The line is somewhere short of "absolute certainty". — unenlightened
Right, so how would you know whether the circumstances are normal or not, to know whether you ought to doubt your reading or not? What even constitutes "normal circumstances"? — Metaphysician Undercover
The answer to, 'how would you know ...?' is 'why would you ask ...? And you might have a good reason for asking, for thinking things might not be normal. — unenlightened
But you have to bring that forward before your question makes sense, otherwise it becomes one of those endlessly repeating games. How would you know you are asking a sensible question? — unenlightened
If you happen to believe that under "normal circumstances", it does not make sense to ask for clarification of a statement, in order to avoid misunderstanding, then you need to explain how one would know whether the circumstances are normal or not, in order to avoid asking for clarification (in an effort to avoid misunderstanding), in times when it doesn't make sense to ask for clarification. — Metaphysician Undercover
So if this idealized notion of exactness (transcendental exactness, we might even call it), isn't appropriate, what notion of exactness is? Well, Witty says, it depends on what you're trying to do with the 'exactness' in question: §88: "what is inexact attains its goal less perfectly than does what is more exact. So it all depends on what we call “the goal”. So if I just want to be able to find you after i get back from my toilet break, 'stay roughly here' will more or less suffice for that goal. There's no need to get any 'deeper' (just as it's not inexact "when I don’t give our distance from the sun to the nearest metre, or tell a joiner the width of a table to the nearest thousandth of a millimetre"). — StreetlightX
No, that's exactly what I don't need to explain, because that is exactly what I have just explained it doesn't make sense to ask for further explanation of. — unenlightened
All you are saying is that my inability to understand what you mean by "normal circumstances" doesn't make sense to you. — Metaphysician Undercover
You can accuse me of this, but not Wittgenstein. He's "just" written a great fat book going into it in exhaustive detail from every possible angle with many many examples. Me, I'm about ready to make with the poker already.You cannot just tell the person, your doubt doesn't make sense to me, — Metaphysician Undercover
No I'm not. I'm saying it doesn't make sense at all, to me to you, or to Norman the Norm. — unenlightened
You can accuse me of this, but not Wittgenstein. He's "just" written a great fat book going into it in exhaustive detail from every possible angle with many many examples. Me, I'm about ready to make with the poker already. — unenlightened
one cannot avoid doubt by judging the normalcy of the circumstances, because the very premise which produces the need for that judgement, the possibility that the circumstances might be abnormal, itself justifies doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover
The whole point is that one does not need a reason not to doubt, but a reason to doubt. — unenlightened
If I notice the ground around the post is disturbed, or the paint is still wet, then I might have a reason to doubt - I don't need a reason not to doubt that the sign post is doing its job. — unenlightened
The possibility of a "not-normal" situation creates the possibility of a mistake in understanding. The goal is to avoid mistakes in understanding. This requires that we doubt the normalcy of every situation. If we are inclined to assume that the situation is normal, because there is a high probability that the situation will be normal, and therefore we do not doubt the normalcy of the situation in each instance, then when the improbable "not normal" situation occurs, it will slip past our attention and mistake will occur. — Metaphysician Undercover
Doubt as to the intent of the sign-post, is the natural state when you approach the sign-post, unless you have a reason to believe that you know how to understand the sign. If you have such a reason you can proceed from the sign-post without doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover
What sort of a reason? — Luke
When the absolute is excluded, then certainty can only be a function of probability. — Metaphysician Undercover
So the question for you. If we exclude the ideal, "certainty" from being the absolute, deny that certainty is absolute, doesn't this open the door to doubt as the absolute? — Metaphysician Undercover
The point is that having a reason quells your doubt, allowing you to decide, and proceed. But removing your doubt with respect to the meaning of the sign, no matter what the reason is, does not justify the claim that there is now no room for doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover
No. If I am certain, I have no doubt. If I am doubtful, I am uncertain. But since these are both frames of mind, I don't even know what it might mean for them to be absolute. — unenlightened
The point is that having a reason quells your doubt, but removing your doubt does not remove doubt? — Luke
I suppose that if you could exclude all doubt from your mind, you would have absolute certainty. I do not think that this is humanly possible. You mentioned "absolute doubt", so I assume that this would be to exclude all certainty. Why would absolute doubt be a bad thing? An attitude, or "frame of mind" of doubt does not prevent you from proceeding, it simply produces a cautious attitude toward procedures, with due respect for the possibility of mistake. While certitude produces a careless attitude toward procedures, because it inclines disrespect for the possibility of mistake. It appears to me, that to exclude the attitude of certainty (absolute doubt), would be a good thing. — Metaphysician Undercover
I suppose that if you could exclude all doubt from your mind, you would have absolute certainty. I do not think that this is humanly possible. You mentioned "absolute doubt", so I assume that this would be to exclude all certainty. — Metaphysician Undercover
Still, to hold any form of uncertainty—including that of doubt—one must first hold a psychological certainty that some contextually relevant given is real/true. E.g., to be uncertain about whether one forgot a cup on a table, I must first hold a psychological certainty that there is a reality/truth to whether or not the cup is presently on the table, that there in fact is a table, and so forth. — javra
I could conceivably doubt any of these things, but I couldn't conceivably doubt everything - that is the philosopher's fiction, because one would have to doubt that the words mean what one thinks they mean and so whether one's doubt itself is something or nothing. — unenlightened
It's a debilitating affliction, not a philosophy. — unenlightened
It's a debilitating affliction, not a philosophy.
— unenlightened
That's a matter of opinion. — Metaphysician Undercover
Are you certain that the words mean what you think they mean? — Metaphysician Undercover
Can I be making a mistake, for example, in thinking that the words of which this sentence is composed are English words whose meaning I know? — On Certainty, 158
The ability to doubt is not a reason to doubt. The kind of certainty Wittgenstein appeals to in On Certainty is not indubitable, necessary, or infallible. It is the certainty of our everyday lives. The certainty that I am sitting here typing this. The certainty that I have read On Certainty. — Fooloso4
Now one might invent a situation in which it is possible that I am mistaken about these things, but the more serious and sinister mistake is the philosophical mistake that because such a thing is possible that anything that follows from it disrupts the certainty with which we live and act and think and speak. Descartes' Archimedean point of indubitability is a philosophical illusion. — Fooloso4
You should ask yourself this question, given that you are the one making claims of radical doubt — Luke
Are you certain that your words mean what you think they mean? — Luke
According to you, you cannot be certain what the word "doubt" (or any other word) means, so how can you maintain your argument? — Luke
Just let me be clear here. This "radical doubt" as you call it, is the consequence of Wittgenstein's ontology of rules. I am explaining how this form of doubt is the consequence of his ontology. I am not necessarily supporting this ontology, but it appears to be very forceful, and I see no good reason yet, to reject it — Metaphysician Undercover
No, I am never certain that my words mean what I think they mean. — Metaphysician Undercover
If certainty is not indubitable, necessary, or infallible, then how is it "certainty"? — Metaphysician Undercover
If we accept Wittgenstein's ontology of rules ... — Metaphysician Undercover
... then we ought to face the consequences, that such an attitude of confidence is unjustified ...This is the point, and why I insist Wittgenstein's epistemology is incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover
Why not just say "I am sitting here typing this", and "I have read On Certainty". What does "I am certain" add to these phrases other than an unwarranted air of confidence? — Metaphysician Undercover
Of course it disrupts the certainty with which we act, that's the whole point. — Metaphysician Undercover
If you are fully aware that there is a possibility of mistake in your actions, how is it at all logical for you to proceed with certainty? — Metaphysician Undercover
But as I explained, this does not impede our capacity to act. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is not a "sinister mistake", it is the virtue of prudence. — Metaphysician Undercover
Firstly, it isn't a consequence of Wittgenstein's ontology or position; it is only your misreading. — Luke
That is how we use the term. — Fooloso4
The rules of grammar according to W. are arbitrary. — Fooloso4
That depends on what you think stands as justification. See the discussions of the river banks of knowledge, hinges, and his call for a step like that of relativity in On Certainty. See also what he says about groundlessness. It is not incoherent it describes what terms such as certainty and knowledge actually mean based on their use. Consider scientific knowledge. It does not establish eternal, unchanging truths. It represents how we understand things at present, and that will change over time. — Fooloso4
What makes you think it is unwarranted? — Fooloso4
Really? If you doubt that you are reading this or that your fingers are moving or that their moving is part of your response to what I have said then why do it? Or that is not the right question because you cannot even be certain that you are doing it. — Fooloso4
Once again, the ability to doubt is not a reason to doubt. — Fooloso4
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