The ideal of absolute precision and clarity is based on the assumption of a logical structure underlying both language and the world. It is a holdover from the Tractatus, not something new and different. — Fooloso4

I'm starting to get the impression that you haven't read the Philosophical Investigations. He describes a striving for the ideal, check 98-110. The assumption that the ideal is there, made him strive to find it. So the assumption of the Tractatus then turns into a striving for the ideal expressed in PI. This becomes even more evident in On Certainty where he strives for the ideal of overcoming doubt, an objective certainty.
"105. When we believe that we must find that order, must find the ideal, in our actual language, we become dissatisfied with what are ordinarily called "propositions", "words", "signs"."

A basic premise of the allegory is that the majority will never leave the cave. It is not that the philosopher will make philosophers of the unphilosophical but that he or she (Plato allowed for female philosophers) will rule the city based on his or her knowledge. The noble lie is essential to the city. — Fooloso4

In Plato's cave allegory, the philosopher very definitely goes back into the cave to teach the others. The noble lie is irrelevant to this part of The Republic, and is related to Plato's proposed eugenics.

Standing there like a sign-post does not mean that it is a sign-post, but that it functions as a sign-post does. A pointed finger does not tell us in what direction to look. We learn how to read the sign. We learn the rule - look in the direction the finger is pointing. — Fooloso4

You are placing the rule within the mind, a principle learned. But Wittgenstein places the rule outside the mind, like the sign-post. So the words we hear and read are themselves the rules, just like the sign-post itself. The rule is the finger pointing, it is not "look in the direction the finger is pointing". Looking in the direction the finger is pointing is the person's response to the rule, which is simply the finger pointing.

Yes it does. It is happening right now to the media. If you sometimes use language to deceive, you will not be trusted, if you do so as often as not, you won't be listened to at all and your talk will become meaningless because it is no use to anyone else, and thus no use to you either, even as a means to deceive. — unenlightened

As your example, of the media shows, it does not become meaningless. Meaning is use. Serving one's own purpose is inherently meaningful. Using a screw driver to kill someone is still meaningful to the person who does that, despite the fact that others judge it as a senseless, or meaningless act.


Let me explain my opinion a bit more clearly. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein posited the fundamental elements of language, pictures of the world, as the foundations of language and conceptualization. He later came to see how naive this was, that these fundamental pictures do not even exist, and that what is at the foundation of language is vague unbounded concepts. This is what he describes in Philosophical Investigations, such vague concepts where we might create boundaries to produce clarity for specific purposes. But in this description he now comes across the notion of seeking an ideal, some sort of absolute precision, or clarity in defining terms, to give an unmistakable understanding.

As I described to old, "the ideal" here in PI is similar, if not the same as Plato's "the good" in the Republic. So Plato's cave allegory is applicable. Wittgenstein frees himself from the cave, to see the sun, the ideal. In Plato's allegory, the philosopher is supposed to go back into the cave, to lead the others to the same revelation, toward the ideal. Instead, Wittgenstein goes back in the cave and tells the others not to look out there at the ideal, that we ought to stay within the cave and settle for what serves our purpose, instead of seeking the ideal.

So that is my opinion, at this point in the text. I see this as a deficiency in Wittgenstein's philosophy, but I may be inclined to change my opinion as things develop further in the text.

The only gaping hole is the one in your understanding. If he concludes that this is not the way language works that does not mean language does not work or that there is some unsolved mystery of language. — Fooloso4

The gaping hole is that he replaces the fundamental pictures at the foundation of language with vague, boundless concepts, families of meaning. Now there is nothing to account for any precision or clarity within language, except for a striving for clarity with regard to some purpose. So language only "works" in relation to a striving to achieve some purpose. The premise of the Tractatus, that it works because it consists of fundamental pictures of the world has been dismissed.

In the PI he is referring to the Tractarian assumption not some other thing. It is this structure that would make possible precision, exactness, or certainty. Since that structure does not exist, precision, exactness, and certainty are never perfect, but typically sufficient. — Fooloso4

The striving to achieve a purpose is absent from the Tractatus, but it is central now in PI. Without the premise of the Tractatus, the existence of any precision or exactness within language cannot be accounted for, unless it is produced from the desire to fulfil a purpose. The problem I see is that simply serving the purpose does not suffice for us, we always seek better, or more efficient ways of doing things. Therefore we cannot dismiss "striving for the ideal" as unreal, because it is very real, and highly evident.

Blame it on the inconsistency of language but you have completely misunderstood this. Sign-posts must be read according to rules. They do not contain the rules for reading them. — Fooloso4

It is you who has misunderstood, please reread the 80's. The rule is a sign-post, that's why there may be ambiguity as to what the rule tells us. And this is how he avoids the infinite regress of requiring rules to read rules, which you and I discussed earlier. You seemed to not be concerned with that infinite regress. Wittgenstein was, and rightly so. "85. A rule stands there like a sign-post--"

You really have made a mess of all of this. There are no elements of crystalline purity. Crystalline purity refers to the Tractarian assumption that there is a logical structure that underlies both the world and language that makes it possible to represent the world in language. Wittgenstein came to see that this picture is wrong and abandoned it. — Fooloso4

Right, so you do not see the gaping hole now? Wittgenstein has dismissed what he had assumed made it possible to represent the world with language. Is it now impossible to represent the world with language. Is all language use just a big misunderstanding?

In the Tractatus logic is form. The elements or substance or the world are simple objects. The elements of language are the names that correspond to those objects. There is no relationship between
the fundamental elements of crystalline purity, and the ideal. They are not two different things. The crystalline purity is the ideal, an ideal which once again he came to reject. — Fooloso4

They are two distinct things, because in the Tractatus, he posited the fundmental elements of crystalline purity as existing things which language is composed of. But in the Philosophical Investigations,"the ideal" is something we might strive after. One is already existent, inherent within the foundations of language, the other not, as a precision, exactness, or certainty, which we might strive after.

Notice at 107 where he describes a rotation around our real needs. The suggestion is to move away from this striving for an ideal (which in itself is an inversion from the position of the pure elements of the Tractatus), back toward what serves our purpose. So language ends up as inherently vague and ambiguous, whatever serves the purpose, because he dismisses both the existing elements and the striving for an ideal. There is no crystalline purity underlying it, nor do we strive for an ideal language, we are simply satisfied with what we have, imperfection in language, which at 98, he calls a "perfect order". Now he is left with nothing but inconsistency.

In order to understand this we must look at the role of the logic of language in the PI. It is no longer some independent structure, but the rules of the language game. Those rules do not exist independently. They are determined by how the game is played. Different games different rules. — Fooloso4

The rules are sign-posts. We cannot say that logic is the rules, because reason and logic is how the mind deals with the rules. We can say that different games have different rules, but we have no principle whereby we can say that the logic differs.

No. The use of a screwdriver is to drive screws. If I use it to open a can of paint, it doesn't stop being a screwdriver and become a can opener. If you use words to deceive, you destroy meaning. The boy cries 'wolf' but eventually, it means nothing and has become useless. But you know this - why are you playing tricks? — unenlightened

Using language to deceive does not completely destroy meaning, if meaning is use. It creates an inconsistency between the general and the particular, just like using the screw driver to open the paint can creates such an inconsistency. The language is still being used, so there is still meaning there. The problem is in the inconsistency between the general purpose "a screw driver is to drive screws", and the particular purpose, "the screw driver is used to open a paint can". We can say that the screw driver is "good" for the purpose of opening the can (serves the purpose), but when the particular purpose is inconsistent with the general purpose, an argument for "misuse" can be made. And misuse is bad despite the fact that it serves the purpose. Likewise, we can say that language is "good" for deceiving people in particular instances, because it is very useful toward that purpose. But if there is a general principle, "the purpose of language", then an argument might be made that deception is misuse.

Since these are human acts we're dealing with, there are moral implications. You wouldn't commonly argue that using the screw driver to open the paint can is a misuse, and therefore bad, but if the screw driver slipped off and stabbed your wrist, you might see that it really is misuse and therefore bad. A person engaged in misuse is culpable. And if someone misuses a screw driver to stab another person we want without doubt, the moral universal judgement that stabbing a person is bad, to overrule the particular judgement that the use of the screwdriver is "good" for this purpose.

So in using language we choose our words according to the needs of our particular purposes, in particular situations. We choose the words as they are deemed "good' for those particular purposes, and the words derive meaning unique to the situation, according to that particular use. But if the words are good for a particular purpose, and that purpose involves an immoral act (analogy of stabbing the person with the screw driver), then we need the principles whereby we can say that this is a misuse of language and therefore bad.

To say that the misuse of words (deception for example) just renders the words useless or meaningless is naivety in its prime. The misuse of the screw driver doesn't leave it as a useless tool, it renders it as a dangerous weapon.

What if it's as simple as coming to see a certain style of argumentation as no longer cool? No longer the way to go? What if there's no gaping hole because for the most part we get along just fine? What if a certain habit is just made to look slightly ridiculous? Perhaps we not only don't miss that habit but are even slightly embarrassed that it was ever ours and that we were ever so pretentious. — old

Well, I guess we've come full circle, because I'm basically going to repeat what I first said about this issue. The problem is in how this all relates to striving for the ideal. Striving for the ideal is a beneficial way of proceeding, it's an attitude of recognition that we are less than perfect, thus allowing ourselves to be bettered. The histories and development of specialized languages like mathematics and logic demonstrate that the attitude of striving for the ideal is very useful. So this attitude is not something that we ought to relinquish. To avoid the situation of describing a foundation which is actually an impossibility, we need to assign to "the ideal" a type of existence which avoids this problem

I didn't say this was bullshit. I said that your attempt to collapse the distinction between "saying" and "doing" was bullshit. Yes, saying is a form of doing, but that doesn't imply that "there is no such thing as 'what I am saying'." You have apparently retreated to this absurd position only because you cannot answer my questions or respond to my specific examples. Repeating "meaning is use" does not address my criticisms or questions.

For example, you didn't answer: 'How can the same thing be both good and bad?' and 'What same thing?' — Luke

I already explained about the same thing being both bad and good, at least twice. It is in relation to two distinct purposes. The same thing is good for one purpose but bad for another purpose. Anyway, you don't seem to have any grasp of what I'm talking about, probably because it is a difficult thing to explain. But this is way off topic so I suggest we give it up, and drop it.

Consider that the principle which we call the law of identity, is not necessarily true, it's just a useful principle. So long as it serves us well, we'll use it. But if we start finding misunderstandings, and mistakes, like I described in the last post, then we might question this principle to make sure that it isn't leading us astray. So we don't really assume that it's true, just because it hasn't been proven false, there's two factors. We assume it true because it has served us well and it hasn't misled us. The latter, "it hasn't misled us" is similar to "it hasn't been proven false", and the former "it has served us well" is similar to being proven true.

Which is fine. The point is only that QM is an abstract theory about the mechanics of physical systems generally, regardless of the specific systems one is interested in modelling (which will include context-specific information). — Andrew M

Right, but we support abstract theories with empirical evidence gathered from observations. If, what is called an "observer" is not really an observer by rigorous standards, then the biases inherent within that definition of "observer" must be accounted for or else "empirical evidence" will not really be empirical evidence.

How can the same thing be both good and bad? What same thing?

Your attempt to collapse the distinction between "saying" and "doing" is bullshit, designed only to try and maintain your theoretical house of cards. You have claimed that "There's no such thing as 'what I am saying'." Honestly? Nobody really says anything - is that what you're saying? Also, this is hardly the main insight of "meaning is use". — Luke

Do you understand Wittgenstein's premise, "meaning is use"? The meaning of any particular instance of words is what the speaker is doing with those words (use). The speaker uses the words like a tool, doing something, so that the meaning (use) represents the speaker's purpose. This is why "meaning" is what is meant, what is intended. Saying is a form of doing. Language is a game. I don't see how you can say that this is bull shit, at this point in the book when it's the premise of the book

I see. If the speaker is being honest then you can understand the sentence, but if they are lying then you can't understand the (same) sentence. But how do you know when they're lying? Do you suddenly become unable to comprehend English? — Luke

The honest speaker gives an accurate indication of how the words are being used. The dishonest speaker does not. Meaning is use, therefore you cannot understand the meaning of the dishonest speaker. Simple isn't it? Often we do not know when the speaker is lying, and we think we understand how the speaker is using the words, when we really do not. This is not a case of the hearer not being able to "comprehend English", it is a case of misuse of English by the speaker.

There is no secret, only things that only a few will understand. Rather than say: "you will not be able to understand this" he simply keeps these things from view, locked behind a closed door that only a few will even notice is locked and that it requires a key to open. In other words, he is saying that what any reader who opens the book will find on the page is not what those who have the key will find. The majority of readers will not understand him. — Fooloso4

He doesn't keep these things from view though, he discusses them. And that, according to your quote, is not the honourable thing. That's why I said it's a dilemma. How can he show it only to those who will understand, without showing it to those who will not understand. As per your quote, the honourable thing is not to show the door to those who do not have the key. How can he show the door only to those who have the key, when he doesn't know who's going to have a key?

There is no door behind which we find hidden the preconceived idea of crystalline purity. The idea of crystalline purity refers to the Tractatus. He is not leading us there, he is saying that the idea is misleading, that he was misled. — Fooloso4

Yes, I already went through this with old. The problem is that when we attempt to get down to that crystalline purity, or what old called the kernel of meaning, in analysis, (look behind the door where it might be) it's not there, and all that is left is this attempt to find it. This process, the attempt to find it is nothing other than striving for an ideal. Then it appears like striving for an ideal might be the only thing which supports the idea of that crystalline purity. We can slam the door and retreat, saying that the crystalline purity is not real, non-existent, and the striving for the ideal is equally useless because that ideal is non-existent, but then there is a gaping whole in the structure of meaning, where that assumption of the fundamental elements stood . Wittgenstein seems to want to do this, retreat with a gaping hole in the structure of meaning. But we do not need to do that, we can stay and contemplate the relationship between the fundamental elements of crystalline purity, and the ideal.

It's worth noting that the Mueller enquiry has already resulted in people being sentenced to jail, including Trump's lawyer and campaign manager, and that Cohen is going to jail for lying to Congress to protect Trump ('Individual 1'). — Wayfarer

All part of Trump's plan to drain the swamp. Now he can distance himself from those corrupt people, and claim credit for exposing and cleaning up all that corruption which was going on.

It's a principle, "A is the same as itself". If there is no conceivable reason why this wouldn't be true then it's a solid principle. If you allow that there might be a "reason" why it is not true, or might not be true in some cases, then by the use of that word, "reason", you allow that it is conceivable. Then we might doubt that principle and seek the reason. But to say "inconceivable reason" is contradictory and doesn't give us any reason to doubt the principle.

The principle serves to help us understand things. And our understanding is only as solid as the principle. if things start going wrong with our understanding of things, evidence comes forward that our understanding might really be a misunderstanding, then we might start to question our principles, to determine where the problem is, why is there an appearance of mistake. If we start at the bottom, and the law of identity is pretty much the bottom, we can consider whether there is any reason to doubt this principle. But it doesn't make sense to look for a reason which is inconceivable. What kind of reason would that be, and how could we ever look for it?

You're saying that there are only two "purposes" of language use: for understanding and for misunderstanding; for good and for evil? Yeah, okay. — Luke

No I didn't say that, those were examples, not the "only two" possibilities. I also said the purpose of language, in general, might be communication, etc..

First you say that there is no saying and only doing, but then you say that we need to create consistency between saying and doing. How do we create consistency between saying and doing if they are the same thing? — Luke

Again, I didn't say that. I said we need to create consistency in what is determined as "good", so that the same thing would not be both good and bad..

If I lie and tell you that "I cannot attend your party today because I am ill" (when I am not ill) do you not understand what "I cannot attend your party today because I am ill" means? — Luke

No you do not understand. Because you do not understand what the speaker is doing with the words, you do not understand the use of the words in that instance. And meaning is use.

Again, you need to understand what I am saying in order for a lie to fulfil its purpose (i.e. to lead you to "misunderstand what I am doing" - or however you describe it). — Luke

It's not the case that you need to understand what I am saying in order for a lie to fulfil its purpose. You need to think that you understand what I am saying. Misunderstanding is when you think that you understand and you really do not.

If meaning is use, there is no such thing as the meaning of "what is said", other than what the person is using the words for. The words are sign-posts. The deceiver misleads you. Therefore you only think that you understand what the words mean when you are being deceived, you are being misled. In reality you do not know how the person is using the words, therefore you do not know the meaning of the words, and that's why you are deceived. It is the assumption that the words have a meaning (independent from what they are being used for), which allows you to think "I know what those words mean", and come to a conclusion about the words' meaning, which is other than what the person is actually using the words for. And that's what deception is. When a person thinks that words have a meaning which is independent from what the speaker is doing with the words, then they might think that they understand what the words mean, without even trying to understand what the speaker is doing with the words, and this thinking that they understand the meaning, when they do not understand what the words are actually being used for, is deception.

If you have a room which you do not want certain people to get into, put a lock on
it for which they do not have the key. But there is no point in talking to them about it,
unless of course you want them to admire the room from outside!

The honorable thing to do is to put a lock on the door which will be noticed only
by those who can open it, not by the rest.

If what I've described, is somewhat accurate, and Wittgenstein is accurate in his description of "the honourable thing" here, then he's faced with a sort of dilemma at this section of "Philosophical Investigations". He's leading us right to the door of what he calls 'the ideal", "the preconceived idea of crystalline purity", what old called 'the kernel of meaning". But then he says let's turn things around (107), so that we won't see the need to look behind that door. I'm going to lead you away from the door now.

The problem is that now he has already shown us the locked door, talked about it. It's too late to turn us away from it, or not talk about it to those who do not hold the key. And it's probably impossible to talk about the locked door in such a way that only those with the key to open it will know of its existence. The question is, how would you keep a secret, allowing some people access to that secret, and at the same time completely hiding the existence of the secret from all others. It can't be done, so perhaps allowing that some people have the key, and others do not, is itself a dishonourable thing.

You did not answer the question: What purposes other than understanding do you mean?

When is the purpose of language use "for us to understand each other"? If it is not always the purpose of language use, then what other purposes are you talking about? Provide an example.

According to you, a lie is a kind of use, it is not the purpose itself. — Luke

I gave you the example, misunderstanding. In deception the purpose, or goal is misunderstanding. Meaning is use, and the person being deceived does not understand what the person deceiving is doing with the words, how the person is using the words, therefore the person being deceived misunderstands. And that is the deceiver's purpose, goal, to make the other person misunderstand how the words are being used. It doesn't matter if the one being deceived thinks that the sentence has "a meaning", and assumes to understand the meaning, meaning is use, and the one being deceived really does not understand how the words are being used.

But not to make them misunderstand what I am saying. Otherwise, the lie would not fulfil its purpose. All that is relevant here (to §98) is understanding what is said. — Luke

You're forgetting the premise. Meaning is use! If meaning is use, there is no such thing as "what I am saying", there is only "what I am doing". We cannot have a "what I am saying" here, as if there is a set meaning to the words which are spoken. That's the purpose of the premise, "meaning is use", to remove this false idea. This is why it is necessarily a moral issue. Meaning is attributed to the act, "use", not the words. So we are now trying to understand language through human acts, "games". But human acts are subject to moral judgements. Now we need to create consistency between what is "good" morally, and what is "good" linguistically. Otherwise we'll have human acts which are both good and bad at the same time.

Yeah, I'd want to look. The guard says it all. I just wanted present the anti-profound reading as a current favorite that I didn't already see on the thread. I'm always looking for better words, a slight further clarification. I'm glad I joined the conversation. — old

Good, I hope you continue with us, I appreciate your input. it may be a long slow process though.

As far as I can tell the notion of an observer in QM is a specialized one; so 'observer' would be a metaphor, not a literal definition in strict accordance with everyday.usage. — Janus

Not the way Rovelli is defining the word. I personally dislike such usage because it encourages exactly such misinterpretations. — noAxioms

The problem is that the definition of "observer' is not consistent with what the observer really is, in practise. The reference frame, which is supposed as the "observer", is inherently a human perspective. Any reference frame is. So to define "observer" in such a way that the observer might be something independent from a human perspective is to falsely define "observer", i.e. to define "observer" in a way which is inconsistent with what an observer really is in practise.

It is warmer than the same lamp measuring colder air. The air temperature has had an effect on the lamp. One system has effected the 2nd, and that's the second definition of measurement that boundless gave. — noAxioms

You cannot say that the lamp is warmer, unless you, or some other human being actually measures to see that it is warmer. Even if you conclude deductively that the lamp was exposed to warm air, therefore it is warmer, this still requires certain premises, and a human being to observe that it was exposed to the warm air, and apply the premises to make the deductive conclusion. You cannot get away from the need of human presence to make an observation, simply by asserting that an object can make an observation without a human presence. Even if the object did make the observation in that way, such an observation would be absolutely useless to any human being. We can't simply assume that an object made a specific observation without confirming that it did, but then it's a human observation. The only observations which are useful to us are the ones which we interpret using our assumptions and logical principles, but then the observation is not made by an object, it is made by the human being which makes the interpretation.

I agree (with reservations below), yet you write as if I'm purveying some theory of the non-fuzzy kernel. My position is roughly that it's not worth the trouble to try to create or appeal to a superscience of meaning. This is not to say that such a thing is impossible, for that would be to fall right back into linguistic metaphysics. Instead one can just market a different approach which is not justified in terms of the old approach. Just as a certain kind of atheist doesn't take the God issue seriously enough to debate about it, so an anti-profound 'Wittgensteinian' might no longer bother engaging in certain stripe of theorizing. — old

All I can say to this, is that each person has one's own approach, one's own interests. What one takes seriously, the second might not take seriously, But then the first might not take seriously what the second takes seriously. Like what I said to Luke, the same game that one plays for fun, another will play for keeps.

tend to agree, especially with pushing Wittgenstein aside. I quoted Graham to emphasize the possibility that the later Wittgenstein is something like a representative of ordinary wisdom who happened to make explicit within philosophy what others implied by not taking a certain kind of philosophy seriously in the first place. To sell Wittgenstein as a must-read guru looks like more linguistic metaphysics. If Wittgenstein is profound and difficult, then I increase my own status by translating him for the mystified. — old

The pushing aside is meant to have a look for yourself. If someone is guarding a door, and claiming there is nothing behind that door, so don't even bother trying to look, doesn't it make you want to have a look for yourself?

As for realizing that there is no such thing, I mostly agree there too, but I'd be careful not to frame it as the result of a method (like a 'theologically' justified atheism.) — old

It is a method though, a descriptive method, and as such it's not unlike the empirical method which justifies atheism. The wisdom of the ordinary "dummy" is to approach without knowing anything, no preconceived notions, only the desire to describe what is, that's the "wonder' of Socrates, the root of philosophy. The problem though is that the descriptive method uses words, and there are preconceptions inherent within word use, so we need first to rid ourselves of these preconceptions which seem to inhere within the way that we use words. We might try to describe language and word use first, but the issue cannot be avoided, there's no such thing as not being caught up in the game, we're in it already, whether we like it or not. So there is no such thing as proceeding without a method, because a method is already inherent within the language use, and we can't get out of those preconceptions without a method for this.

It is still entirely unclear what counts as 'winning' in this analogy, and you also didn't explain what you meant by "playing for keeps" in the context of a language game. Just a reminder, too, that not all games have the goal of winning (§66). — Luke

Playing for keeps is to play with seriousness. Whatever one's objective might be, that person would take seriously obtaining that goal. In the context of language games, we use language to help and obtain our goals. That's what I mean by playing for keeps, we have serious goals and we use language seriously as a means of obtaining those goals. So it's not about "winning the game", it's about achieving my goals.

What purposes other than understanding do you mean? A lie is still understandable, isn't it? Likewise, jokes, stories, orders, reports, and all of the other language-games (or purposes of language-use) that Wittgenstein lists at §23 may be understood. To include understanding as a similar "purpose" of language appears to be a category error. — Luke

Your examples here are called "kinds of use". They are not purposes of use. So for example, an order is a kind of use, but an order is done for a purpose, it is not the purpose itself. Likewise with the other kinds of use. So it only appears to you as category error, because you haven't gotten into the category of "purposes" you are in the category of "kinds of use".

Suppose for example, that a lie is a kind of use. The purpose of the lie is to make the other person misunderstand what you are doing. The words misrepresent your aims. That is deception, to intentionally make another misunderstand what you are doing, or what your aims are. And deception comes in many forms other than lying. So the purpose of lying, and other forms of deception, the goal or intent of lying, is misunderstanding. If the person understood what you were doing you could not deceive them. Between having understanding as a goal, in which the intent is to have the other understand my actions or purpose, and deception, in which the intent is to have the other misunderstand my actions or purpose, there other kinds of use. Ambiguity, vagueness, and obscurities may be intended to leave the other person in a state of neither understanding nor misunderstanding my actions or purpose, more like in a state of uncertainty.

This is irrelevant. We are here to discuss Wittgenstein's philosophy, not yours. — Luke

It's not irrelevant at all. If we are dealing with human acts, following rules etc., then morality is relevant. If a philosopher proposes a system of philosophy in which a human act may be both bad and good at the same time, this is a problem for that philosophy which needs a resolution.

.

An observer is a point of view, but not necessarily something at that point observing, and not something that has an effect. — noAxioms

I hope you realize that an observer, without something observing is contradictory.

So if I claim the table lamp takes a measurement of the air heating it, I'm not laying claim that it has subjective experience. — noAxioms

A measurement is a comparison, between something observed, and a scale (an ideal). A table lamp does not measure.

Simply substitute system for observer if that helps. That is how Rovelli is using the term. — Andrew M

The problem is that anything within that "system" needs to be interpreted according to standards before the system has any observational value. The "system" has no observational value without those human standards.

I can't see any evidence in the article you cited that the notion of "observer'' in QM is thought as having anything to do with being "an intentional being". — Janus

Since "observer", as commonly used, requires that one notices what occurs, the notion that something other than an intentional being could be an observer needs to be supported. Suppose a machine records, as in wayfarer's example, or an object is changed by an event. How does this qualify as noticing what occurs? When that information in the machine, or the changes in the object, are interpreted, the interpretation requires basic assumptions about the relationship between the machine or object doing the recording, and the event being documented. The "observation" of the event is not complete without those assumptions. So the machine or object, on its own, is just changing, it is not observing.

If I understand your analogy, are you saying that everyone is somehow trying to win the language game? — Luke

Not necessarily everyone is trying to win, but there are varying goals which people have behind their use of language. This is why it's a moral issue, because language serves as a means to achieving various goals. If it were an organized game, we'd all have the same goal, trying to win.

But if we can look at language and say that language serves a purpose, whether it's to understand each other, or for communion, unity, or communication, whatever then we impose that ideal onto language, just like we impose ethical principles on other human actions. That ideal allows us to make judgements as to good or bad, in relation to that supposed purpose. So for instance, if we say that the purpose of language is for us to understand each other, then we can judge the vague or ambiguous sentence as a bad sentence because it is not conducive to understanding, and therefore not consistent with the designated purpose of language.

But if we allow that language is sometimes for this purpose, sometimes for that purpose, and sometimes for another purpose, then we have no ideal by which to judge language use, and the goodness or badness of each instance of language use must be judged in relation to that particular purpose. The problem is that the particular purpose may itself be morally wrong. Now we have an instance where the language use is good, because it serves that particular purpose, but the purpose is morally wrong. So that instance of language use is both good and bad at the same time, and this is contradictory. The contradiction points to an inconsistency within the structure of the governing ideals. What is good or bad in language use is judged by an ideal which is inconsistent with what is good and bad in morality.

It seems like you want to knock Wittgenstein down, which is fine. But isn't it also valuable to understand his appeal? — old

I might be trying to knock him down a few notches, but that's my approach to every philosopher, look for weaknesses as well as strengths, to me that's what philosophy is. And when it's a philosopher with high esteem, much appeal, the challenge is just as much to find the weaknesses as it is to understand the strengths. The two become one and the same, understanding the strengths reveals the weaknesses. The real challenge though is to understand what the person is saying, not simply knock down everything the person says because you're jealous that the person gets all the attention. Wittgenstein says very much which is very interesting, with very deep insight into the activity of conceptualization. But like with every philosopher, you reach a point where deficiencies become evident, because the entirety of reality has not been revealed, and then it's time to move along and see how others might deal with that problem.

What he criticized was the leap from often possible improvement to the postulation of some non-fuzzy kernel of meaning, an idea that tempts philosophers away from better uses of their time. — old

I agree, and I think that this is where his insight is deep. The philosopher seeking the kernel of meaning is like the physicist seeking the particle of matter. In reality, meaning is produced by the context, like in QM the particle is produced by the environment. The inevitable conclusion is that there is no kernel of meaning, there is no particle of matter. The materialist has been mislead by this assumption. The problem though is that this insight leaves a giant question mark where that assumption stands. If we drop that assumption, then there is no substance. Uh oh, better get our feet back on solid ground (107). But this turning back is the philosopher's mistake, it's a lack of courage, fear of the unknown. Notice that he's not looking for solid ground at 107, he's looking for traction. Why the need to go somewhere? There's no empirical necessity here, a philosopher might just contemplate that lack of substance, as described by Aristotle in his ethics, not going anywhere, interrupted only by the earthly needs of subsistence. Contemplating the kernel of meaning reveals its non-existence. Why warn other philosophers to stay away from this revelation? He's guarding the door to the secret, saying there's no need to look in there because everything's outside of there. Aren't you inclined to ask, why are you guarding the door then, show me that there's nothing there?

Those wrapped up in a game that depends on the non-fuzzy kernel (who think that some kind of superscience of meaning is possible) are naturally going to resist his project. — old

That the kernel is a fuzzy kernel is a cop-out, a refusal to acknowledge the reality of the situation, that there is no such thing as the kernel, and seeking the kernel is a lost enterprise. Assuming a fuzzy kernel only leads one into the contradictions of dialectical materialism, or Peircean vagueness. That's why you need to push Wittgenstein aside, look behind that door yourself, contemplate the kernel of meaning for yourself, and truly realize that there is no such thing. If you hearken back to Aristotelian metaphysics, the idea of prime matter is simply unintelligible, and needs to be relinquished. Together we can muster up the courage to proceed into the unknown, what can fill that gaping hole where the assumption of the kernel used to stand.

An observer is one who takes notice of (and this means pays attention to) the thing which is observed.

It does matter, because your whole argument hangs on the fallacious assumption that the word "perfect" must always mean "ideal". — Luke

You've misunderstood the argument then. "Perfect" here doesn't have to mean "ideal". In fact, it clearly is other than ideal. However, as I've explained, to serve Wittgentein's purpose of demonstrating that there is no need to strive for the ideal, "perfect" here must have equal value to "ideal". We have no need to strive for the ideal because we already have perfect order in what comes without that effort.

Then I'll leave it to you to explain why you apparently believe that our ordinary vague sentences have not yet got a quite unexceptionable sense, and a perfect language still has to be constructed by us. — Luke

Quite obviously, misunderstanding is still possible, as Fooloso4 wisely pointed out above. Therefore the ideal language, where misunderstanding is avoided, still has not yet been constructed by us. To say, forget about that ideal language because even the most vague sentence (which is very easily misunderstood) is already in its own way perfect", is nothing but fool's play.

You might think that we can either play the language-game for fun or play for keeps, and it would be better if we would all just play for fun and forget about playing for keeps. It doesn't matter who wins or loses, we're playing for fun. The problem though, is that in reality we all play for keeps, and that's why we continually strive to better ourselves (strive for the ideal). Ever see a chess player who says it doesn't matter which move I make, because any move is going to create a perfect order? The chess player strives for the ideal move.

Why should I accept your assertion that there is only one possible meaning of the word "perfect"? — Luke

As I explained, it doesn't matter how many possible meanings of "perfect" there are, it is the only one that serves Wittgenstein's purpose, of dismissing 'striving for the ideal'.

That's right: the kind of perfection under discussion is already there within our ordinary language, but it is "perfect" in the sense of 'suitable', 'apt', or 'appropriate', rather than the ideal sense that you are attempting to stipulate. — Luke

If that perfection is suitable to render 'striving for the ideal' as unwarranted, it must be of equivalent value to the ideal perfection.

This is true only if you stipulate that "perfect" must have the one (ideal) meaning. Whereas Wittgenstein is counselling the reader to abandon such a philosophical pursuit of sublime chimeras (§94). — Luke

Unless he can show how 'striving for the ideal' is unwarranted, then his "counselling" is rather pointless. He would be counselling against something which may be very appropriate. That is why "perfect" must be used at 98 in a sense which is equivalent in value to "the ideal". If that perfection does not have a value equivalent to "the ideal", then any assertions that 'striving after the ideal' is misguided, are unjustified.

if two people shine the sun light into each others eyes with a mirror at 25 feet apart , both will be in conflict with each other objective reality .You can use a garden hose and spray each other too . same difference — TRUE

I'm talking about what one individual observer sees when looking into the mirror. My right arm appears to be my left arm.

If humans use reason to make choices, what do other animals or artifacts use to make theirs? — Πετροκότσυφας

That's a good question, but I don't know the secrets of the soul, so I can't help you with what other animal use to make choices. And, in the case of artifacts, if they are inanimate, as I said, they do not make choices, they do not have ends within themselves. These inanimate things are directed toward ends by the choices of living things, so they are artificial.

We are only talking about the mode of final causality here. I was not saying that God's knowledge is restricted to knowledge of universal essences, I was simply saying that it is through God's knowledge of universal essences that he acts as the final cause of all things. — Aaron R

The issue is important though. We are talking about the final cause of all inanimate things, this means each particular thing in itself. What we observe empirically, is that each type of thing has a way of acting which is specific to that type. However, individual things have a uniqueness which is peculiar to the thing itself. If God acts as final cause of each thing, through the universal essences, then He makes each thing the type of thing that it is. He gives each thing a way of acting which is specific to a type. How then is it possible that things acquire their peculiarities, their uniqueness? Do things achieve uniqueness from some process other than by God's Will? If so, then how can we say that God directs all things toward their ends? Do you see the gap between God directs things through universal essences, and each thing has a uniqueness peculiar to itself? A thing's peculiarity, uniqueness, allows that it has an end other than the one God gives it.

I wouldn't make too much of 'perfect order.' Making too much of that little choice is perhaps to be 'dazzled by the ideal.' — old

The point is that he uses "perfect". And, as I explained to Luke, it is only by employing this concept, (the order in common language is perfect), that he has reason to dismiss the notion that we are seeking the ideal. It is only if this order is "perfect", that we may reasonably dismiss 'striving after the ideal'. If the order were less than perfect, then we might still strive after a better order, the ideal. Clearly, "perfect" plays a very important, pivotal role here.

If anyone is dazzled by the ideal, it is Wittgenstein himself. This is analogous to Plato's cave allegory. But when Wittgenstein comes out of the cave to see the sun, ("the good" in the cave allegory), he's dazzled by it, and wants to retreat back into the cave without apprehending its significance. Wittgenstein is trying to reason away the significance of the ideal, by claiming that the order in common language is already perfect. It's a case of "rationalizing". He doesn't want to face the ideal, so he thinks up a reason to turn away from it. By saying that the order in common language is already "perfect", he asserts that seeking the ideal is misguided. But if it is really the case that the order in common language is less than perfect, then seeking the ideal is justified.

if seeking the ideal is justified, then Wittgenstein's premise "meaning is use" is overruled. This would mean that the ideal itself has significance, meaning, as that which is sought after. But the ideal is something outside of actual use, something which actual use never obtains. Then, meaning would be derived from something above and beyond actual use, such as "the good" in Plato's analogy.

Not necessarily. The "perfect" order Wittgenstein speaks of here has the sense of 'suitable', 'apt' or 'appropriate', rather than 'faultless', 'flawless' or 'ideal'. The same distinction that you made above — Luke

That is very clearly untrue. The terms you have proposed allow for the possibility of something better, or more complete, which "perfect" does not allow for. If Wittgenstein was using "perfect" in the way you suggest, it would not serve his purpose. His purpose is to demonstrate that we are not striving after an ideal language, perfection is already there, within our common, ordinary language. So if "perfect" here is anything less than the ideal, it does not serve the purpose because then we could still be striving after the ideal. It is crucial that "perfect" is equivalent (in value) to "ideal", in order to dismiss as unjustified, 'striving after the ideal'.

Because I was afraid to speak
When I was just a lad
Me father gave me nose a tweak
And told me I was bad
But then one day I learned a word
That saved me aching nose
The biggest word you ever heard
And this is how it goes

Oh, supercalifragilisticexpialidocious!

Forget about looking into a mirror, that might get real complicated.

So, according to you, (most) non-human animals, plants and artifacts can't be said to have ends. — Πετροκότσυφας

No, I think that other living things choose their own ends as well, the difference being that human beings use reason in making these choices, while other living things do not. It is inanimate things which do not have their own ends.

We can't say that the leaf's ends are photosynthesis and transpiration, a bird's singing is to attract mates or that a house's end is to shelter, — Πετροκότσυφας

I think that the tree does make choices in growing its branches in this way instead of that way, toward the light for example, and the bird makes choices about when to sing. So there must be ends involved in these actions, the reasons why these creatures choose to do what they do, and not something else.

Also, human ends can't be traced back to God. Is that right? — Πετροκότσυφας

That's right, and this is why we have free choice, and why we can make mistakes and do what is wrong. There is a separation between God and the free willing beings. But as I described already, I also think that there is necessarily a separation between inanimate things and God. God gives inanimate things direction, making the things behave in a general way, but He is not there within the particular things, making each particular thing act in its own particular way, He directs things in a more general way, as Aaron describes here:

I believe that Aquinas would say that final cause interacts with the inanimate thing through the form as essence. In other words, essences within the mind of God act as the final causes of all things. Insofar as a particular thing has a substantial form, this is possible only because there is a corresponding universal essence existing eternally within the mind of God. — Aaron R

Let me see if I understand what you are saying. If God interacts through essences, then God would interact with inanimate things in a general or universal way. So God might say "all things of this type [of this essence] will act in this way, and all the particulars of that type would act in that way because God makes them act that way. But what gives a thing its uniqueness, its particular substantial form? It cannot be that there is a corresponding universal essence, because that would be a universal, and we are talking about a thing's particularity. If God only directs things toward His ends through essences, universals, then is it possible that particular things have accidental properties which God is unaware of?

Which "principle"? — Luke

The one stated at 98: "So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence."

To paraphrase §98, he says "it is clear that every sentence in our language ‘is in order as it is’." — Luke

You left out the word "perfect", he says that it has "perfect order". And he's very clear about this, he uses "perfect order" twice in that short section. This is the way he denies that we are striving after an "ideal language", by saying that even the vaguest sentence already obtains a "perfect order". We do not have to strive for an ideal language, because perfection is already there, in even the vaguest use of language. So "perfect" plays a very important role here. It is only by saying that language is already "perfect", as it is, even in the vaguest sentences, that he gets away from the notion that we are striving after some ideal perfection in language.

If he simply said that every sentence has order, we might still strive for a better order, and therefore still be striving for an ideal language. But this is not what he said, he said that even the vaguest sentence already has a perfect order. And it is only by this assumption, that perfection is already within even the vaguest of sentences, that he supports the notion that we are not striving after an ideal.

Wittgenstein makes no mention of morality in the text. Why are you? — Luke

Morality concerns the goodness and badness of human actions. Using language is a human action. "Perfect" implies without deficiency, faultless, so morality is implied anytime "perfect" is used in relation to human actions. A human act cannot be perfect if it is morally deficient. To say that a human act creates something perfect (a perfect order), is to judge that act as morally good, because it creates something which is without deficiency. Therefore morality is implied at 98. The order which is created could not be said to be perfect if it was created by a morally deficient act. The order of the vague sentence cannot be said to be a "perfect order" if the sentence is created as part of an immoral act.

I read those passages as us being cautioned against projecting some kind of exact, quasi-mathematical meaning 'behind' language. The fact that we can ask Joe to elaborate on his 'feeling shitty' doesn't imply that his feeling-shittiness has some exact nature that we can approximate with arbitrary precision by talking about it long enough. Joe doesn't even know exactly (ideally, perfectly) what he means. He doesn't need to. Maybe he's explaining why he wants or does not want to walk in the park. — old

But when he says, at 98, that even the vaguest sentence has "perfect" order, isn't he saying exactly what you are saying that he is cautioning against? But instead of saying that the perfect order is something we seek with ideal languages such as mathematics and logic, he is saying that perfect order is already right there, in even the vaguest sentence.

.

If you believe that we use language for the purpose of understanding each other, i.e. language is used to help us to understand one another, then you ought to reject the principle stated at 98 as false, and unsupportive of this premise.

But if we accept the principle at 98, then we ought to accept what is implied by it, and that is that language may be used for any goals whatsoever, including cheating and deceit.

The issue is whether or not language use is an activity which may be governed by principles of good and bad, morality. If it is, then there is a moral basis for the judgement of better (more perfect) or worse (less perfect) language use. If it is not, then any way of using language is just as good (perfect) as any other way.

A thing has a form, and the form is proper to the thing itself, as the thing which it is, a particular thing with a particular form. This form includes all accidents. Then there is the thing's "nature", which is formal. Generally when we speak of a thing's "nature", we refer to its essence, which is the form without the accidentals. It is how we, as human minds, apprehend the thing, the form without all the accidentals.

With respect to final cause now. Does the final cause interact with the inanimate thing through the form as essence, or though the form as particular? For example, the human mind only knows things through their essences, it does not know the particular forms complete with all the accidentals. So when the human being acts by final cause, it acts on the particular forms through the means of essences, and this gives the possibility of mistakes. In the case of God, would the final cause act directly on the form of the particular, God apprehending the complete form, accidentals included. If so, then from God's perspective is there even such a thing as the thing's "nature"? Each thing being its own unique particular in the mind of God, what role would the essence play in God's mind?

What do you think about (81 & 98), old? Is a fuzzy, imprecise, vague concept, which readily gives misunderstanding, just as "perfect" as a precisely defined mathematical concept? if so, how would you understand "perfect" in this context?

Aquinas wrote: By their nature they are determined to one result... act according to the mode of their nature. Etc. — Πετροκότσυφας

I am questioning the consistency of what Aquinas wrote in your quoted passages. When things like human beings act towards their own ends, they freely choose their ends. This is why their actions may be good or bad relative to God's Will. We have free will, which means we choose our ends. If an inanimate thing is determined by God to act toward God's end, then there is no freedom of choice, and the thing is not acting according to its own end, it is acting toward God's end.

So the issue is what is meant by a thing's "nature". In the quoted passage, it is said that "by their nature they [things] are determined to one result". But there is no "end" within the thing's nature, because the thing does not freely choose ends, there is only an "end" in relation to God, the thing acts for God's end. God gives the thing its "nature", in order that the thing may be directed to His end.

This creates a separation between the thing's "end", and the thing's "nature". In order that the thing is what it is, the thing that it is, its nature must be proper to itself, by the law of identity. The thing's nature inheres within the thing itself. But the thing's end, and this is what orders its activities, is not proper to the thing itself, it is proper to God. Therefore the thing's end cannot be part of the thing's nature. The thing's end is separate from the thing's nature, unless the thing's "nature" is proper to God together with the thing's end, but then the thing, as a thing, would either be part of God (pantheism), or else the thing would be other than its nature.

What I was pointing out, is that we cannot say that a thing acts by its nature toward an end, and that end is God's end, unless a thing's nature is part of God (pantheism). This is because the end of a thing is related to the thing's activities, and is distinct from a thing's nature, because a thing, as itself, is distinct from its relations to other things (its activities). So if God gives a thing its nature, the end remains God's end, and does not become part of the thing's nature, as if it were the thing's end.

What are you saying, that a thing might be different from itself? So I don't get your point. You point to "A", and ask if there is a property of that thing which is also not a property of it?

And that's a load of crap.

Yeah. But, no. Nowhere did I say that a thing's own nature and God are the same thing nor that Aquinas is a pantheist. And, I'm fairly confident that, it is you who thinks that if a thing acts toward an end, as directed by God, then it can't be said that it is acting according to its own nature. Aquinas, as far as I'm concerned, thinks and says that it can. Examples: — Πετροκότσυφας

From your quoted passages, would you agree, that according to Aquinas, a thing's activity is according to its nature, and its nature is its form, and this is given to it by God?

What is at issue though, is the thing's end, and it is stated that the thing does not set its end, God sets the thing's end. So what I am arguing is that since the end is a cause, in the sense of final cause, then the cause of the thing's actions are God. If you say that the thing's own nature is the cause of its activities, then the thing's nature must be something separate from the thing, existing in the mind of God.

You are conflating "meaning" and "meaningful". Words have meaning, they do not have meaningful. And although words can be meaningful, they do not have "meaningful relations" which "exist where words are not used". — Luke

That's irrelevant, words are not the only things with meaning. There is meaning in meaningful relations, that's why they're meaningful.

Your use of "use" here has a meaning of personal benefit, such as that it is useful to you. This is a different meaning to Wittgenstein's use of "use" which has a meaning of employment, such as that it has a shared use by the speakers of a community. — Luke

I haven't yet seen Wittgenstein talk about a "shared use". I don't see how that's possible. I speak and type words, you speak and type words. My activity with my intentions, and your activity with your intentions. How could we do this as a shared activity? Anyway, as I explained to unenlightened, the existence of a community is dependent on the meaning within the relations between the people. So any meaning which might be attributed to a shared language use (whatever that might mean) is only a branch from the family of "meaning" which exists in the community, and upon which the existence of the community is dependent.

There is always some way in which something can be misunderstood. MU seems intent on demonstrating that — Fooloso4

Yes, misunderstanding is always a possibility isn't it? That's why doubt can never be ruled out. We went through this already. But since the vague, unclear sentence is conducive to misunderstanding, by what premise do you think it is that Wittgenstein says such a sentence if "perfect" (98)? Is understanding not what we are aiming for when we use words?

Right, but using words is not the same as "meaning" because meaningful relations exist where words are not used. Using words is one type of "meaning". And if we divide, or separate the "meaning" of word use, from the deeper "meaning" of meaningful relations, we have cut it off from the family tree. And this gives us a false impression of what "meaning" is.

I take him to hold that things act according to their own nature (the internal force), which, in turn, is dictated by God (the external force). — Πετροκότσυφας

I see this as contradiction under Aquinas' principles. God, and a thing's own nature are two distinct things. Either the thing acts as it does due to its own nature, or the thing acts as it does due to the will of God. Aquinas is not pantheist, so we need to maintain a separation between the thing with its behaviour, and God as the cause of its behaviour. If the thing acts toward an end, as directed by God, then we cannot say that it is acting according to its own nature, because it is acting according to the will of God, which is distinct from its own nature.

But your example is infelicitous. Of course if one uses different words to act in a different manner the relationship and the meaning will be different. And an inflection can turn the same word(s) from a question into a command with very different meaning because different use, and the meaning of the inflection is conventional too. — unenlightened

The point though, is that to be courteous, polite, and friendly (and I believe this is what social relations are based in), cannot be classified as "use". I do not behave in a kind and considerate way because it is of some sort of use to me. To the contrary, if I took time to think about what was more useful to me, and behaved in that way, I'd be more deceitful and cheating. Sure it's true that we use words to be courteous, kind and polite, but the word use is not the attitude, it is a representation of the attitude, and the attitude is meaningful with or without the word use.

So let's be consistent. social relations are prior to word use, as you say. And social relations are meaningful. But we are talking about the meaning of word use. Isn't it true that the meaning in word use is just an extension of the meaning in social relations, taken to a new level? Just like when the person sitting in the chair becomes "The Chair", it's just an extension to the same family of meaning.

So when one says 'meaning is use', it is saying that the scope of what is and is not a chair is set by the ways in which the word is used in the community, and not set by any property of the object, nor by the use one makes of the object, (doll's houses have chairs), nor by any property of the sound or sight of the word. — unenlightened

You're only looking at one side of the coin here, and you seem to have things inverted, like looking into a mirror where the right appears on the left, you see the cause as the effect. In reality (as opposed to your representation), it is the individual instances of use, which create what you call "the ways in which the word is used in the community". Therefore, the ways in which the word is used by the community cannot dictate or determine the scope of what a chair is, because people are free to use words how they please, and this free usage causes the existence of "the ways in which the word is used in the community". That's why "the Chair" can refer to a person, because some people started using it that way, and it caught on, despite the fact that at the time when it started being used that way, it was beyond the scope of what a chair is. There really is no scope to what a chair is, we're free to use the word how we please. So, the way the word is used in the community cannot set the scope of what is and is not a chair, because it has no capacity to restrict the free usage of the individuals.

So if one says "please kind sir be so good as to vacate my inconsistency. for it is precious to me" one is liable to get a puzzled look and not the restoration of one's favourite stump, because 'inconsistency' doesn't mean anything like 'stump'. 'Chair' would work, or 'seat' or probably 'place'. and the work it does , the use, is to convey to, not to manipulate the other. If the response is 'No it's my turn on the stump', the words have still done their job. — unenlightened

I can't relieve you of your inconsistency unless you see that it is an inconsistency. Let's assume "the use, is to convey to, not to manipulate the other". Now you say that we use words to convey something. What is conveyed? The use of words, and the thing conveyed must be two distinct things if we use words to convey something. It cannot be meaning which is conveyed if meaning is the use itself. So if meaning is use itself, then we have an empty, void conveyor. There's an empty vessel, and to say that the use is to convey, is false because nothing is conveyed. We are not conveying anything, we are simply using words, and this is meaning. But if we are simply using words, we are using them for our own goals, our own intentions, and manipulating the other is inevitable.

I didn't say they are. — Πετροκότσυφας

Sorry, my mistake then. I interpreted "driven", as an internal force, a drive like inspiration, spirit, or ambition, which causes one to go in this way or that, and I interpreted "directed" as an external force which causes something to go this way or that. Do you not distinguish between these two?

And the same kind of thing goes on here at TPF. Someone asks 'is X racist?' And we have a discussion about the exact scope of the term 'racist' as if there is a truth of the matter independent of how we decide to use it. And there is such a truth, but it is only the truth of how the wider community happens to use it and how it and its root-words have been used by the community in the past. Ha, see what I did there? Root - racine - race. And so to a discussion of the tree of life, root and branch of the family/ tribe/nation, and the notion of inheritance... until we are satisfied that we have the fullness of understanding of all the possibilities of 'racism'. But there is no truth of meaning beyond the way a word is used... — unenlightened

I disagree with this. Meaning goes far beyond, and is much deeper than "the way a word is used". There is meaning in human relations, we have meaningful relationships. So what's this thing you are talking about called "the community"? The very existence of a community is dependent on special relations. Therefore there is no such thing as the way that words "have been used by the community" without these special relations which form "the community". The true nature of "meaning" is to be found in these meaningful relationships, not in the use of words. The use of words just facilitates meaningful relationships.

Reconsider I like sushi's example of "get out of my chair". So you're sitting on the stump, and I like sushi says "get out of my chair". If this is successful, and get's you off the stump, you'll probably go away thinking "what an arse hole". But if I like sushi brought you another chair, and explained to you why that particular stump was I like sushi's favourite spot to sit, and asked you to please consider sitting in this other chair instead, you might stick around, engage in conversation, and who knows, you may become best friends forever. That's something meaningful, and a better example of what "understanding" really is.

When we think about "meaning", at first blush it seems like we are talking about creating relationships, relationships between words and objects, or even words and ideas. But this is difficult and doesn't properly pan out, we cannot account for meaning with such relationships. So we might consider that meaning is just the way that we use words. But what are we really doing when we use words? We do not use words to get what we want from others, we use words to create and maintain special (meaningful) relationships with others. Think of the discussion above, concerning how dogs understand human beings, "understanding" and "meaningful relationship" are like two sides of the same coin. If we bring "use" into the picture, we create an imbalance.

When you write "a" and "a" as two distinct things, and ask about the difference between these two things, you have given us the premise that they are two distinct things. The need here would be to support, justify that premise, that they are distinct. We can see that they are distinct things because they occupy different places. So despite the fact that they look the same, the claim that they are distinct things is justified by that fact, that they occupy different places.