N can be difficult . . . and his writings are quite clear — 180 Proof

Thus Spake 180 Proof

:smile:

Asfar as I'm concerned change happens to properties (colors, shapes, temperature, weight, etc.) — Agent Smith

Insofar as an entity must have mass, then mass is a property of that entity.

Insofar as an entity must change, then change is a necessary property of that entity.

Your concerns notwithstanding, there is no way out.

Numerals have spatial presence — Metaphysician Undercover

Numerals are symbols and as such they are especially useful when that for which they stand has no spatial existence.

If you would have spent a tad more time reading the last full paragraph of the comment you clearly spent a significant amount of time criticizing, you would see that I already addressed the possibility that even if we accept for sake of discussion that there are non-spatial entities, wouldn't they necessarily have to refer to an entity that is or was a spatial entity.

And if you choose not to accept for the sake of discussion, then we have nothing to discuss. And I good with that.

I don't think it's very useful to "accept for the sake of discussion" a phra — Metaphysician Undercover

"If we accept for the sake of discussion" is used in place of "if".

And I use it because I am tired of having to point out that "if" indicates that I do not necessarily agree with what follows but that I would nonetheless like to discuss its implications in the event it is true. I guess I was spoiled by the Philosophy Department's universal acceptance and understanding of the conditional nature of "if".

As for the rest of my post, I was clear that I was working with the examples and questions as already given by others. Perhaps your criticisms of their examples could be addressed to them? I am sure they would appreciate them as least as much as I. Though perhaps you could spare them the ad hominems.

But thank you for taking the time.

Or maybe not if I've only read into SuZ my own concerns and missed H's point(lessness). — 180 Proof

I have never heard anyone say Heidegger is easy. And it is definitely hard to determine what his primary goal is. And that is the primary purpose of the post.

Failing to recognize that the primary goal (revealing the meaning of being) set forth in what is mistakenly referred to as the introduction to Being and Time causes many to presume the primary goal of Being and Time is to reveal the meaning of being. Instead, the goal of Being and Time is much less ambitious than and "preparatory" to revealing the meaning of being. As such, its primary goal is to describe the being who questions the meaning of being. And it is from there that one should be off and running.

So in that sense, what is possibly an inherently confusing subject to begin with (the nature of being) becomes ever more confusing beginning at page one.

I have been reading Heidegger for years and still have to orient myself from time to time by reminding myself that, in Heideggerian terms, I am being-in-the-world or I am an understanding of the world or I am an attunement to the world.

But my all time favorite orienting mantra is being is that on the basis of which being is already understood.

I have wasted many a fine summer hour smoking a cigar while trying to understand what the hell that means.

:smile:

Being-there as being-in-the-world is primarily governed by logos…Coming into the world, one grows into a determinate tradition of speaking, seeing, interpreting. — Heidegger

That is good stuff. It would be great to have a citation if it is easily available. I am not asking you to go and track it down. But I like it.

Sartre's overly-Cartesian and derivative B&N might as well be re-titled 'Body and Nobody' to clearly advertise its differences from H's opus. — 180 Proof

Hebert Dreyfus essentially called Being and Nothingness a masterful misinterpretation of another philosopher (Heidegger).

I'm facing problems treating change as a property. — Agent Smith

If we accept for the sake of discussion that some entities have necessary properties, then an entity with necessary properties cannot exist in the absence of a necessary property.

If we accept for the sake of discussion that some entities must change, then why wouldn't change be a necessary property of such entities?

Is it possible for change to be an entity having properties in some situations and to be a property of an entity in other situations?

We are so binary.

I think both space and objects are properties (i.e. events) of change — 180 Proof

An entity having necessary properties cannot exist independent of its necessary properties and properties have no existence independent of that of which they are a property. So your formulation suggests that there can be no change in the absence of space and objects. And if we accept for the sake of discussion that change necessarily implies (and may be synonymous with) time, then there can be space and no objects and no change in the absence of time.

So in the end, isn't it likely that space, objects, and time are all necessary properties of each other and none of them can exist independent of the others? Perhaps that is why Einstein called it the space/time continuum rather than the space and the time continua?

Simply put, I think you are 2/3rds right.

Why would this not be the same individual, extended in time? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because my answer was to the simple and general question of how to differentiate entities not in space. .

Someone other than I postulated a mortgage as an example of an entity that is not in space.

After that, someone other than I asked how would you differentiate entities not in space.

And it occurred to me that if we accept for the sake of discussion that mortgages are not in space, we can differentiate them by the order in which they are created, i.e., we could differentiate them by time. That is why we call one mortgage the first mortgage and the other mortgage the second mortgage.

And I suppose there are methods in addition to time such as by reference to other entities that may or may not be in space. For example, this mortgage was taken out by Bob who lives down the street while that mortgage was taken out by Sylvia who is now deceased.

Simply put, if we accept for the sake of discussion that there are entities not in space, then time is one method by which we can differentiate them.

But this raises an additional and perhaps more fundamental issue, i.e., even if we accept for the sake of discussion that there are entities not in space, do they not necessarily refer to an entity that is or once was in space?

Anyone?

"When we look at a bird, we see the bird, not the activity in our brain." — Qwertyportne

I am confident that I have never seen the activity in my brain. I see no synapses firing or anything of that nature. Way too ghost in the machine like.

Though one could certainly argue that whatever it is I do see is related to the activity in my brain. But then one can argue that activity in my brain is related to the bird whose presence may have had a causal effect upon the activity in my brain.

So the presence of the bird is related to the activity in my brain which is related to the image I have of the bird and suddenly the notion the image must be related to only to either/or strikes me us unnecessarily binary.

So yes, I suspect the image of the bird is the product of the birds affect upon my brain and I have no problem with the notion that the product of the birds affect upon my brain may differ from the product of the birds affect upon my dog's brain.

an ongoing discussion of the nature of being.

objective reality — Mersi

I find disturbing the notion that some things are more real than others. The thought that reality and objective reality are distinct has a nonsensical quality about it. It brings us one step closer to the notion of the actually real which in turn is just a step away from the really actually real and down the rabbit hole we go.

What space does "being third in the alphabet" occupy? — Banno

the space between B and D.

:smile:

If there exist individuals that do not occupy a space, how can they be differentiable? How do you separate an individual that does not occupy a space from another individual that does not occupy a space? — Daniel

by time.

I don't think he was pretending, as he wasn't purporting to doubt what he didn't doubt. — Ciceronianus

:up:

:point:

I would say that venerable joker, Rene Descartes, was (in effect) playing "Let's Pretend" when he pretended an Evil Demon--evidently an even more practiced and accomplished joker than Descartes himself--was causing him to believe the entire world actually existed — Ciceronianus

I don't think "Lets Pretend" is the same as "it could be."

I'm half-right seems far better than completely wrong — TheMadFool

Being half right also seems better than being half wrong.

So there is that.

yes.

I find it useful from time to time to remind myself that Dasein is the term Heidegger attaches to that being whose mode of being is existence.

It saves many (including myself) from arcane arguments about Dasein this and Dasein that.

I strongly encourage you to try and make your way through Division II successfully — Joshs

I have read it dozens of times. I have been reading ten pages a day of Being and Time every day for almost twenty years. I find Mulholland's study guide to be extremely useful for understanding Division II. But thanks for caring.

But be careful, Heidegger is a slippery fellow. He actually wrote what is referred to as the introduction to Being and Time after he wrote Being and Time. So it is somewhat specious to later claim that the two parts you have written completes the 6 part project you set forth in what is referred to as the introduction to the two parts you have written. Yeah, that's the ticket. . .

And if you haven't done so already, I strongly recommend Heidegger's History of the Concept of Time and Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Both are essentially lectures converted to books. The former was from a class he gave prior to Being and Time and the latter is from a class he gave after Being and Time. And the classes are essentially Being and Time as taught in the classroom.

And now that I think about it, Mulholland does suggest that the body of Heidegger's work is sufficient to meet the objectives set out in what is referred to as the introduction to Being and Time. But he certainly does not suggest that Being and Time alone is sufficient. I am quite certain he made his way through Division II successfully.

But always in the context of the question of the meaning of being, which Heidegger repeats over and over again — Xtrix

But that is of little help.

If I am confident I can reveal to you the meaning of baseball if I can explain to you hitting, pitching, fielding, and baserunning and I explain hitting and nothing more, then neither you nor I can claim I have revealed the meaning of baseball notwithstanding the number of times I refer to the meaning of baseball. In fact, Heidegger's continual reference to it makes it even more likely that people will mistakenly expect Being and Time to reveal the meaning of being.

Heidegger did explicate the structure of the being who questions being (the goal of Being and Time), but we cannot understand the meaning of baseball simply because we understand hitting.

Reason alone tells us that it is better than not to understand that what is referred to as the introduction to Being and Time is intended to be an introduction to a 6 part work of which Being and Time is the first 2 parts.

And the greatest fatality to not understanding this point is the endless number of people who cannot tell you the goal of Being and Time.

Average everydayness is not a mere , generic reference — Joshs

I agree.

As I clearly stated earlier, "average everydayness" is the context Heidegger uses to explicate the basic structure of Dasein, i.e., the structure common to all Daseins regardless of any particular state of authenticity.

Heidegger does not use the context of average everydayness to explain our behavior in any situation, let alone particular situations. Instead, he uses the context of average everydayness to explain the elements common to every situation in which we find our self, i.e., we proceed based upon our attunement, our understanding, and our projected outcome. That is true all Daseins whether they be good, bad, short, tall, authentic, inauthentic. . .

I agree.

As I clearly stated earlier, "average everydayness" is the context Heidegger uses to explicate the basic structure of Dasein, i.e., the structure common to all Daseins regardless of any particular state of authenticity.

To be more precise Das Man is the subject of average everydayness. — Joshs

and therefore?

When it comes to Das Man, Heidegger is getting at the forces that create the ego in its average everydayness. And those forces work powerfully upon all Daseins regardless of their state of authenticity. The most authentic person in the world may still mow their lawn or send Christmas cards for no reason other than "that's what one does." There are no Daseins immune to the forces of Das Man. There are simply some who are better able to work the shackles than others.

For reasons I do not understand, you are trying very hard to draw non-existent distinctions between the basic structure of authentic living Daseins and inauthentic living Daseins. You could be the most authentic person in the world and I could be the most inauthentic person in the world and we would both wake up each day with an attunement to a world of which we have an understanding and project ourselves forward through that world based upon our own ultimate for the sake of which. Every Dasien is in and attunement to world of which they have an understanding and proceeds therefrom. That is the basic structure of Dasein. We all have it.

“But the average everydayness of Da-sein must not be understood as a mere "aspect. " In it, too, and even in the mode of inauthenticity, the structure of existentiality lies a priori. In it, too, Da-sein is con­cerned with a particular mode of its being to which it is related in the way of average everydayness, if only in the way of fleeing from it and of forgetting it.”(BT Sec.9) — Joshs

As true as that may be, it is true for all Daseins regardless of their state of "authenticity." "Even in the mode of inauthenticity" is not the same as "only in the mode of inauthenticity." Surly you must see that.

Average everydayness is what Heidegger calls Das Man — Joshs

That is incorrect.

It's my guess (I'm not sure) that Heidegger puts us aside of animals in that our Dasein has a Dasein about itself — Raymond

We can know how we are and we can recognize a description of how we are. Heidegger also maintains that we are the being who questions being and we have no basis whatsoever for claiming that any other types of beings question being.

In addition, each Dasein has an "ultimate for the sake of which" and that different Daseins can have a different "ultimate for the sake of which." And we have no basis to conclude that other types of beings of any "ultimate for the sake of which."

Certainly other animals appear to have an understanding, be in a mood, and act with purpose. But we have no basis for presuming animals have their own individualized "ultimate for the sake of which" or that they are beings that question being.

Heidegger makes no claim that Dasein is unique to human beings and his views do not depend upon any such uniqueness. If it turned out that every Dolphin had their own "ultimate for the sake of which" or that Dolphins spent a lot of time questioning being, Heidegger wouldn't care.

Heidegger never considered consciousness or consciousness of consciousness to be particularly interesting topics. Ultimately, the only recollection I have of any fundamental Heideggerian position on consciousness is that it is derivative of being-in-the-world. If anything, I suspect Heidegger would be a bit perplexed by the all the attention it receives in contemporary philosophy.

Isn't the answer always going to be tied to the example used? If the left side of the room negated the opposite side of the room, then there would be no room.

Objectivity is a theoretically adoptable disposition that leads many to mistakenly believe that pretending to be on the outside looking in somehow cleanses them of the subjectivity inherent to being where they actually are; there is no outside.

We have no more reason to believe that natural laws exist than we have reason to believe gods or faeries exist — Millard J Melnyk

I agree. We have a habit of attaching labels to what we can not explain and then proceeding as if the label explains all.

The subconscious of course, transcendence of course, natural law of course. Buzz killers one and all.

I'm incorrigible, sorry. Imagine not acknowledging his supremacy. World's greatest Nazi, for sure. Philosophy's Fuhrer, as it were. — Ciceronianus

Heidegger was not a good person.

In division two, Heidegger moves on from average everydayness to talk about authentic angst and time. So even though what you say is true, once we have finished the book, we know about both inauthentic ( average everyday) and authentic Dasein. — Joshs

Heidegger does not equate average everydayness with inauthentic existence. Average everydayness is the context that allows Heidegger to explicate the structure of Dasein. A Dasein living inauthentically has the same structure as a Dasein living authentically. And even the authentically living Dasein lives most of its life in average everydayness. They wake up, fall out of bed, run a comb across their head. . .

And again and consistent with my original post, "finishing the book" only gets us through 2 parts of an incomplete 6 part project. Having an understanding of the average everydayness of being human and an understanding of what it means to live authentically does not get us to the goal described in what is mistakenly treated as an introduction to Being and Time, the meaning of being.

Heidegger said that people are the only creatures with a dasein that has a notion of its own dasein. — Raymond

I have not come across Heidegger ever saying that humans are the only beings with Dasein. And if it turned out that other beings had a Dasein, it would matter not to Heidegger. Either you recognize Heidegger's description of the average everydayness of human existence or you don't. If we recognize it, then Heidegger is correct. If we don't recognize it, then Heidegger is incorrect.

Dasein is far more than consciousness of consciousness. Dasein is easier grasped if understood as a structure within which one makes their way about in the world. Dasein is always in a mood, with a certain understanding, and moving forward in the world in a purposeful manner. And that is the structure of the average everydayness of human being.

How unfortunate. Do let us know when you find out. G'day. — Agent Smith

You can count on it. I only hope you will do the same.

Has he a general theory about caring? — Raymond

No. He does not have a general theory about caring. The German care does not have the same emotional and moral connotations as the English care. Again and for Heidegger, care is simply that which motivates and organizes your life. If you care about rocks, you might be well advised to become a geologist. What ever it is that you care about in whatever situation you find yourself is going to go a long way in explaining what you do and why you do it.

his writings are quite clear with great style — 180 Proof

I disagree.

I don't think that is an accurate interpretation of Heidegger. His concept of care has little to do with morality (perhaps like Heidegger himself?). Instead, I interpret his concept of care to be primarily rooted in the notion that what we do is rooted in what we care about in particular and not that we care in general. We do not organize our lives around caring in general. Instead, we organize our lives around what we care about in particular.

If one truly cares about white supremacy, then one will be a good Nazi.

Note N's prescient criticism sixty-something years before: — 180 Proof

I like Nietzsche. But he too is no slouch when it comes to offering up obscurity. Much of his reputation is built upon the notion that he must be profound because he is so hard to understand.

And you know that to be true.

And I make no claim to understanding Nietzsche in any significant way. Even though I know I have read far more Nietzsche than most people who pretend to understand him, any understanding I do have is rooted primarily in Kaufman's interpretations.