Why would you think fictional creatures do not breath? — Banno

Breathing is a real world activity by real world creatures. A fiction can't do this.

are you now saying that there are two levels of ontology, stuff that exists and stuff that is actual?

IMO there's one ontology. Dragons are either real-world creatures, or they are concepts residing in minds.

At best you might say that some dragons breath fire. — Banno

This would imply that the set of all dragons includes all the real dragons and all the fictional creatures so-named. Some members of the set are said to breathe fire. We can't really say that "some dragons breathe fire" because fictional things don't actually breathe.

.

But since he was re-elected after what he pulled in Jan 6, it appears that large swaths of Americans don't care about rule of law either. — frank

Not necessarily. 60-70% of Republicans believe the 2020 election was stolen, and therefore Trump was justified in trying to remedy that situation.

I don't have statistics, but it appears to me that few Republicans understand that Trump committed obstruction of Justice during the Mueller investigation and in the documents case. Many also deny that he sexually assaulted E Jeane Carroll, and that it was therefore fine to defame her for her "lies".

It also seems that many are unaware of, or deny his guilt, at his various fraudulent activities (Trump U, Trump foundation, real estate valuations, and election fraud), or they consider the crimes minor.

So...some voters may actually respect rule of law, but are in denial about Trump. Of course, I expect that many believe that "Rule of Trump" is a greater good than rule of law.

Whether they exist or not, dragons breathe fire.
— Relativist
A change of topic. From "Dragons breath fire", you can conclude that something breaths fire. You cannot conclude that there are dragons. — Banno

It would be correct to say:

"the sentence: 'dragons breath fire' is true whether or not dragons exist"

because:

-If dragons exist, then "dragon" refers to these existing animals.
-If dragons don't exist, then "dragon" refers to a fictional creature.

In the original sentence, "Whether they exist or not, dragons breathe fire", there's just one referrent - not 2.

You've identified even more ambiguity. These all higlight the significance of semantics when sharing information.

So far all you have noted is that you find it improbable that a simple being could have knowledge; but yet haven’t contended the premises I have in the argument for why this has to be the case. — Bob Ross

The probability that magical knowledge exists is low, as I discussed. This is sufficient reason to reject your conclusion prima facie that a being with magical knowledge exists. But in principle, it's possible your conclusion is based on premises so likely to be true, that it could raise the a priori probability of the conclusion. I'll go through a first set of them to explain why it doesn't.

1. Composed beings are made up of parts.
Definition. No problem.

2. A composed being exists contingently upon its parts in their specific arrangement.
False. A particular composed being has its parts necessarily. If even one part were added or subtracted, it would not be the same being. (This pertains to the metaphysical question of the persistence of individual identity. Your view is probably based on essentialism, implying an unstated premise. If you choose not to make a case for essentialism, then I simply apply my own view, so I judge it categorically false: probability=0).

3. A part of a composed being is either composed or uncomposed.
Agreed.

4. A part that is a composed being does not, in turn, exist in-itself but, rather, exists contingently upon its parts and their specific arrangement.
"Exist in itself" is a vague term, but I'll take it to mean existing autonomously. Autonomous means being uncaused and without external dependencies. A part of a composed being may, or may not, exist autonomously. You've given no reason to think a composed being cannot exist autonomously.

The second part about existing contingently is a non-sequitur because all beings have their parts and properties necessarily, even if it is composed. Add or subtract even one part, and the being that WAS, no longer exists.

5. An infinite series of composed beings for any given composed being (viz., a composed being of which its parts are also, in turn, composed and so on ad infinitum) would not have the power to exist on their own.
I infer that you're describing a vicious infinite regress. I agree this is an impossibility because although each compositional layer is explained by a deeper layer, nothing accounts for the series as a whole.

6. Therefore, an infinite series of composed beings is impossible.
Agree

7. Therefore, a series of composed beings must have, ultimately, uncomposed parts as its first cause. (6 & 3)
Disagree that a composed being was necessarily caused. See my objection to #4.

8. An uncomposed being (such as an uncomposed part) is purely simple, since it lacks any parts.
Agreed.

9. Two beings can only exist separately if they are distinguishable in their parts.
False. Two beings can have identical intrinsic properties. Example: water molecules.

10. Two purely simple beings do not have any different parts (since they have none).
False (p=0). Two different types of simple being can exist (e.g. up-quarks and electrons).

11. Therefore, only one purely simple being can exist.
Non-sequitur; false (p=0)

No point in proceeding further, since later statements and conclusion depends on the above falsehoods. Perhaps you could nudge me to increase some probabilities from 0, but as I said before, you'd need to push all of them pretty high to have any persuasive power.

The sentence could be read either way.

Here's another that spotlights semantic ambiguity:

Whether they exist or not, dragons breathe fire.

The evening star is the morning star. Isn't it a tautology and also contradiction, but a true statement? — Corvus

It's a semantic issue. The nouns have a referent. The referent could be a concept in your mind, or it could be the actual object that exists in the world.

Assume "Evening star" and "morning star" both refer to an object in the world. In that case, they are referring to the same object - so it's semantically equivalent to saying "The evening star is the evening star."

But "Evening star" and "morning star" could both just refer to your mental concepts "the point of light I see in the evening (or morning)" - the concepts refer to the context of your respective perceptions.

You could even be inconsistent, and treat one as the concept, the other as the object.

The problem is that even if it doesn’t jive well for you, it doesn’t negate the OP: you would have to demonstrate what about my argument for why this simple being has knowledge is false—for it would have to be false if you don’t believe that knowledge can exist in a simple being. — Bob Ross

Why must I do that? I showed you to have a burden based on your expressed purpose of swaying some people. You've sidestepped that entirely, and are back to making the false claim that I have some burden.

If all you want to hear is that your argument is valid, and that you had no desire to defend its soundness, you should have said so.

"On Thursday, at a federal courthouse in Washington state, U.S. District Judge John C. Coughenour—an 84-year-old Ronald Reagan appointee—delivered a striking rebuke to Trump’s assault on birthright citizenship. Speaking from the bench, Coughenour declared: “It has become ever more apparent that to our president, the rule of law is but an impediment to his policy goals. The rule of law is, according to him, something to navigate around or simply ignore, whether that be for political or personal gain. Nevertheless, in this courtroom, and under my watch, the rule of law is a bright beacon which I intend to follow.” He then issued a nationwide injunction prohibiting the administration from denying birthright citizenship to the children of immigrants for the duration of the litigation."
--https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2025/02/federal-judge-birthright-citizenship-donald-trump-ignore-law.html

As a businessman, Trump treated contracts, and laws, as inconveniences. It's no surprise he'd continue this as President.

This will be his best executive order yet: — NOS4A2

I absolutely agree this cannot be topped.

On the other hand, this "Truth" Social post puts his abject stupidity on full display:

"20 years ago, Autism in children was 1 in 10,000. NOW IT’S 1 in 34. WOW! Something’s really wrong. We need BOBBY!!! Thank You! DJT”

[/quote]

Can you prove time exists? — Corvus

No. Do you only believe things that are proven?

Time doesn't exist. — Corvus

Apparently not.

So do you just adopt beliefs arbitrarily?

my point was that you were invalidly implying that my premises in the OP are proven merely as possibilities, which makes no sense. — Bob Ross

Your premises aren't "proven" at all: you made no case for them. We agree they are possibly true (logical possibility), but your propositions (at least the ones I identified) are also possibly false. Therefore the conclusion is possibly true and possibly false. You agreed your purpose is to sway minds, so you need more than possibility.

Think more granularly than possible/impossible. Instead consider there's an epistemic probability (P) to any statement. It's subjective and somewhat vague, but it relates to levels of certainty.

Each premise has a probability: pn is the probability of premise n. C = the conclusion, P(C) is the probability of the conclusion:

P(C)=p1& p2 &p3 &...&pn
Which implies:
P(C)= p1*p2*p3...*pn

Probabilities are <=1, so P(C) is <= the probability of each individual proposition..

Where P(G) = the prior subjective epistemic probability of God's existence (i.e. prior to encountering your argument). You said your propose was to sway a person with your argument, so that means convincing him that P(C) > P(G). Your "burden" is to succeed at that.

I don’t have the burden of proof to demonstrate how knowledge can exist in something absolutely simple: — Bob Ross

Your argument depends on the unstated premise that knowledge can be present without parts. So it's included in the P(C) equation. So you have the burden of convincing someone that P(knowledge can be present without parts) is sufficiently high to produce a conclusion (C) such that P(C)>P(G). "Can be" = metaphysically possible, but we apply epistemic judgement to proposed metaphysical theories and axioms. More on this below.

Think about it, if you are right that a being with knowledge cannot be absolutely simple; then one of my premises in the OP—which does not argue for how it works—must be false; but yet you have never once pointed to what premise or premises that is or are. — Bob Ross

It's the unstated premise I pointed out above. The probability of unstated premises is just as relevant to P(C) as the stated ones.

Relativist: "You need to provide a compelling reason to think it is metaphysically possible".

It is right here:

20. Intelligence is having the ability to apprehend the form of things (and not its copies!).
21. The purely simple and actual being apprehends the forms of things. (19)
22. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being must be an intelligence.

It is physically impossible to store complex data without parts.

First of all, what is complex data? That suggests that there is a sort of simple data that can be stored without parts (:

Secondly, I agree that it is physically impossible...that just means it cannot happen in accordance with things governed by physics. God is beyond physics — Bob Ross

So another unstated premise is: physicalism is false.

Even if physicalism is false, my intuitions are grounded in what I know about the world- and that includes the intuition that knowledge =organized data, data is encoded, and this entails complexity. I judge it a small probability (<.1) that knowledge can exist without parts. Your defense is just an assertion that my intuitions don't apply because it's not physical. That seems equivalent to saying it's magical, and magic can account for anything. That has no effect on my judgement.

You mentioned "simple data". The simplest data is a bit (value is 0 or 1). Knowing this would require at least one part: the bit. Conceivably, there could exist a being with 1 bit of knowledge. I don't see how a being could know the value without, in some sense, having this encoded as a bit of data.

You asked: "what is complex data"? The data is propositions (more precisely: some metaphysical grounding for those propositions). You refer to each thing's "form", which strikes me as a lot of bits of information. The complexity comes from the logical relations within this information.

that’s too many premises for me to talk in one response! Pick one, and we will dive in. — Bob Ross

I choose your unstated premise that knowledge can be present without parts, If that unstated premise is false, then your step 21 is false. In terms of probability, P(#21) <= P(knowledge can be present without parts).

all existing objects have properties, so it follows from this that it cannot exist. I already demonstrated this is false — Bob Ross

Your "demonstration" depends on Thomist metaphysics being true. You could only possibly show my statement is false by falsifying my metaphysical framework (or at least showing that Thomist metaphysics is superior), because my statement is an axiom of my framework. IMO, my framework is coherent, has sufficient explanatory power to explain all uncontroversial facts, and it's more parsimonious than alternatives. That justifies my belief in it. It's the basis of my epistemic judgement. I'll add that I'm not certain of my metaphysical theory, but I think it's more likely than not (P>.6).

you cannot say that something is impossible because we have no example of it. That’s illogical

Given my metaphysics, it is trivially metaphysically impossible. Here's a snippet of the theory that establishes what I said:

Existence consists of the objects that exist, and the relations between them. I will use these terms interchangeably: object=thing=existent=particular=State of Affairs (SOA)

“State of Affairs” is the most meaningful descriptor because it refers to the structure of objects/things/existents/particulars. A state of affairs has 3 types of constituents: a thin particular, it’s intrinsic properties, and it’s relations (AKA relational properties AKA extrinsic properties).

Objects do not exist without properties, and properties do not exist unattached to objects. Properties exist in their instantiations. Example: the -1 electric charge exists as a property that all electrons have. The -1 electric charge does not exist independently. Now consider an electron: the ‘-1’ charge is intrinsic; any object that lacks a “-1 charge” is necessarily something other than an electron.

You could falsify the theory by identifying an object that can't fit the "state of affairs" model. But as you implied, there are no examples of such things. My theory is coherent, has sufficient explanatory power to account for all uncontroversial facts, and does so parsimoniously. It's unparsimonious to add another sort of existent based solely on it being logically possible. Possibilities are endless.

I said two objects could have the same intrinsic properties

Which, again, makes them non-simple. — Bob Ross

That may be so in your metaphysics, but not in mine. In mine, an atomic state of affairs with 1 intrinsic property is as simple as an object can be. But nothing precludes there existing multiple objects with that same, single intrinsic property. What would distinguish them are their relations (extrinsic properties). I've said this multiple times, but you repeatedly dismiss it. Your basis is Thomism. That's sufficient justification for you, but has no persuasive power for a non-Thomist. You would need to falsify my metaphysical axiom directly, or show my metaphysical system is incoherent.

What makes Iraqi Sesame Street "bullshit"? It's been part of the effort to restore the country to normalcy after the devastation inflicted by Bush's war. Pottery Barn rule.

Regardless, Trump could have ordered review of all the programs and done selective shutdowns. It's a product of executing a simplistic solution with callous disregard for the consequences. That's why I labeled it manslaughter, and not murder.

Add manslaughter to the list of Trump's crimes:

Deaths predicted amid the chaos of Elon Musk’s shutdown of USAid

Critical supplies of life-saving medicines have been blocked and children left without food and battling malnutrition as multiple effects were reported across the globe after Elon Musk resolved to shut down the US government’s pre-eminent international aid agency....

...Analysis confirms that several thousand women and girls are likely to die from complications during pregnancy and childbirth as a direct result of Trump’s order to freeze aid to the agency for 90 days.

I assume Trumpists will dance with joy with each death, because it translates to cost savings.

Trump may think he is anointed by God to Rule, Reign, and Ruin, but Congress actually is the source of program creation and spending. — BC

That's the design, but the GOP leadership is letting Trump do whatever he wants.

I read the entire post. Regretfully.

I'm starting with this point, because it has bearing on whether or not this discussion is worthwhile:

If your premises only seem possible, then your conclusion is still only possible- you won't move the needle of belief one bit.

That’s not how arguments work. Either one agrees with the premise or they don’t. — Bob Ross

The typical purpose of an argument is to change minds. A good argument might lead to someone fully accepting the conclusion, but even if it just results pushing someone in that direction, you've succeeded in making headway that you could potentially amplify with more arguments.

Do you not have such a purpose in mind? If not, why did you bother? I'll address your other issues under the assumption you are hoping to have some success, but if this is incorrect - we won't need to go much further.

[regarding a hypothetical argument for physicalism]That depends on what you mean by “entailments of physicalism”. Every argument comes in with metaphysical assumptions: I don’t think physicalism is any different in this regard. What I would do is provide counter arguments to the premises that I disagree with and perhaps for the assumptions that I disagree with so that I could have a productive conversation with them. — Bob Ross

By presenting an argument, I will have assumed the burden of proof. You would, of course, reject premises that you disagree with, but you wouldn't have the burden to prove me wrong. I would have the burden to prove to you my premises are true.

Someone could come around and offer a rejoinder that we have good reasons to believe that a being which has knowledge must have parts; and I am more than happy to entertain that. However, my problem with you is that the closest argument I have gotten from you for this is essentially: — Bob Ross

You're reversing the burden of proof. You have it because you presented an argument. I explained why I reject your premise, and your response was that it's possible.

There is a problem with the argument I stated: it assumes God exists.

It presupposes that we are talking about an absolutely simple being—that’s it. — Bob Ross

Wrong. The argument I stated explicitly referred to God.

The problem is that you are saying it is impossible; — Bob Ross

My position is that it is most likely metaphysically impossible and I explained why. How is that a problem? You've given me no reason to think otherwise. You embraced the argument I created, suggesting to me that you choose to believe omniscience can be held by a simple being because you "know" God is omniscient and simple. I acknowledged it's logically possible, but possibility is cheap. You need to provide a compelling reason to think it is metaphysically possible. I have no burden to convince you of anything.

my OP’s argument never presupposes God’s existence as a premise—not even in part. — Bob Ross

You presuppose a theistic metaphysics.

You brought up the fact that it's possible knowledge can exist without parts or complexity.

It is logically possible because it violates nothing in logic; it is actually possible because it violates nothing in physics; and it is metaphysically possible because it does not violate the natures of things. — Bob Ross

It is physically impossible to store complex data without parts. It is metaphysically impossible if physicalism is true. To be metaphysically possible would require making some metaphysical assumption that simply ignores the intrinsic complexity of information- making the assumption far-fetched.

First of all, this negates your first point, because you are implying that the OP gives good reasons to believe that is possible (which you said was problematic before)....The OP doesn’t argue for the possibility of God’s existence: it argues that God does exist — Bob Ross

I never suggested you were arguing for the possibility of God, but I'm pointing out that it only does that if it is sound: all the premises need to be true - including the unstated ones. You can't show all the premises are necessarily true. A more realistic goal would be that you could make a compelling case for soundness by supporting each premise.

Give me the premise you are disagreeing with! — Bob Ross

8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17 - not sure of, 18, 20 21, 23, 27, 28, 34. I also disagree with the inferences in 11,14, 19, 24, 29, 31 32, 35, 38,
39, 41, and 42 because they are based on false premises.

In short, I disagree with your entire metaphysical framework. I chose to focus on omniscience and simplicity because it was impractical to discuss everything.

I am explaining to you how this being has no properties proper; and that just because we have no examples of something other than itself, it does not follow that it cannot exist. — Bob Ross

Per my metaphysical framework, all existing objects have properties, so it follows from this that it cannot exist. You have the burden of showing your metaphysical framework is correct, or at least showing it's better than mine. Coincidentally, I've outlined it on another forum. It's in 3 parts:

https://knowwhyyoubelieve.org/groups/reasonable-faith-forum/forum/topic/metaphysical-naturalism-part-i-the-scientific-method/

https://knowwhyyoubelieve.org/groups/reasonable-faith-forum/forum/topic/metaphysical-naturalism-part-2-a-naturalist-metaphysical-theory/

https://knowwhyyoubelieve.org/groups/reasonable-faith-forum/forum/topic/metaphysical-naturalism-part-3-why-its-the-best-answer/

A part is something that makes up the whole; so it cannot be identical to the whole; and your argument here assumes that they can be identical. — Bob Ross

I never said they could be identical. I said two objects could have the same intrinsic properties. The properties that distinguish two electrons are their differing extrinsic properties, such as their location in space, bonds to other particles, etc.

I'm just pointing out that your argument depends on your preferred metaphysical system being true

Literally every argument for anything is guilty of this: that is a trivial note and I never argued to the contrary — Bob Ross

I said essentially the same thing in my first post: every argument depends on questionable metaphysical assumptions. Since you more or less agree, why bother presenting it? (This gets back to my first point of this post). The fundamental disagreement is the metaphysical framework. Everything else is entailment.

I read it. It doesn't have an example of a "should", and in no way addresses my broader issue:

It's fine to define good as "what should be", but this doesn't explain how "should" applies in the absence of minds to make choices. Equating it to "good" doesn't add anything - because that's still a judgment. — Relativist

Matter is not what we experience. Rather, matter is our explanation of what we experience.
We experience only sensations: physical sensations, emotional sensations, and mental sensations.
Other explanations of experience include Descartes' Evil Demon, hard solipsism, brain in a vat, etc.
Matter is a very good explanation of what we experience.
Newtonian Mechanics is a very good explanation of what we experience.
Newtonian Mechanics is not true. Perhaps, the matter explanation is also not true.
Thoughts? — Art48

Matter isn't an explanation; it's an explanatory hypothesis that a particular kind of thing exists.The hypothesis explains all those sensations.

Newtonian mechanics is a hypothesis as well, but in terms of ontology - it just proposes that a law of nature exists. It's actually a pretty good hypothesis, even if it isn't entirely true..

It's logically possible that the "matter hypothesis" is false, but why would we abandon it - unless we had a superior hypothesis? We only abandoned Newtonian mechanics when a better hypothesis came along; even then, it wasn't a complete abandonment. It still works perfectly fine for most applications.

I suppose we could say that ~solipsism is also a hypothesis (albeit an intrinsic one), but there's no reason to abandon it since it hasn't been falsified.

I assumed you meant your second post in this thread. It says nothing about atoms or molecules.

I then went that that other thread you referenced (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15722/the-logic-of-a-universal-origin-and-meaning/p1) , thinking that might be what you mean. The only reference to molecules mentions nothing about atoms.

Why can't you just give me an example of a "should" that doesn't involve minds, as I asked? Seems like a simple request.

It sounds like you might say "an electron should be attracted to a proton"? — Relativist

No, should would denote a more positive state of existence. But for there to be a more positive state of existence, it must be at its base that existence is itself good, versus there being no existence at all. — Philosophim

You had said, "The 'should' is entirely logical." I'm trying to understand what that means. So I gave you an example which you rejected with a reason that I can't understand. What is a "positive state of existence"? What makes one state more positive than another? Give me an example of a "should" that doesn't involve minds.

You referred to your second post. In that post, you said,
"If we are to take that good is, "What should be", then we can take at a base level that there should be existence over nothing. This is because any morality which proposed that existence should not be would contradict itself."

It's fine to define good as "what should be", but this doesn't explain how "should" applies in the absence of minds to make choices. Equating it to "good" doesn't add anything - because that's still a judgment.

Let's focus on this point:

The 'should' is entirely logical. — Philosophim

It sounds like you might say "an electron should be attracted to a proton"?
But clearly the electron has no choice in the matter, so it is more precise to say ""an electron will be attracted to a proton".

This is my issue: "should" typically connotes an outcome that is contingent upon a choice. Broadly speaking (setting aside your premise), this is what is generally meant by moral imperatives: a person may choose to do the right thing, or he may not.

I have several times noted that 'should' does not involve beings. If you are saying it does, and I'm presenting the entire argument that it does not, you need to challenge my point why I say it does not. You have not done that. — Philosophim

That is precisely what I've been challenging! The very point you're responding to is such a challenge! Your response should be to explain how "should" applies to objects that lack minds. Asserting it does not explain it.

For reference, here's how it applies to objects with minds (some of them, at least): If John should do X, then he may or may not do X. The should influences his choice; but other urges and desires may also also influence his choice. His choice is contingent, not determined external to himself.

If I was noting that an objective morality requires a being, you would have a point. But I haven't, I won't, and its not going to change. — Philosophim

My point is that you haven't shown how objective morality applies in the absence of minds that have choices to make.

When thinking upon the fact that the universe was ultimately uncaused by anything else, you realize that anything could have happened. — Philosophim

Here's where you go wrong. A material first cause entails an initial uncaused state, not a "happening". But this is an unnecessary tangent. I'm willing to accept your claim as a premise that the initial state could have been something else. I don't see how this helps your case.

Odds are calculated based on contingencies. There are four jacks in a deck of cards, which is why if we don't know the shuffle order we say pulling a card bling has a 4/52 chance of being a jack.

An uncaused universe has no odds. — Philosophim

There are no discrete odds only because your premise implies there are infinitely many possible initial states. This translates to an infinitesimal probability - but it's still a probability.

How could there be a state of affairs that there is existence at all? The same as a possible state of affairs in which there is no existence at all. There is no contingency for existence. No prior causation. It simply is, and it had no reason to be or not be. We believe something cannot simple 'be' without prior cause in the universe, but logically, its the only conclusion that works. — Philosophim

I'm glad to hear you say "there is no contingency for existence", because it sounds like you're agreeing with me that existence is metaphysically necessary. Is that correct?

However, if existence is metaphysically necessary, how does "should" apply?

An objective morality if it exists is within the universe that is, just like everything else. It does not exist on some outside intention, but would be an existent thing in the universe just like a wavelength of light. — Philosophim

I have accepted your premise that moral imperatives exist, but I've argued that everything in a contingent universe is therefore contingent - including a wavelength of light and any moral imperative that happens to exist. Do you agree? If not, why not?

Your op only claims "existence should be". You haven't explained how that entails the moral imperative "don't steal". — Relativist

Correct. Thus why your point is a straw man. — Philosophim

I wasn't making a strawman argument, I was explaining what I inferred from your statements - to afford you the opportunity to correct my understanding. You asserted that objective morality somehow comes forth from your premise "existence should be". That makes no sense to me,

Secondly, you had referred to moral imperatives being the product of randomness- and THAT is the basis of my claim that each moral imperative could have come out as its converse. If that is not the case, then explain what you mean by "randomness" in your context. Why couldn't this imperative have come out as "do steal"? — Relativist


No, I clearly stated that everything came out of randomness.

If EVERYTHING came out of randomness then this includes all moral imperatives.

Since an objective morality does not require an intention or prior causation, it is a logical part of existence if it exists. I've stated this again and again. — Philosophim

You've repeated it over and over, but you haven't explained how it is reasonable for a random moral imperative is an OBJECTIVE moral imperative.

Having objective EXISTENCE does not entail there being something objective about the moral imperative. I've said that a moral imperative pertains only to choices made by things that can make choices. I don't think you've stated either agreement or disagreement. So tell me now.

Perhaps you just can't comprehend it, it is very different from the normal subjective argument of morals you're likely used to. Bend your mind a bit. And if you still can't understand it, just go with the basic premises of the OP for now and read more.

I've been trying for quite some time, and I've brought to your attention the reasons I think your premises are incoherent. I could have walked away from this discussion on that basis, but I've been willing to hear you correct whatever misunderstandings I have. Instead, you just fall back to repeating the same (seemingly incoherent) premises.

Maybe you'll understand better, have your questions answered, and be able to make a point that demonstrates I'm wrong. Read on to find out why eventually I can make a reasoned conclusion that "do steal" is not an objective moral notion.

I infer that you're saying your basic premise doesn't account for all moral values that most of us accept. I presume that you're only saying that moral values which are entailed by your premise are objective values. Is that correct? It would certainly narrow my objections, but you still need to answer the questions I raised above, and will repeat here:

1) How does "should" applies to objects that lack minds. IOW, explain what it means to say "X should Y" where X is an object lacking a mind.
2) You seemed to agree that existence is metaphysically necessary, so how does "should" apply to the fact of a metaphysically necessary existence?
3) everything in a contingent universe is contingent - including a wavelength of light and any moral imperative that happens to exist. Do you agree?
4. You said, "I clearly stated that everything came out of randomness." So please confirm that you agree that moral imperatives (including your foundational one) came out of randomness.
5) Why should anyone pay heed to a moral imperative that is both contingent (see #3) and random (see #4)?

An objective morality cannot exist that states "Existence should not be" as that is a logical contradiction. — Philosophim

"Should" only applies only to choices made by beings that can make choices. It would make no sense to claim an electron "should" be attracted to a proton. That attraction is a necessary fact.

To suggest that "existence should be" is incoherent because it would imply a being exists who makes the choice for there to be existence. It's self-contradictory.

Everything's existence is contingent. Nothing had to exist. — Philosophim

If there is an uncaused first cause, how could it have NOT existed? What accounts for its contingency? What is it contingent UPON?

Even if you believe the actual uncaused first cause is contingent, how could there be a state of affairs of nothingness- an absence of anything at all? Existence itself (the fact SOMETHING exists) is metaphysically necessary entailed by the fact that we exist and something cannot come from nothing.

if "don't steal" could have randomly come out as "do steal", there is no objective reason to follow it.
— Relativist

No, it could not have. That's the entire point of the OP. — Philosophim

Your op only claims "existence should be". You haven't explained how that entails the moral imperative "don't steal".

Secondly, you had referred to moral imperatives being the product of randomness- and THAT is the basis of my claim that each moral imperative could have come out as its converse. If that is not the case, then explain what you mean by "randomness" in your context. Why couldn't this imperative have come out as "do steal"?

The problem with this statement is that you haven't just declared that an objective morality cannot exist. This statement declares that nothing objective can ever exist. — Philosophim

No it doesn't. I accepted that a moral value can exist. But if it's a product of "random existence", there are 2 implications:

1) it's existence is contingent. It didn't have to exist.
2) it's value is contingent. Its converse could have existed.

The same would be true of anything else with "random existence". But if "don't steal" could have randomly come out as "do steal", there is no objective reason to follow it.

I don’t see anything unreasonable about this argument. You seem to be noting that all the examples we have of beings with knowledge also have parts: that is true. However, this does not entail that a being could not exist which has knowledge and doesn’t have parts. The problem I have is that you are presupposing that a being with knowledge must have parts without giving any sort of argumentation for that. — Bob Ross

There is a problem with the argument I stated: it assumes God exists. To then use the conclusion to support an argument for God's existence entails the circularity I was referring to. It's irrelevant whether or not you agree there's circular reasoning involved; I'm just explaining why I said that.

You brought up the fact that it's possible knowledge can exist without parts or complexity. This points to the fundamental problem with your argument.

Any reasonable person should agree that God's existence (and omniscience) is logically possible, without needing your argument to show that. The question is whether or not the argument in your Op provides good reason to think it's more than merely possible. Consider that it's possible that physicalism is true: would you consider an argument for physicalism compelling if it's premises were based on entailments of physicalism?

Since you're presenting an argument, you have the burden of defending your premises. In particular, you'd need to show that all your premises are sufficiently probable that the conclusion (God exists) gains some warrant (i.e. more justified; gaining some epistemic probability) beyond being merely possible. If your premises only seem possible, then your conclusion is still only possible- you won't move the needle of belief one bit.

That is why God is attributed—or more accurately just is—these properties analogically. I am not claiming that God has, e.g., a will the same as ours. — Bob Ross

You're rationalizing your theistic framework, not making a compelling argument. I described the way knowledge (and willing) exists in the real world - there is a physical basis. You're doing no more than asserting its logically possible that knowledge and will can exist without a physical medium. You need to show it's sufficiently plausible to remove it as a barrier to accepting the soundness of your argument.

That’s still not what circular reasoning is! Even if I ad hoc rationalized my position by saying God’s properties are identical, that would not imply that I am presupposing the truth of the conclusion in a premise — Bob Ross

My key point is that you've given no reason to think multiple properties is equivalent to a single property. It seems like a logical contradiction, like saying "6=1", which would mean your argument is unsound. But even if you could show it's logically possible, but that still just makes your conclusion logically possible - no headway.

I am not sure what you mean by “intrinsic properties”, but assuming you mean something like “properties a thing has independently of what we say it has” then I would say God has no properties: that’s the whole point of being absolutely simple. — Bob Ross

This just shows that your argument depends on a specific ontological model. You have the burden of showing this is better ontological model than the one I'm most familiar with. And if you can't, then you need to accept that your argument is pointless - it does no more than show that God's existence is logically possible, which is exactly where we are without the argument.

how can a being which has no parts exist as a particular? — Bob Ross

Every particular has at least one part. Everything that exists is a particular: a quark, a galaxy, the universe, and even the totality of existence. Anything we can point to, or assign a label to, is a particular. But I'm not debating who's metaphysical theory is better (although I'd be willing to, in another thread). I'm just pointing out that your argument depends on your preferred metaphysical system being true- so for the argument to be compelling, you have the burden of showing your metaphysical system is likely to be true - at least the axioms you depend on in your argument. Again, if your many assumptions are only possible, then your argument is pointless.

Individual up-quarks are distinguishable at a point of time by their spatial location.

That is a property that one has that the other doesn’t; which implies it has parts. — Bob Ross

It's a relational property, not an intrinsic property. Again: we're applying different metaphysical assumptions.

Moreover, yes, I do not see any contradiction with the idea that a composed being which is spatiotemporal must be infinitely divisible and yet ontologically be comprised ultimately by one singular non-spatiotemporal thing. (: — Bob Ross

Irrelevant. I believe there has to be a bottom layer of reality, consisting of indivisible objects. You should at least agree this is logically possible- that's all I've claimed. I'm not the one claiming to prove something.

No, I don't think so. If I'm right in the logic put forth, in at least any universe we can imagine, 'existence should be' is the necessary base answer to any objective morality. — Philosophim

Your logic in the Op was based on the assumption that objective morality exists. I'm showing that morality that is the product of a random existence cannot be objective; it's logically impossible. If you want to assume there are objective moral values then you need to drop the assumption that they are a "random addition".

Everything comes from an undesigned universe that evolves 'debatably' deterministically. I don't want to sidetrack too much, but if an undesigned universe can incept without prior cause, what's to stop other things from also happening later in the timeline? Such things would be completely unpredictable. Again, not a design intent, just random additions. — Philosophim

A moral imperative that is a "random addition" is not an objective moral value, it's a random value whose converse could have instead come to exist. In effect, the universe flipped a coin, and "do not kill" won.

Right, this is the logic. Morality is what should be. — Philosophim

How do you get a relevant* moral imperative from an undesigned universe composed of matter and energy and evolving deterministically? You compared it to a red wavelength of light, but that entails nothing like a moral imperative - it just entails some role in the deterministic evolution of the universe.

*If the moral imperative is random, it's irrelevent - there can't have the sort of meaningful implications that you're looking for. The imperative "don't steal" could just as easily come out "do steal".

Does a red wavelength of light have intent behind it? No. Is a red wavelength an objective entity? Yes. My intent is to find a morality that exists like a wave of light. We may subjectively interpret it in different ways, but its something underlying that we're all observing. — Philosophim

You refer to "shoulds" - which sounds to me like moral imperatives. Correct me if this is not what you mean.

A red wavelength of light exists by brute fact. Its existence has relevance to the deterministic chain of causation, but it entails no "shoulds" outside of this. So if your morality exists like a wave of light, it may have some relevance to the deterministic causal chain, but there are no "shoulds" outside its role in causation.

...morality as existence itself. — Philosophim

I asked you this before, but I don't believe you answered. What do you mean by "existence"? For example: are you referring to the totality of existence? The fact there reality exists rather than not? Or perhaps you're referring to OUR exististence? I have followup questions, depending on your answer.

My point is that noting the natural world is 'arbitrary' doesn't make any point. We both agree that the universe is uncaused, meaning we cannot look outside of the universe for explanation. We can only look within it. The term 'arbitrary', if you are to use it against morality, would apply to everything in the universe at its core. You could just use the word 'random', but arbitrary adds an unneeded emotional element of dismissal to it. — Philosophim

I used the word "arbitrary" to highlight the fact there is no reason for these cosmic morals to be what they are. There can't be a reason unless there is some intent behind them- and intentionality entails a mind. You sidestep this with vagueness- a belief that this vague moral object exists and in some vague way, this is involved in our moral judgements.

This is relevant to your question about the implications of there being objective morals. If objective morality is rooted in a mind, it would have different implications than if there is no mind. But it appears to me that objective morals entaiis a mind because it would have to be the product of intent. Since you deny that, your position seems incoherent.

I feel there is morality that is not relevant to humanity, and would exist even if we were gone. And since you believe morality is subjective based on feelings, I guess I'm right eh?

The paradigm I have presented is the OP and a note that a subjective morality does not serve any rational purpose, but is just a surface level feeling that fails upon close inspection. Feel free to go back to the OP at this point if you're interested. If not, I'm not sure there's anything more that you can add, and I'm not sure I can either. — Philosophim

Your paradigm assumes there are moral values existing external to humans that were caused to exist by undirected natural forces. You have not explained how these moral values are non-arbitrary. In the case of a God, the answer theists give is that God is Goodness. You don't have that.

You haven't even said what you're referring to as existing externally to us. I have used the term "moral values", and you haven't disagreed. If it IS moral values: what are they? For example, does every statement "x is wrong" "y is good" correspond to some object existing out in the ether? Or are there just foundational moral statements existing out there?

You also haven't explained how we know what these moral values (or whatever it is) are- how they influence our moral judgments. You seem to deny feelings are involved, so what is it?

I'll refrain from responding to your criticism of my paradigm until you fully address this.

Read this post: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/962312

If you want more details on the math, read this post: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/962884

And yet, in transfinite math, all the sets you mentioned are the same "size" (the same cardinality).

What caused the energy to exist, which is matter? As you noted, all causality at the end boils down to an uncaused reason for existence. — Philosophim

It boils down to an initial, uncaused state of affairs. What that might be is unknown, but whatever it is, it exists for no reason. This is because to have reason would require there to be something existing ontologically prior to it, which is logically impossible.

But if what is good is feelings, then the only reason we can conclude is whatever we feel is right, and whoever has might gets to assert what they feel is right. — Philosophim

That is categorically false. Self preservation, extended through empathy to the preservation of life in general, is the strongest mutual feeling that we have. It's sufficient to account for the "golden rule" (treat others as you would like to be treated) that has been developed in various cultures- apparently independently. All generally agreed moral values are consistent with it. Indeed we have other feelings/urges that we often act on that are inconsistent with our moral feelings, but we still make moral judgements of those actions - and never claim it's OK because we "felt like it".

Everything exists by chance. "Arbitrary" would apply to everything then and is a pointless criticism to morality in general. Of course its not arbitrary, or you would have hung up on this discussion long ago. — Philosophim

You side-stepped my objection. Moral values that exist due to the blind forces of nature would be completely random. Some value happens to be good because some force of nature randomly with in the direction it did, and it could just as easily gone in another direction.

Further, if a God formed, it too would be an arbitrary formation, and we're stuck with the same pointless argument.

This is the Euthyphro dilemma, but it doesn't apply to my model of intersubjective moral values. In my model, good=directed positively toward life (preserving life and helping it flourish). It's fundamental basis is a properly basic belief- one that is innate and incorrigible. An act is right and good because it is consistent with this properly basic belief. Within the scope of humanity, no moral value is arbitrary because it is necessarily consistent with this this properly basic belief.

In a broader sense, beyond the scope of humanity, the existence of humans is arbitrary. We happen to exist by a chance series of events in evolutionary history, and in cosmological history. So in this cosmic sense, there are no objective moral values. But our scope of interest is humanity: our basic moral value is an intrinsic part of being human. As a properly basic belief, a moral value is right because we all believe it to be right, and it is a belief that has no defeaters. It's reasonable and rational to retain a properly basic belief that has no defeaters.

So my foundation of morality is epistemic. You're inventing an ontological basis for it, so you need to account for why natural forces would just happen to produce the values that it did, and provide some rationale to consider them non-arbitrary. There are, BTW, theistic arguments that deal with the Euthyphro dilemma. You can google them if you like, but you'll find they won't fit your paradigm. You're on your own.

Why is your survival not arbitrary? Why are your feelings not arbitrary? By reason, how is a subjective morality not arbitrary? As you can see the arbitrary argument leads nowhere. — Philosophim

I answered this above. Our survival IS arbitrary in a cosmic sense, but it is NOT arbitrary in the only sense that's relevant to humanity. We judge morals in terms of who and what we are. Now you answer your own question within your paradigm.

I was listening today to a legal podcast, and they brought up an issue I hadn't thought of, regarding the withdrawal of Secret Service protection from people like Fauci,Pompeo, and Bolton. Even if one regards it as appropriate - why not do it quietly? Announcing it publicly served no public interest, and it suggests that he may want it known that they're now vulnerable. I hope nothing happens to any of them.

Its amazing that we have a reality in which there is a law which states, "Matter can neither be created or destroyed." Except that philosophically we know that one part of this is false. — Philosophim

It's anachronistic. Per general relativity, mass and energy are interchangeable. What is conserved is the total amount of mass+energy (see this). Regarding the matter/anti-matter balance issue, it's an open question in theoretical physics.

what we have today is matter, or existence, which has as its core the resiliency to continue to exist in the face even extreme energy concentrations. Everything that exists is built out of this. This resiliency is the core of morality. The logic of the OP is to say, "If an objective morality exists, what must be true?" And what must be true if there is an objective morality is that "Existence should be." — Philosophim

This seems a product of your misunderstanding of the fundamental conservation law. Why did you write "matter, or existence"? How are the two related, particularly under the understanding that matter and energy are just different forms of the same thing?

Just as matter could be incepted without prior cause, — Philosophim

Under the right conditions, energy can be converted to matter and vice versa. Those conditions are the cause.

The reason to believe there is an objective basis is the patterns I've been noting — Philosophim

What you've noted is scientifically inaccurate. But if even if there were some so-called "resliency", it's ad hoc to claim this to be the "core of morality." This seems like a "objective morality of the gaps", although you haven't really identified a gap.

The logic of the OP is to say, "If an objective morality exists, what must be true?" And what must be true if there is an objective morality is that "Existence should be." — Philosophim

I'll set aside the objections raised above, and just consider your sentence, ""If an objective morality exists, what must be true?" The answer depends on what objective morality IS. This was another of my questions. Is it a set of moral values (e.g. murder is wrong; altruism is good), or something else?

The fact that a subjective morality based entirely on emotions breaks down to where even you admit 'reason' gets involved. — Philosophim

Reason gets involved no matter what the basis is:moral questions can be complex, and evaluating them can be complex.

Do I have proof of an objective morality? Absolutely not, that's never been the goal of this paper. My point here is to say, "If one exists, what must be its base?" So the question we are debating is not whether one exists, its whether you think its possible for one to exist, and if so, does the logic I've put forth put forward a reasonable base to start from.

This gets back to what I said in my first post: the existence of objective morality can be used to argue for the existence of God:
P1 – If there is no God, then objective moral values and duties do not exist.
P2 – Objective moral values and duties exist.
C – Therefore, God exists.

You're proposing that morality exists without a God. I agree that is logically possible, but it has a fatal implication: they exist by chance, so they are arbitrary. Arbitrariness is the base, if there is no God who designed them for some greater purpose he has in mind. I expect you wish to assume they are non-arbitrary. How can that be, if they weren't the product of design? It seems to me, the above argument shows that the best explanation for the existence of non-arbitrary morality is that a God exists. (personally, I don't think a God exists - and that's why I inferred the presence of intersubjective moral values. They aren't arbitrary - they are consistent with survival).

Thanks. You've set my mind at ease. :rofl:

Circular reasoning is when a premise presupposes the conclusion as true: I didn’t do that. Also, why would it have to be magical? — Bob Ross

Here's what I inferred to be your reasoning:

1.God is omniscient (possesses all possible knowledge)
2. God is simple;
3. Therefore knowledge doesn't entail parts

But you didn't explicitly make this argument, so I haven't been fair. Perhaps you can show it's very reasonable to assume knowledge does not entail parts. Please do so.

Just think about how you will, and how this willing—even without what we stereotypically refer to as rational deliberation—is correspondence with at least primitive knowledge. Think of a plant growing towards the sunlight. I am just noting that we can see—by analogy—how a being can have knowledge and yet not be computating like a human brain or AI would. — Bob Ross

You've identified no "primitive knowledge" that exists independent of a physical medium. My willing entails physical processes (e.g. neurons firing in a sequence based on action potentials that could be established either by learning, or be "hard wired") in a brain. Deliberation entails access to memories which are stored in the brain (possibly in the form of action potentials of neurons). A plant certainly isn't making a decision - it's growth is entirely a result of its physiological mechanisms, expending energy in the most entropically favorable way.

I claimed there was circular reasoning in your statement,"although you are right that a being with one property is simpler than a being with more than one; my rebuttle is that God’s properties are reducible to each other." And you're correct that you haven't stated a strictly circular argument (I'm making an assumption that you chose to equate multiple properties with a single property to rationalize your claim that God is "simple") You've given no argument at all, and haven't articulated the rationalization I assumed. So I can certainly be wrong.

So make an objective case for the claim that an object with seemingly multiple properties is actually an object with a single property in your ontology, and show that this is more reasonable than considering multiple properties to be distinct. To be clear, I'm referring to intrinsic properties, not just attributes we talk about.

This argument necessitates that an up-quark is not comprised of anything else and is non-spatiotemporal. — Bob Ross

No, it doesn't. It just assumes individual up-quarks exist as particulars, and that (generically) "up-quark" is a universal (it exists in multiple instantiations). Perhaps that's inconsistent with your ontology, but that's my point: your argument depends on some specific assumptions about ontology.

then there would be only one since there’s nothing ontologically distinguishing them. What you are doing is talking about separate quarks and thinking that since they are simple that they are absolutely simple. — Bob Ross

Individual up-quarks are distinguishable at a point of time by their spatial location. It's persisting identity is uniquely identified by it's location in space across each point of time. (Locations in space are relative, but in this case, we can consider it relative to itself).

Regarding "being simple": I'm simply assuming they are not decomposible into other things. If you wish to equate undecomposible with "simple" - I have no objection.

I understand they say quarks have no parts in science — Bob Ross

Then you have an incorrect understanding. They are part of the standard model of particle physics, which is an active field of research. I'm not insisting they are actually the most fundamental level of reality (quantum field theory treats them as disturbances in fields), but all macro objects in the universe have quarks as part of their composition.

I was an atheist before this style of argumentation found its way onto my desk; so, you are grossly making assumptions here — Bob Ross

Ed Feser was also an atheist, and he says he converted because Thomist metaphsyics "made sense" to him. I've read a couple of his books, and these suggest that he just thinks Thomism is coherent and answers the questions he felt important. I haven't seen him make a case for Thomism vs (say) metaphysical naturalism (his polemical attack on "new atheists" is irrelevant).

I've admitted that I've made assumptions. They're based on the assumptions I've seen others (including Feser) make when arguing for deism. In all my years debating arguments for deism with theists, I've found that 100% of the time, they depend on questionable metaphysical assumptions - so when I see a debatable metaphysical assumption, I shine a light on it. But I'll try to avoid jumping to conclusions with you, and give you the opportunity to make an objective case for each of the metaphysical assumptions I've identified so far.