I, personally, don't subscribe to a duality between a "worldly" first person point of view and any non-worldly first person point of view which one would, I presume, simultaneously be (in the same respect?). — javra

This is merely a differentiation between mind and body. As far as "duality" goes - that word carries some meaning (substantiality and stuff) in which I do not want to take stance right now. Dreams are an example where your self (as perceived by the mind) and your more worldly existence presumably can be doing quite different things.

My only claim is that when a subjective being is momentarily thirsty, that subjective being will at that juncture be in just such state of being. — javra

I think your claim was that because of this there was no object other than the subject itself. This, as I tried to point out, does not seem to hold as the thirst appears as just-another stimulus (which you link to your bodily self and hence say "I am thirsty")

Yet this culminating perception is not apprehended as other relative to oneself as subject, but instead is the state of being in which the subject momentarily finds him/herself – and therefore we express this state of awareness as “I am thirsty (as a subjective being)” — javra

Yet the "subject" in that case means the worldly self. This is quite different from the epistemological subject of transcendental philosophy. In fact, the thirst is very different from me. If I turn away attention I might even completely forget about it. This seems to be a strong indicator that it cannot really be a being of the subject itself but just a stimulus among many.

So, here, there is a non-duality between the subject of awareness and its object(s) of awareness. — javra

Why should thirst be that different from a chair or tree as perceived content? Isn't this based on presumptions?

The Subject is felt, it is not known as one of the Objects present to-and-for-itself. — PessimisticIdealism

It is known as the form of it's perception. There is always the perceiving and the perceived. But this only establishes it's mere existence. If it was felt, this would belong into the realm of the perceived.

possibility = a future thing that can be made the present — Syamsu

In a broader sense an event or thing whose present or future existence or happening is not ruled out.

From my perspective there is a possibility that a meteor will hit me today. But as those do not appear out of nowhere this might be impossible as well.

fact = a 1 to 1 corresponding model of a creation in the mind, forced by the evidence of it — Syamsu

I'm still asking myself if the meteor strike actually is possible.
To me it seems that the possibility of said meteor simply depends on (a lack of) knowledge: Knowing enough it is impossible or a sure hit.

Why haven’t u considered the subjective aspect of consciousness originating from the objective one — Vanbrainstorm

There even are philosophers who actually explain the objective aspect from the subject itself. Although coherent in themselves none of them could be used for a "proof" of this kind I guess.

A "relation" is always (at least) binary. To get the object from the subject, in logical mathematical terms, you need a function like y = f(x) and can then write rel(x, y). Just as the other way around one would just have to buy that y=f(x), though. :D

I suppose I'm not going to find an objectively, exclusively virtuous action as it is very subjective. — JacobPhilosophy

A try: Virtuosity means seeking the opportunity to be a hero.
The obligation opposes itself.

This would mean I had less time to do other things which may be even more important. When your are "telling the truth" you are telling one way or the other. But then it has to be the truth :)

Okay, sure, but what should I make out of that outside of it being a linguistic exercise applied to your vocabulary? — InPitzotl

You either get the distinction between subjects and objects or don't.

To quote M.Heidegger (Being and Time)

The essence of Dasein lies in its existence. Accordingly those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not 'properties' present-at-hand of some entity which 'looks' so and so and is itself present-at-hand; they are in each case possible ways for it to be, and no more than that. All the Being-as-it-is [So-sein] which this entity possesses is primarily Being. So when we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein', we are expressing not its "what" (as if it were a table, house or tree) but its Being.

Or with Descartes: Ego cogito, ergo sum

Why are those mutually exclusive? Who you are is what you are works fine for me. — InPitzotl

Yes. Your aren't me. That's a no-brainer. But the question is not "what works". There were many things that kinda "worked" but weren't right either.

Again, only if those things are mutually exclusive. — InPitzotl

To Do and Being done. No difference?

Otherwise, you would be a what that is a who. Who you are is what you are, but not all what's are who's. — InPitzotl

A "what" is never free. Things are involved in external relations defining them and putting them in place. This would contradict free decisions.

With that in mind, when you hear the suggestion that we are x, you picture that as (a) lowering us from our level to the level of x. But that is an artificial perspective, and it is completely unnecessary. There are at least two other ways of looking at the same thing: (b) it elevates x, (c) it elevates x when x is us. — InPitzotl

There is no "us" in final things. The point is that either I am a free subject in a decision or I am not.
I decide. This is where I am free.

This has a flaw... if an action is uninfluenced by totally everything, then you cannot have willed it. So will necessitates at least influence of the actor; otherwise, in what sense is it will at all? — InPitzotl

I guess "will" cannot be taken as a thing different from the subject. It is part of it's being. A mode of existence. After all, when you do something, the "doing" is just you in a special mode.
So it is my will, my willing, me willing.

With that crack in the door, though, the rest becomes questionable; if an effect is a result of properties, but those properties make you who you are — InPitzotl

But in this case I'd not be a subject anymore but an object. Not even a "who" but a mere "what" (those properties). How degrading. I guess you meant to say something else.

then there's no difference between your acting of your own will and the actions being a result of those properties — InPitzotl

The difference is that one holds dignity, the other does not.
Don't be cheap with your will. Most things are not worth it.

You cannot have a relation between two points where one end is defined by the relation.
Either there is something to relate to or there is not. :grin:

Whatever is an "Object" is merely something that is either known or knowable by a "Subject. — PessimisticIdealism

But to be an object it cannot be a subject. It just has to be there to be an object. An object is per definition what is not-the-subject. So what are your speaking of?

P2) All aspects of Objective states can become an Object(s)-for-a-Subject. — PessimisticIdealism

Not at the same time. See Quantum Mechanics.

P3) Physical states are Objective states. — PessimisticIdealism

Yes and no. The house you see through the window is hit by photons if you look there or not. If you shoot photons at electrons to see them you know how an electron shot by photons looks like.
->

Therefore, the Subjective and Objective character of Conscious mental states can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation iff all aspects of a Conscious mental state’s Subjective and Objective character can become an Object(s)-for-a-Subject. (From P1 and P4) — PessimisticIdealism

Therefor one of the mental states has elecrodes pinned at his head.

You could just as well say imagine an object that cannot be imagined. As it cannot be imagined there is no object and hence it cannot be an object. This clearly shows there is no subject as such subject would have imaged an object.

To tell the truth is a moral obligation. Seeking for audience to do so is a virtue.

Will is free a-priori. It cannot depend on preference, personal properties or external factors, as those aren't chosen. In fact, if it would depend on anything it would not be "will" but an effect of that property. Being uninfluenced by totally everything is what makes it free and why "will" is always free.
It's freedom leads to the conclusion that only values-in-itself can be a freely chosen end as only those are still valuable when all influences are eliminated. These values bear an intrinsic dignity - which also means that, because of this intrinsic value, these are always a necessary end of the free will.

Before there was a governmental body there wasn’t a governmental body - hierarchy doesn’t necessarily mean ‘governmental hierarchy’ and I’m argue that small tribal groups don’t constitute a ‘government’. — I like sushi

So you draw the distinction at the absence of positive laws/rights?

I didn't understand what you said. Could you clarify? — TranscendedRealms

The direkt link to emotion maybe original. But we live in modern times. The objective meaning has to reproduce itself in a much more abstract way over different media.
As such the "good" must indicate the vital conditions of the ruling classes.

Good and bad are nothing more than value judgments, and value judgments are actual things. They're emotions. — TranscendedRealms

This is not exactly a necessity. The "good" has to be what can reproduce itself as the good. As such it is a predicate that names what is beneficial for the ruling class.

Anarchism is the natural human state. — I like sushi

A modern myth. Not even animals live without hierarchical structures.

If I make the same decision, being the exact level of blameworthiness as I was last Saturday at 11:47pm, then I don't have free will and therefore cannot be blamed? — InPitzotl

Why would one need the concept concept of free will then to blame someone? This can only be done on rational grounds. The manifestation of free will is understood as a decision based purely on the rational subject itself. This, such a decision can only be based on values set by reason from within itself. As reason is universal such values must be also universal, too. From this the identity of free will and duty follows logically: Freedom lies in the call of duty and the pursuit of universal values common to all rational beings.

To open up a dilemma:
The technicians being on duty in Chernobyl during the meltdown were really just technicians. They were trained for normal operation of the reactor. When things got critical they followed the procedures they were given for certain lights blinking. Which didn't help. It is quite possible that an enigineer that designed the reactor could have circumvented the disaster. Of course the question is not if they were physically unable to press a few buttons. So - are they responsible for the catastrophe and why not?

Interestingly, would one of them just have paniced and started to press buttons wildly it is possible this could have been successful. But no one would put that man back on duty.

Freely willed actions are consciously chosen, so in theory you could choose the same every single time you're given the exact same situation. — Cidat

So, what makes you think a rational decision could be different all circumstances being the same? Is rationality arbitrary?

By imagining a thing that you call "The Good" you closed off the interesting line of thought here. Reification does that. — Banno

I would not call the idea a thing.

The free will debate is masturbation so people can feel security by believing their actions are beyond their control, — Cidat

It is not me who postulates there must be something beyond the rational decision...

On the other hand, by believing in free will you believe you have the power to steer your behavior in a positive direction, away from criminal abuse. If we don't have free will, we can never make any mistakes in our lives, since we could never have done anything any differently. — Cidat

The question then is just if you are sick or just a criminal.
Criminal if it is a free decision, sick otherwise. No reason to believe.

It's not religion. It's philosophy. — Cidat

Paradox as it may seem: I am not into philosophy either.

I like music.

Things are genuinely created in the universe. The universe itself was created. It didn't "just happen". — Cidat

I am not into religion. Sorry.

Just as a book has an author, thoughts are authored as well. — Cidat

The problem I see here, is, that a rational decision must be based on thoughts. If a decision is required to think a particular way that decision cannot be based on reason. And hence not be free.

If you attribute some doing to anything else but the rational decision, there is no choice and hence no freedom. You cannot be free in doing other than you think you should do.

An anecdote from F.Brook in "Myth of the man-month"

In the 70s IBM was developing an Operating System for their new line of mainframes.
Brooks estimated that a single, talented programmer could have done this in about 120 or so years of work. IBM, of course, did not want to wait that long: The schedule was 3 years start to finish.
Over the course of this 3 years IBM spent a total of 5000 work-years on this project with 1000 to 2000 people working on it at all time. All due to the overhead of orginization of coordination.
For example, for every 2 programmers working on the actual code, there was a technical assistant whose sole purpose was to translate the comments made by the programmers into an intermediate form that could then be written down cleanly by the secretary assigned to those 2 programmers. So for every two programmers there were about two other people just for telling others what those two were doing. In total this resulted in about 1-2 inches of bound book every day documenting the official communication/coordination between work teams.
But that was clearly not enough. Those two programmers needed more assistance - for example someone whose sole purpose was to get those two the things they needed for their work: Things like software tools, finding out if or who was tackling or solved which problem and how and such things.
...

I like where you’re going with your groundwork here, but do you see where THE good, if taken as a transcendental principle, cannot be that which is “rational to want”, that being merely A good, or some good or another, as a practical end? — Mww

But that is exactly the point why it has to be "the good". This is simply a question of intension and extension. You can always mistake a fungus for a plant.

Ah. Well, that's an end to that, then. — Banno

Do I smell resentment?

So... what is it rational to want? Do I smell Kant? — Banno

The good, of course :grin:

Why not? I think this was an ingenious answer.

So what? — Banno

You think an analysis must lead to conclusions?

As if you could have an intent that was not an intent to do such-and-such. — Banno

"such-and-such" is pretty universal, but: You do not really want the act in itself but you want what the act achieves.

You think that a good model of human action? — Banno

The subject is not a model of human action, but the question of free will. "Will" denotes an intent not an action. If you act without any intent what is the point? Sh*t happens.

What is it that you are calling "reason"? It's an odd term, conflating the noun and the mass noun; The reason given for an action is a self-serving back construction thought up as an excuse after the act. — Banno

You are surely right that when talking about observed events the explanation follows them. The explanation makes them understandable. But here we are not talking about observed events but about intent and decision. You wouldn't say I think about how mathematics work after I write down the result of a equation.

Free will is the determination of ends(purposes) by reason in and for itself.

- A mere bodily reaction (perceived as such by the subject in question) is not a process based on reasoning and hence is not an argument for anything (a desire isn't as well).

- A choice to do something or not is no indicator of free will per se. The question is if the purpose of a choice is itself determined by reason. Acting against reasoning and understanding does not make the choice free. In fact, this is exactly what would make the choice unfree.

- From this (the choice being based on reason) many people seem to conclude that arbitrary choices must be possible - as if everything that could potentially be done could be justified by reason

- The choice is determined by reason in and for itself. This means the subject perceives it as a choice it makes freely. This rules out "determinism" as a comprehensible reason, but not as a reason for a particular process of reasoning.

- Subjects may preserve their dignity by switching to an objective sight onto themselves: This does not question but underline their free will.

And to define 'free will' quickly, I would say it is "the ability to have acted differently". — chatterbears

If this is true, what is the difference between free will and free choice then? Would you say all choices are made freely or that none are? I do not buy your definition.

In fact free will as such can reduce the number of available choices. Universal moral laws given as a reason. You'd not be free in not following them - you'd be an animal.

Where is the flaw? — bizso09

Simple: You are not in the world as you are not there.