.....except those two, not three for one was repetitive, are precisely examples of a single unit.....one thing to pull, one joke not heard.

There may be demonstrations that successfully counter my assertion; those are not them. — Mww

I would consider "(one) leg" (to pull), "(one) joke" and the pronoun "one" to be different in meaning to "a single unit". Surely "a single unit" is different in meaning to the words "leg" or "joke", even though there may be only a single unit of each of these. And the pronoun can refer to any person or to people in general, so not necessarily even a single person. At the very least, would you agree that "one" can mean, but doesn't always mean, "leg" or "joke"?

A rule is not "an action". It is a generalization which may apply to numerous actions. If you say that a particular action should be carried out in a specified set of circumstances, then to justify the "should" you might refer to a rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

A rule is a generalization of actions that should be taken in a particular instance, or circumstance based on prior observations of those actions working in similar instances or circumstances.

"No running at the pool" is a generalization of actions to be taken in a particular circumstance. That isn't to say that the lifeguard can't run to the pool and dive in (even though there is also a rule stating that there is no diving) to save a drowning person. The rules at the pool are meant to be a guideline for being safe at the pool. That doesn't mean that following the rules will keep you safe in all circumstances, or that running at the pool is prohibitive in all circumstances.

You'd have to go back and read the thread, but I don't argue that there's no guidance, I argued that in the majority of instances of natural language use, we do not refer to any such rules. So I argued that rules are not fundamental to language use, they exist as part of specialized language use like math, logic, and writing. Therefore it's wrong to characterize language as a rule following activity. I discussed with Josh at one point, what type of guidance is employed at the fundamental level of language use, since it ought not be called a form of rule following. But this was just speculation, there is no real understanding here. What we can say though, is that it's not a matter of rule following. — Metaphysician Undercover

What you are actually talking about here is simply reasoning. Applying knowledge of prior actions taken in prior situations similar to situations in the present moment is how we reason. Judges have the power to interpret law/rules. Not every rule is applicable to every situation. They are only meant to be a guide. I think we are talking about the same thing here and it's just a disagreement on terms.

I avert it because I see it as an oversimplification which is simply wrong. And using such words which create "a picture", model, or representation, which is actually wrong, is misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't understand this part.

Actually, the misconception is in thinking that such a situation can be described as rule following. If rules are not being rigidly applied, say they exist there to be consulted, and the person looks at the rules and decides whether or not to follow them at each individual instance of judgement, then we cannot say that rules are being followed, because the person often decides not to follow. We cannot even say that such a rule would serve as "a guide", because when the person decides not to follow, it provides no guidance.

What is glaringly obvious, is that there are no such rules which we consult during natural language use. When we speak in most ordinary circumstances, we speak the words which rapidly come to our minds, designed for the particularities of the circumstances, without consulting general rules. So this whole conception, that language use is based in some sort of rule following activity is a misconception.. — Metaphysician Undercover

Rules are only followed if they are enforced in some way, either by gunpoint, or by recalling what action worked in similar situations. Reasoning is the act of providing reasons, or rules, for your actions. Knowledge itself is a set of rules for interpretting sensory data. The rules can change, but there will always be some rule (reason) for why you acted some way in some situation.

I would consider...... — Luke

.....to which you are quite entitled.

Nevertheless, I find nothing you’ve contributed to be sufficient diminution of the components in my adversus dialectica with Antony.

Okay, I’ll leave it to Antony to try and explain it to you then.

I’m working on it. This format makes long posts on different pages, hard to juxtaposition.

If your general conclusion is that "no rules are followed", this must mean that humans are not free to follow rules. So it's probably a good thing that your argument is invalid. "Rules are not rules" just seems off somehow. — Luke

That's the conclusion which comes about from your proposed substitution. My conclusion was "conventions and unspoken rules are not rules which are followed. " The proposed substitution yields "rules are not rules which are followed". Since all it takes is for a rule to be violated one time by one person, for us to say that the rule has not been followed, I think that conclusion is very true. And as I said, this simply says something about the free willing nature of human beings, we are not rule-following beings. Whether or not we have the capacity to follow rules is irrelevant, the true description is that we do not, we break rules. Therefore, "rules are not rules which are followed".

I didn't pay attention to your arguments 2 and 3 because they are not even related. Rather than a simple substitution, you completely alter premise 2, so what's the point? We're not even talking anything remotely similar at that point.

"No running at the pool" is a generalization of actions to be taken in a particular circumstance. That isn't to say that the lifeguard can't run to the pool and dive in (even though there is also a rule stating that there is no diving) to save a drowning person. The rules at the pool are meant to be a guideline for being safe at the pool. That doesn't mean that following the rules will keep you safe in all circumstances, or that running at the pool is prohibitive in all circumstances. — Harry Hindu

That's surely false. If the rule says no running or diving, this applies to the life guard as well, unless it's stipulated that there are exceptions. If the lifeguard runs and dives, then clearly the rule has been broken by that action if there are no stipulated exceptions.

And if your argument is that rules are just guidelines, and meant to be broken, then we're not talking about following rules anymore. We're talking about looking at suggestions for action, or something like that, not following rules.

What you are actually talking about here is simply reasoning. Applying knowledge of prior actions taken in prior situations similar to situations in the present moment is how we reason. — Harry Hindu

It might be similar to how we reason, but it isn't reasoning, because it's dome habitually without recalling memories. We know which words to use in a particular situation without recalling similar situations in the past, to figure out which words to use.

Rules are only followed if they are enforced in some way, either by gunpoint, or by recalling what action worked in similar situations. — Harry Hindu

I don't think that your appeal to "similar situations" is the answer. So many of the situations I find myself in are completely new, not really similar to anything I've already experienced at all, but this doesn't leave me at a loss for words. So i don't think my choice of words comes from recalling similar situations.
"

My conclusion was "conventions and unspoken rules are not rules which are followed. " — Metaphysician Undercover

As I said, your argument is invalid. This is what your argument should have been (with a valid conclusion):

P1. To follow a rule means to act within the confines of that rule, and not stray outside of those restrictions.
P2. People often act in ways outside of conventions and unspoken rules.
C. Conventions and unspoken rules are (rules which are) not always followed.

The proposed substitution yields "rules are not rules which are followed". — Metaphysician Undercover

This is ambiguous. It could mean either:

(i) Rules are not followed in all cases; or

(ii) Rules are not followed in some cases.

If (i) were true, then I would agree with you that "we are not rule-following beings".

However, if (ii) is true, then it follows that:

(iii) Rules are followed in some cases.

It may not be immediately obvious that (ii) and (iii) are not mutually exclusive, although they might appear to be so with the ambiguous wording when "in some cases" is omitted.

If both (ii) and (iii) are true, i.e. if rules are followed in some cases and not followed in others, then we could equally say that we are "rule-following beings". That we follow rules in some cases but not in others is just what Premise 2 of your argument tells us, particularly with its use of the word "often" (not "always").

You want to draw the conclusion that people don't follow rules, laws or conventions because it sometimes happens that people don't. However, people also do follow rules, laws and conventions in many cases. I think you'll find it far more likely that they are followed than not followed. The conventions of language use are no exception.

As I said, your argument is invalid. — Luke

You haven't shown any fallacy. You're rendition just changes the conclusion so that it is the same as P2, which is to make it appear to be be begging the question. I already acknowledged that you might interpret it as an instance of begging the question. But that's obviously a misinterpretation because it requires that you alter the conclusion, when there is no need to alter the conclusion because mine is valid. Accepting my conclusion as valid, rather than altering the conclusion as you propose, avoids the charge of begging the question.

This is ambiguous. — Luke

Right, your proposed substitution results in ambiguity because there is no longer the distinction between "rules" in the sense of what people follow (def#1), and "rules" in the sense of unspoken rules (def#2). That's the point of my argument. I've been requesting that you uphold this distinction to avoid such ambiguity and the equivocation which follows. You refused, and substituted "unspoken rules" (#2) with simply "rules", creating ambiguity by dissolving my requested distinction between "rules" (def#1) and "unspoken rules" (def#2), so your equivocation of my requested distinction created that ambiguity.

If you weren't so stubborn in your request to allow equivocation into the deductive argument, because you want to hide the valid conclusion, you wouldn't have such ambiguity in the conclusion. In other words, the ambiguity you refer to is the product of your substitution which is an act of equivocation.

You want to draw the conclusion that people don't follow rules, laws or conventions because it sometimes happens that people don't. However, people also do follow rules, laws and conventions in many cases. I think you'll find it far more likely that they are followed than not followed. The conventions of language use are no exception. — Luke

We must adhere to some fundamental principles in this judgement as to whether a rule is followed or not. If a rule is broken once, then we cannot say that it is being followed. That's fundamental to the descriptive (inductive) principles of scientific method. And, since people often break rules, we cannot make the inductive conclusion that people follow rules. Observation tells us that people break rules and this means that rules are not being followed. Therefore you are clearly wrong to say that it's far more likely that rules are followed than not. And since you want to extend the definition of "rule" to include all sorts of unspoken rules, traditions, customs, and norms, which differ throughout the world, and are actively evolving as we speak, being broken time after time, you are simply bringing more evidence against yourself. So the evidence is clear, it is more likely that rules are not followed than followed.

I proposed a distinction between a type of rule which people consciously try to follow (rules expressed in language), and a type of rule which has no expression in language (unspoken rules), such that it cannot be identified or formulated in any way which would allow a conscious mind to attempt to follow it. And this is consistent with def #1, and def #2 of my OED. My proposal is that for the purpose of this philosophical inquiry, and logical proceeding, we only use "rule" to refer to the first, so that we can avoid ambiguity and equivocation. Then we can proceed to examine the actions of #2 without the inclination of confusing those actions with rule following in accordance with #1.

You steadfastly refuse to acknowledge this common distinction, and so you continue to equivocate between #1 and #2. This stubbornness on your part forces the conclusion on you, that "rules" are not followed, producing that dilemma which is specific to your ambiguous interpretation of "rule". If you simply would allow the distinction between rules which we consciously attempt to follow #1, and "rules" in the sense of some descriptive similarity of actions without conscious effort to "follow", #2, you would not be faced with making this glaringly false claim: "I think you'll find it far more likely that they are followed than not followed."

That's surely false. If the rule says no running or diving, this applies to the life guard as well, unless it's stipulated that there are exceptions. If the lifeguard runs and dives, then clearly the rule has been broken by that action if there are no stipulated exceptions.

And if your argument is that rules are just guidelines, and meant to be broken, then we're not talking about following rules anymore. We're talking about looking at suggestions for action, or something like that, not following rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

The exception is a given because lifeguards are there to save lives. Just as there are various contexts in which to use some word, there are various contexts in which to apply some rule.

What you don't seem to realize is that I am agreeing with you and you are contradicting yourself. If words can be used without rules, then why are you bending over backwards in trying to apply strict and rigid rules for how you use the word, "rule"?

It might be similar to how we reason, but it isn't reasoning, because it's dome habitually without recalling memories. We know which words to use in a particular situation without recalling similar situations in the past, to figure out which words to use. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think that your appeal to "similar situations" is the answer. So many of the situations I find myself in are completely new, not really similar to anything I've already experienced at all, but this doesn't leave me at a loss for words. So i don't think my choice of words comes from recalling similar situations. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is patently absurd.

What you are saying is that you can speak any language without knowing the rules. Can you speak Swahili fluently, MU? Why or why not?

You are also saying that you have no reason for why you use the scribble, "I" to refer to yourself rather than some other scribble, like, "you".

Conscious memory is learning memory. Once you learn something well enough, whether it be walking, riding a bike, driving or a language, it can become automatic. The steps, or rules, are no longer routed through conscious memory. That isn't to say that they aren't still there. If you thought real hard, I'm sure you can remember going to grade school and learning how words are spelled and the basic rules of grammar.

And here there will be certain things we can imagine and those we can't within the criteria of a cube because we grew up with cubes as we practiced naming and picturing and focusing on aspects of objects and the language that goes with these activities. I investigate above what we imply when we say "I imagine" or "I see an image". — Antony Nickles

You know we can imagine anything we like, any time we like?
(“....Imagination is the faculty of representing an object even without its presence in intuition....” (B151))

It needs explaining why there are certain things we cannot imagine. Why is it we can imagine things about an object without knowing it, but we cannot imagine certain things even if we do know it?

because we grew up with cubes as we practiced naming and picturing and focusing on aspects of objects and the language that goes with these activities. — Antony Nickles

Isn’t naming the source of words? And aren’t words the source of language? If so, practicing naming is not language, but is antecedent to it, and the supplement “language that goes with these activities”, is false. Language doesn't go with it; it comes after it.

We grew up with cubes, which is the same as saying we know them as certain things. This is not in itself enough to satisfy why we cannot imagine things about cubes, but only that such imaginings do not support the knowledge, or, as Witt says, they are not within the criteria of cubes.

We don’t care what a cube isn’t, we don’t usually waste cognitive effort imagining certain things about cubes that do not belong to them as they are known. We want to know how it is that an object becomes named “cube”. So we build a theory around an image we have, rather than imaginings we don’t need. That is what we imply when we say “I imagine” or “I see an image”. Which still isn’t technically correct, in that we don’t “see” the images we use to name objects, but what is implied remains true.
—————

No: the fact that one speaks of the appropriate word does not shew the existence of a something that etc.. One is inclined, rather, to speak of this picture-like something just because one can find a word appropriate — Wittgenstein, PI

I’m guessing the part left off “Something that etc”, is “comes before the mind”, which transforms the quote into, “the fact that one speaks of the appropriate word does not show the existence of a something that comes before the mind”. Yet, it does exactly that, for otherwise it must be the case there is something named or nameable, that does not exist as coming before the mind, which is absurd.

Speaking of this picture-like something is an inclination, yes, but to speak of this picture-like something, as an act of language use, is never a mere inclination, it is a necessity, otherwise there is no verbal language use at all. And one doesn’t speak because he can find the appropriate word, for he can always be inclined to speak yet speak incoherently, which makes explicit he has not found the appropriate word, perhaps because there isn’t one. Nevertheless, if one is inclined to speak, and wishes to be understood, it is in response to this picture-like something for which there must already be a word representing it.

Finally, to speak of this picture-like something just because an appropriate word can be found, makes no allowance for the advent of new words which by definition can never be found in the manifold of extant words. In that event, without the appropriate word to be found, is it then given that one cannot speak at all? I think not. As such, new words are not found at all, but invented. And even if “one can find a word appropriate” indicates the capacity for word invention, there is still required the existence of the something picture-like with which the newly invented word relates, in order to appropriately speak of it. Recall my mention of quarks?

Was there anything else you edited, that I can make a mess of?

The exception is a given because lifeguards are there to save lives. Just as there are various contexts in which to use some word, there are various contexts in which to apply some rule. — Harry Hindu

So if you're somewhere to save lives, rules don't apply to you? Is that why an ambulance might go through a red light? I suppose the paramedics are allowed to take all the belongings from the helpless person as well. That's ridiculous. And what's equally ridiculous is the idea that one can claim exceptions based on context.

What you don't seem to realize is that I am agreeing with you and you are contradicting yourself. If words can be used without rules, then why are you bending over backwards in trying to apply strict and rigid rules for how you use the word, "rule"? — Harry Hindu

You haven't been reading enough of this thread Harry. I already explained this. Rules are introduced into language for the purpose of logic and reasoning, as a means for understanding. Misunderstanding is actually quite common in natural language use. This is a philosophy forum, the goal is to understand, therefore I see the benefit of bending over backward trying to apply strict and rigid rules for that purpose. Equivocation leads to misunderstanding.

Once you learn something well enough, whether it be walking, riding a bike, driving or a language, it can become automatic. The steps, or rules, are no longer routed through conscious memory. That isn't to say that they aren't still there. — Harry Hindu

This is actually what is absurd. I didn't I learn rules to learn how to talk. It became what you call "automatic" simply by doing it, trying, having success, and practicing. My conscious mind wasn't routed through rules, it was focused on trying to learn how to talk. There was something to do, which I tried to do until I could do it. The basic aspect of learning how to do something is fundamentally different from learning a rule. Do you recognize a difference between theory and practice?

I'm sure you can remember going to grade school and learning how words are spelled and the basic rules of grammar. — Harry Hindu

As I said before, writing is a higher form of language, with logic involved, and there are rules involved in writing.

You know we can imagine anything we like, any time we like? — Mww

As I've said, you can say anything you like but only certain things in certain circumstances will count as, say, an apology--insincerity, lack of acknowledgement of wrong, not saying "I'm sorry" without qualification, etc. are all ways it can go wrong. That's why we have a whole nexus of concepts like excuses, qualifications, mitigating circumstances, etc.

because we grew up with cubes as we practiced naming and picturing and focusing on aspects of objects and the language that goes with these activities.
— Antony Nickles

Isn’t naming the source of words? — Mww

I'm not sure about the "source" but Witt starts the PI with the picture of a child learning language as naming. The investigation starts from there looking into why we want all of language to work the same way. What Witt is trying to do in this section is grant the interlocutor the framework that they want (meaning as picturing) and still show how it can't account for how language works.

Language doesn't go with [activities]; it comes after it. — Mww

And this is the picture that there is an entire world of activities, and that learning our language is simply pointing and saying the word that goes with it. That there is a "before" and "after". But we learn language and the world together; we are corrected, we mimic, we observe, etc. Of course this is not a lesson in education, but the analytical observation is that all the different ways language works (and is learned) are as varied and deep as our lives with which they are wrapped up in.

No: the fact that one speaks of the appropriate word does not shew the existence of a something that etc.. One is inclined, rather, to speak of this picture-like something just because one can find a word appropriate
— Wittgenstein, PI

I’m guessing the part left off “Something that etc”, is “comes before the mind”, which transforms the quote into, “the fact that one speaks of the appropriate word does not show the existence of a something that comes before the mind”. Yet, it does exactly that, for otherwise it must be the case there is something named or nameable, that does not exist as coming before the mind, which is absurd. — Mww

The full thought is that deciding a word is "appropriate" does not "shew that the meaning of a word is a something that comes before our mind... [which is] the exact picture we want to use...." #139 (my emphasis in bold). What he is trying to demonstrate is that we use the options (publicly) available in a concept. Here, we can picture a cube in our mind (give the interlocutor what they want) but we still speak of the fact that it is a prism in connection with a triangular prism. So Witt's point is that the picturing of something is not "meaning" something exact, i.e., when we picture the cube are we "picturing" its squareness? its edges? that it's a prism?

You haven't shown any fallacy. — Metaphysician Undercover

Fallacy of ambiguity, hasty generalisation. It has been shown. Read my previous post.

You're rendition just changes the conclusion so that it is the same as P2, which is to make it appear to be be begging the question. — Metaphysician Undercover

A reminder of your original argument:

P1. To follow a rule means to act within the confines of that rule, and not stray outside of those restrictions.

P2. People often act in ways outside of conventions and unspoken rules.

C. Conventions and unspoken rules are not rules which are followed.

Your inclusion of the word "often" in P2 creates the ambiguity. P2 could be rewritten without loss of meaning as: People act in ways outside of conventions and unspoken rules in some, but not all, cases. From there, you hastily and illicitly reach the general conclusion that "Conventions and unspoken rules are not rules which are followed". The wording of this conclusion is ambiguous and raises the questions: are conventions and unspoken rules not rules? Or are they rules which are not followed?

Judging by the history of this discussion, you started out arguing for the former, claiming that conventions and unspoken rules are not rules. but you've recently switched to the latter, claiming that conventions and unspoken rules are rules but they're not followed. This was just after I pointed out that your argument produces exactly the same result for explicitly stated rules as it does for conventions and unspoken rules. Apparently, that spoiled your assertion that conventions and unspoken rules are not "true" rules, so you decided to start claiming that rules are not followed instead. But this is ambiguous, too. Are rules not followed in all cases or only in some? This ambiguity can easily be resolved just by noting the word "often" in P2 - indicating that rules are not followed only in some cases - but you refuse to acknowledge it.

So what'll it be? Are you going to stick with your new game plan where you strongly imply that rules are not followed in all cases, or are you going to return to your old strategy where you argue that conventions are not "true" rules? Make up your mind, dude.

Right, your proposed substitution results in ambiguity because there is no longer the distinction between "rules" in the sense of what people follow (def#1), and "rules" in the sense of unspoken rules (def#2). That's the point of my argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm happy to adopt your terminology of "def#1" (or "#1") for explicit rules and "def#2" (or "#2") for non-explicit rules, but I'll remind you that your OED definitions #1 and #2 do not make the same distinction.

You'll need to specify how my substitution "results in ambiguity".

My substitution simply demonstrates that your deductive argument applies equally to explicitly stated rules as it does to conventions and unspoken rules. There's no mistaking #1 for #2 here. You originally applied your argument to conventions and unspoken rules ("def#2") and I demonstrated that the same argument equally applies to rules ("def#1"). This supports my argument that conventions are rules and that rules don't have to be explicitly stated. Arguing that conventions are rules and that rules need not be explicitly stated is not equivocation.

You refused, and substituted "unspoken rules" (#2) with simply "rules", creating ambiguity by dissolving my requested distinction between "rules" (def#1) and "unspoken rules" (def#2), so your equivocation of my requested distinction created that ambiguity. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't dissolve the distinction. I showed you what difference results from drawing the distinction, which is none. Your deductive argument has the same effect on both rules and conventions, which only supports my claim (and the dictionary definition) that rules can be either explicit or not-explicit; #1 or #2. And/or it demonstrates that your argument is problematic.

If a rule is broken once, then we cannot say that it is being followed. — Metaphysician Undercover

If a rule is followed once, then we can say that it is being followed.

And, since people often break rules, we cannot make the inductive conclusion that people follow rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

And, since people often follow rules, we cannot make the inductive conclusion that people don't follow rules (in all cases).

Observation tells us that people break rules and this means that rules are not being followed. — Metaphysician Undercover

Observation tells us that people follow rules and this means that rules are being followed.

Therefore you are clearly wrong to say that it's far more likely that rules are followed than not. — Metaphysician Undercover

Therefore you are clearly wrong to say that rules are not followed. (In all cases? In some cases? You wouldn't clarify.)

And since you want to extend the definition of "rule" to include all sorts of unspoken rules, traditions, customs, and norms, which differ throughout the world, and are actively evolving as we speak, being broken time after time, you are simply bringing more evidence against yourself. So the evidence is clear, it is more likely that rules are not followed than followed. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your conjectures constitute neither argument nor evidence. I'll repeat my earlier argument that if conventions were not followed in most cases, then there wouldn't be any conventions. A convention - defined as "a way in which something is usually done" - exists only because it is followed in most cases; it would cease to exist otherwise.

I proposed a distinction between a type of rule which people consciously try to follow (rules expressed in language), and a type of rule which has no expression in language (unspoken rules), such that it cannot be identified or formulated in any way which would allow a conscious mind to attempt to follow it. And this is consistent with def #1, and def #2 of my OED. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not consistent with the OED. The OED def #1 you quoted earlier - "a principle to which an action conforms or is required to conform" - does not exclude unspoken rules. The distinction between explicit and non-explicit is not stated as part of that definition. On the other hand, the Google definition that I quoted earlier states that a rule can be either explicit or understood.

My proposal is that for the purpose of this philosophical inquiry, and logical proceeding, we only use "rule" to refer to the first, so that we can avoid ambiguity and equivocation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I reject your proposal, and so does the dictionary.

This stubbornness on your part forces the conclusion on you, that "rules" are not followed, producing that dilemma which is specific to your ambiguous interpretation of "rule". — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it was your ambiguous, invalid argument that forced the conclusion and dilemma on us. Besides, I've been arguing that we do follow rules, remember? You're the one arguing that we don't.

Fallacy of ambiguity, hasty generalisation. — Luke

There's no hasty generalization, you're just refusing to accept the premises which are true and widely supported by the evidence we see all around us.

Judging by the history of this discussion, you started out arguing for the former, claiming that conventions and unspoken rules are not rules. but you've recently switched to the latter, claiming that conventions and unspoken rules are rules but they're not followed. — Luke

Bull shit Luke. I switched only at your insistence, that I make the substitution, and look at the argument from the perspective which the substitution provided.

Simply substitute the word "rules" for "conventions" in the above. — Luke

But I can agree to your substitution if you insist, just to humour you. — Metaphysician Undercover

Making that substitution results in the conclusion that rules are not followed. The thing is, that when we make a generalization to describe a certain type of thing, it must apply to all of the things in that class, or else it is a faulty generalization. "Swans are white" means that all swans are white, and if we find something which appears to be a swan, and is black, we need to either exclude it from the class, or reject the generalization as false. In this case, we started way back, with the generalization: "human beings follow rules". You want to make "convention" equivalent to "rule", when the evidence is clear that many conventions are not being followed by many people. That leaves us with the choice of either rejecting the generalization "human beings follow rules, or taking conventions outside the class of "rules". I argue for the latter, conventions are not necessarily rules. But you insisted on the equivalence, which leads to the necessity of rejecting the generalization.

So what'll it be? Are you going to stick with your new game plan where you strongly imply that rules are not followed in all cases, or are you going to return to your old strategy where you argue that conventions are not "true" rules? Make up your mind, dude. — Luke

Obviously, the choice is yours. Are you going to stick with your insistence that conventions are rules, in which case we must conclude that human beings do not follow the rules, or are you going to come over to my side, and allow that conventions are fundamentally not rules, thereby allowing that rules are a special sort of convention which human beings use conscious effort to follow.

I'm happy to adopt your terminology of "def#1" (or "#1") for explicit rules and "def#2" (or "#2") for non-explicit rules, but I'll remind you that your OED definitions #1 and #2 do not make the same distinction. — Luke

OK, so here is the difference between def #1 and def #2. In def#1 there is a "principle" to which an action conforms. In def #2 there is simply a custom, or tradition, and no talk of any "principle" or conformity. So, if there are "non-explicit rules", customs, or traditions (def#2), these do not exist as principles of conformity, because this would be to equivocate with def #1. However, we might observe such a "non-explicit rule" and state it explicitly, the statement intended to express a principle of conformity. If you are ready to accept the distinction between def #1, and def #2, can you also adhere to the standard of non-equivocation, and accept that to be a "rule" under def #2 is not sufficient to be a "rule" under def #1? This is because there is no necessary principle of conformity in def #2, which is the defining feature of def #1. And when we talk about following a rule, we are using def #1, referring to a principle of conformity.

Now here's the difficult part. Do you recognize that a principle of conformity, def #1, must have some type of existence somewhere, somehow, or else the principle could never be found, identified, or interpreted, and no judgement of conformity could ever be made. We can see that such a principle only exists as a statement in language. This is why I interpret def #1 as explicit rules, and def #2 as non-explicit, and only explicit rules, def #1, are rules which are followed, principles of conformity.

If a rule is followed once, then we can say that it is being followed. — Luke

Not if we're following Wittgenstein's principles, he's very explicit that to act according to a rule once does not constitute following a rule.

It is not consistent with the OED. The OED def #1 you quoted earlier - "a principle to which an action conforms or is required to conform" - does not exclude unspoken rules. — Luke

Yes it does exclude unspoken rules, because it is only through language that we refer to a "principle". Without the act of speaking there is no principle being referred to, therefore no rule in the sense of def #1. This is how Wittgenstein refutes Platonism. The Platonist will insist that the principle, Idea, or Form, exists independently of the words which refer to it, in some eternal realm inaccessible to our senses. But Wittgenstein shows that the "principle" is what is created by word use, and therefore does not exist separate from it, nor prior to it.

Just a note here to avoid confusion. I suggested a different use of "principle" earlier in the thread, one half way between the Platonist, and the one described above. In that suggestion I requested a separation between "rule" and "principle", such that a "rule" is created by word use, but "principles" are prior to rules, as private. But Wittgenstein appears to want to reject private principles.

What he is trying to demonstrate is that we use the options (publicly) available in a concept. — Antony Nickles

Yes, we do that. Isn’t it then a matter of what options are available in a concept? If the thought is that there is only one option available in a concept, that being its relation to something, what other options can there be? All that’s left is that to which a concept does not relate, or, a plethora of somethings to which a concept can relate.

So Witt's point is that the picturing of something is not "meaning" something exact, i.e., when we picture the cube are we "picturing" its squareness? its edges? that it's a prism? — Antony Nickles

I guess our differing notions of picturing are irreconcilable. I agree picturing something is not necessarily meaning something exact, but only indicating something exact. When we wish to communicate meaning, we then use the word belonging to the concept belonging to the picturing. If that is the case, we are never going to use the word prism when we mean cube.

So, yes, when we picture a cube we picture the manifold of its form, which immediately eliminates non-cube forms. Even if for the very first time ever picturing an object of nothing but right angles, even if there is no name for it, nothing without right angles is going to be pictured. It just makes no sense to me that we might bring up prisms when we mean to speak of cubes.

Nevertheless, I understand the finer points rely on less definitive conceptions. We in fact do make a mess of some concepts that have multiple relations, or multiple implications for singular relations....apologies, as you say.
————

What Witt is trying to do in this section is grant the interlocutor the framework that they want (meaning as picturing) and still show how it can't account for how language works. — Antony Nickles

To say how language works I take to indicate mutually consistent understandings, language works if you understand what I say, and I understand what you say, and language isn’t working if we just look at each other with empty stares. That about right?

If so, then the framework I want is that in which such understandings are given. But there is no way I can promise you’ll understand me, from which follows that granting my framework is itself not sufficient to grant that language works, but still grants how it can work, if only we eventually agree on the meanings of the words being used. So my framework can account for how language works, even if sometimes it doesn’t, but we cannot say it never does, so the claim we cannot, is false. Or....I’m not right in what Witt is saying.

You tell me.

What he is trying to demonstrate is that we use the options (publicly) available in a concept.
— Antony Nickles

Yes, we do that. Isn’t it then a matter of what options are available in a concept? If the thought is that there is only one option available in a concept, that being its relation to something, what other options can there be? All that’s left is that to which a concept does not relate, or, a plethora of somethings to which a concept can relate. — Mww

We might be getting tripped up on Witt's term "concept", but, as I laid out above, the concept of, say, "knowing" has a number of different options in which it can be used (a skill, information, acknowledgement). And these don't "relate" to anything, they just are how we use the concept of knowing, how knowing is in our lives. Now the idea in this section of the PI is that you have a cube, a number of things of which can be pointed out with the word's options ("uses" or "senses" Witt calls them), one of which is the fact that it is a prism, similar in that way to a triangular prism. The point being it is not whatever you have in mind that provides the meaning, but the public concept (of prisms and cubes). You are expressing one of those "uses" (not "using words") rather than there being something like a mental picture that gives the word a "meaning".

What Witt is trying to do in this section is grant the interlocutor the framework that they want (meaning as picturing) and still show how it can't account for how language works.
— Antony Nickles

* * * So my framework can account for how language works, even if sometimes it doesn’t, but we cannot say it never does, so the claim we cannot, is false. Or....I’m not right in what Witt is saying. — Mww

By "framework" I was not referring to something personal to you, like your background or way of looking at things ("my framework"), but that Witt is trying to allow the interlocutor the "picture" of meaning that they want--the philosophical theory that when we see a cube or say cube, there is an image in our mind (our meaning).

I think what is happening is you are adamantly defending something you think I (or Witt) is trying to take away. And this is getting in the way of seeing the rationality of OLP's method even before we get to whatever you believe the repercussions are. Above I try to address what it is people believe Witt is trying to deny (e.g., the individuality of our expressions), and how that is satisfied in other ways.

Now the idea in this section of the PI is that you have a cube, a number of things of which can be pointed out with the word's options ("uses" or "senses" Witt calls them), one of which is the fact that it is a prism, similar in that way to a triangular prism. The point being it is not whatever you have in mind that provides the meaning, but the public concept (of prisms and cubes). You are expressing one of those "uses" (not "using words") rather than there being something like a mental picture that gives the word a "meaning". — Antony Nickles

I don't think you have this quite right Antony. What Witt is showing is that the particular application gives the word "a meaning", just as much as the mental picture, which is attributed to what you call "the public concept", gives the word "a meaning". The mental picture is produced from what the person has learned, it is what you call the public concept. But a judgement has to be made as to whether this picture "fits" the particular application. That's why he concludes 140 with the possibility of a difference between these two. "Has it the same meaning both times? I think we shall say not."

Notice that neither one, nor the other, is "the meaning". Each is a different meaning. So we cannot, at this point, assign "the meaning" to either one of them. Then at 141, the particular application (method of projection) is shown to be more important than the picture which comes to one's mind from the mention of the word (the public concept). And, because there can be an inconsistency between these two he distinguishes between a "normal" application and an "abnormal" application, at the end of 141. So we might say that in the abnormal application the word has a meaning (by method of projection) which is not consistent with the public concept.

Can there be a collision between picture and application? There can,
inasmuch as the picture makes us expect a different use, because people
in general apply this picture like this.
I want to say: we have here a normal case, and abnormal cases.

There's no hasty generalization, you're just refusing to accept the premises which are true and widely supported by the evidence we see all around us. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't refuse to accept the premises (depending on the definition of "often"); I refuse to accept the conclusion. The premises are no less true for the following argument:

P1. To follow a rule means to act within the confines of that rule, and not stray outside of those restrictions

P2. People often act in ways outside of explicitly stated rules.

C. Explicitly stated rules are not rules which are followed.

I have not altered your original argument in any way, other than by replacing "conventions and unspoken rules" with "explicitly stated rules". Do you not find this conclusion to be problematic?

Bull shit Luke. I switched only at your insistence, that I make the substitution, and look at the argument from the perspective which the substitution provided. — Metaphysician Undercover

So the original intention of your deductive argument was an attempt to demonstrate that conventions and unspoken rules are not rules. Thanks for clarifying.

Making that substitution results in the conclusion that rules are not followed. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I pointed out in my previous post, the wording of your conclusion leaves it ambiguous whether rules are not followed or whether rules are not rules. Maybe we can settle for 'rules are not (rules which are followed)'?

The thing is, that when we make a generalization to describe a certain type of thing, it must apply to all of the things in that class, or else it is a faulty generalization. — Metaphysician Undercover

You mean like how your P2 doesn't apply to all cases? Or how you derive a conclusion which applies to all cases from a premise which doesn't apply to all cases?

You want to make "convention" equivalent to "rule", when the evidence is clear that many conventions are not being followed by many people. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let's clear up this lingering false assumption of yours once and for all. Explicitly stated rules are not followed in all cases, either. You seem to think this somehow applies only to conventions and unspoken rules. A good example of explicitly stated rules is in sports. People cheat (i.e. break the rules) in sports all the time. For example, Lance Armstrong or doping at the Olympics. So, the evidence is equally clear that many explicitly stated rules "are not being followed by many people". For some reason, you seem to think that explicitly stated rules are different to conventions in this respect.

That leaves us with the choice of either rejecting the generalization "human beings follow rules, or taking conventions outside the class of "rules". — Metaphysician Undercover

Please decide what you are arguing for. Is it that conventions are not rules, or that conventions are not followed. And, if the latter, is it in all cases or only in some?

Obviously, the choice is yours. Are you going to stick with your insistence that conventions are rules, in which case we must conclude that human beings do not follow the rules, or are you going to come over to my side, and allow that conventions are fundamentally not rules, thereby allowing that rules are a special sort of convention which human beings use conscious effort to follow. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I'm going to stick with my insistence that conventions are rules, because this is in accordance with Wittgenstein's philosophy, which I am trying in vain to convey to you. As @Antony Nickles has repeated several times, "we learn language and the world together". Language is a social activity, which is why it is closely associated with conventions. You have gone awry with this sort of thinking:

The basic aspect of learning how to do something is fundamentally different from learning a rule. Do you recognize a difference between theory and practice? — Metaphysician Undercover

Learning a rule is not a "theory", and neither is language. Language is a practice. Games, sports and other explicitly-stated-rule-bound activities are simply codified practices. You can refer to the rules if you are in doubt, but if you know how to a play a game or sport, you usually don't need to. Even if you don't know how to play, you can join in the practice until you break a rule, and then others can make you aware of it, and you learn it.

I have not altered your original argument in any way, other than by replacing "conventions and unspoken rules" with "explicitly stated rules". Do you not find this conclusion to be problematic? — Luke

No, I have no problem with that conclusion, and I've already explained more than once why. Rules are broken, even explicitly stated rules. That's the nature of free willing beings. So if we are given the option for a general description of human activity as either rules are followed, or rules are not followed, we must conclude rules are not followed. That's the simple fact which observation gives us. And this is the difference we can observe between human beings and inanimate matter, we do not necessarily follow rules, as does inanimate matter.

Learning a rule is not a "theory", and neither is language. Language is a practice. Games, sports and other explicitly-stated-rule-bound activities are simply codified practices. You can refer to the rules if you are in doubt, but if you know how to a play a game or sport, you usually don't need to. Even if you don't know how to play, you can join in the practice until you break a rule, and then others can make you aware of it, and you learn it. — Luke

I don't see how a rule is anything other than theory. So if language is practice, and if this practice involves the application of theory, then we have a divide to cross. How does theory get into the practice? If we say that practice always involves the application of theory (rules in this case), then we have either infinite regress, or Platonism in which theory precedes practice in an absolute sense. To avoid this problem we need to assume a practice which is not an application of theory. This is where we first engaged on this thread and we have not progressed at all.

No, I have no problem with that conclusion, and I've already explained more than once why. Rules are broken, even explicitly stated rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

You accused me of equivocation earlier because you thought your argument applied only to conventions and not to explicitly stated rules. It seems you've changed your mind. You also informed me in your last post that the original intention of your argument was to demonstrate that conventions are not rules. I've just used your argument to demonstrate that explicitly stated rules (def#1) are not rules - and you agree! Now you're back to arguing that rules are not followed.

So if we are given the option for a general description of human activity as either rules are followed, or rules are not followed, we must conclude rules are not followed. — Metaphysician Undercover

In all cases? Or are you just going to continue to ignore this question? You did not even engage the problem I pointed out with your argument: that you make a conclusion about all cases from a premise about some cases.

You say we must conclude that rules are not followed, but we can equally conclude from the premises that rules are followed. Why isn't that your conclusion instead?

That's the simple fact which observation gives us. — Metaphysician Undercover

An observation, not a deduction?

And this is the difference we can observe between human beings and inanimate matter, we do not necessarily follow rules, as does inanimate matter. — Metaphysician Undercover

Isn't your position that one needs to learn language before one can learn and follow rules? How can inanimate matter do this, and how does it learn a language?

Earlier you were arguing that we need to be conscious of rules in order to be able to follow them, and now you're arguing we don't follow rules at all? Gimme a break. Talking to you is an endless rabbit hole. You just keep changing your position.

You accused me of equivocation earlier because you thought your argument applied only to conventions and not to explicitly stated rules. It seems you've changed your mind. — Luke

That's not my argument, it's yours. You took mine, changed it to suit your purpose, and asked if I was OK with the conclusion. I'm ok with it, because I told you I would go along with your substitution just to humour you. But I haven't changed my mind.

In all cases? Or are you just going to continue to ignore this question? You did not even engage the problem I pointed out with your argument: that you make a conclusion about all cases from a premise about some cases. — Luke

I don't make a conclusion about all cases, I make a conclusion which contradicts a general statement which is intended to apply to all cases. So there's no such problem, as I explained, some cases contrary to a general descriptive statement concerning all cases, is all that's required to disprove it. "Grass is green" is disproven by some cases of grass that is not green. "Human beings follow rules" is disproven by instances of human beings not following rules.

My argument is just an example of how we utilize deduction to disprove faulty inductive reasoning.
You've been looking for excuses to reject the deduction, in order to cling to your faulty inductive conclusion, that human beings can be described as rule followers.

Isn't your position that one needs to learn language before one can learn and follow rules? How can inanimate matter do this, and how does it learn a language? — Luke

We discussed this already, the difference between the prescriptive and descriptive sense of "following rules". We are now discussing whether human beings can be described as rule followers. This is the result of the changes you made to my argument, the difference caused by switching my use of "rule", (def#1), for yours, (def#2). Your obtuseness never ceases to amaze me Luke.

You took mine, changed it to suit your purpose, and asked if I was OK with the conclusion. I'm ok with it, because I told you I would go along with your substitution just to humour you — Metaphysician Undercover

So do you agree with the conclusion that “Explicitly stated rules are not rules which are followed” or were you only humouring me? In your last post you said “I have no problem with that conclusion” and went on to detail why you had no problem with it.

I don't make a conclusion about all cases, — Metaphysician Undercover

It’s taken you a while to admit it. Therefore, your conclusion should be stated as: “Conventions [and/or explicitly stated rules] are rules which are not followed in some cases, and which are followed in other cases.

I don't make a conclusion about all cases, I make a conclusion which contradicts a general statement which is intended to apply to all cases — Metaphysician Undercover

Which statement is that? I’ve never claimed that rules or conventions are followed in all cases.

Isn't your position that one needs to learn language before one can learn and follow rules? How can inanimate matter do this, and how does it learn a language?
— Luke

We discussed this already, the difference between the prescriptive and descriptive sense of "following rules". We are now discussing whether human beings can be described as rule followers. This is the result of the changes you made to my argument, the difference caused by switching my use of "rule", (def#1), for yours, (def#2). Your obtuseness never ceases to amaze me Luke. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn’t change the structure of your argument in any way. The same argument applies equally to both #1 and #2.

Besides, what does any of that have to do with inanimate matter? The supposed “rules” that inanimate matter must follow (i.e. the laws of physics) are not the same type of rules we have been discussing here (e.g. the rules of a game). That’s equivocation.

So do you agree with the conclusion that “Explicitly stated rules are not rules which are followed” or were you only humouring me? In your last post you said “I have no problem with that conclusion” and went on to detail why you had no problem with it. — Luke

Yes I agree with that conclusion, for the reasons stated already.

I didn’t change the structure of your argument in any way. The same argument applies equally to both #1 and #2. — Luke

Many deductive arguments have the same structure. You changed the content, so that what you presented was not even similar to my argument.

You changed the content, so that what you presented was not even similar to my argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

How was it “not even similar”? It produces the same conclusion for conventions as it does for explicitly stated rules.

Conventions, as you use the term, are not explicitly stated rules. So doing that switch, changes what the argument is about, while maintaining the structure. You might switch "books" in there, or whatever you want. The switch makes it so that we're talking about something different.

Conventions, as you use the term, are not explicitly stated rules. So doing that switch, changes what the argument is about, while maintaining the structure. — Metaphysician Undercover

What do you mean it "changes what the argument is about"? Let's remind ourselves of the original purpose of your argument:

So if there are some different types of "rules" which are non-explicit, and therefore impossible to be followed, these types of rules are irrelevant to our discussion.
— Metaphysician Undercover

Conventions, unspoken rules, and the unwritten rules of baseball are not impossible to be followed. These are all relevant rules.
— Luke

Since you're having so much difficulty understanding this simple matter, I'll spell it out for you in the form of a simple deductive argument. First premise: to follow a rule means to act within the confines of that rule, and not stray outside of those restrictions. Second premise: people often act in ways outside of conventions and unspoken rules. Conclusion: conventions and unspoken rules are not rules which are followed. — Metaphysician Undercover

You produced your deductive argument as support/proof of your initial claim that conventions and other non-explicit rules are "impossible to be followed". Since you accept the conclusion of "my" argument (with its substitution of "explicitly-stated rules"), this implies you would agree that explicitly-stated rules are likewise "impossible to be followed".

Later, you offered a different interpretation of the conclusion, suggesting a different purpose of the argument:

The conclusion indicates that we cannot make the generalized claim that conventions are rules which are followed. In other words, we cannot truthfully assert "conventions are rules". — Metaphysician Undercover

Did you need to go to all the effort of a deductive argument simply to draw a distinction between explicit- and non-explicit rules?

But that's clearly not your purpose here. You were desperately trying to make the case that conventions and other non-explicit rules do not qualify as "rules" - as you use the term - and that "true" rules can only be explicitly stated. Let's re-write your argument to make explicit your true intention:

P1. To follow an explicitly stated ("true") rule means to act within the confines of that rule, and not stray outside of those restrictions

P2. People often act in ways outside of non-explicit rules, such as conventions and unspoken rules.

C. Conventions and unspoken rules are not explicitly stated ("true") rules which are followed.

The conclusion does not even follow from the premises, and your question begging is now made starkly obvious. P1 and P2 are each about completely different things. That's because you assumed that they were different, and that conventions could not be rules, before you ever derived the conclusion.

But there's a further problem here. Even if your deductive argument does demonstrate that conventions are not explicitly-stated rules, it also demonstrates that explicitly-stated rules are not explicitly-stated rules:

P1. To follow an explicitly stated rule means to act within the confines of that rule, and not stray outside of those restrictions

P2. People often act in ways outside of explicitly-stated rules.

C. Explicitly stated rules are not explicitly stated rules which are followed.

Oh shit, even with this explicit wording, "true" rules are not "true" rules. (I would add the "which are followed", but let's not forget your intention was to prove that conventions are not "true" rules, so that's the part of the conclusion we're concerned with here.)

Explicit rules obviously are explicit rules, and they obviously are followed in some cases, which is what your second premise allows. But exactly the same can be said about non-explicit rules: that they are non-explicit rules and that they are followed in some cases. So, your argument fails to achieve what you intended.

If you define "rule" such that it must be explicitly stated, then obviously a non-explicit rule won't qualify. But you've provided no good reason for restricting the definition of "rule" in this way, other than it's for the purpose of your "philosophical inquiry".

What do you mean it "changes what the argument is about"? Let's remind ourselves of the original purpose of your argument: — Luke

When you change the subject, you change what the argument is about. Don't you think?

I thought we were making progress when you said that you'd respect a difference between OED def #1, and OED def #2.

I'm happy to adopt your terminology of "def#1" (or "#1") for explicit rules and "def#2" (or "#2") for non-explicit rules, but I'll remind you that your OED definitions #1 and #2 do not make the same distinction. — Luke

However you continue acting as if there is no difference. That's hypocrisy. You say 'I'll play by that rule', but then your actions violate the rule. I will not play that game with you.

Did you need to go to all the effort of a deductive argument simply to draw a distinction between explicit- and non-explicit rules? — Luke

Yes, I did need to go to that extent, because you continually refused to look at the difference between those two, assuming that customs and traditions (def#2) are "principles" of conformity (def#1).. Now I thought you had finally agreed to accept that difference, such that we could analyze these two as distinct, but then you went right back to acting as if there is no difference between the two. Within a logical procedure, acting as if there is no difference is called equivocation.

I'm happy to adopt your terminology of "def#1" (or "#1") for explicit rules and "def#2" (or "#2") for non-explicit rules, but I'll remind you that your OED definitions #1 and #2 do not make the same distinction.
— Luke

However you continue acting as if there is no difference. That's hypocrisy. You say 'I'll play by that rule', but then your actions violate the rule. I will not play that game with you. — Metaphysician Undercover

This distinction was made very clear in my last post. Here it is again, simplified for you, ensuring to maintain a very clear distinction between explicit and non-explicit rules:

P1. To follow an explicit rule means to not break that explicit rule
P2. People often break non-explicit rules
C. Non-explicit rules are not explicit rules

This can be re-stated as:

P1. To follow E means to not break E
P2. People often break N
C. N are not E

The conclusion does not follow, since P2 has no relation to P1. The conclusion is not inferred from the premises; it's an assumption or definition that is required by the premises at the outset.

Begging the question "occurs when an argument's premises assume the truth of the conclusion, instead of supporting it."

I changed your P1 from "rules" to "explicit rules" because your position is that "rules" must be explicitly stated and non-explicit rules are not (true) rules. If you look at your original argument, you have equivocated in your use of "rule", as the abbreviated argument above clearly demonstrates.

However you continue acting as if there is no difference. That's hypocrisy. You say 'I'll play by that rule', but then your actions violate the rule. I will not play that game with you. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's not at all true. I have emphasised the distinction which was hidden in your argument. You required the equivocation in order to be able to draw a conclusion from your premises.

Yes, I did need to go to that extent, because you continually refused to look at the difference between those two, assuming that customs and traditions (def#2) are "principles" of conformity (def#1).. — Metaphysician Undercover

See my quote at the top of this post and my stipulation that I agree to your distinction between explicit and non-explicit, but that the OED definitions do not distinguish def#1 and def#2 along the same lines.

I'm arguing (or just reading the dictionary, which tells us) that rules can either be explicitly stated or not. I have been maintaining this distinction and have been referring to them as explicit and non-explicit rules. However, I am confident you will urge that we collapse this distinction and demand to return to your original argument, despite its equivocation and question begging.

I think what is happening is you are adamantly defending something you think I (or Witt) is trying to take away. — Antony Nickles

After a fashion, perhaps. If I succumb to the way Witt wants me to understand my language practice, he will have taken away the “framework” I have always understood language to entail. I don’t fear that, however, not because Witt’s argument isn’t justified, but only because it isn’t sufficient......

Witt is trying to allow the interlocutor the "picture" of meaning that they want--the philosophical theory that when we see a cube or say cube, there is an image in our mind (our meaning). — Antony Nickles

........the lack thereof demonstrated right there. My favored philosophical theory characterizing the image in my mind as the identifying representation of an object, has nothing to do with my meaning upon its subsequent use when I talk about it, or just me when I think about it. As such, my naming is nothing but a relation between the image and my conception of it by which it is known by me. Witt has generalized concepts as having optional characterizations which are then used by anybody, when parsimony suggests concept generation is as private as the mind that contains them.

We might be getting tripped up on Witt's term "concept", but, as I laid out above, the concept of, say, "knowing" has a number of different options in which it can be used (a skill, information, acknowledgement). And these don't "relate" to anything, they just are how we use the concept of knowing, how knowing is in our lives. — Antony Nickles

Tripped up indeed, in that “knowing” is not a concept, it is a mental activity, or part of a methodological procedure, as is “conceiving”, and understanding, judging, cognizing. Knowing information and knowing a skill, etc., are all relations between a particular knowledge system, and that which is presented to the system. From that, it is clear that “how knowing is in our lives” is nothing more than......hey, big deal....we know stuff. I mean, it is quite absurd to suggest that we DO NOT know stuff, so how important can it be to wonder how knowing is in our lives? And if the argument is that knowing has a number of different options in how it can be used, again....big deal. No matter how many options there are for its use, the end result is exactly the same. We know stuff. Thing is....we all know different stuff, and, we all know the same stuff differently. So even if how knowing is in our lives is a valid expression, it doesn’t say anything we didn’t already know.

Witt went backwards, as did all analytic language philosophers. It used to be that the fact we know things is given, and the quest was in how is knowledge possible. That fundamentalism evolved....probably because of its intrinsically speculative nature....into the broadening of how knowing things interactively affects us, and that broadening determinable, made possible, because the language we use to express how each of us are affected by different options for knowing, is right there in your face, thus being very far from speculative.

Hardly a satisfying philosophy, I must say.

The conclusion does not follow, since P2 has no relation to P1. The conclusion is not inferred from the argument; it's an assumption or definition that is required by the premises at the outset. — Luke

P2 is related to P1 through the concept of what it means to follow a rule. That's what the argument is about, what we were discussing, the concept of what it means to follow a rule, and whether traditional, customary, or conventional activities qualify as activities of following a rule. That's what the argument is about, the activity called following a rule.

P! is intended as a definition of "to follow a rule". P2 is intended to state that activities related to conventions ( call them conventional activities) are often outside that definition. The conclusion is supposed to state that we cannot claim the conventional activities to be rule following activities. That's what was meant by the argument, perhaps I didn't state the conclusion clearly, but now that you've addressed the argument appropriately, I'll make it clearer for you.

The argument is not meant to prove anything about the nature of "a rule", because this would be begging the question. That there are distinct referents for "rule" is taken for granted. It is premised that there is "rule" as in def #1, and "rule" as in def #2, and that the two are different. The argument is meant to show that the activities described, or referred to by "rules", def#2, what you call unspoken rules, or conventions, do not qualify as activities called "following a rule", as dictated by def#1.

See my quote at the top of this post and my stipulation that I agree to your distinction between explicit and non-explicit, but that the OED definitions do not ditinguish between def#1 and def#2 along the same lines. — Luke

As I explained already, a few times, the difference is def#1: a principle of conformity, def #2: a custom or tradition. What I want from you is to accept that a custom or tradition def#2, is not a principle of conformity, i.e. not a rule being followed, nor a rule to be followed.

I'm arguing (or just reading the dictionary) that rules can either be explicitly stated or not. — Luke

Just so that we have clarity, can you define "rules" for me? Are we talking about rules which people follow, def#1, a principle of conformity, or are we talking about "rules" in some other sense? After we have a clear definition of what a "rule" is, which we both agree on, then we can proceed to determine whether rules must be stated or not.