Assume that F and G are "attributes". Assume that beings have some combination of attributes.
the number of beings with an attribute combination which contains F or G is sum over all possible attribute combinations which contain F or G, of the number of beings with that combination.

The only possible attribute combinations which contain F or G are of the types
1) F not G
2) G not F
3) F and G

Define Nf as the number of beings with F only. Define Ng as the number of beings with G only. Define Nf&g as the number of beings with F and G. Define Nf|g as the number of beings with at least one of F or G. Then

Nf|g = Nf + Ng + Nf&g

for the special case that Nf = 1, Ng = 1, and Nf&g = 0, Nf|g=2

It is not "safe" to assert that a + (bc) = (a + b)(a + b) because, as you demonstrated, doing so necessarily also requires that c = (a^2 + 2ab + b^2 -a)/b. The initial assumption would only be "safe" if there were no way for it to be incorrect.

An equivalent question is "is it correct to assume that x=2x?", and the answer to that equivalent question is no, because there are values of x for which the assumption does not hold

How many human beings do we want living in America? — Jake

No one is asking that outside the right wing because it's a ridiculous question.

It's definitely a question that moves us in the right direction, because it highlights the false dichotomy between immigration and having children - both are simply means by which the population of a country increases. When we're asking if we want immigration, what we're really asking is if we want an increased population size.

The answer is almost always yes: if a state cannot profit off a citizen paying taxes, then that state shouldn't exist anyway. Saying the state should limit immigration is like saying a store should limit the number of customers it sells to.

There are some challenges involved in "more the merrier". As example, here in Florida, where the population has exploded in recent decades. Most of the roads (especially along the coasts) have already been widened as much as they can be without knocking down trillions of dollars worth of existing structures

The "almost" from my previous paragraph follows from this kind of argument: if adding another citizen necessarily reduces living conditions by an amount greater than the gain caused by the additional citizen, then the additional citizen should be rejected. This is analogous to a store which is operating at max capacity - it would love to accept additional customers, but it can't without ruining it for the current customers.

That said, such a store would, of course, choose to expand such that it could accommodate, and profit off, more customers. Similarly, a nation can expand (new housing, new roads, etc) to accommodate new people should it find that accepting new citizens reduces living conditions. The U.S. is nowhere near capacity, and therefore should not reject new citizens.

But the point is that the goal of the proposal is not to "prevent [illegal] immigration", it is rather to raise the costs associated with it

History seems to suggest that, if demand remains constant, then increased costs to firms tend to be passed onto consumers. A wall will absolutely raise operating costs for the cartels, but just as absolutely that increased cost will be passed onto those who consume the cartels' products. Meaning, the cartels are going to raise their prices.

Every border crossing will suddenly be twice as lucrative for every coyote, and consequently there will be increased incentive to secure product through violence. Anyone who thinks the wall will necessarily make the border safer because it makes the border more difficult to cross has not been paying attention to the past.

(I know you're not making the argument that increased cost->increased safety, I'm just using your comment as a spring board to head off those who do)

When something, like a car, is associated with a person the future possibilities for that car decreases from n number of associations to just the one or a handful. So, it seems to me that value, in your terms, is about decreasing possibilities rather than increasing possibilities

If I were the car, then my possibilities might be diminished. For that reason, if I were a car, I might feel some apprehension about being purchased. Because I am the person buying the car instead though, my possibilities increase; assuming I transition from has_car=false to has_car=true, then I will be able to go places I could not have gone before, and there's nowhere I could've gone before that I no longer can. What you've highlighted, though, is the relativity of the value of events: different perspectives can value the same event differently.

Your theory of value is also a bit too cold. Where is the "sentimental" in it? People have things of sentimental value because of an emotional investment. This component is missing from your analysis.

I think measuring different components of value in different units is a limitation. The emotional component of my analysis of value is missing precisely because I'm trying to avoid making it separate from my underlying notion of value.

You're trying to use a mode of description(mathematical description of motion of physical objects) designed for one purpose, and apply it to an entirely different stratum of phenomena, subjective valuation of human beings

I was tempted to use an additional example, one not based on motion of physical objects, because I feared you would interpret the motion example as being encompassing of the entire idea. Ultimately, I decided you would probably be able to see how motion is only one of the infinite stratum of phenomena the idea applies to, and that you would generalize motion to other phenomena instead of assuming I'm reducing the other phenomena to motion. My mistake.

Here's an example - your example, actually - which applies the same mode of description to the subjective valuation of human beings:

let's say we are trying to choose between two objects put in front of us. One is a robot dog with a randomizing program , so that its behavior will always be unpredictable. Next to it is a live dog. Most of us would say that the live dog is more valuable in general to us, not necessarily in monetary terms(the robot could be made of pure gold and diamonds). What makes the live dog more interesting than the robot? We could interact with the robot in a potentially infinite variety of ways given its randomness. But the dog will appear valuable to us in terms of its purposefulness and its ability to relate to us, to understand and care about us.

First, some disambiguation; just because the robot dog has "random" programming doesn't mean you can interact with it in more ways than you could the live dog. In fact, I'd argue the opposite: randomization algorithms have a necessarily finite number of outputs (every random algorithm inevitably repeats itself after a finite amount of time, or, equivalently, after some finite amount of time it is impossible for a random algorithm to produce a novel output), whereas live objects do not necessarily have a finite number of outputs, and it is always possible for a living object to produce a novel output. Under the assumption that the robot dog is a perfect physical recreation of the live dog, such that they are physically capable of taking all the same physical actions, the live dog will necessarily take a larger number of actions over a long enough duration of time.

Now, to the example. Say the difference between the robot dog and the live dog is that the live dog is capable of "loving" you and the robot dog is not. If I start in state (time=0,has_dog=false,loved_by_dog=false), then choosing the robot dog over the live dog makes the transition (time=0,has_dog=false,loved_by_dog=false)->(time=future,has_dog=true,loved_by_dog=true) impossible. This is a gross oversimplification, but, under the assumption that they have the same physical capacities, there are ways you can relate to the live dog that you cannot relate to the robot dog, but there are no ways you can relate to the robot dog that you cannot relate to the live dog, therefore the live dog is more valuable to you.

But there is no one-size-fits-all description for different aspects of our world as we encounter them. Your mode of thinking is called objectivism.

I am absolutely not assuming any object has an objective value. My entire argument is, in fact, that the value of an object is relative. For example, a life jacket is much more valuable to a drowning person than it is to a person on land, because without the life jacket zero actions will be possible for the drowning person in the future.

A point in space seems to be perfectly objective

As someone who wrote their thesis on the relativity of points in space, I would disagree with this wholeheartedly. Every point in space can be represented in an infinite number of ways, and none of those ways are objectively correct, or incorrect. That said, I don't see how this argument in any way contradicts mine.

We can't understand the software of a computer by reducing it to hardware or the behavior of molecules.

Uh, yes we can. Quantum software in particular is entirely governed by behavior of objects even smaller than molecules. All non-quantum software is reducible to binary operations, and all binary operations can be reduced to uses of hardware. Given enough people, any non-quantum software can be reproduced by people pulling levers. People have built functioning computers in Minecraft, even.

If you're going to make a statement X in an attempt to disagree with a statement Y, then you should quote statement Y and indicate which subset of Y statement X disagrees with. I literally get paid to teach analytic reading and writing, but I don't know how to respond to the rest of your reply because I can't tell which of my arguments you're attempting to disagree with. To clarify, I can tell what you're disagreeing with, but its unclear how what you're disagreeing with relates to what I'm arguing.

My background is in physics/statistics, and I couldn't even tell you the difference between continental and analytic philosophy.

I've definitely been a bit inconsistent with my terminology. In my defense, I'm still trying to figure out which terminology allows me to express myself most consistently. Let me do my best to clarify.

The universe consists of matter condensed into objects. Every object in the universe exists in some position, with some orientation, and has some relation to every other object in the universe at every moment in time. The position, orientation, and relation to every other object in the universe of every object in the universe is the "state of the universe", and at every moment the universe is in one of its possible states.

To take action is to move the universe from an initial state at an initial time to a final state at a final time. The number of possible actions which can be taken at any given moment is related to the number of states which can be reached from the current state. Not every state can be reached from every other state. For example, If I am in state (position=0m,time=0s), and I have access to an object which moves at a max speed of 1m/s, then reaching the state (position=2,time=1) is not possible, and consequently taking the action (position=0,time=0)->(position=2,time=1) is not possible.

My own universe consists of all the objects I am able to use to take action - all the objects I have access to. The actions I am capable of taking correspond to the ways the objects I have access to can be positioned, orientated, and related. My assumption is that humans naturally attempt to maximize the number of possible actions they can take, or equivalently that humans naturally attempt to maximize the number of states which can be occupied at future times. Consequently, humans value an object in proportion to the number of states which can be "unlocked" by having access to that object.

What for example, could be the difference in 'possible futures' between the value to me of a Rembrandt painting vs a Picasso

You are an object in your universe. Maybe you relate to the Rembrandt painting in more ways than you relate to the Picasso painting. Maybe you relate to both paintings equally, but you know society relates to Rembrandt more than Picasso. Maybe you have knowledge that the girl you like is into Rembrandt but not Picasso, and the Rembrandt makes a future with her possible that the Rembrandt couldn't. Maybe neither you not anyone you know relates to either painting, but you know the Rembrandt has more exchange-value than the Picasso and that you can take more actions with more money. There are any number of answers.

What do we make of the person who chooses to write a book rather than purchase a book? How do we measure the value to them of the book they're writing vs the monetary value of the book they would have purchased?

Unlike the one between the paintings, I don't know that this is a logical comparison, because these aren't really situations where you're required to choose one option over the other; writing a book and buying a book are not two alternate means of reaching the same outcome, generally speaking. I've written and published a book, but I don't have a copy of it.

It seems to me that that value, as meaningfulness, is less about number of possible futures than about the meaningfulness of those futures

This is the traditional understanding of value, yes. I find this traditional understanding limiting, and I'd like to push the limitation.

It is in the nature of what we find valuable that in order to continue to find value, we have to qualitatively change our relationship to what we find meaningful. This cannot be subsumed under a quantitative measurement scale because the scale will always be stuck in a prior definition.

If you think dynamic relationships cant be modeled quantitatively then boy does the 1700s have some news for you.

fair enough friend

I'd argue calculative procedure enlarges the 'value' of value so severely as to make it useful in every context except the extremely narrowly defined. For example, the value of life can be understood as being caused by the fact that a human body with life can produce a far greater number of futures than a human body without life.

As an example of how this definition does more than what is achieved by defining the value of money as the quantity of money, consider the difference between someone with one billion dollars and someone with ten billion dollars: by value of money = quantity of money, the person with ten billion dollars is ten times as valuable than the person with one billion dollars; by value of money = number of possible actions given access to that money, the person with ten billion dollars is effectively equally valuable as the person with one billion dollars, because there are only a small number of actions a person can take with ten billion dollars that they cant take with one billion dollars. Note the similarity to the idea of marginal value.

I don't see why you'd think it can't explain why people "lose interest in your product when trends change". The explanation is that people gain knowledge that an alternate product(s) can be used to produce more futures than your product given the same investment.

I'm generally familiar with most of the historically prevailing qualitative and quantitative interpretations of value; which one do you think is being ignored?

The approach does account for sentimental value as I understand it. For example, imagine a commodity X which can be used for set of purposes Ux and a commodity Y which can be used for set of purposes Uy. If the relation between X and Y is Y = X + sentiment, then size(Uy)>size(Ux), because Y can be used for any purpose X can be used for, but, by virtue of the added sentiment, Y can be used for purposes X can't be used for.

I don't think it needs to be a mental operation which turns the knowledge of possible futures into a statement of value; it could be a mathematical operation instead. For example, value = number of possible futures, or, borrowing from statistical mechanics, value = ln(number of possible futures)

I'd love to hear what makes you think I haven't

I'd like to replace the necessity of human judgement with the necessity of human knowledge. That is, I'd like to imagine that human valuation of an object depends on the knowledge humans have of the number of futures which can be created with the object, and not on human judgement of any specific futures the object can create.

different societies with different sets of knowledge are capable of making different futures with the same object, and consequently value the same object differently

I like to imagine value as emerging from broken symmetry; more specifically, from broken possibility symmetry. That is, different objects have different values because they make different numbers of futures possible. If every object could be used to make the same number of futures possible - if possibility symmetry existed - then every object would have equal value.

The most common variation of tic-tac-toe can roughly be described as a game where two players take turns placing a single object on a 3x3 grid, with the goal being to be the first player to place 3 objects in a row. The player who goes first can choose from any of the 9 positions to place their first object, and (assuming rationality) will choose what appears to be the most valuable position. The most valuable starting position - the one which makes you least likely to loose or tie, and the one which has the largest number of subsequent possible game outcomes - is the center*. If instead of on a 3x3 grid the players are playing on an infinityxinfinity grid, then there is no more center, and consequently there is no more most valuable starting position. Because the exact same game outcomes are possible no matter where the first player starts, possibility symmetry remains unbroken, and value has not yet been introduced into the system. Once the first player goes, though, possibility symmetry is broken, and value exists for the second player, and for both players throughout the remainder of the match.

There's nothing you can do with a gold band that you can't do with it once it's used for a wedding, but, by wielding the sentiment attached to it, there are things you can do with it once it has been used as a wedding band that you can't do with it beforehand. That is the origin of sentimental value.


*there's an argument that the best starting position is a corner (by symmetry which corner doesn't matter), and it is true that there are more futures where you win if you start in the corner than if you start in the center, but there are also more futures where you lose: you're more likely to tie if you start in the center than if you start in the corner, but also far less likely to lose.

So you'd argue that the amount of sentimental value added depends on how highly people regard the past?

I'd argue that liberty is literally the opposite: that liberty is the means to delegate our freedom to representatives of our own choosing. When I apply my liberty by voting for a representative, I am delegating my political freedom to him, not being given it by him.

I would set the level of "threshold" fairly low, especially in the modern, industrialized world. That puts most people in many countries in a maximizing setting...In the US, for instance, an officially poor family on welfare living in public housing and getting food stamps--no car, no assets, no cash--is probably living above the threshold level. NOT living well, certainly.

You touch on something really good here: I was originally going use the term "survival society" instead of "threshold society", but then I realized that there are more thresholds than just survival. Another one is what is useful to call a "societal engagement threshold" : the wealth necessary to not only live, but to engage with society. No one needs access to the internet to survive, but "everyone" "needs" the internet in order to be a participating member of today's society, depending on your society.

Until everyone has access to at least the wealth necessary to not only survive in but engage with society, society will be unstable. Maybe.

I understand the argument behind thinking they're both attempting to fulfill needs, and that surviving is just the first stage of thriving - and in a sense, they absolutely are - but I think its reasonable to consider that there is a different between specifically seeking to reach a threshold amount of a quantity and specifically seeking to maximize a quantity. It is, for example, the difference between wanting enough money to purchase commodity X and wanting enough money to purchase any commodity you might desire in the future. For another example, it is the difference between attempting to heat solid-water until it melts into liquid-water and trying to get as hot of liquid-water as possible from solid-water.

I don't really know what this model predicts - I'm only just starting to think about it. Furthering the analogy to phase transitions, maybe it predicts that, like both solid and liquid water existing in the same body of water at the same time at critical temperatures, a society with multiple forms of society existing within it is an inherently unstable equilibrium

Tyranny is representation without consent.
— Bliss

Could be. Or, "Tyranny is government without representation" as in "No taxation without representation". — Bitter Crank

The colonial americans already had a representative in the sense that someone made their decisions for them (parliment), their issue was that their representative did not act in accordance with their will. When they said "No taxation without representation", they meant "no taxation without a representative who we believe will use our money to act in accordance with our will" or "no taxation without a representative we consent to".

When a person votes, he is giving one of two or more candidates permission to represent him (under your formulation). If the candidate to whom he did not give permission to represent him wins, is this voter then subject to tyranny? — Bitter Crank

I think the answer is no. By voting you are consenting to the result of the vote, not just to the candidate you voted for. That is, by voting, you apply liberty to delegate your freedom to the winner of the vote, not to who you voted for. Voting is a special case though - most representatives are not political representatives.

That is true

Haha well in reality sometimes I make the move even if I don't believe the other wants me to, just in case I'm wrong. Even if I didn't, at this time I'm not seeing how it relates to my main argument.

According to the stag hunt wiki, every hunter decides individually, so there aren't any actual conditionals. Sure each hunter might make a decision based on what he expects the others to make, but no hunter's decision is conditional on another hunter's decision. There is an outcome where only one hunts the stag.

While true of course, I'm not sure how those first few things are relevant. Killing is just a word I chose because the supposed intention is to eat the stag. Sure there are ways to kill it without acquiring it, but there isn't a good way to eat it without killing it.

Asking whether the implicitly understood agreement is adequately described by wealth transfer is an interesting question, though. In that case, I think whoever shoots first transfers capacity for action to the other, because, by the first shooters action, he abandons his capacity to kill the stag, and grants the capacity to kill the stag to the second shooter. An analogy is two people who want to date each other, but haven't said anything out loud. The person who makes the first move grants the other the ability to decide, putting himself under that persons power.

Why is an absolute guarantee necessary? I'm not sure which part of my argument implies that.

If acquiring the stag is only possible by killing it, then killing it is the action which allows for acquiring it, and is therefore the goal. To continue your FPS example, if the game mode is team deathmatch, then playing the objective is padding your kdr.

"When this common sense of interest is mutually expressed, and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and behaviour. And this may properly enough be called a convention or agreement betwixt us, though without the interposition of a promise"

Using my reasoning, these people would be in a group, even if there isn't a "promise". All that is necessary for a group is a common sense of interest mutually expressed, and known to both. Hume puts it better than I do, of course, but that's what I mean by "individuals who share a desire for action form groups" and "agreement". Using my example, even if there's no explicit agreement about one person shooting first, they both need know to shoot if the other does, and that understanding is itself the agreement.

What individual acquires the wealth of another in the stag hunt? — Srap Tasmaner

The answer to that depends on why two people are necessary to hunt the stag. If one person needs to distract the stag while the other person gets a better shot, then the distracter gives up some of his capacity to hunt the stag such that the shooter has an increased capacity to hunt the stag, and the shooter would be the representative. If, however, the stag just needs to be shot with two arrows at the same time instead of one, then the two people need to agree upon a way to coordinate their efforts. In that case, the shooter who signals when it's time to shoot would be assumed to have the wealth of both shooters, and to be the representative.

It's definitely worth looking at imbalanced starting conditions, but I want to have the simple case down fosho before I generalize

The assumption is that if that wealth is being transferred to you from another, then you are inherently grouped with that other, with the desired group action being to transfer wealth.

How do you feel about changing "can acquire" to "can independently acquire"?

That only individuals can take action may not imply that a desired result can only be achieved by an individual acting alone. — Srap Tasmaner

My post makes this exact argument, hence the "at least one person" and "individuals in the subgroup". Some desired results certainly require more than one individual - my argument is that the action is taken by individuals in the group, not "the group" itself, and that the individuals entrusted with taking the action are the representatives of the group