The categories are the architecture of mind. They are not imposed in the sense that one can either impose them or not. They are the way the mind makes sense of sense data. — Fooloso4

According to Kant's totally unnecessary theory. In reality, ideas such as Humean causality are empirical generalizations.

I get a message stating that I cannot open files from Microsoft 95 or earlier — Fooloso4

I have Windows 10 and can open all my files. Message me with your email address, let me know what you want, and I will send it in a format you can open (docx? pdf?).

A follow up. You skipped right over the point:

According to Kant, it is not that the mind organizes or categories facts ... — Fooloso4 — Fooloso4

Quite so. As Kant has no facts to be categorized, there is no basis for categorization, as the mind categorizes based on recognized content. The theory is incoherent.

his concept of matter or material (hule) would have undergone a radical transformation. He would retain his focus on intelligible wholes and living beings, but he would no longer regard matter itself as something unformed. Matter or material is self-forming. Matter too is "being at work", energeia. A living organism is not simply a whole but a whole of wholes, a system of systems, self-organizing structuring structures. — Fooloso4

Aristotle already said much of this. https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=POLANR&u=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FPOLANR.DOC

So I take then that you don't subscribe to scholastic realism concerning universals? 'Universals, strictly speaking, only exist in minds, but they are founded on real relations of similarity in the world. Scholastic realism goes beyond moderate realism and affirms that universals also exist transcendently; but instead of having a separated existence, transcendent universals exist in God's mind.' — Wayfarer

According to Copleston, Aquinas is a moderate realist. So, Yes, and no. I am a moderate realist, and see God as having exemplar ideas in the sense of intending to create whatever He creates (which is what Aquinas holds). I do not think God has any universal ideas. I explained this in detail in my 2021 article. (http://gilsonsociety.com/files/847-891-Polis.pdf).

According to Kant, it is not that the mind organizes or categories facts, it organizes and categorizes the manifold of sensory intuitions according to the categories of the understanding. — Fooloso4

Not "according to the categories," as I understand him, but by imposing the categories. For example, Hume rightly found causality as he defined it lacked necessity. Kant saw the mind as imposing causal necessity on the succession of events.

At this point in my reading of your work, I find I understand it most coherently by placing it within a pre-Kantian and likely pre-Humean historical context. — Joshs

That is its context, though I agree with Hume's observations on the lack of necessity in "causality" as he defines it.

hat is, despite your embrace of Aristotle, your thinking on God and nature is much more compatible with Enlightenment philosophical ideas circa 1650-1750 than anything produced in Classical Greece. — Joshs

If you read De Anima, you will find that most of my theory is based on its analysis. I found Spinoza's more geometrico is an irrational approach (see my Metaphilosophy article). Leibnitz's monadology assumes Cartesian dualism, which I find wrong-headed. Locke misunderstood the nature of ideas, distorting epistemology. (See Veatch's Intentional Logic.) So, I think you misunderstand me.

This means that in the case of sense knowledge, the form is still encompassed with the concrete characters which make it particular; and that, in the case of intellectual knowledge, the form is disengaged from all such characters. To understand is to free form completely from matter.

I am writing an article for publication in a Thomist journal rebutting this idea. I laid some foundations in my two articles on the evolution in Studia Gilsoniana, where I argue the relativity of the species concept.

I hold, against Aquinas, that (1) we can encode universal representations materially (as exemplified by connectionist models) and (2) have an intellectual knowledge of singulars/individuals.

Aristotle is quite clear that the senses already separate form from matter. We also have intellectual ideas of singulars, which abstract away temporal variations.

This is part of a more general thesis that knowledge involves the union of knower with known: — Wayfarer

I think that the union of knower and known is independent of the thesis that the essence of intellectual knowledge is universality.

for Aquinas “form” is the principle of perfection

This thesis needs elaboration. Form is the principle of actuality of individuals, who strive toward perfect self-realization. There is no universal form. Universals are abstractions, existing only in the minds thinking them. If they are well-founded, they have a sound basis in reality. Still, they have no independent existence and are descriptive, not normative. Thinking that they are normative is the basis of moral condemnation of, and prejudice against, individuals whose self-realization is not "normal."

Is this something considered in your philosophy? — Wayfarer

I agree with the quotation from De Veritate, and speak of it in terms of "shared existence." Shared existence is an essential aspect of knowing.

Aren’t we all Kantians now , including those physicists who extend the scope of Quantum theory? — Joshs

There are certainly many who have been confused by Kant. I am not one.

I know of no major theorist who has rejected — Joshs

I reject it, and I do not find myself alone in doing so.

his key premise, that the mind contributes to the organization of our experience, and this organizing, categorizing and synthesizing activity of the mind is the condition of possibility for empirical knowledge. — Joshs

I see Kant's thesis as the mind imposing, rather than organizing, content. Our minds do organize content, but that is hardly a Kantian insight, as the idea precedes him by millennia, with the traditional definition of scientia as organized knowledge.

The conditions for empirical knowledge were outlined by Aristotle in De Anima. They are (a) that the world be intelligible (if it were not knowable, it could not be known), (b) that we have a mind capable of being informed by that intelligibility, and (c) that we have the capacity to actualize both potentials in a single act by which the intelligible informs a mind capable of being informed to produce actual knowledge. Absent any of these conditions, we could not have empirical knowledge. None of this involves, or needs to involve, the mind imposing forms of thought as Kant believed.

I would ask you to reflect on your claim, "this organizing, categorizing and synthesizing activity of the mind is the condition of possibility for empirical knowledge." It is prima facie impossible. Why? Because the mind could not possibly organize, or categorize facts it does not know. If it synthesizes a judgement, that judgement is neither empirical nor a fact. Thus, empirical knowledge must precede organizing and categorizing, being the precondition for those activities, rather than the reverse.

Are you rejecting Kant’s central premise or offering a critique of Kant which preserves this premise? — Joshs

I am rejecting the premises that (1) the mind imposes forms on experience, (2) we cannot know noumenal reality (the ding an sich), and (3) that we synthesize facts. We know reality, but not exhaustively, as God does. We know it in a limited way, as it relates to us.

This is a bold and risky move for an outsider to philosophy of mind. — Joshs

I would not call myself "an outsider." There is no club to which one must belong. One must only study and reflect -- and I have done both for decades.

you are turning your back on an entire community of thought. — Joshs

Not at all. Having studied them, I can see what is common to most schools in the community. I am open to suggested refinements, but I think that most subscribe to the SM.

While you say I am ignoring an entire community, another critic says I cited too many sources. [De gustibus non est disputandum..

quote="Joshs;784300"]As a result, much of what was formerly attributed to the non-physical in the form of the subjectively mental can now be placed within the category of the objectively natural and material( although ‘physical’ is a more contentious term).[/quote]
No doubt. Many things are "attributed." I am more concerned with the justification of such attributions. Having a doctorate in physics, I have a reasonable idea of its explanatory capacity. It does not extend to the intentional theater of operations. I am open to correction.

This give the subjectively mental little to contribute other than an affective feeling of what’s it is like to experience. — Joshs

Then you will have little difficulty in disposing of the seven problems I have enumerated. I only ask you to be critical in accepting the "common wisdom."

For you, by contrast, epistemology, logic, Will, intentionality, propositionality and mathematics still belong to the subjective pole as pre-given capacities or attributes. — Joshs

You have a very mixed bag here. Some are contentless capabilities, while others are laboriously elaborated sciences.

God is the completion of scientific analysis -- the end of the line of causal explanation. If you think that everything has an explanatory dynamic, then there must be an end of the line of causality, for mathematical induction allows us to show that an infinite regress is an inadequate explanation.

I'm saying that life = group of chemical reactions that seek to self-sustain. — Philosophim

So, you see life as teleological? Seeking the goal of being self-sustaining.

You seem to put some attribute beyond the physical to it. I don't. — Philosophim

By definition, chemistry seeking non-chemical outcomes transcends the physical.
.

Yes, we all know what analogous means. You described consciousness as analogous. That means it is partly the same and partly different to what? — Philosophim

As I said, it is the different senses of "consciousness" that are analogous.

"I shall argue that it is logically impossible to reduce consciousness, and the intentional realities flowing out of it, to a physical basis." — Philosophim

That does not mean that there is no physical aspect. If you read the whole article, my position would be clear. For example, "Descartes drew the wrong line in the wrong place. It is the wrong line because discursive thought requires neural representations." (p. 109).

Thank you for the congratulations.

Yet nowhere in your paper do you mention this important point. — Fooloso4

I am not writing a commentary on De Anima. I am discussing the Hard Problem.

But if consciousness (active intellect) is deathless and everlasting then it does not emerge in an interaction, it is employed. — Fooloso4

In one sense (its genesis) it does not emerge in interaction. In another sense (its actual operation) it does -- just like electron repulsion.

You say the active intellect is a "personal capacity", as if the ongoing controversies have been settled. — Fooloso4

I said it was controversial and offered my argument to resolve the controversy.

Your appeal is to a notion of logic that abstracts from physical reality, as if it is perfectly logical to think that rocks can become hummingbirds. — Fooloso4

You make my case. If we abstract away physical reality, anything can happen, so the reason many things cannot happen is an aspect of physical reality.

Of course you are free to use Aristotle when doing so supports your argument and abandoning him when he doesn't — Fooloso4

I am never using Aristotle as an authority. I am crediting him as a source.

Your a priori metaphysical abstraction — Fooloso4

By definition, an abstraction focuses on some aspects of experience while prescinding from others. As it is based on experience, it is necessarily a posteriori.

That's not a non sequitur at all. If consciousness depends on a physical basis, then it is up to you to demonstrate aspects of consciousness that do not depend on a physical basis. — Philosophim

If you read my article, you will see that I did so.

Analogous to what? — Philosophim

"Analogous" is a logical classification of meaning. It means that a term is predicated in a way that is partly the same and partly different.

Its your job when someone misunderstands your work to clearly and politely point out where they've misunderstood the position. — Philosophim

I have done so. It is also my job to recognize when further explanation is a waste of time.

When a person has spent days writing and no one responds, be it positive or negative, that is a waste of your time. — Philosophim

I spent weeks writing my article, and you have yet to address its arguments. So, you are wasting my time.

I am noting your position was that it was logically impossible to link consciousness to a physical basis — Philosophim

I made no such claim. You continue to waste my time.

Kant attributed apriori categorical content to the subject. — Joshs

I am neither Kant, nor a Kantian. I think his approach is fundamentally wrong.

I am an Aristotelian. For Aristotle, the object informing the subject is identically the subject being informed by the object -- for these are alternate formulations of the same event. Thus, knowing is not a relation between the subject and a representation, as it is for Locke and Kant, but a case of shared existence. The sharing is limited because the subject and object are each more than their shared act. Still it is, and must be, an ontological union founded on the described identity.

By contrast , contemporary naturalist-evolutionary accounts of subject-object relations conceive the genesis and content of the subject pole in the same naturalist terms as the object pole. — Joshs

Yes, I am well aware of this a priori assumption. That is why I asked you to comment on my discussion of the genesis of representation and consciousness on p. 99.

Essentially the subject pole contributes recall of previous states to the interpretation of objective sense. — Joshs

I have no problem with this; however, it does not explain how we become aware of the relevant contents.

Furthermore, there is no transcendent or self-identical self, ego, ‘I’ underlying subjectivity. — Joshs

I have not suggested that humans have a "transcendental ego." Again, I am not a Kantian. As for "self-identical," whatever is, is identically itself. So, this is a nonsensical claim. As for an ego simpliciter, you have implicitly admitted that humans can be subjects in the act of knowing, and egos are simply the capacity to be a knowing subject, and this capacity, which is not a Cartesian res, is the 'I' required to be a subject. We could hardly know absent an underlying ability to know. Thus, I am unclear what is being objected to.

The ‘I’ that wills in each willing is never the same self, because its nature and identity is subtly reorganized as a result of each encounter with a world. — Joshs

Again, this is confused because of your physicalist bias. Self-identity over time, whether of a river or of an organism, does not mean material identity. It means dynamic continuity. My present self has few, if any, atoms in common with the baby that came from my mother's womb or with the zygote that preceded it; however, I am dynamically continuous with both.

You should impart this important bit of news to the burgeoning field of consciousness studies in comparative psychology. — Joshs

There is no need to. It has long been known that we cannot experience the first person experience of others. This is the so-called "problem of other minds." Also, the behaviorists roundly criticized the method of analogous introspection, by which some early psychologists claimed to study non-human minds.

None of this prevents the study of medical consciousness (a state of responsiveness). It is fully available to third-person observation. Still, it is the rankest form of equivocation to equate medical consciousness with subjective consciousness (awareness of intelligible contents).

Given the intimate proximity between cognition, emotion and awareness, now that multiple sources of evidence point to the presence of the first two capabilities in other animals, it is not a leap to hypothesize consciousness also. — Joshs

I have no doubt that medical consciousness is a purely biological phenomena.

only if we make the thought process into a solipsistic internal activity — Joshs

As I explained in my article, and at the beginning of this post, this is not the Aristotelian view. Rather than knowledge being solipsistic isolation, it is shared existence.

So far, you have not criticized one argument in my paper. Instead, you have accused me to the errors of others and made unsubstantiated claims. Perhaps if you addressed what I actually wrote, we could make more progress. For example, in an earlier post, I listed 7 problems I have with the Standard Model. You could explain why these are not real problems

Have you forgotten your own claims? — Fooloso4

These are not the basis of the arguments made in my article. You will find no theology there.

One person can think on many topics. I think about science, philosophy and theology without mixing them up, as you seem to be. So, I affirm what you quoted. I only deny their logical relevance to the arguments in my article.

Have you heard of the genetic fallacy? It is a fallacy of irrelevance, and you are making it.

This may be difficult for you to understand because you are convinced of the truth of your own arguments, but not everyone is persuaded. Being open to rational discourse does not mean accepting the agency of a God. — Fooloso4

I understand and expect that my sound arguments may change few minds. Once people commit to a position, reason is a poor tool. My hope is to inform fresh, open minds.

As for God, the arguments in my paper neither assume nor conclude His existence. That you persist in the genetic fallacy only confirms my view that some atheists are closed to reason, even when the matter being discussed is not theological.

Is a bird simply what is contained within an outlined drawing? Or is it also the niche that sustains the animal and in which it is embedded? — Joshs

I do not think this is an either or question. There are different ways of conceptualizing the world. In one, the bird is circumscribed and interacts with other circumscribed entities. In another, the bird is conceived in, and is an inseparable part of, its ecological context. Neither mode of conceptualization is wrong, because both are adequate to a set of human needs (and it is humans who are conceiving them).

The point I am making is that we can represent the same reality in diverse ways. This is very common in physics, where we use different coordinate systems depending on which makes a problem easier to deal with. In biology, we can think in terms of cells, organs, organisms, biomes, or ecosystems. None of these concepts is unfunded or useless. We just need to make sure that what we have abstracted away can be safely ignored in the case we are considering.

It is a system of processes in which the dividing line between niche and animal can only be drawn artificially. — Joshs

All distinctions are "artificial" in the sense that we do not find dividing lines in nature. Rather our mind must abstract two or more aspects of a single reality. That does not mean that the distinctions are not both well-founded and useful.

You mean the dualist split between matter and subjectivity? — Joshs

There is no such split. All knowing is a subject-object relation. Without a knowing subject and a known object, there is no knowledge. In other words, subjectivity never occurs absent objectivity -- the essence of each is to be a relatum in the relation of knowing.

Where does awareness begin in the animal kingdom? — Joshs

I do not know. Do you? I do know that humans are aware.

Certainly not with humans. — Joshs

There is no evidence to support this. We are ignorant of the possible experience of other species.

Does it emerge suddenly or gradually as a function of neural complexity? — Joshs

How do you know it is a function of complexity? We only have one data point. Human brains are complex and humans are conscious. Maybe that is a coincidence, or maybe it is not.

If will and awareness is a gradual evolutionary development, then, as been suggested by biologists and neuroscientists, then in some sense one may see it in incipient form already in single-called organisms that have sensory capacities and show learning and adaptive goal-oriented behavior. — Joshs

"Maybe" is a poor basis for conclusions.

Perhaps you would like to comment on my discussion of the in compatibility of the Standard Model and the evolutionary genesis of consciousness and environmental representation in my article (p. 99). Instead of blindly applying a standard explanation, it is good to reflect on how the mechanisms it proposes could apply to the case at hand.

Willed commitments are organized on the basis not strictly of the survival of my organism, but as I have been arguing, are designed to maintain adaptive sense-making, which is as much a social as an individual process. — Joshs

That would be nice if true, but many willed commitments make neither individual nor social sense, as I am sure you know. Some are destructive both to the individual and to society. Even if they did make sense, they are unlike the adaptive biological responses you originally called "will" because they involve conscious reflection.

moral emotions — Joshs

This is a very strange turn of phrase. Emotions are psycho-physical responses. As such, they have no "moral" value. Anger, for example, can be morally righteous or immorally vindictive. Sexual attraction can be destructive to both parties or the basis of a committed and supportive relationship. In any event, willed commitments are not emotions, although they may be responses to emotions. We can see that they are not emotions because they persist through emotional changes.

I am wondering how you define "moral"? I think of it in intentional terms as willing the self-realization of ones' self and others. Perhaps you are a consequentialist, thinking that intent doesn't matter, only outcomes. The problem with that is that we cannot fully predict outcomes, we only know what we intend to happen. So, we are brought back to intention.

Sacrificing oneself for the protection of others is seen in other animals. — Joshs

Of course. What we do not know is if these responses in other species are conscious or not -- and that is what is at stake in the discussion of will vs. instinct.

Anthropologists hypothesize that conscience evolved in order to protect tribes from the violence of alpha males. Even behaviors which on the surface appear unadaptive, such as suicide or homicide, are driven by a combination of such moral emotions. — Joshs

What about beta females who may add poisonous herbs or fungi to a stew? Unconfirmed hypotheses have little cogency. And, here is "moral emotions" again.

Rather, it is social systems ( friendship, marriage, family, clan) that sustain us and that we are primed to defend. — Joshs

This is true of socialized individuals, but untrue of those not properly socialized. So, it seems more a matter of nurturing than of immutable (biological) nature.

what we symbolize in thought ... the way these tentative symbolizations talk back to us — Joshs

You realize that these "tentative symbolizations" need not be the work created, but part of the agent and her agency -- her thought process? So, this need not be the work acting causally on its creator. My thoughts, creative or otherwise, are my acts of awareness. I have heard a number of film actors say that they do not look at the "rushes," "dailies," or their finished films.

There can be, and is, both causal reciprocity and feedback, but there can also be causality without reciprocity or feedback.

Thank you for sharing your reflections. It helps to have other views.

Aristotle is starting with a connection rather than having to presuppose one. — Paine

Aristotle was a biologist. So, I think he came to his understanding of organic wholes from observation.

it is another way to ask what laws of nature refer to in our picture of a caused world. — Paine

We need to remember that mechanism does not contradict teleology. It merely rearranges its constituents. Mechanically, initial states and the laws of motion determine final states. "Final state" is just another term for "end." So, mechanism says systems act toward ends. Every physical end requires means, or mechanisms, and every set of determinate means leads to a determinate final state or end.

My point about differential drives is that psychologists and biologists today view organisms as self-organizing systems whose functioning is defined by reciprocal interactions with an environment. — Joshs

Of course.

The organism is nothing but its adaptive interactions. — Joshs

Not quite. It is a structure able to interact in what was an adaptive way in its native environment. Whether its species will survive depends on the rate at which its progeny can adapt to environmental change.

‘Will’ derives from the overarching tendency of living systems to maintain consistent goal-oriented adaptivity in the face of changing environmental conditions. — Joshs

Scare quotes always concern me. Clearly, you recognize that this is not "will" by the usual definition. It is an adaptive response without conscious commitment. Will, in the proper sense, is a commitment in light of knowledge. This is analogous to what you are describing, but hardly identical. The common note in the analogy is desire, or goal orientation. The difference is that biological desire need not involve awareness, while will proper does. This is a move from the physical to the intentional theater of operation.

‘Will’ makes no sense outside of this reciprocal feedforward-feedback adaptive relationship between a living thing and its world. — Joshs

This would be true if I let you equivocate on "will." I won't. Will in the proper sense is a conscious commitment, and as such transcends the merely biological. So, I am happy to agree that an adaptive biological inclination makes no sense outside the biological context, but that is not what will in the proper sense is.

You can see this from the fact that willed commitments can be extremely unadaptive and harmful -- both to the individual and to the species. Even more telling is the fact that in making willed commitments, we typically have immanent within us incompatible alternatives. There is no counterpart for this in the physical theater of operations, where one initial state is always mapped unto one final state. It would be unadaptive to take the time and energy to represent alternative courses of action if the outcome were predetermined and the alternatives were actually impossible.

The idea of a divine will , a first or final cause existing outside of a continually changing system of interactions, is an empty, incoherent concept. — Joshs

Thank you for your faith claim. Now, how about an argument that shows that one conscious being cannot commit to the good of another, even if it is unadaptive for the one committing? You might just show that the concept of conscious commitment is incoherent.

All causation is reciprocal — Joshs

Really? So an artist creating a work is acted upon by the work that does not yet exist? My learning a song causes the song? Perhaps you can explain what you mean.

What gives Will its meaning , even for a hypothesized god, is its relevance to the aims of adapting to a changing world. — Joshs

No. Will is the capacity to knowingly commit, even if it is non- or un-adaptive.

Will prior to world is like the smile before the Cheshire Cat. — Joshs

Again, this does not work. I can commit to the good of my children even before they are conceived.

And maybe the rejection is also right. — Fooloso4

This confirms that many atheists are not open to rational discourse -- even when the subject is not theological.

Perhaps he is concerned that if he make clear his theological grounds it would lead to rejection of his argument. — Fooloso4

My argument is based on the premises laid down -- none of which are theological. So, to reject my argument you need to show either that my premises are false, or that my reasoning is invalid. Rejecting them because I also think that there is an ultimate cause of reality is an act of prejudice, and so irrational.

Call it what you will, assumption, premise, conclusion, beginning or end, your ultimate answer to how and why is the same, God. — Fooloso4

Of course! God is the ultimate cause of reality. Darwin recognized that when he wrote of his belief in "designed laws." Still, being the Ultimate Cause does not mean that God is the proximate cause of phenomena. As scientist and philosophers, we want to understand proximate, not ultimate causes. That is why Darwin developed his theory. The same with Newton and many others.

What happens to God’s will if we determine the origin and nature of will, following in the footsteps of Nietzsche, Freud and embodied approaches in cognitive science, in terms of a differential ecology of drives? In a twist on Aristotle, Nietzsche suggested we could understand the “mechanistic world as a kind of life of the drives”. — Joshs

I am not quite sure what you are asking, but I will comment.

First, the idea of differential drives is simply wrongheaded. We desire food, water and air. If I asked, "How much food (or money) would you be willing to take for all your air?" you would think I was crazy. This is because our desires are incommensurate. We need a satisfactory, not a maximal, amount of food, water and air, and, indeed, of all the things we naturally desire. So, they cannot be traded off against one another. Accordingly, the idea of a maximal good or utility or anything of that sort is nonsense.

Second, our learning the nature of things in general, or will in particular, cannot change God, for, if God exists, it is as unlimited being, and nothing can change (add to or detract from) infinite being.

Third, the idea of a "life of the drives" seems to entail some kind of panzooism, in which everything is alive and has drives. But, to be alive is to be act to benefit the organism and its species. Clearly, inanimate things do not seek nutrition or reproduce to sustain their species. So, the idea seems to be more poetic than literal.

You are claiming a dualist ontology. The laws of nature as Platonic entities — Fooloso4

No, I am not. I am not saying they are separate, only that they are real because if they were not real, we could neither discover nor describe them, and we do both.

Do the laws of nature have such necessity? — Fooloso4

The laws of nature have physical, not metaphysical necessity. They could be different, and there might even be actual universes in which they are different.

I assume you mean that the laws of nature are physically necessary but logically contingent. — Fooloso4

Yes. Logically (wrt human knowledge) and metaphysically (wrt the nature of existence) contingent.

Upon further examination ontological commitments are with God — Fooloso4

Yes, I see the laws of nature as God's general will for matter. That is my conclusion, not my definition.

How can natural selection act on experience? — GrahamJ

Excellent question.

Here is some Academic material ... — Nickolasgaspar

Thank you.

You define consciousness as "awareness of intelligibility", to be aware of our ability to understand. What about our ability to be aware on the first place....known in Science as Consciousness!(the ability to be aware of internal or environmental stimuli , to reflect upon them with different mind properties through the connections achieved by the Central Lateral thalamus i.e.intlligibility" and thus creating conscious content during a mental state.) — Nickolasgaspar

You misunderstand the definition. I mean the "ability to be aware" in operation. I add "of intelligibility," because we are never aware without being aware of something intelligible. This is important because the carrier of intelligibility is a neural state. I thank you for showing me how my definition can be misunderstood.

Usually, the brain does not "create" contents, but processes contents coming to it from the senses.\

Its looks like we have the practice of cherry picking a specific secondary mind property known as intelligibility or Symbolic thinking or Meaning — Nickolasgaspar

What you call "cherry picking," I call "focusing." My work is no more cherry-picking than any study that focuses one aspect of a whole to the exclusion of others.

Also, intelligibility is not "Symbolic thinking." It is a property that things (mostly outside the mind) must have if they are to be known. In other words, know-ability. If they could not be known, we could not know them.

a specific secondary mind property known as intelligibility — Nickolasgaspar

Intelligibility is typically a property of objects in nature that may be neurally encoded, not a property of the mind. In the mind, it is actually known, rather than merely intelligible, for consciousness makes merely intelligible contents actually known.

s this the Hard problem for you? because if that is the case a simple search will provide tones of known mechanisms on how the brain uses symbolic language and learning (previous experience) to introduce meaning to stimuli (internal or external). — Nickolasgaspar

No, it is not the Hard Problem. You need only refer to my article.

Do any of these articles show how we become aware of the contents the brain represents and processes? If not, none advances the reduction of the act of (as opposed to the contents of) awareness to a physical basis.

Are the facts you raised the following.
(1) The Fundamental Abstraction of natural science (attending to the object to the exclusion of the subject);
(2) The limits of a Cartesian conceptual space. — Nickolasgaspar

No, those are explanations for the problems. The problems I was referring to are:
1. Problems with verbal reports of consciousness (p. 98).
2. No neural structures correspond to propositional attitudes (p. 98).
3. Dennett's arguments against a physical reduction of consciousness (p. 98).
4. A causally impotent consciousness cannot enhance reproductive fitness, and consequent failure of an evolutionary explanation of its genesis (p. 99).
5. The inability to explain the genesis of environmental knowledge (p. 99).
6. The failure of David Lewis’s Humean supervenience because of one-to-many mappings of the physical to the intentional (pp. 99, 107).
7. The inability to account for purposeful human behavior (p. 99f).

I am a Methodological Naturalist and like science my frameworks and gaps of knowledge are shaped by our Scientific Observations and Logic solely based on Pragmatic Necessity , not because of an ideology. — Nickolasgaspar

I am also a methodological naturalist, with no need to capitalize because it is a method, not an ideology. Nothing in my article transgresses the bounds of methodological naturalism. The actual problem is you seem to be a closet physicalist -- unwilling to admit that the intentional theater of operations is just as natural as the physical theater. If you were not a closet physicalist, you would have no difficulty in being open to intentional realities. So, you might as well come out of the closet.

When we don't know, we admit we don't. We shouldn't go on and invent extra entities which are in direct conflict with the current successful Paradigm of Science. — Nickolasgaspar

On the other hand, when we do know, say by analyzing first-person experience, we should admit it.

The success of the current paradigm is impressive, but still limited. Note the seven unanswered difficulties above. Nothing I propose conflicts with any experimental fact, so please stop making such baseless claims. Instead, my suggested new paradigm increases the range of explained phenomena.

Yes a healthy functioning brain is a necessary and sufficient explanation for any property of mind known to us. — Nickolasgaspar

This is not the claim of a methodological naturalist, but of a dogmatic physicalist.

that's not a reason to overlook the huge body of knowledge that we've gained the last 35 years. — Nickolasgaspar

For me, it is not. For you, it seems to be reason to ignore all previous progress.

How can you be sure about the epistemic foundations of your ideas and positions when you are not familiar with the latest epistemology on the topic? How can you be sure that we haven't answered those questions when your philosophy is based on ideas and knowledge of the past? — Nickolasgaspar

All humans are liable to err, and no one can know everything. I opened this thread to allow people the opportunity to point out actual problems. My not knowing everything is not an actual problem with my work. If you find an actual mistake, please point it out.

All the knowledge we rely upon was obtained in the past. You seem to think it has an expiration date. Should I stop driving because the idea of wheels has expired? Can I still use counting? Thread?

IS it ok if I ask you to put all the problems in a list (bullets) so I can check them? — Nickolasgaspar

See above. The list is not intended to be exhaustive. It is just the problems I have identified.

yes they have been huge progress to the emerging physical nature of consciousness. — Nickolasgaspar

Please explain how neuroscience has come closer to understanding our awareness of (as opposed to the processing of) neurally encoded contents.

By default we know,can verify and are able to investigate only one realm, the Physical. — Nickolasgaspar

Congratulations on coming out of the closet!

Sadly, you are fundamentally wrong. We also know, and so can analyze, intentional operations. We know that we know and can speak of what we know.

In my academic links you can find tones of papers analyzing which(and how) mechanisms enable the brain to introduce content in our conscious states. — Nickolasgaspar

Again, the issue is not contents, but our awareness of contents.

Can you give me an example for every single problem? — Nickolasgaspar

I am not asking you to solve "every single problem," but to respond to my actual arguments. If you do not wish to do so, you are wasting my time.

Abstract concepts do not help complex topics like this one. — Nickolasgaspar

All science is based on abstract concepts, because it seeks to be universal, and universal ideas are abstract.

Plus you strawmanned me again with that supernatural first person data. — Nickolasgaspar

Not at all. I said that we are dealing with first person data, and you responded I was dealing with the supernatural.

Science tells us that the brain is necessary and sufficient to explain the phenomenon even if we have loads of question to answer — Nickolasgaspar

Science cannot possibly tell us any theory is sufficient to all phenomena, but only that it is sufficient for the phenomena for which it has been confirmed.

The fact that we're going back and forth on what consciousness is after I've read your paper should reveal to you that you didn't make a clear case of what it meant to you to your reader. — Philosophim

No, it only illustrates the difficulty humans have in letting go of preconceptions.

Can drugs alter our consciousness, yes, or no? If yes, then we can reduce consciousness to a physical basis. — Philosophim

Non sequitur. It only shows that there is a dependence (which I affirm), not that the particular dependence explains all the known operations.

A very simple definition of what consciousness means to you could help here. — Philosophim

Asked and answered.

We are agreeing here. — Philosophim

Good.

Your paper addresses consciousness. Consciousness is something attributed to beings besides human beings. Dogs for example. — Philosophim

Again, "consciousness" is an analogous term. The only organisms we know to experience awareness of intelligibility are humans.

If anything, that would be odd to limit consciousness to only the the human physical form while simultaneously denying it is linked to neurons, or any other physical basis. — Philosophim

You persist in misrepresenting my position. That is not a sign of good faith. I have said repeatedly that conscious thought depends on neural representation and processing.

If you want me to address other aspects of your work, you'll need to address the points I feel unclear or problamatic first. — Philosophim

I have. I am growing impatient with going over the same ground with you, as it wastes my time.

How is my experiencing the color red a particular way not my subjective awareness? — Philosophim

I did not say it was not an instance of subjective awareness. Still, experiencing qualia is just one kind of such awareness. Knowing that pi is an irrational number is another, and it does not have a quale.

You may have wanted to devote more time to it then. At least to the point where you would have understood my reference was not claiming to be a fact or evidence, and a perfectly reasonable thing to mention. — Philosophim

I suggest you read the section of my paper addressing information in computers.

As you say, they are distinct. Hence, dualism. — Fooloso4

Dualism does not mean that there is more than one way of thinking about reality.

I think you have it backwards. It is only when there is change, not when something remains the same, that there is a cause. — Fooloso4

No, even "staying the same" requires a cause -- first, because physical objects are not static, composed of Greek atoma, but dynamic, constantly oscillating at the quantum level and interchanging constituents; and secondly, because they have no intrinsic necessity and so need to be sustained in being by something that has such necessity.

You are adding one assumption on top of another. — Fooloso4

Perhaps you would give me your definition of "possible".

Again, you have it backwards. It is not that the laws of nature preclude a rock from becoming a hummingbird but rather there would have to be some cause in order for a rock to become a hummingbird. — Fooloso4

These are not mutually exclusive. There needs to be a cause both for remaining the same (e.g. conservation laws) and for changing. We live in a world of constant causation.

Self-maintenance, or entelecheia, does not mean immortality or self-sufficiency. The point again is that Aristotle's conceptual space is unburdened by dualism, yours is not. — Fooloso4

To see the world as filled with causal links is not to be a dualist.

Where did you hear of it, if you don't mind my asking? — frank

I read a lot of history of philosophy -- Copleston's and others as well as articles in various dictionaries, compendia and companions. German philosophy seemed to be largely misguided from Kant on, so it did not interest me until Brentano.

ndeed, I'm not sure how we could know it was a contradiction if it didn't feel wrong in some way, a sort of offence to reason. — bert1

I think we can react emotionally to intellectual discord, but I think the perception of discord comes first.

What is "co-extensive" is other than what it is coextensive with. — Fooloso4

A reasonable point. I would say that "otherness" depends on how you conceptualize things. If you think of a rock as a unity, you can say it is attracted to the earth as a unity -- and that would be true. In a different conceptual space, you can think of the rock and the earth as masses subject to the very real law of gravity -- and that would also be true -- be adequate to reality.

A reason to think of laws as distinct is that they are not confined to individuals. Instead, the same laws seem to act throughout space and time, while the things they act on come and go.

All that experience tells us is that there are regularities. — Fooloso4

Experience also tells us that phenomena have causes. So, if there are regularities, they must have a cause.

That is a questionable assumption without evidence. — Fooloso4

It is not an assumption, but a conclusion. Possibility, per se, is only limited by the impossibility of instantiating contradictions. In order to limit possibility to what is physically possible, more constraints are needed. These are the laws of nature.

A rock does not become a hummingbird because it's a fucking rock. — Fooloso4

But, a rock can become sand or lava or a plasma. So, being a rock is not sufficient to preclude change, and it alone cannot prevent it from becoming a humming bird. That it can become some things, but not others, is a consequence of the laws operating in nature.

living beings that are, according to Aristotle, self-maintaining — Fooloso4

Aristotle is well aware of the possibility of death due to external causes, and of the need for nutrients. So, living things are not self-maintaining, by exhibit immanent activity -- i.e. self-directed activity to maintain themselves and their species -- something we continue to see today.

So you've never heard of the idea of starting with a unity that is subsequently divided into opposites? — frank

I have heard of it, but not read Hegel, or been inclined to. I do not see him as an influence.

The acceptance of a paper does not mean it cannot be written better. — Philosophim

I agree, but quick acceptance is a sign that the reviewers found merit in it.

This is just wrong. https://opentextbc.ca/introductiontopsychology/chapter/5-2-altering-consciousness-with-psychoactive-drugs/ At a very basic level humanity has been using drugs for centuries to alter our state of consciousness. Drugs are a physical thing. We can measure how the physical introduction of drugs changes the brain. — Philosophim

This does not militate against anything I said. Since the brain process the contents we are aware of, modifying how the brain operates by drugs, trauma or in any other way can modify the contents we are aware of. Aquinas knew this in the 13th c.

The problem again though, is that your information would not be able to be objectively compared to any other person's subjective experience because you cannot experience it. — Philosophim

This misunderstands the nature of scientific observation. Generally, it does not matter if one person or a whole group witnesses a phenomenon. What is important is the ability of others to replicate the same type of phenomena -- and that is just as possible with 1st person observations as it is with 3rd person observations. Of course, I cannot know if my quale of red is your quale of red, but we can and do know that humans have such qualia. So that is a scientific fact. So also is our awareness of intelligibility.

There are plenty of commonly known emergent properties that are not impossible to deduce from fundamental principles. — Philosophim

You are free to write an article with your preferred definition. I said what I mean by the term, which is all that clear communication requires.

Natural science has never found a soul, so it is not a problem to solve. — Philosophim

Then, why did you raise it?

We can know that a being has all of the mechanical aspects of what we would identify with a conscious being. However, we can't know what that actual personal experience of being a conscious plant is. So of course the definition of a reductive consciousness cannot describe the personal subjective experience of the plant. It doesn't even try to. — Philosophim

I am not sure what point, if any, you are making. In my paper, I am not discussing plant, but human experience. We know other humans are conscious because they are analogous to us, and they verbally confirm that they are self-aware. We do not know this about other beings, but we do know that we can explain all of our observations of them without assuming that they are aware of intelligibility.

There is no problem of what it is like to be a plant or a bat, just as there is no problem of what it is like to be in another universe. These are simply things we cannot do, and we know we cannot do them.

If you believe that consciousness is only defined as, "Having a subjective experience," you are not using a reductive definition of consciousness, which is what you are supposedly railing against. — Philosophim

I think that "consciousness" is an analogous term that can be defined in many ways. I never claimed to be using "a reductive definition of consciousness." I am not railing against anything, but offering some arguments against the physical reduction of subjective awareness, none of which you have commented upon.

And I never claimed it to be a fact or evidence. I would think you would have looked into the debate of consciousness in AI and this would not be a strange thing to mention. — Philosophim

I have concluded that it is not worth more time than I have already devoted to it in my book.

I'm curious on where you think this definition likes on the spectrum of theory to definition. How theory laden is this? Is this what people in general mean, when talking about the hard problem? Is this what Chalmers means, for example? — bert1

I think it is a distillation of experience. There are things that we could know, but do not (so they are intelligible), and when we come to know them when we turn our awareness to them.

This is theory in the sense of a reflective conclusion, but not in the sense of a hypothetical posit. There is nothing hypothetical about coming to know. We do it all the time. And, there is nothing hypothetical about intelligibility, as the things we come to know were capable of being known before we knew them.

What we know by abstracting from experience does not fit the "scientific" (hypothetico-deductive model). Instead of adding a hypothesis to a limited range of experience to generalize it, abstraction removes irrelevant elements. For example, we count apples and oranges and then realize that numbers only depend on the counting operation, not on what is counted.

I'm pretty sure that this is not what Chalmers would say.

I've got more work to do. — T Clark

I've found that being challenged helps me clarify my ideas.

This is a familiar idea. A number of philosophers have expressed the same sentiment. Like Hegel? — frank

I'm pretty ignorant of 19th c. German philosophy.

If they are coextensive with then they are not intrinsic to what they control. — Fooloso4

How can what is intrinsic not be co-extensive with what it is intrinsic to? If it was in one place and time, and what it is intrinsic to were in another, it would not be intrinsic.

The problem is, the ontological status of the laws of nature is not a question of experience. — Fooloso4

On the contrary, they are discovered via or experience of nature, and they could not be if they did not exist as an aspect of nature.

It is not as if things are chaotic and require something else that makes sure they do not misbehave. A rock does not become a hummingbird and fly away because "something" makes sure it doesn't happen. — Fooloso4

If there were no laws operative in nature, anything could happen. In other words, there would be no difference between what was metaphysically possible (involving no contradiction) and what is physically possible (consistent with the laws of nature). It is metaphysically possible for a rock to become a humming bird, as there is no contradiction in being a at one time and b at another. Of course, this does not happen, as there are laws operative. Further, over time, and with difficulty, physicists have learned a great deal about what the laws actually are. For example, they are much closer to what Maxwell, Einstein and the quantum theorists proposed than what Newton thought.

Given your focus on Aristotle I am surprised that you import the notion of laws of nature. — Fooloso4

You should not be. I look in many places for insight. That is exactly what Aristotle did. In Plato's Academy, his nickname was "the reader," because he read whatever he could.

"Consciousness is an arousal and awareness of environment and self, which is achieved through action of the ascending reticular activating system (ARAS) on the brain stem and cerebral cortex — Nickolasgaspar

Unfortunately, "consciousness" is an analogous term, and using this definition, when I define consciousness differently (as "awareness of intelligiblity"), is equivocation. If you want to criticize my work, then you must use technical terms as I use them. In saying this, I am not objecting to ypur definition in se, only to its equivocal use.

the conclusion that brain function is responsible for human behavior and thought processes is way more than an assumption. — Nickolasgaspar

Then you will have no problem in explaining how this hypothesis, which I am calling the Standard Model (SM), conforms to the facts I raised against it. Please note that I fully agree that rational thought requires proper brain function. So, that is not the issue. The issue is whether brain function alone is adequate.

Now, Chalmers's attempt to identify the Hard problem of Consciousness had nothing to do with the actual Hard problems faced by the field. — Nickolasgaspar

That may well be true. I do not know what neuroscientists consider hard, nor is that what I am addressing in my article. As I made clear from the beginning, I am addressing the problem Chalmers defined. That does not prevent you from discussing something else, as long as you recognize that in doing so you are not discussing my article or the problem it addresses. In saying that, I am not denigrating the importance of the problems neuroscientists consider hard -- they're just not my problem.

In defining the Hard Problem, you quote a reputable secondary source (Scholarpedia), but I quoted a primary source. So, I will stick with my characterization.

Searching meaning in natural processes is a pseudo philosophical attempt to project Intention and purpose in nature (Agency) and create unsolvable questions. Proper questions capable to understand consciousness should begin with "how" and "what" , not why. (how some emerges, what is responsible for it etc). — Nickolasgaspar

There are many senses of "why." Aristotle enumerates four. I suppose you mean "why" in the sense of some divine purpose. But, I did not ask or attempt to answer that question. The question I am asking is how we come to be aware of neurally encoded contents. So, I fail to see the point you are making.

Stepping back, you are more than welcome to answer the questions you choose to answer and ignore those you choose not to deal with. The same applies to me. However, if you wish to call something "pseudo philosophical" or claim that it "create unsolvable questions," some justification for your claims would be courteous. Also, since I solved the problems I raised, they are hardly "unsolvable."

The current Working Hypothesis (SM) is more than adequate to explain the phenomenon. It even allow us to make predictions and produce Technical Applications that can directly affect, alter or terminate the phenomenon. It establishes Strong Correlations between lower level system(brain function) and high level systems(Mental states and properties). — Nickolasgaspar

I have never denied that the SM is able to solve a wide range of problems. It definitely is. The case is very like that of Newtonian physics, which can also solve many problems. However, I enumerated a number of problems it could not solve. Will you not address those?

the Hard Problem doesn't reflect a failure of the reductive paradigm because this paradigm (tool of science)is not that RELEVANT to the methods we use to study Mental properties. Complexity Science and Scientific Emergence are the proper tools for the job. — Nickolasgaspar

Again, this does not criticize my work, because you are not saying that my analysis is wrong, or even that reduction is not involved. Rather, you want me to look at a different problem. Further, with respect to that different problem, you do not even claim that the named methods have made progress in explaining how awareness of contents comes to be. So, I fail to see the cogency of your objection.

"Epistemological emergence occurs when the consequences of known principles cannot be
deduced. We often assume, but cannot prove, that system behavior is the result of isolated com-
ponent behavior"
-Thats not quite true. — Nickolasgaspar

It is a definition, specifying how I choose to use words, and not a claim that could be true or false.

First of all in science we don't "prove" frameworks, we falsify them and we accept them for their Descriptive and Predictive power. — Nickolasgaspar

I agree. I did not say that science proved frameworks, but that we use their principles to deduce predictions. That is the essence of the hypothetico-deductive method.

Strong Emergence is an observer relative term. — Nickolasgaspar

It is also a term that I did not employ.

In my opinion the whole "Hard Problem" objection is nothing more than an Argument from Ignorance and in many cases, from Personal Incredulity Fallacies. — Nickolasgaspar

I am not sure how a problem, of any sort, can be a fallacy. It is just an issue that bothers someone, and seeks resolution. It may be based on a fallacy, and if it is, then exposing the fallacy solves it.

I could go in depth challenging the rest of the claims in the paper but It seems like it tries to draw its validity from Chalmers' bad philosophy. — Nickolasgaspar

If you read carefully, you would see that I criticized Chalmers' philosophy, rather than basing my argument on it.

The Ascending Reticular Activating System, the Central Lateral Thalamus and the latest Theories of Consciousness on Emotions as the driving force (Mark Solmes, founder of Neuropsychoanalysis) leave no room for a competing non naturalistic theory in Methodological Naturalism and in Philosophy in general. — Nickolasgaspar

Then you will have no difficulty in showing how my specific objections about reports of consciousness, one-to-many mappings from the physical to the intentional, and propositional attitudes, inter alia, are resolved by this theory -- or how neurally encoded intelligible contents become actually known. Despite the length of your response, you have made no attempt to resolve these critical issues.

because we can not answer a "why" question. — Nickolasgaspar

This is baloney. I am asking how questions. The SM offers no hint as to how these observed effects occur. In fact, it precludes them.

IT takes us back in bed with Aristotle. Are we going to resurrect Gods, Phlogiston, Miasma, Panacea, Orgone Energy all over again??? — Nickolasgaspar

Obviously, you have never read Aristotle, as he proposes none of these. That you would think he does shows deep prejudice. Instead of taking the time to learn, or at least remaining quiet when you do not know, you choose to slander. It is very disappointing. A scientific mind should be open to, and thirsty for, the facts.

We don't have the evidence (yet) to use Supernatural Philosophy (reject the current Scientific paradigm of Methodological Naturalism) in our explanations just because we miss pieces from our puzzle. — Nickolasgaspar

Nor am I suggesting that we do. I am suggesting that methodological naturalism does not restrict us to the third-person perspective of the Fundamental Abstraction. That you would think that considering first-person data is "supernatural" is alarming.

Thank you for the time you devoted to reading my work and the effort that went into your response.

Read my post — Wolfgang

As one trained in mathematical physics, the use of equations in analogies grates on me. So, I have to put aside my distaste for the medium to find the message. Still, I largely agree with you.

You wrote: "From this point of view, it becomes obvious that thinking has nothing to do with any cognition of an 'objective' reality. It is nothing more than the (highly differentiated) process of perception of reality, which (for us and not in itself) has produced tools with which we are able to process nature in a highly complex way."
I almost agree. As I noted earlier in this thread, human knowing does not reveal objects exhaustively, as divine knowledge does. It reveals them as they relate to us. Still, it is objective, for it is informed by the object. Such knowledge can also be true, in the classical sense of adaequatio rei et intellectus -- for it can be adequate to our needs in relating to the objects we know.

"Since the philosophy of mind addresses consciousness as an entity in its own right, it fails to present it as an (emergent) consequence of life."
To me, emergence and consequence are radically opposed. Still, I see what you mean: that it is inevitable that life should lead to consciousness. Perhaps, but I see no reason that it should. Isn't that what "emergent" means -- that the consequence is unforeseeable?

The way I put it is 'sentient consciousness is the capacity for experience. Rational sentient consciousness also includes the capacity for reason'. — Wayfarer

Seeing knowing in as an essential characteristic allows me to connect to a rich tradition of epistemological reflection and bring new unity to the issues. For example, the Aristotelian-Thomistic identity of the sensible object informing the senses with the senses being informed by the sensible object ties in nicely with Damasio's theory of the evolution of sensory representation. It also allows me to discuss the way in which the identity theory of mind is correct.

Perhaps you could comment on that a little further? — Wayfarer

Eliminative materialists show by performance that they recognize that consciousness cannot be reduced to physical operations. If physicalism is to work, they realize that consciousness must be eliminated. In Consciousness Explained Daniel Dennett even offers strong arguments against the reduction of consciousness. Then, he violates the scientific method by rejecting the data of consciousness instead of the falsified hypothesis of physicalism.

The point about Galileo's observations, and Newton's laws, is that they can be validated in the third person. — Wayfarer

So? What makes third person experience privileged? We still have the same subject as in first person experience, subject to the same range of errors. What makes observations scientific is not their 1st or 3rd person perspective, but their type-replicability, as you argue:

In that vital sense, they're objective - the same for all who can observe them. — Wayfarer

Introspection, per se, has no such method of validation - this was the cause of the failure of the early psychological methods of Willhelm Wundt. — Wayfarer

I do not know Wundt's work. I do know that the behaviorists criticized the analogous introspection of other species. We are not another species and so there is a method of validation, viz. other workers engaging in the same type of introspection, just as other physical scientists perform the same type (but not the same token) experiment.

It seems to me that you need to show why performing the same type of observation and getting the same result is not "scientific" -- and to do so without assuming, a priori, that only 3rd person perspectives are acceptable.

Phenomenology introduces a disciplined method of the examination of the nature of experience — Wayfarer

Does that mean that William James, Franz Brentano and other introspective psychologists were undisciplined? I would like you to explain, for I really do not understand, the methodological differences you see (as opposed to differences in philosophic or interpretative assumptions).

Self-knowledge - insight into the nature of one's mind - often comes, not through introspection, but through life events. — Wayfarer

I agree completely. New challenges reveal potentials (for good or ill) that might otherwise remain hidden.

But I don't know if the anodyne term of 'introspection' really conveys that. — Wayfarer

Of course, it does not. The reason, I think, is that introspection is a scientific method, aimed at discovering universal truths, and human beings are individuals who only imperfectly conform to our abstractions. To know one's self is to know one's individuality, and that is discovered in life-experience.

You put yourself at the center of your considerations and start with the thinking. This is arbitrary and only works with logic. Why not start with things and follow along. — Wolfgang

I am starting with the experience of knowing, in which things and thinking are united. The Fundamental Abstraction takes this unity, divides it, and fixes on things to the exclusion of thought.