Which child, if either, am I in each world? Is it simply a matter of stipulation? Do we simply say that I’m one or the other (or neither)? — Michael

Precisely. It is a matter of how one constructs their possible worlds and then chooses to identify their components. As there is no reality involved, there can't be any facts of the matter.

You believe in an un-acknowledged and unsupported assumption that the physical world that we live in is the "actual", "existent", "physical" and "real" one, in some (unspecified) sense in which the infinitely-many other possibility-worlds aren't. — Michael Ossipoff

I do not deny the existence of other universes in a multiverse, or even independently. I am only saying that, as we are not in dynamic contact with them, they are epistemologically irrelevant.

I also note that there is a difference between knowing as awareness of present intelligibility, which is an act of intellect, and believing as a commitment to the truth of some proposition, which is an act of will.

there's no reasons to claim that they're "real" or "existent", whatever that would mean. — Michael Ossipoff

Anything that can act in any way exists. That is sufficient reason to think that things that act to inform me are real.

There's no reason to believe that your experience is other than such an abstract logical system. — Michael Ossipoff

Of course there is. The things I experience act on me and I am aware of their action on me. Abstract logical systems do not act on me in the same way.

If you claim that this physical world is more than the setting for the hypothetical logical system that is your experience-story, then in what respect to you think that this physical world is more than that. — Michael Ossipoff

Because mere hypotheticals can't act on anything.

Do you believe in unparsimonious brute-facts and unverfiable, unfalsifiable propositions? — Michael Ossipoff

No.

speaking of worlds as simply "possible" allows one to confuse logical, physical and ontological possibility. — Dfpolis

...distinctions whose advocates can't specify what they mean by them — Michael Ossipoff

I can. I said :

"P is possible with respect to a set of facts, S, if P does not contradict the propositions expressing S." — Dfpolis

Logical possibility means the proposition is consistent with S = the facts we know.

Physical possibility means the proposition is consistent with S = the laws of nature.
Alternately, one may mean the proposition is consistent with S = the laws of nature plus the facts we know about a physical state.

Ontological or metaphysical possibility means the proposition is consistent with S = the nature of being qua being.

This is all consistent with Kripke's claim that proper names function as rigid designators, and also with his claim that statements of identity of the form "A is B", where "A" and "B" are proper names, are metaphysically necessary. — Pierre-Normand

It depends on how you define "metaphysically necessary." Can you define it without invoking possible worlds semantics? If not, how can this claim be relevant to reality?

That's not what I said. I said that perception is not identical to reality, which is what you said. — MindForged

OK, but that leaves me wondering how it was an objection? You also said:

We don't even have direct access to our own world, so are we able to learn anything about the actual world? — MindForged

This seems an attempt to give possible worlds the same epistemological status as the real world, hence my justification of direct epistemic access.

A consistent "set of facts" is one way of articulating what a possible world is so I don't even know what you think you're arguing against at this point. — MindForged

Facts are actual, not merely possible. Possible worlds might be a consistent set of posits, they are not a consistent set of facts.

Naturally "reliable" is doing all the work here, being used to obfuscate the fact that there's no guarantee that perception maps to reality such that we can have an infallible means by which to say some experience is reliable. It's like you've never considered any objection to your views ever. — MindForged

If I didn't consider objections, I wouldn't have said "reliable." Yes, it's doing a lot of work, but that doesn't mean that we can't have true knowledge, where "truth" is understood as adequacy, not as exhaustiveness or infallibility. I've made no claim of infallible human knowledge, so the notion of infallibility is a straw man -- effectively replacing human knowledge with divine omniscience. Primarily, "knowing" names an human activity, so requiring infallibility as you seem to is a bait and switch tactic.

Necessity is indeed defined as truth in all possible world [of the set of world being quantified over], and yes X being necessary entails that it's negation is not possible. Where is the circularity? — MindForged

If you can't see that using possible worlds as the ultimate basis for defining possibility is circular, I can't help you.

it's nonsense to say that "Venus" names the same object in every possible world because Venus does not exist in every possible world. — Dfpolis

This is exactly what I was talking about, you don't understand this topic. — MindForged

Thank goodness! I understand logic instead. Predicates predicated of multiple subjects are universals. Without equivocating, names can only be predicated of one individual. A "Venus" in another (possible) world is not our Venus. Therefore, one can only be call both "Venus" by equivocation or by universal predication.

But that's not how proper names work, they pick out a specific object in the actual world, and the meaning of that name is fixed in modal logic — MindForged

I am not disputing that the meaning of "Venus" is fixed. I'm asking that you look at how you fixed it. You told me that in each world where "Venus" designated, it designated the second planet from the sun. That is the definition of a universal. If you'd brought me out and pointed at Venus, and said "I call that thing 'Venus,'" you'd be giving it a proper name. But, when you say, "whenever there's a second planet, I'm calling it 'Venus,'" you're either defining universal term, or a set of homonymous names. If it is a set of homonymous names, you can't treat them univocally, which is what you're doing when you say the meaning is "fixed."

Now you say that I don't understand. Am I supposed to understand that the canons of logical predication do not apply to possible worlds? If so, on what factual basis? Surely it can't be because "Kripke has spoken"?

So, we come back to the definition from the SEP article: "A rigid designator designates the same object in all possible worlds in which that object exists and never designates anything else." The "same" of "same object" can't mean "identical" because if the Venus of a possible world were identically our Venus, that world would be identically our world. So, "same" must mean generically the same, not the identical individual. A term that designates generically similar objects univocally is a universal, not a proper name.

Obviously "Hesperus=Phosporus" isn't true in the possible worlds where the references to the terms do not exist. — MindForged

But, in my example, the terms are referential via the same types of experiences that give them reference here. Each rigid designator names is appropriate object: There are morning and evening stars and a second planet. It is just that the references are not what you want them to be. You response will define my possible world out of consideration. So, again, the conclusion is based on how you choose to construct a set of possible worlds, not on any observable facts of the matter -- and that is precisely my objection.

I am sorry, I accidentally clicked post before I was done, and there seems to be no way of undoing a post. So I continued in another post.

Your objection seems to rely on analyzing "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" as definite descriptions rather than proper names. — Pierre-Normand

That part of my objection is that words express concepts, so if you want to know what they mean, you have to examine the concepts in terms of the experiences that elicit them. The reason that an empirical discovery is required for the identification is that the concepts are anything but identical.

The full objection was:

how does Kripke know what "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" mean in any possible world? As their meaning is conventional, the denizens of each possible world might use them to designate other objects or not use them at all. Kripke has no way of knowing. So, when Kripke says they designate the same object in every possible world in which the object exists, he means he has decided to use the terms in this universal way. So, there is no fact of the matter beyond Kripke choice of naming conventions. Thus, all Kripke has done is define his conclusion into existence: the claim "'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is metaphysically necessary" has no factual basis beyond Kripke's choice of naming conventions. — Dfpolis

I am sorry if my shorthand reference to my objection was misleading. The objection is that since we can't know what the denizen call things, "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" are applied as a result of Kripke's fiat and not as the reflection of any known fact. In other words, they designate, not the same thing, but the same kind of thing, in all possible worlds in which that kind of thing exists solely by fiat. So, there is no fact of the matter -- only an arbitrary convention.

which would have told you that this purported objection is misguided:

Or, how anyone can know what "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" mean to the denizens of a possible world. — Snakes Alive

If you read the full objection, you'd see that this is a rhetorical step, not the full objection.

The SEP article is what I read.

Possible worlds are pieces of a technical apparatus that allow a model-theoretic interpretation of a language with modal operators. They have no metaphysical or ontological import in of themselves – only a supplementary theory as to what they are intended to model can provide this — Snakes Alive

I agree. My main problem with possible worlds semantics is pragmatic. By placing a layer of construct between reality, which alone can be a source of actual knowledge, and theoretical conclusions, it obscures the irrationality of conclusions such as Kripke's that "'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is metaphysically necessary."

There's no need for possible worlds in that interpretation. I can't personally see any value in the possible worlds paradigm. — andrewk

We agree. If it does not help clarify, but does help obscure, it is of little value.

Well the value is giving real, rigorous definitions of these notions that allows us to be confident in using them in theorization. — MindForged

But, how can we be certain about anything that does not really exist? We know our world is possible because if it were not, it would not be actual, but when we are dealing with possible worlds all we have is worlds we imagine to be possible, but which might have covert inconsistencies. The idea that there could be worlds with slightly different physical constants and life seems possible, but it's not. Another example is the problem is making proper names universal to apply them to individuals in other worlds a la Kripke. A third problem, the one that got me thinking about this, is using possible worlds to give meaning to subjective probabilities.

Dfpolis: you can stop writing paragraphs and paragraphs of text. Read my previous posts – you're uninformed about this matter. Read up on it. — Snakes Alive

Feel free to tell me why 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is metaphysically necessary when it is actually false. Or, how anyone can know what "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" mean to the denizens of a possible world. Or, how a proper name can be universally predicated and remain a proper name.

There's no possible way to justify this, you only have access to your perceptions. — MindForged

Perceptions aren't simply physical states, they're intentional states. While physical states have no intrinsic significance, intentional states do. Perceptions are invariably perceptions of something. (Think of Brentano and aboutness.) Whatever you may think of that something, it's what we mean by "the object of perception." So, to say that we do not perceive what we are perceiving is an oxymoron and an abuse of language.

Consider this in a different Aristotelian way: In coming to know, we are informed. Whatever informs us must have the capacity to inform us (intelligibility), or it couldn't inform us. Further, in coming to know, a single act actualizes both our capacity to be informed and the intelligibility of the object. Since the identical act makes both the object's intelligibility actually known and informs us, there is no epistic gap between knower and known.

Locke was wrong in saying we only know our ideas. Rather, our ideas are means or instrumentalities by which we know. It is only in retrospect that we realize that some means, which we call "ideas," must have been employed. So, ideas are not the primary object of our knowledge, but only inferred retrospectively as means.

The world of perception is not identical to the world itself. — MindForged

On the Kantian interpretation, this is meaningless. Meanings need to be cashed out in terms of human experience. What possible experience could cash out "the world itself," when, by hypothesis it is inaccessible to experience?

By "reality" we mean what's revealed in reliable experience. So, to say that what we experience is not "real" is an oxymoron. It's a sign of deep confusion and wanton disregard of parsimony to posit something intrinsically unknowable -- all the more if one thinks the posit is more "real" than reality.

On a different interpretation, perception is not identical with, nor does it exhaust, reality. Still, it is a projection of reality in two senses: (1) It is reality dynamically projecting itself into us. (2) It provides a projection (a dimensionally diminished map) of reality. Perception presents only part of reality. Full identity would be an absurd claim. Still, the world informing us is identically us being informed by the world..

Lack of full identity is not an epistic gap. Thinking knowledge can't be true unless it is exhaustive is the Omniscience Fallacy -- making divine omniscience the paradigm of human knowing. We're not omniscient, but that doesn't mean we're out of touch with reality -- as "gap" implies.

Possible world's really just a tool to explain set of concepts. — MindForged

Yes, most of which are modal concepts, hinging on possibility and its correlative, necessity. So, yes, possible worlds talk is circular. I have seen "necessary" defined as true in all possible worlds. Since "necessary" means the contrary is not possible, this is circular.

I do not define "possible" in terms of worlds. P is possible if P does not contradict the set of propositions which it is possible with respect to.

That isn't an explanatory definition at all. You just defined possibility and used possibility within the definition. — MindForged

Yes, I used "possible" -- not essentially, but to avoid circumlocution. So, here's the same definition restated: "P is possible with respect to a set of facts, S, if P does not contradict the propositions expressing S." Again, there is no need to violate parsimony with the possible worlds construct.

It means the same thing if I define that way. — MindForged

No, a circular definition is no definition, whereas my proposal is an actual definition.

The issue is you getting hung up on the word possible appearing in the name of the concept. — MindForged

No, what I'm "hung up" on is the construct of unknown and unknowable worlds when all actual knowledge is based on the one real world. The more "moving parts" in your philosophy, the more there is to go wrong. Still, one can't know if a world is possible unless you know what possible means.

The criterion of consistency doesn't favor your definition at all because it was a circular definition. — MindForged

Really? My definition uses no modal concepts. So it reduces modality to more fundamental, non-modal concepts. It does not assume, as possible worlds definitions do, that one already knows what "possible" means.

Lack of parsimony as compared to what? — MindForged

Compared to not positing an indefinite number of "possible worlds" when we don't know that even one beyond the actual world is possible.

Not only are the usual definitions of the various modalities almost exactly as you defined them in your post — MindForged

Doesn't this contradict your earlier claim: "no one uses that understanding of modality in philosophy"?

No intelligible property? Seriously? So taking a particular path in the sky, being the second planet from the Sun, having a particular level of brightness, having a certain atmospheric composition (etc) are unintelligible properties? The whole point is that we are talking about worlds in which Venus (and the solar system) exists and that the identity statement "Hesperus is Phosphorus" is therefore necessarily true because they pick out the same object *in worlds where the relevant objects exist*. So when you say things like this: — MindForged

I stand by what I said. "Rigid designator" is supposed to be a property of a term. The properties you mention are properties neither of "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus," nor of the concepts, <Hesperus> and <Phosphorus>, they express. They are properties of reality (which you inconsistently claim is not knowable). Further, they are not metaphysical properties (as would be required by Kripke's claim of metaphysical necessity), but contingent physical properties.

Neither the concept <Hesperus> nor the concept <Phosphorus> necessarily includes notes such as <taking a particular path in the sky> or <being the second planet from the Sun>. These are empirical discoveries.

While "Hesperus," "Phosphorus," and "Venus" all name the same planet, they don't all express the same concept. Concepts are elicited by specific kinds of experiences. <Hesperus> and <Phosphorus> are elicited by the experience of seeing a light in the evening and morning skies respectively. So, "Hesperus is Phosphorus," literally means "The experience of seeing a light in the evening sky is the experience of seeing a light in the morning sky" -- a claim that is not only false, but nonsensical.

What Kirpke did, then, is ignore a conceptual analysis in favor of a theory of meaning based on logical atomism. In it, "Hesperus," "Phosphorus," and "Venus" all have the same meaning because they all name the same planet. He sees meaning as no more than naming objects. Venus seen in the morning is not Venus seen in the evening, even though both are seeing Venus.

As I pointed out in my critique, your analysis does not consider all possible worlds, only those consistent with certain contingent facts. As you are constraining possibility with contingent facts, the result is only necessary contingently, not metaphysically necessary. For there are possible worlds in which the light in the morning sky has a different source than the light in the evening sky -- even though they both exist, along with a second planet from the sun.

Propositions are only metaphysically necessary if they are true independently of contingent facts.

I can only conclude you don't know what a rigid designator is beyond reading the introductory sentence on the SEP — MindForged

No, I used the SEP quote to define "rigid designator." Let's look at the argument you go on to quote.

Hesperus = Phosphorus’ is necessarily true if true at all because ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are proper names for the same object. Like other names, Kripke maintains, they are rigid: each designates just the object it actually designates in all possible worlds in which that object exists, and it designates nothing else in any possible world. — SEP

This is a baseless assertion by Kripke.

First, proper names name one, not multiple, individuals. So, to say it's nonsense to say that "Venus" names the same object in every possible world because Venus does not exist in every possible world. We might find a planet corresponding to Venus in various possible worlds (if there are any), but they would be different individuals (because things are individuated by their relational context and the worlds would not be different unless they provided different contexts). Calling them all "Venus" means that "Venus" ceases to be a proper name and becomes a universal term.

Second, as I argued above, "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" express different concepts and so they are never identical.

Third, how does Kripke know what "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" mean in any possible world? As their meaning is conventional, the denizens of each possible world might use them to designate other objects or not use them at all. Kripke has no way of knowing. So, when Kripke says they designate the same object in every possible world in which the object exists, he means he has decided to use the terms in this universal way. So, there is no fact of the matter beyond Kripke choice of naming conventions. Thus, all Kripke has done is define his conclusion into existence: the claim "'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is metaphysically necessary" has no factual basis beyond Kripke's choice of naming conventions.

There's is no world where the planet Venus and our solar system exists like ours and in which "Hesperus is Phosphorus" is false. — MindForged

And there is none in which it is true, because merely possible worlds do not exist.

We don't even have direct access to our own world, so are we able to learn anything about the actual world? — MindForged

Of course we have access to our own world. The dogma of an epistic gap is nonsense to anyone schooled in Aristotle. For example, an object's modification of our sensory state is identically our sensory representation of the object. As one state belongs both to the sensed object and to the sensing subject, there is an existential penetration, not a gap. This analysis can be elaborated at length and extended to cognition, but I've already done so recently in other threads.

Yes modal semantics are used to define modal terms like "possibility" and "necessity" and the like. That doesn't mean you cannot understand what possible worlds are, they are part of how you define the terms. How does this even follow? I could just call them "alternate world" and use the same definitions of these terms, so surely the argument isn't that the world "possible" is used to refer to these. — MindForged

No, it is not confused. If you do not understand "possible" or "necessary" you will not understand "possible world." I do not define "possible" in terms of worlds. P is possible if P does not contradict the set of propositions which it is possible with respect to. P is metaphysically possible if it does not contradict the nature of being. P is logically possible if it does not contradict what we know. P is physically possible if it does not contradict the laws of nature. No appeal to "alternate facts" a la Kelly Ann Conway.is required.

Further "alternate world" does not mean "possible world." I may imagine any number of alternate worlds that are not self consistent, and so impossible. If you want to bring in the concept of self-consistency, you may, but then you're not defining modality in terms of a set of worlds, but following my definition of the last paragraph.

Then just stipulate what type of possibility intended. This doesn't seem like a real worry. — MindForged

Yes, it is, because it leads back to circularity. To define any type of possibility you must specify what makes a world "possible" in that way -- which means that you need an independent definition of that mode of possibility -- in other words, the worlds cease to be a primitive, and are merely an unparsimonious wart on your theory.

If possible worlds talk is nonsense, then rigid designators are undefined.

Um, didn't the SEP define it in your quote? — MindForged

Yes, in terms of the nonsensical concept of "possible worlds." Let's take Kirpke's famous example, "Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus." According to the SEP "an identity statement in which both designators are rigid must be necessarily true if it is true at all, even if the statement is not a priori."

Is there an a priori possible world in which one planet appear in the sky in the evening and another in the morning? I don't see why not. It might be argued that such a world would violate some law of nature, but the laws of nature are known a posteriori. So, if you use this argument, "Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus" not by necessity, but contingently.

So, Kirpke is pulling a swindle. There is nothing about "Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus" that makes it anything but contingent. "Hesperus" does not mean "Venus." it means a planet seen in the evening, which we have since identified as Venus. Similarly, "Phosphorus" does not mean "Venus." It means a planet seen in the morning, which we have since identified as Venus.

Now you can say that "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" are "rigid designaters," but there is no intelligible property that allows us to determine one way or the other if they are. Then, you can hypothesize people in all possible worlds will apply these terms as we do. Again, there is no factual basis for doing so. Then, because of these arbitrary and baseless constructs, you can say that "Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus" is necessarily true.

Clearly, the conclusion is nonsense, because "necessarily," does not even follow the norms of possible worlds talk. There are many worlds that seem perfectly possible where this is not so, but they are excluded by hypothesis and arbitrary dictate.

According to the SEP:

A rigid designator designates the same object in all possible worlds in which that object exists and never designates anything else. This technical concept in the philosophy of language has critical consequences felt throughout philosophy. In their fullest generality, the consequences are metaphysical and epistemological. Whether a statement's designators are rigid or non-rigid may determine whether it is necessarily true, necessarily false, or contingent. — Joseph LaPorte

If possible worlds talk is nonsense, then rigid designators are undefined.

He he

The argument seems to be that it is a way of explaining modality and subjective probability. E.g. "necessary" means in all possible worlds. A subjective probability of 50% would mean in half the possible worlds.

However we wish to categorize the matter, even in reality there is a difference between subject perceptions of the world, and subject-generated experiences independent of perception. Dreams exist in the real world, but they are still different from perception. — Marchesk

Yes, there is a difference between perception on the one hand and imagination or delusion on the other. I just don't think that it is philosophically interesting. Maybe I'm missing its importance.

Linguistic competence exhibited by tool design and fire use. — Galuchat

I don't see that this implies "linguistic competence."

Obviously there is some historical point at which language use began. I don't think that that point can be determined from the level of tool construction and usage. I might be willing to see etching, drawing and painting as signs of representational thought that could be related to language.

Science, having an objective methodology, is not suited to explain the subjective — Marchesk

Yes. As I have said in other threads, natural science begins with a fundamental abstraction that fixes attention on the objects of the physical world to the exclusion of the knowing subject and its correlatives. Those it is bereft of the concepts and data required to related what it knows of the physical world to consciousness and other intentional operations.

Due to the various issues this split tends to raise — Marchesk

I think it is a mistake to think that there is any subject-object split in reality. The only split is mental or logical. Subjectivity and objectivity are invariably linked. There is no knowing subject that is not knowing an objective reality, and no actually known object that is not known by one or more knowing subjects.

Yes, what we experience in dreams and imaginings is not intersubjectively available, but presumably, the content experienced is encoded in objective neural states -- so even here the inseparability of the subjective and the objective is maintained.

Why don't we live in a philosophical zombie universe? Why would there be subjective experience at all? — Marchesk

This is not an answerable question. We might say because God chose to make it so, but we can't reduce the phenomena to more fundamental experiences. From a human perspective, it is simply a contingent fact of experience.

In fact, unless there were subjects in the world, there could be no experiencing subjects and so no experience or consequent knowledge.

How could it spookily emerge from the dance of matter and energy? — Marchesk

Who says it does "emerge from the dance of matter and energy"? This assumes that nature consists only of the phenomena we have chosen to assign to natural science in making the fundamental abstraction. Why should the data natural science has chosen to fix upon explain the data it has chosen to neglect? I can think of no reason it should.

I don't see how this is fundamentally an abuse of language issue. — Marchesk

I agree.

Really, subjectivities (that is the presence of states of experience) are objective in the way assigned to "out there" in split — TheWillowOfDarkness

I agree that our interior experiences are as real as anything in physical reality. So, I don't think the proper dividing line is between "in her" and "out there." It is between the poles of the subject-object relation. Being a knowing subject is distinct from being a known object, even though neither can exist apart from the other.

Btw it speaks to the victory of materialism/atomism/ reductionism that our direct experiences can be considered spooky when they are still our access point to the world. — JupiterJess

I always see "spooky" in this context as a sign of prejudice and closed mindedness. The person asserting it is denigrating a set of solutions before giving them a fair hearing.

Aren't the words "objective" and "subjective" simply being put to use, and insofar that we agree on their usage we have nothing more philosophical to talk about? — Moliere

No. Once we distinguish the subjective and the objective we have to consider their nature. We have to consider whether or not there is an epistic gap between subject and object. We have to consider if any experience/knowledge can be purely subjective or purely objective. The list goes on.

what I think is of disagreement in talking about whether a philosophical issue is substantive or not is over what counts as philosophical. — Moliere

I think that the issue of being substantive was defined in the OP without exploring the nature of philosophy. It is whether the problem is due to an abuse of language or whether it is about the nature of reality.

To me then this whole paragraph adopts not a subjective nor an objective approach, but a sort of mutual approach, and that's often how we are. — mcdoodle

Yes, we need to form a consistent understanding of the full range of human experience.

There are a number of different double-slit experiments, and all of them (or at least, all the ones I know, including several 'delayed choice' and 'quantum eraser' versions) are completely explained by the mathematical analysis, which does not hold any mysteries, — andrewk

Yes. The paradoxes are the result of refusing to let go of Greek atomism and insisting, against all the evidence, that quanta are both particles and waves. The math, which works perfectly, represents quanta as waves.

The name for that is "prejudicial thinking."

Sadly, it is all too common both in society as a whole and in science in particular.

The list of questions is a hodge-podge showing little reflection. Some (such as the existence of God) belong to metaphysics or natural theology. Others belong to Christian theology and the back and forth of apologetics, or to ethics.

The philosophy of religion is reasoned reflection on religious practice. Clearly, it has a place in the spectrum of philosophical thought independently of one's metaphysics, personal beliefs and faith commitments.

If the word phrase "sensory representation" and word "representation" were replaced with "awareness" (perception and cognisance caused by sensation), I could agree with your formulation. Otherwise, I consider the use of the word "representation" in this context to be unnecessarily metaphorical. — Galuchat

I suspect this is simply a matter of defining "representation" differently, and not a difference about fact.

One can have a representation without being aware of the representation. There are many, many unread texts and unviewed pictures. In the same way we can have sensory representations without being intellectually aware of them. In another thread, I gave many examples of complex "automatic" or sensory behavior -- playing musical instruments, bicycle riding, and driving being a few. So, as I use the term, there are sensory representations and intellectual representations. In my view, only the latter require awareness.

There is no "language of thought." Rather thought is what is elicited by language. — Dfpolis

I agree with the first sentence, but disagree with the second. While my own thought is largely verbal, Einstein's thought experiments were, by his own admission, nonverbal. — Galuchat

I was insufficiently precise. I should have said "thought is elicited by language." I did not intend to say that thought is only elicited by by language. I agree that much thought is nonverbal as shown by the experience of knowing what we mean, but not being able to find the right words to express it.

Semioticians Lotman and Sebeok think that language developed as a mental modelling system (an adaptation) in Homo habilis, and that speech is an exaptation derived from language (which emerged in Homo sapiens). — Galuchat

I have no idea what data one could bring to bear to confirm or falsify this hypothesis. So, in my view it is an unscientific speculation.

In the sentence "a is a" "a" is used formally. That is to say that it refers to some (generalized) object beyond itself. In the sentence " a is not a because one a is on the left side of the copula and the other a is on the right side," "a" is used materially. Which is to say that "a" means the symbol "a" and not what "a" indicates. As material and formal predication are different, your argument is uses "a" equivocally, and so is fallacious.

As to Aristotelian vs modern logic, they are not logic in the same sense. Aristotelian (and, more broadly, intentional) logic is defined as the "science of correct thinking (about reality)." Modern logics are not concerned with thought processes per se, but with rules of symbolic manipulation. Since they deal with different subject matter, they are not directly comparable.

For example, in Aristotelian logic universal propositions have existential import. That is because propositions cannot be true unless they are based on our experience of reality. In modern logic, propositions need not be justified by real cases, and so universals need not have existential import.

It signifies the airborne vanilla molecules giving rise to the odor. — hypericin

Smelling vanilla is an existential state. It might indicate the presence of vanilla extract, vanilla beans, good vanilla ice cream, etc. Since it can indicate many things, intrinsically, it indicates no one thing, including the presence of vanilla molecules. For thousands of years, people smelled vanilla and never thought of vanilla molecules. So, intrinsically, the quale of vanilla does not signify the presence of vanilla molecules. (It does not necessarily make us think of them.)

Of course, once we understand that odors are mediated by specific molecules, smelling vanilla is strong evidence for the presence of vanilla molecules. But, even then, it's not an infallible sign of vanilla molecules, because we could have a very vivid olfactory imagination or even be hallucinating.

Evidence is not necessarily, not essentially, a sign. it is something that can be used as a sign, but has an intrinsic reality of its own. Smoke is just combustion products in the air -- whether or not someone uses it as a sign of fire. In the same way, the quale of vanilla, which is identical with smelling vanilla, is simply an existential state, whether or not I use it as a sign that I'm near a vanilla orchid.

On the other hand, an idea is intrinsically a sign and signifies whatever it's about necessarily. My idea <apples> necessarily signifies apples. It's impossible for it to signify anything we don't think is an apple.

We have no access to the reality, only to the symbols representing it: qualia. — hypericin

Yes, that's the kind of pap modern philosophers take on faith. Of course, it is absolutely false. I don't know whose version of this nonsense you believe, so I won't refute them on by one, but simply show you why we do have access to reality.

Anything that can act in any way exists, it real. So, existence is the unspectified ability act. Of course, everything can act in specific ways, and if we knew all the ways it could act, we'd know all the ways it can present itself. So, the essence of a thing is the specification of its ability to act -- what it can and cannot do.

When we sense something, it is acting on us in some way. Perhaps it's emitting vanilla molecules that trigger an olfactory response, scattering light into our eyes or pushing back when we touch it. Whatever it's doing, it modifies our neural state, and that modification of our neural state is our sensory representation of the object. There is an identity and joint ownership here. The object's modification of our sensory state is identically our sensory representation of the object. So, there's no epistic gap here between us and the sensed object. Rather, our representation of the object is the object's existential penetration of us.

When we turn our attention to this sensory representation and become aware of it, we know the object -- not exhaustively but to the degree that we are interacting with it. It is informing us. Recall that Claude Shannon defined information as the reduction of possibility. Of all the ways and unknown object could act on us, it is acting on us in the specific way we are experiencing. Since this is necessarily one of the ways in which it can act, it is informing us about its essence -- about the specification of its possible acts.

So, when we are aware of our sensory encounter with an object, we learn of both its existence (it can act because it is acting on us) and it essence (its specification of possible acts must include the ways it is acting on us.) Again, there is no epistic gap.

So, forget all the nonsense you've heard about epistic gaps, They simply don't exist.

The vanillin molecule has nothing to do with the vanilla smell. The smell is purely symbolic, it points to the molecule. — hypericin

I explained why this is not so. It can be evidence, but it is not intrinsically a sign.

This is an internal language, the body speaking to itself. But the body itself is a multiplicity, and if there is sharing and convention, they exist at that level. — hypericin

There is no "language of thought." Rather thought is what is elicited by language. If there were a language of thought, then it would have to elicit its interpreting thoughts and this would lead to an infinite regress.

The notion of "the body speaking to itself" is a metaphor, not an accurate description. Yes, information is transmitted from point to point neurally and chemically. That information is not a language in the sense of a system of signs that elicit meaning. Rather, neural pulses and hormones effectuate responses without need of mental interpretation. Meaning only enters when we reflect on the process. It is not intrinsic.

The body is not a multiplicity, It is an organic unity with each part depending upon the others. Thinking of parts that we can separate mentally as separate unities is committing Whitehead's fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Regions that are joined physically and dynamically are only potentially separate, not actual units.

So do you think it's correct to say that there are no actual atoms in the original sense of 'indivisible particles'? In that, what is perceived as 'particles' is not something that is actually a particle but for which the term 'particle' is a kind of analogy? — Wayfarer

Exactly

Qualia are symbolic systems. — hypericin

Qualia are contingent forms of awareness. They are not symbols because they have no intrinsic or conventional meaning. The smell of vanilla is the quale of smelling vanilla, not some separate thing indicated by the quale.

Qualia are language, they have the same logical structure as language. — hypericin

Qualia are not language because language is a shared system of conventional signs while (1) qualia are not symbols, (2) qualia are not conventional and (3) we have no idea if they are shared or not. There is no way to compare the form of my experience in smelling vanilla to the form of your experience in smelling it.

Finally, the logical structure ideas, the contingent forms of some of which are qualia, is not the same as the logical structure of language. For language to signify, first, I must grasp the form of the medium of expression (I must hear you aright, make out your writing, etc.) and second, I must form an idea of what that physical form means. Only then can it indicate some target. So we have a ternary relation (physical sign - thinker - signified). That means that language employs instrumental signs.

For ideas to signify, I do not first have to recognize that I'm dealing with an idea. There is no question of making our its physical form. Rather, ideas signify directly. So, we have a binary relation (thinker - signified). That means that ideas (and qualia are the contingent form of some ideas) are formal, not instrumental signs.

Can you describe how you think the classical world (with apparent particles and large scale structures) emerges from the quantum world (of wave function and superposition)? — Relativist

Sure. As I have said, we need to look at the detailed physics of the measurement process, instead of treating it abstractly. When we do, we see how the transition from the quantum to the classical world occurs. The associated philosophical problem is falling prey to Whitehead's fallacy of misplaced concreteness -- treating an abstraction as though it is a concrete reality.

Detectors are made of bulk matter, which is held together with electron-electron interactions. The two electron problem in quantum field theory involves nonlinear dynamics. It is easy to understand why. Each electron generates an electromagnetic field which affects the other, which, in turn, affects the original electron. Since the E-M field is caused by the charge and current densities, it is quadratic in the wave function. That means that electron-electron interactions are intrinsically nonlinear.

The nonlinearity is easily overlooked, because as soon as it is discovered, it is replaced by a linear perturbative approximation. This is done because we don't know how to solve nonlinear equations, but we can solve the approximating perturbation series.

If the two electron problem is nonlinear and impossible to solve exactly, imagine the complexity and difficulty of solving the interactions of about 10^23 electrons in a detector. Even problems with as few as eight electrons test the capacity of supercomputers. Because the exact quantum treatment of a detector is impossible, they are treated classically, or at best, semi-classically.

So, we have the abstraction of quantum existing in isolation, and therefore subject to linear dynamics, and the abstraction of detector treated classically. In reality, we have a free electron approaching 10^23 or so bound, interacting electrons. As it approaches the detector, its interactions with the detector electrons ceases to be negligible -- meaning that the nonlinear terms in the free electron's wave equation become increasingly important.

Superpositions of solutions of linear equations are also solutions of those equations. Superpositions of solutions of nonlinear equations not solutions of those equations. Thus, once the nonlinear terms in the free electron's wave equation become important, the superposition will become unsustainable, and the wave function must collapse to a single solution of a set of (~10^23) nonlinear equations.

Once we see why the wave function has to collapse on detection, it is clear how the classical world emerges from the quantum world. When we have enough atoms interacting so that their nonlinear interactions cease to be negligible, superpositions will no longer be sustainable, and we will have one well-defined solution at a time -- not a superposition of a live cat and a dead cat.

I'm not talking about the count of decisions, but of possible actions. — Dfpolis

This makes no difference — Pseudonym

This is not a sensible response. So, it is time to end this conversation.

It may give the impression that uncertainty arises only when we lumbering experimenters meddle with things. This is not true. Uncertainty is built into the wave structure of quantum mechanics and exists whether or not we carry out some clumsy measurement.

So it's not as if the act of measurement literally alters the subject - I think if it were that simple, then it would not be regarded as the great mystery that it currently is. — Wayfarer

There is no intrinsic mystery. I talked about both types of uncertainty mentioned by Greene in my response, but perhaps not with sufficient clarity.

There seems to be no argument that observing changes the prior state in an indeterminate way. The problem here is not that quantum dynamics are indeterminate. Orthodox quantum theory tells us that all quantum processes other than measurement ate completely deterministic. The problem is that we know neither the detailed prior state of the system being observed nor that of our measurement/detection apparatus. Without knowing the initial state we cannot apply deterministic laws to calculate deterministic outcomes. So, this type of indeterminism is obviously epistemological, not ontological.

I mentioned a second way in which physical states can be said to be "indeterminate" when I raised Aristotle's observation that, in physical reality, quantity is not an actual number, but countability and measurability. I went on to say that the measure number we actually get depends on the details of the measurement process. This is the explanation of the second kind of indeterminism Greene mentions. As you can see, this is not new either, but has been known in principle since mathematical physics was founded by Aristotle.

So, why is this a problem? Because many people, including physicists, approach quantum phenomena with two misconceptions:
(1) Quanta are, sometimes at least, particles that can be adequately conceived of as point masses. This is a prejudice that goes back to the baseless speculations of the Greek atomist. It has never been adequately supported by observational data. Sometimes we can get away with thinking of quanta as particles, but doing so invariably leads to paradox and contradiction.
(2) Physical quantities have determinate values before being measured. This is a prejudice that goes back to the Pythagorean view that physical things are made of numbers and geometric figures. Even those physicists who haven't read Aristotle should have been disabused of this belief with the advent of special relativity. It showed that the values we measure for physical quantities as basic as space and time depend on the details of the measurement process.

So, if you think that quanta are particles then you are going to think that they ought to have well-defined positions and momenta, in any given frame of reference, anyway. Since quanta are not particles but waves, it is not surprising that this leads to immediate difficulties. We have known since 19th century developments in hydrodynamic wave theory and the acceptance of Maxwell's electrodynamics that the energy and momentum of waves is not localized, but distributed over the entire field. It should also be obvious that waves do not have a well-defined position that can be adequately dealt with by conceiving of them as point masses. So, it should be no surprise that when we try to measure the position and momentum of a quantumconceived of as a particle we get puzzling results.

These results are not due to any mysterious, ontological indeterminacy. We know that when we measure the momentum of a quantum with a narrow range of wave lengths the resulting momentum number is inversely proportional to the wave length. We also know that localizing a wave structure requires a wide range of wave lengths (and hence of "momenta"). This is the basis of Heisenberg's uncertainty relation for position and momentum. Still, the relation between localization and range of wave lengths is not a quantum phenomenon. It applies as much to water waves as to quanta. It is simply a consequence of the Fourier integral theorem in mathematics.

As I understand the conundrum surrounding measurement, the electron exists 'in a super-position' which is described by the wave function. That is literally a description of a range of possibilities. — Wayfarer

There is no reason to think superpositions are not fully actual in themselves. What is potential is the number a measuring process will yield, but, as Aristotle noted, that is potential for all physical quantities.

Prior to it being measured, it can't be said to be in a particular place. — Wayfarer

Right, because waves are intrinsically extended.

Pretty much. I think that so-called particles are quantized wave structures, as modeled by QFT. I think that annihilation and creation operators mask more fundamental nonlinear processes.

the concept or meaning of a contingent state is necessary — TheWillowOfDarkness

I am not sure where you are seeing the necessity. Clearly the concepts come to be in the individuals thinking them. If they were necessary, they would always be. Are you a Platonist?

"The green leaves of the tree in my backyard" is a necessary meaning of that contingent state, until such time as it expresses a different meanings or ceases to be as a state — TheWillowOfDarkness

Meaning is a relation between a sign and what it signifies. Since the sign need not exist and the relation is contingent on the existence of the sign, its meaning is not necessary. I do agree that the judgement <The tree in my back yard has green leaves> can't mean anything other than what it actually means. The problem is simply that the judgement need not exist.

But that has nothing to do with behaviourism, as such. In fact a behaviourist couldn't even comment on it, unless he was able to show how they manifested as behaviour, as by definition the behaviourist does not concern himself with internal states but only with behaviour. — Wayfarer

Yes. My point was that there is no need to invoke the notion of being subjectively aware, as opposed to medically conscious, to explain the kind of complex behavior we see in nonhuman animals. The examples I cited were to point out that complex behavior without subjective awareness is part of the human experience as well. Thus, subjective awareness is something over and above what is required for complex behavior.

I would not call subjective awareness "discursive" because I am not referring to "things which we can bring consciously to mind, or are conscious of being conscious of." "Subjective awareness" does not name things we are aware of (which are on the object side of the subject-object relation), but our act of being aware of such things -- of being a knowing subject.

But that has nothing to do with behaviourism, as such. In fact a behaviourist couldn't even comment on it, unless he was able to show how they manifested as behaviour, as by definition the behaviourist does not concern himself with internal states but only with behaviour. — Wayfarer

Of course. Perhaps "functionalist model" would have been better. My point was and is that we have no need of subjective awareness to explain the kind of complex behavior we see in nonhuman animals -- the same point I was making by pointing to human experiences of automatic behavior.

But the problem then is how to account for the reality of intelligibles in their own right, rather than as derived from a purely material, neurological process. You say that you accept the logical order is real in its own right, but in what sense is it real? How do you ground it? — Wayfarer

In nature intelligibility never stands on its own as some kind of abstract entity.. Substances (ostensible unities) are capable of some acts and incapable of others. So, we can say that each has existence (the indeterminate ability to act) -- everything that is can do something, and if it could not it could never evoke the idea <existent>. It also has an essence, which I define as the specification of its capacity to act -- telling us what it can and cannot do. (Note that this is not the kind of "essence" defined by Aristotle, the kind that defines a species, but can vary between individuals in a species.)

When something acts on our senses is is doing one of the many things specified by its essence and so is providing us with incomplete information on its essence. (Perhaps it's looking like a duck, quacking like a duck and walking like a duck, but not revealing everything it can do.) When we become aware of the object's action on us we are informed by it. (The logical possibility that it could not do what it is doing to us is eliminated -- thus meeting Shannon's definition of information). Thus, our act of awareness raises the physical action of the object on us to the logical order.

So, if it's looking, quacking and walking like a duck its likely eliciting the concept <duck>. Of course it is logically possible that the other acts it can do, the acts it has not revealed to us could give us pause. Perhaps it can also act like a demon, fulfilling Descartes's worst nightmare. So, our knowledge of its essence is incomplete and somewhat conjectural and constructive. Still, we are justified in calling it a "duck," even if it is a very special kind of duck.

But in what you're saying, I can't see anything that evolutionary materialism couldn't account for. — Wayfarer

Of course, I disagree on many grounds that I have argued in detail in my book. Here are a few:

First, there is the fundamental abstraction of natural science which begins by abstracting away all data on the knowing subject as in favor of fixing attention on the known objects of the physical universe. Consequently, natural science is bereft of data on the knowing subject and its correlative intentional operations. As natural science lacks lacks these concepts and data, it cannot possibly connect these concepts to its knowledge of the physical world -- as required to reduce subjectivity to physicality.

Second, as David Chalmers has pointed out, in over 2500 years of materialist reflection, no progress has been made on the "hard problem of consciousness." Indeed, Danial Dennett, a naturalist, has shown at length in Consciousness Explained, a naturalistic model of consciousness is impossible. The relevance of this is that unless one can show what kinds of genetic modifications and consequent physical changes would produce consciousness, any appeal to the mechanisms of evolution is moot.

Third, unless you give subjective awareness and its correlatives independent ontological status, the only rational position is epiphenomenalism, which is to say that, while we have awareness, it has no physical consequences. But, if epiphenomenalism is true, then no mutation that gave us a glimmer of awareness could have a physical effect. Without a physical effect, it cannot impact reproductive fitness. If it does not impact reproductive fitness, the mechanisms of evolution cannot select it. So, evolution cannot explain the advent of awareness.

One response to this is that awareness could be the accidental concomitant of the evolution of some other, selectable feature. That is simply to admit that evolution does not explain the advent of awareness -- that it is an accident of unexplained origin.

Finally, no physical process can separate what is physically inseparable, but distinct in thought. For example, how could a purely physical process form separate representations of action and passion (acting and being acted upon) when they never occur separately?

I am trying to argue that the mind, when it comprehends meaning, sees something which can't be accounted for in neurological terms. — Wayfarer

I agree. My example of the distinction of action and passion forms a prime example.

I am trying to develop an argument for how it can be considered real apart from the in-principle account provided by science. — Wayfarer

I suggest that you look at the difference between formal and instrumental signs in Henry Veatch, Intentional Logic. It shows that physical representations are not the same kind of signs as ideas.

That is very close to the point that I'm trying to get it - that h. sapiens possesses a faculty which is of a higher order to sense-knowledge, but which is occluded or ignored in a lot of modern thinking. — Wayfarer

Again we agree. I am suggesting that awareness is the sine qua non of reason.

No, observations all involve action. In seeing, for example, the object is illuminated (light acting on it), scatters light (the object reacting), and our eye receives some of the scattered light (reacting to it) and sending off a neural pulse which involves complex interactions in and between neurons. So there are all kinds of actions going on.

And this does not even touch upon the act of will directing our attention and the sequence of acts that initiates.

Sure, I have a few videos on my YouTube channel on quantum theory if you care to know more.

I assume that we are discussing the quantum version of the experiment. As with Young's optical version and the water version, the observed interference pattern confirms the wave theory and definitively falsifies the particle theory.

So, what about the "dots" in the screen? Don't they show that we are dealing with particles? No, not at all. We have to remember that all detectors are made of bull matter, all bulk matter is made of atoms, and all atoms have quantized energy levels occupied by their shell electrons. Detection events all involve electrons transitioning to higher energy states. This happens in atoms that are localized by the electric potential well of the nucleus, and it happens in individual electrons.

So, when a wave impinges on a detector, it excites the electrons in a number of atoms' electrons and those electrons interact, exchanging energy, just as they do in thermal energy exchange. These interactions are non-linear and so chaotic in the mathematical sense. Eventually one electron accumulates enough energy to effect what we interpret as a detection event. Since the atoms of the detector are localized, so are the detection events -- giving us the dot pattern we observe.

Because electron-electron interactions are nonlinear, they cannot sustain a linear superposition of states, and so the wave function (which previously did not involve nonlinear electron-electron interaction terms) collapses.

How does this reflect my philosophical approach? Just as I look at sensation and knowledge by considering the interaction of the object with the sense or the intellect, so I consider quantum observations by giving equal weight to the physics of the system being observed and of the detection process.

Also, as Aristotle noted, physical states do not involve numbers. At most they are countable and measurable. The measure number that we obtain, then, depends on the details of the measurement process and does not pre-exist in nature. Only a potential to be measured is found in nature. The actual measure depends jointly on the system state and the detector state.

All observations are actions. Not all actions are observations.

You're saying that a count of one (actual possibility) and a count of more than one (actual possibility) are simply different ways talking about the same cardinality? — Dfpolis

Yes, because it's 'one' decision. — Pseudonym

I'm not talking about the count of decisions, but of possible actions.

But don't you see how your 'experience' is not the same as others? — Pseudonym

Of course I see that every individual has different life-experiences. That is not the issue. The issue is that no one has an experience base that can justify the determinist's view of causal necessity against the critique of Hume. Just as we can abstract away the details of what we are counting to come to an understanding of numbers, so we can abstract away the details of individual experiences of event succession to see the soundness of Hume's critique.

No, it can't possibly tell you that because you only did one or the other — Pseudonym

I am talking about what we know before the decision, not what we know after (as you are here). We know what is in our power by seeing (1) what were were able to do in the past and (2) knowing that we have suffered no debilitation or other impediment since then.

You can't possibly say whether it was in your power to take the other choice because you didn't try it. — Pseudonym

This is a nonsensical claim. It misunderstands the nature of potential. Many contradictory outcomes may be possible, not withstanding the fact that only once can be actual.

Do you realise how arrogant this sounds? Like anyone who doesn't agree with you just isn't trying hard enough. — Pseudonym

It is not in the least arrogant. It is how I approach texts. I stand beside the author, trying to see what he or she saw and wants me to see. If you can't bring yourself to do the same, you're not entering into the spirit of dialog, only looking for sniping opportunities.

he question, lest we lose track of it, is how linguistic analysis will resolve my difference with a determinist? — Dfpolis

It won't. What it might do is get you to see that there is nothing further to be resolved. It's like one person describing the field as 'emerald green' and another describing is as 'like a sea of grass' and then you arguing with them assuming they therefore think the grass is blue. Both of you are describing grass, you're just picking out different aspects of it in your language. — Pseudonym

This is the most absurd claim I've read from someone serious in a long while. You're saying that a count of one (actual possibility) and a count of more than one (actual possibility) are simply different ways talking about the same cardinality? Your proposal rejects the Principle of Contradiction as well as basic arithmetic.

The point they disagree on is exactly the point at which actual experience ceases to provide any further data. — Pseudonym

No, this is not the case. The determinist is claiming, against Hume's analysis of necessity in time-sequenced causality, that the temporal sequence of my acts is necessary. I am pointing out that this claim is unjustified by experience, and so we have no reason to believe that my decision is necessitated.

This is neither a linguistic problem, nor one for which there is inadequate experiential data.

It 'feels like' we have choices, but that's as far as we can examine it by self-reflection. — Pseudonym

No, again. "Feels" do not enter into consideration. Experience tells me that it is in my power to go to the store and it is equally in my power to stay home. So, based on experience, two (actually many more) possibilities are equally in my power -- which is my claim.

Like any story, different people will pick out different aspects, and like any description it is contained entirely in language, and is entirely a social act to communicate to another. — Pseudonym

No, it is not like a story. Stories are fictions, which means that they are not tied to our actual experience as philosophical analysis is. Yes, people project different aspects of reality into their conceptual space, but those aspects cannot contradict each other 9they cannot tell us that one is more than one).

How we communicate is indeed a social act. What we communicate need not be culturally or socially determined. The problem of free will, like most philosophical problems, is not about how we communicate, but about the adequacy of the thoughts we communicate to our experience of reality.

The point in highlighting the circularity of definition was not to undermine the concept of defining a word at all, but to emphasise how blunt a tool it is — Pseudonym

Definition is only blunt if one is unwilling to look beyond the words to the reality they point to. If, instead of standing beside me, looking in the same direction as me, and trying to see what I see -- if, instead of that, one remains fixated on the words, seeing language not as a means of indicating intelligibility, but as a closed system, then yes, definitions are a very blunt tool indeed. When to stop is when the dialog partner is unwilling to try to see what one sees.

The slit experiment seems to be reviving idealism given that we supposedly change the universe by observing it. — Martin Krumins

Of course we change the universe by observing it. We are part of the universe and our observations change both us and the objects we observe.

The idea that we somehow stand apart, that what we do, including our observations, doesn't matter is, and always was, simply wrong. Our observations on the human scale may not change things much, and so we can often neglect the changes we make. But, on the quantum scale, the interactions necessary to make an observations cannot be neglected. So, there is no difference in principle between the observations we make in everyday life and those we make at the quantum level -- it is simply a matter of when it becomes impossible to ignore the disturbance our observations invariably make.

This does not mean that we must become idealists. We are observing physical reality, and its intelligible features inform us -- reducing what is logically possible to what is actually the case.

The problem is that before we observe reality is sensible, intelligible and perhaps measurable, but not sensed, known and a set of measure numbers. Thus, in physics, the actual measure number depends not only on what we are measuring, but also on the process we employ to measure it. None of this should be surprising, or make us reject realism.

To be a realist is to hold that what we observe informs us, but it informs us in a way that is limited by our perspective, senses and so on. It does not inform us exhaustively.

When Dfpolis says we don't need anything more than for an explanation, they are saying we need is experience of the right concept itself-- e.g. the crispness of the apple, the triangularity of various triangles, etc. There is no higher or more foundational order than these necessary concepts. The existence (or non-existence) of human reason/experience has no impact upon these. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Thank you.

I don't think I would say that concepts have an intrinsic necessity. They result from an subject-object interaction between say, a human and a tree. Since both are contingent beings, the concept resulting from their interaction must also be contingent.

Animals can learn, and even display problem-solving, along with empathy, aggression, compassion, and many other abilities. — Wayfarer

The brain processes most data without a hint of consciousness. Philosophers have long noted that even complex sensory processing can be automatic, absent awareness. Aquinas cites Ibn Sina's observation that citara players don't pause between chords since they're predetermined.  William James notes Rudolph Lotze pointing tof writing and piano playing as similar activities.  Roger Penrose remarks that people can carry on conversations without paying attention.  Reductionist J. J. C. Smart proffers bicycle riding as his example.  Psychologist Graham Reed studied time-gap experiences in which we become aware of the passage of time after being lost in thought. In my own case, I've found that I've been driving safely (on automatic pilot as it were) while thinking about some issue. By the time I realize this, I may have missed my exit. Thus, complex sensory processing and response need involve no awareness.

So, it's not merely the fact that a behaviorist model works for animals, but also that we ourselves experience complex sensory processing without subjective awareness.

That is a very basic form of generalisation, and 'crispness' hardly a stand-in for the scope of universal judgements generally. — Wayfarer

This is not a generalization on the Hume-Mill model of induction. I'm not starting with one or a few cases and then hypothesizing that all others are like those I've examined. Instead, it is an abstraction in which we see that the structure of a judgement is independent of what is being judged -- just as we come to arithmetic by seeing that the act of counting is independent of what is being counted.

The example is simple, but the model is quite general. How can the judgement <A is B> be true if the object(s) that evoke <A> are not Identically the object(s) that evoke <B>? Suppose I'm unaware that object(s) that evoke <A> also evoke <B>. How would my judgement be justified? Or, if I judge <A is not B>, isn't it because I'm aware that the object that evokes <A> doesn't evoke <B>? So, a judgement is simply my act of awareness of identity (or lack of identity, for negative judgements) of source for the subject and predicate concepts.

Maritain calls this "dividing to unite." We distinguish notes of intelligibility in abstraction and then reunite them in judgement.

For Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and other ancients and medievals, the main reason why the mind has to be immaterial concerns its affinity to its primary objects of knowledge, namely universals, which are themselves immaterial.

Am I saying that intelligibility, information is material? Not at all. It belongs to the logical order.

My rejecting Descartes's misguided notion that we're composed of two things or two kinds of "stuff," Isn't rejecting the difference between the physical and logical orders, or between materiality and intentionality. I see both material and immaterial aspects of reality.

How can we judge that a particular is a universal if particulars and universals are never found in the same theater of operation? — Dfpolis

I did address that - this is a question of the 'synthetic unity of consciousness' - 'synthetic' in the sense of there being a faculty which draws together (synthesises) the differing elements of sensation, perception and judgement into a united whole. — Wayfarer

This sounds like you are agreeing with me and rejecting Aquinas view that the intellect can't know particulars -- for that is what it means to say there is "a faculty which draws together (synthesises) the differing elements of sensation, perception and judgement into a united whole." This faculty has to be able to recognize particulars ("the differing elements of sensation") and universals ("the ... elements of ... judgement). So, it cannot be sense, nor can it be an intellect that can only deal with universals.

It is an experiential fact that we are aware of both particulars and universal concepts, so awareness meets all of your criteria for your synthetic faculty. It is also an experiential fact (noted by Ibn Sina, Aquinas, Lotze, James, Penrose, Smart and Reed among others) that we can sense, and respond to sense in complex ways, without a shred of subjective awareness. Thus, subjective awareness is not an aspect of our sensory faculties. It can only be what Aristotle called nous (noos = vision), i.e. intellect.

And actually the faculty is involved in doing that is still somewhat mysterious to neuro-science - that is an aspect of the 'neural binding' problem (as I think we discussed). — Wayfarer

Yes -- the question of how Aristotle's phantasm is formed. I have a hypothesis on that in my book.

That amounts to much more than simply a judgement about a quality. — Wayfarer

I am not restricting judgements to qualities.

“Abstraction, which is the proper task of active intellect, is essentially a liberating function in which the essence of the sensible object, potentially understandable as it lies beneath its accidents, is liberated from the elements that individualize it and is thus made actually understandable — Wayfarer

This is a rejection of Aquinas' explicit doctrine. He is clear that we have no direct knowledge of essences, but only glimpse them by reflecting on sensible accidents.

I do maintain that central to them is the acceptance of the 'reality of intelligible objects', which is that these forms and ideas are real in their own right i.e. their reality is not derived from their being in individual minds or brains. — Wayfarer

I accept the reality of intelligibility. Still, as an Aristotelian Thomist, I reject the notion that universals are actual outside of the minds thinking them. What exists in individuals is potential universals (aka notes of intelligibility) -- not actual universals.