Aristotle defined time as the measure of motion according to before and after. So, for him, time is a measure. "Unmeasured change" is how I would think Aristotle would describe the unlimited prior history of the cosmos -- as to have any kind of time would require a measurement. — Dfpolis
So is Aristotle saying when we measure it time exists (measured change); when we don't, it does not (unmeasured change), so a past eternity is possible without accepting actual infinity in reality? Putting QM aside for the moment, measuring does not change what is measured. So if something cannot be actually infinite because we can measure it, the same something cannot be actually infinite when we cannot measure it. IMO he should have concluded the past cannot be eternal.
That is not Aristotle's view. I also think it is factually incorrect. We do not do division into parts (which is an intellectual operation) when we run a race, and if we did, it would take forever to do the actual dividing which is why Aristotle is denying actual numerical infinities. The same applies to time. You can only measure from a beginning to an end, and if change has no beginning, you can't actually measure all of it. — Dfpolis
But our bodies do the division of space into parts for us in a race. So Aristotle is saying because we are not conscious of the division of space, it is not happening?
I think actual infinity cannot be regarded as a purely intellectual construct; it represents a fundamental characteristic of the continuum. If the continuum exists (which I doubt), then actual infinity is a fundamental part of reality and every movement we make is a division of space into actually infinitely small components. The fact we do not compute the divisions mentally does not mean they are not happening in reality. The fact the divisions took place in the past I suppose could be argued that actual infinity is not realised in the present, but it is realised in the past which is as bad to my mind - the past happened and was real.
It is like he is saying actual infinity is an artefact of the measuring process, along with number in general I suppose. He seems to be classing actual infinity as a human construct only. But maths mirrors reality and true continuity of spacetime surely requires something physically equivalent to actual infinity?
It is not inconsistent to hold that something can be potentially infinite, but always actually finite. That is how counting is. There is no intrinsic limit to a count, but actual counts are always finite. — Dfpolis
Counting extends forward into a potentially infinite future so I agree that it is always actually finite. But it is an infinite past that I contend requires actual infinity. We can, as a thought experiment, imagine an ever-lasting time traveller travelling backwards in time whilst counting. From our perspective, the past is completed, so the time traveller must have counted every number if the past is infinite. But there is no largest number so we can only conclude the traveller counted to actual infinity somehow. So past eternity seems to require actual infinity.
There are cosmological arguments based on accidental causality, such as the Kalam argument popularized by Craig, and arguments based on essential causality, such as those of Aristotle and Aquinas. The Kalam argument is persuasive, but logically unsound because, as Hume argued, accidental causality has no intrinsic necessity. — Dfpolis
I see all the cosmological arguments as either explicitly or implicitly time-based. Causality and time are inextricably linked; movement and time are likewise linked. From the second way:
"The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible"
Aquinas is talking about efficient causes being time ordered IMO. The 3rd way is temporal in its phraseology, the first way is all about motion hence time.
Ontologically prior (first in order of actualization), yes. Temporally prior, no. There is can be no logically necessary connection between events at separate times and places. This is because there is always the possiblity of intervention. There is no possibility of intervention with essential causality because the agent actualizing the patient is (identically) the patient being actualized by the agent. (The builder building the house is identically the house being built by the builder.) — Dfpolis
Can you explain how the actualisation order could be different from the temporal order?
The possibility of intervention by God? I thought that Aristotle had God as external to the universe, existing in the heavenly spheres - a deist view of a non-interventionist God.
Asserting that something has no beginning does not entail that it does not exist. — Dfpolis
If something never started existing, it does not exist. Time is like space in this regard: if something has no beginning in space, it does not exist. Likewise if something has no temporal start, it has no temporal start + 1, start + 2, etc..., so by induction, it does not exist. A beginning is also required for instantiation of innate attributes, like the mass/charge of a particle. Without a beginning, matter would not have innate attributes and would be null and void.