I don't see how that's relevant. What's relevant is that the concept of "emergence" is such that if something is emergent it is composed of parts. And anything composed of parts is reducible, according to the concepts of "parts" and "reducible". Therefore it is impossible, by way of contradiction, that anything emergent is irreducible. "Emergence" as such is nonsense.

Final cause as described by Aristotle is incompatible with emergence, because it requires that the form of the thing which will come into being is prior in time to the material existence of the thing, as its cause, like an idea, the blueprint or plan for the thing. Final cause implies intention. "Emergence" does not allow that the emergent thing's existence is intentional. Therefore "emergence" is incompatible with "final cause".

So, if the pattern exists as some other thing to the shirt, what happens if we destroy just the pattern (but leave the shirt completely untouched)? — Isaac

The pattern is something other than the shirt because many different shirts are said to have the same pattern. And, the person who designed the shirt had the pattern in mind before it came to exist on the shirt. I don't know how you would destroy a pattern. Suppose 2, 4, 6, 8, is a pattern. Erasing the numerals does not destroy the pattern because I still have the pattern in my mind. So the question doesn't make any sense until you propose how a pattern would be destroyed.

If the two are two different things, there should be some result that is one without the other (A+B, - B, is A, not A+B still), but I can't think what that could be. — Isaac

That the shirt has pattern X, pattern Y, or some other pattern is a judgment which someone makes. The judgement is made by the person who designed the shirt, that it ought to have such and such a pattern. And so the shirt was made to have that pattern. The pattern exists in the designers mind, and on paper, before it exists on the shirt. It could be imagined to be on numerous different media. So it's actually quite easy to imagine the pattern without the shirt. I don't see why this might be difficult for you.

Why would you think it is contradictory? — Janus

I can't believe that this is not obvious to you. If a thing emerges, it emerges from those constituent parts, and is therefore reducible to those parts. How does it make sense to you that something could emerge, but is not reducible to the parts from which it emerges? That would be like saying that there is an effect which cannot be explained by its causes.

Look at a car. It's made of metal, rubber, plastic and glasses that come in varird shapes. Separate they're nothing but together they acquire a property/function that can't be understood if we consider only the parts. Only the whole, all parts together, is what we call a car. I think brain-mind is something very similar and, so, shouldn't cause us to overactivate our imagination. — TheMadFool

I wouldn't say that the parts are nothing without the whole. They are not parts of the car, unless there is a car, but all those bits of metal, glass, plastic, etc., are still something without the existence of the car.

Well, if we take a cellular phone and time travel back to the 12th century it would be unexplicable and I'm quite sure 12th century folks will ''explain'' it as sorcery or something to do with spirits etc. The truth however is that cellular phones are correctly explained with physical radiowaves. This clearly shows that we shouldn't default to magical thinking just because something can't be explained readily with the physical sciences. — TheMadFool

Actually, I think the cell phone would be useless in that situation, without the necessary infrastructure. The cell phone is just a part. It is something without the rest of the system, but it isn't very impressive. I don't know what you mean by "magical thinking", you'd have to explain this. Do you believe that the non-physical is magical?

The pattern is simply the arrangement of colored threads as they comprise the shirt, the relations of them to each other. — Terrapin Station

The shirt is composed of coloured threads. The threads are physical things. To say that the threads are in an arrangement, or a pattern, is to refer to something other than the threads. You refer to a pattern.

But in building a model of suffering we are not attempting to predict how people are going to move! — leo

You seem to be moving toward associating suffering with thought. Thought is mental activity. Mental activity is a movement. So really, I think that trying to model suffering is trying to model how people move. Don't get me wrong, I am not saying that it is completely impossible to produce any such model, but I am saying that any such model will inevitably be very simple and basic, most general. I think there has been some success in modeling the way that people move, in the field of morals and ethics.

There can be pain without suffering, and there can be suffering without pain, so the two are not the same thing, nor is suffering a subset of pain, nor is pain a subset of suffering.

You say that all suffering might qualify as pain but I don't agree. By pain we usually refer to the sensation of physical pain. When you suffer from the death of a loved one, that suffering is very different from the sensation of physical pain. It might however be somewhat similar to the suffering you may experience while you endure a strong physical pain, as in it is an experience you want to stop but you don't know how to stop. — leo

I don't see how there can be suffering without pain. All you are doing here is dividing pain into subsets, and trying to claim that the type of pain which one feels at the death of a loved one is not pain, because it's not a "physical pain". Not all pains are physical. So I don't see that this sort of division and exclusion is useful. Since suffering may coincide with either physical pain or emotional pain, it makes no sense to exclude emotional pain, from the category of pain, claiming that it is not a sort of pain.

Do you agree that we can experience all sorts of pain, physical emotional, or whatever, without suffering, and also that suffering can come along with any sort of pain and is always associated with pain? If so, then it doesn't make sense to separate suffering from pain. And if you insist on such a separation, then the onus is on you to demonstrate what sort of suffering there could be which does not involve pain. Surely when one suffers as the result of losing a loved one to death, there is pain involved. If there were no pain, then how could you call it suffering?

Now I agree that we can't say with absolute certainty that when we feel physical pain and suffering at the same time, that the suffering is a consequence of the pain. At that point it depends on the model of suffering we build. — leo

Isn't the goal to build the correct model though, not just any model? If so, we ought to determine whether the suffering is separable from the pain, as a result or effect of it (as you implied), or whether it inheres within the pain. We do have pain without suffering, we agree on that, so suffering does not inhere within all sorts of pain, but there may be some types of pain which do not occur without suffering. So for example, if we distinguish physical pain from emotional pain, it may be the case that emotional pain is always suffering, as suffering may be inherent within it. If that were the case, then whenever there is emotional pain, there is suffering. If this is the case, then whenever there is suffering which occurs with physical pain, it may be that the suffering is an emotional pain which is coincidental, or even caused by, the physical pain.

What is it that is different between the individual who apprehends pain as something which cannot be overcome, and the individual who apprehends pain as something which can be overcome? Belief. What you refer to as one's attitude or mental approach is in this example one's belief. Depending on what is believed, a given perception may give rise to suffering or not. — leo

Here, you are saying that suffering is the result of a particular belief. This may be the case, but if it is true, then the suffering is caused by the belief, not by the pain. The problem though is that you have reduced "attitude" to "belief", and I don't think that this is acceptable. A person's attitude is one's disposition toward thinking, and one's beliefs are the thoughts which have been formed by such thinking. So an attitude is prior to, and necessary for, the formation of beliefs, as a sort of cause of different types of beliefs according to different attitudes.

Now the suffering may be associated with particular beliefs, as coincidental with them, but it cannot be attributed to the beliefs if it is derived from the attitude, which is the way of thinking, the way that one forms beliefs. If this is the case, then the suffering would be a painful way of thinking, and not necessarily associated with any particular belief. I think it is important to bear this in mind because belief requires judgement. A person thinks, in the effort to resolve problems etc., and when it appears that the problem is solved, this judgement is made, then one no longer needs to consider the problem, as a belief concerning the resolution of that problem has been formed. In some cases suffering may be associated with the inability to make the judgement, the individual is held in suspense. Therefore we ought to associate the suffering with the way of thinking (attitude) rather than with the belief (which is the result of the way of thinking.

What is it that is different between the individual who apprehends pain as something serving no purpose, and the individual who apprehends pain as something leading to something better? Desire. If there is a desire to endure the pain in order to get a stronger body, that pain is not suffering. If there is no such desire then the focus is on the desire to not experience the pain, and that pain is then suffering. — leo

The point which I was trying to make, and I ought to stress, is that the pain is completely separate from the desire. The pain itself is neither desired nor not desired. What is desired is the stronger body. The pain is something which just happens to coincide with achieving that goal. A specific activity is required to achieve the desired end, and some pain happens to be associated with that activity. We do not "desire to endure the pain", nor does pain serve a purpose. We desire the stronger body, and therefore the activities required for that, and the pain happens to come along with those activities, so it is endured. The activities serve the purpose and the pain is a by-product, the pain does not serve the purpose. We now have a perspective of pain which is completely disassociated with desire. Pain is neither something which is desired, nor is it something which we desire to avoid, it is just something which happens to be there.

I don't agree that there is always a conflict between what is desired and what is experienced.

If you desire something but you don't have it, and you focus on the fact you don't have it, you focus on the conflict and you suffer.

However, if you desire something and you believe you can get it, you don't focus on the fact you don't have it. The belief changes the experience, the experience is not the same because the focus is not the same. You focus on the goal you desire, you visualize it, and this desire is stronger than the desire to avoid the perceived pain. There is a difference between what is desired and what is experienced, but it is not a conflict. A difference is not always a conflict.

But I agree it should be possible to come up with a better formulation than "suffering is a conflict between what is desired and what is experienced/believed", that is more precise and less prone to misinterpretations. — leo

You describe suffering here as a mental anguish. Notice how what you describe are ways of thinking, attitudes. One way of thinking is to focus on the goal, what is desired, and act to obtain that goal. The other way is to focus on the fact that you do not have what you want. The latter, you say, is associated with suffering. This may be one example of a way of thinking (attitude) which is associated with suffering, but I belief there are many others, perhaps you could identify some others. .

You'd have to explain that if you mean it literally. If you're saying that physical laws per se aren't physical things, that would be more understandable. Surely you're not claiming that, say, a pattern on a checkered shirt isn't physical? — Terrapin Station

There is the checkered shirt, that is a physical thing. Then there is the pattern which the colours are said to be in, that is not physical. So the pattern which a checkered shirt has, is not a physical thing.

Anyway, I don't think we can use the existence of abstraction as an argument against physicalism because abstractions are functions of the physical brain isn't it? — TheMadFool

OK, let's say that an abstraction is what a physical thing (a brain) does. How can you construe what a physical thing does, as something which is itself physical? The brain is physical, but how is what the brain does something physical? For example, a person walks to the store. The person is something physical, the store is something physical, and the ground is physical. But how is walking something physical? Despite the fact that "physics" is involved in understanding the relations between physical objects, this does not mean that these relations are physical.

I understand that thoughts aren't physical but the interesting thing to note is that arguments that are based on it seem to be argumentum ad ignorantiams: ''Look. We can't explain mind in physical terms. Ergo, it must be non-physical.'' — TheMadFool

I don't see the problem. When it becomes evident that mind cannot be described in physical terms, we assume that it is not physical. How is that a problem? When it becomes evident that colours are not smells we assume that colours are not smells. Where's the problem? Colours are not smells, nor is mind physical. There is no problem unless you want to believe that everything is physical, then there's a problem

Many thinkers, who will still call themselves physicalists consider emergent physical properties to be irreducible; which means that mechanistic explanations will be impossible in principle. — Janus

Despite your claim that "many thinkers" believe this, if you yourself think, you ought to recognize it as incoherent. If something is "emergent", then it emerges from something else, and it is therefore reducible to its constituent elements. It is contradictory to say that something which is emergent is irreducible.

The interaction problem only exists for those who think of mind and matter as completely different substances. Positing a third intermediary which is a composite of both does not really help, since we have no good reason to consider mind and matter to be completely different substances in the first place. The whole of nature would be better considered to be composite like the intermediary in the tripartite model, that would be much more parsimonious. — Janus

There is very good reason to consider two completely different forms of actuality, and therefore two completely different substances. These reasons are evident all over this forum in the form of various philosophical problems. Mind and matter are apprehended as completely different. The so-called interaction problem is an argument used against the dualist description, which is to treat these two as different substances. But the third "intermediary" renders this interaction argument as impotent. Therefore dualism remains as an acceptable solution to these philosophical problems.

When something is apprehended as "composite", a proper understanding of that thing requires an understanding of the individual elements of that composition, and the reasons for their union. So it does not serve us in our attempts to understand nature to simply say that nature, as a whole, is a composite, and ignore the fact that a composite is composed of distinct parts, united somehow. The division is evident to us, like the division between past and future, and to ignore the division in order to claim that the two distinct parts are really one, without understanding how the two distinct parts are united, is just a mistake.

To summarize, we actually have very good reason to consider mind and matter as distinct substances. The so-called interaction problem has no bearing. And, if our goal is to understand nature, and nature appears to be composite, there is no reason not to make the appropriate divisions in analysis. So denying the dualist distinctions is just detrimental to the process of understanding.

Laws of physics are models of things that many of us experience. There are things that many of us experience (desires, beliefs, suffering) that laws of physics do not take into account, but that doesn't mean we can't build models of how desires, beliefs, suffering and other experiences interact with one another. I don't see a fundamental difference between the two.

We take a ball to be an objective thing because we synthesize various reports of that ball from various living beings from various points of view. If you and I experience a ball moving, we're not experiencing the same thing, we're not seeing the ball from the same point of view, you're not seeing what I see and I'm not seeing what you see. Same goes for your desires and beliefs, I'm not experiencing them, but you can tell me what you experience, and we can synthesize various reports and build a general model that applies to various individuals. — leo

I can't understand the point you are trying to make here. Do you not see the difference between modeling the movement of an inanimate object, and describing the activities of living beings? You can make an accurate predictive model of the inanimate movement, but you cannot do that with a living being, because you will never know all the variables, and never know how the variables might influence the being's movement. Sure you can make some extremely simple models like Pavlov, but that's very basic. You can make a model to predict how the ball will move when thrown, but you cannot make an accurate model to predict how the dog will move when you let the dog out the door.

Yes we can't control everything. But there are things that can be done to reduce your suffering. If you experience pain and you suffer because of it, there are things we can do to make you experience less pain.

Again my aim is not to eliminate all possible suffering forever, but to come up with methods that can more effectively deal with suffering. Current methods deal quite well with physical pain and the resulting suffering, but there is a lot of other suffering that current methods deal poorly with. And effective methods are derived from accurate models. — leo

You are clearly making a separation here between pain and the suffering which you might say, it "causes". I don't see any principles for such a separation. When I feel pain, and suffer, the pain and the suffering are one and the same. I know that you've already said that people can have pain without suffering, and I accept this, but that just means that not all pain is suffering. So pain is the wider category in this way of using the terms, not all pain qualifies as suffering, but all suffering might qualify as pain. Therefore you do not have the principles to say that the suffering is something different from the pain, as something caused by the pain, or the result of the pain. Some pain is simply apprehended as suffering, and therefore classified as suffering, and some pain is not.

The reason why some pain would qualify as suffering and some would not needs to be investigated, perhaps it has to do with the intensity, the longevity, or something else. But now I think it is you who is playing on a semantic distinction between "pain" and "suffering", in an attempt to say that these words refer to a different aspect of the same thing, one being a cause, the other an effect, when really it's just two different ways of referring to one and the same thing. When I feel pain, and I suffer, the pain and the suffering are one and the same thing. When I feel pain and I do not suffer, it is simply the case that I have not judged the pain to be sufficient to qualify as "suffering", which is a special way of "feeling pain". That this is the case is evident from the many instances when I feel pain, but I don't know whether I am suffering or not. It cannot be the case that the pain is neither causing suffering nor not causing suffering, because one or the other must be the case if there were a causal relation. What is really the case is that I am incapable of judging whether the pain qualifies as suffering or not, and this is probably due to not having knowledge of the criteria required to class the pain as suffering.

Yes I agree that attempting to avoid all possible suffering can lead to suffering in itself. But again, it doesn't hurt to not put your hand in a fire. It doesn't hurt to not walk into incoming traffic. It doesn't hurt to not undertake endeavors that will most likely lead to suffering.

People live their lives according to what they desire and believe, but their desires and beliefs are partly shaped by their understanding of the world, of existence. I see a good model of suffering as one tool that people can use to live the life they want. They don't have to use it, but when they need it it's nice to have. And better have a tool that works well than one that doesn't. — leo

This is all irrelevant. If you know that doing a particular thing will cause suffering, you will not do it. That's clear. But as I explained above, real instances of suffering are derived from accidents, the unknown. So a model which tells one to avoid activities with a high probability of causing suffering is really useless.

Let's continue to consider why some pain would qualify as suffering and some would not. We carry out many activities knowing that there is a high probability of some pain, but we do them anyway, assuming that the pain will not be suffering. So there is a saying "no pain no gain", in cases like athletics, where training and conditioning requires some pain. We submit to pain for the long term goal, and that pain is not suffering. Why is it not suffering? Because of the attitude, that pain is necessary for some good. But such individuals may live on the borderline of suffering. What if it starts to appear like they are not making progress toward their goals, or that they are incapable of obtaining such goals? Then the pain might begin to appear as suffering.

Do you agree that what distinguishes "suffering" from "pain" is one's attitude, one's mental approach to the pain? When the pain is approached with a defeatist's attitude, it is apprehended as suffering, something which cannot be overcome. But when it is approached with the attitude that it must be overcome, and I must continue to get on with my activities, then it is not suffering, it is just pain.

Would you agree with the idea that the person who experiences physical pain suffers because he doesn't want to experience the sensation of physical pain, and that the young man who is having trouble finding a woman suffers because he wants to find a woman and he can't do it?

In both cases, there is a conflict between what is desired and what is experienced. I suggest that this is what suffering is. — leo

I don't think that this description is quite accurate. Very few people could be described as wanting to feel pain, so we can't describe suffering as when the pain is unwanted, it is almost always unwanted. So the pain is never really consistent with the desire. What seems to be at issue is whether the pain is acceptable or not.

This is why I proposed the categorical separation between pleasure (or what is desired as good), and pain. We cannot really oppose the pain to what is desired, and we ought not make a direct comparison or relationship between the thing being desired, and the pain which may or may not occur in the process of attempting to obtain it. The principal reason for this is that we must not allow that failure in the efforts to obtain the goal is itself painful, because failure is quite common and this could lead to suffering. The whole process, the activities of working to obtain goals is set aside from the pain which might be involved, as the pain is accidental to that process, though some pain might be necessary. This allows that the pain does not interfere with the process, altering one's perspective on the process, developing a defeatist's attitude.

So there is always a conflict between what is desired, and what is experienced, because achieving our goals takes work, effort, and there is pain (which is not desired) that is involved with this. The pain is unwanted, so it really conflicts with what is desired, but it is not suffering. We accept the pain despite the fact that it is not desired, for the sake of achieving our goals. It is when the pain is apprehended as unacceptable that it is called suffering. This might occur if the goal begins to appear unobtainable, the pain would become unacceptable.

That there are certain patterns to the interaction of matter and that these patterns can be described mathematically doesn't undermine physicalism.

Physicalism basically claims all is matter. It doesn't deny that there are patterns/laws in the way matter behaves. — TheMadFool

But patterns are not physical things. Doesn't physicalism dictate that all things are physical? How can one be a physicalist and accept the existence of such patterns?

But you still have not explained how a composite of microphysical entities produces the phenomenon of liquidity. — Janus

But can you find me any scientifically observed properties of liquids which can't be explained in terms of basic physical concepts like shape, volume, motion, temperate and pressure? — Dusty of Sky

Oh look, Janus has reversed the roles, asking Dusty to defend physicalism. Janus, why are you asking Dusty to defend physicalist principles? if you recognize that liquidity cannot be explained by physical principles, then why not just accept the principles which Dusty is putting forward, and follow the conclusion which is made concerning physicalism?

The you have the problem of how something physical could interact with something non-physical. — Janus

The problem of how the physical interacts with the non-physical was solved a long time ago by Plato, through the introduction of a third principle, the medium between the two. This is called "Plato's tripartite soul", mind, body and the medium spirit. Look it up. Descartes did not adequately describe this principle and so reintroduced the problem of interaction to anyone who does not look beyond Cartesian principles to understand dualism. However, anyone who has studied dualist principles with more effort will know that interaction is a non-issue, which was resolved for western philosophers prior to the life of Jesus.

I'd say I've been more politically active in real life over the years than the average person. By a pretty good margin. — fishfry

In many countries it's barely over fifty percent who vote, so saying that you're more politically active than the average person doesn't say much.

If you apply the model of Newton's laws to the trajectory of a ball, you have a method for dealing with the trajectory of this ball, that doesn't mean you're not applying a model. — leo

I agree with this, but laws of physics can't be applied to acts of living beings because living things are self-moving. So it's not semantics that I'm arguing. What type of universal model would be adequate for understanding intentional acts? It's fundamental to a living being that it's motives are unique to itself. Sure you can make generalizations, like if you strike someone with a hammer or similar object you will cause pain, but I really don't think that this sort of generalization is helpful in dealing with the particular nature of the individual instances of suffering which you seem to be interested in.

Psychotherapy has hypotheses/beliefs as to causes of suffering and ways to relieve it, there is a general model implicitly being applied to a particular instance when they are dealing with a particular individual. — leo

I do agree that some general statements can be made about the cause of suffering, such as the hitting with the hammer example, and there are many other straight forward causes of suffering. Also, there are drugs to relieve pain, as well as some forms of suffering, but you seem to be looking for something more than this. If you believe that the tools which the doctors already use are inadequate for dealing with suffering, then what more do you want, other than to throw away these models and deal with the peculiarities of particular instances?

If you put your hand in a fire, and your hand burns, and you suffer, you can analyze the situation and infer that you can prevent a particular type of suffering by not putting your hand in a fire. In a similar way, you can try to analyze in the general case how suffering comes about and prevent suffering by not behaving in ways that will lead you to suffer. — leo

Yes, that's obvious, but most actual cases of suffering are caused accidentally. No matter how well I know that the fire will burn me, this won't prevent me from getting burned when I slip and fall into the fire while stoking it. This is what I meant when I said that suffering is caused by accidents, things we are unaware of, unknowns. I can know that walking down the street is dangerous, a car might hit me, but this doesn't prevent me from doing it, because there are things which I value that require taking this minimal risk. But if a car is hitting me it's already too late to prevent the suffering which will follow.

If you're familiar with Aristotle's ethics you'll know that he talks about a balance, "the mean". Virtue is found in the middle (the mean) between the two extremes, both of which are vises. So courage for example is the mean between being rash and being timid. If we refrain from behaving in ways which could lead to suffering we will fall into that extremity of being timid, and this could increase the possibility of a different sort of suffering.

The key points here are "possibility", and "the unknown". If we avoid any situation where there is the possibility of suffering arising, then we wouldn't do anything. But suffering comes about when you least expect it because there will always be possible causes of suffering which are unknown to you, and therefore not avoided by you. So if you do nothing, because doing anything causes the possibility of suffering, you might find that doing nothing could actually cause suffering itself. This is why we need a healthy balance, the mean between trying to avoid the possibility of suffering arising, which drives us away from doing things, and living an active life.

First step is to list all instances in which people suffer, then find similarities between them to hypothesize underlying causes. — leo

If this is your approach, then I think the first step would be to categorize different types of suffering. I think that you will find that there are a number of different types which are not at all similar. Being not at all similar, they have completely different underlying causes, and need to be classed separately. So for instance the person who accidental put a hand into the lawn mower has one type of suffering, and the young man who is having trouble finding a woman for a date has a completely different type of suffering. I believe that these two are so completely different with respect to causation, that it's difficult to understand why we even call them by the same name, "suffering". The problem I see, is that we will go on and on, determining many different types of suffering, each being a different type according to its mode of causation, until we hit numerous forms of suffering which we cannot say what the cause is. These of course are the most difficult forms of suffering to deal with. At this point we will have identified some difficult forms of suffering to deal with. But since we do not know the causes of them, how does this help us? In other words, the forms of suffering which we can identify the cause of, the doctors already know this, and have ways of treating them. And the forms of suffering which we cannot identify the cause of, we cannot help the sufferer because we cannot identify the cause of the suffering.

The desire to perceive no pain presumably won't stop you from perceiving the pain, but sometimes there are ways to not perceive it, by focusing on other things. The more people focus on their pain the more they suffer (when they don't want the pain), but if you can divert their attention by asking them unrelated questions, they can forget about the pain momentarily, they stop perceiving it and stop suffering meanwhile. There is evidence of this.

In my own experience there were several instances where I was so focused on something that I didn't even notice I hurt myself, although I should have perceived a sharp pain if my thoughts weren't absorbed on something else. — leo

I agree with all this, and that's why I first suggested separating pain from pleasure. I believe that if we can focus on things which we enjoy, and things which we are doing because we want to do them, we can put any suffering which we have, in the background. And, I believe that in most cases suffering is similar to pain, which is caused by an injury, and injuries heal with time. So if we can focus away from the suffering, and occupy ourselves with the things that we enjoy doing, we can give the injury and the suffering time to heal. The problem is to understand the particular source of the suffering, just like understanding the physical injury, because we can very easily reinjure in the same spot and then the wound just festers without healing. Therefore we often must avoid certain activities which we enjoy because these activities are not conducive to healing, but we need to be able to identify which activities are likely to reinjure the weakness which has been created by the injury.

Now, imagine if, when those Russians reached out to Donnie, if they'd reported it straightaway to the FBI. — Wayfarer

Remember, it was about thirty years ago when DT first started meeting with Russians, and he threw out into the media the possibility that he might run for president some time, not long after that. At this point he probably thought it was all pie in the sky, even a joke, so the FBI, at that point in time, probably would have taken it as a joke too. But if the Russians groomed him for the position, when does it change from a joke to a crime?

As a general comment suffering is subjective, so indeed an accurate model of suffering will have to take into account the subjective experience of the individual rather than treating the individual as some objective blob of matter. — leo

Then you are not talking about "a model of suffering", you are talking about modeling a particular instance of suffering.

That's not an impossible task, psychotherapy already applies a model of suffering that makes use of the subjective state of mind of the individual, with some limited success. Interacting with the individual through speech can help reduce/eliminate/prevent some suffering. — leo

So how can you call this a model of suffering, if it is a method of dealing with particular instances of suffering? I would say that it is not accurate to say that psychotherapy is applying a model of suffering, rather they have a method for dealing with suffering.

Do you see a difference between reducing/eliminating suffering and preventing suffering? The first is to deal with an existing condition, and the second is to avoid an unwanted condition. The latter, preventing suffering, I think is an unrealistic goal. This is because suffering is unintended, it is accidental, the result of mistake, and other things which are unintended. So as much as we make all the safeguards that we can, to avoid the unintended problems, the very nature of suffering is that it comes about from the things which we are unaware of, the unknown, thus it cannot actually be avoided. Therefore preventing suffering is like preventing mistakes or accidents. We naturally try to avoid these things, but by the time we see the particular instance taking shape, it is already too late to avoid it. We can live prudently and cautiously, but a human being is an active being, and limiting our activities for the sake of avoiding the possibility of mistake, accident, or suffering, may itself be a mistake, and a cause of suffering.

The more realistic approach I think, is to deal with suffering as an existing condition, one which is unwanted. Since it is existing, present, then it must be caused. To understand the condition itself would require understanding what caused it. Each instance of suffering, being particular and unique must have had it's own distinct causes. As explained above, the causes of suffering are unintended, things we were unaware of, and were unknown at the time of causation, and this may remain the case even after the suffering is caused, if one cannot pinpoint the exact time the suffering started. So I believe that the difficult first step of any procedure, or method for dealing with suffering would be to determine the causes.

This is a start, but here we have the beginning of a model. There is an interplay between what is desired, what is perceived and what is believed. Suffering seems to occur when what is perceived contradicts what is desired. And we can act on this conflict by acting on desire, perception and belief. — leo

I think that this is naïve, and not a true representation of what suffering really is. If suffering were the interplay between desire, perception, and belief, and resulted when what is perceived contradicts what is desired, as described, then we could satisfactorily deal with suffering by altering our beliefs. We could prevent ourselves from desiring what contradicts our perceptions, by adjusting our beliefs. So for example, if you had a physical pain, suppose you crushed your finger and you were suffering, then you could deal with your suffering by altering your desire to perceive no pain, when you are actually perceiving pain. You could theoretically desire the pain, tell yourself that the pain is good, and this would produce consistency between perception and desire, releasing you from the suffering.

I think that to describe suffering in terms of conscious acts like "desire", "perception", and "belief", is a mistake. This is because, as described above, suffering is derived from the unintended, the unknown, what we are unaware of, so it is largely unaffected by the conscious activities of desire, perception, and belief. The conscious mind has a very limited amount of influence over the human body, constituting a relatively small part of the human physiology, and suffering is perceived, apprehended by the conscious mind, but as something outside its control. So suffering is more like an unwanted perception.

Awe, that's so cute. A pair of boobies.

But in desiring to model suffering, I don't necessarily attempt to bring about pleasure, rather I want to help people suffer less, give them the tools to escape a feeling that they want to escape without dying but don't know how to escape without dying. Someone who has escaped this feeling doesn't necessarily experience a constant state of pleasure, but they don't experience the terrible feeling anymore. — leo

The issue though, is that fulfilling a desire is equivalent to, or the same thing as pleasure. Pleasure is fulfilling a desire. So if you have a desire to model suffering, then to do this will bring you some sort of pleasure. If you desire to model suffering because this will help people suffer less, then this is what will bring you pleasure. This is not about bringing pleasure to others, it is about pleasuring yourself. You think that it is good to help others with their suffering, so to do so will bring you pleasure.

You say that you want to help people suffer less, but suffering is particular, unique to the individual. How do you think you can model suffering in general, when there are so many different ways that people suffer? Each person who suffers needs care specifically designed for that person. Don't you think that helping a person to suffer less requires attending to that individual on a personal level?

So it seems to me that if we focused on bringing about pleasure then many people would still be stuck in unescapable suffering. Today's society is focused on providing pleasure in many ways, and yet many people suffer and kill themselves. — leo

I think the point is that pleasure is something wanted, desired, so it is always in the future. It is something to look forward to. But suffering is due to past misfortune. So to focus on pleasure is to focus on the good which the future may bring, and doing what we can to bring about that good, while focusing on suffering is to focus on a past which really cannot be changed. I think that suffering cannot be avoided because it is already present, caused. But by looking to the future, things desired, pleasures, we can distract ourselves from the suffering. And wounds heal with time.

In this regard, to create a 'surveyable representation' is to create a kind of 'local map of grammar': it is to understand how the/a grammar of use relates to the particular activities (forms-of-life?) in which that grammar finds its purpose. — StreetlightX

In my translation we are talking about a "perspicuous representation". The perspicuous representation is said to be "of fundamental significance for us", and it is implied at 123 that we are lost (have a philosophical problem) without it. So philosophy, if we can say "what philosophy is", is the way that we understand the use of words. We often say that a person has "a philosophy", and this for Wittgenstein means a way of understanding the use of words. Hence the oddness of understanding the use of the word "philosophy". But this, one's understanding of the use of the word "philosophy", is incorporated within, as part of one's philosophy.

The overall picture which Wittgenstein is putting forward is exactly as the perspicuous representation StreetlightX has provided. Ways of using words are developed, evolve from particular instances of use (the local). From this comes distinct language-games, and distinct meanings for the same words (thus a family of meanings). This is exactly opposed to, or an inversion of the Platonic ontology of meaning which positions eternal Forms (universals) as prior to particular instances, imparting reality (real meaning) to the particular instance of use through participation in the universal. In the Wittgensteinian ontology of meaning there is no need for an overriding universal concept to give any instance of use meaning, but this creates a gap between particular instances of use and the well-defined language-games (complete with rules), because the particular instance which evolves into the game, is prior to the game. The gap needs to be filled to support a proper understanding because existing within the gap would be like being lost (present us with philosophical problems). Therefore we have a need for "intermediate cases".

The intermediate cases are like the commonly quoted "missing links" in evolutionary theory, which would provide the connections, the relations required to fill the gap between one species and another, or one language-game and another. Logic dictates that the properties or features of the intermediate cases, the missing links, must be attributed to the individual instances, because there is no species, or "universal" there (Platonism denied), to attribute them to. .

This thread is an attempt at creating a model of suffering, through observation and reason, by looking at all the instances in which people suffer, and attempting to find out how suffering comes about and how it disappears. — leo

We could take the approach of Plato. The Gorgias, and the Protagoras, if memory serves me, provide the best examples. What Plato does, (Socrates in the dialogues) is to separate pleasure from pain such that they are not in dichotomous opposition to each other. Placing pain and pleasure as opposite to each other in the same category, proves to be a problem because then pleasure can only be derived as a relief from pain. Then pain and suffering are required necessarily, as prior to, in order to have the goal of bringing about pleasure. So Socrates wants to put pleasure into a different category, such that we can bring on pleasure without the pain and suffering which would be required as prior to pleasure if the two are opposed.

Does this sound reasonable to you, that pain and suffering are categorically distinct from pleasure? The distinction becomes important when we look at pleasure as that which is desired, the goal or end. When they are dichotomously opposed, then the goal or desire for pleasure is necessarily the desire to end pain and suffering. When they are distinct, then the goal, what is desired, pleasure, is not necessarily to bring an end to pain and suffering.

The question now is why do you have a desire to model suffering. If we can bring about pleasure without ending suffering, then why focus on the suffering? The desire, what is wanted, is always based in some form of pleasure, the good, and this is categorically distinct from suffering. Why bring yourself down by focusing on the suffering, when this is unnecessary for bringing about pleasure and good?

To me, it doesn't make sense to say, "There is really no such thing as 'what Wittgenstein is saying.' I think it's plainly contradictory, at least in terms of how we normally use the word say. — Sam26

If a group of people like us cannot agree on an interpretation, and the author of the material intentionally ensured such disagreement through the use of ambiguity, then it is correct to say that there is no such thing as what the author is saying.

Consider his example, "stand roughly here". What does "roughly" add to the statement "stand here", other than ambiguity? If he says "stand here", you know exactly where he wants you to stand, where he's pointing. If he says "stand roughly here", you do not know exactly where he wants you to stand, because he is saying that there are many possibilities of places where you might stand in that area. The author implies that there is a place where you are wanted to stand, yet adds "roughly" to say that there is really no such place. What "roughly" does, is pass the choice of where to stand to the hearer, so that there is no such thing as the exact place where Wittgenstein wants you to stand. This is what the intentional use of ambiguity does, it gives to the reader a choice in interpretation, so there is no such thing as what the author says because the author is giving you a choice of what is said. You decide what the author said, and different people can decide on different things, because there is no such thing as what the author really said, as the author plays a game of possibilities. Likewise, when the speaker says "stand roughly here", there is no such thing as the place where the speaker wants you to stand, there are many possibilities, and the speaker has used ambiguity to allow you to choose the place where you ought to stand.

The use of that example by Wittgenstein, to demonstrate the use of ambiguity indicates that he is intentionally using ambiguity. If a word is recognized as having a family of meanings, and interpretation of that word will depend on one's background (the language-games which one is familiar with), and the author proceeds to use that word in a way which "fits" with a multitude of different language-games, without indicating a specific language-game as intended, then ambiguity is intended.

Sometimes it's about the right balance between what he's saying here or there and the overarching picture of his method of linguistic analysis. — Sam26

There's actually two "methods" which we have to keep an eye on here. One is what you call his method of analysis, the other is his method of writing (the way he uses words). There is really no such thing as "what Wittgenstein is saying". But if we were to look for "what he is saying", wouldn't that just be the theory he puts forward, "his method of linguistic analysis"?

Or would you say that there are three distinct things here, his method of analysis, his way of using words (i.e. his philosophy), and what he is saying? We cannot dismiss "the way he uses words", as a method in itself, and this refers to things like, he speaks clearly or ambiguously, he speaks honestly or deceptively, etc.. These, and similar judgements, are judgements we make concerning the way that people use words, which is a reflection of their personal philosophy.

In fact, when interpreting the PI, as is done in this thread, and in my thread on OC, we are making the same mistake. We are looking for that precise exegesis, which leads to a discovery of Wittgenstein's meaning. — Sam26

Why would you assume this, that we are looking for a precise meaning? Have you not attended philosophy seminars? The goal is to discuss the variety of interpretations, in an attempt to understand the various perspectives of understanding, brought to the table by the different backgrounds of the different participants. Sometimes we may be influenced to alter our understanding based on the perspective of another.

The way (method) of the author of philosophy is often the way of poetry, and that is the way of ambiguity. The intent of the poet is to say something which will be received as significant by a very wide audience. If you and I come from completely different backgrounds, then different sayings will be significant to me, from what will be significant to you. But if the author uses words with sufficient ambiguity, the same phrase may be significant to both you and I, but significant in differing ways. This means that we may each derive meaning, but different meaning. The poet (also sometimes the philosopher) uses ambiguity as a tool, to say something which appears to be significant to the very different members of a very wide ranging audience. When the commentators and critics discuss the poetry, they will rarely agree on the meaning. But such discussions are a very useful exercise to help one understand the variations in understanding, and this aids us in understanding being human.

What your words say depends upon what they are doing—how they are at work—in a context of use". — StreetlightX

When we, as poets and philosophers, use ambiguity (as described above), what we are doing takes a completely different form from "the thought which the sentence itself expresses", because it is assumed already, within that mode of usage that there is no such thing as the thought being expressed.

I am not the keyboard, I am the pragmatic relation with the keyboard. No 'i' apart from this relation , and no keyboard apart from it. Both the 'I' and things have no existence apart from this being-in-the -midst-of. — Joshs

But I have the capacity to remove myself from the keyboard, thereby annihilating that relationship. And if I go on to establish relationships with other things, then just like the relationship with the keyboard, not one of these is a necessary relation. Therefore the "I" really is apart from the relations.

If you want to position the "I" as necessarily "in-the-midst-of", then you must start with the relations which are necessary to the "I". If you do find these necessary relations, I think you will also find that the "I" is not in the midst of them. Was the "I" in the midst of the sexual relation which brought you into existence?

If time is infinite, the universe should go through all possible states eventually — Devans99

Wouldn't this allow that the universe would eventually come back to the exact same state again, making time cyclical rather than infinite?

And the only way to do this is to begin in the middle of things, to begin by ‘cognitively mapping’ (as Csal said) how things stand right now, in order to assess the possibilities of transformation, to measure the transcendental from within, — StreetlightX

Any point which you assume as the middle, or centre, will always end up having something further within, even if it's just a matter of "information" within that point. So the assumption of a middle point actually provides a false start. No starting point can be the middle because there is always something further inside, by the nature of infinity. The assumption of a middle is a lost cause. The seed, which forms the actual existence of "possibilities of transformation", itself must have an actual existence, and therefore a "within". This seed, as possibilities of transformation, has no centre or middle itself, and the information within cannot be described as having the spatial form which lends itself to the concept "middle". In other words, being within cannot be described as being in the middle.

Learning to type is like learning to play a musical instrument, it's a matter of fingering. Anyone who says that playing a musical instrument is "mechanistic" doesn't know how to play. You must do it with feeling. I would say that the same is the case for typing.

then it would seem that what is legal is not something fixed by principles of justice at all, but something determined by power and influence. — Janus

That's right, it's a matter of judgement, and those who make those judgements, by that very capacity, are those who have power and influence..

If you feel satisfied with that and supportive of it, then that is your business. personally I find it quite repugnant. — Janus

Why is it repugnant to you, that those who make these judgements are those who have power and influence. Doesn't it seem natural to you, that the people who make these sorts of judgements are the people who have power and influence?

The screen I'm looking at, for example, is a pure difference. It's not existent by its form. At any moment it might disappear or even turn into a flower. I cannot use the forms I expect of it to judge whether it exists. — TheWillowOfDarkness

There's such a thing as "inertia". Due to the brute fact of inertia, described by Newton's first law, your screen will not disappear at any moment, nor will it turn into a flower at any moment. Force, (cause), is required for this. In reality you can, and we do use the forms that we expect of a thing, to judge whether the thing exists or not. That's inductive reasoning. To deny that things will continue to be as they were, without a cause of change, is just to deny the law of inertia, but what's the point to that?

The point is - the whole enterprise brings you right back to where you started. — csalisbury

It's not surprising that this process is circular, because "centre" is derived from circle. When you assume a centre you've already assumed equidistance from that point, and the circle is necessarily implied. There's no escape from the circle without denying the reality of the centre, which we do by emphasizing the fact that pi is irrational. If, after denying the reality of the circle we assume a spiral, we have to accept completely different principles, such as Fibonacci, and lack of centre.

What's the alleged crime? — Janus

I don't know, I haven't seen the indictment, some espionage or something like that. I think the US wants to emphasize how some information was obtained, rather than the simple reporting of information.

There must be an allegation that a crime has been committed to support indictment. — Janus

I think the US already has an indictment.

The real issue is over whether he has by any reasonable criteria committed any crime, — Janus

I think that's the judgement that a trial is supposed to determine. So without a trial the question is rather pointless.

I believe that if there is an “ether medium” then the laws of physics will be different when a body is at rest relative to the ether and when it is moving at a constant speed in a straight line relative to the “ether”. — MrCypress

Doesn't the Michelson-Morley experiment show that if there is an ether, bodies do not move relative to the ether? This would mean that possibly bodies are a function of the ether, and their movements are changes in the ether.

If you eat the food off the plate, you are not leaving things the way they were. You are leaving the plate the way it was, but not the food. Therefore you are selective in what you are referring to as "things". It's called "cherry picking", the fallacy of incomplete evidence. This thing stays the same therefore I am leaving things the way they were. Call me a pedant if you like, but it's a matter of fact, and one which is important to this philosophical investigation. If you think that we ought to overlook this fact then you are the one who is an idiot.

Here's the point, after spending a section of the Philosophical Investigations describing an act of striving after an elusive ideal, Wittgenstein insinuates that we ought not strive after that ideal, in the subtractive manner described by StreetlightX. Then at 133 he introduces another ideal, which he says we are striving after. So if he were giving a simple description of language, leaving things the way they are, he'd describe this aspect of language, this striving after an ideal, whether it be this ideal or that ideal, without passing judgement that such and such ideal ought not be striven after, and then proceeding to introduce a different ideal which should be striven after. He says that philosophy ought to be descriptive rather than normative, but this itself is a normative statement. So he has no escape from the fact that philosophy is normative, and if his intent was to produce a true description he would describe it as such, rather than implying that it ought to be other than it is.

Have you read MrCypress' posts?

Unfortunately because of the misinterpretation of the null result of the Michelson & Morley experiment he came to believe that you cannot sense motion relative to it. Einstein said, "But this ether may not be thought of as endowed with the quality characteristic of ponderable media, as consisting of parts which may be tracked through time. The idea of motion may not be applied to it." The confusion about this was created by the failure to detect the ether wind. The design of this experiment was incorrect. Looking for a difference in the motion of light will never be detectable relative to the emitting source motion. This is true because light moves autonomously relative only to the medium it is moving within. The density and tension of the medium is what determines the maximum velocity. — MrCypress

What I think is that there must be detectable motion of the emitting source of light, relative to the medium (ether).

Suppose an object is moving relative to space, and some sort of ether occupies this space. Suppose also that the object is emitting light, and the movement of the light is a property of the space (ether). Wouldn't is be possible to track that object's movement relative to the ether based on the wave patterns?

Obviously, cleaning is not leaving everything the way it was, or else cleaning would be doing nothing.

He contrasts metaphysical use and everyday use. When he says in 117: — Fooloso4

He's not making a contrast, by bringing the metaphysical use back to everyday use, he is dissolving that contrast. As I explained to Luke, his method of bringing it back is to show that the metaphysical use is a particular instance of use, just like any other particular instance of use (special circumstances).

he is not referring to any use but everyday use. It is everyday use that he means by actual use. It is only the philosopher who would point to something in front of him and say "This is here". That is not actual use, that is, everyday use. In everyday use it makes sense, its metaphysical use does not. — Fooloso4

As I said, you cannot point to an instance of actual use and say that is not actual use. That is pure nonsense. So what you are claiming here is pure nonsense, and not what Wittgenstein is doing. Wittgenstein does not attempt to say that metaphysical use is not actual use, that would be nonsensical.

If there is a distinction between everyday use, and metaphysical use, these are both classes of actual use. Wittgenstein wants to close this separation, and bring metaphysical use into the same fold as everyday use. He does this by showing that any instance of use, is a particular instance of use (use under special circumstances), and so all instances of use, be it metaphysical, or everyday, are classed similarly.

The special circumstances are particular circumstances. Particular circumstances are not just any circumstances. — Fooloso4

Every instance of circumstances is unique and peculiar, particular, specific, as "that set of circumstances". Therefore any set of circumstances is "particular circumstances". When you point to a set of circumstances, saying "this, here", you individuate that particular set of circumstances, and no other set of circumstances is that particular set of circumstances. This is the basis for the law of identity. Pointing to an object and saying "this, here" is what identifies the object according to the law of identity. However, you may point to any set of circumstances, and say "this, here". So any set of circumstances is particular circumstances, and may be thus identified, according to the law of identity. A particular is unique.

If the answer to the question at 116:



... is the word ever actually used in this way in the language in which it is at home?

is yes, then what does he mean when he goes on to say:



What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.
?

And what does he mean when at 117 he says:



... he should ask himself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used. There it does make sense.)

if the metaphysical use is actual use? If the use in the example is actual use then why would he say that this person should ask himself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used? — Fooloso4

What he means is that when we look at a metaphysical use of the word, it may or may not make sense to us. If one knows the language-game which that particular instance of use is derived from, its home, then it makes sense. This making sense of the word can only be done if one is familiar with that particular language-game (the home game), and in the case of metaphysical use, this might require that the person is educated in metaphysics. That is why I said, the terms of algebra make no sense to me, but it is only because I am not familiar with that place in the language (the language-game) that these terms are used.

That is to treat the metaphysical use exactly as we would treat any other instance of use. Any word may make sense to you, in its particular instance of use, if you are familiar with the language-game which is home to that particular instance of use. But if you are not familiar with the way that the word is used it will not make sense to you. There is a generalization according to a way of using the words (language-game). If you are familiar with this way, the use makes sense. The metaphysical use, is the actual use, and the author is using the words in a way, a metaphysical way. The special circumstances in which the words are actually used like that are the particular instances, just like the algebraic use is a way, and the actual use, the special circumstances, where those words (terms of algebra) are used like that are the particular instances. Each and every instance of use is an instance of using words in special circumstances, but each displays a way of use (a language-game). The particular instances of use are "everyday use", because every day is a new day with new special circumstances. So every instance of use is use according to special circumstances, but the same individual will employ many different language-games each day depending on the special circumstances..

To anticipate a bit, this is why Witty will say, a little later down, the these investigations thus "leaves everything as it is" (§124); - in terms I used earlier, the Investigations are subtractive, not additive. — StreetlightX

You can't subtract and leave everything the way it is, so the Investigations must be neither subtractive nor additive, to fulfill that purpose. Pointing to ideas as wrongful guidance is just as normative as pointing to ideas as rightful guidance.

The context in which it is actually used, as opposed to some metaphysical claim. — Fooloso4

But making a metaphysical claim is a context of actual use, just like any other special circumstance of use. You can't say that making a metaphysical claim is not an instance of actual use, that would be untrue.

Just because someone says something that does not mean that is how the word or statement is actually used. — Fooloso4

Yes it is. When someone says something, that is exactly how the statement is used. An instance of someone saying something is a particular instance of actual use, in particular circumstances. What else could special circumstances of actual use ever mean? Each instance of use is particular to the special circumstances of that instance of use. So that instance of someone saying something is exactly how the word or statement is actually used. and another instance would be another instance of how it is used.

How the word or statement is actually used, refers to particular instances of actual use, "special circumstances", as opposed to a generalization such as "this is how the statement is actually used". So for example the statement of 117, "This is here", we might make the generalization that this statement is used in the context of pointing to an object. But that would be incorrect because it really does not indicate how the sentence is actually used. We would have to refer to particular instances of use, in special circumstances, to see how the sentence is actually used. We cannot see how the sentence is actually used through a generalization. because we have to look at actual instances of use.

A correct context would be any context in which it does make sense, that is, any context in which it is actually used. Which is to say, the special or particular circumstances in which it is actually used. — Fooloso4

So that would be in the context of a language-game then? If the word is use in the context of a game, it is a correct use, if it's outside of all games, it would be incorrect. How would one know whether the use is outside of all games, or just outside of the games that the person is familiar with? I couldn't say that a particular use is "incorrect" just because I'm not familiar with the particular game, so how could anyone say that any particular usage is incorrect?

If, actual usage is what determines correctness, then any and all usage is correct, so what's the point in calling it "correct" usage, or "correct context" if usage is inherently correct, and therefore any context of usage is thereby correct context?

I would say it is not that statements get there meaning from correct context, but that it is only in a correct context, that is to say, particular circumstances or situations that a statements has a meaning. — Fooloso4

Isn't this a misleading statement though? Suppose a word like "game" has a family of meanings, and therefore is involved in a multiplicity of different language-games. Now a statement would be similar, having numerous possibilities for a useful context, depending on the language-game involved. Where do you jump from numerous possibilities to "a correct context"?

My view of OC 348 is that statements get their meaning from correct context, that is, not just any context, which is why, it seems, Wittgenstein said, it "...stands in need of such determination." The correct use of the phrase "I am here" is driven by a certain kind of situation. If you hear someone say that context drives meaning, this isn't quite right, if it were, then any statement would have meaning simply because of context. Remember that incorrect uses take place within a context. The statement fails to have meaning unless it's in the proper context. The logic behind the correct use of this phrase will not work in just any situation or context. Hence, again, the need for Wittgenstein to say that it "...stands in need of such a determination." — Sam26

The problem though, is that the same words may be involved in a multitude of different language-games. Therefore there cannot be such a thing as "the correct context" because the proper context would be dependent on which language-game is involved.

That's why at 117, if "This is here" makes sense to you, it is because you are familiar with a language-game which others whom it does not make sense to, are not familiar with. And so the person who is familiar with that language-game can imagine circumstances in which it actually makes sense to use that sentence, and the person who is not familiar with that language-game cannot.

That is a metaphysical perspective, not a physical one, and what you refer to as a force there is completely different from what a force means in physics. — andrewk

The two distinct perspectives of temporal continuity, which I described, are both metaphysical perspectives, that's the point. That "inertia" is the one adopted by physics doesn't make it any less metaphysical.