If according to your philosophy, all knowledge is gained by experience, then dogs, horses and cows ought to be able to speak and count — Wayfarer

Really?

I assume that the unstated premise here is that dogs, horses and cows know as we know, If not, your claim makes little sense.

I think that the behavior of known non-human species can be explained by the known mechanisms of neural data processing -- without positing that they aware in the sense that makes intelligible contents known contents. If you have evidence to the contrary, I would be glad to consider it.

Neuroscience has done a good job in showing how neural nets can acquire and employ information. Their models do not require a knowing subject or an agent intellect because they do not involve the formation or deployment of concepts.

You seem to think that I'm claiming that sensory experience alone is sufficient for concept formation. I make no such claim. I have always said that concepts require the operation of awareness, Aristotle's Agent Intellect (nous poetikos).

That judgment is an IBE — Relativist

I have looked up "IBE" and still have no idea what you are referring to.

The same process is involved with historiography (which is also unfalsifiable, in principle). — Relativist

Which shows that there are rational approaches to reality other than the hypothetico-deductive method.

What you are "aware of" is belief. — Relativist

I can't imagine why you feel competent to comment on what I am aware of.

If I am aware of reality, most people in our culture would call that "knowing" reality.

If I choose to treat a proposition as true, most people in our culture would call that "a belief" -- especially if I did not have sufficient grounds to know it is true.

Even if your belief has sufficient warrant for knowledge, it is still belief. — Relativist

Knowledge is not a species of belief. I can know things are true, but chose not to believe the, especially if believing them would cause me pain. Again, Decartes tells us he was in his chamber when he was doing his philosophical reflection, but chose to doubt it -- thus knowing, but not believing. That would be impossible were knowledge a species of belief, as many contemporary philosophers teach.

Although the terms have many analogous uses, primarily, knowing is an act of intellect, and believing is an act of will. That is why Descartes' methodological doubt does not have anyting to say about knowing properly so-called.

there are indeed contradictory metaphysical accounts — Relativist

I never doubted that. The question is, are there contradictory accounts based on sound methodology?

in spite of the fact they are constructed just as you describe - based on "awareness of how the world interacts" with the metaphysician — Relativist

I am still waiting to see the sound arguments leading to contradictions.

You are claiming that in certain types of change, "substantial change", there is a need to assume this "active potency". — Metaphysician Undercover

No, Aristotle is claiming that. I'm merely agreeing.

In natural living things, the source of substantial change is the soul of the living being. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, Aristotle considers this possibility in Physics i, 9 and rejects it, because the form of a thing is simply its actuality and what makes a thing actual (its form) can't be the same thing that makes it not actual when it ceases to be. That would be a contradiction.

Nor can it be the new form, because the new form doesn't exist yet.

My interpretation is that substantial change, generation and corruption, whereby one thing ceases to be, or another thing begins being, requires a soul. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, when coal burns and becomes CO2 and ash, where is the soul?

Matter, or hyle, is the principle by which the continuity of substance is understood — Metaphysician Undercover

No. It is the principle of continuity in substantial change. You need to read Aristotle's discussion of the kinds of change. In it, substantial change and accidental change are equally changes.

I watched the second video, and noticed you asserting definitions of "existence" (power to act) and "essence" (specification of possible acts). These can be defined differently but equally plausibly, and this will lead one in different directions. — Relativist

You can define terms in any number of ways. Definitions are not claims about reality. They're ways of clarifying our meaning. If you use a different, incompatible, definition, it does not make either of us wrong. It just means that we're discussing different things.

The coherence of truth derives from the self-consistency of reality.

Yes, but the truths of reality are not apparent, and much of reality may be hidden to us. Consequently we need to apply good epistemology to identify what should be believed, and when we should withhold judgment. — Relativist

We agree.

I'm sorry, but that's absurd - you have some beliefs about metaphysics, and you draw inferences from those beliefs. — Relativist

No, I have some awareness of how the world interacts with me and I draw conclusions based on that awareness.

You make a good case for looking beyond coherence -- considering adequacy to reality instead.

Instead?! Surely you misspoke. — Relativist

Conclusions adequate to reality will automatically be self-consistent. So, self-consistency is not a separate consideration.

Note that this establishes a potential basis for abductively (as IBE) judging metaphysical claims. — Relativist

Falsification is not abduction. It is the basis for a sound deduction by the modus tolens,

I prefer Kant's 'transcendental idealism' — Wayfarer

I can't think of a single reason to support Kant's Transcendental Idealism. He invented it to avoid Hume's very sound analysis showing that time-sequenced ("accidental") causality is not necessary. Then, having done so, he invented anomalies that would not otherwise exist (such as the opposition between a supposedly necessary determinism and free will). It's better to go back to the Aristotelian moderate realism and avoid all these confusions.

But what scientific realists advocate is actually what Kant would describe as 'transcendental realism', i.e. the implicit acceptance that the world would appear just as it is, were there no observer. — Wayfarer

I would call that naive realism. Just because a Fuji apple, illuminated by by white light. has the objective capacity to evoke a red-quale in me does not mean that the apple has objective "redness." If I illuminate a "red" apple with green light, it will look black.

So, what our sensory interactions with the world reveals is the world's objective capacity to interact with our senses. This capacity is real, but potential until the world is actually interacting with our senses. So, it is not that we impose forms of sensation orforms of thought on the world. It is just that we activate some of the world's potential modes of interaction, and not others. We don't sense how Fuji apples scatter infrared our untraviolet light because we can't see infrared our untraviolet light. So, we know reality, but we don't know reality exhaustively.

We can reflect this in formulating our ontology by saying that existence is convertible with the capacity to act in reality, and essence is the specification of an object's capacity to act. Since actual sensory interactions give us information on (but do not exhaust) an objects possible acts, they inform us about the essences of things without beginning to approach divine omniscience. Necessarily, sensation also informs us of its object's existence.

Thus, phenomenal sensations put us in touch with noumenal reality, just not exhaustively.

But the entire vast universe described by science, is still organised around an implicit perspective - in our case, the human perspective, which imposes a scale and an order on what would otherwise be formless and meaningless chaos. — Wayfarer

I certainly agree that our knowledge is a projection (dimensionally diminished map) of reality. it is limited by perspective, by our limited sensory modalities and by the conceptual space we employ in representation and analysis. That does not mean that we impose order on nature.

First, we are not "apart" from nature, but part of nature. So, it is silly to say that order is not found in nature because we are its source. Since we are part of nature, necessarily, any order found in us is order found in nature.

Second, I see no evidence that we are the sole or even the main source of the order we find in nature. If order is found in our sensory life, then it is found in the interactions informing our sensory life. And those interactions are informed as much by their objects as by their subjects. How can completely disordered objects participate in orderly interactions?

Meaning is a semantic relation. Prescinding from theological considerations, it is a truism that there is no meaning apart from agents such as ourselves able to impart and interpret meaning. This is not a statement about insensate reality, but about the nature of semantics.

"Form" is quite different than "meaning" because it is not semantic, but constitutive, Form specifies an object's actuality -- the specific ways it can act here and now. If different kinds of objects did not have different forms, they would not interact with us in different ways. If an object did not exhibit continuity of form, it could not interact with us in similar ways over time. So, forms, unlike meanings, do not depend on subject-object interactions for their reality. They are ontologically prior to such interactions. If an object could not interact with us in this way, it cannot interact with us in this way.

for it has passed through the machinery and manufacture of the brain, and has thus come under the forms of space, time and causality, by means of which it is first presented to us as extended in space and ever active in time.

Of course, there is no evidence that the human mind imposes "forms" as those of space, time and causality. So, before bringing in the vast structure of post-Kantian thought, you need to show that its foundations are deeper than Kant's unwillingness to accept Hume's counter-cultural observations.

Whether it exists, or the mode in which it exists, is exactly what is at issue. As you no doubt know, this question is at the heart of the so-called 'Copenhagen interpretation' which says there's not an electron lurking within the probability wave until we measure it; the probability wave is all there is, until the measurement is made. — Wayfarer

There are a lot of mutually incompatible conjectures that call themselves "the Copenhagen Interpretation," and even more interpretations that do not. I assign no evidentiary weight to the many "interpretations" of quantum theory. I am happy to discuss the actual physics of the matter -- as supported by observational data and the successful application of mathematical formulae.

Quantum physics uses a deterministic formalism for everything other than observations. I have good, physical, reasons to think that the relative unpredictability of observations is epistic, not ontological. (it can be understood by modelling detection events using multi-electron models in a fashion consistent with other successful applications of the same physics.

But you have to know what 2 denotes - in other words, you have to be able to count - before you can make any deductions about the composition of water molecules. — Wayfarer

That's exactly what i said. The concept <2> arises from counting operations, not from the mystical apprehension of a Platonic Idea, *2*.

It's the fact that 2 = 2 and always has an invariant meaning that makes it a universal. — Wayfarer

What makes <2> universal is that it applies equally to all real and possible sets of two elements.

'thought is an inherently universalising activity - were materialism true, then you literally could not think'. — Wayfarer

Almost. Abstraction is universalizing, Awareness of a particular is also a form of thought, and is not universalizing.

I have no problem with the notion of incorporeal reality. I have a problem with substantial universals and with exemplar ideas.

No I don't think there's any surprise here. I know some physicists, and they recognize that the laws of physics are descriptive principles based in inductive reason, and not representative of some "laws of nature" which are operating to cause matter to behave the way that it does. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have already said that the laws of physics are human descriptions. I agree that these are arrived at inductively. When I say "laws of nature" I am not discussing the laws of physics, but that which they approximately describe -- the cause of the particular phenomena that are the evidentiary basis of our inductions.

However, when one goes on to say the laws of physics are "not representative of some 'laws of nature' which are operating to cause matter to behave the way that it does" one is making a claim inadequate to the actual practice of physics. For example, we explain the time-development of the cosmos in terms of the laws of nature. This makes no sense if the only "laws" are descriptions formulated by modern thinkers. Why? Because such laws did not exist during the epochs of the universe they are supposed to have effected. It is also difficult to see how human descriptions could effect purely physical process, even at the present time. Finally, descriptions that describe no reality are, by definition, fictions. If we're willing to imbue fictional descriptions with explanatory power, we should all study J. K. Rowling more closely.

Thus, unless the laws of physics are more than fictions, there is no reason to think that physics has any application to reality. I conclude that those holding these views are voicing philosophical dogma rather than reflections on the actual practice of physics.

There is no basis in reality to assume that there are corresponding active laws of nature causing the occurrence of what is described. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, your claim is that physics is a species of fiction writing.

let's say that there is a descriptive law which says that if the sky is clear, it is blue. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a hypothesis contrary to fact. In fact, it is not even a good generalization. Clear night skies are not blue.

Do you have an actual example you can use to make your point?

the reason why the sky is blue is not that there is a law acting to make it that way. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is false. We explain why the sky is blue by applying laws dealing with the scattering of light, which are based on Maxwell's electrodynamics.

The activity here, which produces "the observed behaviour of matter" is the activity of observation. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are confused. Generally, our observations inform us of activity that happened before we observe it (in the case of astrophysics, often billions of years before).

Our observational interactions usually play an insignificant role in the activity being observed. Of course there are exceptions to this, such as quantum observations.

Hallucinatory things may be measured. — Metaphysician Undercover

First. I am not sure what you have in mind here. How do you measure a hallucination?

Second, hallucinations have a basis in reality. It's just not the basis that normally produces the "image." For example, instead of being caused by a pink elephantine animal, the image may be due to an intoxication induced neural lesion

So just because one provides a measurement of something, this does not mean that the measured thing is real. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, you're saying we can have hallucinations with no real cause?

Imagine that I find Bigfoot's print in my backyard and I take a measurement of that footprint. So I have a measurement of Bigfoot's footprint, but the marking I measured wasn't really a footprint from Bigfoot, it was caused by something else. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not sure how you confusing "something else" with Bigfoot advances your case. I never said you had to know what it was that you were measuring, just that it had to be real to be measured. In your example, the footprint (which is what you are measuring) is quite real.

A faulty description of the thing measured means that the measurement is of a non-existent thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is nonsense. A man robs a store. On the way out, he passes height marks by the door and is measured to be 6'2" tall. A witness says he has blue eyes, but really he has brown eyes. By your logic, the robber does not exist.

You are completely ignoring the creative, imaginative, aspect of ideas. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. I've said that we often bridge our ignorance with constructs that are not adequately supported by evidence.

Ideas are an act of the subject, not an act of the "objective features of reality". — Metaphysician Undercover

Actually, ideas result from a subject-object interaction, not from either in isolation.

"Measurement" is an act carried out by the measurer. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Measurement" is an act carried out by the measurer. The thing being measured need not be active at all, in order for it to be measured. — Metaphysician Undercover

Please explain how this would work in a concrete case. I want to measure my grandson's height. I press a ruler down on the top of his head, and his head presses back (Newtons' third law) as I mark the wall. I want to measure the width of a fabric. I lay a tape measure across it, and compare its marking to the edge revealed by light the fabric scatters into my eyes. I want to weigh out a pound of sugar. I put it on a scale and it presses the pan down against the spring as the dial moves. I want to measure the momentum of a bullet. I shoot it into a ballistic pendulum, and see how far back the bullet moves it.

So, what is your counter example?

you describe it as an act of the thing being measured rather than an act of the measurer — Metaphysician Undercover

No, again. I say that the measurement results from an interaction, not from the act of either in isolation.

We can only measure quantities and intentionality is not a quantity. — Dfpolis

Then there ain't anything to meaningful to talk about. — apokrisis

Would you care to clarify how meaningfulness depends on being a quantity? It sounds like the long discredited claim of Logical Positivism.

Concepts have to be cashed out in their appropriate percepts. And it is clear that you are doing the usual dualistic thing of wanting to claim that intentionality needs to be measured in terms of it being a qualia - a feel, an affect, something mental, something ineffably subjective and hence beyond simple objective measurement. — apokrisis

My, what a bundle of confusion!

1. It seems from the context that by "percepts" you mean sensations of the physical world. The physical world is not something separate from us as mindful creatures knowing it. (I'm not saying that it depends on us for its existence, but rather, when we think and speak of it, we do so as part of nature, not as "gods" looking down on it.) Our intentions occur in, and are part of, the natural world. We are only able to think <physical world> because our intellect allows us to distinguish aspects of reality that are physically inseparable. The physical world as I conceive it is inseparable from me conceiving the physical world -- and so inseparable from my intentionality.

2. There is no a priori reason to give precepts of the physical world a more privileged standing than our awareness of mental acts. And, you can offer no a posteriori reason because your methodological dogmatism prevents you form considering, let alone judging, the data of self-awareness.

3. In speaking of "qualia," you violate your own methodological axiom, because the concept <qualia> cannot be "cashed out in ... appropriate percepts" of the physical world.

4. I am not a dualist, nor am i "doing the usual dualistic thing of wanting to claim that intentionality needs to be measured in terms of it being a qualia."
a. I am not a dualist. I have defined substances are ostensible unities The human capacity to perform different kinds of operations does not transform us into pluralities. Further, we only think of physical and intentional operations as "different" because we project them into different (intentional) concepts. In reality, my intending to arrive at the store and my walking to the store are simply different aspects of the single act of getting myself to the store.
b. I have said intentionality is not a quantity and therefore not measurable. So I'm not claiming
"that intentionality needs to be measured in terms of" anything.
c. I have not raised "qualia" in making my case, nor do I intend to do so.

5. I have not mentioned any "feels." I have pointed out that the act of seeing an apple, for example, not only gives us data about the apple (as objective object), but also about ourselves (subjective object) -- for example that we can see, be aware, direct our attention, etc. None of this involves "feels." So please spare me the typical physicalist pap.

6. As I pointed out above, you have made no case reducing "meaningfulness" to measurability.

7. If you wish to deny that we have a power of awareness, or that in being aware of sensory representations they become actually known, please do so. Just direct your comments to what i actually say instead of what you wish I said.

For a start, it changes the subject at a basic level. — apokrisis

You're quite right. I want to put the conversation on a track that will resolve the problems that have confused Western philosophers since the time of Descartes -- not go around the traditional squirrel cage.

We could say that there is that general quality of first person perspective which makes awareness intrinsically a matter of "aboutness". But that now leaves out the goal-centric nature of an embodied mind. — apokrisis

No, I have already discussed intentions that are commitments to goals -- e.g. my going to the store.

So intentionality ought to be measurable in terms of its objective satisfactions. — apokrisis

First, we have intentions independently of whether our desires are met, and second, knowing is also a kind of intentionality, but generally doesn't commit us to a goal. Still, if satisfaction is a topic that interests you, I encourage you to investigate it.

The aboutness is also always about something that matters — apokrisis

When we first become aware of an aspect of reality, we have no idea if it will be "important" or not. It's only after we have mulled it over, examining how it relates to the rest of what we know, that we come to judge its importance.

So intentionality ought to be measurable in terms of its objective satisfactions. It is not a free-floating subjectivity. — apokrisis

I have not been talking about "free-floating subjectivity" but about subject-object relations.

It can ask the question of what the Cosmos appears to be trying to achieve in general. — apokrisis

This is a philosophical or religious question, not one for natural science, which is concerned with the nature and history of the physical world.

material energy and formal variety are not only both conserved quantities in nature, they are essentially exchangable — apokrisis

I know of evidence supporting this claim. "Formal variety" is not a physical concept, nor is it a conserved quantity on physics. Further, there is no relation in physics linking energy and form as there is linking energy and mass.

Nature - considered as a memory, a record of syntactical markings - is now understood as being composed of atoms of form. — apokrisis

Really?? By whom? What does "atom of form" even mean?

We thus can move on from information as uninformed syntactical possibility — apokrisis

That is not the well-accepted definition of Shannon -- who has defined information as the reduction of possibility -- which is surely not "uninformed syntactical possibility."

As you have completely lost me, there is no point in my commenting on the rest of the post.

When you have no adequate evidentiary basis for a claim, it is made on faith.

My view is that the mind is inextricably involved in every judgement about every matter, even those things that are so-called ‘mind-independent’. — Wayfarer

Of course, for judgements are acts of mind. That does not mean that existence depends on our judgement of existence, a la Berkeley's esse est percipi.

Analogous to: there is no actual electron until some measurement is taken. This is not coincidenta — Wayfarer

Not quite. Necessarily, before anything can be measured, it has to be measurable. If the electron did not exist, it would not be measurable.

Let me suggest that existence is convertible with the capacity to act in some way. For anything to be measurable, it has to respond to our efforts to observe it. Imagine "something" that did not interact with anything in any way. it would be impossible to observe, let alone measure. If if had no interactions, it could not evoke the concept <being>, and so would not be an instance of being.

Real numbers [and the like] don’t begin to exist by virtue of there being someone around who learns how to count. The mind evolves to the point where it is able to count, that is all. — Wayfarer

There's no reason to think numbers exist before someone actually counts -- although nothing can be counted that isn't countable. If you have an argument to the contrary, I'd be glad to consider it.

The same goes for ideas and universals, generally. They are the constituents of the ability to reason but they’re not the products of reason. Otherwise they would be merely subjective or socially constructed. — Wayfarer

Not on the view I am defending. Rather than being baseless subjective or social constructs. ideas are the actualization of objective features of reality, i.e. the intelligibility of the known object.

Let's reflect on your view that universals are real. Lets take *2* (a substantial universal as an example. If this were so, then in knowing the "twoness" of H20, I would either know *2* or I would not. But, if the object of my knowledge were the substantial idea *2*, it would not be the hydrogen in the water molecule. If *2* were not the object of our knowledge, then *2* plays no role in the formation of my concept <2>. So on your theory, either we don't know the "twoness" of the hydrogen in H2O, or *2* plays no role in knowing it. Either way, *2* does play no role in us knowing there are two hydrogen atoms in a water molecule.

Now consider the judgement <a water molecule has two hydrogen atoms>. On my account, the same neural representation that evokes the concept <a water molecule> also evokes the concept <2>. If this were not so, if something else evoked the concept <2>, then we could not attribute "twoness" to the water molecule -- it would belong to whatever evoked it.

On your theory, there are universals: *water molecule*, *hydrogen*, *2*, etc. Presumably, these inform the corresponding concepts: <water molecule>, <hydrogen>, <2>, etc. If so, then what justifies the judgement <this water molecule has two hydrogen atoms>? First, we need a connection between the universals and this water molecule -- raising the participation problem that Aristotle used to destroy Platonic Idealism.

Second, we need connections between these various concepts. On my account this is provided by one thing (this water molecule) having all the required notes of intelligibility -- so that in knowing that object, all the relevant notes of intelligibility are present. On your account, there is no basis in reality for the judgement.

The way I try and express it, is to say that numbers are 'real but not existent', — Wayfarer

This is the problem Aristotle solved with the concept of potential (dynamis). Intelligibility is the power to evoke a concept without actually being that concept. Thus, it is real, but not yet actual.

numbers (and here, 'number' is a symbol for universals generally) don't come into and go out of existence. — Wayfarer

Certainly, intelligible bodies and universal ideas in our minds pass in and out of existence.

But they're real, in the sense that the laws of mathematics are the same for all who think. — Wayfarer

Because they reflect the same notes of real intelligibility.

Intelligible objects must be higher than reason, because they judge reason. — Wayfarer

Your "intelligible objects" must have minds or they could not judge, could not be aware of the truth of a proposition.

It makes no sense, however, to ask whether these normative intelligible objects are as they should be: they simply are, and are normative for other things'. — Wayfarer

It certainly makes sense to ask if norms are justified. We do not receive norms from on high, but develop them as a result of experience.

Joseph Owens — Wayfarer

Yes, he was very learned. I have a book with his collected articles.

And you overlook the fact that this "proper method of metaphysics" leads in multiple directions. — Relativist

There's nothing wrong with fruitfulness. Variety in conclusions don't necessarily mean inconsistency. If two arguments lead to contradictory conclusions, at least one is unsound.

metaphysical theories are contingent upon the the imperfect mental processes that develop them. — Relativist

Following the method I suggested will avoid this. If you have a specific example of contradictory arguments, I would be happy to comment on them.

if you would educate yourself in coherent physicalist metaphysics — Relativist

Coherence is no guaranty of truth. J. K. Rowling tells very coherent tales.

Since metaphysics is concerned with the nature of being, it must be based on our experience of being -- not on a priori assumptions, however "coherent" they may be. That's why I require metaphysical principles be abstracted (not induced) from experience. See my videos "#35 Induction and Abstraction" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VvqcL9LILiA) and "#36 Abstraction & Metaphysics" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s9ohvFQn1J0).

Following a path we find fruitful does not mean other paths are "blind alleys," We all have to judge how to spend our limited time. If you present some pivotal insight(s) I'm missing by not studying Armstrong, I will be glad to discuss them.

Again, keep in mind that there are multiple metaphysical theories. — Relativist

There are also thousands of well-written, coherent works of fiction.

If your arguments persuasive power depends on one such theory, and fails with another, how can it be said to truly have persuasive power? — Relativist

First, the FTA is not "my argument." I use abstraction and deduction in metaphysical reasoning, not probable arguments. That does not prevent me from analyzing the FTA and the counter arguments -- judging their strengths and weaknesses.

Second, not all theories are equally credible. I won't pretend they are.

BTW - a metaphysical theory can be falsified by finding incoherence. — Relativist

I agree. Still, being coherent does not imply being true. The coherence of truth derives from the self-consistency of reality.

physicalism has a problem with consciousness. If not for that problem, I'd lean more strongly toward physicalism rather than being on the fence. — Relativist

It's always good to give reality a bit of weight in your reasoning.

It is contingent on a particular metaphysical theory. — Relativist

No, it is not.

I am agnostic to naturalism/deism specifically because there are coherent metaphysical theories for each. — Relativist

You make a good case for looking beyond coherence -- considering adequacy to reality instead.

"-1" electric charge is a property that exists in every instance of electron. Four-ness exists in every state of affairs that consists of 4 particulars. These are universals. — Relativist

No, they are a bunch of particulars with the same intelligibility -- the same power of evoke concepts.

Until a concept is actually evoked, there is no actual universal.

I'm curious how you would describe a concrete scenario prior to sentient life emerging on Earth with respect to universals. — Andrew M

There were no actual universals prior to subjects thinking them. There was common intelligibility. In the biological world, this can be traced back to the genetics of common descent. In the inorganic world, common structures often (but not always) reflect a common dynamics. For example, I suspect that most planets have the same origin story. Geological laminae are typically due to sedimentation. Spheroidal surfaces are mostly due to surface tension (drops and bubbles) or gravity (large astronomical bodies).

For example, consider a molecule of water consisting of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom. Among the universals here are the kinds water, molecule and atom, the numbers one and two, and the relations between the atoms. — Andrew M

All of these are intelligible aspects of the molecule, not actual universal ideas. If we could see on hydrogen atom, we could form the universal <hydrogen>. Because other hydrogen atoms have the same notes of intelligibility, they have the objective capacity to evoke the same idea <hydrogen>. The universality of an idea rests on each of its instances having the objective capacity to evoke the same idea.

Thus, there is an objective basis for universal ideas, but there are no actual universals until some mind e3ncounters their instances.

there's the second question of whether the relations between the atoms, their structure and their quantity would also have been real prior to sentient life on Earth (i..e, that a water molecule really has two hydrogen atoms independent of mind). — Andrew M

All of these are real and intelligible, but not actually known until someone becomes aware of them.

The one fine point here, made by Aristotle in his definition of "quantity" in Metaphysics Delta, is that there are no actual numbers independent of counting and measuring operations. So, while counting the hydrogen atoms in a water molecule will always give <2>, there is no actual number 2 floating around the molecule.

In the same way, as we learned from Special Relativity, it we measure the distance between the nuclei, the answer will depend on how we perform the measuring operation.

Other, qualitative aspects of cognition are then relegated to the subjective [and implicitly secondary] domain. That is the main characteristic of scientific naturalism, is it not? That what is real is measurable? — Wayfarer

Yes and yes.

Hence the conundrum posed by the ‘observer problem’ in quantum physics. — Wayfarer

Yes, but the observer problem goes even further -- abstracting away the observing apparatus (even though it is physical and subject to physics). Thus, the observer's apparatus is lumped in with the human observer as part of the neglected subjective object.

so I don't hold with the notion of there being substantive qualia at all. — Janus

Nor do I. I see "qualia" as naming the contingent forms of human sensation.

Surely the laws of physics are laws of nature? — Pattern-chaser

I am using these as separate terms of art. By "laws of physics" I mean approximate human descriptions of the ordering relations in nature. By "laws of nature" I mean the laws operative in nature that effect the observed order.

As to the question of how laws of nature relate to human legislation, that is more about naming conventions and the psychology of analogy and association. I am not trying to make any philosophical point from the fact that the same word ("law") is used in both cases -- although clearly Jeremiah thought that the laws of nature were divine ordinances.

I do think I understand your position. I've read Hegel, etc., too. — gurugeorge

Since I haven't read Hegel, and don't particularly want to read Hegel, the fact that you mention him gives me strong reason to think that you're burdening me with (Hegelian) baggage that isn't mine -- and so don't understand my position at all.

The only "subjective object" around is the person knowing, willing, etc., — gurugeorge

Agreed.

that is just the objective human animal accessible to all, and its qualities can be understood scientifically (e.g. its/our means of knowing, its/our capacity for knowledge, etc. — gurugeorge

Of course, the physical aspects of the human animal are available to all, but since the intentional aspects of the human animal have been excluded from natural sciennce by the Fundamental Abstraction, they are not physical. Experience shows that my intentionality is not intersubjectively available, though parts of it can be inferred from behavior. Further, the behaviorist approach to psychology has long since been discredited.

So, what can be known by a purely physical inspection of the human animal is limited, and does not exhaust its intelligibility.

its qualities can be understood scientifically (e.g. its/our means of knowing, its/our capacity for knowledge, etc. — gurugeorge

I agree that we can know our intentional operations "scientifically," if we mean by "scientifically" via empirically based rational analysis (without a priori limits on the kinds of experiential data allowed).

If, on the other hand, by "scientifically" one means to restrict, a priori, the data to the space of physical concepts, then such an approach is both non-empirical (being based on an a priori exclusion of experiential data) and irrational (being based on belief system inadequate to the full range of human experience).

On the other hand, if you mean something like "the knowing subject caught in the act of present knowing," then that's a misunderstanding of what knowledge is.. — gurugeorge

"Knowing" is a term with a vast range of analogous meanings. Preference for any one meaning does not invalidate other meanings of the term, So there is no "misunderstanding of what knowledge is." At most, my preferred meaning is not your preferred meaning. I am happy to concede that, but doing so does not grant your preferred meaning privileged status -- nor do I claim privileged status for my meaning.

I have defined what I mean by "knowing" as "awareness of present intelligibility." If humans are aware of neurally encoded information, then "knowing" in this sense exists. If knowing in this sense exists, there is no rational grounds not to examine its nature insofar as possible. If you wish to examine "knowing" in your preferred sense, I encourage you to so so.

It's actually not a momentary subjective relation in that sense (the momentary, present relation between a notional abstract subject and the abstracted contents of that subject's knowing). — gurugeorge

My definition does not speak to the duration of "knowing." It is not restricted to transient awareness, nor does it require eternal awareness. So, criticisms based on the assumption of a "momentary, present relation" address no essential feature of my concept of knowing. And, to avoid any confusion, I accept that "knowing" in a different sense can name the possession of latent, neurally-encoded contents. In the same way, I'm not considering "knowing how" (= the acquired ability to perform a task) -- and on and on as you note. It's not that there's anything "wrong" with these kinds of knowing - they're just not the kind of "knowing" I'm considering here.

So, now that we're agreed that "knowing" can mean many things, and that knowing in the sense of awareness of present is a subject-object relation, maybe you can say what you are objecting to.

We need to agree to disagree on what Aristotle means by "hyle.

It appears like you have not read "On the Soul", if you think that the movement of living things is due to the activity of matter, and not the form which is called "the soul". — Metaphysician Undercover

1. I have read De Anima a number of times and parts in Greek.

2. You are confusing our understanding of life with our understanding of substantial change (aka generation and corruption). The context in which hyle as a determinate, active potency appears is substantial change -- in which one kind of thing becomes another kind of thing. The soul, which Aristotle defines as "the actuality of a potentially living thing" is the form of a single, living kind of thing -- not the principle of dynamic continuity in substantial change.

How can you be theist and not believe in the soul? — Metaphysician Undercover

God and the soul are distinct issues. One can affirm one and deny the other. I happen to affirm both the existence of God and that of the soul, defined as "the actuality of a potentially living thing." Clearly, every living thing can be alive and is actually alive.

Actually there isn't really any foundation in reality for your concept of "laws of nature". — Metaphysician Undercover

This would come as a surprise to most scientists. We do not see ourselves as engaged in fiction writing, but in describing reality and especially how specific phenomena reveal and fit into the order of nature.

We have descriptive "laws" such as the laws of physics which are really just inductive conclusions. — Metaphysician Undercover

This contradicts the previous sentence. How can you say there is no basis in reality for the concept of laws and then say that we arrive at the concept by induction from an evidentiary basis (a foundation in reality).

Does Newton's hypothesis of universal laws of nature go beyond its evidentiary basis? Certainly. That is the nature of hypotheses. Does that mean that there is no foundation in reality for the concept? Of course not. The hypothesis has been confirmed by over 300 years of observational data.

But just because the inductive conclusions are called "laws" it doesn't really follow that whatever it is in nature that is causing matter to act in consistent ways,.is anything like a "law", it's more like a cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

First, "cause" and "law" are not mutually exclusive terms.

Aristotle and the medieval logicians explained this kind of naming convention. They knew terms can be predicated not only univocally (with the same meaning) and equivocally (with completely different meanings), but also analogically (with different but coordinated meanings).

One type of analogical predication is an analogy of attribution. For example, food and a urine sample are not "healthy" in the sense that a person is healthy; nonetheless, the senses are related by an underlying dynamic. Food is not healthy because it's alive and well, but because eating it contributes to personal health. Similarly, a urine sample is not healthy in itself, but as a sign of good health.

In the same way, the laws of nature are not same as the laws of physics, but they are dynamically related and so laws in an analogical sense.

Whatever it is which acts on matter, causing it to behave in the way that it does, can't really be anything like any laws that we know of. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course the laws of nature don't work like legislative acts. Still, the analogy is sufficient for the "fixed laws" to have been called "laws" or "ordinances" since their first appearance in Western literature (in Jeremiah 31 and 33).

Since you agree that something acts to produce the observed behavior of matter, it is pointless to argue about naming conventions.

Would you agree with me that the matter in motion is just a reflection of the real activity which is the laws in action? — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course. The concept <laws of nature> is one way to think about the order of nature. That does not mean that other ways are wrong. I am discussing <laws of nature> because it plays an important part in our current conceptualization of nature..

It seems to me, then, that you’re actually rejecting Aquinas’ hylomorphic dualism. — Wayfarer

I don't reject hylomorphism, but I do reject Aquinas's version. See my "A New Reading of Aristotle's Hyle" The Modern Schoolman 68 (March, 1991): 225-244 (https://philpapers.org/rec/POLANR).

I don’t think your analysis can account for ‘the unreasonable efficacy [or predictive power] of mathematics’. — Wayfarer

And as I answered before, the integration of constant laws over time gives us the predictive power of physics.

I see the metaphysics of it like this: that the types or forms of things correspond to their original ‘ideas’ in the divine intellect. — Wayfarer

Having been schooled in the Thomist tradition, I have given a lot of thought to this point.
1. The Divine Mind is perfectly simple -- leaving us with no ground for distinguishing diverse ideas in God.
2. Ideas are abstractions. Abstractions leave certain notes of intelligibility behind to focus on others in order to scale the complexity of reality down to human representational limitations. Thus, they are a "stupid human trick," and completely unnecessary in God, Who knows reality exhaustively, "numbering the hairs on our heads."
3. The well-documented evolution of species shows that there are no fixed species "forms."
4. As God is unchanging and so timeless, there can be no before and after in God. Thus, there is no need for exemplar ideas ("design plans") prior to the creation of individual members of a species. In other words, God does not "design" in any way analogous to human engineers.

God does intend what He creates, but we need to avoid thinking of creation in anthropomorphic terms.

The rational soul [unlike the sensory faculties] is able to grasp those forms or ideas by identifying their kind, type, etc; this is the role of the ‘active intellect’. — Wayfarer

I agree that the agent intellect (our power to be aware) actualizes the intelligibility encoded in sensory representations (phantasms) -- giving rise to ideas -- ideas of both species and of accidents. So, I see no reason to believe we're any more aware of essential than of accidental notes of intelligibility. Through experience we come to see what is common and what variable in various examples of a species, and so form, for example, a better defined <human> concept. Aristotle gives us the analogy of a military unit falling in, man by man, until its formation is clear.

Aquinas agrees that we have no direct knowledge of essences, but know them through accidents.

Aristotle’s comments on the ‘nous poetikos’ are regarded as controversial, difficult and obscure and have generated centuries of analysis. — Wayfarer

This is true. The way to avoid the controversy is not to try to get into Aristotle's mind (an impossible task) and not to treat Aristotle as an authority. Rather, we should treat Aristotle as a colleague -- standing beside him, and looking at what he is looking at. When I do that, I ask myself what aspect of my experience is he calling the "agent intellect" (nous poetikos)? What experience makes encoded information actually known to me? This is the phenomenological approach.

It seems clear to me that my awareness makes sensory data actually known. I can react to sensations, automatically (without awareness) and then i do not "know" what I'm doing, but as soon as I become aware of a bit of sensory data, it is no longer merely intelligible,but actually known. Thus, nous poetikos is just Aristotle's name for our power of awareness.

a passage in Augustine on ‘intelligible objects’ that has always been a source of interest to me. — Wayfarer

Yes, St. Augustine is a man of great insight. The more of him I read the more I see.

I also appreciate a sensible and respectful dialogue.

So - I am drawn to a form of dualism, but emphatically not the Cartesian form. — Wayfarer

First, I think we are all pretty much agreed that Galileo distinguished primary and secondary qualities without calling them by those names.

Second, the dualism I see is a consequence of what I have been calling the Fundamental Abstraction of Natural Science. It partitions reality into the physical and the intentional, but one point I hope to make is that physicality and intentionality are not separated in nature -- only mapped onto orthogonal (non-overlapping) conceptual subspaces.

Our conceptual space has a foundation in reality, but its structure is not predetermined. (Making our earlier discussion of Exemplar Ideas even more relevant.) We can abstract alternative concepts and project our experience into the resulting space.

Reading Aristotle, it seems clear that he didn't partition reality into the physical and intentional. The discussion in De Anima, for example, moves fluidly from the physical mechanisms of sensation to the intentional mechanisms of ideogenesis. In Physics i, 9 which I have been discussing in another thread, he explains physical change using "desire" as an explanatory principle. He brings "desire" in again to explain how lesser beings can be moved by the Unmoved Mover.

So, the duality of modern thought is culturally caused -- embedded in the way we have chosen to conceptualize reality.

And so the crucial question becomes how do you measure intentionality in your scheme? — apokrisis

We can only measure quantities and intentionality is not a quantity.

Information and entropy complement each other nicely as measurements in the two theatres of operation as physics and biology are coming to understand them. If you have some personal idea here, then you will need to say something about what would count as a measurement of your explanatory construct. — apokrisis

"Intentionality" does not name a construct. Constructs are inventions designed to bridge our ignorance. The concept of <Intentionality> is evoked when we experience an aspect of reality, the essence of which is to be "about" a target,i.e. that which it intends.

Information is related to intentionality, but quite different. Information is the reduction of (logical) possibility. It can be merely intelligible (capable of being known), or it can be actually known. My knowing information is an instance of intentionality because my knowledge is about what I have been informed of.

Merely intelligible information is not intentional. It's defining characteristic is not being about some intended target, but being an aspect of physical reality. Bits encoded in my computer's memory are electronic states with no intrinsic meaning. (The same computer state can encode many meanings as discussed in my "#24 Mind: Just a Computer?" - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=57466ekUlGE). It is only when my computer's encoded information informs an actual thought that we have intentionality.

Armstrong (a physicalist and realist regarding universals) — Relativist

These seem like incompatible positions. Physics has nothing to say about the logical order and universals belong to the logical order.

I see no reason to think that universals exist independently of the minds thinking them. They have a foundation in reality, in the potential of each instance to evoke the same concept, i.e in the intelligibility of their instances. But, being potential is not being actual.

As universals have no actual existence outside of the mind, they can have no actual relations outside of the mind.

Hume's constant conjunction makes the success of science surprising — Relativist

If that is all you are thinking about, it certainly does. Hume was not addressing the ground of necessity in nature, but the ground of our idea of necessity. So, we need to look beyond Hume's epistemological analysis to a more ontological one.

it doesn't appear to be consistent with your thesis of intentionality, and that seems a flaw for your position. — Relativist

I am not sure what flaw you are thinking of. So, just explain how the concurrent ("essential") causality of the laws of nature can give rise to Humean-Kantian or "accidental" causality (time sequence by rule). If the laws remain the same at each instant of time, integrating their operation over time gives us laws with a determinate connection between successive events. So constant intentionality explains the success of physics. (As anticipated by Jememiah.)

Yes, many people think hypothetical reasoning is the only kind of reasoning.

I meant "is an argumentum signum quia," of course. I corrected my post.

Subjective experiences are "tokens of types of experiences such as knowing and willing" only in the case of knowing and willing about one's subjective experiences. (I had a dream, wish I didn't feel anxious, etc.) — gurugeorge

I think we are misunderstanding each other. By "subjective experiences" I don't mean experiences, such as dreams, devoid of objective content. I mean experiences informing us about our self as a subject in a subject-object relation.

I pointed out earlier that even our most objective experiences inform us not only about a physical object (the objective object, e.g. what we're looking at), but also about ourselves as experiencing the physical object (the subjective object, e.g. ourselves as able to see, know, direct our attention, etc.).

The Fundamental Abstraction of natural science, then, focuses on the objective object (the thing seen and known) to the exclusion of the subjective object (us seeing and knowing).

As I said, I can't remember where I encountered that item of information, but a google search yielded this:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Primary/secondary_quality_distinction — Janus

Thank you for the reference. I think the proper formulation is to say that secondary qualities depend on the relation of particular sensory modalities to physical conditions, while primary qualities are independent of particular sensory modalities.

I think that tastes, odors, colors, and so on are no more than mere names

With respect to Galileo, they are more than bare "names." They are modes of sensory interaction.

that we are not aware of their being anything other than various arrangements of the size, figure, and motions of the parts of these objects — Janus

I think Descartes has it wrong as well. We are not aware of the "various arrangements of the size, figure, and motions," any more then we are aware of our brain states when we know the contents they encode. What we are aware of is the action of various kinds of physical states interacting with our senses. These are presented as qualia.

Differences are simply potentiality of values deviation between two observations. — Akanthinos

Differences can be either actual or potential.

The determination of identity is the determination of a set of values. — Akanthinos

Only if the identity in question is quantitative. Two numerically different protons can have identical masses and charges. We know they are numerically different because they stand in different relations to their environment -- including observers.

the FTA CAN be framed abductively (as an IBE), and this is a more comprehensive analysis than what you are arguing. — Relativist

I am discussing the actual form of the argument. You are not. Changing the FTA's form to what it is not gives you an easier target, but doesn't rebut the actual argument. I've shown that the FTA is an argumentum signum quia (depending on our prior experience of works of intellect), not a case of hypothetico-deductive reasoning.

This kind of bait and switch tactic is common with naturalists. Many say, for example, that free will is compatible with determinism, but to make the case, they re-define free will. Others redefine "intent" in a way that excludes our experience of intending. I give numerous other examples in my book.

I am not responding further to this distortion.

if we allow any exception to the principle of causality, we undermine all science.

You're pontificating an absurdity. Science need concern itself with nothing other than identifying laws of nature (how things work) and working toward a basic understanding of what is physically fundamental in the world. — Relativist

You are confused. Any scientist can limit her field of interest, but doing so does not undermine the fundamental principles of science. Specifically, we can rationally confine physics to quantifiable phenomena, but doing so does not posit the existence of uncaused phenomena. As my Becquerel example shows, denying the principle of sufficient reason undermines the structure of science.

Causation refers to something that occurs in the universe, a relation between physical things in the universe. — Relativist

There are many meanings of "causation," but the definition you've given does not describe how the laws of nature cause phenomena. A "thing" is an ostensible unity. The laws of nature aren't "things" that can be pointed to. I'm unsure how you are defining "physical," but if you're referring to objects with localized space-time coordinates, clearly the laws of nature are not "physical things" in that sense.

The laws of nature are real, not because they are "things," but because they are an intelligible aspect of reality. Further, there is no space-time separation between the laws and the events they control. They act concurrently. If the the law of conservation of mass-energy is not operational here and now, mass-energy will not be conserved here and now. Since there is no space-time separation between the law as cause and its effect, there is no physical relation to be discerned.

Still the laws are causes -- we scientists point to their operation when we wish to explain the time development of the universe or the evolution of species.

There's no basis for claiming it to be more than that (such as a metaphysical principle) — Relativist

Thank you for sharing your faith.

Metaphysical principles are no more or less than fundamental lessons of experience that apply to all existence.

So, of course there's an empirical basis for a different, concurrent view of causality. Aristotle's paradigm case of concurrent ("essential") causality is a builder building a house. This is one, unified event with two intelligible aspects linked by identity. The cause is the builder building the house and the effect is the house being built by the builder. These are necessarily linked because the builder building the house is identically the house being built by the builder.

On the other hand, as Hume famously showed, there is no intrinsic necessity to causality considered as the orderly succession of pairs of events. Something can always intervene between separate events.

Either every phenomenon has an adequate explanation, or we have no rational grounds for requiring an explanation for any phenomena.

You're conflating physical causation with explanation. Explanations exist only in minds; causation exists in its physical instantiations. — Relativist

This is pettifogging. "Explanation" has two meanings, one is the aspect(s) of reality that bring about a phenomenon. That is what I am discussing. The other is a representation of how those aspects of reality bring about the phenomenon. You can tell that I'm talking about the reality by my reference to "grounds."

R: " Physicalism entails the non-existence of states that are "logically prior"

Physics problems often specify an initial state that is logically (and temporally) prior to the final state. Any information used as a starting point in reasoning is, by definition, logically prior to the conclusion.

You're conflating explanations (and "problems") with what actually exists. — Relativist

You seem terribly confused. Note that the subject of my first sentence is "Physics problems." Physics problems are mental puzzles that arise out of reflection on the physical world. They are not in the world, but in the mind reflecting on it. Thus, they are part of the logical order. In short, I did not say that "logical priority" is an aspect of the physical world, but of thought about the physical world.

You're merely identifying the agents of causation, ignoring the temporal context - so your account is incomplete. No clear case of causation occurs other than in a temporal context. — Relativist

Of course all thought and writing about reality is incomplete. We think in terms of abstractions that always leave data on the table.

The point is that Humean-Kantian ("accidental") causality is defined as the temporal succession of events according to rule, and so involves time in its very definition. On the other hand, Aristotelian concurrent ("essential") causality involves a single reality considered in different ways so, time does not enter into its definition.

In other words, essential (concurrent) causality does not reflect the emergence over time of a new state. It reflects the fact that in any given state, there are active and potential aspects and the reality of the potential aspect(s) (effects) depends on the operation of the active aspect, aka the "cause."

Of course it's temporal! You weren't thinking of me prior to our initial engagement on this forum. — Relativist

When I say that time does not enter in an essential way, I do not mean that my thinking of you occurs outside of time. Clearly it does not. What i mean is that time is the measure of change according to before and after, and my continuing thinking of you (as opposed to my starting to think of you), involves no essential change. Since it involves no essential change, time does not enter continuing thought in an essential way -- only incidentally.

This again suggests you're considering life an ends. — Relativist

Objectively, life is the end of the process we call "biogenesis," just as the emergence of specific species are the ends of the processes we call the "evolution" of those species. I don't see what objection you can have to me thinking of states that are objectively the end of identifiable processes are ends. What am I missing?

But you haven't provided a reason to think life is an "ends", and you haven't examined the other logical fork (that it is unintended). — Relativist

To say that life is the end of the process if biogenesis is not to assume that it is intended. It is simply an observation. The fact that life is the termination of biogenesis may be evidence that life is in some sense intended, but being evidence for x is not "assuming" x.

Note that Daniel Dennett, a dyed in the wool atheist, makes a lengthy argument that these kinds of processes are intentional in his The Intentional Stance. So, seeing intentionality here does not require one to be a theist.

The claim, "the fundamental constants are a sign of intentionality " simply ignores the possibility that life is just a byproduct of the way the world happens to be, and depends on treating life as an "ends" - which you have not justified. — Relativist

No, it does not. You continue to ignore how heuristic reasoning works. It's not deductive, and certainly not ironclad. Instead, it reflects on analogous cases and concludes that the present case is like them. "Where there's smoke, there's fire," doesn't mean that smoke invariably entails fire -- it just says that fire is a very rational conclusion when we see smoke. It's certainly possible that aliens made the smoke by pouring oil on the exhaust of their hyperdrive, but we've never seen that happen before, while we've often seen fire make smoke.

he fact that multiverse is possible gives it the same epistemic standing as — Relativist

Aliens pouring oil on their hyperdrive exhaust.

You don't seem to understand what I'm referring to. Symmetry breaking is the process by which a physical system in a symmetric state ends up in an asymmetric state. — Relativist

I am sorry, but as a theoretical physicist, I do understand "spontaneous" symmetry breaking. It was investigated by Pierre Curie, who came to the conclusion I gave you: By definition, perfect symmetry can never be broken. As far as I know, no one has ever shown that Curie's analysis is flawed. That does not mean that "negligibly" imperfect symmetry cannot be made manifest by inflation.

Your understanding is decades out of date: the Copenhagen interpretation ... — Relativist

I am not a proponent of the Copenhagen interpretation. I think the best approach is to avoid "interpretations" and look at what physics actually tells us. Still, this is not the forum to discuss interpretations of quantum theory; nevertheless, as long as the equations continue to work, we can be confident that the time-development of unobserved states is deterministic.

So you really have no grounds for dismissing the physical possibility that the observed laws of physics might be a consequence of symmetry breaking ... — Relativist

You are arguing against a position I have not taken.

I am baffled as to how you can justify dismissing one metaphysically possible hypothesis for its ostensible unfalsifiability whilst claiming victory for your preferred hypothesis that is (at best) equally unfalsifiable. — Relativist

You are baffled because you have still not understood what I'm telling you.
1. I am not dismissing one "metaphysical hypothesis." I am dismissing any hypothetico-deductive deductive approach to metaphysics. The proper method of metaphysics is to abstract necessary principles from our experience of reality, then, applying them to concrete experiences, deduce necessary conclusions about the nature of being and our place in it.
2. Independently of the field of application, unfalsifiable hypotheses are unacceptable in the hypothetico-deductive (scientific) method because it can't be applied to them. The method works by feigning hypotheses, deducting consequences of those hypotheses, and testing the deduced consequences against reality. If a hypothesis is unfalsifiable, we can't test it, and so the method is inapplicable. Feigning an unfalsifiable hypothesis is simply stating a faith position.
3. The FTA is an argumentum signum quia. As such, it is not a sound deductive argument, or even a hypothetical argument. It is merely a persuasive case.

I do not think it is worthwhile to continue this discussion, as we are making no progress.

Unfortunately, Aristotle thinks "in some cases the matter .. is such that it can initiate its own motion [italics mine], and in other cases it is not ...".

Until you can explain this statement on your theory, the case is closed. — Dfpolis

I already explained this. In these cases there is a form inherent within the material body, a source of activity called the soul. It's quite well explained in "On the Soul". — Metaphysician Undercover

Sorry, that doesn't explain the text. He does not say that an associated form acts, but "matter .. is such that it can initiate its own motion."

Where he makes the statement you quoted above, he goes on to compare this type of movement with that of a stone. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, stones are natural objects, not artifacts. They fall as a result of their intrinsic nature.

My understanding is consistent with the whole Aristotelian corpus and its historical context. I think we've exhausted this subject.

So the laws cause matter to behave the way that it does, by informing it? I assume that they exist as information then. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, not as abstract information, but as an intelligible aspect of reality.

How could matter interpret the information which the laws provide, in order to act according to the laws, if it is not aware of that information — Metaphysician Undercover

I did not say it interpreted the laws. It simply acts in a uniform, orderly fashion and that uniform mode of action is the foundation in reality for our concept <laws of nature>.

Don't you think that information is useless without something to interpret it? Do you know of any cases where information does anything without something interpreting it? — Metaphysician Undercover

As I said above, we are not dealing with actual information, but with intelligibility. When we become aware of the intelligible order in nature, we form the concept <laws of nature>, which can enter into judgements about reality -- informing us. Until we have a true judgement, there is no reduction of what is logically possible, and so no information.

Well that' a really bad analogy then. — Metaphysician Undercover

All analogies fall short. That's what makes them analogies instead of veridical descriptions.

Why would you even think that matter exhibiting orderly dynamics is a case of matter obeying laws, when this has nothing in common with what we know as "obeying laws"? — Metaphysician Undercover

If there were no note of commonality, there would not be an analogy. The common note is that, both are a source of order in their respective spheres.

As I see it, knowing and willing are objective relations; their intentional objects are not subjective, but objective (and shared, public). — gurugeorge

There is no knowing without a subject knowing, no willing without a subject willing. So, our experiences as subjects are essential data in understanding the reality of knowing and willing.

I'm not denying that there are objective acts we call "knowing" and "willing." Nor am i denying the intersubjective availability of many of their objects. Still, these acts are asymmetrically relational and so cannot be fully understood without examining both terms of the relation.

Broadly I take a view on causality that is Aristotelian and Peircean. — apokrisis

I know Aristotle's views quite well. While I respect Peirce, I don't know as much about him as a should. What should I know of his view of causality?

Which then cashes out in the kind of current physicalism which sees information and entropy as bridging the old mind-matter divide. — apokrisis

It seems to me that the "divide" is between subjectivity considered in isolation and objectivity considered in isolation. If so, the divide can be bridged by considering them holistically. The concepts of subjectivity and objectivity certainly relate to information, but I don't see what role entropy, as a measure of disorder, has to play.

Talk of an "informational realm" is pretty general. — apokrisis

I am not talking about an information realm, but about physical and intentional theaters of operation and their relation.

You can inquire about the location of an event, or the momentum of an event, but not get a complete answer on both in just a single act of measurement. — apokrisis

While this problem is based in reality, it is due to a misconceptualization of reality not to any ontic inconsistency. As Aristotle points out in Metaphysics Delta, real quantities are not actual numbers but specific forms of intelligibility: either countability (for discrete quantity) or measurability (for continuous quantity). Thus, quantum states do not have actual numerical positions or numerical momenta -- rather they are susceptible to location measurements and momentum measurements.

There is no a priori reason to think that different measurement operations will be interference free. The Principle of Quantum Indeterminacy simply tells us that this logical possibility is real. We cannot simultaneously measure canonically conjugate variables (such as position and momentum, time and energy) with arbitrary accuracy. This may be a surprise, but it has no profound metaphysical implications.

your proposal strikes me as having a particular problem. It seems to have to presume a classical Newtonian backdrop notion of time - a spatialised dimension. And modern physics would be working towards an emergent and thermal notion of time as a better model. So any logical propagator would have to unfold in that kind of time, not a Newtonian one. — apokrisis

First, my concept of time is Aristotelian, not Newtonian. "Time is the measure of change according to before and after." I see no conflict between it and any recent development in physics.

Physics does point to a regime, the big bang "before" Planck time, when our <time> concept breaks down -- because the required measurements are impossible in principle. The canonical (Lagrangian and Hamiltonian) formulations of the laws of physics also break down, along with General Relativity and quantum field theory. I have no special insight into how to formulate physics in this regime.

So, I'm quite happy to concede that there are regimes in which our concepts break down. I don't think that'is an argument against them in regimes where they do apply.

But the bare physical world - the world that does not have this kind of anticipatory intentional modelling of its tomorrow - has only its tendencies, not its plans. So it is "intentional" in an importantly different way. — apokrisis

I would agree: Mary has an explicit representation of the "final" state she intends. Nature does not. Still nature has an implicit representation. Except for personal agency, the present state of the universe and the laws of nature fully specify (and therefore represent) the "final" state. Still, the only difference is that one representation (nature's) is merely intelligible, while the other (Mary's) is both intelligible and actually known.

All this is a great advance on the old notion of transcendent laws floating somewhere above everything they regulate in some kind of eternal and perfect fashion. — apokrisis

I do not see that one projection excludes the other. From the initial appearance of laws of nature in Jeremiah until very recently, the laws were seen as both fixed and providential. As James Hannam points out in The Genesis of Science: How the Christian Middle Ages Launched the Scientific Revolution, without this combined perspective we would not have the scientific revolution as we know it.

Yes, the full physical description needs to recognise final and formal cause. — apokrisis

I would say a full philosophical description. Mathematical physics seems to be getting along nicely without these concepts.

So everything can be brought back to the notion of constraints. — apokrisis

I agree that is one conceptual space into which we can project our experience. It has a related set of supporting concepts that can give rise to novel insights. Still, the concept of constraints is not in any way "unique." Constraints restrict possibilities, but information is defined to be the reduction of possibility. So, we can move our representation from the conceptual space of constraints to that of information -- activating a host of new associations and insights. Again, information reflects the Greco-Scholastic concept of <form> with its network of elaborations.

So, I don't see the benefit of prizing one conceptual space above another.


Stepping back, I am reminded of the Scholastic axiom: "whatever is received, is received according to the mode of the recipient." So, I do not expect that your reception of my ideas will mirror my views. Hopefully you will make fruitful new connections.

I would be happy to comment. I follow Aquinas on a number of issues, but depart from him on a few points where he has a Neoplatonic, rather an an Aristotelian, position. Specifically, I reject (1) his notion of prima materia (prime matter) as a completely unintelligible passive potency and (2) his claim that we can have no intellectual knowledge of particulars. This are related positions and it is hard to reject (1) without rejecting (2).

I have published my reasons for rejecting (1) -- "A New Reading of Aristotle's Hyle," Modern Schoolman 68 (3):225-244 (1991) (https://philpapers.org/rec/POLANR)

My main reason for rejecting (2) is that It makes the application of universal knowledge to particulars impossible. To apply any science to reality we need a judgement of the form "This particular is an A" (where A is a universal). On Aquinas's theory this judgement can't be formed by the intellect (which doesn't know any particular), nor can it be formed at the sensory level (because A is a universal).

Now to your text. Brennan gives an accurate and competent presentation of Aquinas's theory. So, let me say where I think it breaks down.

This means that in the case of sense knowledge, the form is still encompassed with the concrete characters which make it particular; and that, in the case of intellectual knowledge, the form is disengaged from all such characters. To understand is to free form completely from matter.

First, this seems to reify the form. Objects are intelligible - they have various aspects the intellect can grasp (notes of intelligibility). A subset of these notes corresponds to each concept the object can evoke in us. One subset evokes the concept <human>, another the concept <tall>, etc. These notes of intelligibility are not separated in the object, which is an ostensible unity (a "substance" = ousia).

Second, while different material objects have different matter (different atoms), we understand that an object is this particular by grasping, intellectually, is place in the world -- its relation to other objects. This individualizing relations are just as intelligible as the notes that define the kind of object we are dealing with. So, yes, the matter of an object does not enter us in cognition, but information that allows us to judge an objects particularity does.

Third, abstraction is not a mystical process that removes the "form" from individuating data. It is simply us attending to some notes of intelligibility to the exclusion of others. So, when he says "To understand is to free form completely from matter," that is simply wrong. (a) An object's matter never enters our senses -- its action does. (b) If it were true, we could never understand anything other than forms (the intelligibility required to evoke species concepts such as <human>). We could not know when and where we were born, how tall we are, or whether we are driving on the right or left side of the road.

Moreover, if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized.

This is simply a dogmatic claim -- and one contradicted by experience. We have universal concepts not only of substantial forms (e.g. humans, cats and planets), but also of accidents (e.g. height, hair color and age).

But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality.

If you read Aristotle's De Anima you will see that concepts arise when the agent intellect actualizes notes of intelligibility latent in the phantasm (bound sensory representation). If we actualize the notes common to a species, we form the concept of a species form, but we can just as well actualize the notes of intelligibility informing us of an object's particular and individualizing traits (its "accidents").

Since the notion of "agent intellect" is very abstract, it is good to ask how this concept relates to experience. What mental act makes neurally encoded information actually known? Clearly, we come to know when we become aware of them. So, the agent intellect is simply our awareness -- and abstraction is focusing our attention, our awareness, on some aspects of experience to the exclusion of others.

Note that the word nous, which Aristotle uses for intellect, is a cognate of noos (vision).

the intellectual stage, wherein agent intellect operates upon the phantasmal datum, divesting the form of every character that marks and indentifies it as a particular something.

I would say that we are in the realm of intellect when ever we are aware. Sensory processing absent awareness is just what Freud called the unconscious mind.

Abstraction, which is the proper task of active intellect, is essentially a liberating function in which the essence of the sensible object, potentially understandable as it lies beneath its accidents, is liberated from the elements that individualize it and is thus made actually understandable.

As you can see, this is not my understanding, nor, I think, that of Aristotle.

The A of "A at T1" and "A at T2" are identical because they are the same A, not because of any other attributes such as composition or spatial location. — Akanthinos

Just to be clear, by A and A' I meant two simultaneous instances of the same type, not one A at successive times. So, I'm not sure that we are considering the same example.

A at different times is numerically one because its successive states are linked by dynamic continuity, not because they are made of the same constituents. It is formally one to the extent that its successive states have the same intelligibility (can evoke the same concepts).

The question was "Can identity give rise to differences?" My claim was that it cannot. So, I pointed out the differences between two formally identical instance of the same type. Differences, being relational, cannot be found by examining one object in isolation. We need to consider their relations.

A is identical to A is identical to A is ... But each instances are different and identifiable. The phenomenal compound of "A on pick 1" and "A on pick 2" are different. — Akanthinos

I do not see how this rebuts my claim. Yes, A is numerically one, but your example is not pointing out a difference in A, but in the picking events. These events are different because they stand in objectively different temporal relations to each other.

Attributes and relations do not constitute objects, they reveal something about them. — Akanthinos

I never said they did. Still, they are our means of knowing objects.

I think it may have started with Galileo — Janus

I would be happy to learn of its roots in Galileo, if any.

Why would we need to be agnostic when intentionality is something neurocognition studies? We have reason to make a definite distinction between brains and universes, purposes and laws. — apokrisis

Three points.
1. I'm anything but agnostic on the existence of God. I am a theist.
2. The points I've discussed in this thread are an insufficient to decide the existence of God. I have not discussed the origin of the laws or what their existence betokens. Even if we say that intentionality betokens an intending mind, that does not tell us that mind is God. So the agnosticism is wrt respect to what has been established, not with respect to the existence of God in general. Elsewhere i have used the continuing operation of the laws to argue the existence of God.
3. The existence of God is a contentious issue that could easily sidetrack the conversation I want to have.

Given that it is probability states that evolve deterministically, then I would say that makes it literally part of the equation. — apokrisis

What evolves deterministically is a wave that can be used to calculate a probability. That does not imply that the wave itself is probabilistic. Observations always involve an interaction between a relatively isolated quantum system and detectors made of bulk matter. We have no way of knowing the detailed initial state of the detectors, and calculating their interaction with a quantum system is beyond our mathematical wherewithal. This twofold ignorance is a sufficient reason to see the relative unpredictability of measurements as epistic rather than ontic.

And classical determinism is an emergent feature of reality at best. — apokrisis

I'm unsure why you think classical determinism is "emergent." "Emergent" means that a feature is logically irreducible to some prior knowledge base. Given that our knowledge of reality is a posteriori, I see no reason to see determinism as "emergent" with respect to some set of prior features. It is just another contingent fact. What am I missing?

Let me say in anticipation, so we aren't talking at cross purposes, that I do not think that human agency is predetermined. The determinism I'm discussing is my best understanding of what physics tells us -- based on years of advanced study and decades of reflection.

So you are taking an approach to the laws of nature that seems really dated. — apokrisis

I am not concerned with whether my views are dated or avant garde. I only want sound analysis consistent with the known facts.

The idea that transcendent laws could some how reach down, God-like, to regulate the motions of particles was always pretty hokey. An immanent view of nature's laws is going to be more useful if we want to make sense of what is really going on. — apokrisis

My view combines Newton's insight that the laws we learn on earth apply to the whole universe (and so are transcendent) with the fact that the laws are inseparable from the matter they act to control (and so immanent).

Sounds good. But I'm not getting much sense of how you mean to proceed from here. — apokrisis

One step is to discard the ill-defined modern concept of "substance" and return to Aristotle's view that ostensible unities are fundamental our understanding of the world. So, we are not a material "substance" interacting with a mental "substance," but single beings who can act physically and intentionally -- which lead us to examine how our intentional acts relate to our physical acts.

Part of the answer rests on the fact that the laws of nature and our committed intentions act in the same theater of operations.

Talk of "laws" is definitely nonsense if we are to understand that as meaning anything like the kind of law-bound behaviour of reasoning social creatures like us. — apokrisis

Clearly, "laws" has different meanings in the natural order and the social order. Still, the meanings are not equivocal, but analogous. They are both sources of order, but the order is effected in different ways. Also, historically, when the notion of fixed laws of nature first appears in Western thought (in Jeremiah), it is taken for granted that they are the acts of a lawgiver.

But the irony, as I say, is that our human concept of law is all about reification. We create these abstract constructs like truth, justice and good, then try to live by them. A lot of hot air is spent on debating their "reality". — apokrisis

While I certainly agree that our abstractions are not "things," we shouldn't assume that they're mere constructs. Abstractions arise from the mind fixing on some notes of intelligibility in reality to the exclusion of others -- so they have an objective basis. Constructs, on the other hand, are invented to fill gaps in our knowledge and have an inadequate basis in reality.

The problem is that they don't work very well - at least to explain "everything". — apokrisis

Exactly.

So first up, science just is modelling and hence abstractions are how it goes about its business. That won't change — apokrisis

I don't expect it to. The Fundamental Abstraction is a useful methodological move. It whittles the complexity of reality down to a scale more proportioned to our limited mental capabilities. The problem is forgetting that it is an abstraction -- committing Whitehead's Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness -- and thinking that physicality exhausts reality (as physicalists do) or, as you suggest, reifying the abstraction into a res extensa (as Cartesian dualists do).

Second, physicalism can now be better understood in terms of information and entropy rather than mind and matter. — apokrisis

I would be happy to see how you develop this line of thought. I am not one, however, to abandon one conceptual space in favor of another. Each gives us a different projection of reality. So employing several can only enrich our understanding.

And that semiotic view even explains why science - as an informational process - should be a business of abstractions ... so as to be able to regulate the world insofar as it is a concrete and entropic realm of being. — apokrisis

The idea that the sciences are defined by their various degrees of abstraction is well developed in Aquinas Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius. Applying the language of information theory to this insight is a recent development.

I am not sure how you see abstractions as "able to regulate the world."

You are welcome.

Why on earth should anybody care about their subjective experiences? They're of interest only to them. — gurugeorge

As philosophers we are not interested in subjective experiences because they a particular to each person, but because they they are tokens of types of experiences such as knowing and willing.

A and A' are not different because they are identical, but because they are made of different atoms and occupy different locations. So, I do not see that you have rebutted my claim that "You can't derive differences (in thought or in the physical world) from identity. If you have differences, it is because there is some real difference giving rise to them."

We care what Ptolemy, Galileo, Newton and Hubble saw, not about their subjective experience in seeing it. — Dfpolis

Eh, we still don't care. — gurugeorge

It's a matter of choice. Some of us do. You seem not to.

This is what I'm trying to get at in this thread: Is it valid to say that an elephant and a rock and the feeling of looking at a sunset are all merely different names/forms of X (consciousness in this case)? Or do these things 'possess' some sort of essence/identity that make them ultimately unique, despite their all being sublated by consciousness? — rachMiel

You can't derive differences (in thought or in the physical world) from identity. If you have differences, it is because there is some real difference giving rise to them. So, yes, it's rational to conclude that our experiences of elephants and rocks can be traced to irreducible differences in their origins.

It's irrational to think that the variety of our experiences is unreal. At the very least our experiences are part of reality.

So I agree that being is not a "prior substrate" and would say that the very notion of a prior substrate, or passive substance, is really incoherent. — Janus

I think we pretty much agree