Determinism doesn't mean there is no free will, it means there is no Libertarian Free Will. Compatibilists account for a free will that is consistent with determinism:

The choices you make are still YOUR choices, not someone else's.
You could have made a different choice, for example:

• had you better understood the consequences
• had you placed more weight on the long term vs the short term

You are accountable for those choices - you made it based on your own beliefs, desires, impulses, etc, and you could have and would have made a better choice if you had been less selfish (accountability encourages everyone to understand there are consequences to ones actions and to weigh this knowledge into their choices).

Old age has its merits, one being a strange sense of discipline one follows. — god must be atheist

I'm old too. Some of us old folks feel that we make better decisions than we did when we were young, and this is because we know more (and are somewhat less driven by hormones). This too is consistent with a compatibilist account of free will.

If you're referring to Quantum Mechanics, it's still (at least) probabilistic determinism - when there is quantum uncertainty.

The success of science. Empirical evidence shows the world to behave in regular, predictable ways, which supports the hypothesis that there are inviolable laws of nature. Scientific efforts to uncover those laws of nature (or at least approximations of those actual laws) have been extremely successful.

While it's true that determinism can neither be proven nor disproven, I suggest that determinism should be the default assumption in the physical world. This leaves room to debate the nature of mind - if mental activities are entirely physical, then we should assume determinism. If mental activities are at least partly the product of something non-physical, only then should we consider the possibility that determinism might be false.

I'm fine as long as you're not claiming these seemingly random factors "prove" determinism is false. Whims, impulses, etc are just as consistent with determinism as are dice throws.

I think creating another existence is special responsibility and an endorsement of life but simply existing isn't. — Andrew4Handel

I agree, but what particular duties are entailed by this special responsibility?

Sorry. Sure, I make seemingly random choices. e.g. I lay in bed for some random number of minutes after the alarm goes off.

Don't you make any decisions that seem random, where you have two or more options you like equally, so you do the mental equivalent of "rolling dice" (where we're assuming that dice-rolling gives us random results)? — Terrapin Station

Rolling dice seems random, but we know the outcome is actually determined by the physical factors involved in the roll. Do you really think that there's some sort of truly random process in our brains (or in our spiritual minds, if you are a dualist)? It may SEEM that way, but there's no way to know if that's the case. But if we do produce randomness, why is that such a wonderful thing to have as part of our decision making?

if determinism is to be true then what would make up said hopes, dreams etc. would also be the result of previous experiences, the genetic traits and the environment that surrounds me. — AwazawA

All of that is true REGARDLESS of whether or not we have libertarian free will. What factors lead to a decision BESIDES these things, if libertarian free will is true?

free will would mean that out of options a) b) c) & d) I would be able to pick c) knowing it was possible for me to pick any other option. free will is the embodiment of wishful thinking in relation to past, present and future, it is like saying I could have chosen differently when the results are that I didn't choose any differently out of the options...

Even if determinism is true you could have chosen differently - if you knew something more, felt more strongly about something, were more (or less) willing to take risks... There are factors in any decision, even if the decision is based purely on whim.

Imagine two identical, possible worlds -with identical versions of you in both worlds. In both worlds, you reach a decision point. In both worlds, you have identical genetics, identical experiences up to the decision point, etc. Wouldn't both versions of you make the same decision, even if free will is true? If not, why not? I can think of no reason to think the decision would be different unless there is some randomness to the decision - and adding randomness hardly seems like something to hope is present.

Please contemplate how your decision making processes if you actually had free will. If the decision were important, you would try to think of all the consequences, some would be good some would be bad. You might weigh these against one another. You might give greater weight to long term consequences, or perhaps you'd be more inclined to receive a sure short term benefit instead of a possible long term detriment that may or may not occur. All of the factors you would consider would come from you, your mind - your knowledge of the world, your hopes, your dreams, your desires as well as your worries and fears.

Now suppose determinism is true, and thus your will is not truly free. What would actually be different? The decision still comes from within, it is still produced by deliberation with all the same factors. Your knowledge of the world would not be any differerent; you'd have the same hopes, dreams, desires, worries, and fears. Would you choose differently? Why? All the factors that lead to a choice are there. If truly free will leads to the same decision, then what is the difference? If truly free will were to lead to a DIFFERENT decision - what would be the reason for that decision - since the factors that lead to the decision are identical?

That's not being free in any interesting sense. Somebody acting on their intentions doesn't make them blameworthy and praiseworthy for their actions — GodlessGirl

Yes it does.

We act in accordance with our beliefs, feelings, dispositions, desires, whims, etc. An act earns public praise or condemnation based on societal values, values that most of us internalize so that they become beliefs (about what is right/wrong) and dispose us to act accordingly.

Also they aren't making a "choice" if the actions is determined. If it's determined then they couldn't have done otherwise and choice implies their was more than one option. — GodlessGirl

Specific choices are not predetermined as choices. Rather, a choice is determined by the factors I mentioned (beliefs, feelings, dispositions...). No, you couldn't have chosen different given the set of beliefs, feelings, dispositions you hold. However, you WOULD have chosen differently had those factors differed. If you come to believe in moral nihilism, because "free will" isn't as free as you'd like, this itself will influence your behavior.

You are answering the hard question with easy question answers. The question is WHY is it that there is such thing as a subjective feeling of quale in the first place? Or rather WHAT is this subjective feeling of color? If we say it is X, Y, Z physical phenomena, how is it that a physical phenomena IS this quale feeling.. The easy questions deal with simply causal explanations... neural architecture, evolution, correlates of consciousness.. that is not what I am asking though.. — schopenhauer1

I don't have a complete answer, but see my above response to Marchesk for a partial answer. The hard question is....HARD, no doubt. But Michael Tye at least chips away at it, I think.

Does Type support an identity theory of mind? — Marchesk

Yes.. See below.

Okay, but the hard problem is showing how a brain state of seeing red is a red experience, or results in a red experience. Saying they're identical is one way to go that would fit with physicalism. But it doesn't explain why some brain states are experiential and others are not. — Marchesk

Here's Tye's basic answer (partly copied, partly paraphrased, from his book, "Consciousness Revisited"):

1. Red = physical property R (e.g. so-and-so reflectance of light wavelengths)
2. Experiencing red = standing in physical relation M to physical property R

Tye then asks, "why, once so-and-so physical facts are in place, am I experiencing anything? His answer is the following identity:

3. Having an experience = having physical property P

Next he asks, "How could phenomenal consciousness just be a certain physical property? Surely if something SEEMS phenomenally conscious, it IS phenomenally conscious. "

His answer: we are not aware OF phenomenal consciousness at all. What we are aware of are the qualities (like redness) of which phenomenally conscious states make us aware.

Since the bearers of phenomenal consciousness are experiences of which they are composed, this means that nothing SEEMS phenomenally conscious to us. hence, the idea that if something seems phenomenally conscious it IS phenomenally conscious, rests on a false presupposition.

The quale "green" is not ontologically identical to the scientific concept of green (e.g. the range of wavelengths), but the two are related to one another: objects that we perceive as matching the green quale of experience are also known (through science) to reflect light in a specific range of wavelengths. — Relativist


Right, but this presents an ontological problem. For physicalists, anyway. — Marchesk

I showed how qualia fit into a physicalist account (I did not originate this; I'm relating Michael Tye). I realize this isn't a complete account, but it's a piece of the puzzle.

The hard and harder problems exist if we take our ontology from science, because it leaves the phenomenal out. Reconciling would mean figuring out a way to include the phenomenal in the scientific, whether that's by reduction, identity, elimination, emergent or expanding the scientific ontology. — Marchesk

We know too little about the workings of the brain to truly reconcile that. At this point, all we can do is entertain metaphysical accounts and consider how these might relate to, or emerge from, the physical. The one thing I reject is the argument from ignorance that dualists use: that if we can't provide a full scientific account for the various aspects of mental life then we should accept dualism.

(whatever THAT is) — Relativist

THAT is the exact thing that is trying to be understood. — schopenhauer1

I expected a response to that! It's a broader topic than qualia. If we can't agree on qualia, we won't get far in a discussion of mental life.

Yep, so why is it THAT experience at all (whatever it is) with the physiological phenomena? — schopenhauer1

It seems to me it's just an accident of evolution (like the rather large size of my nose). The ability to discriminate objects by color has a utility, and this particular means of discriminating color just happens to be what developed as a consequence of genetic drift and environmental factors.

The "concept" of greenness is that mental image that we perceive. The word "green" refers to this quale. The range of wavelengths associated with greenness are those wavelengths that are associated with this quale. — Relativist

Right, and it is these concepts which cannot be reconciled with our scientific concepts. — Marchesk

What do you mean by "reconciled"? The quale "green" is not ontologically identical to the scientific concept of green (e.g. the range of wavelengths), but the two are related to one another: objects that we perceive as matching the green quale of experience are also known (through science) to reflect light in a specific range of wavelengths.

But they still have some experience- even if not the same as a majority of people. What is this experience as compared to the wavelength/neural states that correspond with the experience? This isn't a semantic question, but a metaphysical one. By simply restating that there are qualia like greenness (or whatever subjective experience the person has, like in the case of colorblindness), and that there are wavelengths associated with green, we aren't saying much except what we already know. So how are you dissolving this problem? — schopenhauer1

What I am addressing is the referrent: green is a word that refers to the experience of greenness (the quale). Like all qualia, it is subjective - so your experience of greenness may differ from mine (due to subtle differences in our neural wiring). Knowledge of greenness constitutes non-verbal, non-semantic knowledge; only by actually experiencing greenness can we have this knowledge. The ontology of the quale green is different from other objects of the world because it is subjective: it is a personal mental image (whatever THAT is).

It's true that there is a range of wavelengths that corresponds to green, but this scientific information is not identical to the experience. A person who has never experienced green can learn everything that can be known about the color from the perspective of science and art, but they will still lack the non-semanticknowledge by acquaintance of the color.

Trinity is irrational in terms of the common understandings of persons: 3 persons = 1 person is logically impossible.

Trinity is defended by creating a metaphysical framework in which contradictions are avoided. That metaphysical framework succeeds in its task, but the problem is that it seems nothing more than post hoc rationalization. I look at the history of Christianity, and it appears this Trinity concept arose to rationalize Jesus' divinity within a monotheistic context. Kudos to the great thinkers for their developing this ingenious metaphysical account, but this doesn't make it any more convincing.

Reading of a teleprompter is so difficult. How could we assume the President of the United States to be able to clearly read out from a teleprompter a prepared speech. — ssu

In fairness, Trump is capable of reading a teleprompter. In this case, we're told the teleprompter stopped working, so he had to rely on his personal knowledge of history.

Conceptual problems arise sometimes, when there is legitimately no good explanation how two phenomena that seem different are the same. That is the hard problem. — schopenhauer1

I suggest that there are non-verbal concepts, and this includes qualia like greenness. The "concept" of greenness is that mental image that we perceive. The word "green" refers to this quale. The range of wavelengths associated with greenness are those wavelengths that are associated with this quale. Color-blind humans who lack the ability to distinguish red from green do not know greenness - they only know ABOUT greenness.

Suppose you went back in time and encountered your 2-year old self. Two distinct individuals standing side be side, with clear physical differences cannot be considered the identical person. You do not even share the same set of memories, you only share a 2-year subset (and your memories of that shared subset are fuzzier). Your DNA isn't even identical - our DNA gradually changes a little over time.

Even without time travel, to maintain identity over time, there must be something that endures. What is that?

Some of the more important mental activity that is discussed in theory of mind is that which mediates between stimulus and response. — Relativist

Problem is that consciousness isn’t limited to perception. Memory, dreams, imagination, feelings, thoughts and hallucinations all can have colors, sounds, etc — Marchesk

We perceive (have a subjective experience) of greenness, and having experienced it at least once, we then have a memory of greenness - a memory that is drawn upon when we dream, think, or imagine things that are green. Perceiving color is a functional capacity that we possess, one that confers an ability to tailor our actions based on this quality. The experience of greenness is nonverbal; words cannot convey the experience. What problems are you referring to?

Representation of a physical attribute? That sounds like where you are sneaking in the ghost or the "Cartesian Theater". It usually happens somewhere. — schopenhauer1

I think the "ghost" is an illusion of introspection. Rather, the representation of greenness is present because it influences behavior. Some of the more important mental activity that is discussed in theory of mind is that which mediates between stimulus and response. This is important because it is contrary to the notion that color qualia are epiphenomenal.

I don't think it has much bearing on your argument. I offer it more for context, in case you get interested in Philosophy of Mind - where the distinctions really do matter.

Then what's an example of a solution? Or do we just not debate philosophy of mind and problem solved? I don't see how the problem is not a problem by using different language, or rather, I don't even see how that language would be employed. When I say "green" as a qualitative state and "green" as a wavelength of light hitting the eye and producing all sorts of neurological states and arrangements, they seem different. How would you suppose to not have the difference without adding the ghost? — schopenhauer1

It seems to me the "ghost" may a product of conceptual problems that arise from (possibly misleading) introspection. It seems that my mind IS something, so I conceptually treat it as an entity. IMO this leads to a dualist (or quasi-dualist) view of the mind.

In answer to your question: the quale "green" is an experience - a representation of a physical attribute, that is produced by the visual cortex which then passes into short-term, and then long-term, memory.

The zero energy universe hypothesis (which I don't necessarily buy) has some sort of 'seed' causing a chain reaction that then generates the rest of the matter/energy in the universe in exchange for negative gravitational energy. So I agree something permanent must exist (at least a seed, maybe all matter/energy if the hypothesis does not hold). But permanent existence is only possible outside of time so whatever existed permanently has its origin outside of time. — Devans99

You have some particular (unprovable) ontology in mind, and dismissing other possibilities because they are inconsistent with the (unprovable) assumptions of your ontology. For example, the notion that something with causal efficacy can exist "outside of time" is pure assumption - there's no basis for thinking such a thing can exist. If such a thing can exist, then your scenario is fine. But if it can't exist, then we're stuck with the sort of scenario I've described - along with the assumptions it entails. We've been down this road before, so there's no point in going down it again. Thanks for the discussion.

My understanding of what you call emergentism is not that higher level properties are not the product of lower level ones, only that they are not predictable from them. Those are not the same thing. — T Clark

There are two flavors of emergentism: ontological and epistemological. I think you're referring to epistemological emergence, since you're accepting that higher level properties are the product of lower level properties, but not predictable. Ontological emergence is stronger: it entails the emergence of novel properties that exist exclusively in the higher level that cannot, in principle, be reduced to fundamental physics. Consider mental causation: our minds have causal effects on substances in the world; is this mental activity reducible to particle behavior (reductionism is true), or is the mental activity entail ontological emergence from the material in our brains (reductionism is false)? If you're interested, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has an article on this (here).

Reductionism is a metaphysical approach. It isn't right or wrong, it's more or less useful in specific situations. It's very useful when dealing with subatomic particles. It gets less so very quickly when you leave that size scale. — T Clark

Reductionism could be an approach, but I've only seen it used as an ontological commitment- so from that perspective it is either consistent with reality, or it isn't. Its converse is ontological emergentism, which is the claim that some higher level properties are not a product of lower level properties. Consciousness is cited as the most likely example of ontological emergence.

Things came into existence/time at the point time started - either by creation ex nilhilo (see zero energy universe hypothesis) or because these things existed timelessly already (and they entered time at the start of time). — Devans99

"Ex nihilo" = from nothing, implies a state of "nothingness" existed, a self-contradictory term ("nonexistence exists"). If x exists at all times, and the past is finite, then x did not "come into" existence - that would entail a prior existing state of affairs into which x appears, which is impossible because x exists at all times. Further, the scenario assumes x is fundamental to everything that exists - everything in existence is composed of x.

I do not think an initial uncaused state is impossible - it is possible, but only possible outside of time. — Devans99

What is your justification for believing something causally efficacious can exist outside of time, and can somehow reach into time and interact?

Everything, including fundamental stuff, must be accounted for. IE it must either be created or exist permanently. — Devans99

The fundamental stuff is necessary for all existence, since everything is composed of it. It therefore exists permanently. It can't have been caused, because all possible causal factors (like everything else in existence) are composed of this fundamental stuff. That's what it means to be fundamental. Your only optiob is to deny that there can exist some fubdamental stuff.

As I've pointed out, it is impossible to exist permanently/'forever' in time - you simply cannot have a brute fact within time because causality (which is a feature of time) requires everything to have a both a prior and ultimate cause.

You have provided no justification for believing this.

There have been a lot of discussions around this type of issue. They often come down to a question of the validity of a reductionist approach to science. The behavior of a complex, dynamic physical system will be consistent with so called laws of physics. That does not mean that the behavior of the system is predictable, even in theory, by those laws. It works top down, but it doesn't work bottom up. — T Clark

If reductionism is true, then indeed it must work bottom up. That's not to say that scientific research should be directed toward (say) fully accounting for biology with quantum field theory - that's impractical, but it is in principle possible to do so - or at least would be if our knowledge of fundamental physics were complete. If it is not possible, this implies there are some higher level properties that are ontologically emergent (and thus truly unpredictable), which contradicts reductionism.

Reductionism does imply that the current state of the universe was in principle predictable at the big bang. Quantum indeterminacy means that base prediction would have actually been of a huge number of possible states of the universe, of which the current state is but one of that number.

Au contraire! Philosphers can be kinda funny:

Rene Descartes goes up to the counter at Starbucks. “I’ll have a scone,” he says. “Would you like juice with that?” asks the barista. “I think not,” says Descartes, and he ceases to exist.

Also, It is not intuition; it is logic: things must first come into existence in order to exist - the alternative is just a belief in magic — Devans99

It's bad logic. If the past is finite, then something existed without "coming into existence" because that would entail a state prior to its existence, and this is logically impossible.

The following two quotes appear to reflect the same point:

If the fundamental stuff exists then its composition exists as well. So both basis are covered and I am not committing the fallacy of composition. — Devans99

If you prefer to view it that way, then I would say those fields and the disturbances in them need a temporal start too. One configuration of the field is caused by a previous configuration of the field. If there is no first configuration of the field, there is no second configuration, no third, and by induction, no configurations at all. — Devans99

If there is fundamental stuff, it is metaphysically impossible for it not to exist (i.e. its existence is metaphysically necessary). A finite past implies the fundamental stuff was in an initial state (configuration) and perhaps this state could have been different (i.e. the specific state is contingent), but why think that it impossible for an initial, uncaused, contingent state to be impossible? You need to provide a justification for this that is not based on the subsequent temporal states and the composition fallacy.

The formal argument you gave is inconsistent with a finite past. A finite past implies an initial state, and I see no reason to think an initial state cannot have some contingent properties.

1. Assume a particle does not have a temporal start point (IE its existed ‘forever’)
2. If the particle does not have a start, then it cannot have a ‘next to start’ (because that would qualify as a start and 1 says that it does not have a start)
3. So particle does not have a next to start (by Modus Ponens on 1 and 2).
4. etc… for start+2, start+3…
5. Implies particle does not have middle
6. etc… unto start+∞ (now)
7. Implies particle does not have a (temporal) end
8. Implies particle never existed — Devans99

I don't follow your argument. It appears you're treating particles as fundamental. What do you mean by "next to start"? An eternal particle doesn't start to exist (nor cease to exist) but it exists in contingent relations to other eternal particles that collectively configure into higher level objects. These higher level objects are what come into existence.

And say we find X is actually fundamental (be it a string or whatever). X will have innate properties. That will require a temporal start at which these innate properties are acquired. Else X has no innate properties and X is null and void. — Devans99

Again, you just seem to be asserting (without support) that contingent things cannot exist uncaused. My response is the same: any initial state will necessarily have contingent properties. This is true even if there is a God. A God that exists in an initial state would have had had an uncaused plan for a universe in his mind - i.e., an intent to create THIS contingent universe rather than all other metaphysically possible universes.

Inner dialog is just one more form of conscious experience. And it's not necessary to experience color, sound, pain in perception, memory, imagination, etc. — Marchesk

I agree with this, but would like to clarify that inner dialog is one aspect of HUMAN consciousness. Non-human animals (and non-verbal humans) probably don't have an inner dialog, but they arguably experience qualia.

I argue that we should use a comprehensive definition of consciousness that admits a wide set of mental behavior. If we get too specific, we become overly human-chauvinistic.

The 'fundamental stuff' must of had a start in time. Else how did it come about? — Devans99

Why believe the fundamental stuff required a start in time? Your intuition about the need for a start is based on experience with configurations of the fundamental stuff, and when you extrapolate this to the fundamental itself, you commit the fallacy of composition.

A quanta of energy remains a quanta of energy even if it s form can change.

Quanta are disturbances in a quantum field. Fields are fundamental (or at least, MORE fundamental), so quanta are just configurations of the more fundamental field.

IMO matter/energy has to have a start too — Devans99

Matter and energy (which are interchangeable) are just configurations of fundamental stuff. The intuition (which is not a proof) is rooted in our experiences with configurations of stuff having a "start." This leads to the conclusion there is a past infinite series of configurations (every configuration "started", having been caused by a prior configuration), but even so - this doesn't entail a beginning for the fundamental stuff itself - just a beginning for any particular configuration.

Anything that exists within time must have a start — Devans99

The sort of thing that clearly has had a "start" are merely configurations of fundamental stuff. The fundamental stuff itself has no apparent "start", and I see no justification for believing it necessary had one.

There must be an explanation for everything that is not a brute fact. Brute facts can only exist outside of time. — Devans99

Your first sentence is a definition: a brute fact is something that exists without a reason for existing. But why believe that brute facts can only exist "outside of time"?
I grant that they don't seem to exist WITHIN spacetime, but that doesn't necessarily have bearing on spacetime itself. Spacetime doesn't exist "within" spacetime, so our intra-universe observation/intuition doesn't apply.

I think it does. Several incredibly stupid insights: the Earth is 6000 years old, give or take a thousand years. Man ate from the tree of knowledge so he was condemned to have sex. Man has free will. Bad things are attributed to Satan, who was created by god, but somehow or other it's not god's fault ETC. — god must be atheist

I grant that (in principle) God could have created the universe 6000 years ago (or 6 seconds ago, for that matter) but this historical explanation doesn't provide a physical explanation of the fundamental structure of material reality: are quantum fields fundamental? Is string theory true? Is there are quantum basis for gravity? It's not enough to "know" that God is the cause of it all - we would like to know exactly what he caused.

Your focus on "explanation" seems a red-herring. Explanations are post-hoc semantic descriptions. The leap to a conclusion that explainability is a metaphysical requirement is unjustified. Determinism entails explainabilty. The state of a quantum system (e.g. the quantum system that is the universe/multiverse) is "explainable" by it's prior states because its evolution is describable in a Schrödinger equation. This does not imply the quantum system itself is necessarily explainable by something external.