The circumstances in which the sentence is used and makes sense is not one in which one points to an object in front of him while saying it. It is not a matter of adding context to the example in order to make sense of it. It is rather, that there may be circumstances in which one says "this is here" and it makes sense but saying it while pointing to something in front of him is not one of those circumstances. — Fooloso4

I don't think this is right. Wittgenstein gives the example, which includes the pointing, and says that in the "special circumstances" in which the sentence is actually used: "There it does make sense."

I find OC 348 a little unclear, which may be confusing things, but this is how I read it:

348. Just as the words "I am here" have a meaning only in certain contexts, and not [in this context, e.g.] when I say them to someone who is sitting in front of me and sees me clearly, - and not because [the words] are superfluous, but because their meaning is not determined by this unsuitable situation, yet [the meaning of the words] stands in need of such determination [by a suitable situation].

Hopefully I haven't made it more unclear, but I think you are mistaken to infer that Wittgenstein is saying that the meaning is not (ever) determined by the situation. I think he is referring to his own unsuitable example (of someone sitting in front of him) when he says this, and that is why he goes on to say that the meaning of the words "stands in need of such determination" (but by a different, suitable situation).

I thought my example in the context of pointing to a map worked okay with "this is here".

What is the sentence: "This is here" supposed to be doing? It cannot be used to inform us that the object is here. — Fooloso4

That's just it though: Wittgenstein has not provided any context/circumstances/situation for the sentence "This is here", so it needn't necessarily have the particular meaning you have attributed to it ("to inform us that the object is here"). That's just one possible meaning that occurs to you when you hear/read it.

Hah, not you. Still, I'd say something like: a language game is conditioned by a form of life. So, in the 'context' of building something, 'slab' and 'block' mean something specific. In another context (maybe a certain board game say), the words will mean something different ('play the "slab" card'; 'play the "block" card'). A form-of-life has to do with the purpose one puts language too: are you a builder? A puzzle-game maker? In a situation of strife? A philosopher? And this in turn will condition how langauge is put to use for you: what language-game you employ. And what language-game another imagines you to be 'playing'. What action, what activity, what form-of-life are you engaged in? - this will condition the language-game in which words are used. Schematically:

Form-of-life > language-game > use > meaning.

Form-of-life > language-game > use > meaning. — StreetlightX

Greengrocery >banana wholesale purchase> "About how many hands to a box?"> how big are the bananas?

Philosophy>realism demonstration> "Here is a hand," > meaningless.

Primary school> naming of parts> "Here is a hand." > This part is called a 'hand'.

Is this about right?

I don't think this is right. Wittgenstein gives the example, which includes the pointing, and says that in the "special circumstances" in which the sentence is actually used: "There it does make sense." — Luke

The particular circumstances in which the sentence is actually used is meant to compare with the example. It is in those circumstances that the sentence makes sense. The example illustrates the point that the meaning is not something that carries "in every kind of use". 'There', as in "There it does make sense." does not mean here, that is, in the example, but those circumstances in which the sentence is actually used.

Just as the words "I am here" have a meaning only in certain contexts, and not [in this context, e.g.] when I say them to someone who is sitting in front of me and sees me clearly ... — Luke

The same holds for the object in front of him in 117.

Hopefully I haven't made it more unclear, but I think you are mistaken to infer that Wittgenstein is saying that the meaning is not (ever) determined by the situation. — Luke

I did not say that meaning is not (ever) determined by the situation. It is undetermined in the examples given though. It is by comparing these situations with those in which it makes sense to say "this is here" or "I am here" that we see that the expression is not being used in the familiar way in these examples.

That's just it though: Wittgenstein has not provided any context/circumstances/situation for the sentence "This is here", so it needn't necessarily have the particular meaning you have attributed to it — Luke

I did not attribute any meaning to it. I said:

It cannot be used to inform us that the object is here. — Fooloso4

[emphasis added].

The question is: what is the expression supposed to be doing? There is no determinate answer to that question in these examples.

The particular circumstances in which the sentence is actually used is meant to compare with the example. It is in those circumstances that the sentence makes sense. The example illustrates the point that the meaning is not something that carries "in every kind of use". 'There', as in "There it does make sense." does not mean here, that is, in the example, but those circumstances in which the sentence is actually used. — Fooloso4

I'm not exactly sure what you mean by "compare with the example" but it looks as though we are in agreement here. However, I don't know how to square this with your previous post () where you stated that pointing at the object should not be included, and that it was not a matter of adding context to the example in order to make sense of it.

I'm not exactly sure what you mean by "compare with the example" — Luke

The example is what he describes in the text, someone who points to an object in front of him and says "this is here". This is to be compared with those circumstances in which this sentence is actually used, for there, in those circumstances, it make sense.

I don't know how to square this with your previous post (↪Fooloso4) where you stated that pointing at the object should not be included, and that it was not a matter of adding context to the example in order to make sense of it. — Luke

Pointing is not part of the sentence. If we are to think of circumstances in which the sentence "This is here" makes sense we do not have to include the act of pointing at an object that is in front of you. In other words, we do not have to start with the circumstances described in the example and add something in order to have it make sense.

If we are to think of circumstances in which the sentence "This is here" makes sense we do not have to include the act of pointing at an object that is in front of you. — Fooloso4

I don't understand why you want to exclude the pointing when it is part of the example described at §117.

In other words, we do not have to start with the circumstances described in the example and add something in order to have it make sense. — Fooloso4

Don't we need to "add" the "special circumstances" in which "this sentence is actually used", given that "there" is where "it does make sense"?

I don't understand why you want to exclude the pointing when it is part of the example described at §117. — Luke

I think the problem starts here:

I find no reason to question Wittgenstein's example. — Luke

As I read it, Wittgenstein finds the example problematic. It does not make sense to point to something in front of you and say "This is here". He then asks us to consider circumstances where it would make sense to say "This is here". He is not asking us to consider circumstances in which one points while saying it. If in those circumstances one does point, that is incidental.

Don't we need to "add" the "special circumstances" in which "this sentence is actually used", given that "there" is where "it does make sense"? — Luke

I don't think so. It is not a matter of adding circumstances to the example but of replacing the example with some situation in which it does make sense to say "This is here".

It does not make sense to point to something in front of you and say "This is here". — Fooloso4

You don't think that my example of pointing at a map and saying "This is here" makes sense?

He then asks us to consider circumstances where it would make sense to say "This is here". He is not asking us to consider circumstances in which one points while saying it. — Fooloso4

Are we reading the same book? Of course he asks us to consider pointing at the object while saying it:

If, for example, someone says that the sentence “This is here” (saying which he points to an object in front of him) makes sense to him, — PI 117

See the parenthetical remark.

I don't think so. It is not a matter of adding circumstances to the example but of replacing the example with some situation in which it does make sense to say "This is here". — Fooloso4

What does "replacing the example" mean? The example is just someone saying "This is here" while pointing to an object in front of him. You want to replace this?

Hah, not you. Still, I'd say something like: a language game is conditioned by a form of life. So, in the 'context' of building something, 'slab' and 'block' mean something specific. In another context (maybe a certain board game say), the words will mean something different ('play the "slab" card'; 'play the "block" card'). A form-of-life has to do with the purpose one puts language too: are you a builder? A puzzle-game maker? In a situation of strife? A philosopher? And this in turn will condition how langauge is put to use for you: what language-game you employ. And what language-game another imagines you to be 'playing'. What action, what activity, what form-of-life are you engaged in? - this will condition the language-game in which words are used. — StreetlightX

I've reconsidered what I said yesterday about language-games taking the place of context. Language-games cannot completely take the place of context because there is always a multiplicity of language-games which each word is involved in. Therefore we have to appeal to context in order to determine the appropriate language-game. This is why, in the following section, Wittgenstein starts to talk about numerous possible purposes. If there was only one language-game it would be possible to understand meaning according to the game. But since there are numerous games, we need a procedure to determine which game is at play in any particular circumstances. So the second sense of "context", particular circumstances, cannot be superseded by language-games, because we need to refer to these particular circumstances in order to determine which language-game is at play.

You don't think that my example of pointing at a map and saying "This is here" makes sense? — Luke

In your example:

"this" refers to a location on the map — Luke

You are doing what Wittgenstein suggests we do, consider circumstances where it does make sense to say "This is here". In Wittgenstein's example "this" would refer to the object, the map.

Of course he asks us to consider pointing at the object while saying it — Luke

In his example someone points to an object. The person pointing might think it makes sense to say that the object he is pointing to is here, but Wittgenstein does not. He is asking us to compare this case with others in which one actually says this, cases in which it does make sense to say "This is here".

What does "replacing the example" mean? The example is just someone saying "This is here" while pointing to an object in front of him. You want to replace this? — Luke

Your own example replaces the one Wittgenstein rejects. Although someone is still pointing, he is not making a claim about the object, the map, being here.

You are doing what Wittgenstein suggests we do, consider circumstances where it does make sense to say "This is here". — Fooloso4

That's right.

In Wittgenstein's example "this" would refer to the object, the map. — Fooloso4

In both examples, the person points at an object. In my example, the object is a map.

The person pointing might think it makes sense to say that the object he is pointing to is here, but Wittgenstein does not. He is asking us to compare this case with others in which one actually says this, cases in which it does make sense to say "This is here". — Fooloso4

You are presupposing a meaning of 'This is here' which is not part of Wittgenstein's example. You have determined in advance that 'This is here' must have the meaning of 'this object is at this location in front of me' (or similar). However in Wittgenstein's example no such meaning has yet been determined because he has not provided the circumstances which would give the sentence its particular meaning. The meaning depends on how those words are used. You seem to assume that 'This is here' makes sense to you. But you should ask yourself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used. There it does make sense.

Although someone is still pointing, he is not making a claim about the object, the map, being here. — Fooloso4

The person in Wittgenstein's example is not necessarily making a claim about the object "being here", either. No such determination has been made about the meaning of 'This is here' at 117.

In both examples, the person points at an object. In my example, the object is a map. — Luke

In your example you are pointing at a map but you are pointing to a location on the map:

"this" refers to a location on the map — Luke

In Wittgenstein's example someone is pointing to the object. In this example "this' refers to the object he is pointing to.

You are presupposing a meaning of 'This is here' which is not part of Wittgenstein's example. You have determined in advance that 'This is here' must have the meaning of 'this object is at this location in front of me' (or similar). — Luke

Wittgenstein says that he is pointing to the object in front of him. While it is possible that he is pointing to something about the object, there is nothing in the example that indicates that this is the case.

You seem to assume that 'This is here' makes sense to you. — Luke

I have said just the opposite. Wittgenstein's example does not make sense. It makes no sense to point to something in front of you and saying "this is here".

But you should ask yourself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used. There it does make sense. — Luke

Yes, that is what Wittgenstein says. Whatever those circumstances are in which it makes sense to say "this is here" might be, his example is not one of those cases.

The person in Wittgenstein's example is not necessarily making a claim about the object "being here", either. — Luke

When he points to the object and says "This is here" I see no reason to conclude he is not talking about the object he is pointing to.

No such determination has been made about the meaning of 'This is here' at 117. — Luke

There is a difference between the question of what he is referring to when he says "This is here" and making a determination about the meaning of pointing to something in front of you and saying "This is here". As with the example "I am here", the problem is not with understanding the words but with why someone would say it. As Wittgenstein asks:

And what is it supposed to be doing? — On Certainty 352

Yes, that is what Wittgenstein says. Whatever those circumstances are in which it makes sense to say "this is here" might be, his example is not one of those cases. — Fooloso4

His example does not contain any circumstances, so there is insufficient information to determine this.

When he points to the object and says "This is here" I see no reason to conclude he is not talking about the object he is pointing to. — Fooloso4

But you are doing more than that. You are assuming that "this is here" has a specific meaning; of the object "being here" or that 'this object is in front of me' or something similar. That is, you are assuming that the meaning of 'This is here' is like "an aura the [sentence] brings along with it and retains in every
kind of use."

In my map example, I am also talking about the object I am pointing to, but the meaning of 'This is here' in that scenario is not 'this object is in front of me', and it need not be.

My view of OC 348 is that statements get their meaning from correct context, that is, not just any context, which is why, it seems, Wittgenstein said, it "...stands in need of such determination." The correct use of the phrase "I am here" is driven by a certain kind of situation. If you hear someone say that context drives meaning, this isn't quite right, if it were, then any statement would have meaning simply because of context. Remember that incorrect uses take place within a context. The statement fails to have meaning unless it's in the proper context. The logic behind the correct use of this phrase will not work in just any situation or context. Hence, again, the need for Wittgenstein to say that it "...stands in need of such a determination."

The statement fails to have meaning unless it's in the proper context. The logic behind the correct use of this phrase will not work in just any situation or context. — Sam26

Agreed, which is why I distinguished between suitable and unsuitable contexts/situations.

Agreed, which is why I distinguished between suitable and unsuitable contexts. — Luke

Yes, I believe we are in agreement.

You can think of statements as if they are pieces of a puzzle, they will only fit where they are meant to fit, and if you force them into places where they don't belong, then you distort the picture, or should I say, you distort the meaning. There's probably a better way to say this, but you get the idea.

My view of OC 348 is that statements get their meaning from correct context, that is, not just any context, which is why, it seems, Wittgenstein said, it "...stands in need of such determination." The correct use of the phrase "I am here" is driven by a certain kind of situation. If you hear someone say that context drives meaning, this isn't quite right, if it were, then any statement would have meaning simply because of context. Remember that incorrect uses take place within a context. The statement fails to have meaning unless it's in the proper context. The logic behind the correct use of this phrase will not work in just any situation or context. Hence, again, the need for Wittgenstein to say that it "...stands in need of such a determination." — Sam26

The problem though, is that the same words may be involved in a multitude of different language-games. Therefore there cannot be such a thing as "the correct context" because the proper context would be dependent on which language-game is involved.

That's why at 117, if "This is here" makes sense to you, it is because you are familiar with a language-game which others whom it does not make sense to, are not familiar with. And so the person who is familiar with that language-game can imagine circumstances in which it actually makes sense to use that sentence, and the person who is not familiar with that language-game cannot.

His example does not contain any circumstances, so there is insufficient information to determine this. — Luke

The circumstance is him pointing to the object in front of him and saying this is here.

You are assuming that "this is here" has a specific meaning — Luke

I don't know why you would assume that I have assumed any such thing. Everything I have said runs counter to the idea that it has a specific meaning.

of the object "being here" or that 'this object is in front of me' or something similar. — Luke

The example clearly states that he is pointing to an object in front of him. He says "this is here" while doing so. Further, Wittgenstein says that if the person saying and doing this says that this makes sense to him he should look to an example where it "this is here" is actually used, there it makes sense.

That is, you are assuming that the meaning of 'This is here' is like "an aura the [sentence] brings along with it and retains in every kind of use." — Luke

Please stop telling me what I assume. I assume no such thing. I have no idea how you could reach that conclusion based on what I have said. You even quoted me as saying:

The example illustrates the point that the meaning is not something that carries "in every kind of use". — Fooloso4

In my map example, I am also talking about the object I am pointing to, but the meaning of 'This is here' in that scenario is not 'this object is in front of me', and it need not be. — Luke

Right. And that is why I said:

In your example you are pointing at a map but you are pointing to a location on the map — Fooloso4

My view of OC 348 is that statements get their meaning from correct context — Sam26

I would say it is not that statements get there meaning from correct context, but that it is only in a correct context, that is to say, particular circumstances or situations that a statements has a meaning.

The circumstance is him pointing to the object in front of him and saying this is here. — Fooloso4

That's not a circumstance. Wittgenstein asks us to consider in what circumstances the sentence (and pointing) are actually used.

You are assuming that "this is here" has a specific meaning
— Luke

I don't know why you would assume that I have assumed any such thing. Everything I have said runs counter to the idea that it has a specific meaning. — Fooloso4

From what you have said:

Although someone is still pointing, he is not making a claim about the object, the map, being here. — Fooloso4

The person pointing might think it makes sense to say that the object he is pointing to is here, but Wittgenstein does not. — Fooloso4

What is the sentence: "This is here" supposed to be doing? It cannot be used to inform us that the object is here. — Fooloso4

I have not seen you suggest that it could have any other meaning. And you criticised my map example because it fails to have this meaning.

Right. And that is why I said:

In your example you are pointing at a map but you are pointing to a location on the map — Fooloso4

Yes, that is the context I have provided.

That's not a circumstance. Wittgenstein asks us to consider in what circumstances the sentence (and pointing) are actually used. — Luke

Of course it is a circumstance, a circumstance in which the sentence does not make sense. That is why he says to consider circumstances where the sentence is actually used.

From what you have said:
Although someone is still pointing, he is not making a claim about the object, the map, being here.
— Fooloso4
The person pointing might think it makes sense to say that the object he is pointing to is here, but Wittgenstein does not.
— Fooloso4
What is the sentence: "This is here" supposed to be doing? It cannot be used to inform us that the object is here.
— Fooloso4 — Luke

How does any of this imply that I assume "this is here" has a specific meaning? The first statement refers to your example. In your example "this is here" does not mean the map is here. Here refers to a location on the map. I did not think this was in dispute since you said "this" refers to a location on the map. The second statement says nothing about a specific meaning, it says that even thought the person saying "this is here" while pointing to an object may think it makes sense, it does not. It is analogous to saying "I am here" to someone sitting in front of you who can clearly see you. The third statement does not say anything about a specific meaning either. It asks what the sentence is doing in this example.

I have not seen you suggest that it could have any other meaning. — Luke

Any meaning other than what? I have said repeatedly that it has no meaning. It does not make sense to point to something in front of you and say "this is here".

Yes, that is the context I have provided. — Luke

And Wittgenstein provides a context for his example as well. The problem is, the context is not one in which the sentence "this is here" makes sense.

You may have missed the late edit of my last post, but let's go back to my map example. You stated:

Your own example replaces the one Wittgenstein rejects. Although someone is still pointing, he is not making a claim about the object, the map, being here. — Fooloso4

It is clear from this that you have a specific meaning of 'This is here' in mind (i.e. "the object...being here"). Furthermore, you have criticised my example because it fails to have the meaning you have presupposed. This is your presupposition about the meaning of 'This is here'.

In your example "this is here" does not mean the map is here. — Fooloso4

That's right, because I haven't made your presupposition about the meaning of 'this is here'.

I did not think this was in dispute since you said "this" refers to a location on the map. — Fooloso4

That's right, but I have provided a scenario in which I point to an object (map) and say 'This is here', precisely as per Wittgenstein's example. Wittgenstein has not stipulated that "this" must or must not refer in a particular way to the object at which I am pointing. That is, Wittgenstein has not stipulated the meaning of 'This is here'. Yet, you have presupposed a meaning, and criticised my map example for failing to meet it.

I would say it is not that statements get there meaning from correct context, but that it is only in a correct context, that is to say, particular circumstances or situations that a statements has a meaning. — Fooloso4

I would agree with that.

I would say it is not that statements get there meaning from correct context, but that it is only in a correct context, that is to say, particular circumstances or situations that a statements has a meaning. — Fooloso4

Isn't this a misleading statement though? Suppose a word like "game" has a family of meanings, and therefore is involved in a multiplicity of different language-games. Now a statement would be similar, having numerous possibilities for a useful context, depending on the language-game involved. Where do you jump from numerous possibilities to "a correct context"?

It is clear from this that you have a specific meaning of 'This is here' in mind (i.e. "the object...being here"). — Luke

If someone points to an object and says "this is here" I assume he means the object he is pointing to is here, but he might be pointing to something else. He might mean a scratch on the object, for example. That does not mean I have a specific meaning in mind, it means that I assume he is pointing to the object and not something about the object. As I said in an earlier post:

Wittgenstein says that he is pointing to the object in front of him. While it is possible that he is pointing to something about the object, there is nothing in the example that indicates that this is the case. — Fooloso4

Furthermore, you have criticised my example because it fails to have the meaning you have presupposed. — Luke

I did not criticize your example. What I said is:

You are doing what Wittgenstein suggests we do, consider circumstances where it does make sense to say "This is here". — Fooloso4

In your example "this is here" does not mean the map is here.
— Fooloso4

That's right, because I haven't made your presupposition about the meaning of 'this is here'. — Luke

The reason it does not mean the map is here is because you are pointing to a location on the map not the map. This has nothing to do with any presuppositions you imagine I have made. My point was that your example makes sense because it provides the further context that Wittgenstein's lacks.

That's right, but I have provided a scenario in which I point to an object (map) and say 'This is here', precisely as per Wittgenstein's example. — Luke

If you mean as per what Wittgenstein says should be considered - circumstances where this sentence
is actually used then I agree. But his example was of circumstances where it does not make sense - pointing to something in front of him and saying "this is here".

Wittgenstein has not stipulated that "this" must or must not refer in a particular way to the object at which I am pointing. — Luke

There is nothing I have said that indicates he has stipulated this. Once again, your example provides a determination that his does not. This is not a criticism. It is, as I have said, doing what he says should be done.

That is, Wittgenstein has not stipulated the meaning of 'This is here'. — Luke

It is not a matter of stipulating the meaning of the sentence, but rather, that the sentence does not make sense in the example he provides. It is because it does not make sense that he says particular circumstances in which it is actually used, circumstances in which it does make sense to say "This is here" should be considered.

Where do you jump from numerous possibilities to "a correct context"? — Metaphysician Undercover

A correct context would be any context in which it does make sense, that is, any context in which it is actually used. Which is to say, the special or particular circumstances in which it is actually used.

If someone points to an object and says "this is here" I assume he means the object he is pointing to is here, but he might be pointing to something else. He might mean a scratch on the object, for example. That does not mean I have a specific meaning in mind. — Fooloso4

Yes, it does. The specific meaning you have assumed, as you yourself have just clearly stated, is that "the object he is pointing to is here".

it means that I assume he is pointing to the object and not something about the object. — Fooloso4

Right?

I did not criticize your example. What I said is: — Fooloso4

The criticism I was referring to was this of yours: "Although someone is still pointing, he is not making a claim about the object, the map, being here."

This indicated to me that you thought that my map example had failed to provide a suitable meaning for 'This is here', because it did not comport with your assumed meaning of 'This is here'.

The reason it does not mean the map is here is because you are pointing to a location on the map not the map. — Fooloso4

The pointing is the same in either case. It is the meaning of 'This is here' that is different.

If you mean as per what Wittgenstein says should be considered - circumstances where this sentence is actually used then I agree. But his example was of circumstances where it does not make sense - pointing to something in front of him and saying "this is here". — Fooloso4

I don't believe that his example at 117 contains any circumstances. Therefore, I don't think that it doesn't make sense. Instead, I think that 'This is here' in his example lacks sense or has an indeterminate meaning. It requires some suitable circumstances to give it that meaning. But maybe we mean something similar by this.

Yes, it does. The specific meaning you have assumed, as you yourself have just clearly stated, is that "the object he is pointing to is here". — Luke

I am assuming that when Wittgenstein says he [edit - the person in Wittgenstein's example] is pointing to the object in front of him that he is pointing to the object in front of him. I am assuming that when he says "this here" while pointing to the object in front of him he means the object in front of him is here. He assumes this makes sense. Wittgenstein does not. I do not. He assumes:

I’m using it with the meaning you’re familiar with.

He is not. I am not assuming a specific meaning. Following Wittgenstein I am questioning his use of the expression. Hence the question: "And what is it supposed to be doing?"

The criticism I was referring to was this of yours: "Although someone is still pointing, he is not making a claim about the object, the map, being here." — Luke

That is not a criticism, it is a statement of fact. You were not making a claim about the object, that is, the map. You were not saying that the map is here. If you were pointing to the map in front of you and saying "this is here" then your example would be the same as Wittgenstein's, and would be just as senseless.

This indicated to me that you thought that my map example had failed to provide a suitable meaning for 'This is here', because it did not comport with your assumed meaning of 'This is here'. — Luke

I have no assumed meaning of the sentence. Again, following Wittgenstein, in the circumstances described it makes not sense to say "this is here". That is not because I assume the sentence has a particular meaning, but because in this situation it makes no sense. The question is: what is the sentence doing in this example?

The pointing is the same in either case. It is the meaning of 'This is here' that is different. — Luke

It is the same in that you are both pointing, but you are pointing to a location on a map and he is pointing to an object, say, the map. In your example 'this' means the location, in Wittgenstein's this means the object in from of him. You have provided a determine meaning, the person in Wittgenstein's example has not.

I don't believe that his example at 117 contains any circumstances. — Luke

I am not going to try to convince you otherwise, but consider this: if I were to ask in what circumstances he said "this is here" the answer would be, while pointing to an object in front of him.

I don't think that it doesn't make sense. Instead, I think that 'This is here' in his example lacks sense or has an indeterminate meaning. — Luke

What distinction are you making between doesn't make sense and lacks sense?