Physicalist causation involves infinite regress, because each effect requires a previous cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Evidence" is a loaded term. What qualifies as "evidence of X" for me does not necessarily qualify as "evidence of X" for you. This is because the proposed piece of evidence, Y, will either be considered as evidence of X, or not considered as evidence of X, depending on the apprehended relation between X and Y. — Metaphysician Undercover

I generally prefer to use "evidence" in the broadest sense: data (excluding nothing). I specifically referred to empirical evidence (data that is obtained by observation). Here, we're dealing with metaphysical "theories", which (I suggest) are best thought of as explanatory hypotheses for the data. The "data" consists of all the uncontroversial facts of the world. The explanatory hypotheses would be the various metaphysical "theories" that endeavor to account for all these facts.

Accordingly, the evidence, Y, may be empirical, and the thing which it is evidence of, X, may be nonphysical. Therefore there is no need to assume that there cannot be "one bit of empirical evidence" for the nonphysical. For those who understand the relation between the physical and nonphysical, every physical thing is evidence of the nonphysical. And that is why the theologists commonly claim that each material thing is evidence of the immaterial God. But if you do not understand that relation between the physical and the nonphysical, you will not apprehend the physical as evidence of the nonphysical — Metaphysician Undercover

This presupposes that something nonphysical exists. That is hypothesis, not an uncontroversial fact. There are metaphysical theories that assume this, but it's nevertheless a controversial assumption (there are clearly professional philosophers who deny this). That's why I stress that it is the uncontroversial facts of the world that need to be best accounted for.

once you get beyond that mental block, which is preventing you from seeing the physical as evidence of the nonphysical, — Metaphysician Undercover

You should publish a paper that proves there are non-physical objects, so that the physicalist philosophers can learn the errors of their ways and start working on something productive. According to a survey of professional philosophers, over half of them "accept or lean toward" physicalism (source). I'm not suggesting truth is derived by majority vote, but rather that you might want to reconsider your arrogant view that only someone with a "mental block" would deny the existence of non-physical objects.

Physicalist causation involves infinite regress, because each effect requires a previous cause.

Or...there is an uncaused initial, foundational state of affairs that exists by brute fact. This seems to me the preferable alternative to a vicious infinite regress, irrespective of whether or not physicalism is true. My personal theory is that the uncaused, initial state exists out of metaphysical necessity - but this depends no one beliefs about ontological contingency.

Well, unless it can account for every aspect of one thing, any one thing, absolutely, 100%, then it does not account for anything. It would only partially account for things. Since physicalism does not account for any one thing, in any absolute sense, then we can conclude that physicalism cannot account for anything. — Metaphysician Undercover

Non-sequitur. Suppose we take as a premise that there exists something nonphysical. That does not imply that every existing is (at least) partly nonphysical. We only need to account for the things (and their properties) that we know (i.e. have strong reasons to believe) exist.

A "universal" is nonphysical, as are the relations between universals. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are obviously unfamiliar with the concept of immanent universals. Example of this view: a 45 degree angle does not have some independent existence; rather, it exists in its instantiations. It reflects a specific physical relation between two objects.

The relation between a statement and "the world" is nonphysical.. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not an ontological relation; it is semantics: the definition of "truth" expressed as a pseudo-relation between a statement and some aspect of reality.

I didn't answer, because I couldn't believe that someone could seriously be asking such a dimwitted question. Have you never tried introspection? Introspection is by definition, the examination of one's own mental and emotional processes. This is not a physical examination. Do you honestly believe that a person could learn absolutely nothing from such an examination?

Once again, I apologize for the attitude. However, I just cannot take you seriously when you ask questions like this. Then, you top it off with "I was serious that I'm open...". . That's the biggest piece of bullshit I've been hit with today. Your mind is closed tighter than a drum. You've locked yourself out, so that you cannot even get into your own mind. Oh my God! What can we do for you? — Metaphysician Undercover

You have demonstrated that your arrogance is rooted in ignorance - you seemed unaware that there are views that differ from your own, that respected philosophers hold to - not just "dimwits" like me. On the other hand, you've mentioned nothing that I wasn't already aware of.

Physicalism is the theory that everything that exists, is composed of physical things, and that they act and assemble entirely due to physical forces due to laws of nature.

Reductive physicalism implies that complex (or higher level) objects are composed of simpler (lower level) objects, and ultimately reducible to whatever is fundamental. Non-reductive physicalism entails the notion that novel properties ontologically emerge in higher level structures.

That's it's domain, and it is only falsified by identifying some existing thing that doesn't fit the model.

So yes, philosophy does have concerns that lie outside the domain of physics — but those concerns are not derivative from physics. — Wayfarer

Of course! Physicalism does not subsume or supplant all of philosophy, or even all of science. Analogously, it would be absurd for a viticulturist to try and predict the composition of phenolic compounds that result in certain flavors or textures in wine, using quantum field theory.

Even if some useful/meaningful philosophical paradigm is inconsistent with physicalism, it doesn't automatically falsify physicalism. Falsifying it on the basis of paradigm inconsistency would be at least as complex as it would be for a physicalist to try and give a physicalist account of the issue.

Again, I have acknowleged that there are good reasons to believe there is something non-physical about mental activity. You have also acknowledged that there is something physical about mental activity. It seems pointless to debate what portions of the gray area are more, or less, likely to point to something non-physical.

Can any of the physical-chemical sciences explain the intentionality of consciousness or explain what a noema is better than phenomenology? Or the Pythagorean theorem better than geometry? Or what a universal better than philosophy? Or what is beauty better than aesthetics? Or what is a correct argument better than logic? Or how prices functions better than economy? Or what is a morphema better than linguistics? — JuanZu

Chemistry provides a more useful explanation of interactions between atoms and molecules associated with chemical bonds than does quantum field theory. Biology provides the more useful accounts of physiology and disease than quantum chemistry. In all these cases, this does not imply that these sciences are not, in fact, reducible to fundamental physics.

When I've said that (IMO) physicalism is the "best explanation", this is in comparison to other complete metaphysical theories. Physicalism is the theory that all existing things are grounded in physical nature.

I'll address some of the issues you raised.

An intention is a disposition to behave in some general or specific way. It reflects some mediation between stimuli and response.

I think "noema" equate to "mental object". I'd just deny that they are objects (ontological). They reflect a component of thinking, a general or specific pattern (neural networks are adept at pattern recognition), often associated with a memory (e.g. a visual memory).

Sure, assuming we're the only ones in the universe. — Patterner

I think it's unlikely that there are other intelligent life forms near enough to us, for them to impact us. But we clearly have different perspectives.

What I would suggest is dropping the assumption that physicalism is the only viable philosophical framework — Wayfarer

I agree. Most of mental life is better considered from completely different perspectives. My issue is specifically with ontology: what actually exists. I think ontology can be set aside for the issues you raised. If this is wrong, and there is such a dependency then there's a burden to make an epistemological case for that ontology.

So my caution is this: philosophy of mind should not be collapsed into neuroscience. To assume that physical causes are the only real causes is already a philosophical commitment, and a highly contestable one. There are many alternatives to physicalism always being debated, look at the new discipline of ‘consciousness studies’ which encompasses a huge range of different approaches. — Wayfarer

I suggest that the "philosophy of mind" issues that concern you could be dealt with without pinnning it to an ontology. This reminds me of your comments about teleology - which can be treated as a paradigm - an explanatory framework , not requiring an ontological commitment to teleology.

I doubt "consciousness studies" depends on a particular ontology of mind, because that would make it a house of cards.

This is obviously false. Physicalism cannot explain the reality of the nonphysical, which we all experience daily, therefore it is clearly not the most successful metaphysical system. — Metaphysician Undercover

I assume you're referring to philosophy of mind issues. Physicalism can account for a good bit, but (as I've acknowledged) not everything. So what DOES explain the nonphysical aspects of mind? As I said, I'm interested in whatever theory is best explanation- in terms of explanatory scope, parsimony, and ad hoc-ness. I'm open to proposals for additional criteria. What metaphysical theory surpasses physicalism as a better explanation?

This is totally wrong. Physicalism does not account for causation. Physicalist causation leads to infinite regress, — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it doesn't entail infinite regress. I'll refrain from guessing at what you're referring to, so please explain why you think this.

Physicalism does not account for any laws, as they are themselves, nonphysical. — Metaphysician Undercover

Seriously, it sounds like you don't understand physicalism. Law Realists suggest that laws are ontological relations between universals. Every instantiation of the relevant set of universals will necessarily instantiate the same effect.

I have no idea what type of "truth" you'd be talking about her — Metaphysician Undercover

Indeed, you don't have any idea. You are pontificating about something you know nothing about. I'm referring to truthmaker theory. A truthmaker is something that exists in the world, to which a true statement corresponds.

I'm making an effort to have a discussion that is reasonable and polite. You're making it difficult by making judgements based on your own lack of understanding. You COULD ask, instead of pontificating.

I was serious that I'm open hearing better theories, and particularly interested in understanding how you think we could actually learn something about the presumably nonphysical aspect of mind. Why have you not addressed this?

It is you who has made the definitive judgement, that the nonphysical is unknowable. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, with the qualifications I described. If you believe I'm wrong, then please disabuse me. How can we know anything about aspects of reality that cannot give us one bit of empirical evidence?

I'm not insisting that we can only obtain knowledge through empirical evidence - there are, for example, analytical truths. I'm open to other means if you can propose some.

That seems very significant to me. Mental activity has done extraordinary things than would never happen without it. — Patterner

Our activities are concentrated around one out of the 10^23 stars in the observable universe, during a period of maybe 1 million years, in a universe 13.7 billion years old. Of course our activities are significant to ourselves, but I see no basis to consider them of cosmic significance.

Let's see. You admit that the mind is not 100% physical. Then you state that the nonphysical part "seems unknowable". But instead of trying to get beyond the way that things "seem" to be, and actually develop some knowledge about the nonphysical, you conclude that any such approach would merely be "guesses". — Metaphysician Undercover

I'll clarify. I think one could justifiably claim there is something "nonphysical" involved, but I also think one could justifiably deny it.

Philosopher Michael Tye proposes one way to deny it: he proposes that there is some aspect or property that exists in all things that is undetectable by any objective means available to science, but manifests only when there exists the physical structure (like a brain) that can produce consciousness. I don't personally embrace it, but it's an interesting theory and I infer that one could develop other hypotheses along these lines (e.g. a broader view of what is "physical"). Of course, none can be verified - so this direction entails a space of possibilities, not a definitive answer.

How does this validate physicalism? You blatantly admit that physicalism is wrong, by accepting the reality of the nonphysical. Then instead of progressing toward where this leads, making an effort to understand the nonphysical, you steadfastly cling to physicalism in a hypocritical way, as if the nonphysical, which you clearly recognize, yet fail to understand, is irrelevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

What I suspect you're considering hypocritical is that I would hold onto physicalism despite it being falsified by the presence of something nonphysical. As I told Wayfarer, if we treat a metaphysical theory as a conjunction of axioms, then that makes sense: the conjunction is false if any one axiom is false.

But this falsification is narrow: it applies exclusively to mind (mental activity). Physicalism is still the most successful metaphysical system there is; successful because it depends on the fewest ad hoc assumptions, it primarily depends on things we know about the world through direct experience and through science, coupled to the most parsimonous ontology. It accounts for causation, universals, laws of nature, and a theory of truth. Should I abandon these virtues simply because there may be some unknowable/ unanalyzable aspect of the mind that doesn't fit? I could rationalize physicalism with ad hoc assumptions, as Michael Tye did, but that seems unjustifiable. It's more intellectually honest to acknowledge that we don't know, and should leave open the space of possibility. At worst, I'm in a position similar to physicists regarding Newton's gravity theory, in the period before general relativity was published; Newton's formula generally worked (orbit of Mercury notwithstanding), and it was the best they had.

Nevertheless, I'm pragmatic. If one is going to embrace a metahphysical theory, I suggest it should be the one that is arguably an "inference to best explanation" among available theories, while remaining open to new information. I wrote about this awhile back on a Christian apologetics forum, and I recently heard Graham Oppy express a similar sentiment. No metaphysical theory is perfect, but if I judge one to fit reality better than any other, then it's the one I will apply in nearly all cases. I will not apply it to the "explanatory gap", because it's truly an unknown - and I don't think any speculative hypothesis is better than any other.

Clearly, your problem is in the assumption that the unphysical is unknowable. What justifies this assumption? You recognize the reality of the unphysical, so by that very fact, you know it to some extent. How is it possible for you to recognize something then proceed to the conclusion that the thing you recognize is unknowable? That conclusion is completely unsupported. Even if you have tried, and failed in attempts to understand it, that would not produce the conclusion that the thing is unknowable.

I suggest that you are proceeding from a faulty assumption about what constitutes "knowable"... — Metaphysician Undercover

First of all, I'll respond to "How is it possible for you to recognize something...". All I've recognized is that there is a good reason to believe there is something about consciousness that may be impossible to account for with a physicalist paradigm. What that actually IS is unknown to me.

"Even if you have tried, and failed in attempts to understand it, that would not produce the conclusion that the thing is unknowable."

That's only part of it, but I'll try to be more precise. It is my (fallible) epistemic judgement that it is unknowable. The basis of my judgement is:

1) it is currently unknown to me.
2) If the question had been definitively answered, there would be no controversy about it among professional philosophers (& philosophers rarely settle anything).
3) I can conceive of no means to draw a definitive conclusion about it.

If you have the answer, and can make a compelling case for it, please share it.

If you have an idea about how a definitive conclusion could be drawn, please share it.

If you simply object to the strong wording I used, I'll acknowledge that I wasn't asserting it to be impossible that a definitive answer can be found. Rather- given the absence of any means to settle the matter at hand, nor any hint about how to proceed to do so, then for all practical purposes, it is impossible. Nevertheless, I will be forever in your debt if you can show that it is more than a bare possibility that the answer can be determined.

I think the point you’re not seeing is that the question of ‘the nature of the mind’ is not an objective question, in the way that physics is. The subject matter of physics are measurable objects, energy, and so on, from the sub-atomic to the cosmological scales. But the mind is not an object at all, in the sense understood by physics. So why should the methods of physics be regarded as applicable to the question of the nature of mind at all? It’s not that the mind is a ‘non-physical thing’ or even that it ‘has a non-physical aspect’. Both of those ways of thinking about it are still based on the approach of treating the mind as possible object among other objects, when the question is categorically of a different kind. Can you see the point of that argument, or explain why it is wrong — Wayfarer

I actually prefer to avoid referring to "the mind" as an object. But it seems uncontroversial to acknowledge that we engage in a set of processes/behaviors that we identify as mental activity. Those activities occur, and it's worthwhile to understand their basis, as much as possible. As discussed, we know the brain is essential to these processes, and (more specifically) the claustrum may be essential to consciousness. It's worthwhile to understand the physical processes involved with mental activity as much as possible. So what is it that you suggest we NOT do, other than objectifying/reifying "the mind"?

It is actually well-documented that neuroscience has identified no specific, functional area of the brain which can account for the subjective unity of perception. — Wayfarer

No argument, except to ask: where do we go from here? I anticipate you'll agree that relevant physical mechanisms are appropriate areas to investigate. If indeed the claustrum is essential to having that "subjective unity of perception", then it's worthwhile to further investigate specifically what it does.

We also can't set aside the philosophical questions. How does the "negative fact" impact philosophical theories of mind? Does it falsify any theories? Does it favor any?

They are unanalyzable by our physical sciences. But if enough people decide it's worth thinking about, some people might come up with some good ideas. It is not an established fact that the only way we can learn of anything is through our physical sciences. — Patterner

A variety of ideas HAVE been proposed (panpsychism, dualism, property dualism...),so how can we learn which is correct? How do we know the correct answer has even been proposed yet? The space of possibilities is large, and there's no methodology for narrowing it down, except perhaps for plausibility and consistency with an individual's other commitments.

Give me a few examples of recent Democratic Presidents flouting or undermining rule of law. I don't recall any court orders being violated, nor anyone's due process rights being denied.

There are close to 400 cases against the Trump administration, and a majority are pending. He's likely to lose a large number. I'll mention a few.

His coercion of law firms who support liberal causes (like Perkins Coie) is unprecedented, and will not survive the court challenges.

His multiple violations of the Impoundment Act.

His executive order on "Birthright Citizenship", in direct defiance of prior SCOTUS rulings.

The issue is broader than violating the law. He may have the legal authority to punish career DOJ lawyers for prosecuting cases against Jan 6 criminals, while treating the criminals as heroes - but it certainly is inconsistent with rule of law.

His politicization of the DOJ is unprecedented. They have lost much of the independence they've had since Watergate. It's appalling that his "former" defense attorney (Todd Blanche) has the role of deputy AG, but is still actively working to protect Trump, as in his sham (quid pro quo) interview of Gislaine Maxwell. The DOJ also filed a frivolous lawsuit against Maryland Judges, because Trump didn't like some rulings.

The DOJ's treatment of the Epstein files seems largely based on protecting Trump, including the performative request to release the irrelevant Grand Jury Testimony - which the judge called them out on.

These are just a few things off the top of my head. I eagerly await your damning facts that demonstrate similar or worse behavior by Democratic administrations.

It might not help "science", if science can only be physical. But I would say coming to a better understanding of our nature, and possibly a better understanding of the nature of the universe, is relevant and fruitful. and if such understanding cannot be complete using science only, then it is even more relevant and fruitful. — Patterner

How does a mysterious/unknowable unphysical aspect of mind help us understand our nature or that of the universe?

Certainly, it opens up possibilities - but they are unanalyzable possibilities.

You’re right that simply pointing out what the mind is not (i.e., “not entirely physical”) doesn’t in itself establish what it is. But that doesn’t make it irrelevant to science. And in fact Armstrong’s materialist account shows why the question is unavoidable. — Wayfarer

As you said:" it is indispensable for the very possibility of inquiry". But given that there is mind and inquiry is possible, we can set this background fact aside and engage in productive inquiry.

How is any non-physical aspect of mind relevant to the advance of science? It's irrelevant to physics, so what aspects of science will be improved by acknowledging there's some unknown aspect of mind that is not consistent with the physical, and therefore beyond its own boundaries? It would be a mistake to assume where the boundary is; progress is best made by pushing forward from a physicalist/scientific perspective. To whatever extent something beyond science is involved, it will simply prove to be an unfruitful avenue.

Physics, by definition, begins with the object—and not just any object, but the ideal object, something exhaustively describable in terms of quantifiable attributes. That is why attempts to treat the mind “scientifically” fall at the first hurdle: — Wayfarer

What sort of failure are you talking about? You acknowledge the dependency on a brain. Neurology and psychiatry are fruitful endeavors. So where exactly is science failing? Here's a quote from Michael Tye, that is pertinent:

"Francis Crick and Christoph Koch (2005) have speculated that the claustrum, a thin, irregular sheet of neurons attached to the underside of the neocortex, which receives inputs from nearly all regions of the cortex and projects back to nearly all such regions, is the place where information underlying conscious perceptions is integrated into an harmonious conscious whole."

Tye, Michael. Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness: Through the Looking Glass (p. 100). OUP Oxford. Kindle Edition.

I'm not proclaiming this to be true, but it is a least a hypothesis with some empirical support (unlike a philosophical speculation unsupported by any evidence). It doesn't entail physicalism, but it demonstrates the usefulness of investigating the "the mind" from a physical/scientific perspective. And there has been some advance in science based on their hypothesis (see this).

So the point is not that “mind is mysterious and therefore irrelevant,” but that mind is real, though not reducible to either physical object or philosophical substance. This marks a genuine boundary condition: any adequate science of mind must reckon with the fact that mind cannot be objectified, even though it is the very condition of objectivity itself. — Wayfarer

In terms of understanding the mind, and advancing science - the mysterious portion seems irrelevant. Still, OF COURSE, the mind as a whole is relevant - to self-reflection, to finding meaning and purpose in life, to finding and expressing love, perceiving beauty... Those aspects of mind are not subject to scientific investigation - and they wouldn't be even if the mind were entirely grounded in the physical.

I’m still waiting for people to ignite some actual rage in opposition to all of this. There still not enough of anti-fascist rage going around. Instead, people, even on the side of criticizing Trump and his followers, treat them as a sort of legitimate political side. — Christoffer

The majority of the population doesn't care about (what can be characterized as) legal technicalities, they simply want action that achieves the results they desire. For this reason, I truly wish the center and left would focus on the aspects of Trump's actions that are illegal and unconstitutional, and remind everyone on why the "technicalities" matter - rule of law is critical to our system of government.

I'll give one blatant example. The administration has been denying due process rights to individuals it chooses to deport. Abrego Garcia is the most stark example. He was arrested and deported (in defiance of a court order) based on flimsy evidence he's a gang member. They have consistently claimed he's a horrible criminal, and attacked the left for coddling him. When they finally acceded to court intervention, they fished for what other charges they could pin on him. They took the unprecedented, and absurd, action of working a plea deal with a man who accused Garcia of human trafficking (bringing undocumented workers into the US). Plea deals are typically made with low level guys in a criminal organization to make a case against the higher-ups. In this case, the plea deal was made with a higher up to get Garcia - the lowest level guy in the (alleged) activity.

There's many more instances. Generally, reporting (on the left and center) mentions the illegality, but indirectly trivialize it by criticizing the policy, the morality, and painting a sympathetic view of the victim. Reporting on the right typically ignores the illegality (often criticizing the judges who rule this way) and stresses how great it is to get rid of illegals.

The importance of rule of law is a non-partisan issue, and more stress on Trump's attack on rule of law should be placed. His die-hard supporters will never care, but the other 20% of Republicans would probably care if it were made clear to them.

Computers operate with logic, so our ability to think logically is consistent with a mechanistic aspect of mind.
— Relativist

Computers are created and programmed by us, to perform operations that we intend. They greatly amplify human abilities, but they would not exist were it not for having been constructed by us. And any AI system will tell you that it is not a mind. — Wayfarer

My point was simply that our applying "syllogistic logic" is consistent with physical mechanism, as you seemed to be suggesting. I have not argued that every aspect of the mind is purely mechanical. The question is: where should we draw the line?

In that context, rational inference is epistemologically basic to anything we surmise about the brain. — Wayfarer

Absolutely, but this is true irrespective of how mind is ontologically grounded.

Focus on the negative fact: the mind is not entirely physical.
- What (if anything) can we discern about this nonphysical aspect?

Unconstrained speculation leads nowhere. It merely raises possibilities.

Intentional acts are able to influence the physical configuration of the brain. — Wayfarer

Yes, but the process of developing an intention is consistent with physical activity. Peter Tse has proposed a model ("criterial causation") of neuronal activity that accounts for mental causation. This would also mean the mind is not epiphenomenol. A mental state corresponds to a physical state, and causes subsequent physical/mental states. Of course, this still doesn't account for the subjective nature of a conscious state.

the mind undeniably depends on the brain, — Wayfarer

Then there's no reason to think mind (or a thought) is an ontological ground. Thinking (including formulating intent) requires something analogous to a physical brain.

I've been forthright in my criticism of physicalist philosophy of mind. — Wayfarer

Indeed you have, and I have previously acknowledged that your criticisms provide a good basis to believe there is some non-physical aspect to mind. So I haven't rejected anything you've said on the sole basis that it's contrary to physicalism, as you alleged.

What I HAVE done is point out that this merely established a negative fact (the mind is not entirely physical). This may suggest that it is impossible to develop a complete understanding of the mind through scientific investigation. However, it doesn't point to any particular boundary- so it seems irrelevant to science.

Relevant to the issue that instigated our current exchange: the negative fact doesn't constitute a reason to doubt that there are laws of nature, and that these fully account for the evolution of the universe (with the possible exception of mental activity). You thought it more relevant that Law Realism is embraced by physicalists (this seemed like a genetic fallacy - rejecting it based on the source, not the merits). You reasoning SEEMS to be: the negative fact falsifies physicalism, therefore all aspects of physicalist metaphysics should be rejected. Isn't that so?

If we treat a metaphysical theory as a conjunction of axioms, then that makes sense: the conjunction is false if any one axiom is false. However, that's not the way I treat it, as I've described.

Turning to your specific comments:

information is not reducible to matter or energy — Wayfarer

My first impression is that this quote refers to some abstract view of information, ignoring the real world fact that information is encoded (it takes energy to encode it, and it is encoded in something physical).

Or perhaps it's just noting that information relates to understanding, which requires mind. This is true irrespective of the metaphysical basis of mind, so it seems to add nothing that isn't already captured by the negative fact.

How, for example, do you explain syllogistic logic? — Wayfarer

Computers operate with logic, so our ability to think logically is consistent with a mechanistic aspect of mind.

general semantics, in terms of neural processing?

A word triggers a sequence of firing neurons, which include connections to areas of the brain such as factual and emotional memories.

Syllogistic logic and general semantics operate in a normative, rule-governed space ('the space of reasons'). To reduce that to neural processing is a category mistake.

Logic and semantics can be described with rules, but that doesn't imply that they are grounded in the rules we describe. That's conflating the model with the functional basis.

Neural firings may underlie thought, but they don’t explain validity, reference, or meaning.

These are problematic only to the extent they relate to the "hard problem". You haven't added additional problems to the ones I've already acknowledged. It's still the "negative fact".

Do you acknowledge the fact that there are essential physical aspects to a functioning mind? There's clearly a dependency on a functioning brain: memory and personality can be impacted by disease and trauma. Birth defects that affect brain development have bearing on cognitive ability. Hormones affect our moods and our thinking. Each of our senses (our interface to the external world)are dependent on physical organs and on specialized area of the brain to interpret the input. I don't see any reason to think that mind can exist without a functioning brain, or something with analogous functionality.

I haven't seen any indication that you will consider any alternatives. — Wayfarer

So...you make the unwarranted assumption that I won't. What I would need would be reasoning to support an alternative. A couple months ago, you said:

As for the 'unknown immaterial ground' - what if that 'unknown immaterial ground' is simply thought itself? — Wayfarer

This was no more than raising a possibility, with no reasoning to show why one might think this to be the case. I replied:

Why should I believe that? Why do you believe this to be more than a bare possibility? Thinking is a process - a process that humans engage in. Referring to a "thought" as an object seems like treating a "run" (the process of running) as an object. There's no run unless there's a runner, and there's no thought unless there's a thinker. This is what seems to be the case, so explain how your alternative makes sense. — Relativist

So you had tossed out a bare possibility, and I explained why I reject it. Because I stated my reason, you had the opportunity to identify a flaw in my reasoning, or simply answered my question, "Why should I believe that?" Or at least explained why one might take this possibility seriously.

I don't even know if you believe it, but bringing it up suggests you considered it worthy of mention. Why DO you?

I've been forthcoming with what I believe and why I believe it. This affords you the opportunity to identify a flaw in my reasoning, or undercut something I believe. By contrast, you have only made vague statements about what you believe.

You're right about that. He's executing Project 2025 to create a MAGA "deep state". People like Stephen Miller are the real strategists, and they know how to play Trump.

I don't assume a master plan - he's not that smart. I think the goal is to stoke his ego. He's playing to his supporters, who perceive him as a tough guy who gets things done ("only I can fix it").

My prediction: he will not send troops to a city, like Chicago, because that would be a blatant violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. He can, and will, send the National Guard to places like New Orleans - where the Governor invites him, since the law allows it. He will then blame Democratic governors for not inviting him and letting their crime rates continue. The whole thing is political theater. This cannot solve a city's crime problem because it can only be temporary. At best, crime will be down temporarily.

Remember that “metaphysics” as a term originates with Aristotle... — Wayfarer

The meaning of "Metaphysics" has broadened:

"One might almost say that in the seventeenth century metaphysics began to be a catch-all category, a repository of philosophical problems that could not be otherwise classified as epistemology, logic, ethics or other branches of philosophy. ...
...Whatever the reason for the change may have been, it would be flying in the face of current usage (and indeed of the usage of the last three or four hundred years) to stipulate that the subject-matter of metaphysics was to be the subject-matter of Aristotle’s Metaphysics."

--Stanford Article on Metaphysics

When you lump everything else under “enormous speculative guesses,” you’re effectively classifying any framework that doesn’t begin from physicalist premises as irrational — Wayfarer

My statements were not a judgement of anyone else's rationality. But it would be irrational for me to drop physicalist metaphysics in total just because of the negative fact you repeatedly discuss: the mind is not entirely physical. I do not insist the mind is necessarily 100% physical (I'm not dogmatic), but whatever else it might be seems unknowable - and therefore the possibilities I've seen discussed simply seem like speculative guesses. You certainly don't have to agree with me, but if you believe my judgement (rooted in my backrgound beliefs) is misguided (irrational), then please identify my errors. If you don't wish to, then just agree to disagree and stop reacting negatively when I describe my point of view.

What is of practical siginficance (IMO) is the importance of making an effort to seek truth through good epistemological practices. What I've been arguing is that inference to best explanation (IBE) is usually the best we can do. I doubt that any IBEs can constitute knowledge,
— Relativist

Right, and that's what I've been driving at: it seems that you think IBE's are the only option, and IBE's do not constitute knowledge. — Leontiskos

No. I said IBEs are usually the best we can do. Whether or not they constitute knowledge is irrelevant to my point.

but that doesn't mean we should treat all inferences as equally credible.
— Relativist

If there is no pole of knowledge then I don't see how one IBE can be better than another (because no IBE can better approach that pole). — Leontiskos

Here are some questions about which rational answers can be given (IBEs), but the answers do not constitute knowledge:

Have aliens visited Earth?

Is Christianity true?

Was the 2020 Presidential election stolen from Trump?

Did Epstein commit suicide, or was he killed?

Is autism caused by vaccines? By Tylenol?

Is my name actually "Fred"?

I understand that you’re looking for a comprehensive alternative metaphysics. That’s a high bar — one that most philosophers don’t clear. — Wayfarer

And yet, physicalism does comprise a comprehensive metaphysics. My eyes are wide open: I recognize that it's imperfect; I want to understand it's weaknesses, because that comprises an area where it can't be applied. But it can be applied to most everything I'm interested in.

It dovetails my epistemology. My epistemology justifies utilizing physicalism as a pragmatic framework for evaluating new information. Conversely, physicalism grounds that epistemology, in terms of a theory of truth. As I've recently discussed in another thread, I think that most of our rational beliefs are the product of inference to best explanation: draw conclusions (form beliefs) based on evidence (interpeted through my world-view, of course) and strive for that conclusion to be the best interpretation of that evidence.

This outlook comes full circle when reconsidering physicalism: I'm not going to drop it unless there is a better explanation. I haven't encountered one. The "explanatory gap" simply comprises an area where no rational position exists - and judgement should be withheld. I observe a variety of (unnatural) guesses about the mind , all of which seem purely speculative and depend on enormous assumptions. There seems to be no "best" one because they aren't epistemologically grounded in objective evidence. This "enormity" has two forms: 1) treating mind as ontologically primitive; 2) negating much else of what we know about the world.

"Possible" is about all we can say about the various enormous speculative hypotheses. There are more modest speculations that address the explanatory gap, that build upon what we know about the world - rather than supplant it. Still, they aren't grounded in evidence, so none are worthy of accepting them. But they support the view that naturalism is also possible - and therefore, I see no rational reason to drop it.

I've written this solely to outline my point of view, not to convince anyone else to change their mind. I'm happy to answer questions and to address any weakness one may perceive.

Law realism works well with physicalism, but it doesn't seem dependent on physicalism being true. The notion that there exist laws of nature seems (to me, at least) a better explanation of regularities than Hume's constant conjunctions.

I want to comment on this:

Many of the contributors I will talk to here - Apustimologist, Relativist, Philosophim, to name a few - assume that, as the brain is physical, and the brain is the source of throught, then thought too has a physical basis. In fact they can't even conceive of there being an alternative to that, it is so firmly a tenet of modern culture. — Wayfarer

I am open to alternatives to a physicalist metaphysics, but I haven't seen any viable proposals from you or anyone else. You've merely pointed to the hard problem of consciousness as a reason to be skeptical of a physicalist theory of mind. The alternatives are as speculative as they are numerous, so they do no more than raise possibilities. You seem interested in exploring these possibilities, but I am not. I'd be interested if you (or someone) felt he had a persuasive argument to support one of them, but my impression is that each theory gets embraced purely on subjective grounds.

Of course, physicalist metaphysics deals with much more than theory of mind. So if you think one should abandon physicalism because of the explanatory gap with mind, I'd need to see a metaphysics that is equally comprehensive and parsimonious. You've never proposed one, and my impression is that this is not something you're particularly interested in. I can respect your point of view on that, but I have a different one.

The damage to the DOJ is also concerning. For that matter, Trump is endeavoring to hire only MAGAs for all government jobs:

"...questions, outlined under the administration’s Merit Hiring Plan, ask candidates how they would “advance the president’s executive orders and policy priorities,” and to name “one or two executive orders or policy initiatives that are significant to you,” and how candidates will help implement them if hired."
--
https://marylandmatters.org/2025/08/25/opm-trumps-hiring-questions-mandatory-to-ask-but-optional-to-answer/

the only way we ever know about universals or laws is through the activity of reason, the mind’s ability to discern likeness within diversity and to infer necessity where the senses show only succession — Wayfarer

What's wrong with that? It's a metaphysical hypothesis with broad explanatory scope, and consistent with the success of science.

The difficulty is that law realists won’t acknowledge it, because it thinks mind itself is simply the product of those same physical processes which it situates ‘in things’. — Wayfarer

You're conflating law realism with physicalism. One could accept the reality of laws, while choosing to believe "the mind" is not the product of natural law - whether by faith (as religious scientists do), or by hypothesis - including whatever hypothesis of mind you are drawn to.

David Hume broke this supposed relationship. He argued that causation is not something we can deduce from reason alone — it's only ever inferred from constant conjunctions: "We see A followed by B, and infer causation." Hence, causation is not logically necessary but contingent and habitual. — Wayfarer

IMO, the Law Realists improved upon this by proposing that laws of nature entail a necessitation. They define a law of nature as a causal relation between types of things (AKA "universals"). Hume would notice the empirical evidence that every observed pair of electrons repelled each other, and label this a "constant conjunction", while law realists would say that electrons (a type of thing) repel each other - and this is constitutes a law. If A and B are electrons, then they it is physically necessary that they will repel, given that that this law exists.

So I'm curious if you agree that law realism is a better explanation of empirical evidence than constant conjunction?

Relativist, how far does the immunity go?
All the way until impeachment + conviction by Congress? — jorndoe

Immunity applies to any acts that are part of his official duties. For example, he can't be prosecuted for illegally firing people, illegally withholding funds from universities, or violating the Posse Comitatus Act (ordering the National Guard to enforce the law). He's done all these things.

He could have been convicted for his 2020 election fraud, when he wasn't in office. He was indicted for this, but it was dropped when he became President because (it has been decided years ago) any prosecution would interfere with his official duties.

He could certainly be impeached for any of the crimes he's committed, and it Dems control the House after the 2026 elections, they may do that. GOP won't, because Trump controls them. Regardless, even if impeached, he won't be convicted because it requires 2/3 of Senate.

It's going to be a long 4 years.

I'm having a surprisingly hard time locating any discussions in the literature of mental-to-mental causation -- that is, the idea that one thought or image could cause another thought or image. I've looked through the usual suspects on causation but haven't nailed it yet. Can anyone on TPF help? — J

That is exactly the topic of Peter Tse's book (from a physiicalist perspective), The Neural Basis of Free Will: Criterial Causation

If a presidential order and actions on those orders are illegal, then US Marshalls should arrest Trump. Simple as that really. — Christoffer

No, it's not. Trump is immune. Even before SCOTUS established this (and before they became corrupted), the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel had determined that a sitting President cannot be indicted. So the only way Trump can be held accountable is if he were impeached and removed from office.
The House of Representatives is controlled by Trumpists. They publicly rationalize everything he does. So although a judge determined Trump's action was illegal, Trumpist Congressmen say the judge got it wrong. It will be appealed, and they will continue to say the courts got it wrong unless and until SCOTUS affirms it.

Here's a classic syllogism in philosophy:
1. All men are moral
2. Socrates is a man
3. Therefore Socrates is mortal

The conclusion does not establish an equivalence between Socrates and being mortal. Neither does the statement "knowledge is belief" entail an equivalence between knowledge and belief. Regardless, it appears we've gotten through this misunderstanding.

So your argument here is, "I believe X is true and I have strong justification to believe it, therefore it is true [or, therefore I know it]." But why do you think those two conditions are sufficient?

Those conditions obviously fail to generate knowledge in certain circumstances. And this idea of "strong" or "adequate" justification is not even in keeping with that broad sort of Gettier epistemology. It looks like a subset, something like probabilistic internalism. — Leontiskos

I agree that "Strong" justification, per se, is not sufficient for knowledge. But if one believes that knowledge is possible, one would then have to agree that there are SOME justifications are sufficient for knowledge. Does "my name is Fred" qualify for knowledge? It doesn't really matter, because I was simply trying to illustrate the relation between knowledge and belief.

But again, rather than falling into the rabbit hole of contemporary epistemology, my claim is that the traditional epistemic opinion is that knowledge is possible - that I can know and know that I know certain things. I don't see how you would be able to accept such a view.

I do believe knowledge is possible (analytic truths, for example), but I also believe it is rare - because Gettier conditions are nearly always present. If one chooses to define knowledge more loosely, with somewhat less deference to Gettier conditions, then he would consider knowledge to be more common. But whether or not the term (knowledge) can be applied to some specific belief seems to me to be of no practical significance.

What is of practical siginficance (IMO) is the importance of making an effort to seek truth through good epistemological practices. What I've been arguing is that inference to best explanation (IBE) is usually the best we can do. I doubt that any IBEs can constitute knowledge, but that doesn't mean we should treat all inferences as equally credible. Conspiracy theorists draw inferences from data, but they tend to cherry pick data to fit a prior prejudice, while ignoring or rationalizing data that is inconsistent with the theory. They are not applying good epistemological practices.

No, your source did not say that knowledge is belief. Go back and have another look. — Leontiskos

Yes, it did. Let me be clear: the sources did not say (nor did I claim) that all beliefs are knowledge. Rather, both sources are saying that knowledge constitutes a a subset of ones beliefs. I'll also clarify that we're discussing propositional beliefs/knowledge.

I gather that you use the terms differently, but I've consistently been discussing what the standard philosophical terms are. If you are unable or unwilling to understand this, then there's no point continuing the discussion.

When we are talking about knowledge we are not really dealing with beliefs. — Leontiskos

I don't think so, because it is a statement of knowledge, and knowledge is not belief. — Leontiskos

You're wrong - in terms of standard philosophical discourse. I provided the definition from the Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy that categorically states that knowledge is belief (belief that is adequately justified and true). Here's another source:

Ever since Plato’s Theaetetus, epistemologists have tried to identify the essential, defining components of propositional knowledge. These components will yield an analysis of propositional knowledge. An influential traditional view, inspired by Plato and Kant among others, is that propositional knowledge hasthree individually necessary and jointly sufficient components: justification, truth, and belief. On this view, propositional knowledge is, by definition, justified true belief. This tripartite definition has come to be called “the standard analysis.”

-- Moser, Paul K.. The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology (Oxford Handbooks) (pp. 15-16). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.

If you think there are truths then can you give an example of a truth? — Leontiskos

I'll give two examples:
I. :My name is Fred.

I believe this to be true, and I have strong justification to believe it (it's the name on my birth certificate, the name my friends and family have always called me, and the first name on a variety of legal documents). My justification is sufficient to categorize this belief as knowledge - so I can also say I know this to be true. A TRUTH is nothing more than a true statement (or proposition), so I can confidently say "My name is Fred" is a truth.

Now let's suppose you believe me - that my name really is Fred. Your justification is weak, compared to mine (you're just taking the word of a strange guy on a public internet forum), so you cannot claim this to be knowledge on your part. In spite of the fact that you can't know this to be true, you do believe this to be the case and this also means you regard "My name is Fred" to be a truth.

II. Consider Goldbach's conjecture:
Every even number greater than 2 is the sum of two prime numbers

This statement has not been proven, and it hasn't been disproven. This implies that one of the following is a true statement:
G1. Every even number greater than 2 is the sum of two prime numbers
G2. There is at least one even number greater that 2 that is NOT the sum of two prime numbers

No one can claim to KNOW G1 or G2, because there's no proof of either. But one of them has to be true in spite of this - and therefore one of them is a TRUTH. My point is that something can be true, even if no one can actually know it.

For me, telepathy means there is an energy that is different from our other forms of communication, which are all physical. — Athena

If telepathy is real, why wouldn't it be physical, given that both sender and receiver are physical? To assume there's something nonphysical means the brain can have a causal relation to the nonphysical. More assumptions = weaker justification.

Perhaps there was a telepathic event as the man was dying, that planted the words in your mind. Or perhaps you received it telepathically from his wife's subsconscious, stimulated by her mental state. These seems more plausible to me than your receiving this cryptic message from him, after his brain ceased functioning.

You seem to be suggesting that our memories could be copied to another form and re-attached to our souls after death.

Sure, this is logically possible, but it's an ad hoc hypothesis that lacks supporting evidence. If this is something that occurs, I wonder why the deity bothers at all with brain-storage of memories, and why she fails to help out dementia patients with access to this resource.

The medical evidence demonstrates that memories are "stored" (in some sense) in the brain. Disease and physical trauma can result in memory loss. So even if a "soul" lives on, if the individual's memories are absent, it seems irrelevant to me. I regard myself as the person who was shaped by my experiences, including the memories that were formed along the way.

Meat is murder, but it's also rather tasty. Ultimately, I think that's why it's going to continue to be consumed.