The Subject is felt, it is not known as one of the Objects present to-and-for-itself. — PessimisticIdealism
Actually in the argument I give at the beginning, I am speaking of exhaustive explanations as opposed to something as general as "knowledge." — PessimisticIdealism
Kudos on originality. Under the assumption, of course, that you were not aware of the “transcendental unity of apperception”, which for all intents and purposes, fairly well describes the content of your thesis, but originated in 1787. Sorry ‘bout that. (grin)
Or....you are aware of said apperception, and found it wanting. — Mww
These two are arguable. As to the first, because “thirsty”, “sad”, etc, are not objects, so “simultaneously the object” becomes an empty, hence impossible, judgement, and as to the second, to suggest the conjunction of the two, carries the implication that “....I must have as many-coloured and various a self as are the representations of which I am conscious....” (CPR B135), which is exactly the opposite of what the unity of consciousness is supposed to represent. — Mww
(On soapbox) [...] (Off soapbox) — Mww
Why should thirst be that different from a chair or tree as perceived content? Isn't this based on presumptions? — Heiko
Yet the "subject" in that case means the worldly self. This is quite different from the epistemological subject of transcendental philosophy. In fact, the thirst is very different from me. If I turn away attention I might even completely forget about it. This seems to be a strong indicator that it cannot really be a being of the subject itself but just a stimulus among many.Yet this culminating perception is not apprehended as other relative to oneself as subject, but instead is the state of being in which the subject momentarily finds him/herself – and therefore we express this state of awareness as “I am thirsty (as a subjective being)” — javra
Yet the "subject" in that case means the worldly self. This is quite different from the epistemological subject of transcendental philosophy. — Heiko
This seems to be a strong indicator that it cannot really be a being of the subject itself but just a stimulus among many. — Heiko
This is merely a differentiation between mind and body. As far as "duality" goes - that word carries some meaning (substantiality and stuff) in which I do not want to take stance right now. Dreams are an example where your self (as perceived by the mind) and your more worldly existence presumably can be doing quite different things.I, personally, don't subscribe to a duality between a "worldly" first person point of view and any non-worldly first person point of view which one would, I presume, simultaneously be (in the same respect?). — javra
I think your claim was that because of this there was no object other than the subject itself. This, as I tried to point out, does not seem to hold as the thirst appears as just-another stimulus (which you link to your bodily self and hence say "I am thirsty")My only claim is that when a subjective being is momentarily thirsty, that subjective being will at that juncture be in just such state of being. — javra
This is merely a differentiation between mind and body. — Heiko
I think your claim was that because of this there was no object other than the subject itself. — Heiko
Because your body does not need to be there (as normal) in dreams.How does the case of dreams dispel the proposition that "the transcendentally apprehensive self is neither its mind nor its body, though conjoined to both"? — javra
So generalized, intuitions, concepts, and one’s conscience, would hence all be objects of awareness when thus contextualized – but these are all what I’ve termed “allologic”, for they are other relative to the subject which apprehends them. — javra
So, in being conscious of being glad I am not conscious of a representation of what I am but, instead, am conscious of what I momentarily am as subject of consciousness which apprehends representations. — javra
How does the case of dreams dispel the proposition that "the transcendentally apprehensive self is neither its mind nor its body, though conjoined to both"? — javra
Because your body does not need to be there (as normal) in dreams.
You may very well be right that "dreams are dependent upon the workings of an organism's physiological body". But this is simply not what the "subject" means in trancendental dialectics. Here the perceptions are taken "as-is" without presumptions. — Heiko
That is to say, if “thirst” is an object of awareness and “basketball” is an object of awareness, some method must be instituted in order to tell them apart, which mandates that ideas such as thirst and sadness and such not be converted to phenomena on the one hand, and physical objects of sense not be converted into mere contingent ideas on the other. — Mww
"Consequently there is no knowledge of knowing, since this would require that the Subject separated itself from knowing and yet knew that knowing; and this is impossible." (pg. 208)
We can't simultaneously claim "there is no knowledge of knowing" and "knowledge is a relation between subject and object" because the former disallows the latter. In fact, the former is self-undermining all on its own. — Theorem
“All knowledge presupposes Subject and Object. Even self-consciousness therefore is not absolutely simple, but, like our consciousness of all other things (i.e., the faculty of perception), it is subdivided into that which is known and that which knows. Now, that which is known manifests itself absolutely and exclusively as Will.” (166)
“The Subject accordingly knows itself exclusively as willing, but not as knowing. For the I which represents, never can itself become representation or Object, since it conditions all representations as their necessary correlate; rather may the following beautiful passage from the Sacred Upanishads be applied to it: That which sees all is not to be seen; that which hears all is not to be heard; that which knows all this not to be known; that which discerns all is not to be discerned. Beyond it, seeing, and knowing, and hearing, and discerning, there is nothing.” (167)
There can therefore be no knowledge of knowing, because this would imply separation of the Subject from knowing, while it nevertheless knew that knowing—which is impossible." (167)
My answer to the objection, "I not only know, but know also that I know," would be, "Your knowing that you know only differs in words from your knowing. 'I know that I know' means nothing more than 'I know,' and this again, unless it is further determined, means nothing more than 'ego.' If your knowing and your knowing that you know are two different things, just try to separate them, and first to know without knowing that you know, then to know that you know without this knowledge being at the same time knowing." No doubt, by leaving all special knowing out of the question, we may at last arrive at the proposition "I know"—the last abstraction we are able to make; but this proposition is identical with "Objects exist for me," and this again is identical with "I am Subject," in which nothing more is contained than in the bare word "I"." (167)
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