain consistency with the three basic laws of logic.

Because we have no such principles, we cannot properly differentiate between a force which acts from the inside, and a force which acts from the outside of an object. So I see the top-down/bottom-up distinction, when it's applied to causation, as based in the global/local distinction which is applied in physics. The problem though is that there are no real principles to distinguish inside from outside, so these distinctions are somewhat arbitrary, and gauge theory for example is just a mess. It's as if the whole of gauge theory is an attempt to deal with anomalies brought about by failing spatial conceptions.

Newer approaches have discarded the computer analogy in favor of organismic metaphors. Cognition belongs to an embodied self-organizing system. Processes like cognition and perception are not the processing of raw stimuli but forms of interaction and self-transformation. Memory, then, is never veridical because it is not the retrieval of data from a filing cabinet. Rather it is a reconstructive activity that changes rather than retrieves. — Joshs

OK, let's assume that memory is a type of talking to oneself then. I still believe that the intent involved in talking to oneself, in general, is much different from the intent involved in talking to another. That was the point.

There is a matter of competition which makes it beneficial not to disclose to others what you want to talk to yourself about (remember). Further, there is a big issue of deception which we all practice to some extent pretty much on a daily basis. You might say that we ought not be secretive and deceptive, but we're talking about the reality of language, not some ideal.

With Trump banned from Twitter and Facebook, shall we invite him to TPF? — tim wood

I thought maybe he was already here, under the moniker of NOS4A2. Oh, sorry about the insult NOS.