But what needs to be analysed is the way in which this symbolic violence is linked to the real violence of the institutions with the myriad of almost invisible micro-violences that make up the society of imperial capitalism. — David Mo

I guess this a good point. The symbols themselves represent "social hooks" which are or were funded by real violence. Yet, the labeling itself is enough establish social distinction or exclusion. Think about racists using the N-word. Even if all they do for the moment is signify you may be well advised to ... be careful.

Deleuze and Guattari made up for the concept of "regimes of significants", following Nietzsche based on the ancient "sign(s) deep into the flesh" to signify ownership or subjection. With the internalization of those archaic structures we get to allegiance in advance.
The language one speaks originally likely was a language of few brought to others by not too friendly means.

Oh really? Didn’t know that its no longer considered scientific. I thought the results haven’t been replicated because of ethical concerns? Thanks for the clarification! — Josh Lee

I have to say I never quite got that experiment or the test subjects. How can a situation where you agree to spend some time in a fictional prison for money be the same as the real thing. How can someone be so stupid to make things difficult for everyone??? The experiment might show what people knowingly participating in those experiments might behave and not much more...
What would you expect? Nobody there has any reason to behave in a certain way _except_ if you told them to play cops and robbers. It is so pretty damn obvious that this "research" wanted some particular results it is not even funny anymore if you think about it.
The experiment is not unethical because some idiots headed for the MMMonsterkill, but because of

The implications we can draw from it is amazing — Josh Lee

this. "They" (paranoia or not) wanted you to draw conclusions. Think about it. There is tons of political issues connect to such "research".

Are there clear criteria to distinguish between legitimate and lawless acts of violence? — Number2018

Would making such a distinction be a legitimate or lawless act? Or would it come down to whose opinion is which?
For example, when a judge calls something "criminal", we all know that this might be quite relative, for example depending on where you are. Would that make any difference?
The "lawless act" was proposed for example by M.Stirner in phrases like "Right is what looks right to me". Marx called this nonsense and a judge might also disagree, I guess.
What is lawless about this act is that Stirner solely bases his judgement on his own decision without any ideological justifications. This cannot be "legitimate" in the common sense as this implies some external measure of judgement.

Could you ever prove I dont? Would it be right to tell people they dont have a purpose if that's what you believe to be more realistic? — Benj96

A little joke: Of course you have a purpose... Who else should pay your elders pension?

Associative speculation: Artificial neural networks are modelled based on physiological properties of the brain. Mathematically what these things do is subdividing space and by this "encircling" regions. "Points" (inputs) that lie in this region are those for which the proposition (the network models) is true (though you can also express how "far away" a sample lies in space).
But here, again, there is always the notion of a (mathematical) space.

But are these truly understandable things, or no matter how evolved our brain gets we'll never grasp the true essence or these very abstract things? — Eugen

I tend to the opinion that we do not understand those as they are real corner-cases that are largely irrelevant to our existence. Hence they lack reality.
The german word "Begriff"(concept) has a notion of "grabbing". This carries some truth I guess.
I am not really into those speculations but even a quantum-amoeba could have a better understanding of it's normal environment than we do.

The lack of understanding in QM comes from the paradoxes of it and from the lack of willingness to admit that the way we're dealing with science from the observer perspective is subjective, therefore wrong. This is why QM has so many paradoxes. — Eugen

Given: Schroedingers cat would know if it is dead or not.
But e.g. finite space gives us a headache. Seems we cannot image finite space as there is always the mental picture embedded in an infinite space. There is always "space in space".

I guess with formal means (maths) we can get quite beyond things we could understand intuitively. If we really "understand" those relations is quite a question. I remember the claim by a physics prof: "Who says he understands Quantum Mechanics has not understood them."

But being present in two universes at the same time is something that makes sense to us, we would understand this state, while a dog cannot understand us playing a videogame. — Eugen

The tale makes sense, yes. This is just like the color-blind without any apparature. He does not really get the difference between colors.

Than your answer to my question would be no and I personally agree with you. So why do you think that way, what are your arguments? — Eugen

Would it? I see it this way: Imagine an intelligence being present in two parallel universes at the same time. We would never really get why it tried to evade invisible obstacles.
So your whole question breaks down to a speculation if there could be something that is per definition irrelevant as it has no reality for us perceived by some fictional super-brains.

But the substance of my question lies exactly in the issue of our capability to comprehend every *comprehensible* thing of the reality, or if reality has things that aren't comprehensible to our mind but comprehensible to a more evolved brain. — Eugen

Comprehensible to whom? I would understand the difference between abezido and nuralemina :D

As I tried to explain: What is comprehensible must be rooted in reality.
A color-blind cannot understand the difference between colos. He may understand that non-color-blind can distinct the look of objects. He can understand the theory of wavelengths and understand why non-color-blind can distinct those colors. So he only can distinct those "colors" with the help of some appartus.
If I just started to call some things "abezido" and some things "nuralemina" you will never understand.

Edit: And Caear would likely understand the cellphone - you would just have to take the long route of explanation.

What do you mean by "understanding"? As the example per se: There is no dissent over the equations of quantum mechanics but what do those mean? The fact that there is discussion and different opinions indicates nobody knows what they are talking about.
There is no guarantee that things rooted in arbitrariness get "understood". On which basis should that happen?

When the computer chip in your clothes dryer receives data from the humidity sensor and decides when your clothes are dry, do you think it has feelings and opinions about the matter?

And if not, why would a bigger machine, operating on exactly the same fundamental principles, be any different? — fishfry

Has anyone ever proven one or the other? All this does is rephrasing common opinions. From this foundational basis then "arguments" shall be made why that property can or cannot be present in which kind of machinery in a "wise platonic tongue".
This appeals to the attitude that led Turing to hiding which one was the machine in the test.

“What does it know about dying if it doesn’t have a body that rots? Can it still be intelligent?” — Frank Pray

What does he know? Did he die before? "Rotting body"? - Death in particular can come quickly. Seems he is lacking introspection wrt to what he is talking about. Just another MIT profressor put out of context?! We can doubt - mushy mysticisms about everyday experience substitute modern voodoo for thorough analysis. Being psychic is not a problem limited to A.I. though. The lack of any foundational reality has a long philosophical tradition. Seems to be something for chosen audiences.

And if I think about it: This is what is pretty annoying about this discussion and the question "But is it conscious?". First one should be able to answer the question if that mattered at all if that thing constantly behaved as if it were. Everone knows it could not be decided by asking what is "true".
So put it clear: We want computer-slaves that can solve our problems without us doing much work.
What are the risks? What is the potential profit worth?
It seems the last thing "philosophers" would consider is asking the machine if it had any problems with doing so. That is significant

As I see it there are numerous fields where computers generate intelligent solutions for particular problems. But there is no implementation yet that could do that ad hoc for any field (and yes, you can fail intelligently).
I would guess that (due to science-fiction) today's society is much more open to the idea of an intelligent machine than maybe was the case at Turing's time. I guess this is reflected in the whole setting. Today there are software engineers running around trying to tweak natural language processing as they know where the flaws are. I would take it pretty seriously if they once say: "Okay, now we really cannot tell the difference anymore."

What do you mean? — TheMadFool

If two subject are the same and one of them is the same as yet another, then all three are the same.

Is this a false assumption? — TheMadFool

It is anthropocentric.

The Turing test specifically states that all the AI has to do is give the impression that it's a human. — TheMadFool

If it can it's behaviour must be intelligent.

I find that hard to believe because the test specifically mentions that the AI has to convince a human that it (the AI) is human and being human involves consciousness - in fact consciousness is the defining feature of being human. — TheMadFool

I guess this is more about transitivity. Humans are assumed to be intelligent. Commonly this is assumed to be indicated by intelligent behaviour and communication. Therefor the behaviour of an intelligent machine must be indistinguishable from human behaviour in this respect.
It is not really about pretending to be a human.

If you think, as Turing supposedly did, that consciousness can be inferred from the behavior of a computer then it isn't much of stretch to conclude that Turing would've come to the conclusion that p-zombies are impossible. — TheMadFool

Turing wasn't concerned with philosophy. And without reading his papers I guess he spoke of intelligence, not consciousness.
If p-Zombies make you headache, may I ask, do you think other people are zombies or not and why? This surely would make for a life-style...

I don't believe physicists have any true knowledge of anything — Gregory

No, they just accumulate power.

Realizing that matter could have infinite aspects (and forces) is an agnosticism that I think leads to a spiritual way of thinking — Gregory

So if you are in spirituality why do you even bother with science? Your could know that arguing scientifically you get scientific explanations. Modern sciences have emancipated themselves from more encompassing systems.

3) so philosophy is a higher science than the physical "sciences" — Gregory

It is clear that in philosophy all statements are made with a certain interest. In my opinion the reputation of philosophy suffers from the fact that those interests do not get reflected. My guess is that they cannot be reflected as this would contradict those interests.

Well, it's just a presumption that drops are drops no matter when. If this was dependend on time physicists were very interested to find out. Just so that they can change their opinion.

You could twist your argument: It is impossible for a voluntarist to gather representative samples from nature as he always just sees them if he chooses to look at them. So he can only speak of objects he chooses to witness. The point? Utter nonsense.

Starting from the fact that we cannot agree on just what is consciousness and have big problems in deciding just what is and what isn't conscious, it's hardly surprising that even a brilliant mind like Turing would be vague on the subject. — ssu

I guess the point was: something is intelligent, if it is called intelligent because it appears to be intelligent.
The judgement is already made by people, not by some arbitrary criteria. :lol:
The written form of communication was chosen to prevent a bias based on seeing a human or not.

One of the best points is made in Gibsons "Neuromancer"
Case: "Are you sentient?"
AI: "Well, if you ask me then I am. But I guess that is some kind of philosophical question. hrhr"

Intelligent?

The p-zombie has no consciousness per definition. On the other hand, nobody has proven that a sheet of aluminum does not have feelings. So what was the point again? Ah yes! We can define things to have a certain property or not and then "prove" that it has it or not. Pretty scholastic.

It was Rousseau that started me on the "loathe society, it's unnatural" path, if it makes any difference. — madworld

Seriously - there is not much to say: The young are far out on the gaussian curve of voters - society is not yours, and will never be until you do not care anymore.
Do something practical - maybe, as student/junior/whatever, you can work at an engeneering company somewhere. Thoughts do not matter. As long as you do not prove your fitness to survive (which might mean earning money) - in practice - you are unable to reproduce yourself and to survive.
Natural as can be: You just know you are scum. :grin:

You assume that because a coherent relation is not detectable now, it will never be detectable because it does not exist. — jgill

One step further: There is no relation as there are no distinct entities.

Consciousness has different modalities. — MonisticIdealist

How would you know? All you relate to is consciousness. Because you call it such?

A perception is a state of consciousness, just like a thought, a dream etc. — MonisticIdealist

No, a perception is consciousness. You seem to image an entity "consciousness" which could then have perceptions or not - which is empirically never the case. That is reification.

However, perceptions of brain activity are certain states of consciousness themselves. — MonisticIdealist

Ex falso quodlibet.

I guess one could say, Subjectivity is objective.

I don't know. Communists have emotions? Ninotschka (from that movie about communism)? It seems to be based on systematically replacing emotions with the scientific socialist formula. — Syamsu

Sure. But there is some epistemology also.
See http://marxistphilosophy.org/stalin1938.pdf

Isn't this readily solved by dialectic materialism?

Because as I see it. in determinism everything is factual. All the causes, all the effects, they are all factual matters.

While with incompatibilist free will, then you have the agency of the choice as inherently subjective, validating the idea of emotions, and the concept of subjective opinion. — Syamsu

Isn't the whole point about what defines the subject in the first place, mind or matter? Why should intrinsic properties of matter constituting a self be something alien to said self? I do not get it.

Rights are essentially a relation of one party bending the will of another.
Property rights limit foreign access to possessions, your rights as a citizen limit the souvereignity of the state. This is why people tend to confuse them with their freedom - which is not that wrong after all.

Neither is there an absence of a first person point of view as self — javra

That was the difference we started with. All there is is there.

is not one (as a transcendentally apprehensive self) frightened during such juncture at seeing this other during the dream? — javra

Big point: There is no "self".

How does the case of dreams dispel the proposition that "the transcendentally apprehensive self is neither its mind nor its body, though conjoined to both"? — javra

Because your body does not need to be there (as normal) in dreams.
You may very well be right that "dreams are dependent upon the workings of an organism's physiological body". But this is simply not what the "subject" means in trancendental dialectics. Here the perceptions are taken "as-is" without presumptions. What can be said for sure is that they are perceived. Explaining them by the means of (other) perceptions is tautological. Not more, not less.

Yet the transcendentally apprehensive self is neither its mind nor its body, though conjoined to both. — javra

Not in the case of dreams. It is literally the empty form of perception.