You keep making assertions as if they are arguments. So, show how I'm misrepresenting the importance of the audience. — Noble Dust

You said "the viewer", singular, passes an inevitable "50% contribution to the work itself". Since there is a vast number of viewers this would add up to thousands, millions, or even billions of percentage, which is nonsense. Therefore, if you are trying to represent what each viewer adds to the work, in this way, as a percentage, you'd have to say that each viewer actually provides a very small percentage contribution to the work. The more viewers there are, the less percentage each one would contribute.

So, each viewer's "interpretive path" does not provide a 50% contribution to the work. So this way of representing the viewer's "contribution" to the work is complete nonsense. If you are insistent that the viewer actually does contribute to the artist's work somehow, you'll have to find a better way of demonstrating it. Maybe financial compensation is a more concrete starting point?

Dr. Nim performs calculations in this sense; it employs a deliberate process that transforms inputs into outputs. But it's not programmed; a program is a set of instructions for a computer to follow, but Dr. Nim has no instruction set. — InPitzotl

To reiterate, you have just redefined "calculation" such that it may not necessarily be an act of reason. But the act of "calculating" which a computer does, is nowhere near to being similar to the act of "calculating" that occurs in a living being's act of perception, so the redefining is pointless.

Consider "the letter A on your keyboard"; for now, that literal phrase. That is a sign. When you read this sign on the screen, you formulate an intension... the idea of what this phrase means. There is a thing to which that idea refers... and that thing is an extension; that is the actual key. — InPitzotl

You try to portray me as "confused", but this passage clearly indicates that it is you who is confused. There is a sign, with an associated idea, and that is what you call "intension", the idea. The idea relates directly to the sign, and the sign only. if a person applies the idea toward possible "things" which may fulfill the criteria of the idea, this is the extension of the idea, the application. But you misrepresent this application with "a thing to which the idea refers". There is no such thing, only possible things.

The phrase "try to say" means to attempt to formulate a sign; a thing on your screen. "'what' we're sensing" refers to an intension. — InPitzotl

See your confusion? The attempt to formulate a sign, is an application of the idea, an attempt to find "possible things" (signs) which fufill the criteria of the idea. Therefore it is an extension, not an intension as you say.

Using reasoning is something you do with intensions. — InPitzotl

This is false. Reasoning is carried out with the symbols (extensions), it is not carried out with the ideas (intensions) themselves. That is where you are getting confused. You think that because it is going on in the mind, it must be intensional, but in reality both intension and extension are mental acts. So you are not separating them properly. Forming an idea is intensional, while applying the idea is extensional. So reasoning is extensional.

And there's a lot of stuff going on in your mind before we even get to that arena where your introspective view actually tells you something. — InPitzotl

All I am saying is that this "stuff going on in your mind" is better represented as a type of "reasoning" (though it may not be conscious reasoning), than it is represented as "sensing". So we are working from opposite approaches. You start from sensing, and want to include this "stuff going on" as part of the act of sensing. I start from thinking and reasoning, and want to include this "stuff going on" as part of the reasoning. Perhaps we'd be best off to compromise, and conclude that it is neither sensing nor reasoning.

From a psychological standpoint, starting with "character" puts the cart before the horse. — Galuchat

Right, I don't see how it is possible to derive a valid concept of "virtue" from a philosophy of psychology, without begging the question of the concept of virtue which psychology already assumes. The question being what makes this concept of virtue a valid concept. Psychology is already normative by its very nature. So just like the moving cart presupposes the horse, psychology presupposes a concept of virtue. That concept needs to be analyzed (by moral philosophy) to determine its validity.

First time I've agreed with you about anything, ever. — StreetlightX

As they say, there's always a first time for everything … might be an eternity before the second time though. However, it occurs to me that when I first engaged you in discussion, perhaps at philosophy forums, we had some discussion on the nature of beauty, good, and the ideal, and we had a degree (maybe only one degree) of agreement.

It's not nonsensical; what borders on the nonsensical is that you barely even addressed what you quoted, which was a description of the difference between the viewer following their own interpretive path based on their inevitable 50% contribution to the work itself, vs. an artist statement trying to block this process. Try again. — Noble Dust

Nonsense again. Since there are multiple viewers of the work, it is impossible that each viewer contributes 50% of the work. That's why I didn't address that part of your post, I couldn't make enough sense of what you were saying, to bring that into relevance. It's true that the artist plays to an audience, and the audience has importance, but you are clearly misrepresenting that importance. Whether that audience is you, me, StreetlightX, or other people, is not really relevant unless the artist is doing something personal. So contrary to what you say, the particularities, and peculiarities, of the individual subjective experience of interpretation are irrelevant. That's why the artist works in the abstract, and it's simply a mistake to say that it's wrong to force the artist into the abstract, because that's where the artist already is, by choice, in choosing the task which the artist is doing, art.

He turns the art buying and art establishment world's on their head like a kind or art terrorist. — Punshhh

"Art terrorist", maybe that's an apt name, but it's a little scary. I like to look at artwork as a statement in itself, that's why I don't like the premise of this thread, which is to separate "the statement" from the art. A piece of art is a way of saying something, you might say it's the medium for a statement. Notice that the way of saying it (the form), in art, is often of more importance than what is said, the statement which the art makes (the content). This is why the inverted purists on this thread want to separate the artwork, as the means for saying something (the form), from the statement, which is the concept, what is said by the artist (the content). Now someone like Noble Dust will insist that the only thing the artist provides is the form, and the viewer, being the interpreter, is free to designate whatever one pleases, as the content, what has been said by the artist through the art. But that's nonsense because if this were true, then the artist could not have any say in the content of the piece, what it says, therefore the artist would not be saying anything, and the art really wouldn't say anything.

As an analogy, let's analyze the act of terrorism, now that "terrorism" has been mentioned. The terrorist is making a statement in an extremist way. So "the way" that the statement is made (the form) becomes the essence of the statement, as "act of terrorism". It's big, bold, and attention grabbing, in the way of terrorism, so much so that the cause, the purpose, the point, or statement that the terrorist is trying to make (the content) often gets lost underneath. So we are left to interpret the act in our own way, individually, by however it affects us. So terrorism itself is similar to art, and may even be classed as an extreme form of art*. But when the act of terrorism gets so extreme, when the statement is made just for the sake of making a statement, then it becomes all form and no content, as the terrorist seeks more and more extreme measures just for the sake of carrying out extreme measures. How could we interpret the content of this type of act, or art which is produced in this way? There is a statement being made, which doesn't say anything, yet it is so loud, exaggerated, and downright scary, that it is impossible to ignore as 'not saying anything'.

Clearly, form without any content is a possibility. How ought this be interpreted? Do we say that this is the content, that what the artist is saying is that form without content is a possibility? If so, then we'd give the piece content, therefore negating the true essence, contentlessness, so this would necessarily be a misunderstanding, a misinterpretation. Therefore, to interpret a piece of art as form without content (just like the extreme act of terrorism, which is all flare, saying nothing) is a valid interpretation. There is no content, the piece is actually saying nothing. No artist statement could validly say that the piece is saying nothing. And if we try to force content onto such a piece, insisting that the artist must be saying something, we are really misinterpreting the piece.

*Philosopher's statement:

Don't get me wrong I'm not promoting this as a type of art, as it would be a very ugly form of art.

Along with Congau, what I'm arguing is that the work should not need qualification from the artist. The reason for this is that it lessens the impact of the work; it pulls the work out of the immediate sensual, and into the abstract and theoretical along a definite course not set by thew viewer. Interpretation, on the other hand, is that same process but done of the viewers own volition. This is important because the audience is half the work anyway. The audience members unique experiences, perspectives, and mindset will determine their interpretation. That's not to say that the artist can't have an explanation at hand; but forcing it on the audience will just inevitably cheapen the experience, and therefore, the work itself. — Noble Dust

This is nonsensical. The artist produces a piece and offers it to the viewer, allowing the viewer the opportunity of interpretation. It makes no sense to say that the artist ought not offer a statement as part of the work as if the statement necessarily lessens the impact of the work, because the statement actually is a part of the work. Why do you think that any statement which the artist makes will necessarily lessen the impact of the work? If the statement is a part of the work, then if done well it will compliment the rest of the work. All the parts of a good work of art, work together. If the statement doesn't do this then it lessens the value of the art. But this only means that the artist has not properly used the statement. If the statement is well used it compliments the work.

And to say that the statement thrusts the work into the realm of "abstract" also makes no sense, because all artwork partakes of the abstract. So the statement, if it is an abstract aspect, is just another part of the abstract aspect of the piece of art.

I think what InPitzotl is referring to is the rational calculations that take place 'below' the level of language. — A Seagull

Sure, but the point is that such calculations are still "rational", so it is wrong to portray them as "pre-rational".

Dr. Nim (the board game/canonically famous, genius, and simple mechanical computer) performs calculations, but does not employ rational thought. — InPitzotl

The computer proceeds according to the algorithms by which it is programed, it does not calculate.

But Dr. Nim is performing calculations. — InPitzotl

No, Dr. Nim is a computer acting in the way it is programed to. It is not performing "calculations" unless you change the meaning of "calculation" to include things in that category which are not reasoning. But that only defeats the purpose.

We have an intension (judgment) A; with an extant extension (scenario) B. — InPitzotl

The reason is

I'm sorry, but no matter how hard I try, I cannot understand this statement. Can you explain? You are calling a judgement an intension, and then you say that this intension has an extension. How could an intension have an extension? That's nonsense, because the intension and the extension are distinct aspects of a thing, so the intension cannot have extension.

..so here I say, back up. Why are we talking about this creature seeing things like "objects of food", when mechanically speaking, such a creature would be seeing "a bunch of stimulated cones on a retina"? Once you're talking about objects of food it is impossible for you to have not gone through calculations requisite to identify what parts of those stimulated cones correlate to edges of objects, what parts are part of the same object and what parts are part of different objects, what shapes the objects are, what colors (if applicable), and so on. — InPitzotl

Right, this was exactly my point. Maybe we actually agree.

There's some reason why you're starting at objects, and not stimulated cones. What is that reason? — InPitzotl

The reason is that I was replying to Samuele's op in which it was proposed that the meaning of "perceiving" be restricted to sensing. So I was starting with what we perceive, while you want to start with what we sense. The fact that we are so far apart demonstrates the fault in restricting "perceiving" to "sensing".

When you accidentally kick something with your little toe... are you saying that the pain is not in your toe? — creativesoul

How can you accidentally kick something when kicking is an intentional action?

Globalism, globalization, what's the difference?
Globalization:

Globalization or globalisation is the process of interaction and integration among people, companies, and governments worldwide. As a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, globalization is considered by some as a form of capitalist expansion which entails the integration of local and national economies into a global, unregulated market economy.[1] Globalization has grown due to advances in transportation and communication technology. With the increased global interactions comes the growth of international trade, ideas, and culture. Globalization is primarily an economic process of interaction and integration that's associated with social and cultural aspects. However, conflicts and diplomacy are also large parts of the history of globalization, and modern globalization. — Wikipedia on globalization

Globalism:

Not to be confused with Globalization.
Globalism refers to various systems with scope beyond the merely international. It is used by political scientists, such as Joseph Nye, to describe "attempts to understand all the interconnections of the modern world — and to highlight patterns that underlie (and explain) them."[1] While primarily associated with world-systems, it can be used to describe other global trends. The term is also used by detractors of globalization such as populist movements. — Wikipedia on Globalism

he thing about extra-judicial killings is that they are not murders such as you and I might commit, but acts of the law-making state, exempting itself from its own definition of justice. So an individual or a revolutionary group can honestly reject the law, but the state itself cannot. — unenlightened

Clearly, the problem here is that "the state" doesn't itself act. Human beings act for what they might claim is the sake of the state. But this is not the state acting, it is individual law makers, human beings acting. So it's not the state exempting itself from its own laws, it's individual human being exempting the themselves from the laws of the sate.

He thinks that every word has a strict definition, every thing a genus and differentia.

But it ain't so.

Hence, for him, the world equivocates. — Banno

Actually this is contradictory. Equivocation requires that words do not have a strict definition. So if I thought that every word has a strict definition I would not be able to accuse anyone of equivocation.

It is in recognizing that the same word has distinct meaning in different contexts of usage, and in recognizing that the word is used in one way, when the author asserts, or implies that it is being used another way that one apprehends equivocation. For example, in Wittgenstein's so-called private language argument, he demonstrates what "same" means by referring to the same chair. Then he implies that when a person has a reoccurrence of a similar sensation, time after time, and calls this the "same" sensation, each use of these two uses of "same" has equivalent meaning. But they do not and so there is equivocation.

Lets agree to disagree. When I talk about "globalism" I refer to the set of ideas that by and large the Western elites have bought into, and that are layed out in books such as "The Pentagons New Map" by Barnett or "George Soros on Globalization". Talking about the latter, look up all the activities that his "Open Society Foundation" is involved in, and you see everything that the Western elites love, and the people of their nations have to suffer from. You can also call it the populist vs elitist debate. Trump, like the European populist parties, takes the populist side, and neocons, neolibs, the coporate media like CNN et all take the elitist (globalist) side.
I can see on which side you are, and you can see on which side I am. — Nobeernolife

Exactly, you have demonstrated my point clearly. Those, such as yourself, who hold an anti-globalization ideology have lumped together a "set of ideas", as conducive to globalization, despite the fact that these ideas are vastly variant, and cannot be reconciled as one ideology, "globalization". Therefore there is really no such ideology as "globalization", because globalization is the result of many ideologies.

However, these are the rational ideologies of the world, promoting cooperation and social relations, and peaceful co-existence of human beings, which lead to globalization, despite the fact that the differences in the ideologies sometimes clash in conflict. The anti-globalization ideology is opposed to these rational ideologies of co-existence and global social relations, and is therefore irrational.

Elitism is irrelevant, and a notion you've just decided to toss in. Why?

Lets agree to disagree. — Nobeernolife

I see you're not prepared to defend your principles. That is because what you hoist up is a deception. You recognize that anti-globalism is a deception, an irrational ideology which you propagate for no other reason than disrupt the status quo. Your post reveals that your true concern is "elitism", and you raise the anti-globalist deception as a means of attacking it. You are dissatisfied with the elitism within the status quo. Anti-globalism is not the solution to the problems of elitism.

What's happening, instead, is exactly what I told you is happening... there's a huge juicy chunk of calculations being performed pre-rationally on those million channels of data. — InPitzotl

This is exactly what I am objecting to. How can you say that these calculations are "pre-rational". This would mean that there is a way of calculating which is not rational. How could that be?

And? Just because I describe something using reasoning doesn't mean the thing I describe uses reasoning. If I see a rock rolling down a hill towards a car, I might reason that it would hit it; but that doesn't mean the rock is employing reasoning to hit the car. — InPitzotl

The problem is that you have already passed judgement, i.e. made a conclusion, when you say that what you see is a rock rolling down a hill toward a car. So the complete scenario "there is a rock rolling down a hill towards a car", is itself a judgement, a conclusion you've made. Plainly and simply, without that judgement, there is no such scenario. So it is complete nonsense to suggest that this scenario might exist without such a reasoned judgement. Therefore that scenario "there is a rock rolling down a hill toward a car" is itself dependent on reasoning.

When I look at a peripheral drift illusion, I see motion. The thing that leads me to see motion is a pre-rational judgment; and that thing is multiple levels above the cones being stimulated by photons reflected from the image. Digital cameras alone don't in any meaningful sense sense "objects" or "motion"; neither does the eye. To get from those "eye pixel" analogs to this pre-rational judgment that something's moving requires tons of analysis, but that analysis is nevertheless pre-rational, not a result of "natural reasoning". — InPitzotl

That you see motion is itself a reasoned judgement. not a judgement made by the cones of your eyes. It's nonsense to say that this judgement is "pre-rational", or somehow not a matter of "natural reasoning", because the faculty which gives us judgement is the same faculty which gives us reason. Unless you are arguing that one can make a choice with absolutely no reason for that choice, then reasoning and judging are the same thing. So to make a judgement that you see motion, or some such thing, is to use natural reason.

I recognize this argument as valid. But I reject the premise: "'recognition' requires some form of natural reason." So I don't recognize that it's a sound argument. — InPitzotl

OK, so this is our point of disagreement right here. How do you suppose that one can recognize something without making a comparison of some sort, and producing a conclusion regarding that comparison? But if you agree that recognition requires such a comparison, how do you think this act of comparison is not an act of "natural reason"?

The calculations that take the stimulation of individual cones when I look at that peripheral drift illusion to a recognition of motion definitely do occur; but they are pre-rational. — InPitzotl

To repeat, I don't see what you could possibly mean by a non-rational calculation. If it's a calculation it's rational. if it's not rational it's not a calculation.

This all depends on how you view the purpose of punishment. if you think that punishment is to extract revenge, or hurt the culpable person, you might say life in solitary confinement, or daily torture is a better punishment than the death sentence. And you would make the punishment directly related to the crime. But we generally don't see punishment in this way, so we do not choose our punishments as if there is a direct relation between the named crime and the meted punishment. The punishment is applied for a purpose other than to hurt the perpetrator.

Not a "fact". Globalism is an ideology (i.e. read the books by Soros and Barnett), and the question is how far to pursue it. — Nobeernolife

I don't think this is correct, "globalization" is a descriptive term, describing what has already occurred, or what is ongoing. It is clearly not an "ideology", because there is demonstrably a number of different ideologies, capitalism, communism, etc., which lead to globalization. In fact most all ideologies which serve the interactions of human beings as rational social animals, lead to globalization. Globalization is the term used to refer to the effects of these ideologies. Anti-globalization may be an ideology, but it does not support rational social interactions between human beings, so it is rather an irrational ideology.

I strongly disagree on all points here. In fact, globalism is the root cause of many of the conflicts we see today. — Nobeernolife

Based on what I said above, the fact that globalization is coincident with conflicts, does not indicate that it is the cause of the conflicts. There are many ideologies involved with globalization, any rational ideology will lead to globalization, and some of them clash in the process. But this does not mean that globalization is the cause of the clash. The cause of the conflicts are the clash of the different ideologies involved in globalization, but globalization is not an ideology.

As opposed to oblique globalist organizations accountable to no one. — Nobeernolife

Because "globalization" is not properly an ideology, this term "globalist organizations" is incoherent or at best ambiguous, and lacking in any real meaning. I suggest to you, that individuals such as yourself, who for some reason do not like the natural phenomenon of globalization, have created an ideology which we could call "anti-globalization", and have also created a phantom category "globalist organizations", implying that there is a globalist ideology which has set up globalist organizations, but there are really no such things. The organizations which are referred to as "globalist" are set up for a wide variety of different reasons, from differing ideologies, for a wide variety of purposes. To class them together as if they are supported by one ideology, with one purpose, and call them "globalist" as if they have one globalist ideology, is simply a mistake, or more likely a move of deception by those supporting an anti-globalist ideology.

No, to the contrary. The endless proxy wars conducted by the globalists (e.g. Clintons destruction of Libya and Syria) are testimony to that. — Nobeernolife

See, this is very clear evidence that you have set up this category of ideology, you call "globalist", as a catch all category, and place people whose ideology you dislike within that category. In reality the people have no such "globalist" ideology, holding a variety of different ideologies instead, because there is really no such thing as an ideology called "globalism". The anti-globalists, such as yourself, have created this category, and place numerous different ideologies into the category, but there is no such ideology at all, just a vast array of ideologies which are resented by the anti-globalists.

↪Isaac Oh, hush your mouth. You did well to get that much out of him.

Besides, he answered your question earlier:
There are plenty of people who believe in extra-judicial killings, enhanced interrogation, etc. They believe injustice is right. — unenlightened — Banno

This is simply argument by equivocation. It is based in an unacceptable definition of "justice". Once you assign "justice" to what is determined by "law" (the legal system), in an absolute sense, as implied by "judicial", you no longer allow justice to be defined as "law according to what is right", or "rightful law", which is the more proper definition of "justice", right rule. You have separated "right", in the sense of correct, from the meaning of "justice", to allow that the law determines what is just, regardless of whether the law is right. This allows you to say that "injustice" might be "right". But this requires an improper definition of "justice", which associates "just" with the law unconditionally, implying that what is judicial is just, instead of the proper definition of "just" which requires that the law is right or correct.

I simply said I agree with his basic policy platform: 1) Stop out-of-control globalism, put your nation ahead of global institutions, 2) Protect the borders, 3) Stop stupid foreign wars. — Nobeernolife

The problem here is that 1) and 3) are incompatible. You must respect the fact that globalism has already occurred, so it is too late to prevent it. The only recourse is an attempt to reverse it. The attempt to reverse it will create strife, and "stupid foreign wars" where there were none before (starting with trade wars, the most stupid type of war of all). The natural tendency for rational human beings is to socialize and cooperate, respectfully allowing for flex in the frontiers of ownership, as this is beneficial to all parties. Rigid walls are detrimental in an evolving world.

In other words, the irrationality of proceeding with 1), which is nothing other than an attempt to reverse the rational development and evolution of human existence, is actually an act of starting stupid foreign wars, directly contradicting 3).

Not exactly. What I'm sensing is cochlea hairs bending. An organ is mapping sounds (say, vibrations of my eardrum) to physical locations in the cochlea (via the hammer/anvil/stirrup/cochlea shape+fluid systems). That may sound like a nit pick, but I think it's perfectly fine to distinguish sensation at this level if you choose... but if you do so, you can't really say we're sensing sound, because we just plain aren't. We're sensing specific frequencies formed by sound (as produced by this sensory organ, which in my mind amounts to a bio-physical computer calculating the frequency components of sounds)... that's it. — InPitzotl

Right, that's the problem I described, as soon as we try to say "what" we're sensing, we're not talking strictly about the sensation any more, but we're referring to some logical conclusion, some reasoning as to "what" the sensation is.

Perception is not "natural reasoning"; it's entirely distinct. — InPitzotl

Here's the problem as it appears to me. "Perception" requires some form of recognition, and "recognition" requires some form of natural reason. Suppose a creature sees something as an object of food, that is a case of perception. But to see it as such, something to eat, requires recognition and therefore some form of natural reason.

Samuele wanted to restrict "perceiving" to sensing, but that's not how we commonly use these words. We generally allow that "sensing" might be used in a way which doesn't require natural reason or a judgement of "what" it is which is being sensed. We generally use "sense" to refer simply to being conscious of the information being received, not to refer to the judgements we make or interpretations of the information.

What we're talking about isn't what's being concluded, it's what is behind a percept. — InPitzotl

How can you say this? Clearly you are referring to conclusions. You are making conclusions that the objects are on the movie screen and not actually there.

think that's the level that you're missing... you go straight from "sensation" to "conclusion" via "reasoning"; in a sense, so do I. — InPitzotl

I think it's you who is missing something. A person cannot describe, or in any way talk about what one is sensing, without forming some sort of conclusions.

But the ability to define and talk about such objects I think is what you're missing, so that's my advantage. — InPitzotl

I think that if you believe that you can talk about what you're sensing, without using some sort of reasoning to make conclusions about what you're sensing, then you are absolutely mistaken. And being mistaken is not to your advantage.

There is sensation, and there is perception, and there is logic. To me, it appears you're attributing perception to logic, but it's very distinct from logic. Logic is something you could sit down and write up in natural language, which can then be scrutinized... the process by which "bird" is presented to you digested as "bird" is not this kind of thing.

The way I use the terms, and there's a reason for it, "perception" is part of "sensation"; so I have no problems saying that you "sense" the bird. — InPitzotl

I don't understand how you arrive at this conclusion. What you are sensing is some sounds. The only way to conclude that the sounds are coming from a bird is to employ some form of logic. Not all logic is formal logic. If it helps, instead of "logic" we could call it some form of reasoning.

You seem to be claiming that the reasoning required to determine that the sounds are coming from a bird, is inherent within sensation, the act of sensation requires a reasoning process for its performance. I am fine with this assumption, but it means that all creatures which "sense", must also carry out a reasoning process within this act of sensation.

This is why I think it's more prudent to separate the reasoning process from the act of sensation. The act of sensation merely picks up the information from the environment, but a reasoning process is required to determine "what" the information represents. if we do not separate these two, we cannot account for the fact that we make mistakes in determining "what" we are sensing. If the act of "sensing the sound" is one and the same as the act of "hearing the bird", then there would be no way to account for the mistake involved if the act of "sensing the sound" was really "hearing a recording" or some other sound, and mistaken for "hearing a bird".

I'm not too interested in commentators, I'd rather get it from the horse's mouth, the primary source. That's why I'm in favour of artist's statements But that appears to be quite an expensive artist's "statement" you have there in that little book.

It makes me think, maybe sometimes the statement might be more valuable than the piece itself. What do you think of Banksy's "statement", with the self-destructing piece? Isn't this a case where the statement is supposed to be more important than the piece itself? The problem though, as I think I mentioned earlier in the thread, the artist does not get to determine the value of the piece.

Maybe this "statement" concerns itself with the way that art is valued. With most merchandise, the seller does actually name the price, and the buyer pays or does not. There may be some negotiations, bargaining to actually lower the price, in some instances. What's with the auction, bidding up prices, so that only the rich can afford the product? I suppose it's a feature of the uniqueness of the product. But it's even becoming commonplace in real estate sales now, bidding wars to buy a house. That would be an artificial, illusion of uniqueness, created with the intent of raising the value of the object. Do you think that artists create an illusion of uniqueness, or a real uniqueness, to support the value of the art? Or is the value derived elsewhere, such as the artist's name and reputation?

Has Klee written any books on colour that you know of? I'm really fascinated by the way that different relations of colour can affect us in a way similar to the way that different relations of musical tones affect us, as harmonic or discordant, and by creating moods through a succession of notes at different intervals.

The thing is that there is a logical process by which we determine north. Look at the sun, the stars, compass, whatever is required, and deduce the direction. This is clearly distinct from sensing north. Why wouldn't you think that the process within the birds is similar to this, but the logic is working at a subconscious level? We have in philosophy, developed a distinction between what we "know", through some sort of logic, and what we "feel" through sensation, for a reason. It helps us to understand these features of reality.

We can, and often do, even cross reference these different perceptual modes according to this perceived space; you might see a bird and hear it, and perceive that the bird you see is making that song... both percepts subjectively feel like they are "in the same place". I'm not sure how far this goes, but this subjective perceived space seems like a type of "glue" of our senses. — InPitzotl

This is the type of thing I am speaking of. Suppose you hear a sound. You say "I hear a bird". However, there is a sort of logic required to produce the conclusion that the sound you hear is a bird. This logic is not itself a form of sensation.

So Samuele might say you sense a bird. But in reality your are hearing noises, and using some sort of logic to conclude that the noises are coming from a bird. Now we could extend this principle to all the senses, including seeing. We're not really seeing individual objects around us, we are sensing differences in electromagnetic radiation, and using some sort of logic to conclude boundaries between things, and we claim to "see" or "sense" distinct objects. In reality the distinct objects are created by some sort of logical process and are not actually "sensed".

You are a beautiful person.

If we now restrict the meaning of "perceiving" to our senses (which, by the way, are by now known to be more than the usually stated five), it becomes apparent that there are lots of things that exist and cannot be perceived.

Take electromagnetic fields. There are some animals (some species of birds) that have a sense that allows them to *feel* electromagnetic fields.

In the past, I read about an experiment in which scientists gave a subject a belt to wear that would vibrate according to electromagnetic field presence. Eventually, that man seemed to have developed a way to sense those fields even without the belt.

If we somehow expanded our set of senses to sense everything, would the number of things that we could perceive still be finite? Would that set coincide with the set of everything that exists? — Samuele

I don't understand your thought process here. You want to restrict "perceiving" to what is perceived by the senses, but then allow that all sorts of "perception", which we would not normally call sense perception is sensation. What's the point in restricting perception in this way, just to allow phantom "senses" which haven't been identified? So when birds supposedly "sense" electromagnetic fields, can you name the sense, and describe how sensation through the means of this sense works, such that the bird might identify the electromagnetic field through this sense? If not, why call it a "sense" at all?

Do we sense gravity? Isn't it more appropriate to say that gravity affects us, and we use logic to infer its existence. In the case of the birds, the electromagnetic field affects them, but they haven't the capacity to use logic to determine its existence. So they do not at all apprehend the existence of these fields. Therefore they do not sense the fields. It has an affect on them but they do not perceive it. Gravity affects us, we do not sense it, but we apprehend it, and therefore "perceive" it, through the intellect. So we need another category of these things which affect us, we do not sense them, yet we may perceive them, apprehending them with the mind.

I won't mention Escher — Punshhh

My life's an Escher.

But even though you yourself is the artist in this case, that is no guarantee that you could produce a better and more truthful interpretation than any other critic. In fact, being the artist doesn’t give you any special interpretive authority. — Congau

The author has no interpretive authority? Isn't that kind of contradictory?

History.

You don't have to agree with Anscombe, and nor do I. Her argument though is that moral oughts only make sense in that context. Rather like money only makes sense in the context of property. I'm going to stop here though for a bit, and let someone else or no one else take over. — unenlightened

What I think is that this is a misrepresentation of the history of moral philosophy. Many people, in the past, have wanted to justify their sense of what they think other people, or themselves, "ought" to do. And to enact this justification, might require for them, reference to a divine mind, as you seem to imply. But that is not moral philosophy, its. more like a sort of apologetics, defending the "oughts" with references to "God". It's a defense, or attempted justification, of what they've already decided. But apologetics is not philosophy, and this is just a vicious circle of justification, as others will justify "God" with reference to "oughts".

Moral philosophy, being philosophy, is aimed at finding the truth concerning moral issues. Philosophy is not an activity of rationalizing, or justifying existing bias or prejudice. As philosophers, to find the truth we must accept the evidence. And what is evident in the world is that people often know what they ought to do, yet they do otherwise. So there is more to morality then simply knowing what one ought to do. This is the dilemma which has perplexed moral philosophers for millennia, since moral philosophy's inception. This was Socrates' and Plato's dissatisfaction with the sophists who claimed to teach virtue. Teaching an individual the virtues could not ensure virtuous behaviour by that person. So creating morality within a person is a completely different thing from teaching a person how they ought to act. Therefore virtue is not a form of knowledge. And this dilemma is more properly the subject of moral philosophy, rather than the attempt at justifying any sort of "ought".

Because of this fact, that people do not do what they know they ought to do, moral philosophy cannot be based in any sort of conception of "ought". That is why moral philosophers, throughout the history of moral philosophy, have instead, turned towards this sort of question of what moves the will. The reason why the intellect cannot guide the will is understood as the force of the appetitive part of the human being, which often manifests as the force of habit. But this force itself may be overcome by will power. So if the will is separate from the intellect and not necessarily moved by the intellect, and also not necessarily moved by the appetite, it must be free.

Therefore, history, and analysis of this dilemma, has produced as a starting point for moral philosophy, the freedom of the will. The activity of the will is not moved necessarily by intelligible principles ("oughts" and other principles of action), nor is it necessarily moved by the irascible and concupiscible appetites. So this one-sided portrayal of moral philosophy which you have presented, moral philosophy being an attempt to justify a 'system of oughts' as the means of compelling good behaviour, without reference to the accepted principles of moral philosophy, which recognize that good behaviour cannot be compelled by any 'system of oughts' , but must be freely chosen, is a complete misrepresentation.

Yes. And given the phenomena of such made up stuff, one can philosophise. But a philosophy that makes up the phenomena - no that's not philosophy. — unenlightened

I agree that strictly speaking, it is not the endeavour of philosophy to make the stuff up. However, made up stuff is abundant in our society, and to judge the made up stuff as good or bad is philosophy. Therefore there is no shortage of work for the moral philosopher in our society, as there is much made up stuff to be judged. If you are implying that the philosopher ought to produce the distinction between good and bad, then you are asking the philosopher to make stuff up. But principles concerning that distinction already exist, as part of the made up stuff, so the philosopher need only refer to this.

Again, this is the whole thrust of Anscombe's piece, that without the divine will the concept of moral oughts has no content and dissolves into an emotional (psychological) appeal, not a theory with any content. Again you are confusing the philosophy of made up shit, with made up shit philosophy. — unenlightened

For what reason does a human being need a "divine will" to judge the made up stuff as good or bad? Human beings themselves, as part of being human, have a will, and therefore a capacity for judging good and bad. It is only if someone feels the need to impose consistency, to judge another's judgement as consistent or inconsistent with a "higher" judgement, and seek to enforce compliance, that a divine will might be invoked.

This clearly does not remove the content from the concept of moral ought, because each individual must decide, in each instance of circumstances, what is the good action. This decision, "what I ought to do now" must be made regardless of whether there is a divine will. The fact that one must make such decisions is the basis of a moral theory with content.

It's only if you associate "ought" with obligation, such that a person is obliged by some external force (other human beings, the state, or God for example), that this problem might arise. However, this is inconsistent with our nature of free choice. We are not obliged to choose. Furthermore, if some "oughts" are inferred by obligation, there are still very many which are not. I can say "I ought to help my sister today", and that "ought" is based in love or something else, as I feel no obligation to do such. Therefore "ought" cannot be characterized by obligation.

That some of us are inclined to judge another's judgement of good or bad, in comparison to some further principles of good and bad, or impose such principles onto others, to validate obligation prehaps, requires making stuff up, and is therefore not actually philosophy.

Perhaps one might conclude, philosophically, that the future is made up, and that morality is made up. But it cannot be made up by analytic philosophy at least. Rather, as Anscombe declares it is made up by psyche, and the phenomenon is then examined by philosophy. — unenlightened

I think you misrepresent the potential extent of analytic philosophy. Do you agree that the made up shit, where it seeps into various forms of manifestation, from myths, religious stories, psychological theories, to physical theories about the nature and origin of life and the universe, has had an important affect on morality? This is supposed to be an empirical fact, based in observation. It's a description. Therefore the way that the made up shit is created, and used by moralists, is a valid object of analytic philosophy. The art of actually making the shit up, we might ascribe to some other form of philosophy, like dialectics. Or have you another suggestion as to how we might account for making shit up, without actually making the shit up ourselves?

Your conclusion is not supported. The premise that "making shit up is called 'fiction'", doesn't produce the conclusion that it's impossible that philosophy is this type of activity. In fact, there is much evidence that philosophy is this type of activity, 'making shit up'. All you need to do is read some philosophy to see that. And that's why philosophy is frowned upon by many in the scientific community.

Disciplines like psychology and sociology attempt to close this gap between 'making shit up' and science. That's why the validity of many principles in these so-called "sciences" is very difficult to judge, because the made up shit and the true science are woven together into a fabric which supports the discipline. But this weaving together tends to hide the distinction between the scientific principles produced from empirical observations of past events, and the made up shit, which are the principles by which the scientific principles are applied toward producing future events.

I think a better question would be : how do artists understand the artist's statement? How do they approach it? What use do artists put it to? How do dealers understand the artist's statement. What use do they put it to. How do curators? Critics? and so forth. — csalisbury

Don't forget, the artist is a cunning creature, sly as a fox. With the growth in media, public critics abound, and they may seize the artist, interrogating with questions of what does this mean, what does that mean, sometimes to the point of harassment, because these critics haven't the confidence, or capacity, to produce an authentic interpretation. I think the artists have simply developed a preemptive strike to fend off the critics. It's a prepared response to the critics.

That's clearly not true. Moral philosophy determines what's good, what ought to be done in the future. "Morals" are judged in relation to actions which have been done in the past. And, there are no good acts carried out without first determining what is good, and then proceeding into that act. I.e. good acts are not a matter of random chance, they are chosen.

In other words, we cannot rely on the morality of the past to determine the morality of the future because this would exclude the possibility of bettering ourselves. And the purpose of moral philosophy is to better ourselves. So to say that we're too bad to practise moral philosophy is incoherent, because in reality the worse we get the more potential there is to better ourselves.

I know. So if Unenlightened's account is accurate, the article suffers the problems Unenlightened has demonstrated.

I don't know what to say really. To paraphrase A : moral philosophy is in a state because bla bla bla and all this other stuff needs to be sorted out before we can hope to make sense of it. In the meantime, I am not going to discuss any of this with Jeffery Dahmer, Adolf Hitler, or Pol Pot. I cannot justify it, but I'm not going to commit atrocities because philosophy is a mess. — unenlightened

Well you've really lost me now. I haven't the foggiest clue of what you're trying to say. I suppose you succeed with "I am not going to discuss any of this..." by saying something completely incoherent.

No, I think what's meant by 'pretending' seems to require a concious deceit. With morality, there doesn't appear to be anything to be a deceitful version of. There's no 'true' moral judgement which copying others is only a pretense of. How others behave just is one of the drives which determine our decisions sometimes. — Isaac

I don't see any reason to restrict "pretending" so as it only may refer when there is conscious deceit. Actors in a play will pretend, that's what acting is, when there is no intent to deceive the audience, the intent is to entertain. In morality, one may pretend to be an authority, without the conscious intent to deceive. It is a matter of acting the part, and the poser might have the true intention, and belief in bettering the audience.

The problem with authority is that it is not something that can be enforced on the people, the people must give it to the person who will become the authority. The authority is created by the act of giving the person authority, not by imposition. This is due to the nature of free choice. So if a person wants to be an authority, that person must pretend, in order that the people might see that person as an acceptable authority, and actually make the person into an authority. In this act of pretense, it is not necessary to deem the person as deceitful, if the person is truly acting for the interest of the people. It is just like an actor in a play; the actor must act the part in order for the audience to see the intended character, and finally the audience will see the actor as the character. Because it is known and respected that it is an act, we cannot say that the actor is deceitful in doing this.

We might be taught it, and in this day and age, probably with good reason, but the teaching is just post hoc rationalisation of what's already going on. After all, why would we trust the teacher? Our sense of trustworthiness, rightful authority, duty... All must be in place already just to accept the teacher telling us to work it out for ourselves. Not to mention the fact we still need an objective against which to measure the options. If we do the calculations ourselves (which course of action is best) we have to already have in place what constitutes the 'best' we're aiming for, and the idea that us using our own rational capabilities to work this out is itself the best course of action. — Isaac

The teacher is an actor as well, acting the part of an authority. But there is a difference here, and this is that the children do not know that it is an act of pretense. So there is a form of deceit which is inherent within learning, and learning cannot proceed without it. If the children knew that the authorities were just posing, there'd be disorder everywhere, and no education. Therefore the teacher walks a fine line of balance between encouraging the virtues of true independent, authentic, and original thought, while displaying the virtues of accepted principles.

From this perspective there cannot be a "best". "Best" implies an extreme, and as Aristotle demonstrated, virtue lies as a mean between the extremes. The balance the teacher must keep is a mean. One might say "best" is that balance, which the teacher must establish, but a balance is not constant and consistent in a changing world, so there is no static or ideal best. Changes on one side must be met with changes to the other. So the teacher is always balancing the deceitful imposition of principles, pretending to be an authority when the children do not know that it is pretense, with the honest encouragement of independence and authenticity.

"The word 'thought' may mean: a single product of thinking or a single idea." (Wiki)

The PT is an idea transmitted down through the ages. Thought = Idea. Your definition of "thought" is far too narrow. You clearly want to keep all your thoughts to yourself. :roll: — jgill

There is a reason why we have the law of identity. It was established to prevent the faulty arguments of sophistry. If you think my definition of "thought" is far too narrow, because I adhere to the law of identity, and you'd like to allow that thoughts in different people's minds might be "one and the same" thought, then I see no reason why you would propose this, unless you are trying to argue some trick of sophistry.

I have no problem saying that a thought is "a single idea", where I have the problem is in saying that my ideas are your ideas. As evidence of the difference, there are laws of intellectual property, based in the real separation between the ideas of distinct people. But in this case, it's not that I "want" to keep my thoughts to myself (otherwise I would not be here), but I have a healthy respect for the constraints of reality, which make my thoughts uniquely my own.

E.g., "I weigh 196 pounds," is arguably never, ever exactly true. . — tim wood

Right, and that's exactly why the phrase is ambiguous. We don't know who weighed you, how they weighed you, when they weighed you, and so the phrase is ambiguous. We cannot pinpoint the meaning of it. What does it mean for a human being, whose weight is changing by the moment, to say "I weigh …" and quote a static quantity? As there is clearly no correct way to interpret this statement, it is a perfect example of ambiguity.

Why not send the man lost and thirsty in the desert towards a mirage. — TheMadFool

Give the man a parable and send him on his way. At least that's better than giving him a counterfactual.

Sorry, sometimes I don't see what appears obvious to others. That's why I ask for explanations. I don't think it's related to smartness, I think it's a psychological condition. Why not just address the issue instead of expressing a biased judgement of my psyche, in a way meant to insult?

Why does one state "it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy", and then proceed to do moral philosophy? Do you apprehend the pretense? In extreme cases like this, it's called hypocrisy. Do you think that psychology has a better system for treating this illness, "pretense", than moral philosophy does? Why pretend that psychology can produce authenticity in a human being, when we all know that authenticity is the product of good moral training. Why pretend that psychology is required for a philosophy of morality?

Thought is incredibly calorie intensive, we have a huge network of functions designed to select and imitate others, it's just massively more efficient than trying to work it out from scratch each time. — Isaac

Would you classify imitating others as a form of pretending?

The interesting question, for me, is how people select who to imitate - but that's a completely different topic. Moral virtues and duties are usually adopted by imitation. Consequentialist moral decisions are obviously an exception, by their very nature, but the goals against which potential outcomes are measured are still virtues or duties determined by cultural inheritance. — Isaac

Aren't we taught that good moral standards involve thinking things out for ourselves, and not to simply imitate others?

Nonsense. Take the Pythagorean Theorem: a2+b2=c2a2+b2=c2

The original thought occurred millennia ago, and it has been transmitted through the intervening years both by a variety of symbols and word of mouth. It remains essentially the same in Euclidean geometry, which by and large is the world in which we live, even though there are other forms of geometry. — jgill

Symbols, and word of mouth do not transmit thoughts from one person to another. It's you who is speaking nonsense. When I write this symbol "A", do you think that there is a thought inside there, which is coming from my mind to go into your mind?

Are you familiar with the law of identity? When I read the symbols you wrote, I do not have the same thoughts as you had when you wrote those symbols. When two things are similar, like my thoughts and your thoughts, they are of the same type, they are not the same thing.

The law of the excluded middle doesn't apply to anything really, love be ing a great example (again Aristotle is wrong). — Gregory

Actually Aristotle is the one who first explained the failings of the LEM. Sophists at the time could produce absurd conclusions by adhering to the laws of logic. He found that either the law of non-contradiction, or the law of excluded middle had to be violated to adequately describe the real world of change, becoming. He insisted that the law of non-contradiction ought to be upheld, and described the types of situations which were to be considered as exceptions to the law of excluded middle. Notice in the Nichomachean Ethics he describes the various virtues, each as the mean between two extremes, the extremes being a vice.

The other possibility, of allowing violation of the law of non-contradiction, was dismissed because Aristotle felt it would lead to incoherency and unintelligibility. It's better to say "x is neither A nor B", than it is to say "x is both A and B". He seemed to appeal to intuition on this principle, but intuition he classified as the highest form of knowledge. If we say "neither A nor B", then we must find different words, a different category, to speak of this property of x. But if we say "both A and B", then we find ourselves in a logical conundrum which prevents us from saying anything intelligible about that property.

But those who read and interpret those symbols revive those thoughts and give them renewed existence. — jgill

Not quite, the readers produce new thoughts, within a new context. So if thoughts are existent things, the old thoughts of the author are different things from the new thoughts of the reader. There is no continuity of existence between a thought at one time and aa thought at a later time, so the two are not the same thing. The moon landing, along with all the thoughts involved, is a distant memory. It may be recreated with new thoughts, but the new thoughts are not the same thoughts as the old thoughts, as is evident from conspiracy theories. The thoughts which supported the moon landing are not existing.

Thus, like monks reading and reciting scripture, were an order to so illuminate and pronounce mathematical works with unflagging resolve those thoughts would exist forever.

Hemingway's thoughts exist unendingly, for someone, somewhere is reading them now. — jgill

This is a myth which science has dispelled. Symbols, which represent thoughts, might exist indefinitely, but not the thoughts themselves. And, as time passes, the context within which the symbols exist, changes. Since the meaning of any symbols is context dependent, the interpretation of the symbols changes with the passing of time.