The Subject is felt, it is not known as one of the Objects present to-and-for-itself. — PessimisticIdealism

Ok, but your argument contains claims about the subject, which implies conceptualization and pretensions to knowledge.

Actually in the argument I give at the beginning, I am speaking of exhaustive explanations as opposed to something as general as "knowledge." — PessimisticIdealism

You defined knowledge in a later post, it's true, but presumably "explanation" would fall under that general definition.

Kudos on originality. Under the assumption, of course, that you were not aware of the “transcendental unity of apperception”, which for all intents and purposes, fairly well describes the content of your thesis, but originated in 1787. Sorry ‘bout that. (grin)

Or....you are aware of said apperception, and found it wanting. — Mww

Thanks for the informative reply. From second-hand readings, I’m aware of transcendental apprehension, and agree with it, but on its own find it somewhat wanting. To me it’s not concrete enough to conclusively establish what it seeks to establish: the delimitations of being conscious. It’s a very challenging topic matter, so I’m grateful for any feedback I can get. And so it’s known, what autological awareness is supposed to reference is one of four general modalities of our awareness, which I then endeavor to use so as to demonstrate our three tiers of awareness, one of the latter being synonymous to transcendental apprehension and, hence, the attribute of being conscious. Hence, autological awareness does not of itself equate to transcendental apprehension. The devil’s in the details, though.

As one example, one is autologically aware of one’s own enactive faculty of sight when seeing anything – for one is (some say, "transparently") aware of being endowed with sight when seeing. And one’s own faculty of sight is not other relative to oneself which sees some given – the given seen is other, but not the sight via which it is seen. Nevertheless, one’s faculty of sight is not itself that aspect of self which is perpetually unified but ever-changing. It, instead, is one of multiple and discrete means via which the “transcendentally apprehensive self” (so to phrase), which is unitary and indifferentiable, apprehends that which is other relative to itself (not only empirically but also conceptually … for any concept we contemplate is other relative to us as transcendentally apprehensive selves). All means of apprehending that which is other, from senses such as that of sight to faculties such as that of understanding, will then be autologically known but not in themselves the transcendentally apprehensive self which knows.

Hoping that makes enough sense in its summarized form to illustrate the difference.

[edit: for added clarity, thus understood, not all autologic givens will be the transcendentally apprehensive self, but the transcendentally apprehensive self will always be an autologically known given]

These two are arguable. As to the first, because “thirsty”, “sad”, etc, are not objects, so “simultaneously the object” becomes an empty, hence impossible, judgement, and as to the second, to suggest the conjunction of the two, carries the implication that “....I must have as many-coloured and various a self as are the representations of which I am conscious....” (CPR B135), which is exactly the opposite of what the unity of consciousness is supposed to represent. — Mww

As to the first critique, a proper contextualization for me would be the otherwise existent dichotomy between a) the subject of awareness and b) the objects of its awareness. So generalized, intuitions, concepts, and one’s conscience, would hence all be objects of awareness when thus contextualized – but these are all what I’ve termed “allologic”, for they are other relative to the subject which apprehends them. In contrast, when I am glad, I as subject of awareness am aware of being glad, and my being glad is the object of awareness of which I am aware – but, here, that of which I am aware is momentarily unified and indifferentiable from me as that which is aware. So, here, there is a non-duality between the subject of awareness and its object(s) of awareness.

As to the second critique, I don’t take my being glad to of itself be a re-presentation, not until it is expressed via language which does re-present givens via concepts. So, in being conscious of being glad I am not conscious of a representation of what I am but, instead, am conscious of what I momentarily am as subject of consciousness which apprehends representations. This, then, to me remains consistent with the unity of consciousness, for while this aspect of awareness is unified and indifferentiable, it is experientially evidenced to be in constant change.

What say you?

(On soapbox) [...] (Off soapbox) — Mww

Glad you got off of the soapbox. Thanks though.

So, here, there is a non-duality between the subject of awareness and its object(s) of awareness. — javra

Why should thirst be that different from a chair or tree as perceived content? Isn't this based on presumptions?

Why should thirst be that different from a chair or tree as perceived content? Isn't this based on presumptions? — Heiko

Hm, the easiest way for me to answer this is via reference to linguistic convention: When I tactilely feel the chair I am sitting on or else look at a tree, I am that which apprehends said chair and tree as something other – and I therefore don’t express this state of awareness as “I am chair (or chair-ness, or what have you)” nor “I am tree-y”. Yes, when it comes to physiological thirst (as compared, for instance, to an experienced thirst for life), one empirically perceives the state of being of one’s own body via interoception. Yet this culminating perception is not apprehended as other relative to oneself as subject, but instead is the state of being in which the subject momentarily finds him/herself – and therefore we express this state of awareness as “I am thirsty (as a subjective being)”.

To say "I feel thirsty" does not necessarily entail that "I am thirsty".

I'm not here addressing logic but a report of (granted, personal) experience.

In parallel, a physiological perception (as contrasted to, for example, a visually imagined perception) that might serve as a better example is the difference between “I am in pain (due to the pain in my finger from a splinter … which might cause me to sweat, or to momentarily be in some degree of shock)” and “I feel pain in my finger on account of the splinter in it (as something one apprehends of one’s own body without momentarily experiencing the sensation of being in pain as the subject of the experience – and thereby something which one can calmly address as needed)”. If this latter example doesn’t ring true as something experientially evidenced, I’d like to know. It may or may not be a good example for me to use.

Still, to the extent that it might make sense on account of being commonly experienced, when being in pain, the pain sensed would thereby be autologically experienced: indistinguishable by the subject which experiences from the subject which experiences. When sensing pain in a body part from which one as subject is removed, the pain sensed would thereby not be autological – instead being other relative to oneself as conscious subject of the experienced pain as object of awareness ... though the pain obviously would very much yet pertain to one’s total self of body and mind (of which the transcendentally apprehensive self is aware).

Yet this culminating perception is not apprehended as other relative to oneself as subject, but instead is the state of being in which the subject momentarily finds him/herself – and therefore we express this state of awareness as “I am thirsty (as a subjective being)” — javra

Yet the "subject" in that case means the worldly self. This is quite different from the epistemological subject of transcendental philosophy. In fact, the thirst is very different from me. If I turn away attention I might even completely forget about it. This seems to be a strong indicator that it cannot really be a being of the subject itself but just a stimulus among many.

Yet the "subject" in that case means the worldly self. This is quite different from the epistemological subject of transcendental philosophy. — Heiko

I, personally, don't subscribe to a duality between a "worldly" first person point of view and any non-worldly first person point of view which one would, I presume, simultaneously be (in the same respect?). There could be both ideal and possible states of being as an aware being - there hence being a duality between what is momentarily actual and the potential as goal to be actualized in the future which one strives for - but to me the transcendentally apprehensive self is just as much worldly as it is non-worldly at any given juncture of its being.

Can you better elaborate on the difference applicable to the same "I" you've mentioned?

This seems to be a strong indicator that it cannot really be a being of the subject itself but just a stimulus among many. — Heiko

This might be a mistaken phrasing of what I have been saying. I did not claim, with great emphasis, that
thirst is what a subjective being is (!). My only claim is that when a subjective being is momentarily thirsty, that subjective being will at that juncture be in just such state of being.

I'm not here directly focused on the metaphysics of what a subjective being is - nor can be. I'm here simply stipulating - fallible though I acknowledge being - the concrete facts of what we can and do experience as subjective beings.

I, personally, don't subscribe to a duality between a "worldly" first person point of view and any non-worldly first person point of view which one would, I presume, simultaneously be (in the same respect?). — javra

This is merely a differentiation between mind and body. As far as "duality" goes - that word carries some meaning (substantiality and stuff) in which I do not want to take stance right now. Dreams are an example where your self (as perceived by the mind) and your more worldly existence presumably can be doing quite different things.

My only claim is that when a subjective being is momentarily thirsty, that subjective being will at that juncture be in just such state of being. — javra

I think your claim was that because of this there was no object other than the subject itself. This, as I tried to point out, does not seem to hold as the thirst appears as just-another stimulus (which you link to your bodily self and hence say "I am thirsty")

This is merely a differentiation between mind and body. — Heiko

Yet the transcendentally apprehensive self is neither its mind nor its body, though conjoined to both. To what extent do you disagree?

I think your claim was that because of this there was no object other than the subject itself. — Heiko

I'm very surprised by this interpretation. How was it obtained from what I said? No, this is in no way what I've been expressing.

Yet the transcendentally apprehensive self is neither its mind nor its body, though conjoined to both. — javra

Not in the case of dreams. It is literally the empty form of perception.

Dreams are experienced non-physiological perceptions (and concepts, which are not percepts, but to keep things simple ...), this just as much as is a visually imagined bird, its auditorily imagined chirping, the tactilely imagined feel of its feathers, and so forth, experienced during waking states. Furthermore, unless we start to hypothesize the possibility of experiences held by incorporeal beings (ghosts, forest fairies, deities, and the like), all REM dreams are dependent upon the workings of an organism's physiological body.

How does the case of dreams dispel the proposition that "the transcendentally apprehensive self is neither its mind nor its body, though conjoined to both"?

How does the case of dreams dispel the proposition that "the transcendentally apprehensive self is neither its mind nor its body, though conjoined to both"? — javra

Because your body does not need to be there (as normal) in dreams.
You may very well be right that "dreams are dependent upon the workings of an organism's physiological body". But this is simply not what the "subject" means in trancendental dialectics. Here the perceptions are taken "as-is" without presumptions. What can be said for sure is that they are perceived. Explaining them by the means of (other) perceptions is tautological. Not more, not less.

So generalized, intuitions, concepts, and one’s conscience, would hence all be objects of awareness when thus contextualized – but these are all what I’ve termed “allologic”, for they are other relative to the subject which apprehends them. — javra

Technically everything is relative to the subject which apprehends, except whatever one chooses to represent his self, re: ego, “I”, consciousness......whatever floats boats. The only problem here would be, depending on the extent of metaphysical reductionism being called into play, it becomes inevitable that different renditions of a common representation will conflict with each other. That is to say, if “thirst” is an object of awareness and “basketball” is an object of awareness, some method must be instituted in order to tell them apart, which mandates that ideas such as thirst and sadness and such not be converted to phenomena on the one hand, and physical objects of sense not be converted into mere contingent ideas on the other.

That said, I’ll stick with these non-cognizable ideas as being called subjective conditions, rather than objects of awareness. Just because I am consciously aware of both basketballs and thirst, doesn’t mean I apprehend them the same way or use the same faculties for it.
—————-

So, in being conscious of being glad I am not conscious of a representation of what I am but, instead, am conscious of what I momentarily am as subject of consciousness which apprehends representations. — javra

And there ya go......momentarily am as subject is the same as being in a subjective condition.

Well done!!!!

Yeah...that damn soapbox. Been luggin’ that thing around for better than half a century. It’s harmless, though, don’t worry.

How does the case of dreams dispel the proposition that "the transcendentally apprehensive self is neither its mind nor its body, though conjoined to both"? — javra

Because your body does not need to be there (as normal) in dreams.
You may very well be right that "dreams are dependent upon the workings of an organism's physiological body". But this is simply not what the "subject" means in trancendental dialectics. Here the perceptions are taken "as-is" without presumptions. — Heiko

Yes, our waking awareness of our physiological body is absent in most REM dreams. All the same, doesn’t there remain the same disparity between subject of awareness and that which it is aware of as other in REM dreams? For instance, if one sees something in an REM dream, does not one see this given from a visual first-person point of view? And if what one sees causes one to be in a state of being of fright, for example, is not one (as a transcendentally apprehensive self) frightened during such juncture at seeing this other during the dream?

I don’t intend to be a badger, so I’ll take a breather from the forum for now.



Just saw this.

That is to say, if “thirst” is an object of awareness and “basketball” is an object of awareness, some method must be instituted in order to tell them apart, which mandates that ideas such as thirst and sadness and such not be converted to phenomena on the one hand, and physical objects of sense not be converted into mere contingent ideas on the other. — Mww

Yes, but of course. I won't bicker too much about term use. But I'm supposing that if well enough defined for the purposes employed beforehand, what you mention shouldn't be a problem.

Thanks again for the replies.

is not one (as a transcendentally apprehensive self) frightened during such juncture at seeing this other during the dream? — javra

Big point: There is no "self".

Big point: There is no "self". — Heiko

Since this will be just as laconic:

An equally big point: Neither is there an absence of a first person point of view as self - a plurality of these coexisting in the world, that is.

Neither is there an absence of a first person point of view as self — javra

That was the difference we started with. All there is is there.

We experience "Subjectivity" as a kind of locus of felt, qualitative "intensity" as it were; and this Subjectival intensity cannot be "known" Objectively or exhaustively articulated in a way that does justice to what it is like to be a Subject.

Could the Subject know "knowing" as such without an Object that is not itself something other than the act of knowing "knowing?" Surely it could not. To visualize the concept "knowing" is not the same as knowing "knowing." When the Subject knows an Object, the Subject is itself the knowing knower. This is no different from asking the question, "Can running run?"

Schopenhauer defends a similar position to this in his essay, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason:

"Consequently there is no knowledge of knowing, since this would require that the Subject separated itself from knowing and yet knew that knowing; and this is impossible." (pg. 208)

Edit: Perhaps the phrase "point-of-view" might help clear things up (note: I am not using "point--of-view" in a spatiotemporal sense). A Subject cannot make its "point of view" an Object-for-itself that simultaneously preserves both the Subject's "point-of-view" and the Subject's "point-of-view" as its own Object.

- In my opinion, you're going to run into the same problem whether it's with the "subject", "point-of-view" or anything else. Again, the fact that you're making claims about these things implies that the understanding and reason have some purchase on them. But if they have enough purchase on them to support judgment and inference, then clearly it can't be the case that they are unknowable. We can't simultaneously claim "there is no knowledge of knowing" and "knowledge is a relation between subject and object" because the former disallows the latter. In fact, the former is self-undermining all on its own. You need to find a model of self that allows the subject to become the object of understanding and reason. This will allow you to make claims about the subject without undermining your own model.

We can't simultaneously claim "there is no knowledge of knowing" and "knowledge is a relation between subject and object" because the former disallows the latter. In fact, the former is self-undermining all on its own. — Theorem

Let's see what Schopenhauer has to say about this issue. These passages are taken straight from his Fourfold Root.

“All knowledge presupposes Subject and Object. Even self-consciousness therefore is not absolutely simple, but, like our consciousness of all other things (i.e., the faculty of perception), it is subdivided into that which is known and that which knows. Now, that which is known manifests itself absolutely and exclusively as Will.” (166)

“The Subject accordingly knows itself exclusively as willing, but not as knowing. For the I which represents, never can itself become representation or Object, since it conditions all representations as their necessary correlate; rather may the following beautiful passage from the Sacred Upanishads be applied to it: That which sees all is not to be seen; that which hears all is not to be heard; that which knows all this not to be known; that which discerns all is not to be discerned. Beyond it, seeing, and knowing, and hearing, and discerning, there is nothing.” (167)

There can therefore be no knowledge of knowing, because this would imply separation of the Subject from knowing, while it nevertheless knew that knowing—which is impossible." (167)

My answer to the objection, "I not only know, but know also that I know," would be, "Your knowing that you know only differs in words from your knowing. 'I know that I know' means nothing more than 'I know,' and this again, unless it is further determined, means nothing more than 'ego.' If your knowing and your knowing that you know are two different things, just try to separate them, and first to know without knowing that you know, then to know that you know without this knowledge being at the same time knowing." No doubt, by leaving all special knowing out of the question, we may at last arrive at the proposition "I know"—the last abstraction we are able to make; but this proposition is identical with "Objects exist for me," and this again is identical with "I am Subject," in which nothing more is contained than in the bare word "I"." (167)

Sorry for my late responses

My usage of relation is quite vague and I apologize for that. What I meant by relation is the phenomenon by which the properties of Q are the direct result of P, through ways that may be known or unknown to us.


Example
The property of wetness can be described as a direct result of water molecules, through a process known to us: when water molecules assemble to give liquid the property of wetness emerges. one water molecule is not wet by itself nor is the property of wetness external and unrelated to the water molecules.
And in case of consciousness’s subjective aspect there are different theories that link it to the objective aspect of the mind through different processes yet to be proven scientifically.
One example is the theory where consciousness’s subjective aspect is an emergency of information processing in mind, thus transcending the layer in which it emerges from the physical parts of the mind but rather emerges from what those physical parts are doing: processing information.
My definition of relation in the above case mentioned that be interpreted in different ways so ask me again if you are not sure what I want to say.

And your example of using tornadoes and hurricanes was not a case for what I tried to say by relation between an emergetive property and the object that gives rise to the property, since Tornadoes and hurricanes aren’t related in such way.