The brain is master of the body. Everything that happens inside the body is caused by signals from the brain, and almost all of this happens subconsciously. — Tzeentch

I sympathize with your general position, but you have overstated it. The brain controls some things and merely influences others. The immune system is not controlled by the brain, but the efficacy of placebos is suggestive of the brain having a degree of influence.

Are you also fideist?

Some of us consider a college degree a doorway to a well-paying job. It would be irrational for a philosophy major to make that assumption. We don't need any more irrational philosophers, so have a realistic expectation about what you will get for your trouble.

I reject the argument because it conflates moral autonomy with perfect knowledge of moral truths. Unlike a hypothetical God of religion (the sort of God that is worthy of worship), we are not omniscient. I am not relinquishing my moral autonomy by placing trust in a God who knows all moral truths, and is all-good, so would not steer me away from goodness.

Thanks for the reference. It seems to me that the premise could be considered contrary to reason if the omniscience is incoherent or unintelligible.

If so, that sounds self-defeating.

You seem to be defending your metaphysical perspective. I was not challenging the (assumed) fact that it is coherent. I was challenging the notion that it's the only metaphysical framework that is coherent and presumably complete. I tried to do that by describing Armstrong's framework, and you simply rejected it based on your own ontological commitments. Believe whatever ontology you like, but if you are convinced your's is the only coherent one, or even that it's the best, then you're fooling yourself if you haven't seriously explored alternatives.

But they all say that the mind can only be understood in terms of neurobiology, which amounts to almost the same. Sure the 'eliminativists' are more apparently radical, but all materialism must deny the primacy of mind - that's what makes them materialist, after all! — Wayfarer

It would be overstatement to say the mind can only be understood in terms of X, for x=physicalism OR dualism (OR any other theory of mind). Some aspects of mind are easier to account for under physicalism, others are easier to account for under dualism. Being easier to account for doesn't make it true.

computers can be programmed to reason. — Relativist


Computers are instruments of the human mind. They can indeed be programmed to emulate the processes of logic - that is fundamental to computation, after all - but they're artifacts. — Wayfarer

Are you arguing intelligent design? My point is that the mental process can be accounted for under physicalism. The evolutionary development of a mind is another matter, but I don't see why that would be a problem. Traits that have a survival value are consistent with natural selection.

Irrespective of whether you consider this normal, I've encountered numerous theists who present Alvin Plantinga's ontological argument as proof of God's existence. Plantinga's argument utilizes this premise:

Necessarily, a being has maximal excellence in every world only if it has omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection in every world

The way I express it is that the natural numbers (and the like) are the same for anyone who can count - hence, they exist apart from minds  — Wayfarer

What exists apart from minds are the properties "1", "2", "3",... but that doesn't imply they exist detached from the states of affairs that have these properties. 7 marbles exist, 7 forks exist, and we can abstract out the property "7" from each of these states of affairs. There's a logical relation between the abstracted properties of "7" and "4", but that doesn't entail the existence of numbers except as mental entities.

3+4=7 because any state of affairs with property "3" when combined with a state of affairs with property "4" will necessarily result in a state of affairs with property "7". This fact does not depend on 3, 4, and 7 existing independent of states of affairs. It just means properties can have relations to other properties, and these relations obtain irrespective of which states of affairs they are instantiated in.

That is why strictly physicalist philosophies of mind, like Dennett's, must deny that there actually is any mind. The very existence of mind defeats their philosophy. 

Physicalist theory of mind needn't deny the existence of mind. Certainly Armstrong didn't, nor do Jaegwon Kim and Michael Tye.

Reason is easy to reconcile with physicalism: computers can be programmed to reason. Physicalist theory of mind is not without problem (in particular: consciousness) but every theory of mind has problems.

The principle of parsimony applies to ontology: we should assume no more types of existent than necessary to account for that which we intuitively know exists, and which we infer exists. Alleged platonic entities are explainable as constituents of states of affairs, so there's no good reason to claim they actually exist independent of the states of affairs in which they are instantiated. We shouldn't be fooled by our intellectual powers of abstraction.

"To give existence to the individual parts requires dividing the whole, and this annihilates the unity which makes it a whole."
Incoherent. Existence isn't "given". Consideration of parts doesn't entail dividing it. The universe exists. Does that preclude YOU existing? The universe has parts, and you are one of them.

I see that you don't actually want to understand, so we're done.

The problem here, as I see it, is treating a number - 6, in this case - as ‘an entity’ in the same sense that an object is an entity. — Wayfarer

That's not done in Armstrong's metaphysics. Remember that what exists is a state of affairs. 6 doesn't exist distinct from a state of affairs that has the property "6" .

But it can be said to be an object in a metaphorical sense, i.e. an 'intelligible object'.

How about as an "abstraction?" That fits the bill. The only possible point of contention is how we consider abstractions. If we treat them as mental objects, produced by the way of abstraction, that's consistent with physicalism. When we start treating them as existing apart from minds, that's platonism.

But I argue that there's a very deep problem of recursion in any naturalistic account, as we must already be able to count and to reason in order to even begin to develop such an account. That is the sense in which number (and the like) transcends a strictly empiricist account;

I don't see the problem. The only "transcendence" I see is that universals exist, and relations between universals exist. This seems transcendent, but doesn't really entail true transcendent existence. We could explore this further.

I don't think science actually explains the laws themselves;

Agreed, and that's where metaphysics comes in. A lot of anti-physicalist analysis just counters the Humean tradition. The modern tradition (exemplified by Armstrong, Tooley, and Sosa) isn't subject to those problems.

So again, the platonist attitude is that such laws pertain to a different level or mode than the domain of phenomena; that being the 'formal realm', although that is not an expression that is in wide circulation. They don't exist - in a sense, they 'subsist' or underlie and inform the phenomenal domain, although the sense in which they are real is difficult to express in the current lexicon of philosophy.

The attitude you express seems consistent with physicalism. We kind of pretend "4" and equations exist, but they don't ACTUALLY exist apart from the states of affairs in which they are instantiated.

Some ants debate the existence of God. A theist ant can't expect to persuade an atheist ant by mere assertion and handwaving. The converse is also true, so perhaps we can just agree that God is a hypothetical possibility.

there have been elaborate arguments developed about ‘the indispensability of mathematic — Wayfarer

Mathematics is essential to understanding much of the world (i.e. physics), but that doesn't change under physicalism. Physicalism just implies that the things that exist stand in relation to one another in ways that are describable mathematically. It seems more parsimonious than to think equations exist apart from the physical things they describe. Which brings up another of set of Armstrong's contributions: his theory of universals and his theory of natural law.

BTW, I'm not claiming Armstrong's metaphysics is necessarily true. I'm just claiming it's coherent and sufficiently complete in its accounts.

there are very many mathematical physicists who are indeed Platonist of some variety, with some of them adopting such views because of the discoveries associated with quantum mechanics — Wayfarer

Since when did physicists become good at metaphysics? A Platonic interpretation of mathematics is a consequence of the way it's conceptualized - it's an intellectual convenience.

How does the platonic entity "6" become get involved in the building of a collection of 6 objects, from smaller collections? Physicalist account: Collections having the property 3 can be merged into a collection having property 6. The 3 (or 6) property is inherent in the states of affairs; the 6 property is necessitated by two collections with property 3.

Some platonist accounts treat equations (which are abstract objects) as causally efficacious. That seems problematic. Causal efficacy is more easily understood by physicalist account.

ll, Armstrong’s major thesis was ‘A Materialist Theory of Mind.He certainly was no crackpot, but his philosophy stands or falls with materialism, and I don’t think his style of materialism is defensible, knowing what we now know from physics. — Wayfarer

His materialist theory of mind was only a component of his comprehensive metaphysics. Indeed it "stands or falls" with materialism - his comprehensive metaphysics aims to show that materialist metaphysics is coherent.

I mean, there are far too many unanswered questions about the nature of matter itself; his philosophy seems to assume a pretty simplistic kind of atomism,

Not really. It's consistent with atomism, but it's also consistent with quantum field theory.

That's a fine attitude to couple with faith. On the other hand, arguments for God's existence depend on conceptual analysis, so words like "omniscience" have to to be taken to mean something.

You seem to be reading meaning into the word "object" that I didn't intend. I was just referring to existents - anything that can be said to exist. An oxygen atom can be said to exist. An oxygen molecule (consisting of two bound oxygen atoms) can be said to exist. This does not entail "dual existence." It is mereological.

Do you want to try and understand it, or are you hell bent on finding some reason to dismiss it? I don't mind spending time explaining it to you, but not if you're going to be combative. David Armstrong was a well-respected Australian metaphysician, not a crackpot whose framework is a house of cards that falls with a faint breath.

The mind-body problem is specific to dualism. Physicalist theory of mind has its own problem the "hard problem" of consciousness,

This seems to be your fundamental error:
"This seems very confused, and unrealistic. A molecular state of affairs would also contain atomic states of affairs. So atomic states of affairs would have dual existence."
Then you are aren't understanding, because it does not entail this at all. Oxygen molecules exist, and so do each of the oxygen atoms that comprise the molecule. This is not "dual existence" - it is simply a consistent mereological account.

If you want to try to understand Armstrong's ontology, you have to let go of your current ontological commitments and accept his account. Consider it a stipulation that everything that exists is a state of affairs. Every object of experience (e.g. your computer, your chair, yourself) is a state of affairs. Each is composed of smaller parts, but each part is also a state of affairs. It's states of affairs all the way down, but stopping at the atomic states of affairs. Once you understand it, you could perhaps try to find something incoherent - but you'll never understand it if you just dismiss the basics because it doesn't fit your preconceived model of reality.

As you noted, I was highlighting the tension. At least one of the following seems likely to be false:
God is omniscient (where omniscient entails knowledge of the future)
Libertarian free will exists
A-theory of time is true
Brute facts don't exist

Omniscience could be revised to mean only that God knows everything that is knowable. This would imply he can only know elements of the future that are the product of strict determinism.

Perhaps brute facts exist (God knows the future by brute fact) but this undermines some important reasons to believe a God exists (i.e. the Leibniz' Cosmological Argument).

Perhaps compatibilism is true, and therefore determinism is true, although this undermines a common theist response to the problem of evil.

Perhaps B-theory is true.

That's doubtful. So let's take this proposition, that a group is a thing, and see if we can validate it's truth. We have "2", and we claim that it is a thing, a unity, one. ... — Metaphysician Undercover

We're talking past each other due to using different semantics. I'll be more precise. I'm basically presenting the physicalist ontology developed by D.M. Armstrong (see this).

In Armstrong's ontology, everything that exists is a State of Affairs (which I've been referring to as a "thing"). A SOA has 3 types of constituents: a (thin) particular, properties, relations. None of the constituents exist independently of states of affairs. A SOA is a (thick) particular. ("thin" refers to the abstract consideration of that constituent of a SOA that is neither a relation nor a property; "thick" particular equates to a SOA, and "thick" is usually omitted).

Anything that exists is a state of affairs, and that includes the simplest objects (the "atomic states of affairs") and complex objects (higher order [molecular] states of affairs and conjunctions of states of affairs). If we treat the standard model of particle physics as describing the most fundamental objects of existence, then the atomic SOAs are those particles (the various quarks, leptons, etc). Even these fundamental ontic objects have properties (electric charge, color charge, spin, mass...).

A neutron is thus a second order SOA composed of those ASAs, while an atom is a third order SOA composed of neutrons, protons and electrons. The properties of the higher order SOAs are determined by the properties of their constituents (i.e. Armstrong is a reductionist).

A gaggle of 7 geese is a state of affairs as well - it has properties (such as mass, volume of air they displace,...).

Armstrong accounts for universals: they are multiply instantiated properties and relations. Multiple objects can have a -1 electric charge (e.g. each electron that exists), so "-1 electric charge" is a universal. Similarly, multiple states of affairs can have the property of being a conjunction of 7 lower order states of affairs. "7" is the property they have in common, and this is a universal.

Your statement, "We have "2", and we claim that it is a thing, a unity, one. In doing this, we deny the meaning of "2", that it refers to two distinct things, not one entity. " has no apparent meaning in this ontology. A state of affairs (a "thing") is not necessarily one thing - that would imply that only atomic states of affairs exist.

Either we describe the swans as individual objects, or we describe them as parts of a whole (an object, the family), but we cannot do both at the same time without contradiction.

I agree than an individual swan is not identical with the group to which it belongs. Each swan is a constituent of the state of affairs that is the group of swans. We can consider the mathematical relation that exists between one swan constituent and the group. This doesn't entail equating the two states of affairs as you seem to be inferring. Simultaneously, the single swan exists and the group of swans exist.

You don't have to accept the ontology, but at least understand that it comprises a coherent physicalist ontology - and Armstrong explicitly rejects Platonism. If it SEEMS incoherent to you, it's due to the brevity of my discussion.

"An object cannot have the property of "two-ness", because that requires two objects. "
An oxygen molecule has two-ness. Two-ness is the relation of the parts to the whole. But groups are also things.

A family of 7 black swans is a thing (a state of affairs). 7 is a relation between one swan and the family. A group of 7 swans has a property in common with a group of 7 marbles: the universal "7".

7 exists, not in a platonic realm, but in states of affairs composed of 7 objects.

"Even in an A-theory of time, certainly some propositions exist at that present moment, and God knows the truth of all those propositions at that current moment. So if someone were to say, "Jack is going to drink a beer at t1" God knows the truth of that proposition, and so knows what will happen at t1. It does not seem that A-theory directly eliminates the possibility of God's foreknowledge"
You are asserting God knows, not showing how it can be possible. It is impossible because libertarian free will implies Jack's actions aren't determined. Drinking a beer is only a possibility at t0.

"Mathematical fields are mathematics, no different in principle to "2+2=4". If you think that this refers to something real then you believe in platonic realism"
Right, and that's not entailed by scientific realism. Scientific realists can be physicalist. A physicalist rejects platonism, treating mathematics as purely descriptive. The abstraction "2" does not exist, rather there are objects having the property "two-ness". Physics formulae describe complex physical relations between objects.

"the idea that consciousness does not depend on any particular arrangements of matter for its existence"
Aren't you saying the mind is immaterial? If so, how does the mind cause me to scratch my nose? How does my mind know I have an itch?

Considering this particle exists if and only if it is moving, and this movement is determined by the projection from locality to another in one direction, the premise of the particle existing at all is dependent upon its directed movement giving it form. In these respects all particulate are premised in linear movement as extradimensional projection. — eodnhoj7

All movement is relative, you're treating it as absolute. Further, per QFT, particles are not moving; rather a quantum of energy is rippling through a field. Finally, your claim that a particle's existence is dependent on movement is an unsupported assertion.

I was referring to scientific realism, and this does not entail platonism.

Your assertion, "2.) God’s omnipotence gives Him power to look at the future."
Is defeated by my argument. God can't do the logically impossible.

I am treating A-theory of time (presentism) as true.

Obviously, yes.

Feelings are not the product of reasoning. Your point of view might help you cope with a loss, but you will not be treated kindly if you approach an aggrieved parent and inform them they are wrong.

E.g. one could commit to the ontological stance that space is actually curved (per general relativity) - not merely that the equations seem to make reasonably accurate predictions.
— Relativist

I think the issue here is that we must admit to, or assume, that space is real, in order to justify our measurements of length, distance, etc.. How we model space (geometry) may vary. This variance in geometrical models indicates that we don't really understand what space is. — Metaphysician Undercover

But we don't have to commit to the existence of quantum fields, just because the math of quantum field theory makes good predictions.

The feeling of loss is not a consequence of believing death is bad. It's knowing that the loved one is permanently absent from one's life, and in some cases a sense of feeling cheated. We expect our children to outlive us

What does this mean: "The particles as projecting to further particle "

Did you use google translate on your native language?

How do you define "fact" and "thing"? Here's my definitions:
Fact: true proposition
Thing: an existent

So by my definitions, the statement is false. The world consists of things. Facts describe things, their properties, and relations between things.

Doesn't Alibaba just act as a broker for selling goods produced by cheap Chinese labor? That labor can't be exported.

High taxes.

"They chose to deal with life. And in reality, they shouldn´t be sad that they lost their child, they should be happy that they had the oppotunity to have it in the first place."
There's no "should" with feelings.

Define " power". In the the sense that money is power, then some corporations have more power than some nations. However, nations can arbitrarily confiscate property, thus seizing power - consider Venezuela.

I believe there is a tension between knowledge of the future (entailed by omniscience) and the notion of omniscience. I'd describe it thusly:future, freely willed acts are unknowable:

t0: 1AM, Jan 1 1920
t1: 1AM Jan 1, 2020

P1: Jack drinks a glass of beer at t1 (the chosen act is a product of libertarian free will)
P0: God has knowledge of P1 on at t0.
(de re semantics stipulated throughout)

There is no truthmaker of P1 at t0, so how can this constitute knowledge at t0?
(where truthmaker: = an elements of reality to which the proposition corresponds)

(note the difference between a freely willed act and one that is the product of determination)

"The object informing the subject is identically the subject being informed by the object."

From an ontological perspective that seems true, but it overlooks the role of epistemology. We do not "know" an object, rather we "know" (perceive) some of its properties in some epistemic context. We identify the object in terms of its properties, but this can be misleading. Paraphrasing Kripke, he notes that Hesperus is that which we perceive as the evening star, and Phosphorous is the name we attach to that which we perceive as the morning star. The ontological identity between Phosphorous and Hesperus is not identical to the epistemic stance because the epistemic context is different.