"Once we are in the presence of God, we are in the presence of the highest good, fulfilling all our desires. So, there is no reason to choose a partial and incomplete good, and so sin. That need not mean that we have no choices. We could still have many different completely good lines of action open to us."
Then you have to agree there is a possible state of affairs in which there exist free-willed creatures who do not sin. Why wouldn't an omnibenevolent God just place us in that environment to begin with?

I agree that, in most cases, truth is inaccessible. But we need an idealized concept of truth to grasp the very concept that objective truth is usually inaccessible.

" If the best knowledge available turns out to be wrong, should it not have been considered truth before that? "
No! We should be fully cognizant that the things we believe may be false. Only then can we explore why we might be wrong. The biggest obstacle to seeking truth is certainty: if you "know" x, then you won't entertain the possibility of not-x, which closes doors. Even if the truth we seek is unobtainable in principle, it is the direction we should try to head toward.

Kaiser Basileus

18

↪Relativist

 Justified "true" belief is a step too far. If everyone in the entire species thought something was a fact and it turned it not to be, it would still have been true "for all intents and purposes" until the new information came to light.
That is confused because it redefines "truth" by equating it with popular belief or conventional wisdom.

There's lots of problems with your claims.

.

Second, atomist prejudices aside, there is no reason to think that the cosmos is made of particles. Quantum theory uses wave equations to describe the nature of things, with so-called "wave-particle duality" resulting from an unwillingness to give up the old dogmas.
Wrong that this was due to "unwillingness." It was due to the observation that photons exhibit the properties of particles in some cases and the properties of waves, in other cases. The duality has been "solved" with quantum field theory, which considers fields as fundamental and particles as quantized ripples in fields.

Third, our best cosmological theories do not see the universe as ending in collapse, but in an ignominious heat death. Thus, the idea of cycling is passe.
Wrong. Sean Carroll, for example, has proposed that the heat death results in conditions from which a quantum fluctuation can occur which results in inflation ( ie a big bang).

A multiverse is not entailed in any accepted theory. (We have no accepted theory of quantum gravity.)
Not quite true. It is entailed by the many worlds interpretation of Quantum Theory, so in that respect it is entailed by accepted theory. However, no specific interpretation of Quantum theory has been shown to be true.

The multiverse hypothesis not falsifiable (since other universes are, by definition, dynamically isolated from ours), and therefore not scientific, but mythological.
Two errors here:
1) at minimum, a multiverse hypothesis is metaphysical, not mythological
2) multiverse hypotheses are tied to broader hypotheses (incomplete scientific theories) that are falsifiable.

Even if there were other universes, there is no reason to believe that their physics (including their fine tuned constants) would be any different from ours.
It is a presumption to claim the constants are "fine tuned." The real issue is: should we believe the physics that we know is truly fundamental? No- and that's because it is clearly incomplete and incoherent. The true fundamental physics would almost certainly have different expressions.

These laws are immaterial -- it is a category error to ask what they are made of.
That is a metaphysical assumption, not established fact. The "laws" of physics are abstract descriptions of the physical relations among the things that exist in the universe. The relations are due to the properties of the existents. Properties and relations of physical things do not exist independently of the things that have them.

It is an explanatory hypothesis that fits the facts better than any other.

"A fact is an individual instance of truth just as a choice is an individual instance of freedom. Knowledge is equivalent to epistemological warrant. "

Then I take it that a fact = a true proposition = a truth.

So when you ask "What does fact mean? " you're asking "what makes a proposition true?"
The most commonly accepted theory of truth is correspondence theory of truth. What makes a proposition true is that it corresponds to some actual aspect of reality. The proposition "the ball is read" is true if the ball is actually red.

(I questioned semantics, because epistemologists often use the term "fact" to refer to the element of reality to which a proposition corresponds, if true. )

You also asked," Under that definition/understanding of 'fact,' is 'fact' applicable where there is no knowledge"
Knowledge = a belief that is true, justified, and (somehow) avoids Gettier problems. Can there be a fact (i.e.a true proposition) if no one has knowledge of that proposition? Absolutely: I believe X, but I believe it for a bad reason, therefore I don't have knowledge of X. Nevertheless, X is actually true (i.e. it's a fact). There's an example of there being a fact without knowledge.

Perhaps you're using the term "knowledge" in the less technical, but more common sense, as equivalent to a belief, one that may or may not be justified. That makes for a more controversial analysis: is there a fact (true proposition) if no one actually believes that proposition? It depends on your stance on propositions. If (like me) you consider propositions as a set of words formulated by, and contained within, minds - then if no one has formulated a proposition then it doesn't exist. Consider the universe 100 years after the big bang. There were no true propositions (facts) at the time because there were no minds to formulate and contain them.

On the other hand, some treat propositions as abstractions, like numbers - they consider there to exist a proposition to describe every aspect of reality, irrespective of whether anyone has actually articulated it They would say, "yes, truths/facts exist even if no one believes the truth/fact/proposition".

According to Romans 6:7: " anyone who has died has been set free from sin"

Do you agree this means that the souls in heaven do not sin? Don't they have free will, or does God remove our free will when we die?

My point is that this suggests there can exist free willed beings who do not sin, despite your claims to the contrary.

It not the simple inference you state, it's an inference to the best explanation.

If a 3-omni God exists, then objective moral values exist and we have the capacity to discern right and wrong - not infallibly, but our moral judgments should be expected to be generally trustworthy. This provides grounds to judge God's actions and inactions against the objective moral values we are confident are correct. For example, we know that it is wrong to allow a person to die when we could have prevented the death - particularly if the act of prevention does not place ourselves, or anyone else, at risk. We might judge this erroneously on occasion, when there are extenuating circumstances of which we're unaware, but we can be expected to get it right most of the time. Out of the 100,000,000 who died in the black death, it does seems unlikely that we're judging it wrong each of those times. This is just one natural calamity, which I brought up because it was such a big one - but there's uncountably many of these throughout history. Children are born blind, or without limbs. Some are born with degenerative diseases, like Muscular Dystrophy, who grow more feeble each day of their short lives. Throughout history, countless people have suffered needlessly because modern analgesics and antibiotics didn't exist at the time. I could go on.

There's no reason to think that an omnipotent God couldn't have created a world without these afflictions and without the various natural disasters that have occurred. If we assume God performs miracles on a few, why doesn't he perform miracles on everyone and eliminate the afflictions entirely?

What is the best explanation for all the evil the world has seen and has continues to see? Is the best explanation an omnibenevolent God who chose to create a world with the many evils this one has, despite there being no apparent reason why he couldn't have create a world without these problems?
Or is the better explanation that there is no such God - and nature simply takes its course?

The latter answers all questions about the evil in the world. The former answers none of them. Sure, it's possible there are answers that we are simply not capable of seeing, but why believe this to be the case?

My argument to the best explanation considers both God's existence and his non-existence, and concludes that his non-existence is more likely given the evidence. Your position seems to assume God exists, and rationalizes the evil he allows based on the mere possibility that there's a billion billion good reasons that we are simply incapable of discerning. If God exists, then that surely must be so. But start with a balanced view, as I did, and that rationalization doesn't make for a good explanation.

A feature that appears due to genetic drift can (in some way) enhance survival."
And when it does, it has a better chance of proliferating.

"Mind evolving by natural selection would require a population which includes both minded and non-minded individuals (both arising randomly) "
That makes no sense. Humans aren't alone in having minds, we just have the most sophisticated ones. So the proto-human population didn't suddenly have some individuals with minds, among all the others who didn't. Rather, some individuals happened to have genes that gave them more intelligent minds than the rest of the population. This would seem to confer a survival advantage.


"That scenario couldnt be any more than speculation since we don't know the origins of what we label "mind".
We know quite a lot about how we fit into the animal kingdom. Our similarities with other primates gives us a pretty good idea about how we differ from them. Our mental difference with chimps are due to genetic differences, and there's really not all that many genetic differences.


"Human evolution is mostly genetic drift due to small population size. "
Sure.

I admit to having overlooked that you stipulated, "Given that solipsism implies epistemological certainty of ones world".

This stipulation indeed entails an absence of doubt - trivially, since certainty = an absence of doubt. I just question that this is a standard view of solipsism. One could, in theory, believe his mind is all that exists - based on a standard view of belief - which admits of varying degrees of certainty. Such a person could therefore have some degree of doubt, and it seems to me this fits a definition of solipsism, even if not the definition you choose to use.

I don't understand why you make the distinction "if I were a solipsist." Do you define "belief" differently for solipsists? Previously you said you said you agreed that "belief entails certainty," so this suggests that you are absolutely certain about all your beliefs, irrespective of whether you are a solipsist.

" an unnecessary adherence to what you perceive as the “conventional” isn’t helpful in philosophy"
Sure, but unconventional positions must be explained and supported, whereas conventional positions are generally understood. You are presumably criticizing my position, which is perfectly fine, but if your counter depends on some unconventional views, you have the burden of explaining and supporting them - and you haven't really done this. It has seemed more of a guessing game where you make some assertion and then I have to guess at what you mean, then you reply that I got it wrong and hint at some more things for me to guess at. I havent even discerned whether or not you are a theist.

"no one is ever convinced here by anything that someone else says, because everyone evidently is only trying to support their already-chosen beliefs and positions. …as opposed to honest, open, interested discussion with willingness to question our assumptions."

Seems like a false dichotomy. My views have absolutely altered as a product of discussions like these, and I think that is common. One learns by striving to understand alternative points of view. I am finding it a bit tedious to understand yours. Perhaps you feel the same, since you have questioned some of my terms. In particular, you have questioned my term "ontological status, so I'll clarify: the ontological status of X entails: does X actually exist? Does it exist hypothetically? What properties does X have, and what relations does it have to other things that exist? Does it exist necessaily or contingently?

"I was referring to your Subjectivism objection."
What subjectivist objection? I didn't know I made one, so this might be a misunderstanding on your part.

"Saying that the abstract facts depend on there being someone to discuss them is meaningless, because there are inevitably infinitely-many experience-stories with their complementary protagonists, some of whom discuss abstract facts."

It is relevant if someone claims the actual world is a consequence of abstractions, which I thought you had implied. Did I misunderstand?

"if you say that you don’t know what ontology I believe in, that might be because I emphasize that I don’t claim or assert one."

I gather that you don't claim or assert a complete ontological system (you and I have that in common), but you DID makethe ontological claim (or claims with ontological implications):
"this life and this world are a blip in timelessness”
This implies that timelessness exists, that this world exists, and that the latter's existence is within the broader context of tbe former. You added:

"What makes this life (or finite sequence of lives) a blip in timelessness is the temporariness of this life or finite sequence of lives."
This does not establish the existence of timelessness as a state of affairs, as something that actually exists as a context for the temporal world.

"“But doesn’t there have be timelessness for us in order for you to validly say that?”
.
Sure, and I’ve mentioned the timeless sleep at the end-of-lives (or at the end of this life if there’s no reincarnation). …which, by its finality in our experience, and its timeless nature, is the natural, normal, usual state-of-affairs."

Our short temporal lives exist within the context if the temoral existence of the universe. This therefore does not establish the existence of timelessness

"timeless sleep at the end-of-lives (or at the end of this life if there’s no reincarnation). …which, by its finality in our experience, and its timeless nature, is the natural, normal, usual state-of-affairs."

Please explain what you mean by your claim that our experience has a " timeless nature". It appears to me that our experiences are entirely temporal. Death seems to me the temporal endpoint of our consciousness, so I see no reason to think this entails "timelessness."

"I’ve supported those statements by the uncontroversial statement that there’s no such thing as oblivion."
What is "oblivion"?


"Materialism, with its big brute-fact*, fails the Principle of Parsimony."

You are confusing my position with materialism. I simply have the uncontroversial belief thst the physical world exists. I am agnostic regarding the existence of anything immaterial. That, of course, makes your assertion relevant to me: show that materialism fails the principle of parsimony - this could shift my view.

"TBA" = is my autocorrect's translation of "TBH" = "To Be Honest". I apologize for my tablet.

It is impossible to assess the impact of any individual advertising campaign, whether allowed by law or not. Nevertheless, in the aggregate, it is pretty clear that advertising is somewhat effective.

If you're right that it was nothing more than a few facebook ads, then it is much ado about nothing. But it was certainly at least a bit more than this, and possibly a good bit more. We need to wait and see.

Under your premise that belief entails certainty, your conclusion that a solpsist cannot doubt is trivial. But I'm curious: do you actually regard all of your beliefs as absolute certainties?

Not that all facts must be known, but that to be a fact, there must be content in the fact.

Three broad questions have surfaced here: 1) are true and fact synonyms? Do they mean the same thing? 2) What does fact mean? 3) Under that definition/understanding of "fact," is "fact" applicable where there is no knowledge? Or, in order to be a fact, does not the fact have to comprehend something as knowledge of that something - in simplest terms, to aver possession of a fact is to claim to have knowledge? — tim wood

These are questions of semantics. Are you just trying to get a consensus on the meaning of the terms, or are you looking for the implications based on some particular definitions you have in mind?

Because it confers a survival value. Genetic drift is due to randomness.

Are you 1) claiming belief entails certainty; 2) (re)defining solipsism as the certainty that only the solipsist's mind exists; or 3) suggesting certainty is entailed by something in the common definition of "solipsist"?

Discuss the implications and/or consequences of such an idea. In particular, I think it would be interesting to(for the sake of argument) accept that that claim is true, and then offer possible relevant scenarios where it would matter.

Nevermind that that would put a president above the law, not just one law, but all of them. If that were the case, a president would be virtually untouchable(legally) for anything and everything he may wish to do. Odd. I'm being reminded of places that are not republican(representative) forms of government. — creativesoul

First of all, the reason a President mind not be able to be found guilty of a crime would be because he couldn't be arraigned and taken to trial while President. That would not preclude being charged when he's out of office. That is not an absence of justice, it is a deferal of justice.

More immediate justice would be possible through impeachment/conviction. Of course, in practice, this would only occur if the House is majority opposition party and the Senate has a significant opposition majority.

I'm only suggesting that the mind is consistent with natural selection: there is a survival value. The consequence of natural selection (survival) is not driven by a goal, rather it is a mathematical consequence of the natural process.

No. As I said, belief does not entail absolute certainty.

I would not agree. The primary task of the mind is to mediate between stimulus and response, so that the responses will be more effective at helping the organism (and it's kind) survive to procreate.

Even if you're right that he lied, how could it possibly be proven that his benign explanation was a lie? Don't overlook the IG investigation findings.

" where is your evidence he did either of those two things? — Baden

The text messages? Corroborating his testimony with that of Lisa Page? "

Are you just assuming there must be a lie in there somewhere because of your negative opinion of the man, or did he say something that strikes you as an intentional falsehood, that is provably so? If the latter, then tell me specifically what these probable falsehoods are.

" the solipsist cannot logically doubt."

I'll need to see your definition of solipsism. By my definition, a solipsist is someone who believes his mind, and only his mind, exists. I've never seen this belief stated in terms of being something of which the solipsist is absolutely certain about. A lack of absolute certainty implies some level of doubt.

"I don't know that my experience of sitting at my PC writing is not an illusion, but I know that I am currently having an experience of some kind."

I question that you're really being honest with yourself here. I bet you really do believe that you are actually sitting at your PC writing, and that is not an illusion. Your issue is that you can't prove it, so you feel as if you ought to be skeptical of that. Please consider this.

It is not at all irrational to believe that the world of experience is actually a reflection of the actual world. I suggest that this is actually a properly basic belief because it is innate (no one had to convince you of this through argumentation), self-evident, consistent with a rational world view, and the presence of such beliefs is consistent with everything else we believe about the world (e.g. it's consistent with natural selection). It would be irrational to abandon this belief solely because of of the conceptual possibility that it is false. You should not abandon a belief just because there is an epistemic possibility of it being false; rather - a belief should only be abandoned if it is rationally defeated - i.e. you acquire a new belief that contradicts this innate belief, and you have more reasons to believe the new belief true.

No, creating a strawman does not help. Respond to what I said in my immediately prior post. In particular, this comment:

You agree that I am justified in believing there is no evidence. Therefore I am justified in making the assertion "there is no evidence."

Do you see anything wrong with this?

(My argument differs from your strawman because I'm applying abduction (inference to the best explanation) and it is to the world at large, inclusive of all the evils we perceive in it.)

You agree that I am justified in believing there is no evidence. Therefore I am justified in making the assertion "there is no evidence."

"There is no evidence" is a proposition; it is either true or false. If true, it is a statement of fact. As fallible creatures, we don't generally have access to objective truth (exception: analytic truths), so any assertions we make are representations of belief. It's reasonable to ask me to justify the belief, and I did so. Therefore you ought to accept that my reasoning is valid.

The belief "there is no evidence" is justified by the fact that I am aware of no evidence. Similarly, take any ad hoc possibility X: I am aware of no evidence for X, and that is sufficient to believe there is no X.

Relativist:There is no evidence of an offsetting good to the evil of the black death, so why believe there is an offsetting good?

That is not a statement of fact.

On the contrary, "There is no evidence of an offsetting good to the evil of the black death"
is a statement of fact, if true. Why think it false?

reply="Rank Amateur;198605"]

There is no evidence of an offsetting good to the evil of the black death, so why believe there is an offsetting good?

but mere possibility is insufficient grounds for rational belief in something.
— Relativist

i disagree with this, depending on the level of evidence, or the basis of belief.

My statement refers to believing something solely on the basis that it is possible and without considering evidence. Do you really disagree with that?

"Because we can not perceive something with the tools we have, is not a very good reason to deny it's existence."
We shouldn't deny the possibility of existence unless proven impossible, but mere possibility is insufficient grounds for rational belief in something.

Both God's existence and his nonexistence are epistemically possible, so clearly we need more than mere possibility to justify belief.

Insert Trump's crime here >........< and then there is something to discuss on this topic.

I listed some crimes that Trump has possibly committed. Criminal investigation starts with suspicion, followed by investigation to see if there is a case. You can't demand proof of a crime prior to the investigation. Why should Trump not be investigated?

"My question is this: what is the basis on which we can make the judgement that God's goodness is incompatible with reality? Do we have the knowledge (or omniscience) and the authority to judge God?"
The basis is our intuitive understanding of right and wrong and conceivibility: there are many bad things that occur for which there is no conceivable offsetting good. How does one make sense of the 14th century "black death" plague, in which 30-60% of Europe's population died?If we can't conceive of an offsetting good, why should we believe there is one? Abduction entails finding the best answer, and a non-answer can't be considered better than an actual answer.

“Anyway, when the "problem of evil" is stated, there's over-emphasis on this physical world and its importance. Sure, this life matters, in the sense that how we conduct ourselves in it matters.

But this life and this world are a blip in timelessness. In fact, the long but finite sequence of lives that you're in is likewise only a blip in timelessness.”
The physical world’s existence is a universally held belief. The same cannot be said for the immaterial. Your claim that “this life and this world are a blip in timelessness” is an assertion that needs support – why do you believe this? Why should I believe it?

“That’s an expression of your unsupported belief in the objective existence (whatever that would mean) of the objects that you believe in.
.
What you’re claiming has nothing to do with verifiability or observation. It has everything to do with unsupported assertion of doctrinaire, dogmatic principle.”
Ontology is the branch of philosophy that deals with what exists. “Objective existence” just means it actually exists, rather than merely hypothetically existing. Unicorns can have a hypothetical existence. The cat sitting on my lap has objective existence.

That there exists an external, physical world is a properly basic belief, an epistemological foundation for all else. We are not taught that there is an external world, we naturally recognize a distinction between our self and the external world of our perceptions. In other words, it is innate – practically everyone believes it. It is irrational to abandon a belief arbitrarily, or just because it is possibly false. Do you have an undercutting defeater for this belief of mine? Were you born with the belief that the external world is an illusion, or was your prior belief in an external world defeated by some fact you encountered?

“you believe that there’s some (undisclosed by you) “ontic-reality” that can’t be explained by my explanation.”
I can’t judge that, since I haven’t assessed the ontology that you have hinted at. However, I question why you should believe your ontology is true. For example, you asserted “this life and this world are a blip in timelessness” – why think that?
“Alright, what ontic-reality that be? Can you verify that there is that ontic-reality?”
I apply the principle of parsimony. The evidence for the existence of a physical world is extremely strong, so that is a strong starting point for an ontology. I can’t rule out non-physical things existing, but there’s no reason to believe it unless a good case can be made for it. Regarding “verification” – I rely on my sensory input, and the instinctual way my brain processes this input such that I can sufficient sense of it that I (and my ancestors) have managed to survive to procreate. That’s enough verification for me.

“there are abstract implications, at least in the sense that we can speak of them”
Sure, we can speak of them, but that doesn’t imply they have some sort of existence independent of the states of affairs in which they are instantiated. I know circular objects actually exist in the world. I do not know that “circles” exist independently of 1) circular objects 2) minds to contemplate states of affairs with the property “circular”.

““objectively real”, whatever that would mean.”
It means that it actually exists as an entity. Ontology deals with what exists.
“You’d have to be specific about what kind of “reality” or ontic status the physical world has”
Specifically: the physical world exists (the is probably the least controversial ontological claim anyone can make).
“and which isn’t had by the hypothetical setting of a hypothetical experience-story built of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things, and a mutually-consistent configuration of truth-values for those propositions.”
Are you asking me to prove your ontology false? No can do. For the sake of argument (since I don’t know much about your ontology), I’ll assume your ontology is as coherent. That doesn’t make it true. I’ve examined D.M. Armstrong’s “States of Affairs” physicalist ontology and it also seems coherent. His seems much simpler, and more consistent with intuition than yours. Why should I accept yours?

“You’re the one advocating some undisclosed special ontic-reality or ontic-status for something (this physical world). I make no such claim about anything that can be described.”
Do you deny the existence of the physical world? The physical world is the only think I’m certain of. I don’t rule out the possibility that non-physical things exist, but it seems irrational to believe something just because it is POSSIBLY true. A case must be made for it, not merely a set of assertions.

“It isn’t clear what you think I’m claiming that logic is.”
I’ll refrain from guessing. Why don’t you tell me if you agree with the statement I made (“logic is an epistemological tool”) and tell me if you think there is anything more to it than that.

“Do you think that physics doesn’t comply with logic’s abstract facts”
Known physics is actually incoherent, so I’ll assume you’re discussing an idealized physics – the actual “natural law” of the universe. I expect that this idealized physics is coherent – it entails no contradictions. What other abstract facts of logic do you have in mind? But yes, of course, I believe that the operation of the universe throughout its history have been consistent with this idealized physics. But I think you’re overlooking the key point: physics (as generally discussed) is descriptive. The fact that 2 electrons repel each other is not dependent on an abstract law that makes it so; rather, it is due to the intrinsic properties of the electrons.

“I don’t claim the objective existence of our surroundings independent of us, the experiencer, the protagonist of our life-experience story. I’ve already clarified that. You’re repeating an already-answered objection. I’ve been saying that Consciousness, the experiencer, the protagonist, is primary, fundamental, and central to the logical system that I call your “life-experience possibility-story”.
Good for you. I disagree. Shall we agree to disagree, or do you think you can show that your view is more worthy of belief than mine?

“Your objection about what they merely are, seems to be a way of saying that you believe that abstract facts would need to be something more ontologically powerful, in order to produce the objectively-existent “ontic reality” that you think that this physical world is. Is that your objection?”
I’m saying that I believe abstractions are causally inert and they actually exist only in their instantiations and in the minds of intelligent beings as a product of a mental exercise.

“I suggest that this life and the physical world in which it is set, are completely insubstantial”
Why do you believe such a thing? This seems similar to someone claiming to be solipsist – one can’t prove them wrong, but there’s not really a good reason to abandon the basic world view that we have innately.
“it would be meaningless to speculate about whether there’d be those abstract facts if there were no beings to whom for them to be apparent.”
It is relevant when discussion the nature of abstractions. Some people think triangles exist as platonic objects in a “third realm” or in the mind of God; others believe they exist only in their instantiations. These controversies may, or may not, be relevant to you – but they are not inherently “meaningless".

Relativist:
“Your assertion isn’t the least persuasive, and in fact it merely seems dismissive – since you aren’t actually confronting the issues. “
.
Michael: ” I confronted the “problem of evil” by pointing out that the evil societal world to which you refer is only one of infinitely-many hypothetical possibility-worlds, which are settings for infinitely-many life-experience-stories.”
At best, you are giving me a reason why you reject the argument from evil. You have given me zero reason to reject it, and I doubt you could persuade anyone because your position depends on accepting some rather unconventional beliefs. ,

“As I said, all that is a blip in timelessness.”
From my point of view, that is an incoherent statement. Timelessness is a term that I’ve seen applied to God and to abstract objects. Even if we assume those things exist, that doesn’t make the physical world a “blip in timelessness.” I accept that it probably makes sense in your world-view, but TBA – I don’t see anything of interest in it, since it seems pretty far fetched.

"Time is a perception of our minds,"
Physics has time dependent equations, such as the Schoroedinger equation, which describe how a physical system evolves over time. Further, this is contrary to intuition. So you have a burden to show why it is more likely merely an illusion.

If time is an illusion, how can you claim the universe can collapse? Are you assuming block time (b-theory)?

Are there infinitely many possible universes, or only a finite number of possibilities? Is the past infinite? There are reasons to think it is not.

Michael - I'll get back to you later.

I simply do not understand the validity of the argument. Given the omnipotence of God, He could create a world in which evil exists and there is a greater good created by the evil that exists. Let's just say that if He did create such a world, then the argument, the 'problem of evil' will not apply.

You seem to be saying that it is possible that all this evil exists for the greater good. I'm not disputing that. What I'm saying is that the "best explanation" (i.e. applying abduction) for the evil in the world is that there is no 3-omni God. i.e. based on what we can know and perceive about the world, it appears unlikely that such a God exists. As I've said several times, I don't suggest this will change the mind of a committed believer - and that's because of the possibility you bring up. However, if someone is willing to entertain the possibility of God's non-existence, then this constitutes a reason to think God might actually not exist.

" Red does not exist in the Physical Universe. That which gives rise to red being seen by a human definitely does exist in the real world. "

Humans are part of the physical universe, so this suggests redness (that thing we perceive and contemplate) is part of the physical world.

There are two general elements that give rise to red being seen by humans:
1) the physical characteristics of the surfaces that result in certain wavelengths of light being reflected
2) the human physical capacity to see, and remember, this aspect of physical objects

I assume you're claiming there to be something about #2 that is non-physical. Is that correct? If so, then what makes you think this can't be physical? I realize that the quale "redness" is not something that can be fully described with propositions, but that just suggests it is a sort of non-propositional knowledge. It is not epiphenomenal, because it contributes to the way we interact with the world. Conscious awareness of redness is just a memory of the past perception, and memory seems reducible to the physical.

"Somewhat of a pointless exercise. But hey, whatever grabs your interest."

Is it completely irrelevant to you if Trump actually committed a serious crime?is it that you simply think it is so extremely unlikely that he committed a serious crime? is it that you think all politicians are criminals, so it doesn't really matter as long as Trump does the things you want done? I'd really like to understand where you're coming from.