SR is also quite consistent for the same reason: different orderings of events are not contradictory if they're from different perspectives. Meta for instance commits this fallacy by deliberately omitting the perspective references: — noAxioms

The problem is that to say that the ordering is dependent on perspective means that there is no objective truth with respect to the order. Therefore the two propositions "A is prior to B", and "A is not prior to B" may be both true, and this is contradiction That you blame this contradiction on "different perspectives" does not make the contradiction disappear, it's just a sort of rationalization. You're just saying that this contradiction is acceptable, kind of like if I said that the best dinner is beef steak and you said that the best dinner is pork chop, we'd accept this contradiction because it's a matter of perspective. But it doesn't make the contradiction go away

My point is simply that if you want to say that energy has an actual potential to get things done, then there must be an activation or actualization of that energy when it gets things done. It is the distinction between 'energy at rest' and energy at work. — Janus

It's very simple, energy is the capacity to do work. As a capacity it is a potential. We look at things and attribute "energy" to these things, and energy is a potential which the things have. If you want to say that this potential is "actual", in the sense of being real, that's fine, but it's really just conceptual, it's a value we assign to the thing.

Now, according to the law of conservation of energy, it is not correct to say that the energy ever gets actualized. When the energy "gets things done", it is just transformed from one form to another, remaining as energy, and therefore remaining as potential. Energy is always potential, and never gets actualized because that potential (the capacity to do work) is always conserved in the temporal continuity of existence. That's why some people get hooked on the idea of perpetual motion. This is just the way that we've come to describe motion, we assign it a value, energy, it has proven to be a very useful way.

[

Per the LNC, there is also "and in the same sense". In this case, the reference frames differ. Do you reject special relativity? — Andrew M

"In the same sense" means using the words in the same way. It has nothing to do with reference frames unless "temporal order" has a different meaning from one reference frame to the next.

The issue was whether fields are real in the ontology of QFT which Carroll's comments confirm. — Andrew M

No, the issue was whether or not the thing modeled as "a field" has the nature of potential or not. As I explained to Janus, energy is modeled as potential, but this does not mean that energy is not real. That fields are modeled as potential does not mean that they are not real. However, just like in the example of "energy", potential is the property of something which is actual. So a field would be the property of something because there needs to be something actual which has that potential For example an electromagnetic field is a property of an object.

Surely you can see it's problematic to reconcile what we understand as 'objectivity' with the notion that reality comprises an endless series of parallel (but ever so slightly different) universes, only one of which we can ever be aware of. I'm sure I'm not the only person who this strikes as preposterous. — Wayfarer

The problem here I think is that there is no real principle whereby we can say that there is "only one which we can ever be aware of". That's what destroys objectivity in many-worlds, that we are aware of only "one world" is an illusion.

Maybe try reading up on it. — Janus

I've read a heck of a lot about it already, and submitted an extensively researched paper in university on the development of the concept of energy. All you need to do is google "energy" to see that "energy" is the capacity to do work, not "work getting done". I described very clearly the difference between potential energy and kinetic energy in my last post. I conclude that you're hopelessly lost, and helplessly refusing to acknowledge you misunderstanding.

Potential energy is the potential to get work done, actual energy is the getting of work done; in any actual doing of work some of the energy is "wasted" and discharged as heat (heat energy which of course itself does other "work"). — Janus

That's incorrect, energy is the capacity to do work, it is not "the getting of work done". Flowing water for example has a certain amount of kinetic energy, as the capacity to turn a turbine etc. (do work). The energy is there whether or not the turbine is. If we build a dam, the water is held up from flowing, and that held up water has potential energy. Release the water through the flood gate and the potential energy turns to kinetic energy, the capacity to do work. Run it through the turbine and the kinetic energy of the flowing water is transformed into electrical energy (the capacity to do work). Energy is not the getting done of work.

We are approaching an extensive section (approximately 135-200) in which Wittgenstein makes an examination of the concept of "understanding". I believe this section to contain significant insight, numerous distinctions, differentiations between various mental activities. So I plan to read through this section numerous times and see if I can reproduce and elucidate some of these distinctions here in this thread.

As a preamble to this endeavour, let me say that the concept of "understanding" seems to have fallen through the cracks in modern philosophy. It's neglected by epistemology which deals with the difference between knowing and not knowing, and neglected by philosophy of mind which deals with the thing which is supposed to know. "Understanding" may be characterized as the process whereby a mind moves from not knowing something, to knowing that thing.

In the classical Aristotle-Aquinas tradition this would be a process of habituation. Knowledge, as what a mind has, can be described as a habit of the living active human being. It's the tendency to think in a particular way. Aristotle first described "habit" in this way, as a property of a living being, the propensity for a certain type of potential to be actualized in a particular way. Aquinas developed theory concerning all sorts of habits, including the habits of the intellect. "Habit" was a very important concept in philosophy, being used to explain the properties of living beings, until the arrival of evolutionary theory. A great rift developed, between Lamarckian evolutionary theory which grounded evolutionary changes in habit, and Darwinian theory which grounded changes in chance variations. It appears that as a result of this great divide, and the western world's adoption of Darwinism, "habit" has been relegated to the furthest limits of respectable science.

I believe we will find a resurgence of the concept of "habit" (though not under that name), in this section of the Philosophical Investigations. We might find that Wittgenstein seeks to replace the notion of learning a principle, with the idea of developing a particular habit.

In a sense, the many-worlds hypothesis is a reductio ad absurdum of the notion of objective reality, because everything possible happens in at least one world, so there is no objective fact of the matter about whether any given event happens. What is objective is the god's eye view of all the worlds. But only gods can have that view. — andrewk

So it's an objective fact that everything possible is actually happening, at every moment of time, in the many-worlds hypothesis?

Pushing it and pushing it and pushing it, shoving it down people's throats uninvited, littering the forum with it. The problem is that it is too repetitive, too stubborn, too oblivious. It is excessive. — S

Are you talking about the professors of dogma? That you hate this activity and believe it to be "detrimental to the quality of the forum" is your own personal opinion. But the world is full of such professors, so having them here in the forum is a fair representation of the reality which we face throughout our lives

I think you know that that's a problem somewhere deep down, but because it's me that's raising it, you very predictably turn up, just like the others, to express your disagreement with whatever I say, and to try to spin your own little narrative. — S

If you do not believe in the pet theories which are being shoved down your throat (dogmata), then identify the weaknesses, and attack those weaknesses, over and over again if necessary. You cannot expect dogma to be changed just by pointing out to the professor of that dogma that you do not like it. Otherwise you are free to ignore such professors, and read something else. Where's the problem?

Why would you do that? Obviously I'm using the term in a looser sense than that. — S

I did that just to say that you're not talking about spam, you're talking about something else, and calling it spam. If you can't handle someone pushing their pet theory, I think a philosophy forum is not the place for you to be.

It's not the only problem, but why are philosophy-types so annoying as to nitpick? — S

If the philosophy-types annoy you then what's with the self-punishment of hanging around The Philosophy Forum?

"Spam" is usually something which comes in your email. It refers to sending the same message to many different locales. Spam on forums would be a case of sending the same message to many different forums. That's why it's classed with advertising. Repeating the same thing over and over again on the same forum (pushing one's pet theory) is not "spam".

I think there's an important relation between 107 and 108 which should not be overlooked. The seeking of the ideal is finally determined as fruitless at 107. Logic does not have the solid grounding which we keep telling ourselves that it must have in order that it be useful (the requirement). This requirement is for once and for all, found to be void. But now there is nothing under our feet for traction. So at 108 he turns to "our real need", to put something solid underfoot.

There's a bit of a problem here philosophically though, because "our real need" is just another ideal. You'll find this ideal if you study Christian moralists. You'll see a distinction between the apparent good, and the real good (wants and needs). I believe this distinction dates back to Aristotle, more fully developed by Aquinas. The "real good", here "our real need", is an ideal, despite the material basis of this idea. The chimeric characteristic of "our real need" is a product of the uniqueness of material beings, evident in the concept of life forms.

So as much as it may appear like Wittgenstein has removed "the ideal" from the description, as a false requirement, he has really just superseded the ideal which is required for sound logic (epistemological ideal) with the ideal which is required for sound moral principles (ontological ideal). This is completely consistent with his description of language as a human activity rather than as a system of symbols for representation. Now meaning is based in fundamental, material human needs (the Marxist social structure) rather than relations between symbols and what is represented.

133. It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for
the use of our words in unheard-of ways.
For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But
this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely
disappear.
The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping
doing philosophy when I want to.—The one that gives philosophy
peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself
in question.—Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by examples;
and the series of examples can be broken off.—Problems are solved
(difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.
... — Philosophical investigations

"The ideal" is right back in the picture in a different guise. One ideal has been replaced by another as the philosopher moves from epistemological problems to moral problems. The former being unresolvable due to the existence of the latter.

If you shout 'banana', when there is a wolf, it is no use, no one will come to your aid to fight a banana; you have to shout 'wolf' — unenlightened

But we're talking about meaning, "use", and when I shout "banana" it has meaning regardless of whether anyone understands my use,and comes to my aid, or not. That "banana" is not the best thing to shout in that situation is the reason why I argue that we ought to always be seeking the ideal when choosing our words.

Every wolf is unique, and every wolf attack is unique, but every wolf attack demands the same call, and every non wolf attack demands the same call not be made (where 'same' is roughly but recognisably - 'Woolve' would probably be near enough, and it is the near enough ness that allows language to be mutual. And being mutual (and thus consistent) is necessary to language being useful, rather than decorative. — unenlightened

This is the matter of "serving the purpose". If shouting "banana" does not serve the purpose, then I have a problem. I am using "banana" in a certain way, but it is proving to be not a very useful way, like hitting a nail with the screwdriver is not very useful. It would be incorrect to say that I am not using the screwdriver to hit the nail, when I actually am, but still that particular use is turning out to be not very useful. A word like "woolve" might serve the purpose, but then again, it might not, so it is clearly less than ideal. A hammer might appear to be the ideal tool for banging nails, until someone shows up with an air-nailer. Then we have a distinction to make between "serving the purpose" and "ideal".

I'm not comfortable with these formulations which smell too much of metaphysics. And they seem out of keeping with the paragraphs both before and after it. Any thoughts? — StreetlightX

I agree, 104 seems to be right out of context. I'll see if I can make sense of it.

I believe that in this section, 100-108, he begins by referencing the primary elements of the Tractatus. He has already dismissed this idea of material elements of fundamental clarity, upon which language and logic is based, but he still references them as "ideals", which we, for some reason, think must be there. At 100, a game can exist without them. But what kind of "game" could that be? It seems like logic would be impossible -101. The fundamental elements of clarity must be there somewhere, hiding in the background -102. It appears like we cannot dispense the notion, like glasses we cannot take off -103.

I think that what is described at 104 is the primary act of abstraction. Predication is that fundamental act by which we take the particular thing, and say something general about it. This is what allows comparison. To put this in context of the ideal which he is discussing, I would say that "highest generality" implies this ideal. So I think he is saying that we are mislead into believing that this fundamental abstraction, this act of predication is an ideal, the highest form of generality, upon which the strength of logic is based. But really, when he turns things around at 108, it may turn out to be the lowest form of generality. What we thought was the most ideal, the fundamental predication, is really the least ideal.

At 105, we don't find the purity of the ideal, here in the fundamental abstraction of the predication, and this dissatisfies us because now we cannot support the rigour of logic. So at 106 he wants to turn way from this highly formal mode of thinking (logic) to everyday thinking because the ideal which was required of logic is just not there. So we need to look at everyday thinking to see what really supports logic. And this is very evident at 107, what was required of logic, that it proceeds from pure, solid principles, is just not there, and our everyday thinking shows us that our thinking is really the opposite of this, we proceed from vague uncertainties, attempting to clarify them. And this is the turning around which he speaks of at 108. Aristotle stated that logic proceeds from the more certain toward the less certain, but maybe he really had things reversed.

That cannot be true.There must be some consistency of use, to be able to use words at all. — unenlightened

I don't know about that, "consistency" is something other than simple use. It might be an attribute, a type of use. But meaning is restricted to use here, as the premise, and if consistency enters the picture, then that is another thing. This is the problem of "types" which Wittgenstein exposed earlier. What is exposed is a lack of consistency. If I point to a particular rock and call it "slab", then to maintain consistency, every time I say "slab" I ought to be referring to that particular rock. But that's not the case, "slab" is used to refer to a type, and therefore many different rocks. So the notion of "consistency" is misleading to us, and we ought to move away from that. Now we move to a family of different meanings, different uses, and this difference demonstrates a type of inconsistency. It appears like Wittgenstein is focusing on inconsistency in use, rather than consistency.

I think that's the point of the passage I quoted, 125-127. We get caught up in this idea that everything goes according to rule (consistency), but that's really not the case, as every instance of use is unique.

Energy is both the capacity to do work and the force that gets work done. The first is potential energy and the second is kinetic energy. I'm not sure if all forms of energy that get work done qualify, according to any conventional definition, as kinetic energy, but in any case we can generalize and call all forms of energy that get work done actual energy as opposed to potential energy. — Janus

You don't seem to understand. Energy is the potential to get work done. We make a judgement concerning a particular aspect of an active thing, its capacity to do work, and call that it's "energy".. You can say that this aspect of the thing is actual, in the sense of "real", just like the judgement that a thing is red is a judgement of something real, but that doesn't change the fact that in the case of "energy" what is being judged is a thing's potential. So all you are saying is that this potential which the active thing is judged to have (called "energy") is something real, actual. When we describe things in terms of "energy", we are describing potential, whether or not we believe that this potential is something real.

There isn't a contradiction. Do you accept the relativity of simultaneity in special relativity? If so, then you already accept that a correct account of events can be reference-frame dependent and not absolute. — Andrew M

I think that the relativity of simultaneity allows for the same type of contradiction. It allows that it is true that two events are simultaneous, and also true that two events are not simultaneous. That is contradiction, plain and simple. The relativity of simultaneity undermines the objectivity of the law of non-contradiction in a very fundamental way. This law states that the same predication cannot be both true and false at the same time. The relativity of simultaneity allows discretion, choice, in the judgement of "at the same time".

Sean Carroll gave a lecture a few years ago entitled, Particles, Fields and The Future of Particle Physics. I recommend listening to his discussion of one of the slides (between 28:00 - 30:40) that includes the line, "Particles are what we see. Fields are what reality is made of." Do you disagree with Carroll's characterization of QFT? — Andrew M

Whether or not I agree with Carroll that reality is made of fields is irrelevant to the issue here. The question is whether what is represented by "fields" is of the nature of potential or not. As I explained to Janus above, what is represented by the concept "energy" is potential. Many people believe that energy is what reality is made of, but that does not change the fact that what is represented by "energy" is potential. And if we represent reality as composed of potential, that's only half the picture, because it doesn't provide us with a representation of what is actual. You might say that the reality is that there is an endless number of possible worlds, but what makes one of those possible worlds into the one that we live in, the actual world? That's what's missing if you represent the totality of reality as potential, a principle by which there is an actual world. If you cannot give reality to this principle as well, then there is no actual world in your ontology.

Rules of use, (grammar) determine sense. Without these rules a word has no meaning, meaning is use. — unenlightened

I don't think this is correct, context is what determines sense, not rules of use. This is what Wittgenstein is getting at, each instance of usage is a particular case, with a specific purpose, and the meaning of the words used is unique to that particular instance of use. That's the basis of "meaning is use".

125 ... The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique,
for a game, and that then when we follow the rules, things do not
turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled
in our own rules.
This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand (i.e.
get a clear view of).
It throws light on our concept of meaning something. For in those
cases things turn out otherwise than we had meant, foreseen. That is
just what we say when, for example, a contradiction appears: "I didn't
mean it like that."
The civil status of a contradiction, or its status in civil life: there is
the philosophical problem.
126. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither
explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view
there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no
interest to us.
One might also give the name "philosophy" to what is possible
before all new discoveries and inventions.
127. The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders
for a particular purpose. — PI

Are you not familiar with the idea of kinetic energy and the difference between that and the idea of potential energy? — Janus

Yes, but how does that make a difference? Energy is the capacity to do work, therefore a potential. Kinetic energy is actually having that potential by virtue of being active, and potential energy is potentially having that potential. So potential energy is a double layer of potential.

Consider it in Newton's terms, an apple is hanging in the tree, it has potential energy by virtue of gravity and the fact that it could fall. If it is falling, it has kinetic energy, and thereby has the potential to hurt someone, hitting them on the head. The falling apple has the potential to exert force (work). When it's in the tree, it has the potential to fall and thereby has the potential to have the potential to hit someone on the head, double potential.

As Banno analyzed earlier here, this already has a precedent in relativistic physics which is also consistent with an objective reality. — Andrew M

Redefining "objective reality" so that contradiction is acceptable in an objective reality is not what I would consider as an acceptable solution.

The field is not constructed as potential. QFT says that the physical things that we observe emerge from the interactions of more fundamental physical fields. That is, those physical fields (one per particle type) are part of the ontology of QFT. — Andrew M

As far as I understand "fields", they are always modeled as potentials, and this includes "the more fundamental fields" of QFT. If you understand them as a model of something actual, then I think you misunderstand the ontology of QFT. But perhaps I'm wrong, and you can show me how a field is modeled as something actual. Read what I said above to Janus "energy" refers to a potential.

No, the classical sense (with absolute state) can be rejected altogether. On a relational model such as Rovelli's RQM, particles, atoms and molecules (and apples, desk lamps and human beings) are all quantum systems with relative state. — Andrew M

This is the point of the op then. The classical sense of "object" can be rejected altogether, and we no longer have any objective reality, everything is a "relative state".

On a quantum fields model, the fields for each particle type are real whereas it is particles that are potentials between interactions. — Andrew M

All you are doing here is constructing a double potential. The field itself is constructed as potential, then you layer another potential on top. This method of layering potential is not new in physics. Consider the concept of energy. As the "capacity" to do work, energy is fundamentally a potential, the potential for work. Then there is potential energy, and this is the potential for the potential for work. The double potential does not make energy actual, energy maintains its definition as a potential. Nor does the fact that the fields represent the potential for interaction between particles make the fields actual, they maintain their created status as potential. and we now have a double layer of potential.

EM waves don't have a propagation medium either. — fdrake

That's what I've been discussing with andrewk, whether EM waves are real waves or not. Andrewk insists that "wave" is defined in physics in such a way that a medium is not required for a wave. But this is contrary to the Wikipedia page on waves in physics, and contrary to what I learned in high school physics, as well. I think andrewk is just fabricating a definition to support an ontological position, and asserting the correctness of that intentionally directed definition.

Think that's how it happened. Michaelson-Moorley? Michaelson-Morley, was linked by andrewk earlier in response to MU IIRC. — fdrake

As I explained to andrewk, the Michelson-Morley experiment was inadequate, using the restrictive premise that objects would be separate from the ether rather than a part of it. That premise is contrary to observational evidence that EM waves penetrate objects. The premise that an object, such as the earth, is independent from the ether is misleading. This is evident in QM, which models the object (particle) as a property of the wave field.

Here's the conclusion from your referenced Wikipedia page. Notice that the experiments were inconclusive. Al that such experiments really show is that the relationship between the proposed ether and the earth, is unknown. Instead of resolving the issue, of the relationship between the ether and physical objects, scientists opted for special relative which provided a way around this problem. However, the problem remained and is amplified in quantum uncertainty. To say that the Michelson-Morley experiment demonstrates the non-existence of ether is a complete misrepresentation. What those experiments demonstrate is that the nature of the ether is not understood

From the standpoint of the then current aether models, the experimental results were conflicting. The Fizeau experiment and its 1886 repetition by Michelson and Morley apparently confirmed the stationary aether with partial aether dragging, and refuted complete aether dragging. On the other hand, the much more precise Michelson–Morley experiment (1887) apparently confirmed complete aether dragging and refuted the stationary aether.[A 5] In addition, the Michelson–Morley null result was further substantiated by the null results of other second-order experiments of different kind, namely the Trouton–Noble experiment (1903) and the experiments of Rayleigh and Brace (1902–1904). These problems and their solution led to the development of the Lorentz transformation and special relativity. — Wikipedia

In particular, §99 tries to head-off the objection that an 'indeterminate' sense - one without a strict boundary, like 'stay roughly there', is not 'good enough' to have, as it were, its own measure of perfection. In terms of §98, one can say that 'stay roughly here' 'is in order as it is'. It needs no further specification to be 'perfect' ... but not ideal. — StreetlightX

This is where I believe Wittgenstein has gone off track. It appears like "stay roughly here" serves the purpose, but it really does not. if someone said that to me, I'd ask "What do you mean? Where are my boundaries? How long must I stay roughly here? Can I stray to the right, can I stray to the left? Can I go get lunch? What do you want from me? How do I know if I've complied with what you want? Is what you want something that I am willing to give?"

So, back at 68-69 he describes how we "we can draw a boundary—for a special purpose". I believe that each particular instance of use involves a special purpose, that's what defines a particular instance of use, its special purpose. And, each instance of use requires boundaries designed for that purpose. Therefore it is implied that boundaries are inherently necessary for each instance of use, and it is those boundaries which make the language useful.

Wittgenstein's attempt to remove the necessity of boundaries would render language completely useless. So boundaries are necessary and they are tailored to the circumstances. In the process of tailoring the boundaries we always seek the ideal. We seek the boundaries which are ideal for the particular situation.

In your reply you seek first to counter my suggested definition of 'wave' by referring to the definition currently on Wikipedia - which anybody could change in two minutes - and then at the end of your third para to claim that part of the Wikipedia definition is nonsense. — andrewk

The point remains, that in physics a wave is defined as a vibration in a medium. It is an activity, and when there is activity there is something which is active. We can have a verbal, or mathematical description of a type of activity and that description can stand alone, as activity X, but once we apply the description to something real (use it to describe something), we engage with the underlying assumption that there is something which is involved in that activity. If it helps for you to understand this by referring to Aristotelean "substance", that's fine, but it's just a simple fact about how we describe things. If we describe a movement in the world it is assumed that there is something moving, otherwise we are describing a type of motion, a concept.

I admit that I was wrong to say that a field is completely mathematical, physicists do regard fields (like an electromagnetic field) as real things. The problem is that a field is modeled as force, and therefore potential energy. So the real existence of the field is modeled as the potential for activity in an object. For example, you can map a space with coordinates and show with vectors the force at each point. The force will change as time passes, and this may display a wave-like pattern.

The issue is that this is not the modelling of a wave. It is the modelling of a wave-like force. It is not the activity of a wave which is being modeled, what is being modeled is a force which has the capacity to cause activity in objects. As an analogy, suppose we model the force of a hammer hitting a nail. We model the effects of the hammer on the nail. This is not a modelling of the hammer. Looking at the model of this force, without any other information, we would assume that there is something there (substance, the hammer itself), which hits the nail. But we have no information about that thing other than the force which it applies on the nail, so we have no means for describing that thing itself, until we look directly at it as a thing to observe. Likewise with the modeling of the force within a field. What is modeled is the effects of the force on objects. This indicates a wave-like activity. But until we look at the field itself, as an object, a moving thing (and this means as a wave in a medium), therefore something actually moving rather than the potential for motion, we have no means for properly understanding that thing.

That's like saying that what we call "apples" aren't actually apples, that's just the word we use. So it's really a semantic issue. If one understands particles in a classical sense (i.e., as having an absolute state) then, I agree, physics gives us no reason to think such things exist. However if one understands particles (and apples) in a quantum/relativistic sense (as having a relative or relational state) then there is no problem - it's a natural fit. — Andrew M

Well, I wouldn't agree that "there is no problem". Let's assume two distinct ways of using "particle". Now we must avoid equivocation so we need some principles to distinguish between particles in the classical sense and particles in the quantum sense. If we start looking at different particles, when do we cross that line? Take an electron for example. It must be a particle in the classical sense, because the structure of molecules and atoms is dependent on those particles. However, it also appears to be a particle in the quantum sense. And this might appear to be the case for the other parts of an atom. We can't use "particle" in both senses without equivocating, and we cannot say that these parts of the atom are actually both types of "particle", because that would be contradictory.

Or, conversely, it's not imaginary since it has physical consequences. Perhaps consider it a manifestation of the measurement problem that can be understood in terms of potentiality. — Andrew M

OK, so as I explained above to andrewk, I'll accept that a field is assumed to be more than imaginary. The problem is that it is modeled as the potential for activity, rather than a real active thing. So the issue is with the modeling technique, not the assumption that an imaginary thing is real. Therefore there is an inconsistency between the assumption, that the field is a real active thing, and the modeling of the field, as the potential for activity.

I can certainly imagine a "perfect circle", an "infinite extension", an "ideal body" and so on. — sime

Suppose "pi" defines the perfect circle. Do you think that striving to resolve the exact mathematical value of pi would be a case of striving after the ideal? We all think that pi has no end, and to prove that it has no end is a fruitless task, like proving infinite has no end. But what if someone found the end?

Not in physics. In physics a wave is a phenomenon that behaves in accordance with the wave equation. — andrewk

No, in my high school physics, that is not how "wave" was defined. Here is what Wikipedia says:

"In physics, a wave is a disturbance that transfers energy through matter or space, with little or no associated mass transport (Mass transfer). Waves consist of oscillations or vibrations of a physical medium or a field, around relatively fixed locations."

Notice two key points: first, "transfers energy", second, "vibrations of a physical medium or field". The problem with "vibrations of a field", is that a "field" is purely mathematical, there has been no physical substance identified which corresponds to "field". Nothing corresponds to "field", it is pure mathematics, so it is nonsense to talk of vibrations of a field. And waves as "vibrations of a field" is something completely imaginary.

Another thing, in relation to the Michelson-Morley experiment. That experiment was completely inadequate because it premised a separation between physical objects and the supposed medium. It did not account for the possibility that objects are part of the medium, that the objects and the space between them are all part of the same medium. And, the empirical evidence, that light waves pass through physical objects, indicates that the objects must be part of the medium.

don't think physics provides any reason to doubt that the elementary particles (as described in the Standard Model) exist and have measurable physical properties just as everyday macroscopic objects do. — Andrew M

I don't agree with this. I've spoken to physicists who say that there is no reason to believe that what they call "particles" in the Standard Model, are actually particles at all. That's just the word that is used. Of course there is something real here which is referred to by the word, but what the word is actually refers to is states of the field. However, the "field" is purely mathematical, with nothing physical corresponding. Therefore it is incorrect to say that these particles actually exist, they are products of the mathematics.

The issue here is that a "field" is an imaginary thing, created by mathematics.

[

If so, then it would seem that the same principle should apply to an electron. One would be measuring the effect of the electron (on a measurement device), not a property of the electron itself.

Are you singling out the measurement of photons as unique here or claiming a general principle for the measurement of all particles and, by extension, all physical objects? — Andrew M

Yes, I think that is the case, electrons are measured as effects, and most forms of measurement are like this. But there is varying degrees of soundness in the theories involved. So for example, I think that the theory which makes an electron as part (property) of a molecule, and part of an atom, is quite sound. But a theory which has free, independent electrons is not as sound.

That supposition was rejected more than a century ago given the results of the Michelson-Morley experiment. There is no medium in the model for electromagnetic waves. — andrewk

I know, that's the point. The physics of a "wave" is such that a wave can only exist as a vibration in a substance. That's what a wave is. Since there is no such substance with electromagnetic activity, we cannot refer to this as "waves". So it is incorrect to assign objectivity to electromagnetic waves, because they are not waves. If people want to insist on the reality of these waves, then someone needs to do some more serious experimentation to determine the substance which they exist in. It's nonsense to say that there are real waves which do not exist in a substance. A wave can only propagate in a substance.

The physical properties of a photon are able to be measured in the same way as for any other particle. If you want to know a photon's position or speed, you set up an experiment and measure it. — Andrew M

What is measured is the effect of the photon. That's the difference between a machine observing and a human being observing, the standards of measurement are being applied to changes in the machine (effects of light energy), they are not being applied to the photon itself. Let's go back to my analogy of measuring water in the dish, as it evaporates in the sun. What is measured is the effect of the sunlight, not the sunlight itself. The point is that there is interpretive theory and logic which lies between the effects on the equipment, and the so-called "physical properties" of the photon. The so-called measurement of the photon is dependent on causal theory. But the equipment has a very focused observational capacity, and can't detect other factors, so it's just like measuring the water in the dish, and figuring that the loss of water is all caused by evaporation.

It occurs to me that the notion of QM undermining the notion of 'objective reality' only makes sense if one insists that only particles, not waves, can be objective. — andrewk

The problem with this is that a wave without a medium doesn't make sense. If we had a medium for that wave, then we could study the properties of the medium, the waves in the medium, and the whole field (pardon the pun) would be opened up to us. But without the medium the waves don't have objective existence, and the wave-function is just mathematics which predicts the probability of so-called "particles". So by the structure of the mathematical applications, the "particles" are what have real objective existence, and the wave-function uses probabilities to predict the existence of the particles. To switch objective reality, assigning it to the waves instead, would require principles for the existence of the waves, and developing a wave based mathematics, instead of a particle based mathematics.

This is why special relativity may not be the best theory here. It leads us astray by denying the possibility of a medium, when the empirical evidence indicates that the waves are real. So special relativity confines the activity of real physical existence to within the boundary of light, by denying that the waves have real physical existence. Light waves cannot be real. But then the activity of light cannot be understood with the normal descriptive terms that we use to describe physical activity because light activity needs to be described as waves, and a wave without a medium is nonsense. Now we can only understand the activity of light by means of how it affects physical things, and the wave-function is only grounded in this way, the effects of light on things, not by any real waves in a medium. So we do not have the principles to say that the wave-function itself represents real waves.

Now, one can argue there should not be a second referendum, but that argument does not follow from democratic first principles but from practical constraints (i.e. we can't have a referendum or general elections about everything all the time, and a second Brexit referendum falls on the other side of the line we must draw). — boethius

I'd say, perhaps go for three referendums. Two wins out of three ought to be fair.

There is no implication of non-physical properties. In QM, light quanta (photons) have physical properties. And QM is consistent with special relativity. — Andrew M

Sure, QM is consistent with special relativity, but I don't think it's correct to call the properties of a photon "physical". A photon has an effect on physical things, and it might have a physical cause, and it is described by mathematics, but according to special relativity, light does not have spatial-temporal properties. The speed of light is the limit to spatial-temporal properties. So how exactly would you describe these "physical properties" which light quanta have? How does something which is only described by mathematics have physical properties? Say for example "2+6=8", that's something only described by mathematics. How does that have physical properties, other than the symbols which represent the mathematical idea?

Nuh. Mathematics is essential to our descriptions of the world, That's not the same. — Banno

But mathematics is necessary for, and therefore essential to, many of the artificial things existing in the world. The world would be completely different without mathematics, so mathematics truly is essential to the world in which we live.

Even apart from the implications you're getting at, the extent of the people in this case (eligible voters in the UK) have a rather big impact on the ability to discern the will of the people. 51.9% voted in favour of leave with a turn out of 72%. We can ask whether that's significant. Luckily someone did and the answer is, no it isn't. So the will of the people is basically not known.

What is known is that Tories know what's good for themselves. — Benkei

Different places have different rules concerning referendum votes. I've heard sometimes it takes a 70% vote on a referendum for change to a country's constitution. Sometimes it might be stated that 50% of the eligible voters is required for change, such that not voting is a vote for no change. Whether such rules are "democratic" is debatable. But governments in office have the power to, and been known to play tricks on voters in an attempt to get the vote they want, and that is not democratic. Referendums in general are tricky business.

But they all do. The particle is somewhere within the range of possibilities provided by the probability field. It is true that by measuring position the thing measured behaves as a particle and not a wave for that measurement but this is a result of it really being neither a wave nor a particle and a limit of language. — Benkei

It's not a limit of language, it's a limit of the principles employed toward understanding the thing. In other words, if the thing cannot be understood, it is because inadequate principles are being employed toward understanding it. Language doesn't have limits in that way. We just make up new words for new things, physicists have no problem making up new words. When you're talking about a thing which you cannot identify (point to), it's very hard to describe that thing. This is not a limit of language, because the thing (just like imaginary things) can be named. Its a limit of the method of observation.

Agreed. A human observer and an artifact will interact differently with their environment based on their physical characteristics. And no observer will pick up all the information available during an interaction. However since whether or not there is a hole in the dish is a physical characteristic then a subsequent observation could detect it (either because the human observer directs their attention to it or because the machine is modified to detect it). — Andrew M

The problem is that in QM we are dealing with the boundaries of "physical characteristics". If having "physical characteristics" is defined as having spatial-temporal presence, then special relativity places electromagnetic energy (light) as the boundary of physical existence. Now we cannot talk about the physical characteristics of the boundary of physical existence. The spatial-temporal presence of light (physical properties) is nonsensical in the context of relativity, that's why it's like a wave (physical property) without an ether.

So, back to the analogy. The dish in this instance, now the boundary, has no physical characteristics. What type of observation could be used to detect holes in the "dish", which has no physical properties? What is necessary is to either release the confines of special relativity, allowing light to have physical properties, and describe those properties, or devise a way of observing non-physical properties.

The United States has been deeply involved, and holds a high degree of responsibility for the crisis in Central America, as Bitter Crank has already pointed out. This goes back to the anti-communist campaigns of the eighties. Back then, if they tried to leave they were bombed as rebels. It appears like the US has had success in its effort to keep Central America from going communist. But now there's no pretense for killing migrants.

The coffers are empty, the well is dry, we cannot handle the sheer number regardless of costs. — ArguingWAristotleTiff

This is from Wikipedia:

Research suggests that immigration to the United States is beneficial to the U.S. economy. With few exceptions, the evidence suggests that on average, immigration has positive economic effects on the native population, but it is mixed as to whether low-skilled immigration adversely affects low-skilled natives. Studies also show that immigrants have lower crime rates than natives in the United States.[10][11][12] Research shows that the United States excels at assimilating first- and second-generation immigrants relative to many other Western countries. — Wikipedia: Immigration to the United States

So every life should strive for ever better form of continuation in order to achieve the goal of perdure, forever. That's the only meaning of life, if any. — Chris Liu

This is actually flawed at the base level. Each living being dies, and that's a fundamental discontinuity in life. Evolution, which is a changing of the existing forms of life, as time passes, is dependent on this fundamental discontinuity. So your assumption of continuity is discordant with this fundamental principle.

The reported 18,500 people being supported by our churches and ngo are a slight indicator of how many are actually making it in. Even still, three months 18.5k people? At this rate, by years end, we will have absorbed an entire city. — ArguingWAristotleTiff

That's barely more than 200 people a day. If the great, and wealthy USA does not have the resources available to process 200 immigrants a day, then perhaps that's where the problem lies. I'm sure the money's there, what's with the attitude?

The order '+3', for example, has the meaning of taking the same step at the same point in one's caluclations. A Stop sign or a red light means you move or react accordingly - "green means go". Although I'm not trying to say that this sort of behavioural reaction to language/signs is always the case. — Luke

What I think, is that the rule is "+3", as you indicate, the sign-post itself. According to the premise, "meaning is use", the meaning of the rule is what is intended (meant) by the speaker, in the particular instance of use, as per 117. We have no premise yet to assign universality, or generality to use, such as "green means go".

"117. You say to me: "You understand this expression, don't
you? Well then—I am using it in the sense you are familiar with."—
As if the sense were an atmosphere accompanying the word, which it
carried with it into every kind of application.
If, for example, someone says that the sentence "This is here"
(saying which he points to an object in front of him) makes sense to
him, then he should ask himself in what special circumstances this
sentence is actually used. There it does make sense."

The question now might be why am I inclined to do what the speaker intends of me, when the speaker uses the words, and I hear the words. Or, why am I inclined to use specific words in particular situations. At 139 this is expressed as "understanding" the word. Understanding the word might be like associating a picture with it. And at 140 there is a "force", or "compulsion" described, which may incline one to associate a particular picture with a particular word, rather than associating some other picture with that word, which would still be a possibility. Further, 141, we might remove the picture and replace it with a process, a "projection" or "application".

Don't worry, us Canadians will always be part of your Kingdom -- well at least until we have a referendum, then bye bye.

And sublime hypocrisy that the rejection of a second referendum (in favour of repeated attempts to get this through) is based on the idea that you shouldn't get to keep asking the same question until you get the answer you want. — Baden

Get some advise from the Québécois they know how to change the question to avoid the accusation of asking the same question. They also know a lot of other tricks which best be kept out of Trump's hands.

I'm not sure I understand your claim. Your example seems to merely raise ordinary epistemic issues around observations and experiments. There's always the possibility of some factor undermining your conclusion regardless of how careful you are or how you define your terms. For example, perhaps you observed the dish all day, but there was leak in the dish resulting in you recording an incorrect evaporation rate. — Andrew M

Right, that's the point, there are epistemic issues with "observations" no matter how you define the term. Sometimes the "observer" might be focused so as to miss many possibly relevant factors. In a human observer, this is one's attention. The person might observe with eyes and not ears, or vise versa, and miss some relevant information. In the case of an observing machine, its capabilities are limited by the intent of the design.

At no point is the wider body of 'theory' as set out by a community of scientists invoked necessary to bring about a quantum phenomenon: the phenomenon is 'brought to a close' by the interaction with the instruments: it goes no further, and certainly requires no 'consciousness' to swoop in from out of nowhere to make it an observation. — StreetlightX

Isn't the "quantum phenomenon" itself completely theoretical? There are some things, like wave interference which can be observed with the human eyes, and some things like the photoelectric effect which are observed by the interaction with instruments, all the rest, what we call the quantum phenomenon is just theory. Isn't it?

Yes, the term observer has two uses, so we should always pay attention to the context to avoid equivocation. If an inanimate object is called an observer, then no intentionality is implied, it's just a reference frame. Whereas human observers have an intentional view (and can additionally serve as a reference frame). — Andrew M

Now the issue is that any information collected by the "reference frame", as "inanimate object", needs to be interpreted by human beings before it is useful as observational evidence. The interpretation is theory laden. So the idea that a reference frame can give observational information which is independent of intentionality is false.

The problem is that the theory laden interpretation cannot account for all the possibilities. For example, I put a dish of water in the sun, as my observer. I measure that water every fifteen minutes and derive a rate of evaporation as the day progresses. But I am assuming that evaporation is the only thing happening, I don't know if something else happened to the water, like a creature went and drank some when I wasn't looking. So the inanimate reference frame, as an observer, is only as good, and reliable, as the principles used to interpret the information.

Please do not insult me. . — Fooloso4

My apologies Fooloso4, insult was not intended. I was just stating an observation, and you did not supply your credentials as evidence of your credibility.



Thanks Luke, the issue with the self-proclaimed accredited Fooloso4 (insult intended) is the difference between "striving after an ideal" (expressed in PI), and the assumption of fundamental elements (Tractatus). Clearly there is a description of "striving after an ideal" in the PI which is absent in the Tractatus. It is absent in the Tractatus because the fundamental elements required for clarity in understanding are assumed to be right there, existing within our concepts. Now Wittgenstein has realized that they are not there, and the only thing which can take their place, to account for any existence of clarity in understanding, is a striving for such. That Wittgenstein directs us away from this notion of striving after an ideal, by "turning our whole inquiry around", instead of guiding us toward the ideal (as the philosopher in Plato's cave analogy does), is what I conclude as a deficiency in Wittgenstein's philosophy.

The ideal of absolute precision and clarity is based on the assumption of a logical structure underlying both language and the world. It is a holdover from the Tractatus, not something new and different. — Fooloso4

I'm starting to get the impression that you haven't read the Philosophical Investigations. He describes a striving for the ideal, check 98-110. The assumption that the ideal is there, made him strive to find it. So the assumption of the Tractatus then turns into a striving for the ideal expressed in PI. This becomes even more evident in On Certainty where he strives for the ideal of overcoming doubt, an objective certainty.
"105. When we believe that we must find that order, must find the ideal, in our actual language, we become dissatisfied with what are ordinarily called "propositions", "words", "signs"."

A basic premise of the allegory is that the majority will never leave the cave. It is not that the philosopher will make philosophers of the unphilosophical but that he or she (Plato allowed for female philosophers) will rule the city based on his or her knowledge. The noble lie is essential to the city. — Fooloso4

In Plato's cave allegory, the philosopher very definitely goes back into the cave to teach the others. The noble lie is irrelevant to this part of The Republic, and is related to Plato's proposed eugenics.

Standing there like a sign-post does not mean that it is a sign-post, but that it functions as a sign-post does. A pointed finger does not tell us in what direction to look. We learn how to read the sign. We learn the rule - look in the direction the finger is pointing. — Fooloso4

You are placing the rule within the mind, a principle learned. But Wittgenstein places the rule outside the mind, like the sign-post. So the words we hear and read are themselves the rules, just like the sign-post itself. The rule is the finger pointing, it is not "look in the direction the finger is pointing". Looking in the direction the finger is pointing is the person's response to the rule, which is simply the finger pointing.