It depends on what you mean by "ontological". — Janus

The standard definition. Ontology is theory/philosophy of existence or being.

So you'd say that all ontological claims are either testable or semantic (i,e, true or false by convention or definition)?

Why would say that? — Janus

Because it's the way you come across. It's an attitude that's projected.

I don't know if you realize it or care, by the way, but every post you type to me comes across like you're a complete asshole who is only interested in arguing.

What do you mean "partially"? — Janus

Not wholly. (Shouldn't that be obvious?) In other words, I don't want to assume that's your complete definition of "empirical." Maybe it is, but I'm asking if it's at least part of how you'd define "empirical."

Okay, so presumably you'd say that some ontological claims are not empirical claims, right?

So you’ve explained that possibilities are possibilities (how things could have been), but you haven’t as far as I can tell explained how, on your terms, they obtain. — AJJ

You'd have to explain why on your view the fact that the world isn't strongly/causally deterministic isn't an explanation for how possibilities obtain. (Or actually that should be phrased as how more than one possibility consequent to identical antecedent states obtains)

What I'm saying there is the fact that enables multiple possibilities. So why wouldn't that be an explanation? What other sort of thing would you be looking for as an explanation?

If it is an empirical claim it must be testable — Janus

Are you (partially) defining empirical claims that way?

You were arguing that one didn't have to be a materialist to be a nominalist, because you could posit a non-material particular, but when pressed as to what this might be, you can't answer the question! — Wayfarer

I said that it's a possible position. I gave you an example--an idealist nominalist's particular rock. I just said that I can't give you a descriptive account of what a nonmaterial anything would be (which is what you presumably wanted), because in my opinion, nonmaterial anythings are incoherent. They're not to you.

Idealists don't reject that things are physical and/or material; — Wayfarer

Ontological idealists do. I already specified that above.

I'd be surprised if you were to now claim that one can't have an ontology that rejects physical/material things wholesale.

It seems to me what you’ve said there is to the effect that “possibilities obtain because there are possibilities.” — AJJ

And that's certainly the case--describing what possibilities are is going to be a case of describing possibilities, right? In other words, it's basically defining what possibilities are, and that needs to be the same on both sides--the definiendum and the definiens need to amount to the same thing or it's not really a definition. We're just not repeating the word on both sides. We're explaining what it refers to just in case someone doesn't know.

What else would we be doing if we're explaining what possibilities are/how they obtain?

If for example there’s a possible world where the laws of physics (however you understand them) are radically different from the ones we have, — AJJ

As I mentioned above, I'm not a realist on laws of physics. I mentioned that most (and maybe all) nominalists are not realists on physical laws, because it's difficult to make sense out of real physical laws that are particulars. So there's no world in which literal laws of physics obtain.

What would an example of a 'nonmaterial particular' be? — Wayfarer

It's difficult for me to give a descriptive example of a nonmaterial anything, because personally I don't believe that the idea of nonmaterial things makes any sense. But obviously many people don't agree with me, and some of those people can be nominalists.

If one is an idealist, where one rejects that anything whatsoever is physical/material, then any particular would do. For example, a particular rock. The idealist thinks that it's not material, not physical.

I just can't describe what the "nonmaterial" part amounts to, exactly, because that bit seems incoherent to me.

The same thing I've said a couple times already: by simple virtue of the fact that the world isn't strongly/causally deterministic. So, for example, we have a particle, a, in state s, and because strong determinism isn't the case, after interacting with particle b, it can be in state q or r.

After interaction with b, one of those possibilities will be what obtains in the actual world. The other we can talk about via possible world counterfactuals. It could have turned out that the other was the case instead, because there were two possibilities.

That's the simplest example. More complex examples work similarly.

Possibilities are real--they're the fact(s) that the world isn't strongly/causally deterministic. That doesn't hinge on thought, but it's not abstract, either.

Possible world talk is a way of talking about the above fact(s).

I'm not sure that makes sense to me. Remember that I actually am a nominalist (about everything), and I'm the conceptualist brand of nominalist.

On my view, possible worlds are a way of talking about the simple fact that not everything about our world is strongly/causally deterministic.

Nominalists, by the way, if they reject abstracts, typically are not realists on physical laws, because it's difficult to construe physical laws as such as something other than abstracts. Physical laws as (real/objective) particulars don't make a heck of a lot of sense.

It would amount to there being either a Platonic third realm where those objects exist, or a divine intellect where they do. — AJJ

So we can't do possible worlds unless we buy platonism or god?

“existing in thought or as an idea but not having a physical or concrete existence” — AJJ

So then, for one, in this context you'd be saying that possible worlds are objective thoughts or ideas? What would that amount to?

Could you repost the definition of abstract you're using?

Re abstracts/abstraction, at least the beginning of the Wikipedia article on it is decent. I don't know if I agree with everything in the article, but the basic definitional idea is more or less on-target:


"Abstraction in its main sense is a conceptual process where general rules and concepts are derived from the usage and classification of specific examples, literal ("real" or "concrete") signifiers, first principles, or other methods.

"An abstraction" is the outcome of this process—a concept that acts as a common noun for all subordinate concepts, and connects any related concepts as a group, field, or category.[1]

"Conceptual abstractions may be formed by filtering the information content of a concept or an observable phenomenon, selecting only the aspects which are relevant for a particular subjectively valued purpose. For example, abstracting a leather soccer ball to the more general idea of a ball selects only the information on general ball attributes and behavior, excluding, but not eliminating, the other phenomenal and cognitive characteristics of that particular ball.[1] In a type–token distinction, a type (e.g., a 'ball') is more abstract than its tokens (e.g., 'that leather soccer ball'). "

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abstraction

I don’t see how this applies to possible worlds, which I take to be discreet abstract objects. — AJJ

There are a bunch of different metaphysical interpretations of what possible worlds are. You'd have to explain how "discrete abstract" makes sense to you (unless you're simply using "abstract" as a synonym for "nonphysical," but I explained why that doesn't work).

In that case concepts wouldn’t be abstract — AJJ

They're abstract in terms of content, or in terms of semantics (meaning). Content-wise, they range of a number of particulars. That's the whole function of concepts.

This is why we say, by the way, that nominalists about abstracts/abstractions reject that there are any real abstracts. ("Real" there amounts to "objective" or "external to mind.")

They do not necessarily reject abstracts as concepts. Hence we have conceptualist nominalists (which is what I am).

And I Googled abstract and this is the first definition given: “existing in thought or as an idea but not having a physical or concrete existence”. — AJJ

Which isn't correct, because you can have physical/concrete abstractions. For example, if you believe that abstracts are concepts, you believe that concepts are events in a specific individual's mind, and you're a physicalist on mind.

Particulars are discrete existents, singular instantiations, with properties that uniquely obtain in that discrete instance.

Abstracts range over multiple instantiations of particulars, whether they're types/universals or concepts.

If possible worlds have been rejected as existing in the abstract then possibility must be grounded in the material world. — AJJ

No. This is wrong. I already explained the alternative. One can simply posit nonmaterial particulars. "Not abstract" doesn't imply "material." (And likewise, "abstract" doesn't imply "not material.")

Someone could be an ontological idealist (so reject materialism wholesale) AND be a nominalist.

What part of "nominalists DO NOT say that possibility must be grounded in the material world" don't you understand?

That has nothing to do with nominalism.

"Nominalism says abstract objects such as possible worlds aren’t real. Possibility must instead be grounded in the material world."

It says no such thing as "possibility must be grounded in the material world."

That has nothing at all to do with nominalism.

The definitions given in the OP are correct for the purpose of the point being made. — AJJ

The definitions, for example, say that nominalists are necessarily materialists. This is wrong.

So why are you saying it's correct?

Have a look at the SEP entry for nominalism:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nominalism-metaphysics/

"Nominalism comes in at least two varieties. In one of them it is the rejection of abstract objects; in the other it is the rejection of universals . . . The two varieties of Nominalism are independent from each other and either can be consistently held without the other."

"Similarly, according to Concept Nominalism (or Conceptualism), there is nothing like scarletness and a thing is scarlet in virtue of its falling under the concept scarlet"

I'm a nominalist a la a conceptualist, by the way. I happen to both reject abstract objects and universals, and I'm a materialist, but it's not necessary to hold both types of nominalism or to be a materialist. Nonmateralist nominalists will simply hold that there are nonmaterial particulars.

-Realism says abstract objects such as possible worlds are real and objective.
-Nominalism says abstract objects such as possible worlds aren’t real. Possibility must instead be grounded in the material world.
-Conceptualism says abstract objects such as possible worlds are real but exist only in the human mind. — AJJ

This isn't correct, really.

First of all, conceptualism is a species of nominalism.

But more importantly, one need not be a materialist to be a nominalist.

In fact, nominalists do not even necessarily reject abstract objects, although that is one popular form of nominalism.

Heraclitus - :up:

Parmenides - :down:

All Bartricks is saying is that you CAN'T give consent prior to birth. Birth causes unknown suffering. Ergo, DON'T give birth since consent is impossible. He is saying the default decision in this case should be no birth. — schopenhauer1

Okay, but I'm simply pointing out that you can't nonconsensually conceive a child, either. Consent is a category error here.

If anything, Americans are pretty awful at the whole thing. — StreetlightX

Way to not stereotype.

I was kind of following you but then your post became increasingly murky to me.

There are no objective goals/purposes, only subjective ones. We agree on that.

And there are social facts that we have to adapt to in order to survive. We agree on that.

But then I'm not following you re the implications you're drawing from that.

For one, some people like working. And not just when it's "dream work" like what I lucked into. My dad, for example, does very blue collar work, as did his dad, and he loves doing it. At 80 years old now, he still goes batty if he has too much time off, and he starts creating all sorts or work-like projects for himself. He'll never retire. He doesn't want to. His dad never retired, either, because he was just the same way.

And take something like exercise. I don't always feel like exercising/working out before I start, but I get into it once I start, and I always feel way better on days when I do significant exercise, so I try to do it every day.

The same thing is true for stuff like housecleaning, home maintenance, etc.

I understand that some people don't like doing that stuff, some people hate their work, etc., but it often seems to be people who have an overall disposition of being miserable, complaining etc. in general--people who will always find something to complain about.

It's a nice change of pace when we solve something here. ;-)

, I was dismayed when a particularly well spoken civil rights activist made the claim that 'all politics is identity politics'. The problem wasn't that he was wrong. He was in fact quite right about that. — StreetlightX

He wasn't right. He was wrong.

I didn't say it would 'amount to identity politics'. — StreetlightX

Then not all politics is identity politics.

A local political concern that happened in my burg recently: "Should we continue to allow right turns on red traffic lights at major intersections?" Politicians decided "No." How would that amount to identity politics ?

And that wasn't the idea (I wasn't saying you had suggested that as a definition of identity politics)

If our answer to "who" etc. is "everyone ," then how would it amount to identity politics? (And then for clarification, I cited a common definition of "identity politics" to make it clear that an "everyone" answer wouldn't fit the definition)

Anything that involves the question(s) of Who(?) does What(?) to Whom(?) for Whose benefit(?) at the social level. — StreetlightX

If the answer to that is "everyone," I don't get how it would be identity politics.

For example, say that we're trying to figure out how to provide free health care for everyone. How is that identity politics?

A common definition of "identity politics," by the way, courtesy of Oxford, by way of Wikipedia, is "Identity politics is a political approach and analysis based on people prioritizing the concerns most relevant to their particular racial, religious, ethnic, sexual, social, cultural or other identity, and forming exclusive political alliances with others of this group, instead of engaging in more traditional, broad-based party politics."

So this seems like one of those silly "I can make moves to interpret anything as x" games.

A big problem with this is deferring too much to what other people think/say--and it doesn't help that there are many advocates of that around, including on this board.

Pursue existential authenticity and work on having confidence in your own assessments, whether others agree or not.

Never had an IQ test, but I don't put much stock in them at any rate.

I used to run into a lot of people online who claimed to have taken IQ tests, but that always seemed weird to me, because almost no one I know offline has taken an IQ test. So I always wondered why all these folks were taking IQ tests . . . well, or I always suspected that most of them were full of shit.

How about "You make a better door than window"? I use that one a lot still.

Hmmm, I only now realized how that not every thread shows up when you click on "Forum"

I chose to quote this here, but did I really choose? — unenlightened

In contexts such as you're quoting, it alludes to the appearance/reality, phenomena/noumena distinction.

For example, "Eureka! There's an oasis at the bottom of the next sand dune! . . . Oh crap, not really."

It's not a very useful distinction if you're not a realist. If you're not a realist, you have to say, "Crap there was an oasis there, but when I got closer, it popped out of existence."