Under what elaborations, or other scenarios, would you like to explore / test it? — bongo fury

I think that telling someone what to do, is not a matter of pointing at anything. How is an activity, which doesn't even exist yet, a thing?

"Can't function" is nice... A relatively entrenched, 'literal' usage sorting the domain of machines into, roughly, those in working order and those not. Then, a more novel, 'metaphorical' usage to sort the different domain of people, according to criteria some of which agree and some contrast with those for literal application. An important contrast, creating humour, would be the more stringent standard, denying the status of working order to perfectly healthy and normal humans recently roused from a sleep state. The story amuses because the child has learnt the secondary, metaphorical use before the original, probably not sensing the humorous implications of the change in domain and criteria. The metaphor itself (the change in domain and criteria) amuses by creating referential links, under the surface as it were, by which other machine-words and machine-pictures are readied to help sort the domain of persons. — bongo fury

So, how does "I can't function...", point to anything? You might say that the subject is "I" so it points to I, but the matter is "function", so the subject matter is "my functioning" and this is not a thing which is being pointed at. Subject matter in general, is not a thing.

Then there is what you call "metaphorical use". How do you think that metaphorical use is a matter of pointing at something?

I really think that most language use cannot be characterized as pointing at something.

And of course we sense the more general struggle of the novice to project, from limited examples, to suitable occasions for pointing a word. — bongo fury

What do you even mean by "pointing a word"? Is this metaphor? If not, I find it rather incoherent. What tool would you use to sharpen the tip of a word?

For the same reason someone might want to restrict the meaning of "momentum" to "mass times velocity". The promise of theoretical simplicity and generality. What I thought you might be craving when you lamented: — bongo fury

There's a problem with this type of restriction though. If you restrict your understanding of "using a word", to "using a word for the purpose of pointing at something", then all those instances in which people use words for something other than pointing at something will not be apprehended by your understanding. And if you say that "meaning is use", and restrict your understanding of "use" to the use of words, you will not apprehend all the meaning which is in those instances of using things other than words. Furthermore, if you restrict your understanding of "meaning" to "meaning is use", you will not apprehend all that meaning which is in things other than use.

Likewise, if you restrict your understanding of "inertia" to "momentum", thereby understanding inertia as mass times velocity, you will not apprehend the inertia of a body at rest. So "momentum" is useful for understanding the inertia of a body, just like "using a word to point at things" is useful for understanding the use of words, but it is an incomplete understanding. And to insist that it is complete would be a misunderstanding.

The word "use" is used in many different ways. If we restrict "use" to the sense of using words, then I think you need to realize that we use words for a lot of things more than just pointing at things. Do you agree that the most common use of words is to tell someone what to do? And do you agree that this is not a matter of pointing at something? Why do you want to restrict the meaning of "using words" to "using words for a particular purpose", when that particular purpose is to point at things?

Agreement (about just where it is we disagree) looming in sight? — bongo fury

Lack of agreement does not necessarily mean that we disagree. If we do not understand each other then we can neither agree nor disagree. To be without an opinion on the matter allows one to neither agree nor disagree. And if the matter is seen as unimportant, or if there is no impending necessity of forming an opinion, one might intentionally continue in this state of neither agreeing nor disagreeing.

Whereas, I see it as a game of 'pretend', on which we must collaborate. — bongo fury

Yes, I understand this, but where does the "we must collaborate" come from? Let's assume that I want you to understand me, for my intents and purposes, and you want me to understand you for your intents and purposes, does that force the conclusion "we must collaborate"? If I am unwilling to help you, and you are unwilling to help me, then even though we want each other's help, we might just go on our separate ways, thinking that the other is unwilling to help. Where does the sense of fairness (you'll only help me if I help you), which is required for collaboration come from?

Which is fine, I'm not complaining. We have different agendas, different half-baked theories of discourse. I speak for mine when I say half-baked - yours can be done if you like.

As expected, very different views on "use", the difference resting, if I'm not mistaken, on whether we see reference as a matter of fact. — bongo fury

You haven't really described to me your view on "use", only repeating that it's very different from mine. Then when you allow me a little peek it appears to be very similar. You mention something about striving to agree, and the need to collaborate, but when I say something to you, you make a short reply and run away, saying we're very different in our views, making very little, if any attempt to agree. So it appears like you are proposing that we need to collaborate, and we ought to strive to agree, but you demonstrate the very opposite. This makes me very doubtful of your proposition. I don't see how you relate "use" to "we must collaborate". Do you recognize a difference between loving a person and using a person? How can you produce collaboration through "use" instead of through "love"?

I think a lot of these white evangelical leaders are doing more to hurt Christianity than the so-called New Atheists ever could.

Self-destruction is worse than being destroyed by something else. Didn't Jesus say something about that when criticized for not washing his hands, focus on the illness which comes from within.

You said: "we use language and therefore "play language games" without any such agreement." There was no qualification; you meant that there is never any agreement. "The agreement is non-existent." — Luke

Right, we can use language and play language games without any agreement, just like the girl in the op. Agreement may come afterwards, for those who strive for agreement as bongo says we do. Why impose "never" on your interpretation of what I said, when I never said never? Sometimes we agree, sometimes we do not. Where's the problem? When I speak of an instance when there is no agreement, why assume that I mean there is never agreement.

There was no qualification; you meant that there is never any agreement. "The agreement is non-existent." — Luke

Are you familiar with the term "context". I said that agreement [in that type of instance which was being discussed, ones like the op], is non-existent. How can you interpret this as "there is never any agreement"? Come on Luke, you're just arguing for the sake of arguing, when will you start striving for agreement?

about, specifically, which words (or pictures or sunsets) are pointed (already or eventually) at which things. — bongo fury

Let me repeat what I already said, in a different way. I really don't think that agreement is relevant here, at this level of meaning which is demonstrated by the op. When I say something to someone, and the person understands what I have said (understanding is demonstrated by the person's actions), I do not think that it is the case that the person agrees with how I use the words to point at different things. I think it is simply the case that the person understands how I use the words to point at different things. Understanding how the words are used, and agreeing with how the words are used, are distinct. So for example, when a person speaks to me using a lot of jargon which I do not think is warranted in the situation, I might understand what that person is saying, but I wouldn't agree with that person's use of words.

In this type of situation, we understand without agreement. Nor do we really strive for agreement because understanding is what is important, and so long as we understand each other it's sort of irrelevant whether or not we agree with how the other is using words. It might be better to say that we strive for understanding rather than agreement. But when it comes to philosophy, and logical arguments, agreement might be expedient toward understanding. Then we might strive for agreement, but this would still be for the sake of understanding. So we ought to give "understanding" priority over "agreement", as what is striven for, or required for language to be useful.

What you seem to fail to understand is that similarity is not a concept sufficient to substitute in all uses of 'same'. "Two dogs are the same kind of animal"; I cannot substitute "two dogs are similar kinds of animal" without losing the sense of the statement. — Janus

Yes I went through that already. It is appropriate, in a philosophical discussion, or logical argument, to say that two distinct things are of the same kind. It is inappropriate in a philosophical discussion, or logical argument, to say that two distinct things are the same. Despite the fact that we often say two distinct things are "exactly the same" in everyday language use, in philosophy this amounts to sophistry.

I see. I must have misunderstood when you said: — Luke

I apologize for lack of clarity at that point. I didn't mean that there is never any agreement, in an absolute sense, only that in those instances there is no agreement. I believe that is what the op indicates, there is no agreement in that instance of use, yet there is still meaning in that instance.

Bongo had said that we strive for agreement, but I think that people strive for agreement sometimes, and other times not, so striving for agreement is not essential, just like agreement itself is not essential.

We can look at "definition" as a type of agreement, and agreement clearly has a place in language use, especially philosophy and logical proceedings. For example, "I agree, for the purpose of this logical argument, to use "same" in the way indicated by the law of identity. But such an agreement wouldn't restrict the way that I use "same" in my day to day use, which might be full of bad habits. And so long as people understand my day to day use of "same" there is no problem.

However, if I slip outside of the defined usage, which I have agreed to in the proceeding of the logical argument, if my bad habits overwhelm my will to maintain what I've agreed to, then I may be charged with equivocation.

Here is the problem which Wittgenstein exposes at 253 of PI. When we are talking about our sensations, and how one person may experience "the same" sensation as another, by what criteria of identity are we using "same" in this case? Clearly we are not using "same" in the way outlined by the law of identity, as the example of the chair demonstrates. However, there are enormous epistemological consequences which follow from this use of "same", as Witty outlines in the following section. Unless there is some clearly stated criteria (a definition, or agreement) for how "same" ought to be used in this type of situation, all the epistemology which is built on this use of "same" is completely unsound.

As I have already said the fact that the world of human experience, which is what we all experience... — Janus

You are making the same unwarranted generalization as Mww, assuming that we all experience the same thing. Quite obviously, we do not all experience the same thing, So there appears to be no basis to this claim that there is one world of human experience. Each person has one's own experience, and no two people have the same experience. There is no such thing as the world of human experience.

As I've told you, over and over now, you're starting from a false premise. Will you please dismiss this false premise, and start from the reality that each person has one's own experience which is very distinct from every other person's experience, then we might be able to properly discuss the role of perspective in relation to reality.

A definition of the law of identity gives its meaning, yet it is your claim that no two meanings are the same or that we can ever be sure that they are the same, since agreement in ways of use are non-existent, and we can at best have only similar but not the same ways of use. — Luke

I think this is where your confusion lies Luke. I never said that agreements in ways of use are non-existent. I said that such generalizations about ways of use come about through retrospection. I do not deny the existence of generalizations, nor do I deny agreements in ways of use. What I deny is that generalizations indicate sameness within the things generalized, and that agreements in ways of use create same use. What is indicted by generalizations is similarity, and what is created through agreement is similarity.

And being similar is distinct from being the same. Is this difficult for you to understand?

A definition of the law of identity gives its meaning, yet it is your claim that no two meanings are the same or that we can ever be sure that they are the same, since agreement in ways of use are non-existent, and we can at best have only similar but not the same ways of use. — Luke

No, we were working with the premise that meaning is use, and attempting to determine how "use" is being used in this sense. To say that a definition is what gives the law of identity meaning is way off track. It is the use of the law of identity which gives it meaning, and I readily admit that we do not use it in the same way, but similar ways. So I do not see that you are making any point here whatsoever.

Therefore, how can you use the law of identity as a law or a standard of sameness when the agreement of use is non-existent? You cannot be using it the same way as anybody else, including Aristotle, by your own argument. There is no such thing as the "same" because you have made it an impossible standard. — Luke

That's your opinion, it's not mine. If you think that the criteria for "same", as described by the law of identity is an impossible standard, and therefore you refuse to agree to it, then so be it. I agree to it, and other philosophers (Leibniz for example) agree to it, and therefore the agreement does exist. That you refuse to agree does not negate the agreement.

If you and I, and by association you and Janus, can agree that the term “perspective” denotes a particular attitude or opinion about a thing, and we each as particular persons all agree as a matter of discourse that the fins on a ‘60 Cadillac were rather extreme.....wouldn’t we have a common perspective with respect to extremism? — Mww

I don't see how agreement constitutes a common perspective. Care to explain? That we agree to refer to things using the same words does not mean that we have a common perspective.

If humans are known with absolute certainty to be entities with the capacity for perspective, then the concept of human perspective cannot be either false nor contradictory. — Mww

I think this is seriously faulty logic. That distinct human beings each have a perspective, does not produce the conclusion that there is one human perspective. That's some sort of composition fallacy, or a category error.

If there is something that is specifically the property of individuals, perspective, and not the property of a group of individuals, then to say that it is the property of the group is contradictory.

If it is true every human ever has or had or will have a perspective, then it follows necessarily there is a human perspective. — Mww

Fallacy of composition, text book case.

So, there is no single perspective, but "for us" signifies perspective in general, the fact that all those different perspectives are examples of perspective, human perspective. — Janus

OK, let's start with this then. "For us" signifies that there is such a thing as perspective. Further, "the world" is something created, constructed, from a perspective. The concept "the world" only has meaning from a perspective. Therefore perspective is fundamental to this thing, the world, which is signified by the concept. Furthermore, we could replace "the world" with "existence", to say that the concept "existence" is something created or constructed from a perspective, therefore perspective is fundamental to existence. Do you not recognize that there is no such thing as the thing represented by a concept, without that concept?

Please explain why you believe that such conclusions about the fundamentality of perspective are unwarranted. When "the world", and "existence" are concepts which are created from a perspective, and there is no such thing as the thing represented by a particular concept without that concept, what makes you think that there is such a thing as the world, or existence, without a perspective?

Are you not being a little harsh, perhaps? If there is at least one irrefutable commonality in human reason, wouldn’t the concept, or just the idea, of a human perspective be validated? — Mww

How does agreeing on something validate a common perspective? Suppose you and I agree to call something by the same name, how would this validate the claim that we have the same perspective of that thing?

The addendum “for us” is tautological, as you say, but it isn’t necessarily impossible and certainly not contradictory. — Mww

It is only tautological if "us" refers to a number of individuals, each with one's own perspective. It is false and contradictory if "us" refers to a point of view called "human", with its own perspective.

It's a shame that your use of the word "same" cannot be identical to Aristotle's definition, by your own argument, since he lived so long ago. — Luke

Of course my instance of using "same" is not the same as Aristotle's, that's exactly the point, and it's quite obvious according to how "same" is defined by the law of identity. Whether it's "identical" depends on how one would define "identical". Do we adhere to "identity" as described in the law of identity as the basis for "identical", or do we subscribe to some form of similarity to define "identical"? Leibniz argues, with his principle "identity of indiscernibles" that "identical" ought to remain consistent with "same"

But Wittgenstein offers a very adept demonstration of a difference between "same" and "identical" at 253-256 of the Philosophical Investigations. You should read it, since I know that you take Wittgenstein as an authority. Notice at 253, that two distinct chairs can be said to be "exactly the same", yet they are distinct and therefore not "the same" by any rigorous standard of identity. Then, at 254 he mentions this switching of "identical" for "same", as if it were a philosophical ploy. (This is the sophism I refer to, two chairs are said to be "the same", because they appear to be identical, when in fact they are distinct chairs and not the same.) .

It is very important to understand this distinction in the way that we use "same", as a foundation for understanding how we attach names to our sensations, which is what Wittgenstein is discussing in that section. We will assign two distinct sensations the designation of "the same", based on some judgement of similarity, despite the fact that they are not "the same" by any rigorous criterion of identity. So when he proceeds to discuss how a symbol "S" is used to stand for a "certain sensation", what the "S" really stands for is a generalized multiple occurrence of multiple sensations, which have been judged as being similar (identical), but are not really "the same" according to the rigorous law of identity. It is only by circumventing the law of identity, and the rigorous criterion for "same" which is associated with it, that a symbol may be used to refer to a sensation in this way.

Only if you hold "same" to the impossible standard that requires another person be in precisely the same place and time (and mind?) in order to replicate your usage. Nobody besides a misguided philosopher would ever use the word "same" in this way about meaning or use. — Luke

Don't be absurd, this is the "same" which is defined by the law of identity. It was stated by Aristotle as a means of expelling sophism from philosophy. If you want to call similar things "the same" then you are not engaged in philosophy, but sophistry.

We often speak of synonyms having the same meaning without requiring your impossible standard of sameness. — Luke

Sure, we use "same" in this way. But it's clearly a way which is unacceptable in logical, or philosophical arguments. "I have two distinct brothers who own the same car, and both drive their cars at the same time " Try to figure that one out. Oh, I really mean that they have similar cars, not "the same car". So, why didn't I say "similar" in the first place? I was just making use of a colloquialism to pull a trick on you. Ha, ha, isn't that a funny joke? Let's call it what it is, sophistry.

You say "synonyms have the same meaning". If you are using this as a premise for a logical argument, it's very clear that it ought to be rejected as unsound. What you really mean is "similar". So if you are trying to use this as a premise for an argument, please state it in an acceptable form. Don't use the form of sophistry.

That's just not how the word is commonly used, especially when describing linguistic meaning. — Luke

No wonder there is so much confusion in the land of linguistic meaning. Sophistry abounds.

As I stated in my reply to Marchesk, we need to differentiate between the use of language itself, and the analysis of language use. Generalization enters when we look at how language was used, in retrospect, it is not an essential part of using language in the first place. When we generalize, we class similar things as the same. This use of "same" does not mean to say that similar things are the same, it means to say that they have been classed into the same category. The category here is the distinct "way of using" the word. When you say "synonyms have the same meaning", you are saying that these words belong to the same category (way of using).

By the way, we haven't gotten anywhere near to the bottom of this problem of the sophistic use of "same" in the land of linguistic meaning. In this illusory world, two distinct occurrences of a word are said to be occurrences of "the same" word. So the mother says "function", and then the daughter says "function", and we say that this is two occurrences of "the same" word. Clearly if we adhere to the law of identity we can see that this is a misleading use of "the same". And, we can also see that the sophism in this land of linguistic meaning has a very strong base.

Stop being such an idiot. I think you know, or should know, full well that by "for us" I am referring to human perspective. — Janus

I have a perspective, and you have a perspective. They are clearly not the same. What I am asking is how do you validate this proposed "human perspective".

The distinction is between the "in itself' (no perspective or interpretation) and the "for us" (perspective or interpretation). — Janus

The point is that your proposed distinction is unacceptable because there is no such thing as "the perspective for us". As I explained, that is impossible, contradictory, and therefore your division is unacceptable. A similar, and acceptable distinction would be between "in itself", and "for me".

Are you ready to dismiss "for us", and start with an acceptable premise, "for me"? Then if we manage to synthesize a "for us", by way of some agreement, you might acknowledge that the "for us" is a synthesis of a multiplicity of distinct "for mes", and not actually a true perspective. it is artificial.

It's an amazing level of stupidity you are displaying if this is not deliberate obfuscation. — Janus

The problem you have created is that you are designing "perspective" on the faulty base of "for us", and therefore you obviously have no clear understanding of what a perspective actually is. In other words, it is you who is actually displaying an incredible degree of stupidity. if you have no desire to proceed, and attempt to remove this fundamental stupidity from you argument, then so be it. You can live with that stupidity.

The special theory of relativity won't help your case here because it is part of the "for us". The "for us" does not make "a useless tautology" because it highlights the distinction between knowing and the real. It is safe to assume that we and our perceptions are part of the real, but we and they are not adequate or sufficient to a complete revelation of the real, insofar as they will always remain partial (in both senses of that word). — Janus

Your proposition is flawed because it assumes a "for us". Since we each have our own distinct perspectives, there is no such thing as "for us", when we are talking about perspectives. So you have just made up an impossible scenario, a premise based in the contradiction, that "we" have "a perspective".

We cannot proceed with this discussion until you relinquish the contradictory premise of "a perspective, for us". If we are talking about perspectives, there is no such thing as "for us", do you agree? Either we are talking about "for us", in which case the unity of "us" must be validated such that "us" might represent an existing enity, or we are talking about "perspective" in which case we each have our own.

So we're right back to the same point, if we remove the "for us", which is clearly warranted because the unity which creates an "us" has not been validated as being anything real, then we are left with perspective as the fundamental principle of what is real.

Well, I think that generalization arises from the public aspect, the plurality of use. I use a word in one way, you use it in a similar way, and for the sake of simplicity we assume that we are using it in the same way. This, saying that it is "the same way", is the agreement which bongo said that we strive for. If you and I say that we will use, or do use, the word in the same way, then we have agreement. Notice though, that it's a faulty sense of "the same", really meaning similar. But "similar" doesn't indicate agreement in the same way that "same" does. If a "game" requires multiple players with some such "agreement", then generalization is inherent within the "game".

The problem though is that all of this description is produced in retrospect, from analysis. In reality, we use words in similar ways, without any agreements. And when we reflect on this in a linguistic analysis we generalize, saying that this similar way is the same way. The generalization is produced by the analysis, which is an effort to understand, so "same" is posited to facilitate principles. It's a deficient "same" though. Then, we claim that we agree that this is the same way, and this supposed agreement supports the posited "same". The agreement is non-existent.

Yet we use language and therefore "play language games" without any such agreement. It is therefore, when we want to say that "I play the same game as you", or some such thing, that the problem of generalization crops up. We are apt to use "same" in a way which is not consistent with a rigorous interpretation of the law of identity. The generalization is dependent on that loose use of "same".

As I said, I'm not denying the existence of generalizations, I'm just pointing out that the existence of such things is very hard to understand. A generalization, as a thing to be understood seems to defy logic. As indicated, they are based in contradiction.

To understand the situation, I suggest you start with what I would call the pure form of "meaning is use". In this case we begin with the assumption that every instance of use is unique, particular. We might say that the true and precise meaning of each word is given by the context of the situation. So in one instance "cup" would refer to a specific object in my kitchen, and in another, it would refer to an object in your kitchen. Do you see that the meaning of the word "cup" is different each time it is used to refer to a different object? When I sit in my kitchen and say "could you please get me my cup", it has a completely different meaning from when you sit in your kitchen and say that, because I am asking for a different object from you Here we have what I would call the pure form of meaning in which the word relates directly to an object without the use of generalization. Each instance of use is distinct from every other.

Contrast this with what others seem to say about "meaning is use". They would say that "use" refers to a "way of using" a word. In this case, there would be a way of using the word "cup", to refer to a certain type of object, such that the word has "a meaning" which corresponds not with the actual use of the word, but with the "way" of using the word. Notice the two generalizations inherent within "way of using", and within "type of object". So in this way of using "meaning is use", one generalization (way of using the word) is related to another generalization (type of object).

In the latter case, we have utilized generalizations to understand meaning. Now we must make a move to understand the nature of a generalization, or else we are not really understanding meaning at all. we would simply be describing meaning in terms of generalizations, without having a clue as to what a generalization is. What is the point of that? What do you think constitutes a "way of using"?

Are we willing going to go down the road that we can't use language to speak in the general sense? All word meanings are unique and particular? — Marchesk

No I wasn't really going down that road. Notice I spoke in a general sense, and I even used "use" in a general sense. Even so, don't you agree that each instance of use is unique and particular, having its own peculiarities, and no two instances are the same? If you agree, then don't you think that this itself is a meaningful fact? Or would you argue that this is a difference which doesn't make a difference? I would say the latter is contradiction.

Maybe I misunderstand, but if so, I can't help but think something has gone badly wrong. It's language's ability to generalize which is so very useful. — Marchesk

There is a very evident problem with the idea of generalizing, as bongo brought up, and that is the question of what is being referred to in the generalization. If we say that there is a category, a mental object, which is referred to, then we get lost in Platonism trying to validate such a reference. If we say that there is a "way of using" a word, then the generalization is intrinsic to this concept, "way of using". What would validate a "way of using", if not some faulty assumption that X (a particular instance of use) is the same as Y (a particular instance of use)? That there is a difference between X and Y, which doesn't make a difference, is contradiction because the very fact that it may be identified as a difference is an instance of making a difference. Therefore, contradiction is intrinsic to generalization. I believe it was C.S. Peirce who expounded on this incompatibility within the relationship between the fundamental laws of logic and generalization. For him, it manifests as vagueness.

I.e., there is no such thing as anything. — god must be atheist

Right, where can we start? To have any meaning, a symbol must be associated with a thing, correspondence. If there is no association there is no meaning, therefore the symbol is not a symbol and ought not be called a symbol. If the symbol may be associated with anything, then we have a very similar problem, the symbol might be called a symbol, but it may be associated with absolutely anything. What kind of symbol is that? Can we say that there is any meaning there? If we restrict the use of the symbol, then meaning is created, but it is not created by the use of the symbol, which is inherently free, it is created by the restrictions. Now we can dismiss the idea that there is necessarily a thing which is referred to by the symbol, because it is intrinsic to the nature of the symbol, that it could theoretically (potentially) refer to anything (and there is no such thing as anything), but its application has been restricted, and so it has meaning. The idea dismissed is Platonism, it assumes the restrictions as a thing, an idea. If the restrictions are not ideal, then we are left with the task of characterizing them. How could they exist?

haven't said it is true that "things only ever exist from a perspective"; I have said that this is only true with the added caveat "for us". — Janus

You clearly said, "leaving off" the "for us", that this is unwarranted. And that is what I objected to.

The further point is that if, leaving off that critical "for us", you then want to go on to say that since "things only ever exist from a perspective" and " nothing has real 'self-existence' or exists in its own right", it follows that the Real must be ideal, that mind or consciousness must be fundamental, you are drawing an obviously unwarranted conclusion; a conclusion no more or less unwarranted than saying that because things appear to us as material, then the physical must be fundamental. — Janus

What I said, is that if we leave off the "for us", and consider that things only exist from a perspective (and this can be derived from the special theory of relativity incidentally), then the conclusion actually is justified. You only make it unwarranted by adding "for us". But the "for us" only makes a useless tautology anyway.

So your answer to the question 'are you or anyone you know experiencing racism in your life (outside TV) , the answer is no. — halo

As I said, the answer is yes. I see it commonly, in my life, not on TV, not every day, but more times than I can count. And it appears to be on an increase.

They are completely taking it out of context. — halo

Really? It was a tweet. Trump doesn't make speeches. He makes sporadic remarks strategically aimed at incite.

The further point is that if, leaving off that critical "for us", you then want to go on to say that since "things only ever exist from a perspective" and " nothing has real 'self-existence' or exists in its own right", it follows that the Real must be ideal, that mind or consciousness must be fundamental, you are drawing an obviously unwarranted conclusion; a conclusion no more or less unwarranted than saying that because things appear to us as material, then the physical must be fundamental. — Janus

I don't see how you can argue this. If it is true that "things only ever exist from a perspective", then perspective is fundamental as the basis for the reality of existence. So unless you can separate perspective form mind or consciousness, the conclusion that mind or consciousness is fundamental to the reality of existence is clearly justified.

Again, it seems to me that you are drawing an unwarranted conclusion here. Of course our knowledge is always "for us" by us, of us, in us and so on. On the other hand we are warranted in assuming that the world exists independently of our observations of it, just not that it exists in the same form as our observations of it. — Janus

There is no such warrant. If the world as we know it is a construct of our minds, then the assumption that the world exists independently of our observations is clearly unwarranted.

So the mind is of course involved in "constructing experience and so knowledge", but so is the world in ways which must remain unfathomable to us, unfathomable at least apart from our scientific investigations of nature, human physiology and perception, and so on, which are all " for us" insofar as we are obviously involved in them.

We can see the world although we cannot see it but "through a glass darkly". — Janus

I see no reason to assume the reality of what you call 'the world". Once you accept the reality of the principle you've stated, that what we see is "through a glass darkly", then you ought to recognize that there is no reason to believe that there is anything at all beyond the glass. The glass itself could be generating the impression that there is something beyond it. The "darkness" of the glass could be what you call "the world". "The world" is within the glass

The question now is is this true, what is the nature of the glass. If the mind constructs the experience with what is received from the glass, then what is beyond the glass, what you call "the world" is irrelevant. Our reality is the glass itself. One might ask, whether or not the mind itself has constructed the glass. If the glass is the human body, the thing we see the proposed "world" through, then I would argue that the mind does construct the glass. And if we ask what it constructs the glass out of, we cannot say "the world", because "the world" comes after the glass, as a proposition of what is on the other side of the glass.

This is the importance of the temporal perspective. We create a tool by which we can observe (sense), let's call this the glass (it's the human body). Through the use of this tool we create "the world", which is supposed to be what we are observing through the glass. To say that the glass was created from the world is a faulty temporal perspective because the glass was created before there was a world. What is on the other side of the glass is not unfathomable to us, it simply requires determining what the glass is made of.

If the vast majority of people do not experience racism in THEIR day to day lives, then by definition , by sheer common sense, the race issue is leftist propaganda and in fact promoting racism by continuing suggest the idea.
Please take note that what you hear or see on television does not count, as television does not equal reality since information is deleted, ignored , focused or not focused on, or taken out of proportion. — halo

So when the vast majority of people see Trump encouraging racism on TV, this does not count as "day to day life" because it's not reality? I suppose you think that the film's been edited to make Trump look like he encourages racism when he really does not. Regardless, I think most of us do experience racism, outside of what we see on TV, most of us not every day, but how much is too much? And if it is observed to be on the increase, this is cause for concern.

I'm guessing you can't mean "there is no such thing as 'using something' in a general sense because each instance of using something is unique and particular"? — bongo fury

Actually this is exactly what I said, and what I meant.

Rather, you are saying you oppose dignifying a narrower, technical sense of "use" whereby it means, more specifically, "using a word to refer to something" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Use–mention_distinction)? You want instead to emphasise and keep in play the very general sense of "using something in some way"? Resist reducing linguistic "use" to the mere pointing of words at things? — bongo fury

This is proceeding in the opposite direction of what I suggested. Each instance of use would be a particular act of referring to something, whether that something is a physical object, or a mental object like a type, a class, or category. Therefore "using something in some way" is excluded, as itself a mental object, a classification, which is not an act of use, it's a category.

Such a disagreement between us (where you resist what I embrace) is what I said I expected to be the case, yes. Do you agree this is the disagreement? — bongo fury

Do we have agreement then? The issue though, between us, was the relationship between meaning and use. You said you equate the two. I make "meaning" into a wider category than "use", such that all particular instances of "use" may be classified as meaningful, or having meaning, but not all instance of meaningful things are instances of use.

To explicate this, I brought in the distinction between "good" and "beauty". Instances of "use" necessarily relate to some "good". We use something for a purpose, and that purpose is the good which is expected to come from that use. But when we see beauty in something, such as a piece of art, there is meaning without use. The beautiful thing is meaningful, but not because it is useful. Therefore, meaning extends beyond "use" (good), into the category of beauty.

From this distinction we can produce two categories of "meaning", corresponding to two types of expression. We have expressions which are based in purpose, good, and use, as well as expressions which are based in art, creativity, and beauty. I would say that the two forms of meaning mix and intermingle. So in language for example, we find a mixture of purposeful use, and artful expression. Referring back to the op, we might ask what degree of artful expression is there in the child's statement, and what degree of use. I've noticed that children often enjoy saying unusual and creative things.

The logic is the same with either "seeing" or "experiencing".Hallucinating an asteroid is not experiencing an asteroid, but experiencing an hallucination. If an asteroid is experienced then it follows that the asteroid plays an essential part in producing that experience. The logic here is irrefutable. — Janus

What logic? It looks like a matter of begging the question to me, and that is a refutation Care to show me the premises and conclusion, to demonstrate that you are not begging the question? Your claim appears to be that "an experience" requires something sensed, the sensations play "an essential part in the experience". Is a dream not an experience? Suppose that the person was dreaming, and there was nothing "extra" acting as an essential part of the "experience". By what argument do you demonstrate that the person is wrong to refer to the thing in the dream as an "asteroid", and call this an experience of an asteroid in a dream. Clearly the person experiences "an asteroid", in a dream, and there is no "extra" playing an essential role in that experience.

We weren't talking about seeing an asteroid, we were talking about experiencing an asteroid, and what it is which "produces" the experience. I think that it is the systems within the human being which produce the experience, though I agreed that there is something "extra " involved with the experience. But you were claiming that the extra thing produces the experience. That, I think is clearly false.

The point is that there is no direct chain of causation between the thing within the experience, and the sensible "extra" thing which you claim produces the experience, so it is false to say that the sensible thing produces the experience. In reality, the causal chain which produces the experience occurs within the human being, and the things which are sensed act as influences on this experience. This is evident in the reality of hallucinations, dreams, and imagination. You cannot just dismiss the reality of these experiences for the sake of supporting your claim that the sensible "extra" thing produces the experience. Then suggest that we were discussing "seeing" rather than "experiencing".

Consider for example, the experience of hearing someone play the piano. What you hear is a series of notes and chords, music. If you look, with your eyes, you see someone playing the piano, and the person's actions correspond with what you hear. Because of this temporal correspondence, between what you hear and what you see, you might conclude that the person's actions at the piano are causing you to hear music. But you'd be forgetting the role that the human body plays in selecting a very specific and minute part of the vast reality around it, the notes, and focusing on that very tiny aspect, to hear the music independent of sights, smells etc., and even other sounds. Likewise, when you look with your eyes, you must focus on a very tiny aspect of the vast environment, to see that it is the particular actions of the person at the piano which correspond to what you hear.

So it really is the human body which produces the experience, through a process of selecting from what is available in the environment. Each sense is designed to distinguish a very unique type of information, indicating that the body has developed ways of separating out, and focusing in on very tiny aspects of a vast world, creating an "experience" through this process of separating things from each other. The experience is created by this process of separating things out, which the senses do, distinguishing minute parts, along with the brain synthesizing all this distinct information into a unity. The "experience" is the unity, and this unity is synthetic, produced within the body, with information selected by the body..

Why would it have to be a mass hallucination? if one person hallucinates an asteroid, then that person can speak about that asteroid.

There is no such thing as "use" in a general sense because each instance of using something is unique and particular.

There is no experience of the asteroid without the asteroid.. — Janus

But this is false. There could be an hallucination in which there is an experience of an asteroid, in which case there is the experience of that asteroid, the imaginary asteroid. Therefore there is the experience of the asteroid (the fictional asteroid) without any real physical asteroid. And this is not a small problem to be dismissed as nonsense, because in particle physics there are no real fundamental particles. There is something which is experienced, and the name "particle" is given to that experience, but there are no actual physical particles. So there is the experience of particles without any real physical particles.

In fact it is the conditions of the world, taken as a whole, including the human, that produces the experience of the asteroid, so the "something else" that produces the experience of an asteroid is nothing less than the whole world. — Janus

How would you account for imagination and creativity then? Suppose that someone creates a tune, and hums it in one's mind, or someone creates an image of a fictional asteroid, or a physicist creates a fictional particle. Why would you say that "the whole world" produces this experience when it's really just the imagination of the creator? .

But I'm not sure yet what this "qualitative leap" is supposed to be exactly? — WerMaat

When being and not being are subsumed within becoming, in the manner of Hegelian dialectics, the "qualitative leap" is difficult to make sense of. Such a leap, under its own definitive terms is an end, a not-being of the past existence, and a beginning of the being of the future existence. Such a leap must be understood in terms of process, a coming-to-be, to be made sense of in Hegelian terms, but then the term "leap" is misleading. Hegel's challenge is to describe these occurrences which appear as qualitative leaps, in terms of processes or comings-to-be, "slowly and quietly" ... "reshaping itself", because the leap for him is an illusion. You might call this "qualitative leap" a faulty description.

I'm surprised you can't see the strife as striving for agreement? No one need assume that any eventual settlement must be congenial for all parties. — bongo fury

I see no reason to conclude that this strife is a "striving for agreement". In some cases it may be, but in other cases not, so we cannot characterize it as such, with a general principle. I think it is often the case that one person is trying to get something from another, but what that person is trying to get is not necessarily agreement.

Do you associate meaning with use? (Or were you just interrogating T Clark on the point?) I certainly do associate the two. Equate them, even. — bongo fury

I do associate "use" with meaning, but I would not equate the two. I believe that meaning extends beyond use. We could consider the metaphysical distinction between "good" and "beauty". "Good" is associated with use, but "beauty" is something desired for no purpose, just for the sake of itself. So "a good" is desired, and called "good" for some purpose, use, and it is meaningful because it is useful for that purpose. But things of beauty are desired and are apprehended as meaningful, though not because they are useful for a purpose. That brings meaning more toward the desire, rather than the act which is intended to fulfill the desire (use). This is why I believe that "use" accounts for some aspects of meaning, but it doesn't account for the entirety of meaning.

Yes, I completely agree that there is such a prejudice, we need to look no further than the English word "right" to see that.

But I think that some of your conclusions concerning this prejudice may be incorrect. Why is being right-handed associated with "right", as in correct? The two words, "right" are the same. I would say that it is because the majority of people are right-handed, so we look at this as the normal way of being, and the norm is the right way of being. Using the left hand is seen as not normal, therefore it is incorrect, and not "right".

Where I think your premise is incorrect is your association between right-handedness and cooperation. It could be that because the majority are right-handed, the left-handed are left out, excluded due to the prejudice, and therefore appear as uncooperative. It could be that they appear to be weaker, and people have a natural tendency to cooperate with those who appear to be stronger, the strength of the other being seen as an advantage, so we choose to cooperate with those who appear to be stronger.

It depends on what is meant by saying that prior to humans there were asteroids. Something extra-mental (at least in the sense of 'beyond' or 'outside' the human mind) is obviously involved in producing the human experience of a world of phenomena (including asteroids), and it seems safe to at least entertain the idea that that "extramental something" pre-existed humans. — Janus

So it doesn't make sense to say that there were things called "asteroids" at that time, does it?

So, if by saying there were asteroids all that is meant is that whatever it is (apart from the human itself) that produces the human experience of asteroids pre-existed humans, then there would seem to be no problem. — Janus

This is blatantly false in two distinct ways. First, it is the human being with its many systems, which produces the experience of an asteroid. I agree that there is something "extra" involved, but it is incorrect to say that this extra thing is what produces the experience. That's what separates the position I'm arguing from the brain in a vat scenario. The brain in the vat requires the evil genius to "produce" the experience, I argue that the brain produces the experience. I accept, on the basis of evidence, that there is something extra, but the extra thing is not necessary, therefore we cannot say that it is the cause of experience.

Second, if we assume the reality of this "extra" thing, the first thing that is evident about it, is that what exists at one time is distinctly different from what exists at another time. Whatever it is, that "extra" thing, which might contribute to a human experience of a asteroid today, or might have contributed to an experience yesterday, was not the same before human existence. So you have a faulty assumption of continuity, "sameness", which does not account for the reality of change. You need some principles to base this idea, that the same "extra" thing which contributes to a human experience existed prior to human beings, when the evidence indicates that we live in a world of change.

Premise (1) begs the question. The existence of "an asteroid" assumes the human spatial-temporal perspective which individuates and identifies something as "an asteroid". Therefore it is really impossible that there was such a thing as an asteroid before humans, because it requires a human to identify a thing as "an asteroid" in order that there is such a thing as an asteroid. Unless you believe that God identified things, and called them "asteroids" before there were human beings, there was no such thing as "an asteroid" before there were humans beings.

Doesn't knowing the meaning of a word really mean knowing how to use it appropriately? — T Clark

Do you see a difference between knowing how a word was used, and the act of using a word? If you associate meaning with use, then I would say that knowing the meaning of a word is knowing how the word was used. This accounts for the fact that the same word has different meaning in different instances of use. Meaning is specific to the instance of use, and knowing its meaning is knowing how it was used in that particular instance.

Knowing how to use a word appropriately is a different matter altogether. This assumes that there is a distinction between appropriate and inappropriate use. On what principles would this distinction be based? Would this be a moral issue? I don't think it's a legal issue. What sort of principles do you suggest would be used to determine appropriate use?

The little girl used it appropriately. — T Clark

What makes you think that she used the word appropriately? I think it was a lie, she really can function without her blanket. Since she didn't intend to tell a lie, yet her use of that word creates the appearance that she was lying, her usage belies her intention. Therefore I do not think the word was used appropriately. Using words in a way which is inconsistent with one's intention is deception, and deception is morally inappropriate.

But about which we are nonetheless happy to strive to agree. — bongo fury

What's this --- we are happy to strive to agree? In some instances we co-operate and truly do strive to agree, happily. But in other instances, like in the philosophy forum, we happily disagree.

Whether or not there is a "fact of the matter" appears to be completely irrelevant. Sometimes we are inclined to agree and co-operate, and other times we are inclined to disagree and be pricks in the side of the others. From where comes the strive to agree?

I think one way to think of what I consider a common and usual approach is to consider meaning primarily a matter of definition. To have a meaning is to be defined, as it were. I think one of the things the example brings out is the inadequacy of that model: I don't think our three year old would be able to define 'function', if asked. — StreetlightX

That is precisely the issue. To have meaning is not the same as to have a definition. There are some members here at tpf who would restrict the meaning of "meaning" to words, statements, and propositions. They will say, that only these things have "meaning" to produce a very special meaning of "meaning". And if you talk about the "meaning" which art, or a beautiful landscape has, they will insist that you are using "meaning" in a different way, claiming you use a different sense of "meaning". But this is not true at all, these things have "meaning" in the very same way that words have meaning (as your example of the child using "function" demonstrates). So these people are trying to create a division between this type of meaning and that type of meaning, without any supportive principles to show that one suppose "type" is actually different from the other. In reality, the meaning which a defined word has is no different from the meaning which a piece of art has, which is no different from the meaning which a beautiful sunset has..

Just as an example the holocaust required a high level of co-operation among the Nazis in terms of unified ideology and implementing of extermination plans against hapless Jews and other minorities. — TheMadFool

The deficiency in the thesis is that co-operation is not opposed to evil. That's what I tried to bring out in my post, evil people may co-operate, and this greatly increases the level of evil. So if co-operation is associated with right-handedness, then we need to turn to something other than left-handedness to account for the more serious evil of conspiracy. Maybe left-handedness is only a minor evil.

As you can see, if you agree with the above, associating lefties with evil is not just a bias by the majority. It's in fact a falsehood and the reverse, right-handedness and its associated higher co-operativity has a greater connection to evil, is true. — TheMadFool

You could have looked into the multiple meanings of the English word "right" to see that "right" is not always "right". So to say that right-handed is the right way to be, is just a bias. Likewise, the Latin word "sinister" has multiple meanings. The meanings might be connected through some old-school thoughts, but that really says little about today's beliefs.

However, that "little" may actually be a lot more than you think. Plato's Republic offers a definition of "justice" as "might is right". We will off-handedly reject this as ridiculous. But there's an edge to it, from the perspective of social Darwinism, which some people today might actually believe in. And so we are forced to look for real principles to support your dubious conclusion which appeals to our intuition, co-operation (might) in the service of evil, is actually the opposite of "right".

What is interesting is that evil is still prevalent in the modern world. Could I go even further and say crime rates are higher in the 21st century than in medieval times? Criminal activity is also diversifying into any new human activity e.g. we developed computers and now there's cybercrime.

Does this mean that evil requires more cooperation than being good? I mean how do we explain evil given that there are more right-handed people and science has shown that the right-handed are cooperative? With cooperation shouldn't evil have declined? — TheMadFool

Co-operative evil, i.e. conspiracy, has a much worse effect than non-co-operative, you might say it is a greater evil. So as the evil-doers become more co-operative the overall level of evil increases.

As I read your post and then all the follow ups, I kept thinking about it from the other direction - the process you're describing is how the little girl learns the meaning of "function." — T Clark

But if you think of "meaning" in this way, as something which is attributed to words, you would have to accept that we can use words without knowing the meaning of the words. How would we characterize this type of use then? The child gets some sort of message across to the parents, but we cannot call it "meaning", because the child doesn't know the meaning. What is the child doing?

To start, would you not say that an assumption is a species of proposition? — tim wood

No I don't think that this is the case, because a proposition is a type of statement, and one can hold an assumption without stating it. But I don't think this distinction is relevant anyway.

Or perhaps I'm confused: "which claims something about being." What claim can there be about being that is not actually a claim about something else? That is, being, being the supremum genus, has no species and no accidents. How can you predicate anything of being? — tim wood

Yes, this is the difficult thing. We do make claims about such general things, universals. What does it mean to be a human being, to be an animal, to be alive, etc.. Notice that I phrased it as "what does it mean", There are many such examples, what does "colour" mean, what does "number" mean. When we make a statement which claims something about these ideas, we are generally trying to clarify the meaning of the term. Do you agree that this type of expression, clarifying the meaning of terms, is distinct from predication? These claims which we have, hold, or make, about the meaning of the terms, are what I call assumptions.

So if someone makes a claim about "being" this is an expression of what that person believes is the meaning of the term. Maybe it could be called defining the term. If you look, you'll notice that such definitions are generally assumptions. For example, let me take something very simple, like numbers, and start with the numeral "one". That word refers to a unity, an individual. Next we have "two". Two refers to one individual together with another, making an artificial unity of "two". Notice that I distinguished the unity which is referred to by "one", from the unity which is referred to by "two", by calling the latter "artificial" (whether or not this term is adequate is not the point). It is necessary to do this because the use of "unity" which refers to one is distinct from the use of "unity" which refers to two. These are two completely distinct types of unity. "Two" implies that the unity referred to as two, is already intrinsically divided into two, whereas "one" implies divisibility (of infinite possibility), with no such division having been made already. So the unity referred to by "two" is a false unity because it is of necessity already divided. In the use of "two", we must recognize a sort of contradiction, a unity, one thing referred to with "two", which already has a defined division into two equal parts, so it is not really a unity. Whereas "one" represents a unity without any such division. Therefore the "unity" of one is distinct from the "unity" of two, three, four, etc.., and we cannot say that "two" refers to a unit in the same way that we say "one" refers to a unit without equivocation. These are some of my "assumptions" concerning numbers.

I take it this your ontological principal. But in what sense is it just an assumption - and not an induction? — tim wood

This is a good question as well, and I'll tell you what I assume is the answer to it. The problem is that we do not have access to see, touch, or in any way sense the vast majority of things in existence. Therefore we do not have the capacity to make proper inductive conclusions concerning "all things". (Incidentally this is the biggest problem with what I consider the best arguments for God, formulations of the cosmological argument. They start from principles which appear to be inductive principles, but are really not drawn from sound induction, and so are dismissed by atheists as faulty assumptions). This is why ontological principles are better characterized as assumptions rather than inductive conclusions. If we start allowing that these are proper inductive conclusions, it sets a bad example.

Instead, ontological assumptions are drawn from examining all sorts of evidence, and drawing conclusions from who knows what sort of logic, mixed in with different intentions and pragmatic concerns. So it's better to call them assumptions than inductive conclusions.

If you're suggesting - arguing - that predication attributes to a subject, and neither subject nor attribution "touch" the object, then the ultimate predication, being, is also similarly ungrounded. If you deny induction and call it all assumption, then you rule out reason-as-process. For what indeed can you reason about but predication? (The reasoning itself - if you allow for such - being mainly governed by logic.) — tim wood

I don't agree with this. It may be the case that predication is required for deductive reasoning, but there are other forms of reasoning as well. Induction for example, though it often involves predication, does not require it. But, as mentioned it is difficult to draw a line between good induction and faulty induction. We can apply induction, for example, to different activities, deciding whether certain activities are successful for achieving desired ends. The process of trial and error allows us to focus in on the successful activity, and when it is found that a certain activity consistently produces the desired result, we might produce an inductive conclusion concerning cause and effect. The process of determining the correct activity is not a matter of predication, though it is a matter of reasoning.

Nope. You just ruled this out. More accurately, on your approach, is that we recognize samenesses in the predications. Which is exactly what you say just above. . — tim wood

You must have misunderstood what I said. The "sameness" recognized through predication is a false sameness. It is the "sameness" which is found within inductive reasoning (which is really similarity), and is not the "sameness" expressed by the law of identity. That's the problem, Kornelius switched the "sameness" of the law of identity (often called numerical identity), for the "sameness" of inductive reasoning (often called qualitative identity, which is really a similarity), so that the formulation of the law of identity expressed by Kornelius was based in an equivocation of the word "same".

Even on your approach, no. On your approach, you don't have access to an object, so comments about an assumption about an object is an assumption on and about an assumption. You've left yourself no back door to the object. — tim wood

I don't see the basis for this claim, I think it's drawn from a misunderstanding of what I said.

Reading the rest of your post, I see we "assume" the subject into real existence, real objective reality, — tim wood

No, it's the object we assume into existence. The subject has real presence to us, within our minds, but the object is what is assumed. That's why there is such a thing as radical skepticism concerning the sensible world.

Sure, in your Aristotelian sense. — tim wood

We're discussing the law of identity, and this was expressed by Aristotle, and the proper expression of it is maintained as the Aristotelian expression even today. So if we are to understand "the law of identity" we need to understand the Aristotelian principles behind that law. But if your intent is to replace that law with something else, then we ought not call it "the law of identity", because of the risk of creating ambiguity and equivocation.

You above state "that a thing is the same as itself." You call that a law. Is this true of only some things and not others? Or is it instead true of every thing? If it is true of every thing, then it is true for all things. And you can complete this. So how, exactly, do you disqualify your ontological law of identity from being a law of logic? — tim wood

Let me explain the difference. We can define "thing" as "that which is the same as itself", or we can look at different individual things and make the inductive conclusion that all things are the same as themselves. The latter, as explained above, is a faulty inductive conclusion because it is very likely that the vast majority of individual things are hidden from our senses. So, the law of identity, which defines what a "thing" is, is not supported by inductive logic, it's more of a stipulation. Therefore it is not a logical principle, i.e. it is not a logical conclusion. I will not deny that it is supported by some sort of reasons, and some sort of "necessity", but it is more of a necessity in the sense of "needed for" the purpose of understanding, and not in the sense of a necessary conclusion, which requires some sort of understanding as a prerequisite for logical process.

Now, under Aristotelian logic, the assumption is that every category has at least one member. So that on the square of opposition, A implies I. That is, given all, you extract some, at least one - it is all at least existentially qualified. Kornelius, however, informs us that these days existential qualification means at least one, whereas universal qualification does not mean at least one. It means all without affirming that there are any. Which is interesting. I take him as correct in what he says.

In sum, it appears your argument has about it a dog-in-the-manger quality. You claim a "law" as your own (in ontology), which is very clearly a closed circle of argument, and at the same time deny it outside that circle. But the grounds for that denial are as confined as the denial itself. And it seems pretty clear that whatever you claim for, is based in what you claim. Tough circle to get out of, not to be escaped by mere assertion. — tim wood

Again, I do not understand the relevance of this.

can barely handle long posts. If you reply to this, perhaps consider just setting out succinctly your argument against the law of identity being a law of logic. I will grant you have done this in Aristotelian terms - a different argument. But now do it in terms of logic. — tim wood

How would this be possible? To discuss the law of identity in terms of logic would be to reformulate it into logical terms, which would destroy its essence, as Kornelius did.