Attributes and relations do not constitute objects, they reveal something about them.

I beg to differ : objects have intrinsic properties. Where p is an intrinsic property of object x: if p is not an intrinsic property of object y, then y is not x. i.e. p is a necessary property of x.

The converse is to assume particulars exist without properties. But if that's true, how do properties become associated with particulars?

entity with intelligence but no will, will have no need for going on and will see the logic. They will not "care" in the most literal sense. They will have no motivation to.

I suggest it is a mistake to separate intelligence and will. True intelligent thought requires a will. Deliberation is goal-driven.

Earth as matrix, with heaven as the true reality would be a more coherent model. Instead of death being a sleep., it would be an awakening. I'll start writing hymns.

The form of reasoning in the FTA is heuristic, not hypothetico-deductive. The FTA doesn't make a hypothesis, and then deduce its consequences as hypothetico-deductive reasoning does. Saying it does is a distortion. Instead, it argues that coordinated means directed to a common end signify intelligent direction.

But the FTA CAN be framed abductively (as an IBE), and this is a more comprehensive analysis than what you are arguing. Each hypothesis deserves equal consideration, and they should all be evaluated on the same basis- this is the heart of my objection to your analysis. If all hypotheses that lack direct empirical evidence are to be excluded, then you won't get very far. If you're going to enter the "fact" of fine tuning into evidence for your preferred hypothesis, then you have to accept them into evidence for the alternate hypotheses as well.

Metaphysics requires sound deductive reasoning, not hypothetico-deductive reasoning -- but if it did, it would still require hypotheses to be falsifiable.

Special pleading. Apply the same rules to your preferred hypothesis.

As I said, this is not an analogous case

It is absolutely analogous to my objection concerning the value (or specialness) of life - the objection that you have not dealt with much at all, as I'll show in a bit.

if we allow any exception to the principle of causality, we undermine all science.

You're pontificating an absurdity. Science need concern itself with nothing other than identifying laws of nature (how things work) and working toward a basic understanding of what is physically fundamental in the world. There may be a "first cause" (and I think it likely), and this doesn't undermine science. In fact, I expect a lot of scientists would find that laughable (consider the Hartle-Hawking "no boundary" proposal, or the Carroll/Chen model.

Causation refers to something that occurs in the universe, a relation between physical things in the universe. There's no basis for claiming it to be more than that (such as a metaphysical principle), so your claim commits the fallacy of composition.

Either every phenomenon has an adequate explanation, or we have no rational grounds for requiring an explanation for any phenomena.

You're conflating physical causation with explanation. Explanations exist only in minds; causation exists in its physical instantiations.

R: " Physicalism entails the non-existence of states that are "logically prior"

Physics problems often specify an initial state that is logically (and temporally) prior to the final state. Any information used as a starting point in reasoning is, by definition, logically prior to the conclusion.

You're conflating explanations (and "problems") with what actually exists. "Logical priority" only applies to the descriptions of the sequence of states. Descriptions are products of mind (abstractions), and don't exist in the absence of minds. The physical evolution of a quantum system has no dependency on description of that evolution. Each physical state deterministically evolves to subsequent states (there being no "final" state contrary to your locution), and "logic" (i.e. reasoning) has no bearing on this physical evolution.

[Causation is temporal] is a baseless simplification often assumed in contemporary thought. Here is a counter example. If John is building his house, clearly John is the cause of his house being built. But, the house is not being built if John is not building it. Here cause (John building) and effect (John's house being built) are clearly concurrent, not sequential or time-ordered.

You're merely identifying the agents of causation, ignoring the temporal context - so your account is incomplete. No clear case of causation occurs other than in a temporal context.

Another example is my thinking of you. My thinking is the cause of you being thought of. Time does not enter into my thinking of you in any essential way

Of course it's temporal! You weren't thinking of me prior to our initial engagement on this forum. Our interactions were temporal, from the reading of a post to the thinking about the post, to the formulation and typing of a reply. To have a new thought entails a prior state in which the thought is absent.

Relativist: "Claiming they demonstrate intentionality is just a different way of saying they demonstrate design, or they imply God"

Establishing the truth of premises is not arguing their conclusion.

I'm not seeing anything that contradicts my analysis. The claim, "the fundamental constants are a sign of intentionality " simply ignores the possibility that life is just a byproduct of the way the world happens to be, and depends on treating life as an "ends" - which you have not justified. A byproduct is logically equivalent to an unintended consequence. Your analysis is incomplete if you fail to examine both logical forks: a) the constants as being intentional; b) the constants being unintentional.

From your paper:

What is the observable sign of intentionality? Is it not a systematic time development ordered to ends?

This again suggests you're considering life an ends. I completely agree that if you make this assumption, that this entails intentionality, and a mind to hold that intention. But you haven't provided a reason to think life is an "ends", and you haven't examined the other logical fork (that it is unintended). This is the point of the Douglas Adams quote.

First, I am not rejecting the multiverse hypothesis. I agree a multiverse is possible. Second, the lack of supporting evidence is just one reason for saying it has no epistic value. Another is that it's unfalsifiable and a third is that it is unparsimonious.

I still contend that the most complete analysis of fine tuning requires stepping back from the narrow analysis you seem to be contemplating, and applying consistent principles. The inference to the best explanation analysis I proposed is a fuller analysis.

Relativist: "multiverse seems to be entailed by the theory of cosmic inflation"

There is no "seems to be" wrt to entailment. Either something is entailed or it is not. As far as I can tell the multiverse is not entailed by cosmic inflation.

When I said it "seems entailed" I was referring to statements like this (from the article I linked):

"In most of the models of inflation, if inflation is there, then the multiverse is there. It's possible to invent models of inflation that do not allow [a] multiverse, but it's difficult. Every experiment that brings better credence to inflationary theory brings us much closer to hints that the multiverse is real." - Stanford University theoretical physicist Andrei Linde.

The referenced inflationary models constitute the available evidence, and so the preponderance of evidence implies the multiverse is entailed. Of course, one of the contrary models could still be true, even though it seems unlikely given that they are in the minority.

First, I am not rejecting the multiverse hypothesis. I agree a multiverse is possible. Second, the lack of supporting evidence is just one reason for saying it has no epistic value. Another is that it's unfalsifiable and a third is that it is unparsimonious.

The fact that multiverse is possible gives it the same epistemic standing as the alternative you're pushing. The facts you submit into evidence for inferring intentionality are the same facts I'm submitting in evidence for multiverse - so your claim is false.

When entertaining the metaphysical possiblity of a multiverse, I agree it's unfalsifiable, but so is the metaphysical possibility of intentionality in nature. But as I pointed out earlier, most inflationary models entail multiverse - and these physical models are certainly falsifiable. If I were to play the same game you play, I could use this fact to simply exclude your intentionality hypothesis. But I'm interested in a balanced analysis, not merely interested in proving something to myself that I already believe.

Relativist:" Inflation also entails symmetry breaking, which is the mechanism that produces the classical world that we know."

No, it does not. If a symmetry is perfect, inflation will not break it. If a symmetry is imperfect, inflation can make the imperfection manifest.

You don't seem to understand what I'm referring to. Symmetry breaking is the process by which a physical system in a symmetric state ends up in an asymmetric state. This can occur during a change of phase when the system undergoes a temperature change - that's the way it's treated in inflation models. here's a tutorial.

Relativist: " Symmetry breaking at the level of a quantum system almost certainly entails alternative physics because most processes of a quantum system entail quantum indeterminacy"

This is false. All unobserved processes are completely deterministic in quantum theory. Quantum indeterminacy is a feature of measurement processes, and so cannot have occurred before the advent of intelligent observers -- making them "special."

Your understanding is decades out of date: the Copenhagen interpretation, with its wavefunction collapse at observation has fallen from favor, and never really made sense as anything more that an instrumentalist's heuristic. 21st century physicists understand that an "observation" is just an entanglement between an observer and an eigenstate of the quantum system. Eigenstates can become entangled with anything in the environment. Clearly a classical world emerges from the quantum system of the Planck epoch, so there is ample environment to become entangled with.

So you really have no grounds for dismissing the physical possibility that the observed laws of physics might be a consequence of symmetry breaking of eigenstates of superpostion quantum states. I don't claim this necessarily occurred, but it's consistent with the available facts.

As I said above, (1) metaphysics does not use the hypothetico-deductive method, and (2) if it did, no unfalsifiable hypothesis can pass methodological muster.

I am baffled as to how you can justify dismissing one metaphysically possible hypothesis for its ostensible unfalsifiability whilst claiming victory for your preferred hypothesis that is (at best) equally unfalsifiable.

When I refer to this as a metaphysical theory, I am not claiming this constitutes a metaphysical system, but rather that it is metaphysically possible: the space of possibility that is broader than the narrow physical possibility you use as a methodological hurdle to dismiss anything not entailed by established science. This is the same space of possibility where your intentionality hypothesis resides: broadly logical possibility.

Relativist: "Violating the "norms of the scientific method" is irrelevant to evaluating metaphysical hypotheses

False. As I said, methodological norms arise from the nature of the method, not from the nature of the discipline using the method.

Your entire case depends on utilizing methodological "norms" as rationale for special pleading. You overlook the fact that all disciplines of study (science, history, mathematics, philosophy...) are unified in being a search for truth. An epistemological method valid for one discipline is not invalid for another - either it serves to advance us toward truth or it does not. There are more stringent norms for science, like falsifiability, only because the empirical nature of scientific investigation makes it feasible - so we needn't settle for less. But metaphysical investigation (i.e. looking beyond science) has to settle for less, or it doesn't get off the ground. So even if it were true that a scientific multiverse hypothesis fails to meet the norms of science, it's fair game to consider it in our search that looks beyond science, and it deserves that same looser standards under which any other metaphysically possible hypothesis is tested.

<value> is a concept that arises out of the relation between the thing valued and the subject(s) by whom it is valued. There is no value devoid of a valuing subject. So, not only is there no "objective value," the very concept is an oxymoron.

I agree - and this seems problematic for your position.

The FTA does suggest that the result of coordinated, improbable means is of value to the intelligence instantiating those means -- that life is valued by God -- because one does not seek to effect an end one does not value. This is a conclusion, not an assumption.

If you do not start with the assumption that life has value then what is your basis for claiming there is intentionality for life? As I brought up earlier, you can't claim there's a remarkable coincidence without there being two coinciding things. The existence of life coincides with nothing - unless you assume it is coinciding with an intent for life, which is circular.

[accidental=not intended] is begging the question to decide this prior to examining arguments

I didn't decide it! I've merely argued that you have not even considered it. You're the one claiming fine tuning entails intentionality/a mind/God - so you have the burden of proof to show why "intended" is more likely than unintended. You've agreed to take value of life off the table, so what's left?

No system of human thought can do this, because humans have both a limited representational capacity and a limited lifetime. So, if metaphysics is to be a real, human science, it must be far less ambitious.

Obviously we're not omniscient, and we can't prove coherence - but philosophers try to prove incoherence in the theories of those they disagree with. The opponent then responds with a new or revised account that maintains coherence.

I see metaphysics as the science concerned with nature of existence and how more specialized sciences are grounded in existence. It derives its principles, not from assumption or hypothesis, but from a reflection on our experience of being. It demonstrates the adequacy of its concepts and conclusions by showing how they are grounded in our experience of being.

That reflection on our experience beings results in a conceptual framework. The objective and hope is that the conceptual framework actually corresponds to reality (i.e. "is true" per correspondence theory). Correspondence can't be vague and imprecise, it must be a perfect match to be true. Is it true, or is it actually just assumed true? I contend it is the latter. As an example, consider Aristotelean agent causation - as I pointed out, reference to agents does not fully account for causation. Unless you can fully account for causation, then there's clearly something untrue about the conceptual framework.

The problem of universals requires reflection and analysis, not the assumption of an a priori solution.

I wasn't suggesting philosophers had failed to do their due diligence of reflection and analysis. Rather I'm highlighting that this reflection and analysis leads to different answers among different philosophers. I'll assume each of them has a rationally justified belief in whatever they decide - so how do we account for the differences of opinion? I submit that this is due to assumptions within their analysis - there have to be, because it's not based solely on analytic truths.

The multiverse hypothesis posits not just one or a few other universes, but a myriad of other universes. If does not posit other universes like ours, but universes with a range of physical constants that we do not know to be self-consistent. Clearly, it is an unparsimonious solution to the fact of fine tuning.

The variability of physical constants is due to exactly one assumption: that the constants are a product of quantum uncertainty - that they arise from entanglements with the environment from a superposition of all the possibilities. This one additional assumption is not superfluous, because it explains the alleged fine tuning.

the operation of intelligence in the cosmos does not require the rejection of standard physics. If it did, I would say it did.

Provide an account of intelligence in the cosmos based on standard physics.

The difference is that we have an observational basis for accepting GR and none for the multiverse.

That observational basis has taken decades to reveal itself, but GR was accepted physics long before that.

We judge the merits of an argument by how well it conforms to the accepted norms of reasoning, not by the nature of its conclusion

I agree, but my problem with your argument is your creative special pleading, holding multiverse to the higher standard of science while using a looser standard for your preferred solution.

Sound reasoning entails God. Unsound reasoning does not.

I have yet to see any such sound reasoning. They all depend on assumptions.

The point I was making is that a BIV is in a nearly identical epistemic position as are we, except we know the BIV cannot have knowledge of the physical world, because his belief is a Gettier condition.

It's another matter about whether or not physicalism is a justified belief. The truism "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" just means physicalism is possibly false- and without evidence, it is just a bare possibility, and the mere possibility of being wrong does not serve as a defeater for that belief. Compare this to solipsism -no one believes it's true despite the possibility it is false.

What is the difference between "grounded in observation" and "empirically verified"?

One can't empirically verify a negative (physicalism is the doctrine that no non-physical things exist). However, it may be reasonable to infer that only physical things exist because there's no evidence of anything else existing - that is still "grounded" in observation.

Are you saying this because physicalism can't be verified empirically (which isn't the same thing as being "grounded in observation") or because of something different about a BIV?

I agree physicalism can't be verified; neither can non-physicalist metaphysics. They are just theories, and all one can do is test their ability to account for aspects of the world, and potentially falsifying it by showing it incoherent.

Physicalism can't be grounded in observation whether BIV or not

Yes and no. Our perception of the world (our mental interpretation of our sensory input) constitutes non-verbal beliefs, that are properly basic (they are innate, and are the product of nature to provide us a perceptual image that corresponds to some aspects of the actual world), about an external world and it's nature. This grounds our belief in a physical world. One can then infer the physical world to be all that exists (i.e physicalism).

I assume you mean false sensory impressions. In terms of formal epistemology, his belief in the physical world would be just as justified as ours, so this could also lead him to to justifiably infer physicalism - just as we could.

However, his belief in the physical world (and thus his belief in physicalism) would not constitute knowledge in the formal sense. That's because his belief is due to a Gettier condition (i.e. his belief is true by accident). Knowledge = a belief that is justified, true, and does not entail a Gettier problem.

Contrast this with our belief in the physical world. We believe there is such a thing because of our actual physical contact with it, through our innate capacity. Of course, we could be wrong - solipsism is possibly true (or you could be a brain in a vat who is imagining this conversation). That possibility just implies that our justified belief is actually false, and therefore doesn't constitute knowledge. But as long as our belief is true, we indeed have knowledge.

Let's say a person is actually a brain in a vat. They are convinced that physicalism is the case, which is to say that all of reality is made up of the stuff of physics without exception

How did this brain come to believe there is actually a physical world (a sine qua non for physicalism)? That is an essential question, because it has bearing on the rationality of its belief. In the real world, we believe there is a physical world because we interact with it (or so it seems, but it seems that way because of the way our perceptions are hardwired).

No, [dark matter and dark energy] are part of a hypothetical physical (as in 'physics') system. Metaphysics, as I understand it, is not what you think.

I agree, but it would be helpful to define "physical". I offer the following definition:

The physical includes all objects that are pardigmatically considered physical*, the properties and objects that account for these paradigmatic objects, and all other objects that have those properties or are composed of any of the objects in the account.

* i.e. the stuff of everyday experience, and taken for granted as being "physical". The concept is grounded in our hard-wired perceptual capacities to interact with an external world.

"There isnt much of a connection between Trump and crazy evangelicals as there was with Bush 43."

There IS a connection, and it is not pretty.

Lot's of Evangelicals voted for Trump because of his promises to appoint anti-abortion rights justices ( a promise he is fufilling). That is somewhat understandable, but what is not understandable is the continued defense of Trump by many Evangelicals. F or example, consider Frankin Graham's defense of Trump.

Suppose the universe just happened to have beings of type x, but these beings would not exist had some set of historical facts (F) not occurred. Does this imply F was designed to produce x?

Relativist: "The FTA doesn't point to evidence, it fits a hypothesis to a set of facts."

In fitting a hypothesis to a set of facts, it points to those facts as evidence.

I agree with this, but the point is that those same facts serve as evidence for each of the hypotheses to be considered. However your next statement is problematic:

I have considered the multiverse hypothesis and found that (1) there is no observational data in support of it (in contrast to the FTA) and (2) it makes no clear, falsifiable predictions.

It entails a special pleading, because you identified criteria to dismiss one hypothesis but ignore these criteria with respect to the God-hypothesis.

You need to show how the facts might not signify what proponents of the FTA say.

I've done that, by providing alternative hypotheses that explain the facts.

the existence of a multiverse is a physical hypothesis. So, we have to judge it as we do any physical hypothesis -- and it simply does not pass muster.

Wrong. Multiverse is BOTH a physical hypothesis and a metaphysical hypothesis. You are overhasty in dismissing it as a physical hypothesis, and you fail to take it into consideration as metaphysical hypothesis.

Defense of the Multiverse Physical hypothesis:
1. There is no valid reason to reject a physical hypothesis solely on the basis that it is not entailed by accepted science. If that were done, no new science could ever get off the ground.

2. There are valid scientific reasons to believe there is multiverse, for example : multiverse seems to be entailed by the theory of cosmic inflation (which is widely accepted science). (see this). Inflation also entails symmetry breaking, which is the mechanism that produces the classical world that we know. Symmetry breaking at the level of a quantum system almost certainly entails alternative physics because most processes of a quantum system entail quantum indeterminacy. These hypotheses are consistent with established physics; they simply assume there's a more fundamental basis for the laws of physics as we know them.

Defense of the Multiverse Metaphysical Hypothesis:
Multiverse is conceptually possible, it is consistent with a variety of physical models of physical reality, consistent with physicalist metaphysics, and it has explanatory value. Any proposed physical multiverse hypothesis is thus a viable metaphysical hypothesis, even if one were to reject it as a valid scientific hypothesis due to some presumed methodological restriction (as you do).

We have abundant evidence [of the persuasive power of the FTA]. Many people, including atheists, find the argument so strong they need to violate the norms of the scientific method to hypothesize an alternative explanation.

Violating the "norms of the scientific method" is irrelevant to evaluating metaphysical hypotheses, and this again betrays your special pleading in exempting the designer-hypothesis from this methodological criterion.

<Significance> and <importance> are concepts depending on human valuation. If humans use life as a sign, then it has significance. If humans see life as pivotal, it has importance.

This is a key point that deserves more discussion. Obviously, we all value human life - it's human nature to do so. And this explain why many people uncritically accept the FTA (and hence, its persuasive power is due to a lack of imagination in challenging a questionable assumption) - it seems to us that human life is special. The problem that is often overlooked is that the FTA depends on there being an objective value to human life. Holding human life to be of value obviously has a survival value, and so our having this value is consistent with natural selection and doesn't depend on there being an objective truth that we're (magically) grasping.

I am not sure how you're defining "accidental." (referring to the possibility that "life is an accidental byproduct of the nature of this universe").

I simply mean "not designed"; "not intended".

Relativist: “ imagine a puddle ..."

For this to be analogous to the FTA, other "holes" (other sets of constants) would have to "fit" (work) equally well. They do not.

You're missing the point: the puddle exists accidentally, not a product of design, but from its perspective the world seems designed for it.

Relativist: "How do we explain natural law? That's a metaphysical question..."

When you make an actual argument on the baseless nature of metaphysics, I'll give you an actual reply.

You're changing the subject. I was pointing out that a brute fact basis for natural law does not violate a principle of science, because accounting for the existence of natural law is in the realm of metaphysics (science just investigates what actual natural laws exist).

I don't think physicalism entails the non-existence of a state logically prior to this universe

Physicalism entails the non-existence of states that are "logically prior". Logical priority pertains to epistemic investigation of propositions that are about reality, and hence it has no bearing on what actually exists. Causation in the world (as opposed to its propositional description) is a temporal phenomenon.

No, because it neither mentions nor assumes the existence of God. It deals with the essential character of the laws of nature. if you have a criticism of my actual analysis, please state it.

You didn't provide an analysis, you only made a vague allusion. But I inferred that you were claiming the "finely tuned" constants entail intentionality, and I'm pointing out that this is a presumption - or just an alternate way of presenting the fine-tuning hypothesis. Claiming they demonstrate intentionality is just a different way of saying they demonstrate design, or they imply God. So this doesn't in any way support your case, it's just another way of stating it.

Not everything called "metaphysics" is an adequate to reality. A rational metaphysics is not based on assumption or speculation, but on sound reflection and analysis of our experience of existence.

A metaphysics demonstrates its adequacy to reality by its ability to coherently account for everything that we perceive exists. It's no trivial task to construct a metaphysics that is coherent and complete, but it certainly does depend on speculation and assumptions. Consider a nominalist metaphysics: it's the product of sound reflection and analysis, and it can account for everything that exists, but it is founded on the assumption that universals do not exist. An assumption of universals existence/non-existence is not an arbitrary assumption - it takes a great deal of analysis to convince oneself either way, but clearly these are pivotal to a metaphysical system and their existence can be neither firmly proven nor firmly disproven.

(1) The FTA is evidence based, while the multiverse hypothesis is not.

The facts presented in evidence for the fine-tuning also serve as evidence for a metaphysical multiverse hypothesis. That's why I've said we have to consider this an "inference to best explanation."

(2) It is more parsimonious to posit one God than a myriad of other universes which have the additional property, also unsupported by evidence, of diverse physical constants.

Parsimony does not entail a small number of existing things, it entails no more assumptions than are necessary to explain a set of facts. We could debate how many assumptions are entailed by multiverse vs God, but I doubt we'd ever find common ground.

That the FTA is a classic argumentum signum quia -- a rational form of heuristic reasoning (e.g. "Where there's smoke, there's fire"). On the other hand, positing a multiverse violates the accepted norms of the scientific method by (a) being unfalsifiable, and (b) rejecting the standard framework of physics (which sees the laws and constants of nature as universal).

Special pleading: failing to apply consistent criteria to the various possible explanations.

IF we choose to consider life as something objectively special (which you have not shown), then we need to account for fine-tuning. We've discussed two metaphysical hypotheses that can account for it: 1) God; 2) multiverse. Neither is falsifiable; neither is entailed by established physics - although multiverse is consistent with established physics while God is not.

Your claim that multiverse depends on "rejecting the standard framework of physics (which sees the laws and constants of nature)" can only possibly apply to a physical multiverse hypothesis, not the metaphysical one. However, it doesn't even apply to the physical: all physical hypotheses are consistent with that framework, it simply extrapolates to a hypothesis that established physics is a special case of more fundamental physics. This is exactly the same framework as Newton's gravitational theory is within General Relativity (which is a theory of gravitation): Newton's theory applies more narrowly than GR.

Relativist: "clearly one can't assume God exists if one is to claim the FTA makes a persuasive case for God's existence"

I disagree. We are not debating the existence of God, but the merits of the FTA.

Fine tuning entails a fine-tuner. In the context of our discussion, I am using the term "God" to refer to the fine tuner (or that which is the holder of the intention, if you prefer).

If we look at our early ancestors, I agree: some would evoke my concept <human> and others not. I further agree that different individuals might evoke your <human> concept than would evoke mine. Nonetheless, whatever creatures evoked your concept would do so because they have the objective capacity to do so. So, I don't see that these differences undermine my case.

We have the objective capacity to create "a perfectly well-defined set of criteria" (as you put it), but these will be arbitrary. Each generation was capable of breeding with the prior generation (and many generations back), throughout evolutionary history, so any criteria that might be developed will necessarily draw an arbitrary line. Each change that has occurred in evolutionary history is an accident, and therefore every property that exists in humans today is accident -there is therefore nothing to distinguish an accidental property from an essential property.

So, how does this widespread agreement show anyone is "assuming" their common position rather than abstracting it from reality?

All metaphysics is based on abstracting from reality, and there is not agreement on all matters.

Relativist: Causation is a spatio-temporal relation between particulars (due to laws of nature). "
Definitions are not assumptions.

It is a postulate (which is an assumption) that has explanatory scope and is consistent with physicalism. These relations are also universals. It's used to account for the observed regularity in the world which could also be accounted for through trope-like behavior that a nominalist metaphysics might have).

You cannot define yourself into a conclusion about reality.

That is my point. One metaphysical system entails God, and another does not. Both are developed consistent with observed reality through contemplation and analysis. Both are coherent. The one that concludes "God" is basically "defining itself a conclusion about reality."

Apparently it means it's time for monologues. Here's mine: I admire your passion.

Michael - I seem to recall your saying you would give me the last word. Maybe I dreamed it. Seriously, I don't have time to respond to everything you wrote, but if you will identify the most important thing you'd like me to respond to, I'll be happy to do so.

OK, but then the statement, "The probability of (E given design) > probability of (E given no design)" is vacuous. I look at a grain of sand under a microscope, and produce a digital map of it's irregular shape. The probability that it would have that exact shape is higher if it was designed. So what?

the other piece, which is at the heart of FTA that I am not sure you have addressed is the overwhelming large odds against the observed criteria that exist and support sentient beings like us. Again on the order of 52!. An incredibly large number. This is an important concept of FTA.

I addressed this - it depends on treating sentient life as privileged. In any world, something will exist, and the a priori probability that it would exist is infinitesmal. Yet, something must exist.

Consider a lottery: what is low probability is that a chosen number will match what is drawn - this entails a coincidence, two sets of numbers coinciding. Sentient life has no prior thing that it is coinciding with. It is just something that happens to exists.

1. We exist
2. The set of conditions that allow us to exist are incredibly precise and incredibly unlikely.

What are the probabilities that this situation is be design, chance, other. Which is more likely.

That is equivalent to saying:
The probability of (life given design) >probability of (life given no design)

Let's analyze the reasoning.

1. Every metaphysically possible world entails some type of existent (E) whose existence depends on the properties of that world - irrespective of whether that world is designed or exists by chance.
2. The probability of (E given design) > probability of (E given no design)

Conclusion 2 seems a truism, but does not imply there was design, because every world has unlikely existents irrespective of whether the world is actually designed or exists by chance.

I looked at the linked paper, and confirmed it does not address this objection. It treats observers in a privileged way.

anyone who thinks or believes that there is less than 50% chance that God exists, is irrational on the issue. They are absolutely not thinking logically (on the issue of God being real).

My only issue with your statement is that there is no consistent means of assigning epistemic probability. It's tempting to base it on the principle of indifference, but that has a major flaw.

We must not be referring to the same thing. I'm referring to arguments like this:

1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.

2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance.

3. Therefore, it is due to design.

The conclusion is presented as a truth claim, one deduced from the premises. The premises are also truth claims. I have seen arguments like this presented as a reason to believe God (a designer) exists.

This is the sort of argument I am refuting.

You statement "it fails to do that" needs an IMO in front of it.

Sure, but the burden is on the FTA proponent to make the case and refute all objections. I have raised two objections that no one has refuted. You seem to accept my objection about the multiverse. I needn't show that multiverse is more likely than God, just that it is equally likely.

there is no difference in God as a designer or multi universe as far an evidence. Neither is a matter of fact, both are reasonable answers.

Agreed, but consider the implication. The hypothetical open-minded agnostic approaches the argument on the fence, neither affirming nor denying God's existence. If the argument is consistent with both his existence and non-existence, then it doesn't shift his position.

You are conflating science with physicalism (as a metaphysical theory). A physicalist believes that only physical things exist, and this is based on the observation that every aspect of the world is explainable in physicalist terms, and that the physical sciences are the means for exploring the nature of what exists. A physicalist will ask: why assume immaterial things exist, if reality is fully describable in physicsl terms? It violates the principle of parsimony.

That's been debunked by just about every economist as a temporary blip initiated by Trump’s failing trade war, which is already requiring billion dollar bailouts. Anyone who thinks the US will have grown by 4.1% by the end of the year, in other words that this is "very sustainable" in Trump's words, needs to be provided with a very tight jacket and locked in a room with bouncy walls.

Don't overlook the possibility of higher GDP growth this year, even if it's not 4.1%. Lower taxes have historically been stimulative. The problem is that this growth is paid for by running up more debt, and this debt will be unsustainable because deficits have grown (increasing the debt) and interest on the national debt rises with interest rates. Interest on the debt will eventually overwhelm the budget at this rate. This is a booby trap for the next (Democratic) president, who will unavoidably have to raise taxes, which will be a drag on the economy.

Again, it is impossible to logically show that there is more chance that God doesn't exist than that God does exist. That can be the starting point in understanding anything else.

You're reversing the burden of proof. The FTA purports to show God's existence is likely. It fails to do that. It's failure has no bearing on whether or not God exists, and I've made no claim that it does.

Dfpolis: "We only have to consider actual evidence "
Relativist: "Then this removes God from consideration."

No, it does not The point of discussing the FTA is to consider whether it points to evidence for the existence of God, and if so, how strong that evidence is. To say flatly that there is no evidence is to beg the question under consideration

Your wording is loose. The FTA doesn't point to evidence, it fits a hypothesis to a set of facts. This is abductive reasoning, specifically: inference to the best explanation. A reasonable abduction requires that other explanations be considered - you have to test how well the facts fit the alternatives.
If there's a God, it's reasonable to infer that the "finely tuned" constants may be an act of intentionality by God. But if there's no God, there are two sub-possibilities: 1) there are many universes, each with different constants, so it's reasonable to expect some would be life permitting. 2) life is an accidental byproduct of the nature of this universe, with no objective significance or importance.

Your response to #1 is that multiverse is not entailed by known physics. Obviously, neither is God, so this fact doesn't serve to make God more likely. With regard to #2, the only response I've noticed is your claim that life entails a coincidence - but you haven't specified anything that life is coincident with.

Relativist: "For the FTA to have any utility, it needs to have some persuasive power."

Clearly, it does.

Assertion without evidence. You quoted Carr, but all he does is to put the God hypothesis on par with multiverse - indicating both are metaphysical claims. Carr hasn't even considered #2, so I'll give you another quote:

“If you imagine a puddle waking up one morning and thinking, 'This is an interesting world I find myself in — an interesting hole I find myself in — fits me rather neatly, doesn't it? In fact it fits me staggeringly well, must have been made to have me in it!" (Douglas Adams)

Relativist:" it is also possible that the world is simply a brute fact"
Only if you reject the fundamental principle of science, viz. that every phenomenon has an adequate, dynamical explanation.

Every phenomenon is explainable because there is natural law. How do we explain natural law? That's a metaphysical question, who's answer depends on the metaphysical assumptions you make (despite the fact that you deny there are metaphysical assumptions, but more on that later). Physicalism with the assumption of a finite past entails an initial, uncaused state, a state that entails the natural law that determines the subsequent states of the universe. That initial state, inclusive of its properties, would be a brute fact.

I started with Brentano's analysis of intentionality in Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. showing that it is characterized by "aboutness" and then showed that the laws of nature have the same kind of aboutness

All this does is to show that the God hypothesis fits the facts, as I described in the first portion of this post. You have to show this more likely than the two "not-God" alternatives.

It is metaphysics, in examining the foundations of physics, that deduces the existence of God.

That deduction is contingent upon metaphysical assumptions. Obviously, physicalist metaphysics does not entail God.

1. I do not use metaphysical possibility to argue the existence of God. I only use actual being.

You have made no such argument in this thread, so this seems moot.

2. I do use the logical possibility of a multiverse as one reason to say that the FTA is not a sound proof, only a persuasive case.

The persuasiveness of your claim is similar as Johnny Cochran's persuasive case for O.J.'s innocence: convince the jury to ignore the full picture. "if the glove does not fit, you must acquit"; "God provides an answer, so look no further." Your challenge is to show that the God possibility is a better explanation for each of the not-God possibilities I presented.

3. As I have pointed out a couple of times recently, possibility is not information. Information is the reduction of possibility

I have no idea what you're talking about.

More broadly, there are sound, evidence-based deductive arguments for the existence of God.

Perhaps there are, but we're discussing the failure of the FTA specifically.

I can't make sense of this. You don't give any example of my modal errors. You assume that my discussion of God is "baseless." Finally, you speak of a solution without specifying the problem.

Here's the problem: Removing multiverse from consideration because it's not entailed by accepted science is equivalent to saying the multiverse is (narrowly) physically impossible (a modal claim). Then you proceed to claim this makes a persuasive case for the God hypothesis, despite God also being physically impossible (your solution must be implicitly "possible" to be considered, but clearly it's not the same modality of possibility). I admit you hadn't couched it in these terms, so I'm happy to rephrase the error as a special pleading if you prefer.

Yes, but since we can show that God exists, we know that the existence of God must be possible, as nothing impossible can be actual. My philosophical claims about God are categorical, not conditional.

We can show God exists?! Are you referring to some other, unstated argument? I'd be happy to discuss these at some point, but let's first complete our FTA discussion, and clearly one can't assume God exists if one is to claim the FTA makes a persuasive case for God's existence - that would be circular. We have to approach it abductively, but then you need to meet the challenge of comparing it to the 2 "not-God" hypotheses.

I demand evidence of actual existence to credit a multiverse, just as I do for the existence of God

That would be interesting to discuss, but I'm discussing an evaluation of the FTA without presumption - and it is presumptive to assume God exists when approaching the FTA. If you're willing to agree the FTA fails such an evaluation, then we can move on to the evidence you have for God outside the FTA.

The last time I looked, snow is a form of H2O and sand is mostly SiO2. There is nothing about a
planet that requires heavier elements for its formation.

Regarding snowflakes: snow and liquid water are not in the form of individual snowflakes any more than humans are just a hodgepodge of water and hydrocarbons. Regarding sandstone: Silicon and oxygen are only produced through fusion in large stars, in novae; quartz (silica) particles are the predominant mineral in standstone, but the quartz has been particalized and compacted over time- which depends on a series of activities and environments.

It's "an assumption" that the billions of people on earth have the objective capacity to evoke the concept <human>? I can't agree. For me, it is an experiential fact.

It is a concept that's vague, in the context of evolutionary history - as I pointed out.

Relativist: "every metaphysical theory depends on assumptions. "

Thank you for sharing your faith.

I'm stating an belief that I'm pretty confident of, but I invite you to prove me wrong by agreeing that physicalist metaphysics does not depend on assumption.

You seem confused. DNA encodes out physical structure, and that structure goes into evoking the concept <human>. Still, to know that you're human, I don't need to know about your DNA. So, while DNA is a cause of what you are, it's not part of most people's concept <human>.

If you can't draw a sharp line between human and non-human in your ancestral line, then your concept of "human" is flawed.

It depends what you mean by "postulated." If you mean fundamental concepts abstracted from reality, I agree that essence and existence, potency and act, substance and accident, etc are such concepts. If you mean put forward as unjustified speculative starting points, then that is far from the case.

The postulates are well thought out, but they are postulates nonetheless. Here's a postulate of Armstrong's ontology: everything that exists consists of a particular with properties. i.e. properties do not exist independent of the particulars that have them. Causation is a spatio-temporal relation between particulars (due to laws of nature). Under this account "pure act" cannot exist, because it does not entail particulars with relations between them. See what I mean about assumptions?

Relativist: "Life is not the result of a random process. It is the result of complexity arriving through stages of increasing complexity. "

The logical conclusion to make, exclusively based on probability, is that life is not the result of random process because God created it.

I am addressing the argument from incredulity that arises from considering only the two endpoints: the quantum fields (as an example of what may be fundamental) and the existence of conscious life. It's hard to imagine how life could have just "happened" from random behavior of quantum fields. However, if one considers the natural processes that give rise to increasing complexity, it's not so incredible after all.

In order to set one level of complexity, random materials are randomly working with other random materials, through randomly set "laws of nature", with the probability for that random process to result in a new, more complex and consistent unit of reality being near 0% or an absolute 0%.

Laws of nature are not "randomly set, " they just are what they are, although they may manifest themselves differently depending on the context.

A metaphysical investigation should start with what we know (in the loose sense of "know"), and we know that there are laws of nature. There is nothing impossible, or even surprising, about the fact that these laws of nature (as we know them) led to the existence of complex, functional entities. Hydrogen is more complex than the quantized quark and electron fields from which it arises. Stars are more complex than the hydrogen of which they are mostly composed. The heavy elements produced by novae are more complex than the lighter elements that fuse to form them. Planets are more complex than the individual elements that coalesce into them. ... No laws of nature are broken anywhere in the chain, and yet complex functional units arise. And it's wrong to call this a product of randomness - because they occur as a consequence of the laws of nature.

For example, we haven't observed a single case where a non-human being evolved into a human or other being with 100% observable and demonstrable human-like consciousness and abilities that result from that level of consciousness.

You're going from a bad argument to a worse one. I'm not interested in debating evolution with someone who is so ill-informed.

Notice that in his conclusion, Ellis says:
"Nothing is wrong with scientifically based philosophical speculation, which is what multiverse proposals are. But we should name it for what it "

i do not claim belief in God is irrational, but I do think many of the arguments for God's existence (including the FTA) are problematic. It is problematic to claim that multiverse should be dismissed because it's "just" metaphysical speculation, when consideration of God is also metaphysical speculation.

That said, it can still be reasonable for a theist to look at fine tuning as the point at which God's hand in our existence can be seen. But recognize that this interpretation follows from a belief in God, it doesn't establish such a belief.

I think the counter to that is for anything to emerge, there has to be at least some order.

The best explanation for the order is the existence of laws of nature.

the point of the fine-tuning argument, as far as I understand it, is that the order that is observed in the Universe ultimately derives from a very small number of fundamental constraints

That is not correct. The FTA is based on the obsevation that life as we know it would not exist had the constants been different.

Relativist: "Can you show it to be more probable that an omniscient, omnipotent, omni-benevolent, omnipresent being exists than a multiverse?

No, but I do suspect that those terms are essentially meaningless in this context

Then you should agree that the FTA has no persuasive power.

'existence' is the wrong term for 'God'. Even if 'God' is real then God is not 'something that exists' in the sense that you're naturally inclined to understand by the term 'existence'. There is not anything 'out there' that answers to the name. This is the meaning of 'transcendent'.

This seems a nuance one might consider after deciding there is a God.

The point is, again, 'God' is not one term in an empirical hypothesis, not a cause in the sense that fire is the cause of heat or water the cause of rust. So, an appropriate theistic answer to the question of what evidence there is for God, is the fact of existence - that God is the reason that anything exists whatever.

That's great rationalization for the absence of evidence for a God if he exists, but it doesn't provide a reason to think God, rather than (for example) multiverse is the reason for the alleged fine tuning for someone who is open to both possibilities (God's existence and nonexistence).

Regarding Dawkins: I have no interest in discussing his polemics.

"I think you are missing the main concept of FTA. It is not a proof, and does not present any evidence in support of any particular hypothesis"

Do you understand that it is still an argument intended to persuade someone that God exists? Arguments needn't be deductive to do this. The FTA is presented as an abductive argument- an inference to the best explanation. God is an explanatory hypothesis, offered to explain "fine tuning". That is a reasonable approach, but to be persuasive it must be shown to be a better explanation than alternatives. In this case, an alternative is a multiverse. Of course, if you approach it with the prior belief that God exists - you will see no need to look further. I have no objection to that. But if you are going to claim this has some power of persuasion, you have to show why it's a better explanation.

"As a theist, I only like it because it shows a bias in atheism of discounting any argument that shows God as a possible answer, solely on a faith based belief that God does not exist. It is a juxtaposition I enjoy."

It reflects bias to dismiss one possibility due to lack of evidence, while embracing another that also lacks evidence. So it would be poor reasoning for an atheist to claim there must be a multiverse, and equally unreasonable to claim it must be God. We should therefore agree that both are possible, as far as we know. Right?

You might just as well say: create an algorithm which produces random strings of alphabetical characters and then set it to run indefinitely.

You are missing my point. There's a tendency to incredulouly look at life as magically appearing from primitive substances. But this overlooks the development of increasing complexity. So while it is highly unlikely that a living creature would come to exist from random processes applying to simple things, it is not unlikely for something more complex to arise from something that is somewhat less complex.

"The fact that many scientifically-inclined atheists are so eager to embrace the concept of the multiverse as an alternative is itself an indication of its effectiveness."
Hardly. Can you show it to be more probable that an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omnipresent being exists than a multiverse? My impression is that theists jump to the conclusion they already "knew" to be correct, while dismissing all alternatives. Earlier, someone said "yeah, but there's no evidence of a multiverse" - and yet they have no problem suggesting the answer is something else that lacks evidence: God.

A stone's sentience is only a bare possibility, and that's insufficient reason to take that possibility seriously.

Where in Brazil? (I have friends in Curitiba, one of whom is named João).

I'm very impressed with your English.

-tchau

We have an idea of what intelligent behavior is from introspection, psychological study, and philosophical investigation. For example we know that humans engage in intentional behavior - they decide to do things, and (sometimes!) actually do those things. Decision making is a product of deliberation, based on dispositions (from long term passions, to short term impulses) and beliefs (from the tentative to the certain). These aspects of intelligent behavior go well beyond Turing's simple test, but are sine qua non for human-like intelligent behavior.

It may be feasible to build AI's that behave intentionally and deliberate, because we can describe it. That which we can't fully describe (like consciousness) isn't going to just happen - we need to understand it first.

"A Human Life is a set of experiences from birth to death. "

The shape of a rock is a product of the many factors that formed it, and influenced its current shape. Those factors could be said to be the set of experiences it had. How is human experience different?

"I wrote this already on another thread: AIs just "work". There is absolutely no point in discussing what an AI would need to be to make a human judge a picture as aesthetical pleasing, interesting or whatever."

This seems similar to the "Turing Test." The Turing test doesn't entail true intelligence, nor would the development of aesthetically appealing pictures entail having a true sense of the aesthetic. AI is mostly about simulating intelligent behavior, not about actually engaging in it.

That said, there are some aspects of AI that seem aimed at truly engaging in some components of human-like intelligence - in particular, the work with artificial neural networks. But the big obstacle will always be the "hard problem" of consciousness. I'm not predicting it will be impossible, but we'd first have to figure out a physicalist theory of consciousness to have have something to work toward.

"I don't see it that way. My analysis here comes from applying probability thinking, defined within mathematics, that results in conclusion that there is almost or absolutely no chance that life is a result of random process."
Life is not the result of a random process. It is the result of complexity arriving through stages of increasing complexity.

Consider the old claim that monkeys banging away randomly at keyboards would eventually produce the works of Shakespeare. The probability is low that monkeys hitting on keyboards will randomly produce Hamlet, but it is highly probable that they will accidentally produce some words. Imagine randomly selecting sets of words: it is improbable that random collections of words will organize into a play, but less improbable that phrases and then sentences will be produced, and so forth. As long as each stage of increasing complexity is viable, able to exist and be combined, further organization becomes inevitable.

Does anything ever get destroyed in the world?

It depends on how you define "thing" in "anything". If your iphone is dropped from a tall building, it's constituent parts will still exist, but they will no longer be the constituent parts of a functional iphone.

It is logically impossible for AI to take all jobs. AI would have to become self-sustaining, so that software and hardware maintenance and construction required no humans. AI would have to develop a sense of aesthetics, one that is superior to humans, to take the place of artists of all sorts. This latter seems impossible, because aesthetics is related to human experiences by humans, and to a human perspective of qualia.

Your analysis depends on the assumption there is something objectively special about life. It's true that the odds are against the existence of life (unless there is a multiverse, which can't be ruled out), but the odds of any specific sort of existent is also extremely low.