Maybe, if The Word then all things being, and if not The Word then not the case that all things being: ∃x∀y[(Wx→By) & (¬Wx→¬By)]

I appreciate your honesty and would it interest you that I've never actually took a course in formal logic? I taught myself and am only an amateur and so I'm quite open for my syntactic interpretation to be questioned, even to the point of being totally ripped apart by someone more knowledgeable than me; not so impressive really. Logic btw is just an epistemic tool that I use for rationalizing my (or other people's) reasons and so stating that an argument is valid or sound via some natural deductive rule (such as modus ponens or modus tollens) says nothing in itself about what is ontologically so, which to me, is what's important.

In the spirit of honesty, I admit to not being a very good philosopher but will say that if I don't understand anything pertaining to its ontology then I tend to lose interest in the discussion. When I asked you about the domain of a variable, I'm really asking you what is the ontological status of a predicated subject, in this case, moral value. I asked for it syntactically because then I will semantically interpret the predicated subjects myself in coherence (or incoherence as the case may be) with my own ontological beliefs. This is a useful utility I do find with formal logic; stripping semantic arguments down to syntactics (its what you do yourself in stating: p→q; ¬p therefore ¬q). And what I mean by ontological status is where does it reside? What type of substance is it? Or am I showing a bias in these specific questions due to my lack of philosophic skills?

Btw, I'm in the emotivism camp concerning morals and apologies if I don't attend to your replies immediately due to being in work at the moment!

1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable (if P, then Q)
2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable (not Q)
3. Therefore moral values are not my values (therefore not P)

That argument is valid and sound. You can run it again with yourself mentioned in premise 1 and 2 rather than me and it will remain valid and sound. — Bartricks

First order predicate logic is needed because different domains are forwarded and their variables need to be quantified. For example, when stating, I value something, two separate variables share a relation to the predicate value:

∀ = for all, ∃ = there exists a least one.
Predicate V = value, M = moral.
Variables x = not y nor z, y = person(implied by I or my), z = something,
Necessarily = ∆.

∀x∃y∃z[
1. (Vx&Mx→Vy)→ ( ∆(Vyz)→Vx&Mx)
2. Vyz→¬∆(Vx&Mx)
3. Vx&Mx→¬Vy
]

Firstly, line 1 via Hypothetical Syllogism, is Vx&Mx →Vx&Mx, which is circular.
Secondly, the modality is switched with no justifying premises.
Thirdly, even if line 1 is accepted and the switched modality ignored then the other premises don't follow as the correct version of Modus Tollens would be:

∀x∃y∃z[
1. (Vx&Mx→Vy)→ ( ∆(Vyz)→Vx&Mx)
2. ¬ ( ∆(Vyz)→Vx&Mx)
3. ¬(Vx&Mx→Vy)
]

Which is saying something different to what you're stating because Vyz→¬∆(Vx&Mx)
doesn't have the same truth value as ¬ ( ∆(Vyz)→Vx&Mx) and Vx&Mx→¬Vy
doesn't have the same truth value as ¬(Vx&Mx→Vy).

Now I'm not presuming I'm correct but if I'm mistaken, then I'd appreciate it if you would type it syntactically in first order predicate logic and define your domains of variables (or constants as the case may be) so we don't have to indulge in semantics.

Thank you everyone for your responses. I would only like to know how Newton knew his laws are true. What were the experiments he performed? — Fernando Rios

Newton didn’t do any experiments with regard to his laws of motion and gravity*. He believed that Kepler’s laws of a heliocentric model of the solar system, with its elliptical orbits, were true because of their predictive power and that they were formulated due to an analysis of Tycho Brahe’s comprehensive and accurate data of celestial observations. He also believed that Galileo was right about motion being relative and that objects fell at the same rate regardless of mass (overturning the contemporary prevalent view of Aristotelian motion).

With Kepler's planetary laws and his invention of differential calculus, Newton devised his universal law of gravity and with the experimental results of Galileo (my example prior being a modern interpretation of such an experiment) he devised his three laws of motion. Personally I don’t care whether Newton thought himself to be right, or Brahe, Kepler, and Galileo either. Because, as with most geniuses, they were insufferable arseholes who thought everything they did was true and correct. Honestly, each and every one of these people were know-it-all pricks who were about as welcome at parties as a fart in a crowded lift (elevator to my colonial cousins). But then again, I would’ve liked to party with Brahe as he seemed to be a larger-than-life character. He had a tin nose due to losing his own nose in a duel! He also made Kepler practically beg for his observational data (like I said, an arsehole!)

Why everyone else thought Newton’s Laws were true was because the laws themselves had great predictive power and his genius was (besides coming up with calculus) that his laws explained how the celestial and terrestrial bodies move all due to being bound by gravity. The idea that celestial and terrestrial movement were the same thing wasn’t even considered beforehand and the simplified elegance of this probably gave reason why Newton himself thought his laws true. Newton didn’t know why gravity (he didn’t even know precisely what the gravitational constant was) and so he credited God with this feat. It wasn’t until Einstein came along that a naturalistic account for gravity was given. Newton also admitted to a certain artifice to his calculations as he was acutely aware that messing about with numbers didn't prove anything empirical.

Incidentally due to Newton’s thin skin towards criticism and his dislike for other academics (especially Robert Hooke.Newton’s quote about standing on the shoulders of giants was a sarcastic dig at Hooke’s diminutive size) he sat on his calculations and it wasn’t until he was befriended by the astronomer Edmund Halley that he decided to tell of his findings. Even if Newton thought his laws were true, it seemed that he wasn’t that bothered if other people thought them true also.


*Newton was a theoretician about motion and gravity but it’s not to say he didn’t dabble with experiments himself. When formulating his theory of colour, he stuck a bodkin in his eye to see how this changed his perception of colour. Also in his later years, he dabbled in alchemy.

Get a narrow piece of plastic strip and bend into a u-shape measuring 5ft from end to end. Make sure that the plastic is lubricated so as to cut down on friction and wide enough for a ball-bearing. Place the ball-bearing at one end and let it drop (don't push or throw it). If the plastic track has minimal friction then the ball bearing should reach the same height, from whence you dropped it, at the end:



Repeat this for a plastic track measuring 10ft, then 15ft, then 20ft, then 25ft, and so on. If all plastic tracks and ball bearings have minimal friction then the ball bearing should again reach the same height at the end as the height at the beginning. From this we may inductively reason that if we don't allow the plastic track to bend back up at the end, then the ball-bearing could hypothetically go on forever at a constant velocity if no other net force is acted upon it, i.e. Newton's first law of motion.

Heraclitus was a great philosopher but it appears Parmenides did more research and gave more thought on the matter.

What say you? — TheMadFool

The way I read it is that in the times of Heraclitus, Parmenides, Zeno, et al. it was widely believed that stuff permeated everywhere, whether that stuff was elementary or atomic. Zeno believed that if stuff permeated everywhere then no room to move, so no room to change; all was one and continual with motion being illusory. Also that plurality was impossible due to no room for separation, the motionless can’t also be in motion and the continuous can’t also be discrete. He forwarded his arguments to show that reasoning about unchanging things changing leads to a paradox, such as super-tasking, with the idea that if the rationale concurs with observation then change is real but if not then change is not real. By today’s standards, Parmenides and Zeno would be considered hardcore rationalists.

However it does seem that we do experience change and Heraclitus thought that, even though the elements themselves don’t change, their configurations do in a global give-and-take between the elements. By today’s standards we may term this as conservation - the magnitude of properties in a closed system remain constant.

In contrast to both these views, the Atomist Democritus flipped it around and proposed that if experience of change then room to move, so the idea of the void was entertained which rendered Zeno’s arguments mute but the void was still widely rejected (both Plato and Aristotle also thought the idea of the void was absurd) until relatively recently.

I myself see Zeno’s paradoxes as a cautionary tale on how our observations and rationale can be both wrong and that we ought not to expect that either should concur.

High marks to you my friend!! I could not agree more with your analysis! — 3017amen

Bullseye on the etiological myths. — Brainglitch

Thanks :up:

I’ve never been a theist and so I tend to read the story at face value. It seems to me that it's not talking about morality but rather making a distinction of knowledge as being either good or bad, an epistemic distinction rather than an ethical distinction if you like.

It seems to me to be various etiological myths wrapped up in a main etiological myth. The myth of why we are here, why we wear clothes, why we toil for a living, why giving birth is painful, why snakes are feared, etc. The main take home point is why we die rather than live forever (we shall not eat from the tree of life). It's a tale about mortality, not morality.

Are there any good modern refutations to Global Antinatalism? — OP

No because it's a fact that the Neanderthal all killed themselves because they realized that they lacked a decent tumble dryer! Oh how great their suffering must've been!! :cry:

Uncertainty is freedom from having to be right all the time, If the internet is full of incessantly boring think-they-know-it-alls now, imagine what it would be like if there was certainty! Uncertainty is what makes life worth living!

I think Eccles is saying that to deny freewill due to determinism is presupposing a choice to make the denial, hence contradictory, therefore irrational. Or else denial is but an automated response genetically determined, therefore cannot be considered rational due to being prejudiced. So by this way, determinism refutes itself if it wants to be considered a rational theory.

Churchland's objection to this is that it doesn't follow that, even if determinism is true, we do not reason rationally and I tend to agree. If a person is asked for the quantity of marbles in a jar and reasons via calculus but is out by, say, five marbles from the actual quantity, I don't think it is necessarily so that this person's reasoning was irrational or non-rational. The most that can be said is that the question determined an answer of quantity, not quality of answer.

The expansion rate of the universe has slowed in the past (end of inflation), it could slow again and maybe reverse. I think the astronomers are not too sure on the actual expansion rate: — Devans99

Yeah, I must admit that my info is possibly from five years ago. I forget that these telescopes are updated periodically.

Cheers for the read, interesting. I guess I'm in the presentism camp myself but a finitist. I also don't see space or time as substantive.

But the Big Rip does not explain the Big Bang in a neat and tidy way like the Big Crunch does. — Devans99

I agree with this, theoretically speaking.

The only topology that fits this requirement is a closed loop - circular time. — Devans99

Measurements so far have density equal to the critical density(mass needed to stop the expansion) which should eventually slow the expansion down gradually to a flat, infinite universe. This being contingent on the observable universe being at the range of the entire universe

I heard of a theory that, from a fifth dimensional perspective, the big bang and the big crunch as come and gone and positrons are electrons travelling in reverse-time! In this theory, the Red Dwarf scenario maybe likely.

Anyway, did you know that the smart money is on being a big freeze due to dark matter being a constant? If we get a decrease in dark matter then a big crunch is likely and an increase would mean a big rip is more likely!

We can even postulate that the distinction between 'mind' and 'matter' is necessarily ambiguous, precisely because 'mind' is entangled in 'matter.' --or also note that the distinction is already a metaphysical axiom that obscures how we actually live in or even as meaning-matter. — sign

To me, mind is a form of matter and it is actually due to physicality, being what it is, that we get these mistaken views such as idealism, dualism or soul belief. The experiencer is not substantively evident to the experience due to things being physical such that it is physically impossible for me to turn inward on myself. We are like prisoners of our own physicality and I find it amazing and awesome that we can come to agreements on many matters and indeed disagreements also. Agreements and disagreements we are behooved to make to due to being physical, sensitive creatures living in a physical world. (I was going to use the word material but I didn't want to come off sounding like Madonna! :joke:)

I think you're in a bit of a tangle here with what Berkeley is really saying. — Wayfarer

You can imply that I have misread Berkeley all you want but it still remains that if you buy into Berkeley's immaterialism then you should accept that deity itself is but a perception also and not of any actual substance. If you don't then it's a case of special pleading. Berkeley's immaterialism is preposterous due to this simple inconsistency. And you can replace deity with whatever, because at the end of the day, they too are all just ideas.

I do kick the stone and say, "persistent existence of matter, not persistent whim of deity!"

There is the well-known and oft-quoted limerick which might have already been posted in this very thread, but it's such a gem it can hardly be repeated too often: — Wayfarer

My mum likes those inspirational quotes/biblical verses on prints (tea-towels, cushions etc.) I might get her those words printed for a xmas present!

And what you’re calling ‘objective realism’ is a very recent arrival! — Wayfarer

Maybe that term as such but ancient man did conceive of gods and other fantastical creatures very much part of the natural world with Plato being apart from the norm in contemporary Greek thinking.

I would not define a term like that, because it has too many different uses in different contexts. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is only one context pertinent here; ontology!

I can't say that I have an answer to this question because I do not understand the context. — Metaphysician Undercover

:brow: It was you that brought up these principles. I'm starting to think that you really don't know what's real or not! But in your defense, you're not the only one! :up:

You're too kind. Thanks! — sign

Sorry I can't stay around and chat, have to get out early to avoid the xmas shopping rush, But I promise I will mull over your posts and hopefully have something interesting to say later!

Fair enough! I'm happy to have at least not been boring. — sign

Boring?!! Never!!

Ha. Well, I'd love to see what else you have to say about the issue. — sign

I'll try! :up:

No doubt we can imagine (in some problematic way) that 'matter' (whatever it is exactly supposed to me) was here first and be here after. If we identify the actual with durability, then matter becomes tempting as the actual. On the other hand, this whole line of thought exists as meaning. Perhaps the materialist forgets the ideal nature of matter (itself an abstraction in some views from a stream of sensation), and the idealist forgets the entanglement of meaning in its other. We can even postulate that the distinction between 'mind' and 'matter' is necessarily ambiguous, precisely because 'mind' is entangled in 'matter.' --or rather because the distinction is already metaphysical axiom that obscures how we actually live in or even as meaning-matter. — sign

You've given me some food for thought here, I'm going to have to come back to you on this one.

I am interested though in precisely this metaphysical ignorance as a metaphysical axiom. — sign

Damn sign, you just made my brain hurt! Am I not being open-minded by declaring metaphysical ignorance as axiomatic?! :joke:

Berkeley says the world is real and therefore physical, the physical things in his world are not made of matter. Matter can exist independently and ideas cannot. — Jamesk

Yeah, it does seem that Berkeley proposes an epistemological idealism.

In Berkeley's time atheism was in it's early stages, the vast majority of the western world believed in a God whom they were scared of. God was much more taken for granted then than now. I think that this may explain his glossing over of the subject because people had a much stronger idea of God than they do today. — Jamesk

It does seem like Berkeley is writing to atheist intellectuals rather than common folk. Much in the way Pascal did earlier, but whereas Pascal uses pragmatism, Berkeley uses scepticism.

Idealism was born out of Melebranche's occasionalism which had God destroying and recreating the world on a second to second basis, thus being present in all of our lives. Berkeley say's why would God make such massive and destructive efforts just to prove his existence when he could do the whole thing mentally — Jamesk

Would you not say that Plato's theory of the forms informed idealism also?

Yep, my thinking also. How do you unchange what's been changed?

Travel, no. Looking, yes. By looking at the Andromeda galaxy you are seeing it as it was 2.5 million years ago. By traveling closer to the Andromeda galaxy it's change would accelerate "forward" in time until you get to it and see it in its near-present state. — Harry Hindu

Interesting thought. Makes me think that somewhere, really advanced aliens are sharing snapshots of each others' histories!

If time is circular, then travelling forward in time would eventually lead to retro-time travel. — Devans99

I remember seeing a Red Dwarf episode in which the crew land on an anomalous planet where time travelled backward to the crews', and our point of view. This seemed like it was normal to them and our past is their future and vice-versa!

The thing about the big Crunch though is: would it necessarily be the same set of events going backwards in that the inhabitants from the rebound do the same things as us, or reverse-time as in the Red Dwarf story?.

Berkeley is a proper empiricist, all the laws of nature are preserved, real and empirically knowable. With everything being an idea of God causation is also explained. There is no necessary connection between events except Gods will, event A precedes event B because God makes it this way. God is the ultimate causal force in the universe, being finite spirits ourselves we also have some minor causal efficacy but none whatsoever exists in objects. — Jamesk

Wayfarer forwarded the idea that we are not in error in what we perceive, it's our judgements that are in error about what we perceive. And as I've now read the Dialogues, this does seem consistent in what the Philonous character states. And furthermore, when we pull the oar out of the water, we see that the oar is straight. Sight and touch converge to the actuality of the oar, the convergence due to God of course!

But this is strange because water and other liquids (themselves an idea rather than a physical entity), produce this error in judgement constantly and appealing to laws of refraction would be kicking the stone also. What is also strange is that we all have an idea that this planet is covered mostly by water which means that God is the cause of this idea and that most of our world is prone to this error in judgement constantly??!!

Why God does such a thing is not forthcoming and all we are left with then is faith that God has his reasons for such because Berkeley doesn't explain it further and considering he wrote such to dispel scepticism and atheism, he hasn't done a very good job of it in my view, in fact it leaves me with more answers than before!

The dialogues make no bones about criticising atheism and goes as far to say that if I realize objective realism is mistaken then I would realize atheism is mistaken also. But my atheism was neither informed by science or philosophy, it just seemed a ridiculous story to me just like stories of Zeus or Odin are ridiculous. A believer may say that what I stated is clichéd but this is only because it's a matter of fact for many atheists. And the thing about my atheism is that, in itself, it doesn't inform my belief in an objective realism. Can this be said of subjective realists with deity and the like?

I have not encountered a believer in such that isn't informed by a belief in deity, or some other greater power, because what I call the persistence of existence (such that a tree is still there when not being perceived) can only be with some deistic figure perceiving it so. I find it quite amazing that, given Berkeley is an empiricist and a nominalist, he doesn't appeal to parsimony or question what he does or doesn't experience about deity??!! Look at it from my point of view; either I believe that matter is actual or deity is actual! This to me, is the crux of the matter (if you pardon the pun!)

I should clarify that will only defend Berkeley up to a point. I think his fundamental intuition is sound, but the way that I interpret it is in the sense that it reminds us that we are participants in reality, and not just observers of it; — Wayfarer

Yes Berkeley does state as such in that we have volitional cause but God is the prime causer, so to speak. But as you see from my answer to JamesK above, all we are left with is faith because deity himself (or spiritual realm) is shy about such things.

The problem resides in taking the methodological attitude of ‘objectivity’ as a metaphysical axiom, which it isn’t; — Wayfarer

Whatever metaphysical axioms are afoot, we all have metaphysical ignorance so saying what is or isn't seems to me something we can't be sure of. I don't presume that objective reality is right and subjective reality is wrong, just that objective reality, i.e. physicalism, is a story well told in my view. Granted that physicalism is by no means an epistemic done deal but I prefer it's uncertainty to any other metaphysical notions' uncertainty.

because reality is not actually something we are outside of or apart from — Wayfarer

And this is why we have metaphysical ignorance.

So ‘the real’ can only properly be known by the sage or philosopher who, in the Western philosophical tradition at least, ascends by the use of reason to the ‘vision of the One’ (which is the meaning of the allegory of the Cave). — Wayfarer

So wait a minute, you have forwarded a statement that illusions are erroneous judgements and now you're saying that enlightened people who endorse a theory of the forms can only know what's real? So not-real (i.e. illusion) is erroneous judgement and real is correct judgement so long as you buy into anything that isn't objective realism? It all seems wishy-washy to me in its so-long-it's-not objective-realism attitude.

I would not define "real" in a way so as to exclude relations from being real, such that only absolutes are real. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, so again you've just stated in different words that you don't think real is absolutely being. What is your definition of real?

So if we assume this distinction between real and not real, we would need some principles to differentiate one from the other in this context. — Metaphysician Undercover

So what are these principles?

Thanks :up:

I appear to have a reply that I made earlier deleted on me. I'm guessing that linking a youtube video is a violation of the ToS which wasn't my intention. Is my guess correct?

Say we see an oar in water, Hylas says, and it appears bent to us. We then lift it out and see that it is really straight; the bent appearance was an illusion caused by the water's refraction. On Philonous' view, though, we cannot say that we were wrong about the initial judgement; if we perceived the stick as bent then the stick had to have been bent. ... Philonous has an answer to this worry. While we cannot be wrong about the particular idea, he explains, we can still be wrong in our judgement. Ideas occur in regular patterns, and it is these coherent and regular sensations that make up real things, not just the independent ideas of each isolated sensation. The bent stick can be called an illusion, therefore, because that sensation is not coherently and regularly connected to the others. If we pull the stick out of the water, or we reach down and touch the stick, we will get a sensation of a straight stick. It is this coherent pattern of sensations that makes the stick. If we judge that the stick is bent, therefore, then we have made the wrong judgement, because we have judged incorrectly about what sensation we will have when we touch the stick or when we remove it from the water.

Thanks for that , but what does God, the arbiter of actuality, see? Why would he present such an illusion to us if not just the mere behaviour of physical things? I guess I'm appealing to parsimony here.

To me, what you have said here appears very confused. Why does something have to be absolute to be real? Are relations not real? — Metaphysician Undercover

What was confusing about it? I may be wrong about it but I thought what I typed was pretty clear! Relationships do exist, there is no denying this, as do illusions, so what is your definition of real?

This is a question to both of you, are illusions, even though they exist, real?

Yep, I admit that my definition was somewhat vague and general (hence my disclaimer of being opinion) but throwing words in such as understanding, fulfilment, play, common sense and sentience isn't exactly making things any clearer.

What do you think about this video(loads to a specific time). Could it not be said that the robot comes to an understanding?
https://youtu.be/DVprGRt39yg?t=3138

For those who don't like links for whatever reason, here's a transcript of the video:

Back in 2005 we started trying to build machines with self-awareness. This robot, to begin with, didn't know what it was. All it knew is that it needed to do something like walk. Through trial and error, it figured out how to walk using imagination and then it walked away. And then we did something very cruel, we chopped off a leg and watched what happened. At the beginning it didn't quite know what had happened. But over by the period of a day, it then began to limp.

And then a year ago we were training an AI system for a live demonstration. We wanted to show how we wave all these objects in front of the camera and then the AI can recognize the objects. And so we're preparing this demo and we had on a side screen this ability to watch what certain neurons were responding to. And suddenly we notice that one of the neurons was tracking faces. It was tracking our faces as we were moving around.

Now the spooky thing about this is that we never trained the system to recognize human faces and yet somehow it learnt to do that. Even though these robots are very simple, we can see there's something else going on there, it's not just programmed. So this is just the beginning…. [Dun, Dun, DUUUUN!! - I added this part]

Will do, might take me a day or two (or even a week to fully digest). I'm not the brightest bulb in the christmas tree! :sad:

I'd say that defining intelligence as a capacity to understand is rather anthropocentric and a better definition is a capacity to deal with theoretical and/or practical problems effectively. But this is merely an opinion of mine rather than an assertion.

In it he pretty much uncovers every possible objection to his theory and overcomes them — Jamesk

We shall see! :wink:

Berkeley addresses and answers this objection in the Dialogues. Optics was actually his best subject, his book on it did much better than immaterialism. — Jamesk

I admit that I haven't read his Dialogues, only Principles of Human Knowledge and even then, that was a while ago. But cheers for the heads up anyway, I'll download a copy and give it a read.

Please read all of his posts before commenting. — Jamesk

I have, I've read all posts. I guess that I'm not included when it comes to principles of charity! :worry:

But anyways, about Berkeley and his subjective realism: if I observed an oar in the water and it is bent then according to Berkeley, the oar does not appear to be bent, it's actually bent. But if I put my hand in the water, I feel the oar is straight! Does this mean that there are two actual oars I am perceiving?. Also, God wouldn't be any help in this matter because then either God has a different idea in mind, making three different ideas of an oar or I should call him Loki rather than God.

It is problems such as this that make me think that an objective reality is more so than a subjective reality. It is no use in asking me what I think what stuff matter actually is because I don't really know without kicking the stone, but given the choice between the two, I prefer the epistemic uncertainty of an objective reality rather than a subjective reality with it's mysterious deity. Well so much for my two cents worth! :smile:

Thank you, illuminating comment. I hope you stick around :smile: — Wayfarer

Thanks :up:

TS claimed that a tree is matter in the same way that the song called Kashmir is music. This statement is only true and sound if universals are real. — Metaphysician Undercover

When someone says something is real I take it to mean absolute (as opposed to being dependent or relative) in being, so particulars are absolute in being wheres universals are not so absolute but rather dependently being on something absolutely being. Such as music dependently being on absolute instruments for creation and absolute people to listen to. Trees dependently being on particular configurations of absolute matter and absolute people naming these configurations such.

I suggest that we just stop answering this Terrapin until he starts doing some philosophy. — Jamesk

So asking people to ignore someone who doesn't hold your views and doesn't conform to how you think a philosophy discussion ought to be is doing philosophy?

The statement 'all that exists are particulars' is a general statement. So if 'all' denotes anything, then the word 'all' must be general, which means the statement is false. because ‘all’ is an existing word; and if it doesn't denote anything, then the statement is meaningless. — Wayfarer

All is quantifying all instances (not universals :wink:) of the predication of existing with the predication of being particulars. In predicate logic form: ∀x(Ex→Px).