Still, to hold any form of uncertainty—including that of doubt—one must first hold a psychological certainty that some contextually relevant given is real/true. E.g., to be uncertain about whether one forgot a cup on a table, I must first hold a psychological certainty that there is a reality/truth to whether or not the cup is presently on the table, that there in fact is a table, and so forth. — javra

I cannot understand this. I've seen similar statements, by many different people, and no one has been able to justify this claim for me. Why must there be a foundation of certainty? If reality consists of possibilities, then we face reality in terms of probability. And, we create certainty within our minds, by excluding things as impossible. Necessary is equivalent to impossible to be otherwise. But as I've been explaining to unenlightened, there is a fundamental inconsistency between probabilities and impossible. Any impossibility created through probability is not a true impossibility, as the principle of plenitude indicates.

Further, the threat of infinite regress of doubt is not a problem. Infinite regress is simply repugnant to the mind which seeks to understand, as is doubt. So an infinite regress of doubt is not at all inconsistent.

So maybe you can explain to me what the others have not been able to. Why must there be an underlying psychological certainty? Take your example. I've lost my cup. I think, perhaps I left it on the kitchen table. Why must I be certain that there is a kitchen table, to consider this possibility? Suppose my memory is quite bad, and I'm confused perhaps by illness, can I not at the same time consider as a possibility that I do not even have a kitchen table? Maybe I sold the kitchen table last week, or moved into a new place without a table. Where comes the need for an underlying certainty?

I could conceivably doubt any of these things, but I couldn't conceivably doubt everything - that is the philosopher's fiction, because one would have to doubt that the words mean what one thinks they mean and so whether one's doubt itself is something or nothing. — unenlightened

This is exactly the point. Are you certain that the words mean what you think they mean? With Wittgenstein's position, there are possibilities as to the meanings of the words. I approach your words assuming that there is inexactness in my understanding of how you are using those words. Therefore I cannot exclude the possibility that I misunderstand what you are saying. The certitude you express in your examples, I am certain of this, and I am certain of that, is really irrelevant, because the goal here is to determine whether this certitude is justified. I think that from Wittgenstein's perspective, his ontology of rules, this internal certitude which you cannot be justified. Therefore you ought not claim to be certain about the things you claim to be certain about.

It's a debilitating affliction, not a philosophy. — unenlightened

That's a matter of opinion. As you said in the last post, doubt is a frame of mind. When you develop the attitude, that all the things which you might otherwise claim to be certain of, (such as the things you list), might not actually be as you think they are, this does not impede your life. You may simply live your life in the same way as one who claims to be certain, yet recognizing that certainty is an illusion, it's not real. All it does is give you a different world view, the view that we may have a fundamental misunderstanding about the way that the world is, and therefore certainty is unjustified. This does not impede one's daily life.

We live in a society with a foundation in Platonic idealism, and that idealism supports the belief in certainty. Because of this, we have an attitude of certainty. You claim "I am certain", because that's your attitude, you tend to use those words in that way. Wittgenstein demonstrates that these ideals ought to be removed, they are not supported by a real description of language. if this is the case, then we can conclude that the attitude of certainty, and the tendency to say "I am certain" is a statement of falsity created by the illusion of idealism. Removing the attitude of certitude does not incapacitate one's ability to act. It just produces a more realistic description of human actions, and that is that we act without being certain. And when you state "I am certain that...", it is not a statement which is consistent with the possibilities of the human condition, it's a falsity, a self-deception.

Additionally, could you recommend me either videos or books on Aristotle that can help explain his thought to me? Thanks! — Walter Pound

I really can't recommend anything to you here, because I see so much variance in interpretation. The best is to read Aristotle yourself, but there is so much material it takes a long time.

This tells me what matter does and not what matter is. — Walter Pound

The problem with this question is that we really cannot say "what" matter is. This is because the "whatness" of a thing is its form. So any statement of what a thing is, is a formula, a statement of a thing's form.

If the form is not material, then why suppose that the form changes at all when time passes? We don't see how immaterial entities behave and we don't see how forms behave alone as Aristotle believed matter and form must exist together. — Walter Pound

The shape, size, colour, etc., all the descriptive terms which we use to explain what a thing is, are referring to the thing's form. All that we see, and in anyway perceive of the thing is its form. So we do see a thing's form changing.

Given that the substance of the Rubik's cube is a composite of form and matter and that the matter is the only thing that we see change, why should the Rubik's cube change its identity when it is being altered? — Walter Pound

The problem isn't quite the same today, as it was in Aristotle's time, because logic has progressed, and Aristotle did a lot for that. At his time, a thing was identified by the description of "what" it is, its form. So, the Rubik's cube at one moment, has a different description from the description that it has at the next moment, therefore the two instances of existence, are instances of two distinct things, the identity of a thing being given by its description.. Aristotle's law of identity is designed to avoid this problem. But the assumption is that the matter, of which the cube is composed, remains the same, therefore the cube's material identity remains the same, while the form of it changes.

Unless we start qualifying what it means for a substance's matter to be a substance's matter, why does the spatial arrangement of the Rubik's cube's "matter" determine whether the Rubik's cube is the same as it was before the toddler's manipulation? — Walter Pound

Under the logic in use at Aristotle's time a thing's identity was its description. Therefore if the cube had one description at one time, and another description at another time, these two instances could not be instances of "the same" thing.

However, from your previous sentence, it seems that Aristotle wanted to say that although a thing's matter changed, such as Theseus' ship, it does not mean that the thing itself was altered. — Walter Pound

The thing's matter does not change, the form changes, that's the point. Theseus' Ship is a more complex issue which mixes the two forms of identity.

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When you say, "does not change" do you mean to say that matter does not come into or out of being or that matter is static? I have heard that Aristotle subscribed to a relational theory of time and if Aristotle really believed that matter did not change, then that would suggest that matter is timeless. — Walter Pound

Yes, that's the whole point, matter itself does not change.

If an apple is a substance, and a substance is a composite of matter and form, then I only experience a change in the substance's matter when I cut the apple in half with a knife. I don't experience a change in the substance's form. — Walter Pound

When you cut the apple, you have change its form, by dividing it in two. All the matter remains as the same matter, but it is now in a different form.

But if you could somehow see space-time...but couldn't see matter, could you put it the other way, ie
'matter isn't a thing in itself, it just supervenes on space-time and its relationships' ?

or maybe separating space-time into space and time:
'matter and time aren't things of themselves, they just supervene on space and its relationships'? — wax

This is an interesting thought experiment. Let's say that we "see" space-time with our minds, in the sense that we apprehended it only with the mind. And matter is somewhat unintelligible so we do not "see" matter with the mind. Now, we have observed the existence of objects, and their movement, and from this we have apprehended with the mind, the conception of space-time. However, something is missing here, and that is the substance, what gives reality to the objects which are observed to be moving. So we posit "matter" as that substance, the reality of the objects which are moving.

So, would you agree on this? Our understanding of "matter" is dependent on our understanding of space and time, which itself is based in observations of moving objects. Now, if our concepts of space and time change, due to changing empirical data, so must our concept of matter. However, let's say that space, time, and matter all refer to something real, and this is what we observe as objects and their movements. We need to disentangle these three aspects of objects in motion (which forms our empirical data) in order to properly answer your questions.

What exactly is matter in Aristotle's eyes? — Walter Pound

Consider that in Aristotle`s physics, matter is the aspect of a thing which does not change when change occurs to a thing. It is therefore the principle which provides for the reality of the temporal continuity of existence. Imagine a changing thing. At one moment it is assumed to have a definite form, and at the next moment it is assume to have a slightly different definite form. Strictly speaking, from a logic of formal identity, at the second moment it is not the same thing as it was at the first moment. The idea that it is logically necessary that these are two distinct things, provided fodder for sophistry and paradoxes of infinite regress. So Aristotle wanted a law of identity which would corroborate our observed experience, and allow that one and the same thing could have temporal extension despite the fact that changes occur to that thing during the time of its existence. So he posited "matter" as the underlying thing which does not change, providing for the observed temporal continuity of existence of a thing, despite the fact that the thing's form is continually changing.

Behavioural patterns can be evidence of rule following. — S

Sure, I agreed with Janus on this point. But not all cases of behavioural patterns are cases of rule following. So the premise "if there is behavioural patterns, there is rule following" is not a true premise.

There are two disagreements about rules I have with you. One is your assertion that rules are created in being formulated, and since it takes language to formulate a rule, then it follows that rules are created by means of language.

The other disagreement I have with both you and Terrapin Station, is that the way I am using 'rule' does not conform with common usage, and the pedantic and overly strict way you are both using the term does. — Janus

Yes, we disagree on what "rule" means.

Two common kinds of expressions refute that: "As a rule he has eggs for breakfast" and "It is an unwritten rule that people should respect others and wait their turn". You see the latter operating without the need for any explicit expression of it, for example, where two lanes merge, and most people give way to every second car. — Janus

I don't see your argument here. Both, "he has eggs for breakfast", and, "people should respect others and wait their turns", are written in words. The fact that you say "it is an unwritten rule" does not negate the fact that it is actually written in words.

Try this. Take away the words "he has eggs for breakfast", Now, the person gets up every morning and has eggs for breakfast, nice pattern. How does this pattern become a rule, unless it is stated as such? Or do you think the person gets up and thinks there is a rule that I must have eggs every morning for breakfast therefore I must have eggs, and so decides to have eggs? And try the other, so-called unwritten rule, "people should respect others and wait there turn". Take away those words, and what are you left with? It's certainly not "a rule".

You see the latter operating without the need for any explicit expression of it, for example, where two lanes merge, and most people give way to every second car. — Janus

If it is true, that when people are merging in their cars, they are following the rule "people should respect others and wait their turn", then they must be following that rule, as it is written, meaning that they have been exposed to that expressed rule, and are obeying it. Otherwise they might be following some other rule, or more likely, doing it for some other reason, and you are simply making the false statement that they are following that specific rule when they really are not..

Even animals do it; social predator species commonly have unwritten (obviously!) and unspoken (presumably!) rules about who gets to feast on the carcass first. — Janus

See, this is the problem with your perspective, which I've already explained to you. You assume that there are rules here, where there are none. Then, instead of looking for the real reason why these animals behave in the way that they do, you'll be totally distracted by the false premise that they are following rules, and maybe even go off on some wild goose chase, looking for some rules which don't even exist.

I think I'm noticing a general link between problems and overly strict adherence to rules at the expense of resolving the problems linked to them. — S

This is a problem isn't it? To follow a rule means strict adherence. You argue that using language is a matter of following rules, but now you complain that we cannot resolve these problems because people are too busy following rules. See the hypocrisy? Problem solving requires that we ditch the rules, and be innovative. That's what language is really all about.

No. If I am certain, I have no doubt. If I am doubtful, I am uncertain. But since these are both frames of mind, I don't even know what it might mean for them to be absolute. — unenlightened

I suppose that if you could exclude all doubt from your mind, you would have absolute certainty. I do not think that this is humanly possible. You mentioned "absolute doubt", so I assume that this would be to exclude all certainty. Why would absolute doubt be a bad thing? An attitude, or "frame of mind" of doubt does not prevent you from proceeding, it simply produces a cautious attitude toward procedures, with due respect for the possibility of mistake. While certitude produces a careless attitude toward procedures, because it inclines disrespect for the possibility of mistake. It appears to me, that to exclude the attitude of certainty (absolute doubt), would be a good thing.

The point is that having a reason quells your doubt, but removing your doubt does not remove doubt? — Luke

I would think that having a reason, or reasons, might quell your doubt to the point where you might proceed based on probability. But since a complete removal of doubt is unjustified, you ought not proceed as if you have no doubt at all.

If I were to add anything, I might say a rule presupposes a principle, whereas a habit presupposes an interest.

Another way to look at it is, a rule is reducible to a principle from which a corresponding behavior is obliged to follow, but a habit is not reducible to any principle, which permits habit to be merely a matter of convenience with arbitrary benefit. — Mww

I like this. I think that a principle is something particular, we might say that it's an object, but an interest is more general, directing one's attention in a more general way rather than in a specific or definite way like a rule.

Also, a rule presupposes a language for its expression. That which the rule expresses by means of language must already be given before the rule or the language, otherwise the expression has no content, therefore cannot stand as a rule. — Mww

Right, I think this is the important point here. And to relate this to what I say above, it is this expression in language which gives the principle, or rule its particularity and this is its existence as a thing. That's what I told S, in the question about abstraction. An abstraction only exists as a thing, if there is a symbol. The symbol is what allows the abstraction to have actual existence as a thing. One might try to separate the principle or rule, from the language which expresses it, like one might try to separate the abstraction from the symbol which represents it, but there is no sense to this unless we allow that the symbol is prior to the principle represented, and then what is the symbol at that time before it represents something? It can't be said to be a symbol.

So this is a dilemma which leaves us with no choice but to say that the rule or principle cannot exist independently of the symbol which is said to represent it. Then the rule cannot exist independently of its symbolization. But this allows that language might exist prior to principles or rules, but this language would have to consist of something other than symbols, the words could not be called symbols. That is because it would not be proper to say that the language symbolizes, or represents anything, because if it did it would be rules or principles, being symbolized or represented, and we've already denied that possibility.

So you'd agree that being a convention isn't sufficient to be a rule? — Terrapin Station

Right, "convention" is a rather broad term. In one sense "convention" may refer to a rule, but in another sense it might refer to a custom which is not a rule. So not every convention qualifies to be a rule.

I don't know what you would mean by "absolute doubt". To me, an absolute is an ideal, and the ideal is "certainty", and certainty excludes doubt. So "absolute doubt" appears contradictory. In the context of absolutes, doubt is relative, relative to certainty which is the ideal, the absolute. "Absolute doubt" would be like "absolute evil". In the context of absolutes, "good" is the ideal, the absolute, and "evil" only has meaning insofar as something is deficient in relation to that absolute. But it would be contradictory to make "evil" the absolute because this would make it equivalent to "good", both being the absolute.

So the question for you. If we exclude the ideal, "certainty" from being the absolute, deny that certainty is absolute, doesn't this open the door to doubt as the absolute? The issue being whether or not an absolute is necessary. Wittgenstein denies the ideal, "certainty", but can he deny the absolute? If not, then the absolute may be what is left by the exclusion of certainty, and that is doubt. So "absolute doubt" is very real if we cannot dispose of the need for an absolute.

According to normal usage conventionally established patterns of behavior are rules. — Janus

That's not true. There are many conventionally established patterns of behaviour which are not rules. Are you familiar with "customs", and "mores"? "Rules" can be used to refer to some patterns of behaviour, but not all, depending on whether or not we have apprehended a principle which the behaviour conforms to.

Think of the road rule: drive on the left hand side of the road (in Australia). If one consistently drives on the left hand side of the road merely on account of following what everyone else does; that is following a rule. — Janus

That's a stated rule though.

Standing in queues is another example. — Janus

in some cases standing in the queue is a rule, in other cases it is not, and people just do it as their pattern of behaviour.

I have shown that rules are prior to, are not dependent on, and also underpin language. The point of your claim that an unformulated rule is not a rule is apparently to support a further claim that "rules are created by language". This is nonsense, since rules are created by people not by language, and even animals have rules and hierarchies that determine customary behaviors. — Janus

I never said anything yet about how a rule is "created". I said that language is necessary for the existence of a rule, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about rules existing prior to language. You clearly have a completely different idea of what a rule is than I do, and I think that your idea is counterproductive to understanding the reality of rules.

Language itself is a customary behavior. Whether you call these pre-linguistic customary behaviors "rules" or not doesn't change the fact that they exist and determine linguistic, as well as moral, behavior. — Janus

This is exactly why your notion of "rule" is counterproductive. When you characterize these customary behaviours as instances of obeying rules, instead of as instances of habitual behaviour, you produce an inaccurate description. Under your description you have "the fact that they [the rules] exist". because you assume as a fact, that these rules exist. Therefore, to understand these customary behaviours you will proceed to seek those rules. Under my description there are no such rules, and customary behaviours are habits of free willing human beings. Therefore to understand these customary behaviours I will seek to understand the habits of free willing human beings. From my perspective, your approach could be nothing more than a waste of time and resources, seeking non-existent rules.

That's a good point in that there's a lot of conventional behavior that people do not condone. For example, it's a convention to acquire alcohol and drink in excess at parties organized by high schoolers. Is that thus a rule? It has to be if being conventional is sufficient to be a rule. — Terrapin Station

One reason why I think it is a very good idea to distinguish habits from rules is to see that each of these two actually have a very different nature. The nature of a habit is that it arises from the choices of a freely choosing being. The nature of a rule is that it is designed to curb those choices, those habits which have been determined as bad. Consider that a lot of what the freely choosing being learns, is learnt through trial and error. By the time that the freely choosing being learns that a particular type of choice is an error, that choosing pattern may already be habitual. Then rules are needed to restrict that choosing pattern.

This is what you have a burden to demonstrate without begging the question, as you are want to do. — S

I can give you countless examples of rules which exist in the form of language, and could not exist without language to express them. In order to disprove my inductive conclusion, that rules require language to express them, you need to present some rules which do not require language to express them, or demonstrate how the rules which we express in language could exist without language. Otherwise you might reject my inductive conclusion, but your rejection is rather meaningless. And, an inductive conclusion is based in observation and reason, it is not a matter of "begging the question" as you are wont to say.

I have some questions for you. What do think an abstraction is? And do you think that an abstraction is composed of language? — S

An abstraction requires language, because a symbol is required to represent the thing abstracted. Otherwise the thing abstracted has no presence, and there is no such thing as the abstraction. You are using "abstraction" as a noun, not a verb.

I make lots of mistakes, that's not really relevant except to show that doubt is always called for. The point is that Wittgenstein's epistemology is incoherent. His ontology of rules necessitates doubt. There cannot be absolute certainty in understanding, he excludes Ideals, rendering absolute certainty as impossible. Then he proceeds in his epistemology as if there could be a situation which leaves no room for doubt. He seeks to ground his epistemology in the Ideal (the exclusion of doubt) which he has already designated as impossible.

When the absolute is excluded, then certainty can only be a function of probability. We can name some arbitrary degree of probability, and claim that at this level of probability doubt is excluded, but this claim that doubt is excluded at this arbitrary level, cannot be justified because of that arbitrariness. The arbitrary level of probability could be one in a thousand, one in a million, whatever; and we could take each lottery ticket, and claim that without a doubt this ticket is a loser, but at the end of the day, one of the tickets wins, so those claims are not justified.

The point being that the exclusion of doubt is inherently incompatible with Wittgenstein's ontology. That's why he's "written a great fat book going into it in exhaustive detail from every possible angle with many many examples". He's trying to do the impossible, and he could continue that great fat book to infinite fatness without success. Not even the principle of plenitude could save him because instead of leaving absolute certainty as a possibility, he has denied it as impossible.

As I said above, I have no problem with this ontology, I think it's strong. But we need to accept the ramifications, and principally this is that doubt cannot be excluded. Consider doubt to be a natural product of the physical constitution of the human being; that physical constitution disallows the possibility of absolute certainty, therefore the claim that doubt can be excluded cannot be justified.

What sort of a reason? — Luke

Any reason. You might think, I've seen this type of sign before, and I've learned what it means, therefore I know what this one means. You might think, someone has explained to me this type of sign, and told me what it means, therefore I know what this one means. Perhaps your reason is even some sort of superstition, or intuition. The point is that having a reason quells your doubt, allowing you to decide, and proceed. But removing your doubt with respect to the meaning of the sign, no matter what the reason is, does not justify the claim that there is now no room for doubt.

Language is not merely an individual habit, but a collectively evolved and utilized system. Of course there are patterns of usage, but without those there would be no language. Those patterns are equivalent to rules; they reflect the communally shared ways of doing things with language which have become established by convention. — Janus

As I said in my post that you rejected as "empty tendentious assertions", we can learn habits from others. This is not an empty assertion, it has been proven by observation. We copy the actions of others, it is one way of learning how to do things.

Also, a pattern is not equivalent to a rule. Patterns are described by rules, and there is a reason for a pattern. For instance, meteorologists study weather patterns, and assume reasons for the patterns, and describe the patterns with rules. But a pattern is not a rule, because a pattern is an observable arrangement of order, and a rule is the principle which the order conforms to. Do you apprehend this difference?

These communally shared ways of doing things with language are effectively rules, whether or not they are explicitly recognized as such. The 'chess' example I gave, where someone could learn to play chess, that is to follow its rules, by imitation, without actually explicitly formulating those rules shows the same thing. Rules of etiquette are another example of rules that can be acquired just by imitation without needing any explication. — Janus

Your example does not prove your point. That a person could imitate another who is following a rule, and therefore act as if following the same rule, does not prove that when a person imitates another, that person is following a rule. Imitation is just a matter of repeating what has been observed, it is not a matter of following a rule.

If you want to pedantically say these examples are not 'really' rules; what could that "really" mean, when what I have outlined is in accordance with common usage of the term 'rule'? — Janus

I do not think that what you have said actually is in accordance with common usage of "rule". A rule is a principle, so to learn a rule is to learn a principle. When one person imitates another, that person is copying. To copy another is not to learn the rule, we learn this in grade school. That's why copying is not allowed. We must each learn the rules, the principles involved in what we are being taught, and copying from another does not qualify as learning the rule.

Rule-following, even when it is not made explicit, is ubiquitous in human communal life, and obviously necessary for that life, and that is really the point, whether this social phenomenon is called "rule-following" or not. Even animals do it. — Janus

What are you trying to say here? Are you saying that there is an activity which most people would not call "rule-following" because they do not consider it to actually be rule-following, but it really is rule-following according to your superior knowledge of what rule-following really is? I think you're wrong, imitating and copying each other is not "rule-following". So I'll repeat my tendentious assertion. You need to learn that there is a distinction to be made between activities which are habitual, and activities which are instances of following a rule.

So that while playing can work for a one-night stand, it is a completely inadequate basis for a long-term relationship. That especially is the case if there are children involved. They will see you and they will judge you even if your wife does not. — Ilya B Shambat

Would you say then, that "playing" is a validly ethical activity if the man is interested only in one night stands? The way you describe it, playing only seems to take on the characteristics of being an unethical, deceptive activity, if the man uses it in an attempt to produce a long term relationship, and playing for the sake of one night stands is not unethical because the deception is not there.

If you produce an argument that addresses any of what I have written, I'll consider responding, otherwise I will ignore you. MU. — Janus

OK. I'll give it another go then.

For example, the so-called rules of grammar were operative long before anyone analyzed actual language usage and explicitly formulated them. — Janus

This is simply false. It may be the case, that people were using language in identifiable ways or patterns, prior to the formulation of "rules of grammar", but this in no way means that the rules of grammar were operative at this time. Language use is an habitual behaviour, and habits are not based in rules. That people can come along and formulate rules which reflect those habits, does not mean that the rules were operative as the cause of those habits. A habit is not necessarily formed by someone obeying a rule, so it is an invalid conclusion to say that habitual behaviour such as linguistic habits are cases of rules being operative. And your claim that the rules of grammar were operative before anyone formulated the rules of grammar is false.

The whole point is that one does not need a reason not to doubt, but a reason to doubt. — unenlightened

This is clearly not the case. Our natural approach to all circumstances is to consider possibilities. And, the nature of possibility makes doubt natural, whereas certainty is only created by subjecting possibilities to the principles of probability. Therefore the reasoning of probability gives us reason not to doubt. But without probabilities we are presented with possibilities and no certainty, so doubt is natural. Doubt is fundamental, and reason is needed to exclude doubt.

If I notice the ground around the post is disturbed, or the paint is still wet, then I might have a reason to doubt - I don't need a reason not to doubt that the sign post is doing its job. — unenlightened

The job of the sign-post is to direct you in the intended direction. You are the person reading the sign. You need a reason to believe that you are reading the sign correctly, otherwise you are unsure as to whether you are reading the sign correctly (doubt). Doubt as to the intent of the sign-post, is the natural state when you approach the sign-post, unless you have a reason to believe that you know how to understand the sign. If you have such a reason you can proceed from the sign-post without doubt. Without such a reason there will be nothing conclusive within your mind, that you are reading the sign-post correctly, and doubt as to how to read the sign will be pervasive.

Now let's say that you have good reason to believe that you know how to read this type of sign correctly, you have much experience with this type of sign. You assume that your understanding of this sign, under "normal circumstances" gives you no reason to doubt. But what if the person who posted the sign doesn't follow the same conventions as you, and planted the sign in a backward way, or the sign has been tampered with as you allude to as a possibility, making the circumstances "not normal". If you approach these signs with the certainty that you know how to read this type of sign correctly, you will not doubt your capacity, and you will not notice that the circumstances are abnormal, until after you make your mistake. If you approach these signs with uncertainty, doubt, then the probability that you will notice an abnormal situation will be greatly increased.

The possibility of a "not-normal" situation creates the possibility of a mistake in understanding. The goal is to avoid mistakes in understanding. This requires that we doubt the normalcy of every situation. If we are inclined to assume that the situation is normal, because there is a high probability that the situation will be normal, and therefore we do not doubt the normalcy of the situation in each instance, then when the improbable "not normal" situation occurs, it will slip past our attention and mistake will occur.

Have you ever worked in a factory with multiple levels of safety precautions? You would think that one simple form of safety precaution would be adequate. But no, we tend to let down our guard with respect to one level of safety precaution, assuming to be certain that we would apprehend the not-normal circumstance, and a mistake would not be made, and so the second level of safety precaution is required to save us when we fail to apprehend the not normal situation.

Neither does activity between the sperm and the egg. Everything what man does and what sperm "does" and what woman does and what egg "does" is part of causal chain. And not one of those is the root cause, which is prior to man, and woman, and sperm, and egg. — Henri

Well that's not the case, a lot of things are unrelated and some are incidental. We are looking for a causal chain for the existence of the baby, examining to determine whether it is internal or external. We follow the sperm and the egg, and see where they come from. Exactly what the man and woman are doing, is incidental, so long as the egg and sperm are brought together and supported under the right conditions. I agree that external factors play an important role as causal factors, what we are arguing though is your denial of internal causes.

I was talking about an action of eternal being, not the cause of eternal being. So we can say, in keeping the theme of root cause, that the root cause of an action of eternal being is eternal being, and not something prior to eternal being. If one wants to say that there is actually no root cause, or no cause, of an action of eternal being, that's ok too. Eternal being is different category of being than us, so some translation of terms is necessary one way or the other. — Henri

I don't follow you. Before you seemed to be talking about a cause of eternal being, which I explained is contradictory. Now you are talking about "an action of eternal being". But it's not clear to me what you mean by this. First, this requires the assumption of "eternal being". I believe that "eternal being" refers to something which never ever changes in time. If it changed, it would become other than what it was, and therefore be a different being. So it's arguably the case that eternal being cannot change and therefore it is also contradictory to talk about an action of eternal being. So I am really not following what you mean by "an action of eternal being".

Your point is that you're being unreasonable? We agree for once! — S

Wow, your (dim) wit never ceases to amaze me. It would be unreasonable for me to expect you to do anything else. But that something else is what is required of you to support your claims. So it would be unreasonable for me to expect that you could support your claims. You seemed to recognize this as well, in which case we would have agreement.

As you honestly don't seem to understand, I've thought of an example to elucidate. Every morning when I leave the house I have a little routine of chores that I do outside before I go to work. One of the things I do is to feed some cats outside, so I bring a little plastic bag with some cat food. So under "normal circumstances" when I go out the door I am carrying a little bag of cat food. But some times I'm bringing other things, or I'm distracted talking to someone, or thinking about philosophy, and I forget the cat foot, so this is an "abnormal circumstance". Now, when I'm going out the door, it clearly makes sense to doubt myself in the abnormal circumstances, before I proceed, because then I will notice that I've forgotten something. Also, it appears like it doesn't make sense to doubt myself before proceeding in the normal circumstances, because that doubting would be a useless waste of time. However, I will never know whether the circumstances are normal circumstances or abnormal circumstances, unless I doubt. So it actually does make sense to doubt myself every time I go out the door, in order to distinguish the normal situations from the abnormal situations.

Compare this to understanding the sign-post, or another person's use of language. Under normal circumstances I have a correct and adequate understanding of what the other person is saying. It is an abnormal circumstance if my understanding is mistaken. In the abnormal circumstances, when my understanding is mistaken, it clearly makes sense to doubt my understanding. And, it appears like it doesn't make sense to doubt my understanding in the normal circumstances when my understanding is correct and adequate. However, this appearance is an illusion created by the way that the situation is being described. In reality, I cannot determine whether the circumstances are normal or abnormal without doubting. Therefore, if we base whether doubting is justified or not, on a determination of normal or abnormal circumstances, doubting is always justified because this determination requires doubt.

In other words, one cannot avoid doubt by judging the normalcy of the circumstances, because the very premise which produces the need for that judgement, the possibility that the circumstances might be abnormal, itself justifies doubt.

No I'm not. I'm saying it doesn't make sense at all, to me to you, or to Norman the Norm. — unenlightened

It makes sense to me. Every moment I live from day to day is different from the last. How would I say that the circumstances at one moment are normal, but the circumstances at another moment are not normal?

You can accuse me of this, but not Wittgenstein. He's "just" written a great fat book going into it in exhaustive detail from every possible angle with many many examples. Me, I'm about ready to make with the poker already. — unenlightened

Have you read "On Certainty"? If he takes it for granted that "normal circumstances" requires no further explanation, then his epistemology has a big problem. The problem with "many many examples", is that each example is different, so the more examples that one produces the more evidence one gives, that "normal circumstances" is incomprehensible. If it requires normal circumstances to exclude doubt, then doubt will never be excluded because circumstances are never normal.

It's expressed in the quote. It's unreasonable for you to expect me to do anything else here. How can I show you without expressing it? You're basically asking me to express it without expressing it, which is obviously an unreasonable request. — S

Right, that's my point. A rule can only exist as expressed by language. The rule requires language for it's existence, it is dependent on language. Therefore language is prior to rules, as required for the existence of rules, and it is impossible that language depends on rules.

The antecedent in your conditional is false. — S

If you think that it is false that a rule can only exist as expressed in language, then the onus is on your to give evidence of this. You said above, that this is an unreasonable request. It is not, an unreasonable request. You are claiming X is false, and the request is for evidence to back up your claim that X is false. If you cannot show me a rule which is not expressed in language, then it is your claim, that X is false, which is unreasonable.

You know how babies are made. There is a specific action man does to a woman, before sperm even comes into contact with the egg. That action is part of the process of making you, and you are at that time non-existent. — Henri

Yes, now what is the proper "cause" of existence of that baby? Is it the internal activity which happens within the sperm and the egg, or is it the external activity which happens between the man and the woman. Notice that the activity between the man and the woman doesn't necessarily produce a baby.

If a being is eternal, cause is internal, within that being. — Henri

This is incorrect. If a being is eternal, then it does not have a cause. So it is contradictory to say that an eternal being has an internal cause.

So if this idealized notion of exactness (transcendental exactness, we might even call it), isn't appropriate, what notion of exactness is? Well, Witty says, it depends on what you're trying to do with the 'exactness' in question: §88: "what is inexact attains its goal less perfectly than does what is more exact. So it all depends on what we call “the goal”. So if I just want to be able to find you after i get back from my toilet break, 'stay roughly here' will more or less suffice for that goal. There's no need to get any 'deeper' (just as it's not inexact "when I don’t give our distance from the sun to the nearest metre, or tell a joiner the width of a table to the nearest thousandth of a millimetre"). — StreetlightX

What he does here is replace "the ideal" with "the goal". The degree of exactitude required in any particular circumstance is relative to "the goal". Therefore exactitude is defined in relation to practise, rather than defining it in relation to a theoretical "ideal". Again, this is a rejection of platonic dialectics. Plato would position "the goal", as the ideal, such that the ultimate goal is the ideal, and any particular instance of "a goal", would only have meaning in relation to the absolute, the ideal.

His example of time is quite powerful. We can measure time by seconds, we can measure time by nanoseconds, or whatever, each giving a different level of exactitude for a different purpose. And there is no "ideal' or absolute exactness in relation to time, which we could strive for as a goal, as relativity theory has removed this.

No, that's exactly what I don't need to explain, because that is exactly what I have just explained it doesn't make sense to ask for further explanation of. — unenlightened

All you are saying is that my inability to understand what you mean by "normal circumstances" doesn't make sense to you. That's fine, I'll just go on my merry way, bringing my lack of understanding with me. But no matter how much you insist that it doesn't make sense for me to ask for further explanation, my lack of understanding will continue to exist until you provide for me a satisfactory explanation. You cannot make a person's lack of understanding disappear simply by insisting that the person's questioning doesn't make sense to you.

That's the whole problem with Wittgenstein's approach to doubt. If a person has doubt, then that doubt can only be removed by answering the person's questions, and providing appropriate explanations for that person. You cannot just tell the person, your doubt doesn't make sense to me, therefore it is unreasonable doubt, and assume that this will make the doubt nonexistent.

The answer to, 'how would you know ...?' is 'why would you ask ...? And you might have a good reason for asking, for thinking things might not be normal. — unenlightened

Yes, I had good reason for asking. You used the phrase "normal circumstances", so I asked for an explanation, how would I know if the circumstances are normal or not. This is what Wittgenstein is investigating at 87, such explanations. Is there is a way to end the possibility of infinite regress of explanations required to ensure that one does not misunderstand? Yes, there is an end he says, but this end only exists under "normal circumstances". But if "normal circumstances" itself needs further explanation, then this is not a real solution to the problem.

But you have to bring that forward before your question makes sense, otherwise it becomes one of those endlessly repeating games. How would you know you are asking a sensible question? — unenlightened

Actually, the onus is on you. When you use language, it is always respectable for the hearer to ask for clarification, so such a question (how would you know whether the circumstances are normal or not?) always makes sense. It makes sense because the hearer is asking in order to avoid misunderstanding. It always makes sense to ask for clarification in order to avoid misunderstanding. And, it is disrespectful, and doesn't make sense to automatically assume that the asker is playing an endless repeater game.

If you happen to believe that under "normal circumstances", it does not make sense to ask for clarification of a statement, in order to avoid misunderstanding, then you need to explain how one would know whether the circumstances are normal or not, in order to avoid asking for clarification (in an effort to avoid misunderstanding), in times when it doesn't make sense to ask for clarification..

For example, the so-called rules of grammar were operative long before anyone analyzed actual language usage and explicitly formulated them. So a rule is certainly not merely the statement of it. — Janus

I don't believe this, I think you're fabricating again. How could there be a rule which was not formulated? There's no such thing as an unformulated rule, it couldn't exist as a rule if it wasn't formulated. What form would the rule have, if it were unformulated? It could have no form because that form would be a formulation of the rule. And if it didn't have any form, how could it exist? Saying that a rule exists before it is formulated is like saying that a thing exists before it exists. It's pure nonsense.

Rules of grammar are stated. If they're not stated, they do not exist as rules of grammar. You need to distinguish habits of language use from rules. Just because a person is in the habit of doing something in a particular way, (e.g. I am in the habit of calling this thing a "laptop"), this does not mean that the person is following a rule. Furthermore, people learn habits from each other, through observation and experience, without referring to rules. Rules are created to curb habits. So the habits exist before the rules relating to those habits, are produced. You ought not confuse these two, thinking that people acting in a similar habitual way, are following a rule.

I'm not getting you. What's "a rule" other than the statement, do this under these circumstances, or do that under those circumstances? To understand what the words mean is one thing, but it's not the rule. The rule is the statement itself.

The line is somewhere short of "absolute certainty". — unenlightened

Right, so how would you know whether the circumstances are normal or not, to know whether you ought to doubt your reading or not? What even constitutes "normal circumstances"?

The point though, is that "leave no room for doubt" (85) implies absolute certainty, whereas "under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose" (87) implies something other than absolute certainty. And, since we are talking about the rules (sign-posts) which are foundational to knowledge and understanding, the epistemological difference is significant, depending on which of these two, one chooses to believe.

The latter, "somewhere short of 'absolute certainty'", is what I believe to be the true description. However, in "On Certainty", Wittgenstein proceeds in an attempt to justify some sense of the phrase "it is certain that...", and this is a falling back onto the ideal, 'absolute certainty', which he is here, in his description, trying to dispatch.

I just did. It's there in what you quoted. — S

Where's the rule? I don't get it. I don't see it.

A rule expressed in language is indeed a rule expressed in language. — S

Right, so I'll repeat the point. If rules only exist as expressed in language, then rules are created by language. Therefore language is prior to rules, as a cause of existence of rules, and rules are not required for language.

No, these are all just rules. There's a rule that this new variation is to be called an "apple", there's a rule that "apple" in this instance isn't to be taken literally. Show me something where I can't give you the rule. — S

What rules? Show us one of these rules.

All the rules which I know of are expressed with language, so it takes language to make a rule, as far as I understand "rule". If this is the case, then the existence of language cannot rely on rules, because language is required to make rules.

Of course, Wittgenstein's empirical explanation is doubtful, and most likely incorrect, as I explained above. Instead of describing "explanation" as an effort to minimize the probability of misunderstanding, thus minimizing the degree of doubt, to the point where we can safely proceed, he characterizes it at 85 as leaving "no room for doubt". This difference between excluding the possibility of misunderstanding (W's description at 85), and minimizing the probability of misunderstanding (what I believe is the true description, at 87), is significant epistemologically.

This passage at 85: "So I can say, the sign-post does after all leave no room for doubt." is inconsistent with this passage at 87: "The sign-post is in order—if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose." The latter "if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose", is inconsistent with "no room for doubt".

Your DNA didn't exist until it was set by a process external to you. Just because your DNA is very similar to the DNA of your parents, you are not your parents and there was no you until you were conceived by them, which is a process external from you, since you didn't even exist at the initiation of conception. Or is it something else? — Henri

I don't understand why you would call this process "external from you". Weren't you internal to your mother, in her womb? That was you in there, in that act of conception, and all those processes going on, which you say, "set' your DNA, were internal to you. When these processes are internal like that, it doesn't make sense to refer to them as "external from you".

Why do you think that it's more rational to think of the cause of your existence as something external to you, than to think of it as something internal to you? Consider that the self, the "being", is a very specific spatial-temporal perspective, and internal/external are spatial terms. It does not make sense to restrict "cause" to necessarily external, when causes could equally be internal. And, if you can separate an external cause, as distinct from the thing caused, why not also separate the internal cause as distinct from the thing caused?

If free will is a willful act of a conscious being which ultimately originates within that being, then a being has to be eternal, without being created at certain point in time, in order to have free will. — Henri

This is a mistaken premise because it assume that a "cause" must be external to a being. That it is mistaken is evident from Newton's first law, inertia. Newton takes inertia for granted, as if there is no cause of it. However, once you accept the reality that mass is the cause of inertia, then mass is an internal cause, the cause of a body's inertia. And if you accept the reality of an internal cause, then the premise stated here is false.

Originating cause of your existence is definitely something external to you. Do you disagree with that? — Henri

No I don't agree with that.

Do you claim that originating cause of your existence is yourself? Then you are the one to prove such claim. — Henri

No, I wouldn't say that the originating cause of my existence is myself, that would be nonsense. However, it looks far more likely that the originating cause of my existence is something internal to me, rather than something external to me. There is no reason to conclude that if I am not the cause of my own existence, then the cause of my existence must be something external to me, because something internal to me is another possibility. And, the evidence points to the internal.

How did first sperm and ovum come into existence? How does continuity of DNA exist? How does process that allows for DNA to exist exist? — Henri

Need I point out, that these processes are internal processes, not external processes?

But that's not possible since we are not eternal beings, but beings who were created at certain point in time. So, nothing can ultimately originate within us. — Henri

The situation is not so simple, as Terrapin explains. If you say that human beings were created at a certain point in time, and insist that the originating cause of our existence is not something "within" us, then to justify this you need to show that the originating cause of our existence is definitely something external to us, and not something which is within us.

When man's sperm meets woman's egg, it can start a process that results in human being. But if sperm meets anything other than woman's egg, nothing will result from it. Why? Because reality is already set in a way to produce new thing in first case, and nothing in second. — Henri

This does not suffice, because it is what is within the sperm and the ovum which are responsible for the existence of the human being, and there is a continuity of DNA through the process. So you haven't shown an external cause of existence yet.

Yes, I reject all premises you erroneously believe to be reasonable, and go by my own premises, which actually are reasonable. — S

OK, I think I've satisfactorily proven my case. Yours is a metaphysics of extreme selfishness. It's reducible to solipsism: "I am the only authority".

I understand and agree with all of this.

To be moral depends on the true existence of the Ideal ethic. This is aspirational, is it not?

“... if there is such a thing remains in the realm of not yet understood.”

There’s two things there: a) is it real?, and b) if it is real it’s not yet understood.

If it’s real, from where does it come?
If it’s not real, then who are we?
If there was no Ideal ethic then we would be immoral creatures because there would be nothing to chose from.

But we don’t know if we are moral creatures, because we don’t know if the Ideal ethic exists. Is that true? — Brett

In response to these questions, this is what I believe.

If the Ideal is real, it must be immanent within us, and this would be what you call innate. It would have to be within us due to its nature as an idea. It appears to us as an idea, something within, not as a physical object which is what is external to us. This is supported by the two senses of "moral" which I referred to. In the one sense, we are moral in so far as our actions conform to the ethics of our society. These codes are external to us. But the inconsistency between the various ethics, differences in those external codes, and the problems caused by those differences, drives us to seek the Ideal, as the basis for compromise, or reconciliation of the differences. This requires review, and renewed understanding of the formal principles which make up the ethics. This is a turning inward, to understand the ideas and ideologies. So the Ideal is how we relate to the necessity for consistency, or coherency of ideas, and this must come from within thought itself.

If the Ideal is not real, then understanding would be very difficult. There would be many differences in ethics, ideologies, and inconsistencies in knowledge. And here's what I think is the problem. Empirical evidence demonstrates that all these factors which would be the case if the Ideal were not real, actually are the case. So empirical evidence points to the Ideal as not real. But the Ideal is only apprehended by the desire to go beyond the empirical realm, and accept the reality of something non-empirical, ideas. So it is as you say, aspirational. What inspires us to act, is the desire to bring into existence something which is presently non-existent. This is the creativity of art. So the "aspirational", and this includes inspiration, ambition, motivation, and the Ideal in general, is what has no empirical existence. Therefore despite the fact that empirical evidence cannot support the existence of the Ideal these human emotions do support its reality.

Whether or not we could be moral creatures, without the reality of the Ideal is a difficult question for me, which doesn't really make sense. I think that we must be, on the basis of the first definition of "moral", which places morality in relation to human ethics. So we could still judge morality based on those principles if there was no Ideal. The problem is that we would have no real mechanism for resolving differences without appeal to the Ideal. And the reality is that we are capable of resolving differences, and this is because we assume some sort of Ideal. So we ought to conclude that the Ideal is real, based on that logic. Assumption of an Ideal is necessary to resolve differences, we do resolve differences, therefore the Ideal has real effect in our world, and is real. Following this, we cannot really make any conclusions about "if there was no Ideal", because our world is a world in which the Ideal is real. And since the Ideal is immanent, it must go right to the core of what it means to be alive, so asking that question is like asking what it would be like if there was no life.

Regarding my conversation with S., in this thread, just for the record, that conversation ended by S. being asked what he meant, and being unable to tell what he meant. — Michael Ossipoff

Welcome to the club. That's the history of the thread, in a nutshell.

I think we all know your argument by now. What's the point of repeating it? That reply of yours doesn't progress the debate or engage productively. It merely reasserts premises I rejected ages ago, and anything that follows from rejected premises is irrelevant to my position. — S

Yes, you reject all reasonable premises which could explain what you are talking about, as non-progressive, and assert "there is a rock an hour after all people die", as the only reasonable premise. OK.

It ended with me informing you that I was going to ignore you, because we reached a dead end whereby you kept asking me to do something which is demonstrably unnecessary - provide a definition - and thus a waste of my time, and I had already explained that. The meaning is understood by both of us, but the difference is that I don't pretend otherwise for the sake of pushing some rubbish argument. — S

Whenever someone gets you to the point where your op might begin to appear unreasonable to you, you say, I'm going to ignore you because this does not progress the debate. Nice work.

But post-human rocks are not simple and easily understandable if you actually think about it. — Echarmion

The problem is that S refuses to think about.

§85: "But where does it [the signpost, the rule - SX] say which way I am to follow it; whether in the direction of its finger or (for example) in the opposite one?”

It’s worth recalling that one of the imports of Witty's discussion of of ostension was that ostension is thoroughly differential: the same pointing gesture may point out any number of different things, and that

§30: "An ostensive definition explains the use a the meaning a of a word if the role the word is supposed to play in the language is already clear.”

Similarly, rules too must be understood in a differential manner: what rules ‘do’ depends on the role that rules themselves play in a particular language-game. This differential nature of rules is captured in §85 itself: — StreetlightX

I think it may be appropriate to call this section a "de-interiorizing" of rules. The rule is given a physical presence, it stands there, like a sign-post. So in the case of language, the rule is the physical presence of the words. The rule is not what the sign means to the person who interprets it, it is the sign itself.

I believe that this is an acceptable ontological principle, but if we adhere to this premise, we need to respect the implications. The principal implication, as Wittgenstein points out, is the existence of doubt. If the rules by which we know and understand things, are outside of the mind, not directly accessed by the mind (noumena, in Kant's terms), and what is present to the mind is a representation of the rules (phenomena), then doubt is justified in all of our knowledge and understanding. This is because doubt with respect to the rules by which we know and understand, is itself justified.

The infinite regress which would be created by characterizing 'the rule" as a principle within the mind, is an infinite chain of needing a rule to understand a rule. If the rule is positioned outside of the mind, as Witty does, the "sign-post", then it is not by means of rules that the mind interprets and understands rules, because rules are not within the mind. The mind must have within itself something other than rules by which it understands. But if it is not the case that rules are at the bottom, the foundation, the basis for the mind's understanding, but are something which need to be themselves understood by the mind, using something other than rules, then doubt is a real concern.

Wittgenstein grapples with this problem in "On Certainty" and attempts to establish some principles to contain doubt. He attempts to distinguish between situations where doubt is reasonable, and situations where doubt is unreasonable. The problem with his procedure is that his ontology of rules makes some degree of doubt reasonable in every situation. So we cannot separate doubt from the situation, to say that there are situations where doubt could be excluded, as appears to be Witty's intent in On Certainty. So when he proceeds in this way, he's producing an incoherent epistemology. The kernel of this incoherency is evident at #85

---So I can say, the sign-post does after all leave no room for doubt. Or rather: it sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not. And now this is no longer a philosophical proposition, but an empirical one. — Philosophical Investigations 85

I believe this empirical proposition is false. Instead of describing the sign-post as always leaving some room for doubt, even if it's the most minute, infinitesimal degree of doubt, and each different instance of occurrence having a different degree of doubt, he describes the sign-post as sometimes leaving room for doubt, and sometimes not. The difference between these two descriptions amounts to a substantial epistemological difference.

If the idealist can't even handle a hypothetical scenario of a rock (as defined by the dictionary) after we've died, then that's a big failing for idealism. — S

That there's no one to interpret the dictionary definition of "rock", or the meaning of "rock" in any way,and therefore there is no such thing as "what a rock is", after we all die, is a statement of reality, fact, it is not a failing for idealism. Those who refuse to recognize the reality of this fact simply fail to understand.

Am I asking whether there would be a rock? Yes. — S

Since there would be no such thing as "what a rock is", then it makes no sense whatsoever to ask if there would be a rock. Why is that difficult for you to understand?

The meaning isn't objective in the sense that it never required any subject or subjects at any point previously, because it did: that's how it got a meaning in the first place. But it's objective in the sense that it doesn't need there to be any subject or subjects at the time, or all the time. It simply means what it does, and would continue to do so an hour later, even if we all suddlenly die in five minutes. Once the meaning has been set, it is retained, unless there's any reason for that to change, and no one here, yourself included, has been able to reasonably provide such a reason. They've instead assumed or asserted a reason which is inadmissible. There's an unwarranted link that they make. — S

You point to a rock, you say that's a rock, and voila, it's a rock. Now everyone dies, and time passes. As time passes the world changes, and the thing you pointed to no longer exists as the thing you pointed to because it changes along with the rest of the world. Why would you think that the thing you pointed to and called "rock" would still exist as the thing that you pointed to and called "rock"? Are you denying the reality of change?

But they do, we see it all the time, you know you possess it, so do your friends. It’s not something we make up day to day. — Brett

Yes, I agree with this, it is an objective fact that human beings make these decisions. The issue though, with objective morality, is whether or not there is an objective truth to the correctness or incorrectness of those decisions.

Yes, if those distinctions between good and bad haven’t changed These morals are evolutionary, through a set of preferences that contribute to the wellbeing of a society. They have developed in a singular vein to what they are now. They have not swung off on some crazy tangent then returned to begin again. In modern times there have been cases of cannibalism, and those people tried to conceal what they’d done. In the case of Eichmann, he knew he was transgressing a set of moral, otherwise why run to South America? — Brett

This is where we disagree. I do not agree that those distinctions between good and bad have not changed. Here's the reason why. Each judgement of good or bad made by a human being is either made in relation to a particular situation, or made as a generalized statement. These two are distinct. The former refers to how we proceed in daily life, making decisions about what we are doing, and the latter refers to generalized rules such as it is wrong to trespass; it is wrong to take another person's possessions; it is wrong to kill a human being; etc..

The category of "generalized statement" must have come into existence along with communication, a "statement" being the product of language. We can argue that the statement is just a reflection of the Idea, which existed prior to the statement, in the Platonist manner, and that these Ideas have not changed, as you say. However, we need to bridge the gap between these Ideas (generalized statements) and our day to day decisions of good and bad. Human beings often, (and I'll insist on that term "often", so that it's not just incidental), choose in particular situations, to do something which is contrary to the Idea, the generalized statement of what is good or bad. Do you agree with me, that even if these Ideas (generalized statements) concerning what is good and bad, exist in a timeless, unchanging way, morality consists in conforming day to day human choices to be consistent with these ideas?

So I think, that what has changed, evolved over the time of human existence, is the capacity of human beings to conform their day to day choices to be consistent with the objective "rules of behaviour". And this is what morality is, conforming our day to day behaviour to be consistent with the rules. So whether or not there are objective unchanging "rules of behaviour" is a moot point, in relation to "morality" because "morality" is concerned with the human being's capacity to conform one's behaviour to be consistent with whatever rules of behaviour are apprehended. And, since the capacity to express, and understand these rules of behaviour has undoubtedly progressed as communication has emerged and evolved, so has the human capacity to conform one's behaviour to be consistent with such rules. Therefore morality, being a description of this capacity to be consistent with the rules, rather than being a description of the rules themselves, must have changed considerably over the time of human existence.

Do you really believe you have been taught not to kill, not to rape? Do you really think that’s the reason you don’t? In your life did you ever get a message from anyone that rape was wrong! Did you ever think, at any age, that causing pain to others was okay? It’s not necessary for each and every generation to learn morality all over again from scratch. Not only is it not necessary, it’s unlikely. Our evolution would be too slow, if not actually reaching a dead end. It’s part of you, just like your thumb. — Brett

So the issue is not whether you've been taught that killing, stealing, and raping, are bad, or whether these ideas are innate. The question is whether the habits which help you to avoid making the wrong decisions (with respect to these rules), in your day to day life, are innate or learned.

Only if you can prove they have changed. First you’re suggesting that they’re not objectively true without proving it, you only suggest it might not be true, and then using that claim as a fact to argue the second point, that moral differences exist, as if it was proven. — Brett

So my argument is that our ability to understand these moral Ideas, rules, which are expressed as generalized statements, has changed in accordance with how our ability to communicate has changed. And, our ability to conform our day to day decisions to be consistent with these rules (this is morality), has changed in accordance with our ability to understand these rules.

You begin to partly define “morality’ as the ability to negotiate these differences. Even if it were true that there are moral differences, where does the idea of resolving them come from. If there are such differences that clash why would we feel the need to resolve them without possessing some sense of morality? If it wasn’t morality then what would you call it? If you call it co-operation then I suggest you have to consider where the idea of co-operation springs from. Co-operation requires an understanding of reciprocity, empathy and fairness.

Is your conclusion that there must be differences, there has to be differences, because without those differences to be resolved there would be no morality?

It’s like a trick question; if I agree that there are differences then there can’t be a singular morality, and if I don’t agree to the idea that there are differences then there can’t be a morality. — Brett

I believe that this is an important issue which can only be resolved through a more strict definition of "morality", to avoid equivocation. I suggest we start from the bottom, and define "morality" as concerning the particular choices which one makes in one's day to day activity. The rules which the day to day activity ought to conform with are called "ethics", this is the top, perfection in conforming to the rules, the Ideal.

From one person to another, or from one society to another, there are differences with respect to ethics, the rules. The desire to resolve the differences comes from the assumption of an Ideal ethic, an unchanging law of good and bad, an ethic which is innate within us, such as you describe. We can attribute the differences between us to the differences in our ability to apprehend and understand the Ideal ethic. Without the assumption of an Ideal ethic, I believe there is no inclination to resolve such differences, because there would be no assumed further principle to appeal to in any such attempt. The differences between us would just be considered as a fact of nature.

I described this attempt to resolve such differences as "morality", because these activities fall into the class of day to day activities. However, these activities cannot be said to be consistent with one set of ethics, nor the other set of ethics, because they are intended to resolve differences between the two. So to be "moral" instead of "immoral", these activities rely on the true existence of the Ideal ethic. From one set of ethics, or the other differing set of ethics, the person's actions would appear inconsistent with the rules, and immoral, but in relation to the Ideal ethic, if we allow that there is such, the person's action may be moral. The problem being that all we understand is this or that set of ethics, in the form of statements, and the Ideal if there is such a thing remains in the realm of not yet understood.

"I'm unable to make sense of what you're saying because I'm not interpreting it right" is not a sensible criticism. It's not a criticism at all, it is an admission of failure. — S

The problem here though, is that I've asked you to explain what you mean, in a way that does make sense me, and you've failed to do that. You keep resorting to unconventional and improvised definitions of your terms, which indicates that what you are saying doesn't even make sense to yourself. If you have to improvise fabricated meanings of the words you use, in order to convince yourself that what you are saying makes sense, then it's quite clear that you do not even know what you are trying to say, yourself.

The use of fabricated, improvised, unconventional definitions of your terms indicates that there is a problem with what you are trying to say, the meaning you are trying to purvey, not with my interpretation of what you have said. It's evident that you cannot say what you want to say in a way that makes sense. And it's not just me, but other people have told you that in this thread as well. This is evidence that there is a problem with what you are saying, rather than a problem with my interpretation of it.

All I have to do is point this out, and I've done that here in this comment, and once is enough, so even if you repeatedly make the same error, I would've already dealt with it. — S

To insist "the problem is yours if you can't make sense of what I am saying", is pure selfishness. There is no point to even trying to communicate with an attitude like that.

Here's the problem, see if you can resolve the problem in a way that makes sense. How can there be such a thing as "what a rock is", or "what an hour is", if there are no human beings with those ideas? And if there is no such thing as 'what a rock is", when all the people are dead, it doesn't make sense to speak as if there is. If you admit to "Platonic Realism", under this ontology there is an Idea of "Rock", and an Idea of "Hour", independent of human existence, I will accept this as a reasonable explanation.

This is not too far form free will, either. If one follows a rule is one acting freely? — Banno

I explained this earlier, one may freely choose to follow a rule. The more relevant question would be whether one could act freely without following a rule. Could something which does not follow a rule be an act at all?

So go look at the Wiki argument on private language. I wrote much of it, anyway. — Banno

That's why we're best to avoid getting our information from Wikipedia, it's very unreliable.