I don't quite see where you get the unity aspect from. — Echarmion

I told you where i get the unity aspect from. Individual is defined as single, and single is defined as one, which is define as a unit, or unity. Therefore an individual is a unity. Can you imagine the possibility of an individual which is not a unity?

And I think the concepts of single and multitude are mutually dependant. — Echarmion

This is quite clearly incorrect. To understand what a multitude is requires that one understand what as a single, or individual is, because a multitude is made up of singles. But one need not understand what a multitude is in order to understand what a single is. That is why we learn what one is, and even how to count, what two is, and what three is, before we learn what a multitude is. It's only through philosophical inquiry when we ask what's the difference between one and the other numbers, that we compare the concepts of single and multitude.

If there was only one of a kind of entity, we wouldn't call it a "single entity", we'd call it by it's name. Just like we'd not call someone named "Jason" a "single Jason" unless there was some need to differentiate. — Echarmion

Each entity is a single entity, and this is how we can assign a name to it, by recognizing it as an individual. There is no need to understand the meaning of "multiplicity", or "plurality" in order to recognize an entity as an individual, and give it a name and distinguish it form other entities which are recognized as individuals as well. In other words, we recognize things as individuals, and name them as such, long before we learn how to recognize individuals as part of a group. We even learn how to count individuals before we learn how to distinguish members of a group

From an evolutionary perspective, it seems like some kind of gathering would have had to come first. A random mutation for sociability wouldn't benefit a species unless they were interacting in some way. — Echarmion

From an evolutionary perspective, a single-celled organism came first. Putting aside the question of abiogenesis, or how the first organism came into existence, we need to consider why a single-celled organism evolved into a multi-celled organism. There appears to be no survival advantage in moving from simple to complex, so associating "benefit" with survival cannot be supported, if making one organism out of numerous cells is supposed to be a benefit. Likewise, the benefit of sociability must be something other than survival.

Ok I'm still confused about why active substances explain interaction. — Dannation99

The reason why it is argued that eternal Forms cannot interact is that they are eternal, therefore outside of time, unchanging and necessarily inactive, as activity requires time. If we allow that immaterial Forms are active, they are only outside of time if time is conceived of as being a property of physical change.

And what about Hume's Problem of causation? Are not Aristotle's substances subject to the same unpredictability of interaction? — Dannation99

I'm not sure of the problem you are asking about here.

Humans have a natural capacity for empathy. — Kenosha Kid

This is a good point, but I think the issue of the op is whether this natural capacity for empathy is caused by group existence, or is the cause of group existence. It appears like the latter is what is the case.

But I wouldn't interpret that as the group coming before the individual. Our social nature is part of our individual nature (since those biological capacities were selected to benefit the individual) and, while you can have individuals without groups, you may not have groups without individuals. — Kenosha Kid

At this point you seem to concur, that the existence of the group is caused by the existence of the individuals. But if this is the case, that the capacity, or propensity for empathy is prior to the group which it produces, it creates a perplexity. Why are individual living beings naturally endowed with a propensity toward creating groups?

An "open system" is one with empirically verifiable boundaries, which allow specific materials to cross the boundaries, like a living cell. It is not a system with boundaries which are unverifiable, and unknown, therefore arbitrary.

This does not meet the charge: that the election officials were part of the fraud. — FreeEmotion

To make a blanket accusation of "election officials" in this way, without a shred of evidence, is extremely defamatory, corrosive, and ought to be punishable, if made by a person of authority like the president.

Wow, you're really clutching at straws there.

Also curious is the flat out (absolutist) view that there has been no voter fraud and no irregularities. The question is why no one ever says 'yes, there were errors in counting, however these are insufficient to decide the election' except for AG Barr has said in his statement. — FreeEmotion

Actually, I saw it reported over and over in the media, that any irregularities were insignificant. And, what was reported by elections officials was that this was an election with an even lower degree of error than those in the past.

This does not meet the charge: that the election officials were part of the fraud. Of course they say there was no fraud. — FreeEmotion

Why don't you just come out and say what your hinting at. More than half the American population were part of the fraud. They all conspired to 'illegally' throw Trump out of the office which he righteously deserves. Of course all those people will insist that there was no fraud, just an election. So, why do you believe that there was fraud? Because mailed in votes were counted in the middle of the night? If it happened after midnight it must be evil.

As for the evidence: supposedly people committing crimes are supposed to leave evidence sufficient to throw their entire project into utter dissarray and get jail sentences for their agents. — FreeEmotion

The problem here, is that we cannot just suppose that people were committing crimes without any evidence that crimes were committed. Do you see how backward that is? The election did not go my way, therefore crimes, (many many crimes required to swing elections in numerous states) were committed. Therefore I accuse everyone involved in carrying out the elections in four states as possibly having committed these crimes. You're all potentially criminals, and I'll try you all in court, until you rat each other out. Back to reality, no evidence that any crimes were committed, and no one is ratting each other out, so that's further evidence that no crimes were committed.

You mean your typically esoteric definition? I wouldn't class that as a failure. It's important to have consensus in language. Adhere to that and you will make fewer communication errors. Since I introduced the word into the convo, you can take it as read that I mean it in the normal sense of interacting parts comprising a whole, not whatever arbitrary definition you insist upon after the fact. — Kenosha Kid

The problem here is that we're talking about the reliability of scientific observations, not the capacity for common vernacular. In science, "system" has a very specific definition involving boundaries, such that any "whole" which you are talking about is defined by its boundaries. If the boundaries of the proposed "whole" are really unknown, or nonexistent, and the observer applies systems theory in interpretation, which pretends that the nonexistent boundaries are there and known, in order to treat what is observed as a "system", then obviously the observations will be unreliable.

This is a good example of what Wayfarer refers to as the "participatory universe". The proposed "whole", being the observed object, is a fabrication of the observer, created for the sake of applying systems theory. And systems theory works, because it is formulated to allow that something which is not really a system (has no definite boundaries), can be treated as a system. So the result is fabricated objects (systems), and therefore fabricated observations.

Ever since Plato introduced the "tripartite soul", there hasn't really been an interaction problem, because the principles are there to resolve it, for anyone who wants to. "Spirit" is the third feature which accounts for the interaction between body and mind.

The interaction problem is commonly presented by monists who reject the eternal Forms of Platonism. It is argued that eternal forms could not interact with temporal bodies. But as Aristotle showed, so long as the two distinct substances are represented as actual, therefore active, there is no problem with interaction between dual substances. The appearance of a problem is a result of representing one of the two substances as necessarily passive, by being eternal, outside of time. This indicates that the understand of time which is involved with the concept of "eternal forms" is faulty. So the "interaction problem" is the manifestation of a misunderstanding of time.

That's not how people use the word individual. Being individual means discrete, e.g. seperated, distinct and differentiated. Unity can be more things united as a whole. So several individuals can form unity. — Benkei

When you list what "individual" means, discrete, separated, distinct, and differentiated, why do you intentionally exclude "unity" and "whole" from this? Is an individual not necessarily a unity? How could an individual be other than a whole? I suggest you are just making this distinction in an attempt to support an untenable position.

Sure, several individuals might be united, but that does nothing to diminish the claim that one individual is a more fundamental unity than a group of several individuals, which as a group might also be referred to as an individual unity. Likewise 1 represents a more fundamental unity than 3 does, because 3 is dependent on 1 for its meaning, but 1 is not dependent on 3 for its meaning.

Take the universe as an example of an individual is a bit ridiculous really because quite clearly it contains individuals. — Benkei

You have no argument there. There is nothing about the concept of "individual" which denies an individual from being composed of parts, which are themselves individuals. Any group, is itself an individual, by the fact that it exists as a group. The point though, is that the individuals which make up the group are necessarily prior to the group. The group, as an individual, has no existence until there is a multitude of individuals which make up the group. So the group cannot be prior to the individuals which make up the group. However, there might be first, just one individual, then there'd be an individual but no group.

I was assuming we go by the common meaning. — Echarmion

So was I. An individual is a single, a single is one, and one is a fundamental unity. The common meaning of "individual" is a fundamental unity. You might say that an "individual" is a person. But isn't this exactly what a person is, a fundamental unity?

While the term "individual" may not logically depend on a specific group, it does depend on the concept of a multitude. You can only be an individual if you can be differentiated from someone else in some way. Without this, nothing would give rise to the notion of individuality. — Echarmion

This is not true. "Individual" is defined by unity, not by being differentiated from its environment. That's why the universe, which is supposed to be a unity of everything, is an individual without the need of being differentiated from anything else.

So you appear to be confusing "individuation" which is an act that distinguishes an individual from its environment, with the definition of "individual" which is based in the concept of unity rather than an act of individuation.

That might be true, but you'll have a hard time convincing those who believe that an individual is necessarily a part of a group. However, the logic is on your side. A "group", as a multiplicity, by definition requires the existence of individuals. But there is nothing within the concept of "individual" which requires that one is the member of a group. In this way, "individual" is logically prior to "group", because "group" is dependent on "individual", while the inverse is not the case.

I'm not quite sure what it is they're trying to express. — EricH

Then why do you assert a "high level of confidence"? Are you highly confident that you are unsure? I'll call you Socrates then, you're sure that you're unsure.

But once you get beyond the physical, language falls apart - there are no clear definitions and you end up with a word salad - and no two people can agree on anything. — EricH

Why would you say this? Do you think that every word used must always refer to a physical object in order for language to be useful? That would be very strange if it were the case. In reality, agreement between individuals is much easier when the terms and conditions are more vague and general than precise and specific, because the commitment required for that agreement is less restrictive.

Yes, it is. It is a system in an undesirable state, but it is still a system. — Kenosha Kid

This is a failure to adhere to a rigorous definition of "system", which very clearly would lead to faulty observations. The apparatus is not doing what it's supposed to do, but it still serves the function which it is supposed to serve, only in an "undesirable" way. Come on Kenosha Kid, you know better than to say something like that.

A carbon atom is a system of fermions. — Kenosha Kid

This is a good example of the faulty use of "system" which I described in my last post. A "system" requires defined boundaries. When the boundaries cannot be well defined, as is the case with an atom, one might attempt to incorporate the unknown boundaries into the description of the object, as variables, to create the illusion of a "non-linear system". But in reality a non-linear system is not a system at all, because the boundaries are unknown and this contradicts any rigorous definition of "system".

I mean 4500 pages of brain-meltingly hard, interesting and greatly written (or maybe it is the translation, who knows) work of Thomas Aquinas must be, for now, the pinnacle of my search for interesting reading outside of the box (the book I have been mentioning in my guided tours for years, ironic.) But Avicenna's Medicine looks also incredible (despite it maybe being little non-philosophical) — Kakarrott

If you are truly interested in what Aquinas wrote, then it would be beneficial to read some Aristotle. Much of what Aquinas wrote, was an attempt to make sense of Aristotle, from the perspective of Christian theology. In my understanding, I'd describe Plato as a pinnacle. Following Plato, there were two distinct directions which evolved, the Aristotelian interpretation of Plato, and the interpretation of the Neo-Platonists. The Neo-Platonist perspective was incorporated into early Christian theology through people like Augustine, and served in the formation of some fundamental theological principles. The works of Aristotle were held by the Islamic world, and were introduced into Christian thought later, by people like Avicenna and Averroes. At this time, there was no accepted consistency between the Neo-Platonist and the Aristotelian philosophies. So some, like Averroes could highlight differences, while others like Avicenna could highlight similarities. I believe the reason why Aquinas appears as such a genius, is because he took it upon himself to establish consistency between Neo-Platonism and Aristotelianism through the arduous task of interpretation. so this point of unification could be described as another pinnacle.

Not necessarily, that's the point. When the apparatus is faulty, or in some way deficient in its capacity to be what it is supposed to be, it cannot be said to be a system. This is because a "system" is an artificial thing designed for a purpose. If the apparatus fails in the attempt to fulfill the conditions of the described "system" it cannot truthfully be said to be that system. And since the operation of that apparatus falls outside the boundaries of the described system, or any other described system, it's true function is unknown, so it cannot be a system at all.

This is the problem with your idea that an apparatus is necessarily a system. It produces a false sense of certainty through the assumption that the apparatus necessarily fulfills the parameters of the system. And with this false sense of certainty, systems theory deceives us. The unknown is brought into the system, and accounted for through probabilities, as evident in nonlinear systems, and the illusion that what is actually outside the system, the unknown, is within the system, as known. So systems theory allows that the boundaries of a system are breached, while creating the illusion that they are not, by treating it as a "system" which implies such boundaries. Allowing this contradiction, to persist, unchecked is a deception which creates a false sense of certainty.

In my opinion, unless verified/proven, it will remain unverified or unproven. — 8livesleft

So you agree that what it means to be real, or to be true, remains unverified and unproven. Do you also see that the following statement makes no sense?

Therefore, any object/phenomenon/concept can only be proven to be real or true based on the scientific method. — 8livesleft

How could the scientific method prove anything to be real or true, when what it means to be real or true remains unproven?

Well, to be honest, I was just answering your question, "why don't we?". My reply was pretty much just a matter of identifying the problem, we can recognize ourselves to be engaged in wrongful activities, but still not have the will power to rectify this. Now, finding the solution is another matter altogether. Maybe the first step is to quit looking at will power as a "mysterious power", and recognize it as a fundamental capacity which can be exercised and strengthened.


I think what I was saying, is that we all get set in our ways, it's a matter of habit. Our habits are what provide us with our comfort. But each one of us can look at a number of different habits and determine that these are not really aspects of the best way of living; in other words, bad habits. A word that comes to mind is "luxury". I think Plato used something like "relish".

But to break a bad habit requires that one makes an effort, and this is to step outside of one's comfort zone, so it is a sort of self-inflicted pain. If we encourage each other, the pain is lessened, but if I see that others are engaged in the very activity which I am taking pains to curtail, I might use this as an excuse not to put myself through that suffering, despite knowing that I ought to.

An observation is a recording of data about a system. — Kenosha Kid

I think this is a bit off, on a number of different levels.

First, there is no need to assume "a system". There might be an apparatus, designed for the purpose of an experiment, but we cannot simply assume that the apparatus comprises a system unless it is specifically designed with boundaries of isolation to ensure that it actually is a system. To assume "a system" when proper boundaries are not imposed is a mistake.

Next, when a person records an observation, there is a choice made as to the descriptive terms used, as in my example, "flash of light" or "lightning". The wording is itself an interpretation of what was noticed by the observer, and there are often logical inferences inherent within the wording, like in the case of "lightning". When you observe "the outputs of a technology", such inferences are already inherent within the design and programming of the machine, such that the outputs are a mechanized interpretation. So for example, every time that a flash of light inputs the machine, it might output "lightning". So in your example, who, other than the manufacturers of the machine, knows what input is interpreted as the decay of a pion in your example?

The problem being that the interpretive theory is not necessarily sound. The machine may serve the purpose even with faulty interpretive theory. For example, it reports every flash of light as "lightning". You might insist that it doesn't matter what we call it so long as we are consistent. And that is fine, until the machine records a flash of light as lightning, which isn't lightning, then there's a problem. See, "flash of light" is the more general description, and "lightning" more specific. So long as the vast majority of flashes are actually lightning, the machine will remain within an acceptable margin of error. But that machine is operating in a very specific system, and a different environment could render the interpretive theory which is correct under those circumstances, as unsound.

Then so long as the machine is always employed in a similar environment (the same type of system), the faulty interpretive theory will appear to be acceptable. This is a problem with the use of extremely constrained artificial systems, in experimentation. It is the inverse problem of the first problem, which was to assume a system when "system" is not justified by proper boundaries. Here, we have the problem of assuming that theories which are valid within a tight system are also valid in a wider application.

"Solid metaphysical principles"? Talk about a contradiction in terms. — EricH

I think I can conclude with a high degree of confidence, that you have never studied metaphysics.

All of this confirms my initial reaction - when it comes to metaphysicas there is no agreement on even the most basic concepts. — EricH

This is exactly why a very thorough study of metaphysics is required before one can obtain a satisfactory level of understanding in the field. A very significant amount of effort and hard work is required to make sense of what appears to be incoherent nonsense at first glance. It is also probably why most modern metaphysics has gone soft, it requires an awful lot of work to be a good metaphysician.

But I try to keep an open mind - I am out on the forum to learn new things - so perhaps I am wrong. If there are any solid metaphysical principles that should be taught, then clearly all (or most) meta-physicians should agree upon them, yes? So what are these principals? — EricH

Every human being can judge whether a principle is solid or not, and we all judge them in our own way. So it appears to me, that what you are lacking is confidence in your own capacity to judge metaphysical principles. I do not think I can give you what you need. Judgement is an activity, requiring technique, which is developed through practice.

Now I think you need to employ that perfect smell to trigger the image of the perfect pitch, as I described here:

It seems like you've been trying to locate your image by relating it to other tones. But this would be like ungrounded logic, you could have a complete scale in your mind, with nothing to connect it to reality. perhaps you could relate it to an image from another sense, like a visual image for example, so that when you produce the designated visual image it would automatically recall the correct pitch through association. You might even cheat, and use a real sensible object to create the association. A hit of smelling salts, quickly followed by g4 on the piano, for instance. Repeat a few hundred or thousand times, and according to Pavlov, a hit of smelling salts, followed by g4 in the mind without the need for the piano. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ah ok. I suppose, like symbols, concepts/intentions/ideas/values - once expressed, will also become real. — 8livesleft

Now, since this unobservable, unmeasurable, aspect of... (reality?) is causal, as evidenced by the
observable and measurable existence of artificial things, ought we not assign "real" to these unobservable things? What would be the point (other than a misguided attempt to justify some form of scientism) in denying "real" from the unobservable "intention", when it has real causal efficacy.

Perhaps this is a cop out, but I think it's good one: Haven't we (or hasn't philosophy) already been through the mess of this mental/physical game? It's all (actually) physical! It's all (actually) mental! But for this 'actually' to work in either direction requires bending 'physical' or 'mental' beyond recognition. — f64

Yes, philosophers have been through this mess already, most notably in ancient Greece. The resolution to this dilemma, developed by Plato and Aristotle, is dualism. Hence the great rise in Christian dualism.

It seems like the modern trend back toward monism is simply a failure of our institutions to teach solid metaphysical principles. So we now have many people approaching metaphysics from other fields of study, without appropriate training in sound principles. Instead of performing a thorough study, the tendency is to think that simplifying an extremely complex field of study, is the right approach. Therefore, what we really need today is people who will take metaphysics seriously.

I guess it would be politically unpalatable to charge Donald Trump with sedition in that it would utterly paralyse relations between the two sides of politics. Still think it would be justifiable. — Wayfarer

He'd pardon himself! Lol.

The mentioned things, which are not observable, were "what we want to do", "value", and "meaning", not the symbols. These things are not observable, yet they clearly have an observable effect on our world.

How's this relevant to defining "real"? Is "what we want them to do", or "value", or "meaning", something real?

Is "real" confined to what is observable, or does it include things, like the above mentioned, which have an observable effect in the world, but are not observable themselves?

I don't think that explains the problem at all. We have the will power to create armies and bombs to seek out new fossil fuels to exploit, and all kinds of stuff and yet we are terrified more by the prospect that someone will get something for nothing than by the destruction of the world. Here is Trump willing the death of a few more while he still can in the dying days of his presidency. No lack of will... — unenlightened

I think that "will power" refers specifically to the capacity to prevent oneself from acting in a situation where the person is inclined to act. So it is distinct from "willing", which is when the person carries out the act which one is inclined to do. Will power is the means by which we prevent ourselves from doing what we know is a bad act, but we are nevertheless inclined to do it for some sort of pleasure, or out of habit. It is the means by which we break bad habits.

A computer can be programmed to assert that it thinks. Doesn't make it so. Descartes was starting from what he knew for sure, which is that he thinks. — Kenosha Kid

I take that to be an argument that Descartes did not know for sure that he thinks. I can agree with that. Thinking does not necessitate knowing. So in thinking, Descartes thought that he was thinking, but that doesn't mean that he knew for sure that he was thinking, because thinking doesn't necessitate knowing.

recisely as much as the empirical sciences. We cannot put spacetime curvature under a microscope: we infer it from indirect evidence, i.e. observations of its effects. This is actually true of all observations. You have no direct observation of your chair: it is all interpretations of effects. — Kenosha Kid

This is why we need a rigorous definition as to what constitutes an "observation". Observation is in general, theory laden. If I see a flash of light at night, I might say that I saw lightning. If you knew that there was no clouds in the area at that time, you might ask me for a better description of what I really did see. Stated observations can be easily tainted by the descriptive terms employed.

Where I differ from you on this subject is that I look at the observation as a creation of the observer, I do not look at it as an effect of what is observed, like you seem to. So I see no necessary causal relation between what is observed, and the noted observation. The existence of hallucinations is evidence toward the truth of my position. And the observer, being a free willing human being is not constrained to describe the observation in any particular way, but does so freely according to one's intent. This is why science needs rigorous principles regarding what constitutes a valid observation.

We use such machines all the time, and class an observation to be a reading of their outputs. — Kenosha Kid

Right, that's one of the places where I think modern science fails us. Machines are used as tools to make measurements, and measurements may make up part of an observation. But notice that the observation proper is the reading of the output, what you called interpretation. And this is a matter of contextualizing the output, because understanding the context is a vital part of interpretation. However, the output from the machine is often taken as an interpretation already, in itself, when the machine cannot even distinguish context.

The 'I think' of the cogito is an observation. — Kenosha Kid

That's a dubious proposition. I would say it is more of an assertion than an observation. So in the logical argument of Descartes, it serves more as a definition than an observation. It defines "I" as something thinking, and concludes that the something which is thinking is necessarily existing. It cannot be considered as a valid observation because the supposed "I" cannot be observed to be thinking. The existence of the "I" is rather inferred from the act of thinking, not observed to be thinking. That is the point of the argument the existence of the "I" which is claimed to "be", is inferred from the thinking, it is not observed to be thinking. Many in philosophy will dispute the existence of the "I", by insisting that an "I" is unnecessary for a thinking.

But I see from your discussion with Luke, that you are free and easy as to what qualifies as an "observation". I think that this is one of the places where modern science (especially quantum physics) fails us. Modern science does not employ rigorous restrictions as to what qualifies as a valid observation, and many theories are verified by bogus "observations".

Really, all observed things are detected by their effects. — Kenosha Kid

When we reduce the human act of sense observation to being passively effected by something, we ignore the active aspect of observation and neglect the role of intention. Then we might create "detection machines", and claim that these machine are observing. But of course they are only detecting what they are designed to detect, and everything else goes right past them. So they cannot be claimed to be making valid "observations".

Let me give you an example. Let's take the natural numbers. We have numerals, 1,2,3,4, which are symbols, representations of numbers. The numbers themselves cannot be observed. And if we wanted to measure the natural numbers, we would try to count them. But the count goes on indefinitely, so they never really get counted or measured. Therefore we can say that they cannot be measured.

Are these numbers something real? We cannot prove scientifically that they exist, because we cannot even determine where they are, to observe them. Yet they clearly have an effect in the world, as we can see the products of mathematics all around us. So how would you define "real", as anything observable, and measurable by scientific methods, in which case numbers are not real? Or would you define "real" as anything which has an observable and measurable effect in the world, in which case numbers might be real.

If we choose the latter definition, allowing that numbers have some form of reality due to the effects which they bring about in the world, then we ought to allow the truth of the proposition that there are things which cannot be observed, or measured by science, which have an effect in our world, and are therefore real.

But it really depends what we're talking about. If it's something that can be observed, measured or possibly recorded then there are a lot of things we can use to confirm what you're saying. — 8livesleft

OK, let's talk about that part of reality which cannot be measured or observed, how is the scientific method the only way to prove that these things are real?

If we restrict reality to 'only the things which the scientific method can prove', then all those things which cannot be proven by science, are necessarily not real. And all that part of reality which cannot be measured or observed is necessarily not real.

Sure we can, so why don't we? — unenlightened

This is a lesson which the pandemic, and the calls for physical isolation, may teach us, if we look. Each person must do one's own part, make the resolution and adhere to it, with will power. But the human being is in many ways lazy with respect to will power, always seeking excuses, rationalizing ways to escape the resolve. So when we see that so and so are not keeping up their end of the stick, we see this as a good reason to drop our end, instead of forging ahead as leaders instead of followers. Therefore the structure falls like a house of cards, the domino effect of herd mentality.

So the answer to "why don't we?", is that we do not have the will power. And human beings will never implement any such solutions until they learn how to practice and exercise will power, which makes them into leaders instead of followers.

Yes I understand that science can only tell us what's real for us humans. And since our perception is limited, then the science will also be limited. — 8livesleft

You have an assumed "us" here. What substantiates the required proposition that what is real for me is the same as what is real for you, to support this assumed "us"? This is the point of relativism. And all I have to do is insist that what is real for me (perhaps all sorts of supernatural things) is different from what is real for you, to refute your claim of "us". To support your claim you would need to prove that I am lying. But if I truly believe what I am saying, then I am not lying.

I agree, but knowing that I have doubted is a detection. — Kenosha Kid

OK, this is a good start. By what means does one "detect" the mind. Surely it's not a sense observation, so the indubitableness of this proposition is not empirically based. What produces this certainty then? We can see that the conclusion expressed by Wayfarer (from Descartes) is a logical conclusion, and ask the same question about logic in general. Logic provides us a type of certainty which is not empirically based. What supports, or substantiates this certainty?

Therefore, any object/phenomenon/concept can only be proven to be real or true based on the scientific method. — 8livesleft

The problem with this claim, as I explained at the beginning of the thread, is that science cannot tell us what constitutes being real, or being true. And your claim is left hollow when you can give "real" and "true" whatever meaning you want. So scientism will give us the circular argument that "real" and "true" is what science demonstrates to us, therefore "any object/phenomenon/concept can only be proven to be real or true based on the scientific method".

Human beings are thought wrapped up in a meat blanket. — Pantagruel

If this were me, I'd eat myself. Then where would I be?

However, there are ambiguities in his thinking, and part of this may be due to the way he divides experience into four categories: bodily sensations, rational thinking, emotions and, intuition. He believes that these are balanced different from person to person, with most people having one function which is distinctly inferior. — Jack Cummins

The problem with this approach is that we have only the consciously learned thought habits by which we can attempt to apprehend the unconscious. The conscious are add-ons, like the branches, or leaves of the tree, while the unconscious is the base, the roots. and trunk. If we turn around with the conscious, to face the unconscious, we have to be prepared to allow for a true flow of activity, from the base upward. We tend to think that the conscious mind controls the body through intentional acts, because this is the approach from the conscious mind, and this would be like the leaves thinking that they had control over the tree because they collect the sunlight. But this is to neglect the flow of power which is coming from the base, the unconscious, and to be able to apprehend it we must be willing to turn things around in our perspective.

Once we allow the conscious mind to submit in this way, we have no more intelligible principles by which to understand the flow from the unconscious, because these are the consciously developed principles which we must release. So the mystic might say that once we have successfully navigated this reversal, we learn to respect this true source of power, our endeavour is finished. However, the philosopher, as described by Plato's cave allegory is inspired to turn back around again, and proceed back to the culturally inspired conscious principles and reeducate them in relation to what has been learned from a glimpse at the true base.

Moving away from Jung to the idea of intuitive knowledge, we can note that some philosophers have, such as Leibniz and Descartes have believed that we have certain ideas which are innate. So, these would override relativism. — Jack Cummins

We have to be careful how we use "intuition", and "intuitive knowledge", because different philosophers have a different place for these terms. Aristotle describe intuitive knowledge as the highest form of knowledge. Following Plato's epistemic divisions, described at the cave allegory, Aristotle reworked the divisions, in his Nichomachean Ethics, to name the principal epistemic division as that between practical and theoretical knowledge. Within each of these divisions there is a layering, or hierarchy, each culminating with the highest form being intuition. We can see intuition in the practical sense, as the person who is extremely capable of discerning and factoring in all the variables before making a judgement for action. In the theoretical sense, we see intuition in the way that one judges theoretical principles to be compiled in the composition of hypothesis. You'll see that the two types of intuition are very similar, but are in a way inversions of each other. Practical intuition refers to how we apply theory toward action, and theoretical intuition refers to how we apply what has been learned from practice, toward theory.

I believe the next philosopher to significantly use the term "intuition" is Kant. You'll see that Kant uses it in a completely different way, which starts the trend in modern philosophy, to equate intuition with instinct, or an innate trend. For Kant intuition is something necessary for knowledge, and therefore somewhat prior to as a necessary condition for, but not actually a form of, knowledge. But we have to be careful with Kant's usage because this is how Kant puts the noumena out of reach of knowledge, by designating intuitions as a medium between the thing itself, and knowledge of the thing. It is the intuitions which are responsible for the sense appearances within the mind, and it is implied that the conscious mind has no control over the influence of intuitions in its fabrication of knowledge. When Aristotle broached the question of whether intuitive knowledge was innate or learned, he decided that it must be a combination of both. Relative to my description above, this allows that the conscious thinking mind, still has some sway over the power coming from the unconscious base, so that the conscious mind might influence one's intuitions. I believe it is necessary to maintain this aspect in the model of intuitive knowledge to account for the means by which the cultural consciousness gains control over the intuitive. That is where we find ourselves within society, our cultural training is in fact an exercise of conscious control over our innate and instinctual tendency, the intuitions. That is how relativism takes hold, and it is why the Kantian model cannot be accurate.

One kind of structure is that which encodes information. In this instance, we know that the information -- the design of the house -- is encoded physically by an immediately physical (motor) process, so the information is also encoded in the deliberate sweeps of the arm. We know that those arm movements are caused by a great many physical (electrical) signals from the brain which cause muscles in the arm to contract and relax, and those signals also encode that information. And finally we know that one thing the brain definitely does in addition to sending signals is physically encode information (such as long term memory in the cerebral cortex). — Kenosha Kid

This does not account for the causation of existence of the physical house. It is clear that the house exists in a non-physical form, "the design of the house", prior to its physical existence. Of course you dismiss this as technically untrue, the house does not exist in a non-physical form, what we call the non-physical form (ideas), you describe as brain signals, which cause arm movements.

So you transform what we call the non-physical, into a specific type of activity, an activity which "encodes information". The problem with this is that you do not account for the cause of existence of this type of activity, and all you do is posit a new non-physical object, "information", as being involved in that activity. You cannot account for this type of activity because it is the intentional activity responsible for free willing movements, and it acts to create a physical object, which is contrary to Newton's law of inertia. Newton's first law describes an assumed temporal continuity of a massive object, and cannot account for its creation.

In modern physics, all we have as principles to account for the existence of massive objects, is a described relationship between non-massive energy, and massive objects, which cannot account for the designed creation of massive objects. You know Kenosha Kid, that the physicist's understanding of the relation between the wave field and the particle does not allow that the wave field intentional designs the particle. Unless the creation of a particle is determined by existing mass (law of inertia), the furthest that physicist can go in speculating about the cause of massive existence, is spontaneous, or random creation. But this excludes the possibility of this activity being used to encode information. To propose that this random activity encodes information is a violation of the laws of physics.

Physical has been an expanding category for a long time. The things that are considered physical are really just the members of what is considered real, regardless of properties. The best case, it seems to me, is the one you are making where if it affects something physical than it is physical. Which ends up, it seems to me replacing properties with relations. That's fine, but then we are using a word with metaphysical property baggage when we are really referring to relations. — Coben

That's a good explanation. The category of "physical" has been expanding with the intent of occluding dualism. The result is all sorts of category mistakes all over the place because the most fundamental division, the distinction between a thing and its properties, has been lost to the occlusion.

He said the piano with its tempered tuning irritates him. — Daemon

Nice going, crack open a whole new can of worms. Do you think it would be easier for a person to develop absolute pitch if the person was trained in tones of just intonation?

Let's consider the distinction proposed by between cultural consciousness and cultural unconsciousness. There is much that we learn, in institutions like schools for example, which is culturally specific. This means that other cultures might not learn the same thing. Now we tend to associate "correct", "right", and "good", with what is proper to one's own specific culture, and this would be the person's cultural consciousness, what one's culture has given to one's conscious mind. Some will even argue that "truth" is given to the individual in this way, through teaching. But this gives us a relativism, because what is correct in one culture might be incorrect in another.

If we turn to the unconscious, we look toward a deeper level, more like instinct and intuition, and we get into the effects of genetics, and the force of hereditary attitudes. Here, in this instinctual, intuitive level, the unconscious, we might find some consistency between the various cultures. So in this way we might get beyond the relativism inherent in culture consciousness, toward a more pure truth. But do you see that it requires rejecting all the things brought to you through your culture and taught to you as correct, right, good, and even true? You might call it a mysticism, you might call it a skepticism, but it is necessary to reject all those things taught to your conscious mind, in order to avoid the relativism of distinct cultures, and start from the unconscious level, to proceed toward a truth based in the unconscious collective, what is common to us all.

Thank you germanium miners. — unenlightened

I never heard of germanium before. But I thought you said geranium miners. Flower power.

Based on what it says there on the chart: "Limited testing meant that most infections were not confirmed during this wave". — ssu

You cannot proceed logically from the premise of a lack of information, to your conclusion of a similar or larger amount of infections.

but notice that the statistical difference is huge: from April to June there is hardly any correlation, — ssu

I see a very clear correlation there. What's different in the April-June time frame is a higher proportion of deaths per infections. That's probably due to a combination of the reasons you stated (insufficient testing), and the reasons I stated (rapid infection in the most vulnerable population). But there is nothing to indicate that the actual infections were as high at this time, as you assume. Even multiplying the March-April tested averages by ten will barely surpass the tested rate of today. And we can still assume that there are many infected today who do not test.

while starting from July the correlation between deaths and infections is obvious. — ssu

The increase in test confirmed cases in mid summer might be construed as representing a better testing capacity. However, there is also an increase of deaths at that time, so we might rule that conclusion out as unsupported by the data. Therefore the graphs show three distinct waves of increased infection, each one bigger than the last, spring, mid summer, and fall. The fact that the death rate was extremely high in the spring wave is probably due to the reasons I mentioned.