why is it easier to predict the mind of God than it is to predict the mind of another human being? — Harry Hindu

Berkeley says that we don't have ideas of other spirits or of God, because an idea can only resemble an idea. We do have 'notions' of other minds and of God because of our intuitive knowledge that we have ourselves minds. The notion theory is a bit more complex than I make it out and it is one of the weakest parts of his theory.

So, why do idealists complain that science can't explain the mind - the human mind - like it can explain gravity or chemical reactions when gravity and chemical reactions are ideas of God? — Harry Hindu

Science can explain what gravity does but it can't explain how it happens or why, there is still no gravity equation. Newton clearly admitted that all he was doing was asserting what it does and how to measure it, that's even less than neuroscience can tell us today about 'minds'. God is not such an unrealistic alternative.

I want to add to my previous reply that I have grown uncomfortable with my description that the "ontological" turns into the "epistemological" in regard identity theory. The theory does not explain how things are known.
I am back to what I was asking before about the limits of what is being explained. The epistemology involved is how to approach what has been proposed. If I take my starting point that brains are what causes mental events, it is like the big bang theory, what happened to cause brains? Why did they develop the way did?
I can ask those questions while having no doubt that my brain is a player.

When someone says something is real I take it to mean absolute (as opposed to being dependent or relative) in being, so particulars are absolute in being wheres universals are not so absolute but rather dependently being on something absolutely being. Such as music dependently being on absolute instruments for creation and absolute people to listen to. Trees dependently being on particular configurations of absolute matter and absolute people naming these configurations such. — Happenstance

To me, what you have said here appears very confused. Why does something have to be absolute to be real? Are relations not real?

His key arguments are as plausible as materialism and just as well supported. That is the problem, he cannot provide better support that materialism has, he basically uses the same support that he demolished in materialism.

Please take some time and actually read his theory and dialogues before engaging in a meaningful discussion about them. — Jamesk

I'm familiar with his key arguments, and I don't agree that they're anywhere near as plausible as materialism; which is why, in terms of adherents, Berkeleian idealism is a minority position dwarfed by materialism. His arguments are clever enough to give one pause for thought, in a similar way to some of the arguments of Descartes or of Zeno of Elea, but that's about all they have going for them.

Berkeley says that we don't have ideas of other spirits or of God, because an idea can only resemble an idea. We do have 'notions' of other minds and of God because of our intuitive knowledge that we have ourselves minds. The notion theory is a bit more complex than I make it out and it is one of the weakest parts of his theory. — Jamesk

This is the most incoherent reply you've had yet. If an idea can only resemble an idea, then an idea is a resemblance of itself? Or, it would be that resemblances are the fundamental aspect of reality - not ideas!

"Notions" is a synonym for "ideas", so you've contradicted yourself.

For me this bottom-up approach is not the way to go. We can't atomize the mind and reconstruct it. Of course you mention emergent properties, so you see the problem. But I'd say that our atomizing theories themselves emerge from this same 'emergent property.'

Another way we might approach this is to 'confess' that meaning (in all its embarrassing and suspicious mysteriousness) is fundamental. The world or what exists is clearly not only 'meaning' (whatever this meaning is), of course. But existence is always already meaningfully structured. Of course we can theorize about the origin of meaning as an act of meaning. — sign

"Emergent" might be the wrong word. It's a result from our size relative to the size of other things. We seem to be right in the middle with everything extending away in both space, size and time. Our minds compartmentalize space - into atoms, molecules, on up to things on our size-scale and past it to planets, solar systems, galaxies and universes. These larger things seem to "emerge" from the interactions of smaller processes if you think from "bottom to top". In order to try to get a more objective understanding of it, we'd need to think of ourselves as not having a size relative to other things. That seems difficult - maybe something we just can't grasp because having a size relative to other things fixes our subjective size-relation perception of the world and we can't escape that view of the world

I agree with your explanation of meaning. I consider meaning and information the same thing and the relationship between causes and their effects. Effects carry information about their causes. Effects mean their causes. I like to use Steven Pinker's tree rings example. Tree rings (the effect) are the result of how the tree grows throughout the year (the cause). The tree rings mean, or carry information about, the cause, which is why you can get the age of the tree by the number of rings it has.

For me we still have the problem here that 'sensory impressions' and 'quarks' are signs that point to meanings that themselves point beyond themselves. The world, in my view, is composed of (among other things) acts of meaning. The world is composed of (among other things) attempts to say what the world is composed of. I know this may sound strange. But what does it mean when a metaphysics excludes itself from the real it tries to grasp? If acts of meaning are 'unreal,' then any theory of the real is itself unreal. It's odd that a theory of the real would be satisfied with building up itself from quarks or sensory impressions that themselves function within this theory. — sign

This seems like how I keep saying that the mind, including it's misperceptions, illusions and delusions, are real because they are part of reality as much as everything else. Galaxies and illusions should be part of the same substratum.

Fascinating theory. I must confess that I'm still somewhat opposed to the project being framed in terms of finding fundamental units. IMV, any description of what is has to acknowledge what makes such a description possible and intelligible. I'm not saying yours doesn't, but it doesn't go into much detail about its own presence. Let's say we have a theory about what is fundamental that does not include language. Maybe it theorizes the origin of language. Yet language is also the origin of this theory of the origin. This doesn't make the theory worthless. But perhaps it calls for an enriched account. — sign

As for the basic building blocks of the mind, it seems to me that it would be sensory impressions. All of our ideas, imaginings, beliefs and knowledge are composed of sensory impressions. The smallest unit I can think about is a sensory impression. For instance, I can think of just the color red, or a tactile sensation, or a sound with no meaning. Anything else I can think of, would be composed of these things. Coffee is composed of visual (black vs. w/ cream), tactile (warm liquid or iced), auditory (the sound of the coffee dripping), olfactory and gustatory units.

Even language is composed of these sensory impressions. Language is just visual scribbles or sounds. Words refer to other sensory impressions. When you think of "democracy" what fills your mind? What form does "democracy" take in your mind other than just the scribbles on the screen? How do you know that you're thinking of "democracy"? It requires an awareness of some visualization of maybe politicians vying for your vote, or citizens voting. Our minds cross-reference these visual or auditory impressions with other sensory impressions. "Warmth" refers to some tactile sensation. "Green eggs and ham" refer to a visual of eggs and ham that are colored green with maybe even an imagined smell or taste.

Can you think of anything more basic than your sensory impressions? Is that evidence of a fundamental unit of thought, or mind?

These larger things seem to "emerge" from the interactions of smaller processes if you think from "bottom to top". In order to try to get a more objective understanding of it, we'd need to think of ourselves as not having a size relative to other things. That seems difficult - maybe something we just can't grasp because having a size relative to other things fixes our subjective size-relation perception of the world and we can't escape that view of the world — Harry Hindu

I like this and think you make a good point. This also points back to the body as the bridge between 'mind' and 'matter' as poles of a continuum (which is only one way among others to try to frame our situation.)

I agree with your explanation of meaning. I consider meaning and information the same thing and the relationship between causes and their effects. Effects carry information about their causes. Effects mean their causes. I like to use Steven Pinker's tree rings example. Tree rings (the effect) are the result of how the tree grows throughout the year (the cause). The tree rings mean, or carry information about, the cause, which is why you can get the age of the tree by the number of rings it has. — Harry Hindu

I like this. It's less linguistic than my approach, but that might even be good in that it blends 'mind' and 'matter' more successfully, or points further toward the matter pole.

This seems like how I keep saying that the mind, including it's misperceptions, illusions and delusions, are real because they are part of reality as much as everything else. Galaxies and illusions should be part of the same substratum. — Harry Hindu

I agree. In one sense there is nothing that isn't real. Of course people use 'real' sometimes for the physical or genuine, etc. I understand that use. But philosophy does seem to be the mission to conceptually unify and clarify experience, which means it can't ignore illusions (concepts, meanings). It has to account for its own possibility and recognize itself as perhaps even a primary entity. (Another approach thinks of thinking as radically isolated from the 'object,' not seeing that its own thinking is perhaps the essence of the 'object' it supposes itself unable to touch directly. An absolute gap is assumed and the absolute knowledge of the impossibility of absolute knowledge is produced from this assumption.)

All of our ideas, imaginings, beliefs and knowledge are composed of sensory impressions. The smallest unit I can think about is a sensory impression. — Harry Hindu

In my view, this approach has quietly slipped into the theoretical mode without noticing it. Our everyday experience is a moving around in a world of objects and persons instantly grasped as such. Similarly we live in language (in meaning) in a kind of easy and automatic way. Heidegger is great on this issue. In one of his early breakthrough lectures, he uses the lecture room as an example in a powerful way.

Heidegger takes the path of repudiating the primacy of the theoretical attitude. For him, we are never in the position of experiencing the sensedata of the Anglo-Saxon tradition.

According to this view, all perceptual experience involves awareness of an appearance, regardless of whether it is an experience of a physical object. Moreover, all our knowledge of the external world is said to be based upon our beliefs concerning the sense-data that we experience. For Heidegger, in contrast, the theoretical attitude is secondary, being predicated on the existence of a preconceptual understanding that is the basis on which we conduct our day-to-day life. We do not see sense-data, what we see – at least as students and lecturers – are, for example, chairs, desks, windows. There is no problem of the external world because we are always already in that world.

He gives the example of the lectern from which he is speaking. He doesn’t see brown surfaces, arranged in such and such a way, from which he infers the existence of a lectern; what he sees is the lectern ‘in one fell swoop’ as either too high or too low, as convenient to his purpose or not. He sees it as already something meaningful... For the young Heidegger and his audience it is simply part of the environment (Umwelt) in which they live, it has the character of a world (Welt). Further, in a neologism which is to become characteristic of his manner, he turns the noun into a verb – ‘es weltet’ – that is, ‘it worlds.’ — link

https://philosophynow.org/issues/32/Towards_the_Definition_of_Philosophy_by_Martin_Heidegger

This doesn't make sensedata a useless or absurd concept, but it does reveal the idea of such data to be a theoretical tool or hypothesis. Heidegger acknowledges in the lecture that one can indeed switch into the theoretical mode and de-world an object. He can learn to see the lectern as brown surfaces. IMV, I understand the appeal of sense-data as building blocks, but I think this neglects the significance of significance itself.

This is the most incoherent reply you've had yet. If an idea can only resemble an idea, then an idea is a resemblance of itself? Or, it would be that resemblances are the fundamental aspect of reality - not ideas!

"Notions" is a synonym for "ideas", so you've contradicted yourself. — Harry Hindu

An idea can only resemble another idea. I already said that the whole 'notion' business is where he starts to come undone. Notions are kind of the seeds of ideas, but we also have notions of matter.

He can learn to see the lectern as brown surfaces. — sign

Yes, and eventually realize that it may even be presumptuous to call this state-of-affairs a "view" where one is "seeing" brown surfaces. What the f*** is this state-of-affairs that is going on?!

Coffee is composed of visual (black vs. w/ cream), tactile (warm liquid or iced), auditory (the sound of the coffee dripping), olfactory and gustatory units. — Harry Hindu

I think this is a nice disassembly of coffee. In some ways we are trying to undo the mind's automatic unification of the coffee and the entire living world in which it fits. Heidegger is great when he brings the pre-theoretical world to theoretical consciousness, but he doesn't thereby cancel this project of disassembling to reassemble. In that lecture he associated transcendental idealism with this project, if memory serves. The lifeworld can be deconstructed, examined by reason, and put back together (if possible) to test our understanding of the pieces and the way they fit together.

Yes, and eventually realize that it may even be presumptuous to call this state-of-affairs a "view" where one is "seeing" brown surfaces. What the f*** is this state-of-affairs that is going on?! — Harry Hindu

Indeed. His word is not the last word. He does increase the complexity of the situation. If sense-data remain appealing as atoms, we at least gain a new distance from them by recognizing them as a meaning act of the theoretical gaze.

The lifeworld can be deconstructed, examined by reason, and put back together (if possible) to test our understanding of the pieces and the way they fit together. — sign

And put together into completely new configurations (imagination). This is another reason to think of sensory impressions as fundamental units.

And put together into completely new configurations (imagination). This is another reason to think of sensory impressions as fundamental units. — Harry Hindu

I can at least grant that they are well-chosen atoms for certain purposes. I very much consider sensation to be fundamental. The world is not just ideas, not just meaning. It is very much sensation and emotion too. 'Being' or that which is seems to be or include (roughly, as a start) concept, sensation, and emotion. Or rather we can try to construct an external world from these subjective concepts if we choose. It's a path among others. The 'external world' and 'concept' are themselves concepts, which complicates things. Is it even correct to assume that concept is subjective or only subjective?

fundamental units. — Harry Hindu

I am clarifying for myself that I don't object to the atomistic project. Analysis is good. I would just balance it out with a further clarification of what is already there. If we are going to explain reality (including what is called mind or reason) in terms of building blocks, then we also have to really look into the nature of reason. (Do we betray it when we only scan it for atoms to rip out of context?) Otherwise we have something like an un-opened box at the heart of our explanation. We We explain 'mind' (which includes our own ability to do) without having clarified its nature. Our attempts to explain reality add to reality and in that sense oppose themselves. (This still doesn't cancel the value of an atomistic/analytic approach.)


***
A little more on my understanding of Heidegger that might add this issue. Our pre-theoretical experience of the world is largely in terms of objects that we can just grab and use. We as the subject aren't present to ourselves much of the time. Instead we just 'are' grabbing and using. From this perspective, pure mind as opposed to pure object is a theoretical postulation. When we switch to the theoretical mode we gaze on the objects dispassionately (or of value only in the construction of generalizations.) And we are also highly conscious of the subject as we scan our own ideas for coherence. So the theoretical mode only reinforces its founding assumptions, in some sense --maybe trapping us in problems or at least trapping us in a reduced set of approaches to these problems.

Clarification.

Ok been reading some Dancy on Berkeley.

1. Berkeley wants to deny material substance but want to allow the existence of physical things.
2.'Physical' means part of the outside world.
3. He takes the word physical to mean material and so in one sense accepts material things
4. Does not accept that material things can exist outside of minds.

So Berkeley on one hand accepts physical objects as material things but because he doesn't accept that physical things can be mind independent . So the physical side of matter presents no conflict, only the quality matter has to exist independently stops materiel being a synonym physical.

So what Berkeley does is deny material objects while insisting on the existence of physical things.
Only minds and ideas exist (two things) but only one substance exists - minds / spirits.

I am clarifying for myself that I don't object to the atomistic project. Analysis is good. I would just balance it out with a further clarification of what is already there. If we are going to explain reality (including what is called mind or reason) in terms of building blocks, then we also have to really look into the nature of reason. Otherwise we have something like an un-opened box at the heart of our explanation. We We explain 'mind' (which includes our own ability to do) without having clarified its nature. Our attempts to explain reality add to reality and in that sense oppose themselves. — sign

That's not really how I see it. I see explanations (both right and wrong ones) as part of that causal substratum I talked about. They are just new arrangements resulting from interactions of input (sensory data) and our built-in software (genetic and life history). Explanations would be the output, no different than any output a computer produces (processed information). Explanations are causes themselves and produce effects. Everything is a process of causation (information/meaning). In essence, what is real is what has causal power.

That's not really how I see it. I see explanations (both right and wrong ones) as part of that causal substratum I talked about. They are just new arrangements resulting from interactions of input (sensory data) and our built-in software (genetic and life history). Explanations would be the output, no different than any output a computer produces (processed information). Explanations are causes themselves and produce effects. Everything is a process of causation (information/meaning). — Harry Hindu

Fair enough. How do you understand explanation? For me it's the postulation of necessary relationships. It's a grid thrown over experience. If you see this, then expect that (or project 'that' back on the past.) To get this, do that. Entities in relationship. I like this project/understanding of explanation. Clarifying/installing the causal nexus is what it looks like to me.

But I'd add that we have genesis and not just structure. The 'mind' creates new entities. Since the mind is creative, it is never finished knowing itself. It is its own product in some sense. The mind determines the nature of mind according to the memory of its own products. Meaning accumulates. The conversation becomes more complex and involves the introduction of explanatory entities that themselves end up asking for explanation. Reality swells and reflects on itself, at least if we grant the reality of ideas as deserving of explanation. Now we can box all of this up with the word 'mind' and still get some work done. I see that. This doesn't prevent our imposition of causal relationships.

When you think of "democracy" what fills your mind? What form does "democracy" take in your mind other than just the scribbles on the screen? How do you know that you're thinking of "democracy"? It requires an awareness of some visualization of maybe politicians vying for your vote, or citizens voting. Our minds cross-reference these visual or auditory impressions with other sensory impressions. "Warmth" refers to some tactile sensation. "Green eggs and ham" refer to a visual of eggs and ham that are colored green with maybe even an imagined smell or taste. — Harry Hindu

This reminds me of Derrida's point taken to the extreme. I largely agree. I'm interested in the 'finite resolution' of thought in the lifestream. Meaning is 'dirtied' by sensation, history, image, metaphor. 'Pure' meaning (the ideal essence of democracy in perfect clarity) does indeed look like a fiction. But I can't go the other way and neglect what is 'ideal' in the voice and text altogether.

I think we are emphasizing different aspects of the same situation. I'm focusing on the internal evolution of the imperfectly ideal and sensation-soaked concept system. You are starting more from the stuff of the world.

Which one is original ‘ship of theseus’? :razz:

How do you understand explanation? — sign

The original impulse behind philosophy was soteriological, in the sense of seeking an unconditional truth - understanding this one thing, all things are understood. Explanation was finding the reason for everything.

So Berkeley on one hand accepts physical objects as material things but because he doesn't accept that physical things can be mind independent . So the physical side of matter presents no conflict, only the quality matter has to exist independently stops materiel being a synonym physical. — Jamesk

I agree with Berkeley in that regard. He reminds us that it’s a conceit to believe we can see the world as if from no perspective whatever, as if sense-knowledge is absolute. In so doing we attribute to sense-knowledge a kind of absoluteness which is not warranted. This is his principle point.

if I observed an oar in the water and it is bent then according to Berkeley, the oar does not appear to be bent, it's actually bent. But if I put my hand in the water, I feel the oar is straight! Does this mean that there are two actual oars I am perceiving? — Happenstance

Say we see an oar in water, Hylas says, and it appears bent to us. We then lift it out and see that it is really straight; the bent appearance was an illusion caused by the water's refraction. On Philonous' view, though, we cannot say that we were wrong about the initial judgement; if we perceived the stick as bent then the stick had to have been bent. ... Philonous has an answer to this worry. While we cannot be wrong about the particular idea, he explains, we can still be wrong in our judgement. Ideas occur in regular patterns, and it is these coherent and regular sensations that make up real things, not just the independent ideas of each isolated sensation. The bent stick can be called an illusion, therefore, because that sensation is not coherently and regularly connected to the others. If we pull the stick out of the water, or we reach down and touch the stick, we will get a sensation of a straight stick. It is this coherent pattern of sensations that makes the stick. If we judge that the stick is bent, therefore, then we have made the wrong judgement, because we have judged incorrectly about what sensation we will have when we touch the stick or when we remove it from the water. 1

the sense of seeking an unconditional truth - understanding this one thing, all things are understood. Explanation was finding the reason for everything. — Wayfarer

I understand why one would say 'if you understand anything completely, then you understand everything.' It captures that the nature of things consists largely of actual and possible relationships with other things. Things in isolation are in some sense an abstraction.

Is explanation just the projection of necessary relationships? Or does passion come into it? A sense of recognition and familiarity? One can use the word in various ways, but I'd say that metaphors the frame the situation in terms of motive and purpose have their value.

I agree with Berkeley in that regard. He reminds us that it’s a conceit to believe we can see the world as if from no perspective whatever, as if sense-knowledge is absolute. In so doing we attribute to sense-knowledge a kind of absoluteness which is not warranted. This is his principle point. — Wayfarer

I have also gleaned from Dancy that Berkeley is only attacking the theory of materialism that also accepts spiritual substance - in which case he is also attacking Descartes and saying Rene you got it wrong, there is only one type of substance and that is spiritual

I am not clear on whether Locke accepted spiritual substance or not although I suppose he must have. Locke presents us a world created by God that runs by itself, so I guess he does allow for it.

Also Berkeley has a strict definition of 'sensible thing', for him the tree presents itself to our senses,'matter' or material substrata do not directly present themselves as 'clouds' of atoms, particles and forces. Matter presents itself in the form of the tree, all we sense is that aspect, anything more behind it is beyond our senses.

Say we see an oar in water, Hylas says, and it appears bent to us. We then lift it out and see that it is really straight; the bent appearance was an illusion caused by the water's refraction. On Philonous' view, though, we cannot say that we were wrong about the initial judgement; if we perceived the stick as bent then the stick had to have been bent. ... Philonous has an answer to this worry. While we cannot be wrong about the particular idea, he explains, we can still be wrong in our judgement. Ideas occur in regular patterns, and it is these coherent and regular sensations that make up real things, not just the independent ideas of each isolated sensation. The bent stick can be called an illusion, therefore, because that sensation is not coherently and regularly connected to the others. If we pull the stick out of the water, or we reach down and touch the stick, we will get a sensation of a straight stick. It is this coherent pattern of sensations that makes the stick. If we judge that the stick is bent, therefore, then we have made the wrong judgement, because we have judged incorrectly about what sensation we will have when we touch the stick or when we remove it from the water.

Thanks for that , but what does God, the arbiter of actuality, see? Why would he present such an illusion to us if not just the mere behaviour of physical things? I guess I'm appealing to parsimony here.

To me, what you have said here appears very confused. Why does something have to be absolute to be real? Are relations not real? — Metaphysician Undercover

What was confusing about it? I may be wrong about it but I thought what I typed was pretty clear! Relationships do exist, there is no denying this, as do illusions, so what is your definition of real?

This is a question to both of you, are illusions, even though they exist, real?

How do you understand explanation? For me it's the postulation of necessary relationships. It's a grid thrown over experience. If you see this, then expect that (or project 'that' back on the past.) To get this, do that. Entities in relationship. I like this project/understanding of explanation. Clarifying/installing the causal nexus is what it looks like to me. — sign

I see explanation as just a use of language, and language is just composed of visual and/or auditory impressions. When we explain things to others, we use our cultural language (those specific visual and auditory symbols) to communicate an explanation.

If we are just explaining it to ourselves, we may do it in our cultural language, but those scribbles and sounds still need to refer to something to mean something other than just being visual scribbles and sounds. We don't necessarily think in our cultural language, rather we think in our sensory impressions. Most of the information we receive about the world comes visually. We are visual creatures and is why most of the terms in our language refer to visual experiences, or visual models. They are the "words" (or symbols) that make up a majority our explanation of the world (world-view). We then communicate that amalgam of visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory and gustatory representation of the world by converting them to specific visual and auditory symbols that we know others understand the meaning to (they refer to their other sensory units). I hope that makes sense.

A little more on my understanding of Heidegger that might add this issue. Our pre-theoretical experience of the world is largely in terms of objects that we can just grab and use. We as the subject aren't present to ourselves much of the time. Instead we just 'are' grabbing and using. From this perspective, pure mind as opposed to pure object is a theoretical postulation. When we switch to the theoretical mode we gaze on the objects dispassionately (or of value only in the construction of generalizations.) And we are also highly conscious of the subject as we scan our own ideas for coherence. So the theoretical mode only reinforces its founding assumptions, in some sense --maybe trapping us in problems or at least trapping us in a reduced set of approaches to these problems. — sign

Going back to being skeptical of this state-of-affairs being a "view", I have to ask, "why does it appear like a "view""? What I mean is, why is there depth, not just in vision, but in our auditory, tactile, gustatory and olfactory symbols? That may be the one thing that they all share in common because if not for that, we could have good reason to be skeptical of our sensations being about a external world. Each sense supplies very different symbols. The fact that I can see coffee and feel coffee at the same time, isn't as good as being able to see them and feel them in the same location as well.

And it's not just depth, but the location of everything seems to be relative to a specific location - the head, or dare I say, the brain. All of our sensory impressions carry with them a location in space relative to the head. Try this experiment. Close your eyes and touch your thumb and index finger together. Move your arm slowly around and you can sense the location of that sensation moving relative to a specific location - your head.

It just seems odd that this state-of-affairs isn't a view when it certainly seems like one. And it's not just using language to call it a "view". This state-of-affairs is what a "view" would be, no?

This is a question to both of you, are illusions, even though they exist, real? — Happenstance

Berkeley is a proper empiricist, all the laws of nature are preserved, real and empirically knowable. With everything being an idea of God causation is also explained. There is no necessary connection between events except Gods will, event A precedes event B because God makes it this way. God is the ultimate causal force in the universe, being finite spirits ourselves we also have some minor causal efficacy but none whatsoever exists in objects.

I didn't bypass it. I replied and I said that it is only coherent if they mean something, or else it's just scribbles. That isn't subjective. — Harry Hindu

Meaning and coherence are subjective.

"The song Kashmir" refers to a particular, and so does "music" refer to a particular (particular idea or whatever) — Metaphysician Undercover

There, "music" refers to a particular as in a particular song, like "Kashmir" (and a particular instantiation of "Kashmir" at that.)

Thanks for that Wayfarer, but what does God, the arbiter of actuality, see? — Happenstance

Not sure, but I suppose the doctrinal answer would be that, being omnipotent, He sees everything. I would also imagine that classical theology surmises that God sees in a way that humans - or ‘individual spirits’ in Berkeley’s parlance - cannot.

I should clarify that will only defend Berkeley up to a point. I think his fundamental intuition is sound, but the way that I interpret it is in the sense that it reminds us that we are participants in reality, and not just observers of it; ‘the world’ is not something that exists quite independently of us in the way that modern philosophy nearly always assumes. That assumption is grounded in an attitude characteristic of early modern science, which I think Berkeley also intuited, and was reacting against.

The problem resides in taking the methodological attitude of ‘objectivity’ as a metaphysical axiom, which it isn’t; because reality is not actually something we are outside of or apart from (and this shows up eventually in the so-called ‘observer problem’). But this subtle point is something that I have come to understand through the perspective of non-dualism rather than through Western philosophy per se, although once you learn to see it through this perspective, then some convergences between Western philosophical idealism and Eastern non-dualism emerge (see e.g. here.)

we use our cultural language (those specific visual and auditory symbols) to communicate an explanation. — Harry Hindu

I agree, but you didn't go into how you understand explanation. What is an explanation?

but those scribbles and sounds still need to refer to something to mean something other than just being visual scribbles and sounds — Harry Hindu

I agree. I think being-in-a-world-with-others is something like a basic structure of experience. I see an lamp on my desk as see-able also by others and as something I can switch on for light. I expect others (within my community) to also grasp it immediately as something one can switch on for light and as something that I can see. I grasp the word 'lamp' as grasping such things in a vagueness that covers many individual lamps. So we start from somewhere like this, understanding 'too much.' And then an atomic reconstruction needs to forget this complex unity of self, others, and world through language in order to build it all back up.

Relationships do exist, there is no denying this, as do illusions, so what is your definition of real? — Happenstance

In all pre-modern philosophy, there is an underlying architecture or archetype of the ‘great chain of being’, such that what is the source of being or ground of being possesses a greater or higher degree of reality than does the phenomenal domain/realm of sense/material world. That is why in classical culture, philosophy (and philosophical spirituality) is characterised in term of ‘ascent’ through higher forms of understanding. So ‘the real’ can only properly be known by the sage or philosopher who, in the Western philosophical tradition at least, ascends by the use of reason to the ‘vision of the One’ (which is the meaning of the allegory of the Cave).

This overall orientation is still visible in Hegel, but with the subsequent rejection of philosophical idealism, especially in the English-speaking world, it has basically been abandoned and forgotten, save for in the work of a few solitary individuals (see obit for Timothy Sprigge.)