I don't think Clinton lost because she was a moderate, but I'd be interested in hearing why you think so.

The only people that I can imagine that were put of by her being a moderate were Bernie supporters. I doubt many of them voted for Trump, although I'm sure some of them just stayed home (I know some who did this). I bet the vast majority of them now regret their decision, so I don't see this as a factor in the next election.

Elections are usually won by getting the votes of those in the middle. Trump is certainly an anomoly, but it would be good to consider why so many found him appealing. Fewer will find him appealing this time, and I'm confident that his opposition will be extremely energized.

BTW, there's one progressive that I think could beat Trump in a landslide, but there's zero chance she will run: Michelle Obama. Nevertheless, she's my dream candidate.

It's an assumption that entails a causally efficacious necessary being, which is unique (all other necessary "beings" are abstractions, which are not causally efficacious). The alternative is an assumption of an uncaused brute fact - one whose nature entails the potential for change (and thus does tell us what causality is), and is also unique.

As an example of the latter, consider a quantum system in an initial state that deterministically evolves per a Schroedinger equation. That it will evolve is instrinsic to what it is.

Theists are drawn to the assumption of a causally efficacious necessary being, while atheists would propose the brute fact. Consequently there's no persuasive power in this line of enquiry - contrary to devotees of Leibniz' argument.

I would say the reason I don't know what it is like to be a bat is because I am not a bat — Moliere

You're also not a girl (I assume). There certainly are more differences between bats and humans than there are between boys and girls, but they're still different. The differences are physical as well as social. There certainly is a "girl role" that is "imposed" on girls, but that role is part of their identity. A boy who'd like to live in that role will not have had the same experiences as the girl.

Of course, we could chose to define the "girl role" in a way that people of either genetic sex could fit - but there will be arbitrariness to it. I'm actually OK with doing that, but this doesn't make it something more than it is (arbitrary).

I know what it is like to be poor because I have been poor.

Same here. I wonder if we experienced it the same way, though. Everyone experiences things based on who and what they are, and on their environment.

Thanks for the link - the analysis is very plausible. It is also disheartening because it has the corrollary "lies don't matter" to the public, and probably also that the public is short-sighted. There are consequences to unsustainable budget deficits, protectionism, and ambiguous relations with other countries where the distinction between ally and enemy are blurred.

IMO, the Democrats best hope is to nominate a moderate. Left-wingers certainly feel energized, but their favorite candidates (Sanders and Warren) have lower chances of getting elected than does a real moderate. They can only win if something pretty bad happens during the next 2 years. The best counter to an a-hole like Trump is an even tempered, well-spoken person. e.g. if Mitt Romney became a Democrat, I think he could be Trump.

The laws of logic are not contingent laws like man-made laws or even the laws of physics, which are what they are but could have been different. Logic is an essential part of reality: not everything that is logical is real, but everything that is real is logical. I+I=II because you can see II in I+I (just remove the + sign). It does not "appear" from it, like an effect appears from its cause. — Samuel Lacrampe

You're reifying logic. Logic is not part of "reality" it is a truth-preserving guide to reasoning. It "exists" only as abstractions exist - within the mind. Outside of the mind, there is no such thing as logic. Logic guides us to understanding the world based on limited "knowledge" (as a set of beliefs) about the world; it applies to propositions not directly to reality.

" To those who don't regard causation as such though, to those who think causation itself must be explained, something other must be doing that work. "
That's circular reasoning: why assume causation must be explained, unless one first believes everything has an explanation?

By contrast, we have an empirical basis for believing causation. It may not be ontologically primitive, but it seems an epistemologically justifiable belief that is not circular.

Consider why we can't know what it's like to be a bat. Among the reasons: our perceptions are based on our world-view, and our world-view is a product of hard-wiring, and layers of experience. Each layer of experience is a product of the lower (earlier) layers.

Males and females are hardwired differently. Among other differences are the hormonal - these influence our perceptions. A boy may empathize with girls rather than boys (and vice versa), and conceptualize an opposite gender-role, but it will not be identical to being that opposite sex. (Don't construe this to imply I'm opposed to trans-rights. I'm socially liberal on this, but that doesn't mean I can set aside reasonable analysis.)

"Then my answer is yes -- one can know what it is like to be such and such. "
You should let Thomas Nagel know.

A state of affairs is something that exists, so it entails the "existence of non-existence." This is (broadly) logically impossible.

Alternatively, to suggest there could have been nothingness implies the proposition "there is nothing" is true in some metaphysically possible world. "Is" is a statement of being (existence), so this again reduces to the self-contradictory term, "non-existence exists".

I used "if" to avoid asserting a negative ( "there is no justification..."). I acknowledge there may be justification of which I am unaware.

A belief in X is rational only if it is justified. What is the justification for believing there are necessarily reasons for everything? The only justification I'm aware of is causation, and that is not sufficient because that only establishes the necessity of causal reasons.

I was alluding to Leibniz's cosmological argument. — frank

I know, and I was relating an objection: it depends on the assumption that nothingness should somehow be expected in the absence of a reason. A state of affairs of "nonexistence" is incoherent.

"Why should we think reasons can only be causes? "

I didn't suggest there can't be non-causal reasons, I questioned the justification for believing there are necessarily reasons. If I'm right that the justification is based on the presence on causal reasons, then it is unjustified to claim there are necessarily reasons when there are no causes.

Western philosophy is steeped in a theistic world view, so the mere fact of a rich literature carries no weight. That's not to suggest there might not be good justifications imbedded therein, but what are they?

(BTW, your link didn't work)

Why expect nothingness in the absence of a reason?

Please elaborate. Why should we think there are reasons without basing the reasoning on causation?

That is my sense as well, but then the second clause of Leibniz' formulation is unjustified: that a first cause has a reason (necessity of its existence).

Leibniz formulation implies brute facts can't exist, but that seems unjustified.

I
Why think that time does not require change?

I suggest that time is inherent in the objects that experience them, down to the qunantum level. If there were no "atomist" time inherent in the object, then time would not exist for that object. I read of this hypothesis in a speculative physics paper awhile ago. I'll hunt for it and post a link.

The alternative is that time is transcendent: a river in which we ride and in which events occur. But why should we believe this?

The causality principle states that everything has a cause, which is very different from every thing has a reason.

But it seems reasonable to believe everything has a cause. Only by considering causes to be reasons can the PSR be justified. I see no justification to believe there are necessarily non-causal reasons.

Free will is consistent with determinism. Libertarian free will is not (by definition).

One is exercising free will by making decisions based solely on one's personal factors (prior beliefs, dispositions, impulses, emotions, likes, dislikes...), and not being coerced into some choice. This is consistent with determinism because those internal factors determine the decision we will make. This is a compatibilist account of free will.

Libertarian free will is simply the doctrine that our freely willed choices are not determined.

As to which is true (compatibilist or libertarian free will) - it is impossible to know one way or another. Consequently, the concept of free will doesn't really provide a clue into the nature of the mind.

I think it's interesting to ask: why are there actually no solipsists?

IMO, it's because to be a solipsist, one has to abandon hardwired beliefs. Belief in a proposition is not simply a bit being turned on, it entails a psychological state. We are hardwired to perceive the world as we do. Beliefs don't drop away because we can't rationally justify them based on priors, they only drop away if we become convinced they are false.

the FTA is persuasive, as a number of atheists have admitted -- giving it as a reason for positing a multiverse.

That is all anyone could hope for, but my position is that the alleged persuasive power is a consequence of people failing to see the inherent problems that I've brought up.

The strength of the FTA lies in the fact that when many improbable means coordinate to effect the same end, it is usually the case that they are intelligently directed to that end. This is the kind of reasoning used in court cases. So it's quite rational, even though not airtight.

I agree with the approach, but disagree with your claim that there is intelligent direction "to that end." This characterization continues the same flawed reasoning by implicitly assuming there is an end (or goal or objective). That is one of my most important points.

we do know that whatever the fundamental laws are, they closely approximate the physics we have in its verified realm of application.

Which sidesteps the important issue. The "realm of application" is the universe after Planck time. That's problematic for drawing conclusions about a broader scope - and a multiverse, and the possibility of differing "constants" is a broader scope.

Relativist: There are many sorts things that exist in THIS world that would not exist had the constants been different

For example?

Sandstone and snowflakes, to name two. But keep in mind that if we're including God among the possibilities to consider, we have to consider all metaphysically possible worlds - and a multiverse with differing constants is every bit as metaphysically possible as is a God. You can't dismiss multiverse for lack of evidence and then propose a God which also has no evidence.

Aquinas is quite clear that neither essence nor existence are "things." They are just "principles" -- the foundation in reality (objective basis) for saying that a thing is (existence), and what kind of a thing it is (essence). So, if you think that there's an objective basis for saying something exists, you agree with Aquinas that it has "existence," and if you think there's an objective basis for saying you're human and Fido is a dog, then you agree that you and Fido have essences. There is nothing more to essence and existence than that.

Aquinas distinguishes between essence (necessary and sufficient properties) and accidents (contingent properties). Consider humans: there are no necessary and sufficient properties for being human - every portion of human DNA is accident. You can define a sortal - i.e. a set of properties that divides up all beings into two sets: human and non-human, and if you only did that with the set of people alive today, you'd have no difficulty. However, try to divide up all living things that have ever lived on earth into human and non-human, and you will unavoidably have to draw an arbitrary boundary. Among the ways one identifies a species is that members of that species can breed and produce another of that species. Consider an ordered set of all your ancestors through the evolutionary past: each generation was the same "species" as the prior generation - able to interbreed. And yet, you are not the same species as your Australopithecus ancestors (as well as a great many other ancestors in the evolutionary chain.

If you treat essence as nothing but a sortal of accidental properties, then Aquinas definition of God goes awry (according to Aquinas, God is a being in whom essence and existence are identical).

I brought up essence just as an example of a metaphysical postulate. Aquinas paradigm also postulates: act, potency, form, substance, and accident. It's coherent, but it is not the only coherent metaphysical paradigm, so one can't claim to have an objective case for something that is based on any particular metaphysical paradigm.

Relativist: My issue is that if you're going to accept unprovable postulates in your preferred metaphysics you must accept them in alternative metaphysics to avoid a double standard.

We know our fundamental facts directly from experience, not indirectly, via proofs.

The nature of the things that exist (such as whether they consist of form and substance, or whether they are states of affairs) is not a "fundamental fact" that comes from experience - rather, it is a postulated paradigm - an assumption.

What is the specific falsifiable prediction [in a rigorous mulitiverse hypothesis]?

The Loop Quantum Gravity cosmological model is dependent on Loop Quantum Gravity theory being true, which is testable in principle (see this). The Cosmology also predicts observable remnants in the CMB, but will require more precise measurement.

I am not saying that they can operate independently of the things they operate on. That would be nonsense.

That's not what I asked. I asked if you believe the laws of nature EXIST (not operate) independently of the entities that exhibit them.

Humans are part of the physical universe, so this suggests redness (that thing we perceive and contemplate) is part of the physical world. — Relativist


This is like saying that Harry Potter and Sherlock Holmes exist in the real world, because the books and films that represent their adventures exist in the real world. I don't think this argument holds water. — Pattern-chaser

Consider the fact that there's nothing unnatural about the fact that there exist fictional narratives with fictional characters - so yes, these DO exist in the real world (as fictions). Fictions exist in our minds, just as redness exists in our minds.

The definition you use for "red" is unusual, and does not include many or most of the shades of meaning used by humans when they say "red"....My view is broader, and tries to embrace all of the meanings that humans conventionally use "red" for. — Pattern-chaser

OK, but this is because of the nature of "redness." I'll relate a philosophical thought-experiment.

Mary is a woman who has lived her entire life in a single room, a room in which there is nothing in it that is colored red (any shade of it), so she's never actually seen anything red. However, she has devoted her life to learning everything there is to know about redness. She understands the physics of light reflection, and even understands the concept of color, by virtue of her perception of other colors. She becomes the world's foremost expert on redness, understanding all the many "shades of meaning" you reference. Can she truly understand red fully and completely, without ever actually seeing it? No - because she would never have had the experience of redness.

The moral of the story is that we can talk around "redness" and no words will be able to convey the understanding of redness that is associated with the experience. I also suggest that the "shades of meaning" aren't essential to a complete understanding of what the quale "red" is - those shades of meaning are anologies, and cannot convey what red actually is.

at what point did a single cell decide it was going to start splitting and growing into a heart?
and if it DID, why?
was it already a brain that knew it needed a heart?
was a Primordial Goo Brain smarter than we are now?
that it (accidentally randomly) knew it needed a complex operating system??
but even if it WAS that smart -- how the heck did it manage to keep the body alive while it was
3D printing itself over a million years? one. piece. at. a. time. when all the pieces function as a WHOLE? — Uniquorn

The evolution of complex structures is not due to decision making. I suggest you read up on natural selection.

Regarding the relationship between MWI and the multiverse, I refer you to this paper: The Multiverse Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.

You've bandied about "arguments from ignorance" for a while I don't recall advancing any -- nor you pointing out any. On the other hand, you're using our ignorance wrt a multiverse as a counter to the FTA. Please be specific as to any arguments from ignorance you think I'm making.

You've reference the Fine Tuning Argument, and I inferred that you were referring to the FTA for God's existence. If I'm mistaken that your agenda is to "prove" God's existence based on the alleged "fine tuning" of these constants, then there's nothing really to discuss. But if that is what you have in mind, then I see an argument from ignorance behind the reasoning: we don't know why the constants are in this narrow life permitting range, therefore it must be due to design.

I'll assume you actually do believe "fine tuning" entails God, so I'll continue.

But, as I keep repeating, the MWI is not evidence against the FTA because every "world" has the same physical constants

And as I keep repeating, we don't know what the true fundamental laws of nature actually are. All we can know is what we have access to, and that's the way the laws of nature manifest in this universe. To avoid continuing to go in circles, I'll interject that our fundamental disagreement is really metaphysics, not the physics. We can agree that known physics does not entail a multiverse, much less variations in the so-called fundamental constants. This takes our epistemic quest out of the realm of (narrowly defined) physical possibility. What is the implication? It just implies the answer is beyond the realm of current physics. If you were to claim, "therefore it must be God" you would be committing an argument from ignorance. Why should we think a supernatural being is more likely than an unknown natural cause? The converse seems more likely because we don't know that there exists anything other than the natural world.

I apologize in advance if I am mistaken in assuming your objective is :"prove" God's existence from the alleged fine tuning, but if I have correctly anticipated this - then my arguments are relevant.

No, the FTA infers that life was intentional from the fact that the variables have the exact values required to produce life.

So what? This universe happened to produce a set of things that we characterize as "living." Why regard this as special?

Suppose you ran a store with only one thing costing $1.59 and a young person plunks $1.59 on the counter, looking at you expectantly. It would be a rational inference to conclude that the child wants the one thing costing $1.59.

You are relating a coincidence (two things unexpectedly coinciding). What is life coinciding with?

Relativist: "Consider any metaphysically possible world W, which contains complex objects of type T. One could argue that W was fine tuned for T.."

This is simply false. For the argument to be persuasive, you need the additional datum at the core of the FTA, viz., that minute variations of W's constants would preclude the existence of Ts.

I considered this implied, but OK, let's formally add it: Consider a metaphysically possible world, W, which contains complex objects of type T which would not exist had the fundamental constants differed from what is actual in that world.

There are many sorts things that exist in THIS world that would not exist had the constants been different.

You are confusing my individual characteristics with what allows me to be called a "human." Aristotle's essences are not individual, but specific. So, "Essence entails the existence of necessary and sufficient properties for individuation" is simply false. "Essence entails the existence of necessary and sufficient properties for delineating 'kinds'" is true.

I believe you're right about Aristotle. I had confused his metaphysics with that of Thomas Aquinas. Thomist metaphyics has the view of essence that I was referring to: it is an integral part of his metaphysics, and yet it is pure assumption that there is such a thing.

My metaphysical framework is dynamic realism -- that "existence" is convertible with "the power to act in some way," and a being's "essence" is a specification of its possible acts. (This isn't Aristotle's definition of "essence,")

Sounds similar to Thomist metaphysics, and it again sounds like an assumption - not something that we know exists due to evidence, but rather something that is postulated. My issue is that if you're going to accept unprovable postulates in your preferred metaphysics, you must accept them in alternative metaphysics to avoid a double standard. Every metaphysical theory depends on postulates (sometimes called "first principles").

Relativist: We weren't discussing evidence. You had alleged the multiverse hypothesis was "mythological" and that it was not falsifiable.

A theory is mythic if it has no evidentiary basis. It is unfalsifiable if no evidence can falsify it. You did not show I was wrong on either count. ("I admit there is no evidence for a multiverse.")

All physics is rooted in empirical data, even when at the stage of hypothesis. Any physics hypothesis may assume physical structures that are not observable- consider quantum field theory. Nevertheless theories are falsifiable, and so are the rigorous multiverse theories, such as Loop Quantum Cosmology which is derived from Loop Quantum Gravity (an incomplete quantum theory of Gravity.

This seems another case of you trying to constrain naturalistic metaphysical theories to known physics, while (I anticipate) availing yourself of unconstrained supernatural assumptions. If you applied your stricture consistently, you'd have to treat "God" as mythic. It certainly fits your definition (no evidence).

You seem confused as to my position. I'm open to the possibility of a multiverse. I even think it's a sensible line of inquiry. What I'm discussing is the current epistic value of the multiverse hypothesis as opposed to the FTA. It should be obvious that any hypothesis lacking supporting evidence (as you agree wrt a multiverse) has no epistic value. On the other hand, the FTA is based on evidence and peer-reviewed calculations. I agree that the FTA is not a "proof," but it does have epistic value. So it makes a far stronger case in the legal sense.

The dependency of life on the universe having these constants within a narrow range is accepted science, but it is still nothing more than a post-hoc analysis. It's somewhat interesting that we wouldn't have existed had these constants differed. The error in reasoning occurs only when attempting "prove" God's existence by this fact. And it most certainly IS consistent with the scientific endeavor to explore whether or not there's a reason for the constants being what they are - and the only valid way to explore this is to consider if and how they could have been DIFFERENT. This has nothing to do with figuring out why there is life, because life just happens to be something that exists in this universe. Some naturalists fall for the bait and try to answer it, but they're as misguided as those who tackle the equally presumptive question: why is there something rather than nothing?

I am willing to grant this is the case. Since my sentence is perfectly meaningful in normal English language discourse, I conclude that Armstrong's metaphysics is inadequate to normal English discourse. You are perfectly free to limit yourself to their framework. I prefer to be open to many complementary projections of reality.

You are mistaken about Armstrong's metaphysics - it's pretty complete, and it's coherent. We don't necessarily need to explore it in detail. And no, I'm not actually committed to Armstrong's metaphysics. I bring it up when other metaphysical assumptions are made to show that any conclusions that are made are contingent upon those metaphysical assumptions being true.

You had made this claim: "These laws are immaterial -- it is a category error to ask what they are made of." Immaterial laws exist in the mind. If you were to claim they exist independent of the things that exhibit the described behavior (e.g. as platonic entities) and they somehow direct or govern that behavior, then you would be making a debatable metaphysical assumption. Of course, I may be mistaken that you had this in mind, in which case this is all moot.

“Existence” is metaphysically-undefined. In any case, no one denies that this physical world is real in its own context, and that your life, and this physical world which is its setting, are real in the context of your life.

Existence is a concept referring to the quality of "existing." To exist is to be in the world (world in the generic sense, not necessarily limited the physical world). The world contains beings (=existents, the things that exist). The set of all beings = the totality of reality.

We understand the concept in terms of our innate belief in ourselves and in the external world. We (all animals with any semblance of a mind) intuitively know that we exist (no one has to be convinced of the reality of their being), and we also intuitively know there are things beyond ourselves - we see them and we interact with them. So this non-verbal intuitive foundation entails a world consisting of the self and that which we perceive. From this foundation we conceive (verbally and non-verbally) of additional elements of the world beyond our perceptions.

You refer to being " real in its own context". That seems an attempt at a meta-analysis. It is in our nature to believe the world actually exists independent of ourselves; no one is truly a solipsist. So we naturally believe the world is actually real, without the qualification you suggest. One would need to come up with reasons to think our intuitive beliefs are false or misguided, which you haven't done.

The finality of that sleep at the end of lives, and the absence of any knowledge, memory or perception that there is, was, or could be, such things as identity, time or events, suggests the use of the word “timelessness”.

"Sleep" seems a poor characterization. Death is the cessation of being, if there is no "afterlife." If there is an afterlife, there is no "sleep" - there's just a transition of states of being. In neither case does the term "timelessness" seem applicable. "Timelessness" suggests to me something that does not experience time. "Sleep suggests subtle change in state of living consciousness, not a cessation of consciousness nor a transition of states of being.

So all you’re doing is defining your “objective existence” as more than hypothetical existence....

I'll clarify. Math and logic use the symbol, "∃" , which is read, "there exists". This is not an ontological claim, it is used to analyze mathematical and logical relations. I label this a "hypothetical existence." It may, or may not, refer to something that is in the world. But (hypothetically) if it exists, we can deduce various things about it.

Regarding "objective existence." This refers to that which exists (not just hypothetically), with the properties it actually has, as opposed to merely what we perceive. I perceive a red ball, you perceive a red balloon. The actual object is a white balloon that we both view through a red filter. The white balloon has objective existence. I suggest that our perceptions provide us a reflection of objective reality, not necessarily identical with objective reality. However, further analysis can lead us in the direction of knowledge about the true nature of reality (a direction to a destination that we may not reach, but it is at least an ideal to work toward).

Relativist:" That there exists an external, physical world is a properly basic belief, an epistemological foundation for all else." — Michael

...for Materialists, of course.[/quote]
Nothing I said is contingent upon materialism being true, and my statement makes no claims about the existence of anything immaterial.

Your experience is the epistemic foundation for all else.

I strongly disagree. Our innate, nonverbal view of the world is our epistemic foundation.

You’ve admitted that you don’t have an answer regarding in what noncircular way you think that this physical world is more than that.

You are imaging things. I did no such thing.

Relativist: "We are not taught that there is an external world "
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There’s undeniably an external world in our experience. That’s what our experience story is about.

No experience required. All us animals that come into the world know intuitively that there is an external world, irrespective of whether this fact is formulated with words.

We’re taught, from an early age, to be little Materialists and Science-Worshippers. Some of us never question that.

Not me. I was raised Catholic. I eventually came to question what I was taught, just as you did.

As animals, we instinctively deal with our surrounding physical world as best we can. Kids, and most people, and (for all we know) all other animals leave it at that, and don’t ask what there really is, or why they’re in a life, or why there’s something instead of nothing.
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…but that doesn’t support Materialism.

Who said it did?

if you say that you don’t know what ontology I believe in, that might be because I emphasize that I don’t claim or assert one.

We have that in common.

"I apply the principle of parsimony."
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It doesn’t support you. Materialism, with its big brute-fact*, fails the Principle of Parsimony.

You've made two errors: 1) you assume I'm a materialist; 2) you don't understand the principle of parsimony.

But no, there’s absolutely no evidence, no physics-experiment, to support a claim that this physical world is other than the hypothetical setting in your hypothetical experience-story, a complex abstract logical system.

I agree that we can't confirm our properly basic beliefs. That does not preclude having rationally justified beliefs. My theory is that we have these properly basic beliefs because we are a product, and component, of this world (and this is true irrespective of whether there is a supernatural creator). This could be wrong, of course, but neither you nor anyone else has given me a reason to doubt it.

None of that supports a claim that this physical world is other than what I said it is.

You repeated this multiple times. You seem to be saying, "nothing you've said has convinced me that my assessment is false." That's great, but I wasn't trying to convince you of anything, I was just sharing what I believe. I hope you realize that such statements don't give me any reason to think I have it wrong either.

I addressed your Subjectivism argument in my previous post.

You are casting my assertions in terms of subjectivism, that is certainly not my claim. Of course, you can believe whatever you like. I hope you aren't trying to convince me of anything, because if you are- you're failing miserably.

To propose an ontology, I’d propose that the physical world is nothing other than part of a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts, and that the describable world consists of nothing other than that.

That is not "an ontology" it is an ontological claim. OK, I hear you and I disagree with you.

You’re the one with an ontology that you aren’t specifying or being clear with us about.

As I said above, I don't believe in an ontology. I do believe certain things exist (e.g. the physical world), and other things possibly exist (such as gods), and I'm just not sure about the nature of the mind (is it really something immaterial?)

At least as discussion-topics, there uncontroversially are abstract facts

I prefer to use the term "fact" to refer to an element of reality as distinct from propositional descriptions of a elements of reality. Abstractions can be the subject of propositions and discussed as such - if this is what you mean, I completely agree.

“Physicalism” (a regrettable two-meaning word for Materialism (or for a philosophy-of-mind position)) is blatantly unparismonious, with its big, blatant brute fact.

I think you may misunderstand the principle of parsimony. It seems to me that whatever is the foundation of reality, it entails a very complex brute fact. An omniscient, immutable God who created material reality is an extremely complex brute fact. But the principle of parsimony is actually an epistemological principle that we should refrain from making any more assumptions than necessary to explain the facts at hand. It does NOT mean that reality is simple.

Relativist:" it seems irrational to believe something just because it is POSSIBLY true"
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And what do you think that I believe in.

You had several similar reactions wherein I tell you something I believe, and then you react in this way (what, inferring that I think you DON'T believe this?). I'm not suggesting what you do, or don't believe, I'm just telling you what I believe.

I emphasize that, in this discussion, I’m not advocating an ontology or metaphysics. I’m merely pointing out that there’s no reason to believe in an ontology that says that this physical world is other than what I’ve said [the physical world is nothing other than part of a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts])"

That's an interesting and bizarre perspective, since you've given no reason to believe "the physical world is nothing other than part of a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts." And of course, I disagree - there are very good reasons to believe the physical world is something other than this. I expect we'll just have to agree to disagree on this.

Relativist:" …, or do you think you can show that your view is more worthy of belief than mine? "
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What belief of mine are you referring to? If I made a controversial claim, what was it?

This one: "the physical world is nothing other than part of a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts"

So you aren’t central to your experience?

Of course I am, but I believe we are also able to contemplate objective reality, that we actually can escape subjectivism. I believe you have things backwards when you claim the physical world is a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts - these abstract "facts" (actually: propositions) are descriptive of what actually IS. Logic is not an existent, it is a rational process, so to claim the physical world is a "logical system" is a category error. Again, we needn't agree - and I doubt we ever will.

“I suggest that this life and the physical world in which it is set, are completely insubstantial”
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Relativist: Why do you believe such a thing?
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I merely claim that there’s no reason to believe otherwise.

I've given you one: we believe it innately, and it is reasonable to think that this is because we are a product of that substantial world. Now you can't make that claim; you have to find a reason to reject what I've said.

let’s be clear which of us is advocating an unverifiable, unfalsifiable proposition.

We both are. But at least mine is grounded in our innate view of the world. I don't have any idea how you came up with your bizarre view.

No need to quibble about how or if the abstract facts exist. I haven’t claimed that they exist other than as subjects of discussion or mention.

If the physical world exists, and it is nothing more than "part of a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts," then you must believe abstract facts exist. If abstract facts do not exist, then the physical world doesn't exist.

Saying that the abstract facts depend on there being someone to discuss them is meaningless, because there are inevitably infinitely-many experience-stories with their complementary protagonists, some of whom discuss abstract facts.

100 years after the big bang, there was no one around to have an "experience story". At that point in time, did abstract facts exist?

what I’ve been saying doesn’t include any assumptions, brute-facts, beliefs or controversial statements.

This is an assumption: "the physical world is nothing other than part of a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts."

An Omni-benevolent God as judged with our limited knowledge? Yes or no?

Our knowledge about everything is limited, and yet we end up believing things anyway. We typically come to a belief based on the information at hand, and that's why the mere possibility of inscrutable reasons doesn't defeat a belief in God's non-existence that is formed based on the information we actually have.

The answer is that the only reason that those in heaven do not sin is because they have chosen to love God.

Christians choose to love God while their on earth, and yet they continue to sin.

Relativist: If a 3-omni God exists, then objective moral values exist

Michael: You're the one insisting that God must be omnipotent.

Nope. I never suggested such a thing.

You’re assuming that God is responsible for this world and your birth in it.
Hardly.

In general, just as it’s best to explain by physical-science what can be explained by physical-science, before invoking higher for an explanation—likewise it’s best to explain within describable metaphysics what can be explained within describable metaphysics before invoking higher.
How does one invoke a metaphysics "higher" than that which is describable, which evidently implies that an indescribable metahphysics? This doesn't seem to make any sense.

You can’t be so sure of your assumption and notion of omnipotence.
I'm not sure of anything. What I have argued is that a 3-omni God seems incoherent, given the world we live in. This could mean there is a God who 2-omni.

As an Atheist, you’re telling us what God must be like, and concluding that your God doesn’t make sense. No argument there.
No, I'm telling you what God cannot be like.

But you’re blithely blanket-applying that characterization and motivation to all Theists.
Nope. Consider the argument I stated in my Op: one premise depends on the Christian assumption that the souls in heaven have free will and do not sin. Not all theists are Christian, and even a Christian could simply deny the premise (e.g. maybe the souls in heaven CAN sin). A non-Christian theist could simply deny there's an afterlife. Take the argument for what it is and what it shows, and devise your own logic to get around it - such as, as you alluded above, perhaps God isn't really omnipotent. Lot's of ways around the argument, and I never claimed there wasn't. I address only a very specific set of beliefs, and that's why I tried to structure my argument pretty precisely.

I’m just answering the question about how anyone could not be convinced by the problem-of-evil argument.
Who asked that question? I've said multiple times that I knew this would not convince a committed theist. My purpose in engaging Christians on this topic was to show them how one might reasonably decide God (as usually defined) does not exist. Some Christians already realize this, and for them there's nothing notable here. But others that I've encountered seem unable or unwilling to believe that a belief in God's non-existence can be perfectly rational - and my mission is to help them be a bit more understanding.



It’s popular to start with the premise that one’s view is balanced, while those of others aren’t.
Consider these potential starting points: 1) The premise: God Exists; 2) the premise:God does not exist;

Neither of these seem "balanced," in that they both entail a presumption.


Tomorrow I'll respond to your earlier post (the one that has nothing to do with the purpose of this thread).

Thanks for the honest and polite conversation!

and as above - the theist answer remains, compensating goods or morally justifiable reasons. Which is why this issue always inevitably spirals to this point and has for many many years

Sure, ...and that's also why some people conclude a 3-omni God doesn't exist. If there is such a God then there are compensating gods, but IF there are no compensating goods, then such a God cannot exist. Contemplate the evil in the world without presumption of God's existence, and seeing no compensating goods, then the conclusion is obvious. (That's not to suggest this need be the end of the epistemic quest)

On P4. Your proposition is assuming there is evil in heaven that the free willed beings in heaven would be free to chose if they desired, but don't because of their nature created by God. I do not think it is a valid assumption that there is evil in heaven. Or at least a case need to be made for it.

My premise makes no assumption like this, but you can suggest this as the environmental condition that results in the absence of sin. But the question becomes: Why would an omnibenevolent God place the creatures that he loves in any OTHER environment? Why did he choose to make us suffer?

What is unnatural about killing cats?

I don't think cat killers were the only victims of the black death. My issue is that an omnipotent God could have seen to it that all humans had a natural immunity to it, or miraculously cured those who contracted it. God doesn't seem to intervene in such ways, which suggests indifference or worse.

When I say that Everett's interpretation is more epistemological than ontological, I am speaking about the "manyness" of the worlds envisioned...It is not many worlds on top of each other, but a mathematical means of representing a single state in as a sum of mathematical forms called "eigenfunctions."

Sure: there is one all encompassing state in a quantum system, but the issue is: how does the classical world that we experience emerge from the quantum system that comprises reality. A realist view of MWI is based on the ontological commitment that physical reality is a quantum system, and that the classical world of experience is an eigenstate of that QM system. So the "world branching" is (technically) just a classical perspective: each eigenstate is a classical "world."
You also mention there being exactly one set of physical constraints, and I agree - but that doesn't mean we have a complete understanding of what the true constraints are, since we can only see how they manifest in our classical world.

So, the physics showing that minute variations in the constants leads to conditions unsuited to life depends on the assumption of design? Would you care to provide an example showing how this assumption changed the calculations? Or even how it could change the calculations? The vast literature generated by naturalists to support the possibility of a multiverse as an explicit alternative to fine-tuning shows that some very prominent physicists and cosmologists take the calculations quite seriously.

It's moot what you see in the literature because you're seeing response based on a flawed premise. The alleged "fine tuning" is a product of post hoc analysis. The FTA has the unstated assumption that life was a design objective. Consider any metaphysically possible world W, which contains complex objects of type T. One could argue that W was fine tuned for T. What is special about life? It's special to us, but that doesn't make it intrinsically special. I feel special to myself, and am the product of a series of improbable accidents of pairs of individuals who happened to reproduce: was I the product of a priori design? If you disagree with my analysis, try reformulating the FTA without assuming life is intrisically special, or assuming the world was "fine tuned" (a question begging concept).

Aristotle was an empiricist. He did not "hypothesize that 'essence' exists." He said that our definitions of universal terms reflect common elements in their instances and that we may name those common elements the object's "essence." In other words, essences are the foundation in reality for essential definitions. I do not see how any empiricist could deny that there are real differences, found in individuals, that allow us to say this is human and this a canary. Biologists do that every time they determine what species an organism is.

Aristotle's reasoning was a product of his time, but with advances in science and analytic philosophy, we can see that the notion of essence has no empirical basis. And yet there continue to be philosophers who embrace the metaphysics (e.g. Edward Feser).

Essence entails the existence of necessary and sufficient properties for individuation and for delineating "kinds." What are your necessary and sufficient properties vs your accidental properties? Would you be YOU had there been a single gene that was different? How about a single day of your life having different experiences?

What are the necessary and sufficient properties for being a horse? Consider the evolution of horse throughout the evolutionary history of its ancestry: it is arbitrary where you draw the line between horse and non-horse. Species is a sortal, based on vague boundaries, not some underlying metaphysical distinction.

Really? "Incomplete" theories now have evidentiary standing? This merits no further discussion.

We weren't discussing evidence. You had alleged the multiverse hypothesis was "mythological" and that it was not falsifiable. I showed that you were mistaken on both counts. I admit there is no evidence for a multiverse, but there are good reasons to think this might be the case - as I discussed. Multiverse is consistent with what we know, and it is entailed by some reasonable extrapolations about what we know (these extrapolations are what I referred to as "incomplete theories"). Science advances in this way; accepted theory does not arrive in its final form.

" So incomplete that it has made no falsifiable prediction and its supporters mix results from logically inconsistent versions. I will not repeat the harsher and less charitable criticisms.

Errors in the analysis are self-correcting - that's what peer review is for.

I merely note that dressing ignorance in mathematical lace doesn't make it a thing of beauty.

Agreed, but this doesn't make metaphysical speculations that are devoid of math any prettier. I bring these things up not because they are necessarily true, but rather to show why we shouldn't be seduced by metaphysical explanations that implicitly rely on arguments from ignorance. We should be agnostic to the existence of multiverse, not hastily dismissing it for insufficient empirical basis while declaring victory for a deism that also lacks an empirical basis.

I have no problem with physics that only works for empirical reality. I am not sure why anyone would -- accept to rationalize a faith position.

That's fine as long as you refrain from arguments from ignorance as I just discussed.

You're arguing skew to the point here. It is not a question of whether we think abstractly or not. The question is: what are the properties of the object of thought. We think abstractly of quanta and fields, yet we know they are material because they have mass-energy and parts outside of parts (extension). We think abstractly of works of art, but we know they are composed of atoms. When we think of the laws of nature, our concept does not involve parts outside of parts -- they are not spatially divisible -- or the possession of mass-energy. Thus, laws of nature lack the defining characteristics of matter -- not because our thoughts are abstract, but because what we are thinking about falls into a different category.

You seem to have some physical/metaphysical framework in mind, and are judging the Armstrong-Tooley framework from that perspective. That is the category error. Armstrong developed a fairly complete metaphysics, and it can account for everything you've discussed - but it of course does so very differently. So, for example, from the perspective of Armstrong's metaphysics, it's meaningless to assert "laws of nature lack the defining characteristics of matter". We don't really need to debate which metaphysics is true, as long as you don't implicitly insist that your metaphysical assumptions form the proper basis for exploring metaphysical truths.

Its important tho consider what sort of thing logic is.

First, what it is not: it is not an object of being, nor is it a property of being. It is a category error to treat it that way (reify it).

What it IS, is a tool for epistemological analysis. I agree with Mollere (above) that it is truth preserving. It is the path of reason through the jungle of possibilities, the path toward contingent truths; and it applies exclusively to propositions.

Look back at the argument. It basically shows that if Christianity is true (premise 4) then God is not omninenevolent (the conclusion). You could reject premise 4, but this is Christian doctrine. That's why I said an omnibenevolent God is not consistent with Christianity.

I realize my argument would not convince a committed theist, but it should sway someone who's tries to objectively weigh God's existence and non-existence without presupposition.

"Not sure I have ever seen an argument that depends on a state of affairs in heaven, as a defense for the argument from evil, Seems like a proposition in conflict with the conclusion to me."
It shows that Christianity is incoherent.

"There are two states of affairs we can identify as good and evil. In order for free will to exist in beings like us, both states must be an available choice. If beings like us were created with an inability to chose evil, there would be no option and no choice, and no free will."
Are you saying the souls in heaven (i.e. the souls of dead, faithful Christians) are not "like us?"

"Where is trauma located?"

That's somewhat like asking, "Where is the piccolo's middle "C" in the 4th measure located within the MP3 file"? It's a category error.

Fair enough, there's more to the evolution of the human mind than direct descent. What's your point? My only point is that the existence of the human mind, as it is, is the product of nature.

Relativist: It is entailed by the many worlds interpretation of Quantum Theory, so in that respect it is entailed by accepted theory.

Dfpolis: No, actually, it is not so entailed. If you actually read Everett's paper, as I have, he does not propose many worlds in any ontological sense, but only in an epistemic sense. What he argues is that as the measured quantum system is represented as a superposition of states, so we should model the brain of the observer as a corresponding superposition of states (a sort of Schrodinger cat). Each sub-state of the brain then represents one possible outcome of the quantum observation. So, we do not have many worlds, but many representations of one world.

Everett wrote: " from the standpoint of our theory, it is not so much the system which is affected by an observation as the observer, who becomes correlated to the system. " and "In our case, we wish to make statements about "trajectories" of observers. However, for us a trajectory is constantly branching (transforming from state to superposition) with each successive measurement."

Irrespective of whether Everett himself was a realist or an instrumentalist, a realist perspective on his interpretation is absolutely ontological .

Even if true, Everett's interpretation is entirely useless in rebutting the fine tuning argument, as each supposed representation has exactly the same physics, with exactly the same (fine-tuned) constants, as every other representation.
Of course it doesn't rebut the FTA on its own, but in conjunction with the potential for more fundamental physics it constitutes a mechanism for actualizing alternative realizations of localized physics.

"What[Everett] argues is that as the measured quantum system is represented as a superposition of states, so we should model the brain of the observer as a corresponding superposition of states"
Everett does not use this characterization in his dissertation, and it would be problematic when you consider potential consequences of different branches (one branched brain states gets one girl pregnant, while another branched state gets a different girl pregnant. This results in different offspring in the two branches).

So, we do not have many worlds, but many representations of one world.
Only with a specific interpretation of Everett's paper. The MWI interpretation has a variety of post-Everett flavors.

Relativist: "a multiverse hypothesis is metaphysical, not mythological"

Dfpolis: "A metaphysical conclusion is one based on our experience of being (existence). A mythological claim lacks an adequate experiential basis -- as does the multiverse hypothesis."

A multiverse metaphysics has as much standing as an Aristotelian metaphysics (consider Aristotle's hypothesis that "essence" exists). Metaphysical theories are not the product of physical experiments. They are explanatory hypotheses that attempt to explain that which exists, and is posited to exist. If your simply making the epistemological stance that we have no right to believe something that is not subject to experimental confirmation, I don't really take issue with it - I just object to applying different epistemological standards in order to argue for something one would like to believe.

Dfpolis: "The multiverse hypothesis not falsifiable (since other universes are, by definition, dynamically isolated from ours), and therefore not scientific, but mythological."
Relativist: "multiverse hypotheses are tied to broader hypotheses (incomplete scientific theories) that are falsifiable."
Dfpolis: "Tied to" does not mean "derived from." When there is no logical implication, a hypothesis must be judged on its independent merits.

Each specific multiverse is actually derivable from an (incomplete) scientific theory, so your objection has no merit. Here's an excerpt from a survey of Multiverse Theories written by P. C. W. Davies:

The problem arises because string theory is formulated most naturally in 10 or 11
spacetime dimensions, whereas the spacetime of our perceptions is four dimensional. The
extra space dimensions are rendered unobservable by a process called compactification:
they are rolled up to a very small size. ... This basic notion may be extended to any
number of extra dimensions, but then the process of compactification is no longer unique.
In general, there are very many ways of compactifying several extra dimensions. When
additional degrees of freedom in string theory are taken into account, compactification
may involve several hundred variables, all of which may vary from one region of the
universe to another. These variables serve to fix the low-energy physics, by determining
what sorts of particles exist, what their masses might be and the nature and strengths of
the forces that act between them. The theory also permits compactification to spaces with
other than three dimensions. Thus string theory predicts myriad possible low-energy
worlds. Some might be quite like ours, but with slightly heavier electrons or a somewhat
stronger weak force. Others might differ radically, and possess, say, five large (i.e.
uncompactified) space dimensions and two species of photons.

This flavor of string theory entails multiple possible "low energy physics" (the physics we observe), and this string theory is falsifiable.

Dfpolis: the physics we have now is more than adequate to many purposes -- just as Newtonian physics continues to be more than adequate in its verified realm of application. So, while we can and should expect further, fundamental, revisions in our present physics, there is no reason to expect that the conclusions of a revised physics would overturn the conclusions of our present physics in its verified realm of application.
Sure, but its "verified realm of application" is limited to this universe. It's premature to declare that the quest for more fundamental physics, and the possible implications of it, are doomed.

As the arguments for the fine-tuning of the various constants are sound applications of present physics in its verified realm of application, there is no rational reason to think that advances in physics would lead to their rejection.
There is no good argument for the "fine-tuning" of the constants! - they all depend on the presumption of design. But there is very good reason to think further exploration into more fundamental physics would change our views on what is physically possible: the Copernican principle (or principle of mediocrity): why should we think our portion of the universe is representative of the whole?

" they can be separated in thought, so they are a different aspect of the universe than its matter and fields -- an aspect which is immaterial in the sense of lacking parts outside of parts and material constituents
The fact that we can think abstractly about some properties of physical states of affairs doesn't imply there is anything immaterial about those physical states of affairs. It seems a tangent to discuss the nature of mental objects, like abstractions.

"It is confusing to call laws "properties."
Get used to it, I didn't make it up. Physicalist philosophers like D.M. Armstrong and Michael Tooley have been using this terminology for years.

In brief: everything that exists is a "state of affairs". A state of affairs has 3 sorts of constituents: a (thin) particular, its relational properties, and its non-relational properties. ("Thick particular" = the particular with its properties).

There are "state of affairs types" - i.e. sets of particular states of affairs that have one or more properties in common. Example: a specific electron is a state of affairs, whereas "electron" (in general) is a state of affairs type.

A law of nature is a relation between states of affairs types. Ergo, under this account, laws of nature are relational properties that exist between states of affairs types. "electrons have an attractive relation to protons" is a law of nature. The law is instantiated in specific pairs of electrons and protons.

It is an explanatory hypothesis that fits the facts better than any other.
— Relativist

No. Such a genetic change has been searched for in human remnants. It's not there. There are a number of alternate theories.

Your claim sounds like it was taken from the Institute for Creation Research, but it's irrelevant to what I said. There are facts available to us, such as the relative intelligence of various primates (including ourselves), the respective genetic structures of primates, and the mechanisms of natural selection and genetic drift. We can deduce the genetic structure of common ancestors, and from this we can deduce the mutations that would lead from that ancestor to ourselves. This is an active area of research. Genetic structure is the direct cause of brain structure, and brain structure is a direct cause of mental capability. Therefore we can conclude that the genetic changes supervene on the mental changes; ie no other causes need be postulated to explain what we see.