I'd put the first paragraph last. Start right into your project at the outset, so he can decide if he's interested or not, then provide the boring introduction afterwards. I think that the entire paragraph starting with "It strikes me..." is opinion-based, unnecessary, and cumbersome. Also, I think that the paragraphs starting with "Furthermore, by adding a richness...", and "Notwithstanding...", are redundant, opinion-based, and unnecessary as well.

In other words, setout concisely what you are doing, and why you want his attention, then introduce yourself, and hope for a reply.

I expect a ton of hate for a lot of things, here. — Arcane Sandwich

Well, isn't that what heavy metal is all about? If you can define the key features, "the essence" of heavy metal, then we could judge the material as to how well it fulfills the criteria. You need to define "the feeling". If you just go on how it sounds, then we'll get all sorts of shape-shifting, genre-crossing posers, pretending, just to cash-in. You know, like the way the country guys do. Then we have sex-starved, cry-in-my-beer, crossed with a-ton-of-hate. What's your favourite "country-metal"?

First, what is a cause? A cause is a combination of factors which explain why a state of reality is the way it is. Why does a baseball exist? We can note physics, bonds, and materials. There is some existence that makes up the existence of the baseball in combination. We can then focus on the thread of a baseball and say, "What causes that thread to exist?" Then we can delve into its chemistry and physics, as well as its interaction with the world. — Philosophim

You seem to have neglected a very important aspect of causation ("why a state of reality is the way it is"), and that is "intention". Why does a baseball exist? It was created artificially for the purpose of playing the game of baseball.

Your discussion of scope, causal chains, and limits, does not even approach the true answer for "why does a baseball exist?". Do you not see that "intention" (it was produced for a specific purpose) provides the true answer here, and this is where you ought to be focusing your attention?

Determinism and causation in our context here are much the same, and they are fundamental to humans with intentions regardless of their view of the arrow of time. Whether an individual is suffering from cause and effect thinking or thriving on it is more a psychological question than a scientific question, isn't it? — ucarr

You ask me a psychological question, concerning the difference between believing in freewill, and believing in determinism, and how this might affect one's life. I answered accordingly.

But determinism and causation are not the same, and this is the central issue of our discussion. Determinism reduces causation to one type of cause, known in philosophy as efficient cause. The concept of freewill allows for the reality of what is known in philosophy as "final cause". This type of causation is completely distinct from "efficient cause". "Final cause" is only intelligible when we allow that the force from the future is causal.

If possibility is logically connected to realization of possibility, and logical continuity is atemporal, then the reality of the realization of possibility must be contemporary with the reality of the possibility. This doesn't, however, mean that possibility demands it be enacted; it just means the reality of its realizationability is simultaneous with the reality of its possibility. So possibility is not prior to realization, right? — ucarr

No, I don't think that follows logically. First, any specific possibility must have a temporal extension, what might be called colloquially as "the window of opportunity". Realization must occur within that period of time, so to say that the two are "contemporary" would be misleading. Also possibility is required for the actualization, and it is highly improbable that the actualization would occur at the exact moment that the possibility arises.

Furthermore, the moment that the actualization occurs, the possibility is gone, because "possibility" implies more than one option, and when actualization occurs, other options are rendered impossible by the fact of actualization. Therefore it would be contradictory to say that the possibility and the actualization occur at the same time. So we must conclude that the possibility is temporally prior to the actualization.

From the experience of experimental verification, we know that possibilities don't become realities, i.e., don't become realized, until at the time of verification via realization, not before this realization. — ucarr

That is an incorrect description. Possibilities must be a reality prior to being actualized, or else they could not be act on. Therefore they have a place in reality which is other than "actual".

Are you uncoupling space and time? — ucarr

Of course, as I explained, this is necessary for a proper understanding.

If we move in space as time passes, is this how we're experiencing time, i.e., as movement through space? If so, how is movement through space, and the time elapsing in sync with that movement, different from things moving in time?

Does this posit time as necessary to our movement through space, i.e., time is necessary to physics?

Does time have physics as either a dimension, or as a multiplex of dimensions?

Since time moves, does its motion imply its physicality? If not, what is non-physical motion?

Can time move without causing things to change?

Can time move without causing things to move? — ucarr

I think I've already addressed all this.

Let's reconfigure the thought experiment as follows: passing time is making me change. First I name my present day as Friday. Passing time changes me so that I next name my present day as Saturday, and so on. This is an ordinal series which has passing time changing me through a sequence of present days, right? — ucarr

Not quite. The passing of time causes changes. You notice these changes, and name the days according to the way you were taught and understand, "Friday", "Saturday", etc.. To make things easier, imagine that the clock says 1:00, so you say "it is one o'clock". The passing of time causes changes, and you notice that the clock says 2:00, so you say "it's two o'clock".

Generally speaking, people live under the illusion that they have control over their phones, and the paranoia that if they install it into their brains it will have control over them. We are conditioned with an internal /external boundary which supports a "self", but it's also in some ways self-contradicting.

We assume some control over our interactions with the external, and control over the critical aspect, which is what we allow into the internal, from the external (no vaccines please). However, to subsist we must allow the external to penetrate, and the effects of toxicity make us realize that we really have no control over the internal. And that is where "self" becomes "self-contradicting". Once the toxin is internal, it has gained control. That realization may manifest as irrational fear toward the external, paranoia. So the "self" is supported by control over the external, but it's contradicted by lack of control over the internal, and the contradiction is enhanced by the need to allow the external into the internal to enable subsistence. This could produce an unhealthy fear of "the wrong choice", which is lack of self-confidence.

I believe this lack of self-confidence underlies the fear and skepticism toward applying quantum principles to biology, a move which could make GM look like child's play. We see the tip of a huge iceberg of ethical dilemma, and avoid it like the plague.

The majority says stay away, all you scientists ought to just go back to working on nuclear fusion, find the free energy which would make life a breeze, or something else useful like giving my phone more abilities. But there's always a few who want the fountain of youth, and how could you stop them from proceeding?

With the past_future POV, decisions of the past are completed and thus choices are excluded. With the future_past POV, decisions are not finalized and thus choices are available. — ucarr

The past is fixed, unchangeable. If time flows from past to future, the fixedness of the past causes what happens, in a determinist way, and there is no possibility of anyone making any real choices. If time flows from future to past, then we allow that what happens is not fixed by the past.

If this is right, does it follow that Man A and Man B have an equal chance of realizing their choices? The difference, then, is that Man B has a more correct understanding about how his temporal path from choice to realization is organized in time? — ucarr

Correct, Man A has a misunderstanding concerning this matter.

So, the difference between the two POVs comes down to perception and understanding, not down to a literal choice between having free will or not having it, right? If it were true the past_future POV literally prevents a person from ever getting what they choose, no one would commit to that POV, would they? — ucarr

I think the issue is a bit more complex than this. People give all sorts of reasons for believing in determinism. And, a belief in determinism can produce a defeatist attitude, fatalism etc.. This attitude may be very detrimental to one's life, and prevent a person from getting a happiness which they might otherwise obtain.

When I say, "It's now possible for me to lift my left arm." am I connecting* my words to the dynamism of the event of my arm going upwards in the air? If so, does it follow that the words and the dynamism of my arm are synchronous? In other words, when one is true, the other must also be simultaneously true? Does it follow that if they are not synchronous, then my words are not true and thus the possibility does not exist? So, going the other way, when I verbalize a possibility, the words are synchronous with the possible physical event? — ucarr

I don't follow your logic. The phrase "possible for me to lift my arm" does not imply actually lifting an arm. So a person could repeat this phrase over and over, without ever lifting the arm, and it could be true. I do not understand the relation you are describing.

*If my words don't accurately signify a possibility, then I'm just indulging my fancy, right? — ucarr

Sure, but the possibility to lift the arm is not the same thing as actually lifting the arm. The relation of necessity is only one way. After the arm is lifted, we can say that the possibility to lift the arm was necessarily prior to the actual lifting. However, when the possibility is real, and no arm is yet lifted, this does not imply that the arm will ever necessarily be lifted.

The key point is that the words do not connect to "the dynamism of the event", as you say. The words connect to the possibility of that dynamism being activated, so this is something which is prior to that event. The words do not connect to the event, but something prior to the event, which could be actualized, and cause that event.

Do you agree that any movement in time is from one present to another present? — ucarr

As I said, I do not agree with "movement in time". We move in space, as time passes. Therefore time moves, we do not move in time.

When I get into my time machine now, in 2025, I intend to time travel backwards 100 years to 1925. Upon arrival there, however, 1925 is now my present, right? If this is true, then it examples my having traveled from one present, 2025, to another present, 1925. When I return to 2025, again that's traveling from one present to another present, right? — ucarr

I'll reply to this with your own words:

"If my words don't accurately signify a possibility, then I'm just indulging my fancy, right?"

Talking about time travel is fantasy. Unless you can somehow show that it is real, it provides no evidence toward your claim that we move through time. Are you using fiction as evidence of the truth of what you say? How could that make sense to you?

Yes it's what I believe. I also just noticed that I spelled "cite" wrong.

That's put out there by Roger Penrose, and he does seem to have a pretty good understanding of the problems of metaphysics.

Hook me up. I want one implanted in my brain.
I wonder if that's how those monarch butterflies find that spot in Mexico.

Her breasts are bulbous, and her hips rock when the action starts. The lyrics get interesting at about the 53 minute marker (I skipped to the end because it was very boring).

So you have a deflationary approach to metaphysics? Is that it? — Arcane Sandwich

I don't think so, but I don\t know.

The flow of future-to-past direction has the future tense flowing toward the past tense? — ucarr

I don't understand your use of "tense" here. so I can't answer this.

To what subject does the consciousness of the future-to-past direction belong? — ucarr

Ontology, I would say.

Regarding "Because possibilities are in the future," If I say, "It's now possible for me to lift my left arm." am I speaking in the present or in the future? — ucarr

You are speaking about the future, because by saying it is "possible" to lift your arm you are referring to something which would occur in the future. Anytime you say that such and such action is possible, you are saying that it may occur in the future. Your act of speaking is in the past though, by the time I hear it.

Regarding "and actualities are in the past," The dictionary defines one of the senses of "actual" as "existing now; current." Is it wrong? — ucarr

No, I would not say that the dictionary is wrong, it represents the way we speak. But I'd characterize "existing now" as an inductive conclusion. If I observe a chair in my room, in front of me for a duration of time, I will conclude "the chair exists now", or "is actual", meaning that I believe the chair will continue to be as it has been observed to be. That is correct by our conventions, and the dictionary indicates this. But it doesn't take into account the fact that the true nature of "now" consists equally of future as it does past. So by the time that I finish speaking that sentence, or by the time you hear it, the chair might cease to exist. That's why i would say that "actual" represents the past part of now, but not the future part.

Dimensions are a part of time.

How are dimensions connected to time?

Does time have other kinds of parts? — ucarr

A dimension is an aspect, or facet of a thing, it is not really \"a part" of a thing. Time has dimensions just like space has dimensions, but since space and time are completely different, the dimensions of time are in no way similar to the dimensions of space. The two dimensions of time are past and future, and since these two overlap at the present, the present is two dimensional.

In your example, does time start in the present? — ucarr

Due to the priority of the future, and the logical conclusion that there could be only future and no past, when time starts, we'd have to say that time started from the future. Only after time started to pass (i.e. after there is a present), could there be a past. Past is everything which is after (past) the present.

Does logical priority imply causation? — ucarr

No, not necessarily, though I think it could in some applications.

Does causation imply temporal priority? — ucarr

I think so, but there are different senses of "cause", as Aristotle outlined, and the different senses may require a different temporal ordering. So for example "efficient cause", which is the determinist sense, requires the Past-tp-future ordering. "Final cause", which allows for freewill requires a future-to-past ordering.

What is inevitable then, is that depending on the ontology you choose, one or the other becomes an invalid concept, and gets dismissed as illusion. So from the determinist ontology freewill and final cause are an illusion, but from the freewill perspective determinist causation loses the required necessity.

Can Cause A exist if Effect B doesn't simultaneously exist? — ucarr

It is temporal succession, not simultaneity.

When there is only the first, and thus it makes no sense to say that the first is prior to the second, because there is no second, does it also follow that it makes no sense to posit the possibility of time without a past and only a future because such a possibility has neither present nor past, but only future. — ucarr

No, why would you ask this? When there is the first, but not a second, it clearly makes sense to talk about the possibility of a second. In fact, in some interpretations, the first would itself be the possibility of the second. This is why possibility is in the future, and it is prior. When there is only future, all there is is possibility. However, something must act to actualize that possibility, and produce a past. This act is the act of time itself.

Given this setup, the temporal future tense has no present and thus no presence and therefore cannot exist and therefore cannot look backwards to a past that follows the future? — ucarr

That's right. something must act, and this act would bring about actual existence (past) from that dimension of possibility (future). This act we know as the passing of time.

Given this train of logic, does it follow that the arrow of time, logically speaking, must move from one empirical present to another empirical present, with each empirical present possessing the past and future tenses as mental abstractions relative to the phenomenal_empirical present? — ucarr

I suppose, I don't like your terminology though, "empirical present".

Does it make sense to always pair both the future tense and the past tense with the present tense because the present tense is necessary for the other two, relative tenses to exist, i.e., to possess presence? — ucarr

I don't agree with this. Future has the logical priority, as explained. It is necessary for the other two. Then present, as that act which creates a past from the future, is necessary for a past. So "present" requires future, and "past requires present and future.

If I remember correctly, he was supposed to be given vinegar to drink, when he was on the cross. Someone gave him water instead, and that pissed him off. So it was really his people that he felt were abandoning him.

No matter what position you take in that debate, in the example of the watch, the problem with the Ship of Theseus still stands: it is not self-evident that when you divide an object into parts, the original object ceases to exist, even if new objects with distinct identities are created in such a case. — Arcane Sandwich

That's why the correct answer is neither. The issue you sight is not a problem of metaphysical "identity", it's an issue of naming conventions.

Neither, because dividing a thing into parts creates distinct objects with distinct identities. That's why the problem is a ruse, it associates "identity" with the name for a thing, rather than with the thing itself. If we divide a thing, remove a part, and wish to maintain the same name for one of the parts rather than another, that's a matter of convention, not identity.

The name of the object "Ship of Theseus" is not the thing's identity, nor is anything we say about the object, "what it is". So the purported problem is not an issue of identity at all, that's a ruse. The thing's identity inheres within the thing itself.

People don't actually care until they get a boot on their face and they cry out "how did this happen!?" — Christoffer

I don't think this is quite right. People really care about money. Many strongly believe in a necessary relationship between money and happiness, so much so that money is often equated with happiness. Having money is being happy.

Money is the opium of the masses. And the happiness which it is equated with is an illusion produced by its presence, the effects of that addiction. Feed the addiction, the illusion persists. Threats to the supply, allow fear and anxiety to permeate the illusion of happiness. DJT well understands the relationship between money and illusion.

It's like my example of the caterpillar that turns into a butterfly. — Arcane Sandwich

The problem though, is your interpretation. You say "it still has the same essence". It doesn't have the same essence because the essence of an individual material object, as an individual material object , consists of all those accidentals which are changing. The object however, retains its identity despite changing. This implies that the identity of the object is associated with its matter rather than with its form. The matter is what persists through the change, as does the thing's identity.

The arrow of time outside of the boundaries of the empirical present is an abstraction. — ucarr

We seem to have a fundamental disagreement concerning "the empirical present". I deny that there is such a thing, because "empirical" requires "observation", or "experience", and anything observed or experienced is past. Therefore I find "empirical present" to be self-contradicting. So I incorporate both, empirical (past), and anticipatory (future) elements into my conception of "present". You refuse to relinquish your idea of an empirical present, and this makes it impossible for you to understand my explanations.

What we have here is a complicated interplay of different frames of reference. I keep my perception oriented by confining myself to the present tense view of all three tenses, with the understanding only the present tense is, for me, pragmatically real beyond the neuronal activity of my brain. — ucarr

See, this is your supposed "empirical present" dominating your thought.

Keeping this in mind, I can ask why the future-to-past arrow and the past-to-future arrow don't both possess determinist causation? — ucarr

I wouldn't say that either one "possesses" determinist causation. Both allow for determinist causation. However, the past-to-future direction renders determinist causation as necessary due to the fixedness of the past. The future-to-past direction recognizes that the past is fixed, but since the flow is not from the past, but from the future, and the future consists of possibility, this causation is not necessary. The lack of necessity in this efficient causation is recognized by Hume, and even Newton as well, who said that his first law of motion relies on the Will of God.

If, as you claim, the arrow of time is the same for both directions, then how could one be any less causal than the other? I ask this question bearing in mind your talk of free will. Even if we somehow inhabit the future pragmatically and thus also paradoxically, and therein exercise our free will such that the past events following this future free will decision making are caused by it, how is that an example of the future-to-past arrow of time being any less determinist that the past-to-future arrow of time? — ucarr

The past-to-future representation does not allow for the future-to-past causation, which is required for free will, because no future-to-past flow is allowed for, Because possibilities are in the future, and actualities are in the past, the flow must be future-to-past to allow that possibilities can get selected and actualized at the present. This is required for the reality of free will. Under this representation efficient causation is understood as a human representation produced from inductive reasoning, therefore lacking true necessity, as explained by Hume.

Even if we somehow inhabit the future pragmatically and thus also paradoxically, and therein exercise our free will such that the past events following this future free will decision making are caused by it, how is that an example of the future-to-past arrow of time being any less determinist that the past-to-future arrow of time? — ucarr

The future consists of possibility.

You acknowledge that time is a dimension... — ucarr

I told you, time is not a dimension, it has dimensions.

There's a logical problem in your statement. In the situation of "time without a past," how can the "future" be prior to something that doesn't exist? — ucarr

In the case of all contingent things, the possibility of the thing is prior to the thing's actual existence.

That can't be the case in a situation with only a first and no second. — ucarr

Sure, but we're looking back, after the second has come into existence, and realizing that the first was necessarily prior to the second. As is indicated by the nature of "possibility", when there is only the first, and the first provides the possibility for a second, the second is not necessary. So you're correct to say that if there is only a first it makes no sense to say that the first is prior to the second, because there is no second. However, that is not our perspective. From our perspective there is both, and we can judge one as prior to the other.

Now, however, another problem arises: this is a situation with no present. It follows logically that a situation with no present has no presence, i.e., doesn’t exist. — ucarr

That's correct, but it's really not a problem. Possibility cannot be said to be an existent thing. We cannot say that anything in the future "exists" nor does the future "exist" by how we define that word. But this does not mean that the future is not real, it just means that it cannot be described by that word. So we use "possible" to refer to future things, rather than "exists". This is not a problem, it's just a recognition of the complexity of reality.

We're in the empirical present - how we consciously perceive the world around us, moment to moment - which time lags behind the theoretical numerical present. Speaking in terms of the relative positions, the nearly present, our empirical present, chases closely behind what to us relatively speaking is the near future. This is a way of saying we're some tiny fraction of a second behind the numerical present. Now, to be sure, perception of the numerical present gets gnarly when we home in on its details in high resolution. We can only approach the numerical present as a changing variable traveling the highway of an infinite series. We're always approaching and never arriving at a relative future we're trying to make present here and now. Since these discrepancies at the Newtonian scale are minute, we ignore them. However, if we wish to talk scientifically, we say our position is spacetime is probable, not certain. So, now you see why the present is represented as a theoretical point of zero dimensions. — ucarr

"Empirical present" is a faulty concept for the reason I explained above. All you are saying here, is that the empirical present isn't the real present, it's the past. What I propose is that we add to this aspect of being conscious (what you call the empirical present, which is really the past), the aspect of anticipation and intention (which is really the future), to have a more complete representation of being conscious at the present. The present includes some past and some future.

"Have I ever been bodily present within either the past or the future?" — ucarr

I consider myself to be present in both future and past, because I believe "the present" to be an overlapping of future and past. This I explained days ago with my dimensional representation of the present.

We both know you know the answer is "no." — ucarr

What I've been explaining is that a thorough analysis of the nature of time produces the need to answer this question with "yes". We believe ourselves to be in the present. But analysis of "the present" reveals that it cannot be a dimensionless point, as we've discussed. This implies that the present must be a duration of time. This duration cannot be completely in the past or we'd have to call it "the past". It cannot be completely in the future or we'd be calling it "the future". So introspection reveals that this duration must be partially past and partially future.

We know we're following the arrow of time only going forward because we know from our life experience we are born young and die older; we understand this as the present going forward to the future. — ucarr

That's not true. We understand this as the passing of time. The reason why we grow old is because time passes, this is not "the present going forward to the future". That doesn't even make sense. How could the present going forward to the future cause you to grow old? And don't say because of entropy. Entropy is not a cause and we're just left with asking what causes entropy. And that is the passing of time. Here we are, entropy is caused by the passing of time when time is modeled as past-to-future.

So when we model time as past-to-future, we are stuck with "entropy". And if we ask what causes entropy, we must answer that it is caused by the passing of time. Therefore, we must conclude that the past-to-future model is wrong, because it leaves us with something, "entropy", which can only be accounted for by a different model, by representing time as a cause, actively passing, and this implies future-to-past.

You're saying the past_present_future arrow of time is self-contradicting because it cancels the free-will option? — ucarr

No, I'm saying that to choose determinism over freewill is self-contradicting.

Surely you're not surprised that examiners of your theory turn to Relativity as their paradigm. I struggle to see how it's legit to brush off Relativity as incompatible and irrelevant. — ucarr

I understand that relativity provides the go-to perspective for many people. What I am saying, is that if you want to understand what I'm proposing, you must relinquish that perspective. If you can't apprehend as "legit", examining a completely different theory, because you think that relativity has got the ground covered, then we ought to stop right now. You would have no doubt that relativity provides all the answers, so there would be no point to pitching a new proposal to you.

Since you're the one trying to overthrow it, aren't you responsible for meeting it head on with cogent arguments? — ucarr

No, That's not my MO at all. I am very confident that relativity is sorely deficient in the way that it models time. And, I am very confident that many other people will notice this as well, because it is quite obvious. Therefore, I am also confident that there will be people interested in alternative theories.

There is no need to meet that theory "head on", or attempt to "overthrow it". What is required is to work on the true model of time.

Since you fault Relativity for dismissing time-passing-without-events without empirical observation, you plan on supporting your claim of immaterial time with empirical observation. — ucarr

No, that would be impossible. Since one whole dimension of time, the future, is completely hidden from empirical observation, and the other dimension, the past, has been observed but is currently unobservable, understanding of time is based in logical reasoning, not empirical observation.

Perhaps time isn't physical, but Relativity's belief in same connects it with our lives, which are, at least in part, physical. Why should I drop my belief in the connection linking physical me with physical time? If It's something unreal - as according to your understanding - shouldn't you show me that immaterial time is somehow connecting with my physical life using cogent logic that overturns my belief. In the boxing ring, the challenger, in order to win, must knock out the champ. This is another kind of boxing ring. — ucarr

The immaterial is not unreal, so I don't know what you are asking for. Don't your plans for the future, next minute, next hour, tomorrow, etc;, connect with your physical life? These things in your plans are completely immaterial. So it seems very obvious to me how the immaterial connects to your physical life, through desires, plans, goals, intentions, etc.. Do you, for some reason, not apprehend this fact?

The distinction in this particular situation becomes a false generalization when applied to all actions involving time and objects — ucarr

There is no false generalization, because all events require time. That's a true generalization.

Its false because the objects moved can act as transitive verbs acting on time. Since time as a dimension has duration, an argument can be made for the actions of moving things acting as movers of time, with time getting moved because its duration increases. — ucarr

Again, you are just applying the incompatible premise, the premise I say is false. The thing is, events can be modeled in different ways. Each way will model the events to some degree of acceptability, depending on the purpose. But the two models cannot be mixed. Relativity theory might tell you that each way is equally valid, and this might incline you to think that one way is no truer than any other.

So it's like if I were handing you a theory about the motions of the earth, sun, moon, planets, and stars, and I was telling you that the earth is spinning, and I model those other objects accordingly. Then you tell me "an argument can be made", that these things are orbiting the earth. Sure, but how is pointing out that there is another way of modeling these things any indication that my way is wrong? The issue is that we need a model of time which allows for the reality of freewill. Your model doesn't provide this, and mine does, that's why I say mine is better.

You cannot cite me one example wherein you pass through space without simultaneously passing through time. — ucarr

I will cite you every example of motion. In each case, when something moves through space, time is passing. It is obviously not the case that the thing is passing through time, because time is passing for everything, even the things which are not moving. Therefore the proper representation is that time is passing, whether a thing is moving or not. Otherwise a thing would be moving through time only when it's moving, and not moving through time when it's not moving.

With heat death, motion stops, time becomes meaningless. — ucarr

Good thing you defined "whimsy" for me, because this is a perfect example.

I'm assuming that when a person dies of electrocution, you think it's due to time passing and not the presence of enough electromotive force to cook the person alive like a piece of meat in a hot skillet. — ucarr

The primary cause is time passing, because "electromotive force" requires this it is a secondary cause.

Logical priority exists when one category, being more broadly inclusive that another lesser category, logically contains the lesser category. If A is logically prior to B, then A is a necessary condition of B; A is the ground of B. — ucarr

Right, now do you see that "time" is logically prior to "event", "motion", and "change"? All of these, "event", "motion", and "change", are the lesser categories than "time". Time is the necessary condition for them. Further, "event", "motion:, and "change" imply "time", but "time" does not imply any of these. That is the order of logical priority.

Do you think logical priority can stand on mere possibility absent proof? — ucarr

Of course, logical priority is based in definition, no proof is required. That's why you can question the logical priority of "time" over "event", by defining "time" in a way which makes the logical priority which I described above, not hold.

The problem though, is that we can manipulate definitions, for various purposes, to the point where it doesn't correspond with reality. Sometimes we can correct ourselves by looking at common usage. So we see that in common usage "time passes", and we do not "pass through time". And if you propose a definition for the purpose of avoiding the logical priority which would prove your argument wrong, and the definition (such as "pass through time") is not consistent with our common understanding, that is a problem for your argument.

You don't think it does. I believe it does because the direction of time from future to past has the arrow of entropy moving from birth into old age to death in pre-fertilization. — ucarr

As explained above, "entropy" is just a symptom of a problematic representation of time. The proper representation of time has no need for this concept which is the result of trying to model something which is not a system as if it was a system.

From you I've learned time can exist apart from matter and energy. — ucarr

At least it wasn't a complete waste of time. And to be fair, I've learned something from you too, physicalists are not completely hopeless. Can I ask, what immaterialist premise gets through to you? What makes you think that it might be worth your while to read this? Is it the supposition of freewill?

Can you give me an example? — Arcane Sandwich

A car gets dented, it still retains its identity as being the same thing, despite that change of form.

I'm asking you why you think it's empirically true that we remember what happens before our present tense experience? — ucarr

No wonder I couldn't understand. I don't think that.

You say there's a jump from future to past, — ucarr

I never said anything about a jump. In fact i was implying that the future and past overlap, with my description of the dimensionality of the present. How is that a jump?

You are badly misrepresenting me.

Possibility is a logical understanding, whether ontological or not. In either case, the sentient experiences this awareness in the empirical present tense whereas both the past and the future are abstractions of the empirically present tense mind. — ucarr

This is what I would say is the mistaken assumption. Really, we are aware of the past, through memory. And, we are also aware of the future, through our anticipations and intentions. The "present" is just an abstraction. That's what I discussed concerning the faulty idea that "the present" is a nondimensional point which divides future from past.

Check around and you'll see, if you haven't already, that the arrow of time and the arrow of entropy point in the same direction. — ucarr

I can't see an arrow of time, nor an arrow of entropy. These are abstractions, part of a (faulty in my belief) conceptual structure.

Note - You've been very patient and very generous with your time, as I've needed a lot of repetition from you as I have corrected my misreadings of your intended meanings. Only recently have I realized immaterial time is the central part of your theory. Now knowing this, I have a better grasp of your point of view. I'm grateful to you for giving me ample chance to understand you. Also, I'm grateful for the extensive workout; I like to believe it has strengthened my ability to reason. — ucarr

You may claim to have a "better grasp" of what I'm saying, but you still badly misrepresent me, especially on the subject of the flow of time. The problem is, that you have this idea that the past is before the future, and this works as a model for determinist causation. When I tell you that it is necessary to understand the future as prior to the past, in order to understand the freewill perspective, you simply reverse the flow of time, and present that as my perspective. But I keep telling you that is not the case, the flow of time is exactly the same, whether it's modeled with past before the future, or future before the past. What is changed is the way that one understands the floe of time.

Do you agree that it is necessary to understand that the possibility for an event precedes the actual occurrence of that event? And do you understand that possibilities only exist in the future, not the past? What happens at the present is that possibilities coming from the future, are selected for, actualized, and then become past. Therefore the future is prior to the past.

The role of time within gravity does not match its role within QM. — ucarr

That's good evidence that Einstein's spacetime is a faulty theory of time.

I infer from this statement that time without a past cannot be dimensionally extended because this state of the system presupposes the system being a proper subset of itself, a cosmic contradiction. — ucarr

The "time without a past" is not dimensionless though. That's the point. It still has a future, which is a dimension of time. And, the further point is that this condition you mention, "time without a past", i.e. only a future, is necessarily prior to there being a past, if we rule out eternal or infinite time. Therefore if the extension of time is not infinite, future is necessarily prior to past.

The correction to the cosmological contradiction of a pure origin - there are no pure origins - embodies as the theoretical point with zero dimensions as the limit of the present. As we move in time, we make an approach to the numerical present - that's the theoretical point with zero dimensions as the limit - without arrival. This asymptotic progression toward the numerical present is evidence of QM properties being present within the Newtonian scale of physics. This is a way of saying we humans, like the elementary particles, have only a probable location in spacetime. At the Newtonian scale of physics, this seems not to be the case, and that's why Newton himself didn't include it within his physics — ucarr

Again, this is a terrible model. Why exclude "origins"? Having a model which excludes origins as unintelligible renders real origins as unintelligible. That origins appear to be unintelligible is the fault of the model, not because real origins are actually unintelligible. Origins are modeled as unintelligible, so whenever there is an origin it appears to be unintelligible. That's a faulty model.

Look, the following makes no sense:

"As we move in time, we make an approach to the numerical present - that's the theoretical point with zero dimensions as the limit - without arrival. "

Earlier, you said we are in the "empirical present". Now you say we're moving in time, but never reaching the present. What does this mean, that we are always in the past, yet empirically in the present? Well how do we ever make freewill acts to change things then? The past is already fixed as unchangeable, if we never reach the present we never have the capacity to make a freewill act.

The infinite series of the calculus and it's limit work very well. They aren't deficiencies. — ucarr

Yes, infinite series' are deficiencies, because as you yourself show, they make origins unintelligible, requiring that there is an infinite series to be traversed between now and then. And, the appearance of infinite time here provides an avoidance of the argument which demonstrates that the future is necessarily prior to the past. Only if time was infinite, could this argument be avoided, and the calculus which works with the infinite series produces that illusion of infinity.

Now we have a contradictory scenario, there is supposed to be an origin on the other side of that infinite series, but the infinite series denies the reality of the origin. Then arguments like mine which actually address the origin, can be dismissed, because the infinite series makes a real origin impossible. So all we have is 'waffle-land', deny discussions which take an origin as a premise, because the infinite series doesn't allow the origin to be real, yet also deny that there is an infinite regress by claiming that there is an origin behind the infinite series.

In claiming free will as a self-evident truth, you're ignoring a perennial debate stretching across millennia. The continuing doubt about the existence of free will renders your following argument undecided WRT free will. — ucarr

Since the determinist perspective, and the freewill perspective produce incompatible models of time, we need to choose on or the other. I am not interested in discussing time with anyone who makes the self-contradicting choice, i.e. choosing that choice is not possible.

There's a question whether time, or any other dimension, is causal. — ucarr

You continue to misrepresent "time" as a dimension, in the incompatible determinist way. I mean that's acceptable to that model of time, but if you want to understand "time" in this model you need to rid yourself of those incompatible premises. "Time" here is not a dimension of something, it is something with dimensions.

Since time, per Relativity, is physical, in order for your conclusion to be true, you must overturn Relativity. — ucarr

Overturning relativity is not what is required, only to demonstrate it's deficiencies, like the one mentioned above. Another one which I've been arguing is that it wrongly renders the logical possibility of time without physical events as impossible. When a theory renders a logical possibility as impossible, through stipulation rather than through empirical observation, that theory must be held suspect.

Since time is a physical dimension... — ucarr

Bad premise!

You haven't shown contact between the non-physical and the physical. — ucarr

You haven't dropped your bad premise. Once you drop that premise that time is physical, what you ask for is accomplished.

You say, "we construct a physical system, according to a design." Why isn't the physical thing a system? — ucarr

The physical thing is a "system", but it's artificial. Then there's the other meaning of "system", as in system theory. In this sense we might model a natural things as a "system", but the natural things don't actually fit the theoretical system, so boundaries and things like that, need to be fudged. Both senses of "system", the physical system, and the theoretical system, refer to something artificial. Natural things just don't fulfill the requirement of "system".

This is your argument supporting the separation of activity from event? Thinking about doing something is not equal to the actual doing of the something thought about. In order to support your claim non-physical activity is prior - both logically and existentially - to events, you must show that priority, both logically and existentially. Show me, with mathematical inference, how non-physical time passes inside the Cern particle accelerator in such manner as to cause the animation of the material things that populate events. — ucarr

I've told you many times now, it's taken as a logical possibility, not as a proof. However, when we accept this logical possibility as reality, it makes freewill very intelligible. And, you can deny free will if you so choose, but then we'll have nothing more to talk about.

[

Regarding passing through time, time is the dimension of duration, so is it false to think of my temporal experience as passing through a duration? Consider that it takes one hour to travel from point A to point B. Don't you think about your travel by car as passing through the interval of time required to arrive at your destination? I think it less intuitive to picture time as a separate thing passing away from me as I remain stationary. — ucarr

No, I think of passing through the space between A and B when I travel, and I think that this takes time, i.e. time passes while I traverse this space. I definitely do not think that I travel through time in the way I traverse space, because moving from one place to another requires energy, but time passes without any effort on my part. This is a very big difference which you need to respect. We need to propel ourselves to change locations, but time passes with no effort on our part. That is because time itself is the thing which is active when we supposedly "move through time", not us.

How about I let Einstein justify it?

Time dilation caused by gravity or acceleration
Time dilation explains why two working clocks will report different times after different accelerations. For example, time goes slower at the ISS, lagging approximately 0.01 seconds for every 12 Earth months passed. - Wikipedia

Note the above is not a thought experiment. It is scientific verification with real evidence supporting a prediction of Relativity. — ucarr

I don't see how this proves anything.

Must be a piss poor model if it in no way resembles systemically the systemization of the natural thing it models. — ucarr

I didn't say "it in no way resembles..." If one thing resembles another, that does not mean it is the other. That's piss poor logic. If a natural thing resembles an artificial system, it's piss poor logic to conclude that it is a system.

Again, your argument, even if valid, doesn't necessarily establish what is factual. — ucarr

How many times do I have to tell you? I am in no way trying to "establish what is factual". I am discussing logical possibilities. Do you understand this? This is a theory based in possibilities, not based in what is actual, or factual. This is what makes it consistent with freewill, that it deals with possibilities.

The heat death of the universe is a postulated end to the universe as we know it. It is when a state of maximum disorder, or entropy, is reached; where no thermodynamic processes occur and time itself becomes meaningless — ucarr

That's very faulty. Look, "entropy" is a feature of a system, it accounts for the energy of a system which is no longer useful to that system, and cannot be account for. The universe is not a system. And, assuming a "heat death" is actually accounting for the energy which the concept of "entropy" explicitly indicates cannot be accounted for. So this heat death idea is just self-contradicting, even if you overlook the first fault, that the universe is not a system. Double bad does not make a theory good.

No doubt your understanding of time is based upon the artifice of human-centered system theory. — ucarr

Sure, but I don't pretend that the model is the thing modeled. My model is a model of possibility. You think time is the measurement, so all you are doing is modeling the model.

The problem with having it be time instead of energy is the fact time is not a force — ucarr

Again, you are just adopting incompatible premises to deny the theory. Clearly, in this theory time is a force, so your premise that time is not a force is irrelevant. Furthermore, you replace time as the force, with "energy" as the force, but energy is just a measurement, it's not a real independent thing like time is. We take measurements, and determine "the energy" of something, but that is just physical laws and mathematics. So "energy" is the product of measurements and applied mathematics, it is not a real force in the world, like the passing of time is. It appears your theory has swallowed up your reality.

"Where there's mass, there's time. This tells me time doesn't pass apart from events populated by animated things. — ucarr

This is an invalid conclusion. Like I explained, "where there's mass, there's time", implies that mass cannot exist without time, but it does not imply that time cannot exist without mass.

You need to learn how to understand "logical priority".

Logic works with proofs. How does logic, short of a proof, support a proposition? You don't have any evidence because there's no experimental verification of a half-Planck scale. — ucarr

Clearly you take one way in which logic is used, and assume that this is all that logic does. You see to be totally missing out on some of the greatest uses of it.

By contrast , the language game underlying the statement ‘water boils at 100 degrees’ cannot remain intact if this fact is questioned. — Joshs

You are neglecting the qualification "at sea level". That qualification indicates two essential conditions, temperature and pressure. So, the statement "water boils at 100 degrees" is in fact doubted by the addition of that qualification. However, the language game remains intact, only slightly changed by that doubt. If however, as in my example, it turns out that water boiling is completely a feature of external pressure, and internal temperature was just a ruse, then we'd want to rid ourselves of that language game, as being a faulty representation.

Wiitgenstein uses the word ‘doubt’ to indicate a situation where some particular feature within a language game is put into question, while leaving the game intact. This is why he says that some beliefs must be left certain in order to doubt anything. We can’t doubt the geocentric model by switching to a heliocentric model unless the two models have features that can be incorporated under the same language game. — Joshs

Obviously, I do not accept the common interpretation of how Wittgenstein portrays "doubt". I believe that we can and do doubt foundational rules. And, I also believe that the foundational aspects of the geocentric model were doubted, and this doubt is what allowed it to be replaced by the heliocentric. So I think it is very clear that we do doubt foundational aspects, and completely destroy important conceptual structures, even though vestiges of the old may still remain in our language games ("the sun rises", "the sun sets"). These vestiges become metaphors, so sometimes instead of ridding ourselves of the faulty language game, we allow it to remain in the form of metaphor.

Ok. What would be an example of that, so that I can get a clear picture of it? — Arcane Sandwich

The form of a material thing, in the strict sense of the word "form", in hylomorphism, includes all the accidental properties of that material thing. That's what gives the thing its unique "identity", as the particular thing which it is. However, the accidents are always changing, therefore the form of the material thing is always changing. Nevertheless we say that the thing maintains its identity as the same thing despite the scratches and dents that it receives.

We have to be careful with our use of "essence" because the "essence" of a particular, "what the thing is", as a unique particular, is different from "essence" as a type, "what type the thing is". This is the difference between primary and secondary substance, the unique individual being primary substance, the species being secondary substance..

Would you say that deciding to change the rules of chess in order to make a more interesting game is an example of ‘doubting’ the current foundation of chess? — Joshs

I think there is a need here to distinguish between essential and accidental properties, as a way toward understanding this question. If we say that every single rule is essential to the game known as "chess", then changing any one of them would render the new game as no longer "chess". We'd then say that any such change affects the foundation. But if, for example, we designate only the position of "check" as essential to the game, then we are free to make all sort of rule changes, still call the new game "chess", and say that we have not doubted "the foundation".

So it all depends on what is determined as "the foundation". I believe that in many conceptions, there is no such thing as "the foundation", because numerous essential aspects are brought together, therefore numerous foundational aspects. Doubting, and changing aspects of a conception generally alter the conception by degree. However, I believe that we do have to acknowledge the reality of foundational aspects, such as when we turn things right around, like the change from the geocentric to the heliocentric model. Clearly the foundational belief was doubted.

Imagine if we turned the game of chess right around, so that each player started in an equal position of checkmate, with some pieces already taken off the board, and the players were allowed to move other pieces while the king was checked, and the goal was to get all the pieces back to what is now the starting place. This would render the check position irrelevant, and that change would clearly be the result of doubting the foundation, because "the object" of the game would be completely changed. In this case we can say that when the conception of "the object" is doubted, the foundation is doubted.

So, back to the main point, I would say that an Aristotelian substance cannot change its form and still be the same substance, because the form of the substance is its essence, and if its essence changes, then its identity has changed: it is no longer the same substance, it is instead an entirely different substance. — Arcane Sandwich

Aristotle's law of identity, allows that a material object has a changing form, yet maintains its identity as the same thing, through a temporal continuity assigned to the matter. A thing's identity may be its "essence", but its essence is ever changing, as form is "actual". This is why we can represent a thing as a subject for predication, and as time passes, contrary predications are true of the same subject. That is how Aristotle represented becoming, or change, as contrary predications to the same subject.

I think you misunderstand. According to , Rodi is differentiating between the judgement of "a is f", and the judgement of "I judge a is f". The former is a proper predication. The latter, in which the subject would be a self-conscious being, and the predicate would be a belief, cannot be accurately characterized as a predication.

This is the issue I argued in another thread, we cannot represent an idea as the property of a human subject in the way of predication, because this would require that we violate the fundamental laws of logic. (Peirce does this with universals.) For example, when a person deliberates while making a choice, one holds both of two contrary ideas in one's mind at the very same time. If we predicate those ideas of the subject, there would be violation of the law of noncontradiction.

This points back to what I said about how we would represent "the soul", earlier in the thread.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/958098
First, we determine that we would reject the idea that the soul is like a physical object with parts. (This was accomplished by Plato's argument against the soul being a harmony.) However, Aristotle demonstrated that "the soul" is an actuality, a substantive form. So it appears like we could represent "the soul" as a primary substance, and proceed to describe its properties in the way of predication. But because this procedure would lead to absurd conclusions, we must reject the idea that "the soul" is like an object which we can represent with subject/predicate relations.

So, the soul has "properties" of a sort, represented by Aristotle as potentia, capacities, or powers, but we see now that these capacities cannot be described by proper predication, because this creates a situation in which the fundamental laws of logic would be violated. This is the issue Aristotle came across with the proposal of "matter", and "potential" in general. To properly understand these concepts, violation of the fundamental laws of logic was required. He proposed we adhere to the law of noncontradiction, but allow for violation of the law of excluded middle.

Perhaps we don't say it, but we think it, don't we? I mean, if someone asked you, "Does time continue passing while you're asleep," you'd answer, "yes" wouldn't you? — ucarr

Of course, but I think that time passes. You, on the other hand think that the present moves through time instead of time passing. That's the issue, do you really think that you're moving through time while you're sleeping, or do you think that time is passing while you're sleeping?

Time is conventionally conceived as being a dimension. — ucarr

I know, and that's what I am arguing is a faulty conception. You can explain it to me all you want, but unless you justify it, your explanations do nothing for me.

I now suspect you're theory posits time, not as a dimension emergent from matter_energy transfer systems, but as another dynamical system in itself. — ucarr

That's right, but for the reason explained, "system" is the wrong word.

Even if it is, cast in this role, it exemplifies the animation of matter, and is therefore not apart from it. — ucarr

This is backward. The animation of matter exemplifies time, not vice versa. The animation of matter is the example. This means that the animation of matter is not separate from time, but time is separate from the animation of matter. The relationship of necessity is in one direction, but not the other.

Human beings exemplify "animal" and there is a relationship of logical necessity which means that a human being is necessarily an animal. But "animal" is separate from humane beings, and there could be animals even if there was no human beings, because there is no logical necessity that an animal is a human being. Likewise, there is a relationship of necessity which means that animated matter implies that time is passing. However, "time" is separate from the animation of matter because there is no logical necessity which implies that if time is passing there must be animated matter.

This is the "logical possibility" I demonstrated to you, which you refuse to accept. Since this is causing you difficulty, here is another way to look at it. Consider that during a period of time, it is possible that some things can be stationary relative to each other. If it is possible that during one period of time some things can be stationary relative to each other, then it is also possible that at a period of time all things might be stationary relative to each other.

If you already know this, then you need to immediately tell your reader you’re rejecting the conventional wisdom and embarking on a radically different path to discovery about the identity of time. — ucarr

Of course, I've been dismissing "the conventional wisdom" on time, from the beginning. That is the point. We started with a discussion of how "the present" as a point in time, a convention which enabled the measurement of periods of time, leads to significant ontological problems. When you appeared receptive to that analysis which demonstrated the faults of this conception, I proceeded toward explaining a possible solution. But now you seem very reluctant to leave the comfort of your convention, and so you fall back on "conventional wisdom" insisting that we adhere to it, despite the fact that you seemed to agree with the demonstration which showed that the conventional wisdom is faulty.

Sound thinking in physics says spacetime can exist without matter_energy. If it’s the source of matter_energy systems, then we ask whether time alone is a system. If so, what kind of system, how does it work, and how does it ground matter_energy systems? I think these major concepts should be put into the first paragraph of your theory. — ucarr

As I explained, systems are artificial, made by human beings, and time existed before there was human beings. So this "systems" perspective is a non-starter.

When you model an object as fundamentally static, yet being changed by the flow of time, does the modeled object remain static and only appear to be animated on the basis of relative motion? — ucarr

No, it means that without the passage of time, the object would not change. It, the object in itself, is fundamentally static, and the passing of time is what causes it to be active.

Is time passing without anything happening an activity of time? I ask this question because if time makes itself pass, then to my understanding that's time being active, and thus it's an activity of time. To me these seem to be correct readings of what the language signifies. — ucarr

Correct.

Is the activity of time passing without anything happening an event? I ask this question because it seems to me that time passing without anything happening is something happening and I know events happen, so this too must be something happening, even though it's time passing without anything happening. — ucarr

No, I drew this distinction all ready. An "event" is a particular physical thing which happens. It is describable by the terms and laws of physics. That is the way we understand "event". The activity of time passing is something more general which encompasses all events. Therefore it cannot be an event itself.

Imagine that each and every event exemplifies the passing of time. It's impossible that the passing of time could itself be an event, for much the same reason that it is impossible for a set to be a member of itself.

For example, consider a multitude of particular objects which exemplify the colour red. In order for a multitude to exemplify that property, "red", there must be something which forms the basis for that category, "red". It is impossible that the basis for that category is itself a red thing, because this would mean that every object in that category would have to be the exact same as that one red thing, leaving that thing as the sole member of the category.

For those reasons, you can see why it is necessary to maintain the distinction between the particular "event", and the general activity called "the passing of time".

Here you're keeping activity and event distinct? Also, since time is physical, please explain how time passes without any physical event occurring. — ucarr

Time is not physical, and that's a big reason why "conventional wisdom" is so faulty. Since there is no physical thing, which qualifies as "time" we just stipulate principles, like we do with mathematical axioms. When the principles prove to be useful, they become conventional. Neither "conventional" nor "useful" implies true.

So, "Time passing is not the events, nor is it an event, but it is the cause of events"? — ucarr

Correct.

So, time, being immaterial, causes material things to change by passing. This, then, exemplifies the concept of "freewill" that allows for the reality of a cause which is not a physical event? — ucarr

I'd say rather, that it is consistent with the concept of free will.

The argument is simple. Inside a spaceship, the substance being forced through a membrane establishes a frame of reference wherein it's stationary relative to the substance being forced through it. Outside the spaceship, we realize the membrane, like the substance being forced through it, exists in a state of motion. Anything dimensionally extended - something you want to do to the present tense - has a variable state of motion depending upon its frame of reference. So your dimensionally extended present tense is part of the phenomenon of relative motion. How does this agree with your claim the present, dimensionally extended, is static, and thus future moves directly to past, skipping over present? — ucarr

This argument is irrelevant because you are talking about spatial dimensions, and I am talking about temporal dimensions, so the principles do not apply. You are comparing apples and oranges. And only through the incompatible premise which makes time a spatial dimension, could the comparison be made.

This shows logical possibility is not always proof of facts. So, a logically valid argument does not necessarily support a given proposition, such as time can pass in a duration closed to events. — ucarr

As I said, the logical possibility is not presented as proof. However it does support the proposition, as evidence. But freewill allows us to deny and refuse (which is your approach), even things which are necessary. But the evidence remains evidence for those who accept it, until it is proven to be actually impossible.

These foundations can be turned on their head, and then the facts become organized in a completely differently way, revealing a completely different sense of meaning, as when paradigms shift. Turning the foundation on its head isn’t doubting that foundation or making it false. — Joshs

Turning the foundation on its head requires doubting it. Only by doubting it, will we seek a better way. We will never "change our whole way of looking at things", unless we first doubt our current way of looking at things.

So for example, Witt says "water boils at 100 C". But @Banno qualifies this with "at sea level". The need for such a qualification gives reason to doubt the original way of looking at things, "water boils at 100 C". The skeptic might then propose the hypothesis that the boiling of water is a feature of environmental pressure rather than a feature of the internal temperature of the water, and experiments could be carried out accordingly. If the experiments confirm what is proposed, this could lead to us changing our way of looking at things, that foundation would be overturned. But this cannot occur without doubt, so doubt is an essential feature of shifting paradigms (ways of looking at things).

If it makes you feel better, Rodl would be correct when it comes to angels. Self-judging judgments require temporal-discursive reason. That might be my response to Kimhi and Rodl: I see your dissatisfaction with excessively compositional reasoning schemes, but it is true that we are not angels. There is a strongly compositional aspect to the way we reason. Reducing our reasoning to ratio makes no sense, but it is also wrong to reduce it to intellectus. We are involved in both. — Leontiskos

I don't see how you can make the leap from "I think like this" to "we think like this". You can judge "I am not an angel", but what validates "we are not angels"? Angels may walk amongst us, like Jesus did.

The process known as evolution is dependent on substantial differences within the multitude designated by "we". This difference demonstrates the faultiness of general conclusions concerning "the way we reason".

Absolute Idealism cannot be turned into Dialectical Materialism. — Arcane Sandwich

I wouldn't be so quick to make that judgement. But I don't see what this has to do with whether or not there is a reincarnation of Hegel.

I guess this depends on what "be turned into" means. There is a break in the continuity of identity which is implied by that phrase. And there is a special term for such a break in the continuity of identity, it is generally known as a "transformation". "Reincarnation" also implies a type of transformation, as does "transubstantiation". The concept of "transformation" has been a great gift to creative philosophers. Now there must have been some jealousy from the mathematicians, because the concept "transformation", has now been adopted into mathematics and physics, enabling lofty sophistry.

When I finished reading this sentence, I slapped my palm to my forehead and exclaimed, "Oh, man! Now he tells me!"

Given that your theory makes radical changes to the view of time, whether it's viewed through the lens of common sense, or viewed scientifically, it's belatedly clear you have neglected your responsibility to your readers.

In order to prevent them from wasting their time with many irrelevant questions aimed at clarification of your premises and their applications, you need to write a pamphlet, booklet or book exposing the foundational components of your theory and their ramifications. — ucarr

I think it was obvious what I was saying. And it's obvious to anyone who has given it any thought. What I was saying is very simple, and consistent with experience and how we commonly speak. We say that time is passing when the day of Jan 4 is replaced with the day of Jan 5. We say that time passed overnight. We do not say that we were moving through time while we were asleep

Here's another fragment from your list of radical premises: Time is an activity somehow distinct from the animation of material things. I infer from this that it's related to this: Time passing is not the events, nor is it an event, but it is the cause of events.

Immediately another gnarly issue arises: there appears to be an inconsistency between: "the passing of time itself is an activity, a process..." and "Time passing is not the events, nor is it an event, but it is the cause of events." How is it that time as an activity is not an event? Perhaps you have a cogent answer to this question. What you've written here looks like a contradiction. In your writing, you're doing a terrible job of communicating.

So far, your rollout of your theory is a tissue of radical premises obscurely explained and embedded within a continuity containing contradictions. — ucarr

Activity is the condition of being active, an event is a thing which happens. I see no contradiction in saying that the passing of time is an activity which is not an event. This is simply to say that there is not any particular physical "thing" (event) which happens, which is describable as the activity which we know as the passing of time. It is an activity which cannot be described as "a thing which happens". Instead, we describe it by the general terms of "time passing".

I see that you have problems imagining the possibility of time passing without anything happening, and you are inclined to refuse this conception, but that's simply your refusal, your denial, having an effect on your ability to understand what I am saying.

Now you tell us material objects are not animated, yet they are being changed by the flow of time. So, a material object doesn't move. — ucarr

No, I did not say this, and this is not what I am proposing at all. As I said movement is the change of position of an object relative to another. What I said is that movement is caused by the passing of time.

You make a pronouncement that flies in the face of everyday experience, then give us no explanation why it isn't blatant nonsense. — ucarr

I think what I say is very consistent with everyday experience, and saying things like "we move through time" "the present moves through time", is what is not consistent with our experience. Really, when people say that we are moving through time, this only makes sense as a metaphor. Where is this medium called "time" which we would be traveling through? Obviously, anyone who considers the reality of the situation recognizes that time is passing, and we are not passing through time.

This contradicts: "Time passing is not the events, nor is it an event, but it is the cause of events." — ucarr

It appears contradictory to you, because in your condition of denial, you refuse to allow the possibility of what I demonstrated as a valid logical possibility, that time could be passing without any physical event occurring. Therefore you refuse to accept the distinction between being active, and being an event.

The term "event" is restricted to a physical happening, but "active" is not restricted in this way. Therefore whatever it is which is active, is not necessarily a physical event. A physicalist would deny this difference, disallowing that there is anything more to reality than physical things and events. But anyone who recognizes the reality of what is known as "the immaterial", will allow for the reality of activity which is other than physical.

This is why I warned you that it would be pointless to proceed into this discussion without accepting the reality of freewill. The concept of "freewill" allows for the reality of a cause which is not a physical event. If you cling to physicalist/determinist principles, you will simply deny and refuse the principles which make this thesis intelligible, and claim contradiction, as you are doing. So, if you refuse to relinquish this attitude, further discussion would be pointless.

You say that motion is relative, and you say that the present is dimensionally extended. Since relative motion requires dimensional extension, you must explain why a dimensionally extended present is not a part of the phenomenon of relative motion. This explanation is especially important given the role of the present as a separator of future and past that moves in relation to them. How else could it separate them? — ucarr

I really do not understand what you are asking, but it appears like you are saying that any separator between future and past must be moving. I explained to you why this is false, and provided an example, the substance being forced through a membrane.

What's the value of an "example" that's merely whimsy about how the world might be? — ucarr

I told you the value of the example. It's a logical possibility. You refuse things based on your claim of "contradictory". But it only appears contradictory to you because you refuse to accept a valid logical possibility. When you accept it as a valid possibility, then your claim of contradiction disappears. It is logically possible that time can pass without any physical change occurring. You refuse and deny this logical possibility, and that's what creates problems for you. You frame it as a problem for my theory of time, but it's not. It's just a problem with your attitude.

I know your narrative overall is very complicated, but for the moment, I ask how can memories of the future not be what humans experience, given your claim time is prior to events? Since human lives consist of moments strung together, and time, as you say, is prior to all of these moments, how can our lives not be memories of what hasn't yet happened? You're the one frequently claiming the future jumps into the past. — ucarr

Sorry, I really can't decipher what you are asking here.

Firstly, understanding that the possibility for an event must always precede the actual occurrence of that event is an awareness that happens in the empirical now, not in the future. So, the possibility of an event, an abstraction of the mind, does not reside in the mind in the future, but rather in the empirical now. — ucarr

I'm not talking about "possibility" here, as an abstraction in the mind. I am talking about ontological possibility.

Secondly, in what direction does the arrow of time for the conscious human individual move? If we say it moves from the future toward the past, then we’re also saying the conscious human individual grows younger with the passing of time. — ucarr

That's a false conclusion for the reasons I've already explained.

Since the present moves in time, it's not static. — ucarr

Your preferred model of time might have the present moving in time, mine does not. And, I explained to you why mine does not. If you want to understand mine, then you have to drop this idea, because the two are incompatible. If you insist that time must be modeled as having the present moving in time, then we might as well end the discussion right now, because I'm not interested in that model, I think it is obviously false.

Time is a dimension, not a force. — ucarr

A "dimension" is an aspect, or feature of something. If time is a dimension, then what is it a dimension of?

Time is not a system, but a part of a system in the role of a dimension. — ucarr

OK then, what is "the system" which time is a dimension of? You do realize that all systems are artificial don't you? There is physical systems, and theoretical systems, but they are all produced by human beings. Are you saying that time is simply theoretical, part of a theoretical system? I think this is what you said earlier, when you defined time as a mathematical measurement.

I explained why you have to get beyond that idea of time if you want to develop a true understanding of time. As I said, you need to drop these preconceived ideas, if you want to discuss time with me, because I am not interested in discussing time with someone who will relentlessly insist on false premises.

With this claim you validate the theoretical point with zero dimensions as the limit of the present. — ucarr

Again, you are applying incompatible premises in an effort to make what I say look contradictory.. The start time does not have to be "the present". It's not, that's the point of the example. As the example clearly shows, the start time is "the future". The future is first. If time started then it is necessary that there was a future before there was a past or a present. The only way to avoid this is to say that time is eternal, but that has problems.

There is the ever-closer approach to a start and to an end, but no arrival. — ucarr

I'm not interesting in discussing the deficiencies of mathematics.

No one disputes time being required for events. How does the temporal extension of events prove time is logically prior to them? — ucarr

As I said, this is not proven, That time might pass without physical events, is offered as a logical possibility which needs to be considered, instead of simply rejected as impossible.

I don't read your statement as a self-evident truth. — ucarr

What is offered as self-evident truth is free will. And, when something other than a physical event (a free will), selects a possibility, and causes a physical event, this implies an activity (cause) which is not a physical event. Do you understand this basic principle? The physical event which is caused by a free will, is not caused by a physical event, it is caused by a free will. This implies a cause which is not a physical event. As a cause, it is necessarily an activity. And, activity requires time. Therefore we have time and activity without a physical event. There is an event which is caused by that activity but such an event is posterior to that activity.

Moreover, you haven't described any action time performs apart from material things. — ucarr

This is not true. I described the activity of time, as the future becoming the past. You simply did not accept my description, insisting instead on a model which has the present moving from past to future. But, as I explained above, my model of "time passing" is consistent with how we experience, know, and understand the reality of time. Your model of "the present moving", is not consistent with our experience.

No one disputes time being required for events.

...

I don't exactly agree time is required for events. — ucarr

Hmm, what can I say about this, sloppy writing?

Events and time are parts of a dynamical system, with time supplying the temporal parameters of the system. Is time the cause of something it's a part of? This question spotlights the likely fact time under your theory's causal hiearchy is a proper subset of the dynamics of physics. If it's a cause of its own superset, then that's saying it is its own superset. The comprehension restriction of set theory prohibits a set from being the proper subset of itself. — ucarr

Let me remind you, a "system" is always artificial. In one sense of "system" we construct a physical system, according to a design. In another sense of "system" we model a natural thing according to system theory. The thing itself is not taken to be a system, it is modeled according to a system theory.

You may model a system, and include time as a part of that system, but I'm not interested in such false representations.

So you are separating events from time. — ucarr

Well of course. If you're just starting to see that now, then where were you?

So show me your measurements of time passing without events passing concurrently. — ucarr

We discussed the difference between the measurement and the thing which is measured, way back.
Now, do you agree that a measurement requires an act of measuring. There is no measurement without that act of measuring. However, the thing to be measured exists as the thing to be measured, regardless of whether it has been measured or not. Because I am discussing the thing to be measured, and an approach toward the means for making accurate measurements, your request for measurements is unwarranted.



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You said, "The point is that justification for the act is produced from an understanding of the relationship between the act and the end (as means to end)." I agree, but is that understanding from the individual or another? That understanding is of interest because it can be two sided....what does it take to do that? To understand? For self to? For all to? — Kizzy

I believe that proper "justification" requires demonstration to another. However, we do use "justification" to refer when a person justifies something to oneself. There is definitely ambiguity here. We could call one a "subjective" justification and the other "objective" justification, but this produces ambiguity in our use of "objective", which could be a problem in epistemology We would now have a proper sense of "objective", meaning of the object, and a sense of "objective" which refers to properties of subjects, like "objective knowledge". The latter is better known as "intersubective", or something like that, and needs to be distinguished from the proper sense of "objective", referring to a proper object.

In our discussion, "the object" is the goal, and the question is whether a person can be acting towards a goal which they do no even apprehend. Notice, that if it is an apprehended goal, it is within the subject's mind, therefore subjective. So this is an indication that the true object, or goal, is not within the subject's mind.

We dont believe ourselves, that is uncertainty. We need to accept the unknown with trust, I said that before. BUT at other times, it happens and is knowing you are right where you are supposed to be in that moment of time, conscious reassuring to self. A feeling becomes a knowing of surety when it is felt within us...we KNOW and no one can know THIS feeling like we do...some will swear they KNOW what you mean. How can they? Do you have to believe them? When would you? When it's nothing but love. Those intentions that are masked while the truth of the matter is that the desire is going to (drive or lead?) us towards the goal no matter what...only one outcome exists for every moment that passes...too quick to ever fully get a hold, however a quick glimpse of that is all we really only NEED. It's in the life lead of a conscious being in harmony with their nature...and in nature? — Kizzy

So I believe this sense of "KNOW" which you refer to here ("knowing you are right where you are supposed to be in that moment of time", for example) is not beyond doubt at all. It's a subjective belief, where "supposed to be" is supported by the subject's apprehension of an object, goal.

But why do you say "the truth of the matter is that the desire is going to (drive or lead?) us towards the goal no matter what"? If a subjective goal, or failure to apprehend the true objective goal can misguide the person, such that the goal is not realized, then what validates your claim that the goal is reached no matter what? To make your claim true, we'd have to remove the reality of "the goal" completely, and instead assert that whatever obtains was "the goal". But that means there could not have been any goal prior to the consequences of the act, because whatever occurs as the result of the act is designated to be the goal.

What if intention can be justified as the morality in the acts itself, could the desire and therefore the goal be knowable or NOW known? — Kizzy

I do not understand how we could talk about the morality in the act itself. In order to be judged as good or bad, the act must be related to something, some kind of principles for judgement. Morality is based on a relationship.

So, where I think, the intentions can be changed in any moment, it is the desire that is the realest thing towards knowing any truth of any reasonable matter because it is that which is the drive behind the light from the darkness and back into the dark... — Kizzy

You seem to be portraying "desire" as an underlying urge to act in a certain direction, while "intention" refers to moment to moment choices of action. So "desire" has more temporal duration, while "intentions" change from moment to moment depending on circumstances. Both of these are subjective, so where would the goal or "object" lie? Would the object be associated with the desire, or would it be associated with the intention?

But what if consciousness updates our being with a goal through the intentions that change in decision making moments, because of whatever reason? What if being conscious of the goal, or what we think is the goal changes the DIRECTION not the desire but how we move in life to get through the next day? I think its important before we or anyone implies their judgement that it's necessary to verify the credibility of the people judging and the objective nature of what comes from a judgement. A group or person may be wrong in their judgement without a standard way of verification that the judgement is necessary in the first place.. — Kizzy

If we position "the goal" in this way, as what is produced by the conscious mind, from moment to moment, as what guides our immediate actions, then how could "desire" relate to the goal? If the conscious decisions dictate our actions from one moment to the next, then it would appear that desire is totally excluded as not having any influence. However, we could allow that desire influences the conscious mind in its decision making, but how would that work?

If the conscious mind consciously apprehends the desire, and formulates its actions toward what is desired, then "the object" must be associated with the desire. But then the conscious mind would have no option but to follow the desire, recognizing that the desire is directed toward the true object, and this would rob the mind's capacity for choice. But if the conscious mind itself is what is directed toward the true object, and the desire influences its apprehension or grasp of its object, then how could the conscious mind possibly grasp and understand this influence? The desire would be interfering in the mind's domain of ruling what is the true object, and the mind would have to ignore it as irrelevant. However, the desire as the persistent underlying force which inclines one to act, cannot be dismissed as irrelevant in this way. For the mind to enact such a dismissal, would be a false, not real way of dealing with the influence of the desire. Therefore the true location of "the object" remains obscured.

I will say maybe you did not follow up on my answer to your original question because of my formatting and style, that is on me then. It is properly known that my writing style can be not easy to follow, but only for those willing. Some are not willing to even read at all. Good. You should have to try and understand not just follow lines of words. They are not for everyone. Good. — Kizzy

To be honest, my reply was long and drawn out already, and I saw the mention of time, and the other thread, as a good place to curtail it, and request that part of your post be addressed in the other thread. I could go back and address it here if you want though. It was just a desire to not put too much material in one post, especially since I was running out of time and wanted to post it. That was my goal.

I'm asking you to say what you think happens as you travel in time. As you move from Jan 4 to Jan 5, do you get younger, or do you get older? — ucarr

We do not travel in time, we do not move from Jan 4 to Jan 5 in this model of time. This is the principal difference of the model. Things, or people, do not move through time, the passing of time itself is an activity, a process, and this process has an effect on us, it causes change. When you model an object as moving through time, you model it as moving from past to future, but if you model it as fundamentally static, yet being changed by the flow of time, then change and movement are caused, by the passing of time.

this amounts to saying the future causes the past to move toward the more distant past. — ucarr

That's a correct representation. I described the future becoming the past as a force. We, as human beings work to maintain our position at the present (maintaining this position is known as survival), despite the force of the future pushing against us. But the force of the future always wins, and each human being is forced into death, then further and further into the past.

We know what you’re saying is backwards, as obviously the present*, as it moves forward in time, thus moving towards the updated, newer present, doesn’t move from the past to the more distant past. — ucarr

I see absolutely no reason to believe that the present moves, or changes in any way. The present is always the division between past and future, so clearly it does not change. And, movement, motion, is an observed property of physical things, relative to each other. We do not observe any such movement with respect to the present. You are simply assuming that the present is something moving through a static medium, "time", but this is a faulty representation, because what is actually moving is time itself. Imagine a membrane, a filter or something like that, and a substance is being forced through that membrane, and this results in a change to the substance. The membrane represents "the present", and the substance being forced through is time, being forced from future to past.

*The empirical present... — ucarr

As I explained, there is no such thing as the empirical present. Sensation is of the past, and anticipation is of the future. The two might be united in experience, but this does not produce an "empirical present", it produces a theoretical present. And, as I made great effort to explain to you, our theoretical present is inaccurate.

If you're saying Jan 4 progressing in time toward Jan 5... — ucarr

This is what your model would say, the model which puts the past as prior to the future. It would say that the past Jan 4 progresses toward the future, Jan 5. The rest of that passage makes no sense.

You haven't shown time independent of the animation of material objects because your supporting example, a thought experiment based upon imagination, is not evidence. Logical possibility necessitating corresponding physics remains unproven. This lack of proof is memorialized in Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems. There are logical statements unproven by the rules that generate them, and there are physical systems unexplained logically. The scientific picture of the world is incomplete. — ucarr

You just asked for an example, not proof. I gave you an example, not proof. Please don't take it as an attempt at proof.

The time lag of experience rendered though the cognitive system has sentients experiencing the empirical present as a time-lagged older present relative to an ever-updating numerical present, an abstraction. This is evidence abstract thought is emergent from memory. Abstract thought emergent from memory is evidence the ever-updating numerical present is about time_future not yet extant. Since time_future is grounded in memory, this is evidence time_future is not an existentially independent reality standing apart from phenomena, but rather a component of a complex memory phenomenon. — ucarr

This is very wrong. "Future" cannot be grounded in memory. Memory applies only toward what has happened, the past. There are no memories of the future. "Future" is grounded in our apprehension of possibilities and anticipation of things to come, not memories of things past.

Now, going back to how we relate to events, we understand that the possibility for an event must always precede the actual occurrence of that event. This implies that the event, exists as a possibility, in the future, prior to its actual existence. as the event moves into the past. Since it is the case, with all physical events, that the possibility of the event must be prior in time to the actual occurrence of the event, this is very clear evidence, "proof" I might say, that the future of every event, is prior in time to its past.

Time is not on its own, i.e. not independent, for two reasons: a) time_future is an emergent property of a complex memory phenomenon; it is tied to the material animation of memory; b) time experienced empirically as the updating present is itself a physical phenomenon, and as such, it cannot be independent of itself. Relativity is a theory of physics; it is not a theory of abstract thought falsely conventionalized as immaterial. — ucarr

Human experience consists of both memory of the past, and anticipation of the future. You are focusing on "memory" while completely ignoring anticipation, so your representation is woefully inadequate.

Time experienced as the updating present is the empirical present ever moving forward within a physically real phenomenon. This movement from the present to a newer present posits an arrow of time from present to newer present. It also posits an arrow of entropy from the present state of order to a lesser state of order. Both arrows move toward a newer state. — ucarr

Again, you are simply representing time as static, with the present moving through time. This is what I argue is the bad (unreal) representation. Any complete analysis, as I am working at, will reveal that time is really active, and "the present" is just the way that we conceptualize this activity.

Since time, being itself a phenomenon, is not prior to other phenomena, its progression is therefore contemporary with the animate phenomena it tracks numerically. — ucarr

This is no progression of time in your representation, only a movement of the present to a newer present. But if the present moves this way, along the time line, or however you conceive it, something must move it, a cause, or force which propels the present along the line. But it should be obvious to you that there is no such activity as the present being propelled along a line. The real activity is the future becoming the past, and this is simply modeled as the present being propelled down a line. Of course that model is obviously wrong because the idea that there is a force in the world propelling the present down a line, is simply unintelligible, incoherent. What is really the case, is that there is a force which causes possibilities to actualize as time passes. This is very obvious, and this is the future (possibilities) becoming the past (actualities)..

See above for my counter-narrative to your premise time is prior to the phenomena (events) it tracks numerically. — ucarr

You have provided no counter-argument, only the assertion, which I agree to, that my example is not proof. It's just an example.

Since the start of time takes time, there is no extant time without a past. — ucarr

This is self-contradicting. If there is a start to time, then it is necessary to conclude that at the start there is no past. Your claim that "the start of time takes time" is contradictory, implying that there is time prior to the start of time implying that time is already required for time to start. This is clearly wrong, all that is required is a future, and along with that the impetus which causes it to become past.

.

You seem to be separating time from occurrence of events. — ucarr

Exactly.

I think all occurrences of events happen in time. — ucarr

I agree, and we can conclude that time is required for events. This means that time is logically prior to events, but not vise versa.

Following this line of reasoning that keeps time paired with events... — ucarr

This is faulty logic. That all events happen in time implies that time is required for events, but it does not imply that events are required for time.

If your argument is predicated upon the premise events occur outside of time (which includes dates) - and that appears to be the case - then it is obviously false. — ucarr

Why would you think this, when I've been arguing the exact opposite? I have been saying that time can pass without an event occurring. You did not like my example, saying that it doesn't prove this claim. It was not meant to prove the claim, only to support it by showing that it is logically possible for there to be time passing with no events occurring.

This process of the future becoming the past has the arrow of time moving in which direction: a) the events of Jan 5 change into the events of Jan 4; b) the events of Jan 4 change into the events of Jan 5? — ucarr

I don't see what you are asking. The events of Jan 4 are the events of Jan 4, and the events of Jan 5 are the events of Jan 5. One does not become the other. However, the time marked by, or referred to as "Jan 4", itself moves from being in the future to being in the past, as does the time referred to as "Jan 5".

The difference is that in my model, time itself is assigned substantial existence, as something. What we know as "the passing of time", which is the process by which the time indicated as "Jan 5" changes from being in the future to being in the past, is reified, understood to be something real, a real process. This "something" can be understood as the cause of all events. Time passing is not the events, nor is it an event, but it is the cause of events. And, we order events as past events being prior to future events, due to the way that events are observed by us through sensation. However, when we consider time on its own, as something which can be marked with indicators such as dates, then we understand that any indicated time, is in the future before it is in the past, like the example shows.

Here's another way of looking at it, which may or may not help you to understand. Imagine that there was a start to time, time started, there was a beginning to time. At the point when time began, there was future, but no past, because no time had passed yet, but there was time about to pass. And, as time passes, there becomes more and more past, and less and less future. Imagine a wind-up toy, fully wound, and ready to go. The process of its unwinding is fully in the future, but as it unwinds, it goes into the past. This demonstrates that future is prior to past.

Since you say, “time is unidirectional, future to past,” and also you say, “the day named as tomorrow becomes the day named as ‘yesterday,’” logically we have to conclude the arrow of time moves from Jan 5 to Jan 4. — ucarr

Why do you say this? If "Jan 4", and "Jan 5" referred to events, we'd say that Jan 4 occurs before Jan 5. But these do not refer to events, they refer to dates in time. If we made a timeline, based on our empirical observation of events, we'd see that the events of Jan 4 are prior in time, to the events of Jan 5, and we might be tempted to model "the flow of time" in that direction. However, this is because we are mapping the dates as events which occur. A true analysis shows that both Jan 4, and Jan 5. are in the future before they are in the past, so regardless of the order that these dates occur to us as events, the future part of time is prior to the past part of time.

Your conclusion doesn't seem to be valid, and I do not know how you derive it. The arrow of time has it that the day named as "Jan 4" was in the future before it was in the past, as is the case with the day named as "Jan 5". Now, today, the day named as "Jan 9" is in the future, but soon it will be in the past.

Now if we look at "Jan 9" as an event, instead of as a date, we will say that this event occurs after Jan 8 occurs, and we will represent this with a number line of sorts, showing that order. But according to my explanation, that number line represents the occurrence of events, it does not represent the passing of time.

The first statement of "when the sun orbits the earth", is what we know as the rotation of the earth on its axis. The second statement "the earth orbits the sun", is what we know as the earth revolving around the sun. These two do not model the same motion.

What we model as "the rotation of the earth" is the same motion as what you described as "when the sun orbits the earth". If we know the distance between the earth and sun, and assume the earth to be a point at the centre of a circular orbit, we could calculate the speed at which the sun orbits the earth, in that model in which the sun orbits the earth.

Good stuff, the quotes below are of my particular interest and I quoted them as I read the thread...Sitting now looking at them, I am fascinated in this thinking. The thinking thoughts are now typed words that are giving me ideas [right now even holding me accountable to them].... — Kizzy

You've given me a lot to look at Kizzy, and some of this I don't quite understand. So I'm going to address firstly, the distinction you mentioned between desire and intention, to hopefully lay some ground work for a base of understanding between us.

*reason=goal or desire? i think they exists with and without a belief system but im looking at linking goals or desires to ones purpose in life, the one that exists despite knowing it. Though knowable. Morals are justification itself.

you can have intention without a goal, i say yes..but can you without a desire? i say no..for now at least. Your intent though doesnt need its own purpose, because it doesnt mean you act on it according to how you imagined you would act...Once the act occurs, your purpose could be repurposed successfully... but how much it was planned, thought of or out vs imagined or believed .[ex. my intention was/is to have fun tonight-8.20.23 522pm]] AND without parameters or constraints OR GOALS, intentions can change in decision making moments through that experience of choosing to act/acting on those intentions and how what you imagined vs what reality played out was very different

Intentions show that the individual has thought.
What happens when you bypass your intentions? COULD INTENSIONS COULD BE THE BRAIN TRICKING ITS SELF OR BODY? WHETHER WE ACT ON THEM OR NOT..PLANNED OR RANDOM, COMPLETE ATTEMPT AND FAIL, OR SUCCESS OF WHAT FROM ACTION IS JUSTIFIED? IS IT STILL WITHOUT ACTION? " — Kizzy

I think, generally speaking, we use "intention" to refer to actions motivated by a conscious goal, and we use "desire" to refer to feelings which motivate actions. This is the most common form of "intention" as used in philosophy of mind, and social sciences, which frame intention as a property of human consciousness and reason. In this case, strict adherence to definitions implies that an intentional act would require thought out reasons, and a conscious goal. This puts "the object" of intention, the goal, into the domain of knowledge, what the person knows (though it is essentially subjective knowledge). On the other hand, since a desire derives directly through emotions and feelings, it can incline, and produce an activity, where "the object" of the act, the goal is completely unknown This is the case when we are "overcome by passion". The act is based in emotion, hate, anger, lust, etc., and the object, or goal of that act may not be adequately known. In other words, the act is produced without consciously considering what the end will be.

However, this separation leaves a large grey area where the two relate to each other. In law for example, a person cannot excuse oneself from the rule of law by saying I was overcome by passion, I had no particular goal in mind when I did that, therefore it was not an intentional act, and I am not responsible. So moral philosophy relies on a much broader definition of "intention", from the one proposed by some philosophers of mind, who want to tie "intention" strictly to the conscious mind.

This definition ties intention to "purpose". The key difference here, is that when we say that a person, or even a thing, acts with a purpose, it is not necessary that the purpose is known to the the acter. So when we say that the various parts of a machine have a function, we mean that they have a purpose, and intention is implied. The "intention" is associated with the creator of the machine. This broader definition of "intention" effectively rids us of the grey area between "intention" and "desire", by bringing acts which are motivated by emotions and desires, where the goal is not adequately understood by the acter, into the category of "intentional".

Broadening the definition of "intention" in this way, has its own problems though. By placing the object, or goal of intention, as not necessarily grasped by the mind of the agent which is acting intentionally, we allow that all sorts of purposeful acts are intentional. Therefore we see all sorts of intention throughout the acts of creatures in the biological world. And we see intention in the parts of living beings; the heart, the lungs, etc., demonstrate purpose, and therefore intention is behind the actions of these parts. This is a problem, because knowing the object, the goal, is what makes intention intelligible to us, because the intentional act can be justified as the means to the end, in the way I described. But when the act demonstrates purpose yet the object or goal is unknown, then we just speculate as to the goal, and even question whether there is truly intention there. Furthermore, the possibility of an intentional act without an object or goal, must be allowed for, and this is completely foreign to the thinkings of the conscious mind, which requires justification for any proposed intentional act, as means to some end.

The result is, that when we allow that we may be inclined, motivated, and actually carry out acts, without an understanding of the relationship between the act and an end, as in the case of emotional acts, being overcome by passion, etc., we allow that intentional acts may be carried out without an object or goal, whatsoever. This ought to shake our confidence in all that we think we know about "intention", because the way that we've always understood "intention" is as actions directed toward goals. Now there is a need to remove the requirement of a goal, and understand intentional acts as purposeful acts without a goal. So in relation to traditional understanding of intention, this makes "intention" completely unintelligible because we need to understand an intentional act as an act without an object or goal, rather than as an act with a goal, and the goal is what makes the act intelligible.

Personal opinions are both bad and good, though no? Bias is opinion based, some outspoken far from the silence of their own wonderings within the mind...when bias or opinion based beliefs, reasons, or claims is used as an excuse to not continue towards finding that real good...lack of acceptance or awareness or willingness to see self and others. See the self in others. When our personal opinions are preventing US (together) from reaching higher levels or desires (which are, personal) then the real problem is in the excuse to NOT act towards higher levels because for some it is not easy tolerating others opinions and these tolerances are at different limits. They are valid, even when reasonable doubt arises. We doubt our selves and others, but how do you know I never doubted from the start? Does that chance exist to prove some one or our selves wrong? Right? Transcending personal opinion requires lessons to be learned, a settlement is justified in itself at that decision making moment. Maybe they never knew what they truly desired and are scared that they already foresee the truth, and it's not good. — Kizzy

I would say that we need to recognize, and adhere to the principle that "bad" and "good" are judgements. So when we talk about "the real good", and whether or not there is such a thing as "the real good", this is a judgement too. And if we maintain the principle outlined above, that intentional acts may be carried out without an object, or goal, i.e. without a good, then we have a very real problem with the assumption of "real good". This makes all your discussion of "higher levels" grounded only in the supposed good of "US (together)", but what makes "US (together)" a good itself? See, intentional acts are inherently acts which are carried out without a goal (like trial and error maybe), and from these acts goals are created. But what criteria is used to judge a goal as a good goal rather than a bad goal?

Can we break this down more? I am confused at the way you put into text the inverse statement and how it was incorrectly asserted that the motivating "object" cannot be outside the sphere of knowledge. Are you saying the justification ITSELF is justified knowledge Understood by GOD, how does one understand such things? Seeing? Learning? Observing? Living? Watching? I think it's more of a KNOWING. A knowing and a faith that goes beyond questioning, doubts, and opinions. Beyond good or bad, into.....the light! — Kizzy

I was responding to the quote from Peirce, where it was claimed that "the object" must be within the realm of knowledge. I think it's obvious from the evidence we have, of real intentional acts, that the object, or goal of the intentional act may not be known at all. In fact, from my exposé above, it may be the case that the true essence of an intentional act is an act without a goal, where understanding of "the goal" is developed after the act.

The point is that justification for the act is produced from an understanding of the relationship between the act and the end (as means to end). The end is completely opinion based, as explained. This means that if the act itself is liked, enjoyed, or in any way preferred by the person, whatever is produced from that act, will be claimed to be the intentional end, because this justifies the preferred act. For example, "the act produces happiness". In that way the means becomes what is desired, and the end becomes completely irrelevant, just manipulated words to support the desire for the action. This is why we need to look at the end from the other direction, not as the known object which inspires the act, and justifies the act, but as the unknown object which the act will produce. This forces the need to judge the object, end, goal, itself, rather than simply judging the means in relation to the end. The end, being opinion, is simply manipulated to support enjoyment of the activity, the means. Essentially, this is habit. The activity is what is enjoyed, and whatever is produce from that activity is rationalized as the desired end.

I have been following the back and forth with MU, it seems relevant to mention that from reading the other thread discussion currently being had encouraged me to respond HERE now. — Kizzy

I'm going to stop here, and keep the discussion of time to the other thread, which is more suited to that with the question of what does consciousness do, as a temporal question of activity. This thread asks about ideas, which are more like static things, involving objects, goals, while the other thread is about activities. Of course there is a lot of overlap, but I think it's best to make some sort of division. Maybe you can copy some of the questions from here over to there, if you want me to address them.

I did now. What about it?

Firstly, I asked you to give me an example of a duration without math and without observation of a material object changing its position in space. Instead, you ask me to imagine (along with you) half a Planck time. A conjecture, which has a measure of scientific and logical formalism, falls short of an example, which is evidence from the real world. The act of imagination you invite me join as proof of time's independence from measurement doesn't even have the nascent persuasiveness of a conjecture.

Secondly, even if we grant the existence of half a Planck time, such a reality of Planck time means material objects occupying that space, so how does that show time's independence from measurement via math tracking the change of position of a material object in space? It doesn't.

Your two closing lines indicate you are making your argument for time's independence by knowingly imagining something unreal and thus devoid of material objects. Of course, this argument also doesn't work, because, as I've said, unreal things don't count as evidence.

Thirdly, if we assume future technology will empower observation of material reality below the Planck scale, then continuing on this path, which you argue for logically, we make an ever more close approach to the present moment as a theoretical vanishing point with zero dimensions. I think this is the third time that your attempt to argue for your theory has you instead arguing for its refutation. — ucarr

To be clear. My example was time passing without any change occurring. I said "imagine what it means for time to pass, then imagine this happening without anything in the world changing". I then referred to Planck time to demonstrate that my example is logically possible. The example is not "unreal" as the Planck time demonstration shows. Therefore all of this criticism is misguided and not at all relevant.

our attempt to spin away from the present as zero dimensional doesn't work because your uni-directional time, future to past is just a word game. It has no effect whatsoever upon physical spacetime. We all know this because we all know that all we ever experience in reality is our asymptotically close approach to the present moment of time, and that's the very near past chasing the very near present. When you declare that tomorrow is prior to today in time, you always make this declaration in the nearly present moment. Our thoughts are not prior to our position in time, regardless of the word games we play. Even if it's true our minds make decisions before our conscious awareness of them, the neuronal activity at the subconscious level is still the near past chasing the near present. The arrow of time for the real, physical time is the near past chasing the near present. — ucarr

There is no such thing as "physical spacetime". Spacetime is conceptual. And none of this makes any sense. Your reference to "near past", and "near present" are incoherent. What could you be referring to with this other than "future"? But that would mean that you are saying that all we ever experience is the future. But that's my proposal, that we experience the future as near to the past, and you want to be arguing against my proposal. So this argument makes no sense at all.

If the arrow of time has breadth, then it is an area and not a line. How does this change time's operations within the context of relativity, which shows us some of its operations in three dimensions? You also say time has thickness; that means the arrow of time has three dimensions. Does your arrow of time merge into relativity? — ucarr

Relativity theory is not applicable, being an incompatible theory as I explained last post.

Your desire to expand the present tense (of the timeline) positions you to explain how your reversal of the arrow of time doesn't also reverse the direction of entropy. — ucarr

The arrow of time is not reversed! It's simply a different model. I've told you this numerous times now, but you just don't get it. Switching from the geocentric to the heliocentric model of the solar system does not change the direction that the planets move, it models the very same movement in a different way. My model does not change the arrow of time, it models it in a different way.

So your criticism about entropy is misguided and irrelevant, as is the rest of your criticism in this post.

And...does that mean I can't trust anything science says? — Darkneos

First, science does not say anything, scientists speak.

And of course, anything claimed as "science" ought to be approached with a healthy skepticism just like when the guy on the other end of the phone calling you says "I'm from the Windows department of your computer, you have a problem in here". This is what Socrates demonstrated the need for critical thinking. Unless we have good reason to trust and respect the person making the statements, then we ought not trust what the statement says.

There's a bit at the end of the paper that shows that theories can override our memory and interpretations even if the data is strong. — Darkneos

The way that one's attitude affects what the person remembers, is very interesting. Even a healthy person has a sort of selective memory. And that's the best scenario. A person with mental illness tends to have a creative memory. The person with the creative memory will remember things in a way which would be judged as unreal. Then, there are all sorts of variations between these two extremes.

A lot of it has to do with how a person "attends" to things, how one's attention is focused. And this focusing of one's mind is greatly influenced by one's intentions. For example, if you are speaking to a very selfish person, the person will be "intent on" (meaning having one's attention focused on) strategizing ways to get what they want from you. This will influence the way that they hear what you say. If the selfishness is to the degree of mental illness, the memory will fabricate, according to the strategy one is intend on. When you approach that person later there will be much "you said this", and "you promised me that", which is inconsistent with what you remember.

In saying we can (correctly) model the world either way, you're basing your faith in the correctness of absolute time on New Age Physics? Since absolute time encompasses the entire world, then relative time, being incompatible, cannot coexist with it. So you must be proposing a multiverse containing two incompatible universes. Isn't such a multiverse a contradiction? Please click on the link below. — ucarr

As I said, I'm basing my faith in what I believe to be a self- evident truth, free will. I don't see how this relates to multiverses.

Please click on the link below.

New Age Physics — ucarr

This theory is actually very different from mine. There is a sort of starting premise which is similar to one of mine, what I said about the passing of time being a force, the future forces itself upon us. Here's the similar statement from the New Age Physics article:

One crucial component of my ‘Theory of Universal Absolutivity’, is that the flow of Time is the source of all kinetic energy because it enables all movement. This becomes very apparent when not ‘at rest’, i.e. when subject to a force other than just the forward progression of Time. Owing to the curvature of space created by the Earth’s mass, all human beings experience the ‘force’ of gravity, that being the Earth’s resistance to our continual forward momentum through space-time towards the centre of the Earth. We still progress through the universe at exactly the same speed of Absolute-Time – (there is no other option!) – but we are in resistance to this speed because we are not in an inertial frame of reference. So, for example, when we walk up stairs, or sharply change direction in a car, the additional pressure we experience is our increased resistance to vectors of Absolute-Time.

The big difference though, is that the New Age theory does not take the very important premise of free will. It is the premise of free will which makes the future to past flow of time evident, as we seek the means to avoid being swept into the past (the means to survival), by the force of the future becoming the past. The other thing which the New Age theory doesn't provide, which is necessitated by free will, is the multi-dimensional present.

The issue of free will is what makes time relevant to the op.

If you don't at all understand what I'm asking above, then this might be evidence you, no less than I, have a fundamental problem with the rolling out of your theory in the fullness of its detail. You, like I, appear to be struggling to achieve a clear and full comprehension of some possibly important ramifications of the details of your theory. Take another look at what you posted earlier: — ucarr

Yeah sure, I agree with this. As I said, time is a very difficult subject which no one has a good understanding of. And of course, that includes me.

I think a dimensionally extended present - it contains a future_present_past timeline - entails nesting a second temporal timeline within a larger structure that also has a future_present_past timeline. — ucarr

You are not understanding the breadth of time at all. Start with this. How long is the present? That depends on context. The present might be 2025, a full year, it might be this week, today, this hour, this second, etc.. This way of determining the length of the present is completely dependent on one's purpose, so we can say it's arbitrary. Another way, to simply stipulate that the present is a dimensionless point between past and future, is demonstrably unreal, as we've discussed.

So, I propose that there is a true, non-arbitrary breadth of the present. So, not only do we have an arrow of time, the flow of time, but that arrow is not one-dimensional, it has a second dimension, breadth, the arrow has thickness. This is necessary to avoid the falsity of "the point of the present", and the arbitrariness of a duration of "the present".

This larger structure is the temporal timeline: future_present_past, including in its present, the second, nested future_present_past timeline. This multi-tiered complexity implies physical relationships whose questions about which you don't understand at all. — ucarr

So this is irrelevant being based in that misunderstanding.

If the Planck time is the shortest possible time duration, then half of that duration doesn't exist, so it can't be an example of time independent of a material object changing its position in space. — ucarr

The Planck length is not the shortest possible time duration, nor did I say that it is. I said its the "shortest period of time which provides for observation of the physical world". Notice the difference. The limit here is imposed by the restrictions to empirical observation. However, it is not a logical restriction. A shorter time period is still logically possible. Just because we do not currently have the capacity to observe it, does not mean that we ought to rule it out as a logical possibility.