Where is a Mind-independent world?
— Corvus

All around us. It existed before us and will exist after us. — RussellA

I don't see it anywhere. Even with binoculars, telescope and magnifying glasses and microscopes, there is no such a thing as a Mind-independent world. There is just the empirical world with the daily objects I see, and interact with. That is the only world I see around me. Nothing else.

If you can see it, can you take a photo of a Mind-independent world, and upload here? :)

Pretty simple, really. If one doesn’t hold with transcendental philosophy, he has no need for things-in-themselves as such. By the same token, though, one can’t hold with some principles of CPR while rejecting others, and at the same time deny the notion of things-in-themselves. — Mww

No one was denying the concept of Thing-in-themselves. But the point was that thing-in-itself is unknowable but thinkable. It is not both unknowable and unthinkable object. Claiming it is both unknowable and unthinkable comes from possible misunderstanding of CPR.

In a world outside these Phenomena are Things in Themselves, which are unknowable, and as unknowable, cannot even be thought about. — RussellA

But what is the point even bringing up a concept that you cannot even think about? Kant's point is that Thing-in-itself is not in the category of sensibility, so it cannot be known. But because of the fact that we have A priori concepts in the categories, we can think about it.

Even if books existed in a Mind-Independent world, as Things in Themselves they would be unknowable, and being unknowable, we couldn't even know whether they existed or not. — RussellA

Where is a Mind-independent world? Again what is the point even talking about something which is unknowable? If it was unknowable, then how did you know it was unknowable?

No, not at all. The empirical object is not the thing-in-itself. Not sure where that came from. The 'empirical' world is the world of phenomenal sense perception. The thing-in-itself is beyond this, and entirely unknowable. — AmadeusD

Maybe from your previous quoted below, you were denying any knowledge of the external world due to the fact the perception happens via perceptual aggregates?

I don't think this is a case, and to my mind, on a re-reading i did delineate out what i'm talking about.

In the most simple terms: Sensory perception is not access to the 'real' world. It is data mediated by the sense organs, and relayed to the brain/mind further mediating our access to it. We can only access our sensory data, via sensory perception. Therefore, we do not have any access to the external world. The 'thing-in-itself' is entirely, and necessarily inaccessible to human sensibility, and therefore, the human mind. My contention with Mww was around whether the thing-in-itself stimulates sensory perception, as an unavoidable inference - and i think this is correct, and your recent comments above this one outline that well imo.

In terms of my comment on 'conceiving', as we have literally no empirical indication of the thing-in-itself we can't conceive it. Where would you even start, to conceive of something you have literally no knowledge, and cannot have any knowledge? Assuming that that, per the above, is the case. — AmadeusD

But then I thought you accepted that is not the case.

TII(unknowable)->Noumenon(merely conceivable)->Phenomenon (actual, as it were)

as we have literally no empirical indication of the thing-in-itself we can't conceive it
— AmadeusD

This comports exactly with the above specifically noting that the thing-in-itself is outside the empirical purview. Nowhere in your quote do i indicate a conflation of the empirical and 'thing in itself'. — AmadeusD

I thought you were saying the empirical world is unknowable, because it is all Thing-in-itself. But that was maybe the claim of @RussellA. I must have been confused between you and @RussellA.

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No one, in any of these comments, has suggested this. — AmadeusD

Did you not say that you cannot conceive or access the empirical world because they are Thing-in-itself?

What are you thinking about when you do this?
Seems entirely incoherent to me. — AmadeusD

Your post below was clearly saying it. I read it again. Was it not?

I don't think this is a case, and to my mind, on a re-reading i did delineate out what i'm talking about.

In the most simple terms: Sensory perception is not access to the 'real' world. It is data mediated by the sense organs, and relayed to the brain/mind further mediating our access to it. We can only access our sensory data, via sensory perception. Therefore, we do not have any access to the external world. The 'thing-in-itself' is entirely, and necessarily inaccessible to human sensibility, and therefore, the human mind. My contention with Mww was around whether the thing-in-itself stimulates sensory perception, as an unavoidable inference - and i think this is correct, and your recent comments above this one outline that well imo.

In terms of my comment on 'conceiving', as we have literally no empirical indication of the thing-in-itself we can't conceive it. Where would you even start, to conceive of something you have literally no knowledge, and cannot have any knowledge? Assuming that that, per the above, is the case. — AmadeusD

In terms of my comment on 'conceiving', as we have literally no empirical indication of the thing-in-itself we can't conceive it. Where would you even start, to conceive of something you have literally no knowledge, and cannot have any knowledge? Assuming that that, per the above, is the case. — AmadeusD

Thing-in-itself is something that you can think about. You can have concepts on the objects that comes up in your mind as the contents of your intuition such as God, souls etc. But you cannot see them in the empirical world. Therefore you cannot know them, but you can think about them.

In contrast to that, you can clearly know the daily objects such as cups and trees and books. You have the concepts, as well as the matching objects in the empirical world.

Saying that Kant said that you cannot know thing-in-itself, therefore you cannot know all the objects in the empirical world such as cups, trees and books, the bent sticks (claimed by RussellA) sounds not making sense.

When I see the book in front of me, I know the book. I know it is in blue colured cover, it is a paperback book, the title of the book is "CPR" by Kant. I cannot be wrong on that. It is the truths I know about the book in front of me. I don't need to worry anything about Thing-in-itself book of CPR. There is no such thing as Thing-in-itself CPR book, but there is a CPR book in front of me.

But God or Soul is different. I know in my intuition via their concepts. But they never appear in my visual perception, or I have never heard them saying or making any noise in real life. Therefore they must be belong to in Noumena and they must be Thing-in-Itself. I can think about God and Souls via the concepts, but I can never know them. This is what Kant meant, I understand.

The OP's arguments seems to be based on a typical anachronism and misunderstanding what Philosophy of Mind is about.

There, in turn, it means a purposeful intentional behavior based on abstractions.
As long as the philosophy of mind does not make use of a sharp and categorically clear approach to the theory of science and instead loses itself in all kinds of irrationalities, it can be called dead. — Wolfgang

The OP clearly seems to think that Philosophy of Mind is a subject that is similar to a Science. Philosophy of Mind is a huge area of subject which encompasses many peripheral areas. Philosophy of Mind is hard to define in its subject and methodology. It would be too simple to think that it can be defined in a few sentences or paragraphs the OP has read in some forum posts for its negative side.
Neuroscience, A.I. and Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics and Logic must all work together as a unified Science or Subject as suggested by Kant in CPR [A838/B866], NKSmith 1933.

A Science cannot be just a pile of collection of data, experiments and hypotheses. It has to be in a well structured Logic as its foundation interconnecting with the other relevant subjects / sciences.

Some negativists might even say, if they were all clearly separate subjects of their own territories, then A.I. would be looked as a subject studied by some commercially minded bunch of soldering iron heads with the computer chips trying to produce human mind mimicking devices to make bunch of money. Neuroscience would be looked as a subject run by bunch of folks with lab gowns playing with the stem cells and neurons staring at them with the microscopes pretending they are studying or looking at the mind. They have nothing much to do with the study of human minds from the negativists' perspectives. But it would be clearly unfair, wrong point of view and invalid claims stemmed from ignorance and gross misunderstanding of the subjects.

The bottom line is that Philosophy of Mind is not a form of Science. It is a subject of its own, which has different scopes, methodologies, topics, aims and logics. Thinking Philosophy of Mind is in the same level as the other Sciences is nonsense and a gross misunderstanding on even what the subject is.

Do you have a reference that says that Kant believes that it is possible to have knowledge of Things in Themselves? — RussellA

Things-in-itself is something that you can think of, not knowable. There is a difference, and you seem to think they are the same. No one was claiming Kant said the Thing-in-itself, something that is knowable.

The discussion goes back to the question of whether, when we perceive a stick in our sensibilities, are we also perceiving the same object external to us in the world. This is something that the Direct Realist would argue is the case. Kant's position is not that of the Direct Realist.

You are still seeing an object external to you when you see the bend stick in the water jug.
— Corvus

Do objects such as "sticks" exist in the empirical world? — RussellA

Due to the above misunderstanding, the misunderstandings just keep going and extending to this.  Kant never denies the existence of physical objects in the empirical world.  The objects must cause / stimulate our sensibility for experience to begin, he said.  That is not denying the objects in the empirical world.

And if something cannot be judged to be either a stick or a branch, then how is it possible to be either a stick or a branch? — RussellA

Where does "if something cannot be judged" come from? It cannot only be judged because you have brought a highly unlikely, suspicious and groundless condition "in the absence of humans", which you must clarify as to what exact the condition means, and your motive for brining the condition into your conclusion.

If the fundamental particles are thought of as "material things", then I agree that "material things" exist in the absence of humans. — RussellA

I am not sure what the fundamental particles actually means in the empirical world objects. It is another big issue for debating whether particles and atoms must be regarded as existence in Metaphysics, or are they just bunch of nonsense terms invented by the SciFi people.

If you had a single particle of the bent stick, would you say that is a part of the bent stick, and it is a stick?

However, I don't agree that "sticks" if thought of as a material thing exists in the absence of humans. I agree that a human can judge whether or not something is a "stick", but in the absence of humans, who or what judges that something is or is not a "stick"? — RussellA

In the absence of humans, sounds a condition that you must clarify before progressing further. Is it the case of humans never existed in history? Or are you talking about the case where humans existed, but one day they have all vanished and disappeared into non-existence? Depending on which case you are talking about, the arguments would go different ways. Which case did you mean?

On the one hand, Kant held that we can never know about Things in Themselves, we can never have knowledge of Things in Themselves. — RussellA

There are different interpretations on this point.

Things in Themselves include everything outside us in the world, meaning that there are not some Things in Themselves that we do have knowledge of whilst there are other Things in Themselves that we cannot have knowledge of. — RussellA

This part seems totally wrong interpretation. Things-in-themselves are for the objects we have concepts, but not the matching physical objects in the empirical world. We can think about it via concepts, but we don't see them in the phenomena. They belong to Thing-in-itself.

My belief is in Neutral Monism, in that what exists in the absence of humans are fundamental particles and fundamental forces in space and time. — RussellA

If you believe in the existence of invisible particles and forces in space and time, then why do you deny the existence of the physical objects such as the bent stick in the empirical world?

The claim that the external world is caused by the internal world is wrong, but that has nothing to do with the capacity for conception. — Mww

Agreed. It sounds like an extreme subjectivism or solipsism.

The aggregate of perception, technically**, is how we come by objects of sensation, which just is the totality of intuition, not conception. The capacity of conception is unlimited, or, more correctly, is limited by productive imagination, which is itself unlimited. Remember “…..I can think whatever I wish…..”.

If you like, you could with justice say what you are capable of knowing is the result of your perceptions in aggregate, insofar as any and all empirical knowledge is of things perceived. — Mww

As long as one's sensibility and understanding works with concept, categories and intuition, one must be perceiving the external world, and making sense of the them acquiring knowledge of the world.
There are various types and levels of knowledge. One can claim to know anything in fact until challenged and clarified what level of knowledge it was, and whether it was true or false knowledge.

Humans can judge when something is a stick and when something is no longer a stick, but in the absence of humans, in the absence of any definition of stick, in the absence of anyone to judge when something is a stick or no longer a stick, what determines when something in the world outside us is a stick or no longer a stick. A god or nature itself? — RussellA

Where humans don't exist, of course, there is no perception, no thoughts. But we can still make logical inference (from the human world), that things keep exist as they have done.

Even in Science, there are cases, when the direct observation and experiments are impossible due to the astronomical distance, impossibility of the physical access (such as the core of the earth) etc. In these circumstances, Scientists can still make their conclusions and theories via logical inferences from the available data and evidence.

what determines when something in the world outside us is a stick or no longer a stick. A god or nature itself?

How can you prove that "sticks" exist in the absence of human thought without using human thought? — RussellA

When absence of human thought, the concept of proof cannot be an agenda. The fact that you have been mentioning about the word "proof" proves that you have been thinking about it, and also the object of your thought. The case that "even if no humans exist" also an idea in your mind, which proves that your thought was engaging in the thought.

Even when no humans exist, all the material things must exist as they have been, and we can say this quite assuredly because we still can think on the case that no humans exist, and all the material things must exist as they do. Because there is no reason why the things and the world stop existing. That is all there is our thought can think of.

The brute fact is that, you know that you exist, think and perceive the objects outside of you. You must trust what you perceive, or you commit yourself to an extreme sceptic and contradiction.

For Kant, a stick in the world outside us is a Thing-in-Itself and therefore unknowable. Being unknowable, it is impossible to judge whether bent or straight. — RussellA

I understand Kant's Thing-in-itself, is not everything outside us in the world. If that was the case, Kant would be an extreme sceptic, who professes everything outside us is unknowable. That would render all our knowledge of external world impossible. In that case, Kant would have been rejected for being an extreme scpetic, and nobody would take him as a serious epistemologist or philosopher. To even suggest that would be a gross misunderstanding of Kant and his philosophy.

First it has to be proved that sticks exist in the world. — RussellA

Isn't your perception of the sticks enough evidence they exist? Do you not trust your own visual perception?

what you are capable or conceiving, is a result of your perceptions in aggregate. Therefore, you are actually entirely unable to access anything about hte 'external' world at all — AmadeusD

It would be better if you could define "capable of conceiving" and "to access anything about the external world". What do you mean by these expressions and ideas? What is it for you to conceive something and access the external world?

For you to suggest that we are unable to access anything in the external world, there must be reason for that, and it seems your definition of "conceiving" and "accessing" might be something different from the ordinary definition of them.

What do you mean by "X exist"?
— Corvus

I see a bent stick. Seeing a bent stick is not proof that bent sticks exist in the world. The bent stick exists as an object in appearance whether or not a bent stick exists as an object in the world. — RussellA

Why is it not? What else do you need for proof that bent sticks exist in the world?

A mountain could weigh a billion tonnes, so it is hardly surprising that the camera doesn't think it has a mountain in its memory card.

Even people only have a representation of a mountain in the minds, not the real thing. That really would be a load on their mind. — RussellA

Your claim that the external world is caused by your internal world is wrong then. You don't have an internal world which weighs a few trillion tons. What you have been calling as your internal world is nothing more than a figment of representation of the world in your mind via your sensibility from the external world.

Kant proposed that we have pure concepts of understanding prior to any possible experience. It would follow that it is the a priori Categories acting on the sensibilities that determine what we experience rather than our sensibilities alone determining what we experience.

For Kant, the experience of seeing a bent stick, the number two or a statue has been determined by the a priori categories acting on the sensibilities rather than by the sensibilities alone. — RussellA

Kant wouldn't have said that.   What Kant would have said is, that even if your sensibility sees a bent stick in the water jug, your category of concepts and understanding (followed by reading the scientific explanation on why the stick looks bent), would come to a proper reasoning on the experience, and judge the stick is straight in actuality, even if it looks bent.

As the world I perceive is only a representation of any world outside me, the world I perceive is an internal world that is not necessarily the same as any world outside me. — RussellA

I find this difficult to follow. It is like saying that you used your camera, and took a photo of the mountain across the field in your town, and then the camera thinks that it has a mountain in its memory card, because it cannot understand why the mountain is out there outside the camera.

The camera concludes the mountain must exist in its memory card inside the camera, but not outside of the camera, because when you switch it on, and view the photo in the memory card inside the camera, it displays the image of the mountain it took. It is very similar story as your claim above. I am not sure if that is a sound argument or thinking.

You are correct to say that the stick that looks bent does not exist in any world outside me, but as I see a bent stick as clear as day, this means that if the bent stick doesn't exist in any world outside me, it must exist as a representation of a world that only exists inside me. — RussellA

If X doesn't exist outside of RussellA, then X must exist inside of RussellA.
This sounds logically unsound. Groundless premise, and unsound conclusion.
If X doesn't exist outside of RA? Under what ground do you claim that premise?
What do you mean by "X exist"?

The meaning of life can be looked at from several different levels. On the one end there is the selfish view of how it is useful to us. Am I happy, am I successful, do I have a lot of friends, etc.? On the other end it is tied with purpose and causality. Not just my life but what about life in general or human life. Is there a reason why I am, or anyone is. — George Fisher

People have different ideas on what life is, and how they want to live their life. But then, there are parts of life which all humans share.

They get born with no choice of their own. They live, and get old. Some die young, and some die old, but eventually and ultimately they all die. This is the common form of life all humans share.

Can life be reflected without reflecting death? Unlikely.

:ok: :cool:

Hume followed John Locke in rejecting the existence of innate ideas, concluding that all human knowledge derives solely from experience. — https://en.m.wikipedia.org › wiki

I was just wondering if your use of the word "impression" was Humean, or from the ordinary language. But even for Hume, numbers are concepts which is part of the rationality or reason. I don't believe that any philosopher in history has said that numbers are physical.

You’re claiming numbers and their relations are understandable a priori, regardless of age, situation, and personal experience?

Do you, or anyone you know of, have knowledge of a human society that does no counting of material things whatsoever?

Do you, or anyone you know of, have knowledge of a human society with children who can’t see the difference between one lollipop and two lollipops? — ucarr

You still seem to be misunderstanding the difference between the act of counting physical objects, and the ontology of numbers. The two are not the same thing. I have given you enough explanations for the reasons that they are not the same.

If you are talking using a religious language, then yes you can say even rocks have minds, because they are created by God, and even say the recent frequent volcanic eruptions around the world were the acts of God showing his frustration for the Global warming trend. However we want to reject that type of metaphors, when we are debating the point in philosophical analytic perspectives.

We have different mental impressions in our heads. This variety includes: grocery list items, images of statues observed, numbers learned in grammar school now being used to count grocery list items. — ucarr

Is it the Humean impression are you talking about?

We’ve been talking about mental objects. This category includes numbers as well as other mental objects as, for example, the memory of the statue. — ucarr

You are using the concept impression wrong, if it is the Humean.  It would make more sense if you used ideas instead of impressions.  Numbers are mental concepts, and they would have no matching impressions according to Hume. Humean impressions are not associated with knowledge, judgement or concepts. They are passions, emotions and feelings viz. sensations in nature.

  Well, the idea of the statue is from the external object, and the idea of number is from the mental concept, so you are talking about totally different ideas in nature.  You cannot have an idea of the statue without seeing the statue, and having the impression of it.   But you can have an idea of a number without having to see any external objects or impressions of the object.

Just because you have a concept of something in your senses does not mean that the something you have a concept of exists on the other side of your senses. For example, when you see a stick bent in water, are you saying that on the other side of your senses there must be a bent stick in water? — RussellA

You are still seeing an object external to you when you see the bend stick in the water jug.
There is no internal world. You have a mental space which is total darkness without your visual perception, as explained previously.

In the case of the bent stick, it is again a simple story. The light reflected from the stick in the water, passes through the water with the refraction, so it looks like double or bent in the water of the jug.

To reiterate, you are seeing the straight light from the stick in the water of the jug, and also the light refracted in the water of the jug. So it looks like a double or bent to your perception, but you were seeing the 2x different lights coming from 1x stick in the water of the jug - 1x straight reflected light from the stick, and 1x refracted light in the water from the same stick.

Clear water in a transparent glass jug has a character bending lights (refraction) and reflect into different angle from the object(s) inside it.

We have been talking about the nature of numbers.

The correct impression in husband’s head is either damaged or destroyed. Does this correct version of his impression, that was previously operational within his head, but now is not, still exist somewhere outside of his head? — ucarr

Well, whatever happened to the man's head, the statue exists. Someone's head going off, doesn't affect the physical or mental existence which has been exiting before.

If the statue was there before, it would still be there existing as it was unless someone moved it away. If it didn't exist before, then it doesn't exist now unless someone placed one at the location.

Numbers will always be existing in the minds of humans. Because someone died, or someone's head gone off doesn't mean numbers turn to physical or disappear into non-existence.

When you look at a world containing a street with cars and buildings, if this world was not internal to your mind, how would you be able to think about it? — RussellA

They are external. You can think about it, because you have the concepts in your mind.

Pain is real yet only exists in the mind, so why cannot your thought of a street with cars and buildings be real even though the thought only exists in your mind? — RussellA

How do you know your pain is real? What if it were just itchy skin, and you might have mistaken the itch sensation for pain?

Exactly, how do you know whether the street with cars and building only exists as a thought in your mind or exists outside the mind, when you only know about it through the senses? — RussellA

It is dead simple. Close your both eyes totally and decidedly for 10 minutes, you will see nothing, but a total darkness. You are no longer perceiving the external world outside you. Therefore you have no perception of the external world. What you have at that moment is just total darkness. That is not a world. It is an empty mental space. It follows there is no such a thing as a world internal to yourself.

How do you know that the world you perceive in your senses has been caused by the world external to your mind rather than the world internal to your mind? — RussellA

How do you know you have a world internal to your mind? Is it a real world? How do you know it is the real world or just a imagination?

You say this is bad logic because the road is there whether the eyes see it or not.

One day at the dinner table a husband tells his wife that afternoon he saw a statue of George Washington. Your wife tells him he’s wrong. “The statue you saw at the location you gave is a statue of Thomas Jefferson,” she says. Next day he returns to the location and, going much closer to it than on the previous day, he sees that, indeed, it’s a statue of Thomas Jefferson. — ucarr

You know that even if your eyesight is bad, and cannot see the road, the road exists.

You know when your memory and eyesights are both bad, so you can't tell what the statue was, and you must go back to it to check it out, but you know that the statue exists.

Therefore even if  your memories can be unreliable,  numbers  do exist in your mind.  To say that numbers are material and physical, is a bad logic.

Do you acknowledge that in order to check the truth content of the husband’s first mental impression of the statue, he had to return to the site and try to verify or revise that first impression? — ucarr

Of course, you need to go back and see the statue to confirm what it is. Therefore it proves, even of your memory is unreliable, things exist as they are, be it physical or mental. Just because your memory is unreliable doesn't mean that mental objects become physical. Even if you memory becomes bad, numbers are concepts in the mind.

How do non-physical numbers attach themselves to the physical brain in your head? You will say you have a mind that’s not physical. I then ask you how your non-physical mind attaches itself to your brain. This conversation has always been about how concepts, supposedly non-physical, connect with the physical humans who create and propagate them. — ucarr

It is good to see you are now accepting that numbers are concepts.  It is a progress. But you still seem to insist that there are numbers which are physical.  So now we notice that you have changed your claim, and brought in the Cartesian dualism into the argument.

Please bear in mind, the Cartesian dualism is not about numbers as concept and physical existence at the same time.  To start, that is a contraction for something being both physical and mental at the same time.

Cartesian dualism is about mind and body as separate two distinct substances.  It is not what you are trying to claim.

Descartes was a rationalist, and dualist.  He would be the last one who would have said numbers are material or physical.  No,  he would never have said that.  I have not read Descartes, but that is my gut feeling. Please correct me if I am wrong on Descartes on this point.

I tried to understand cases where numbers are physical entities, but I must admit that I couldn't possibly think of any case number that can be regarded as a physical object.  You need to come back with a more convincing argument for your claim.

However, how do you know that these sensations are caused by a world that exists outside your mind rather than by a world that exists inside your mind? — RussellA

Possible worlds, and worlds in your imagination and memories exist in your mind, but they don't cause your perception for the external world.

George Dicker argues that the main difficulty with Kant's argument in B276 is the part "All time-determination presupposes something persistent in perception". — RussellA

Kant's first premise in the refutation is that he is conscious in time. Some might ask to prove how does he know he is conscious in time? What if he was dreaming, or hallucinating?

The problem is, how can we step outside of time in order to see ourselves existing in time — RussellA

How can you step outside of your concept or intuition?

You don’t. This has been my point all along. — ucarr

I didn't quite understand what you meant by "uncouple seeing the road from the road's existence as a thing-in-itself." in your replies, hence asked to clarify what you mean by that.

You say above it’s poor logic to claim “My eyesight is bad and I cannot see the road; therefore, the road doesn’t exist.” I agree this is bad logic because of the objectivist assumption the road is there whether one sees it or not.* — ucarr

Yes, I was trying to say to you that numbers exist as concepts, whether one remembers them or not. The road exists in front of you, whether you see it, or not (because you had a bad eyesight.)

If numbers were physical, as you have claimed all along, then they might not exist, or stop existing due to some external reasons or ageing, deaths or destruction = Do numbers get old or die? What a baloney even to suggest that !

People get old. But numbers don't get old, because they are concepts. Numbers are not physical, and you cannot break them or throw out in the bin. You cannot uncouple numbers from anything. Numbers are concepts.

By facts do you mean propositions or the state of affairs? — Lionino

Both.

The mind perceives countable material things in the natural world and, through the process of abstraction, a process that composites multiple experiences linked by a theme into one representative abstraction, links number signs with the property of being countable, an intrinsic property of material things. — ucarr

Numbers are concepts which describe the objects and the world with the values. They are not the objects themselves, and they are definitely not physical in nature.

What branch of Logic is this?
— Corvus

If you don’t know the five logical operators, then you need to open a book of logic for beginners. That’s the book I’m studying. — ucarr

I didn't ask about the five operators. There are around 50 - 60 different type of Logic schools all dealing with different type of events and contents with different forms. I asked which school of Logic was it? Anyhow, I thought it was quite odd for you to have written the operators in words rather than the symbols.

For this reason, I claim number is a physical property of the natural world. Numbers, then, are, ultimately, physical. — ucarr

Money can lose its value from many different factors. It has nothing to do with breaking the connection between the paper money and numbers. Your arguments seem to have deep flaws and don't add up at all.