You don't know and have no way to prove the existence of an underlying ontology so it is irrational to keep pushing this ideology on the excuse "conscious experience appear to be magical"! — Nickolasgaspar
"conscious experience appear to be magical"! — Nickolasgaspar
Declaring the failure of reductionism seems premature. — Fooloso4
You didn't quote my argument so I am not sure you understood it correctlyThis is your whole argument repeated. — schopenhauer1
Correct. Science produces the most credible Epistemology while Philosophy is the tool we use to understand its implications and make us wiser.Philosophy and science are doing two different things. — schopenhauer1
Not true. As I pointed out many times before ,claims with unknown epistemic value can never be accepted as wise. (this isn't difficult to comprehend).The assumption you’re making is the value statement that philosophy is to only be subordinate to science to have any value. — schopenhauer1
-We can agree on that. The problem emerges when a dialogue doesn't start fromasturdy epistemic foundation allowing it to drift towards wishful thoughts and desires.Rather, it is a never ending dialogue that poses questions and proposes avenues to explore to answer them — schopenhauer1
-That is a factually wrong statement. Science, previously known as Natural Philosophy is a Philosophical Category with the addition of a huge set of empirical and statistical methodologies.It considers science as a methodology but is not bound to not ask questions science cannot be able to answer. — schopenhauer1
_No I am only demarcating Philosophy from pseudo philosophical claims based on fallacious reasoning and total lack of epistemic support in their metaphysical assumptions.You are asking philosophy to do something it’s not bound to do and say why isn’t it so bound. Sounds like a you problem. — schopenhauer1
What we don't do in Natural Philosophy is to accept pseudo philosophical worldviews like idealism, occasionalism,solipsism as frameworks of our epistemology.
There are many reasons why some questions can't be answered, but not all sentences with a question-mark at the end qualify as real philosophical questions.(look Chalmers's fallacious teleological questions).
The problem we are dealing with here is not between Science and Philosophy, but Philosophy and Pseudo Philosophy. — Nickolasgaspar
Humans evolved as cooperative social creatures. Like many other mammals, we are born with certain moral emotions , such as the protection of our young and the ability to experience pain at the suffering of others in our group. Sacrificing oneself for the protection of others is seen in other animals. Anthropologists hypothesize that conscience evolved in order to protect tribes from the violence of alpha males. Even behaviors which on the surface appear unadaptive, such as suicide or homicide, are driven by a combination of such moral emotions.
It is not the self strictly defined as a body, that our biologically evolved motivational processes are designed to preserve. Rather, it is social systems ( friendship, marriage, family, clan) that sustain us and that we are primed to defend. — Joshs
Let us start from the evolutionary side. It is now empirically clear that Darwinian evolutionary theory contained a very great error in its identification of the unit of survival under natural selection. The unit which was believed to be crucial and around which the theory was set up was either the breeding individual or the family line or the subspecies or some similar homogeneous set of conspecifics. Now I suggest that the last hundred years have demonstrated empirically that if an organism or aggregate of organisms sets to work with a focus on its own survival and thinks that is the way to select its adaptive moves, its "progress" ends up with a destroyed environment. If the organism ends up destroying its environment, it has in fact destroyed itself. And we may very easily see this process carried to its ultimate reductio ad absurdum in the next twenty years. The unit of survival is not the breeding organism, or the family line, or the society.
The old unit has already been partly corrected by the population geneticists. They have insisted that the evolutionary unit is, in fact, not homogeneous. A wild population of any species consists always of individuals whose genetic constitution varies widely. In other words, potentiality and readiness for change is already built into the survival unit. The heterogeneity of the wild population is already one-half of that trial-and-error system which is necessary for dealing with environment.
The artificially homogenized populations of man's domestic animals and plants are scarcely fit for survival.
And today a further correction of the unit is necessary. The flexible environment must also be included along with the flexible organism because, as I have already said, the organism which destroys its environment destroys itself. The unit of survival is a flexible organism-in-its-environment. — Gregory Bateson, Form, Substance, Difference
Kant attributed apriori categorical content to the subject.
— Joshs
I am neither Kant, nor a Kantian. I think his approach is fundamentally wrong.
I am an Aristotelian. — Dfpolis
So far, you have not criticized one argument in my paper. Instead, you have accused me to the errors of others and made unsubstantiated claims. Perhaps if you addressed what I actually wrote, we could make more progress. For example, in an earlier post, I listed 7 problems I have with the Standard Model. You could explain why these are not real problems — Dfpolis
The flexible environment must also be included along with the flexible organism because, as I have already said, the organism which destroys its environment destroys itself. The unit of survival is a flexible organism-in-its-environment. — Gregory Bateson, Form, Substance, Difference
-you stated , I quote "Philosophy and science are doing two different things." So I pointed out that its not about science vs philosophy, its Philosophy vs Pseudo philosophy.Glad it's not science we are discussing. In Fight Club we don't talk about Fight Club. But I'm not in Fight Club, so I'll talk about it and not limit myself in such a way. — schopenhauer1
-Classifying different types of emergence doesn't change the nature of an observable phenomenon like human conscious states.Also about emergence, there are whole sections of philosophy that discuss the trickiness of emergence and reduction- how it is that the whole reduces to its parts. Weak and strong emergence, which I think you were alluding to. We know that new entities supervene on their constituents, but we aren't clear on how. — schopenhauer1
Facts of reality render that claim wrong.An Idealist, for example, could make the claim that emergence could never take place without an observational standpoint. — schopenhauer1
No the analogy of a container is wrong since Diachronic Emergence wouldn't be possible. (persistence after the causal mechanism ceasing to exist).Sort of a container. — schopenhauer1
The new emergent phenomena are observable, measurable and most of the times quantifiable. We can affect them and manipulate them by changing the setup of the responsible process. Ghosts do not share the same qualities.Otherwise, we get ghostly new entities from fiat, which itself has to be explained. — schopenhauer1
"Answering it"? I am not sure your statement is on topic. We identify the Necessary and Sufficient mechanisms responsible for the emergence of the phenomenon.In other words, answering it by giving its constituents would simply be circular reasoning and not a sufficient answer. — schopenhauer1
Right, and but that is smuggling in value statements as if they were objective fact about what comprises what.Philosophy vs Pseudo philosophy. — Nickolasgaspar
-Classifying different types of emergence doesn't change the nature of an observable phenomenon like human conscious states.
We can talk about Emergence if you want but your starting point needs to be anchored on our current epistemology and go from there. You shouldn't start from the actual metaphysical claim you have the burden to prove! — Nickolasgaspar
Facts of reality render that claim wrong. — Nickolasgaspar
-"There has to be "something" for which emerging happens in."
_Correct. We observe physical systems producing emergent phenomena ,either Synchronic or Diachronic. (Taxonomy of emergence). — Nickolasgaspar
No the analogy of a container is wrong since Diachronic Emergence wouldn't be possible. (persistence after the causal mechanism ceasing to exist). — Nickolasgaspar
The new emergent phenomena are observable, measurable and most of the times quantifiable. We can affect them and manipulate them by changing the setup of the responsible process. Ghosts do not share the same qualities. — Nickolasgaspar
"Answering it"? I am not sure your statement is on topic. We identify the Necessary and Sufficient mechanisms responsible for the emergence of the phenomenon.
We do it so well, that we can even make predictions when specific aspects of a mechanism is damaged (brain injury, pathology, intoxication) ,we can make diagnosis and design surgical and medical protocols to treat and improve the quality of the emergent property.
THERE is nothing circular in this approach.
The suggested magical idealistic ontology of the phenomenon has nothing to contribute to the discussion other than stating "wow its so different so a magical source should be hiding behind it".
Sorry this is not Philosophy! — Nickolasgaspar
... pre-given capacities or attributes. — Joshs
There are certainly many who have been confused by Kant. I am not one.Aren’t we all Kantians now , including those physicists who extend the scope of Quantum theory? — Joshs
I reject it, and I do not find myself alone in doing so.I know of no major theorist who has rejected — Joshs
I see Kant's thesis as the mind imposing, rather than organizing, content. Our minds do organize content, but that is hardly a Kantian insight, as the idea precedes him by millennia, with the traditional definition of scientia as organized knowledge.his key premise, that the mind contributes to the organization of our experience, and this organizing, categorizing and synthesizing activity of the mind is the condition of possibility for empirical knowledge. — Joshs
I am rejecting the premises that (1) the mind imposes forms on experience, (2) we cannot know noumenal reality (the ding an sich), and (3) that we synthesize facts. We know reality, but not exhaustively, as God does. We know it in a limited way, as it relates to us.Are you rejecting Kant’s central premise or offering a critique of Kant which preserves this premise? — Joshs
I would not call myself "an outsider." There is no club to which one must belong. One must only study and reflect -- and I have done both for decades.This is a bold and risky move for an outsider to philosophy of mind. — Joshs
Not at all. Having studied them, I can see what is common to most schools in the community. I am open to suggested refinements, but I think that most subscribe to the SM.you are turning your back on an entire community of thought. — Joshs
Then you will have little difficulty in disposing of the seven problems I have enumerated. I only ask you to be critical in accepting the "common wisdom."This give the subjectively mental little to contribute other than an affective feeling of what’s it is like to experience. — Joshs
You have a very mixed bag here. Some are contentless capabilities, while others are laboriously elaborated sciences.For you, by contrast, epistemology, logic, Will, intentionality, propositionality and mathematics still belong to the subjective pole as pre-given capacities or attributes. — Joshs
if the senses are material powers, they receive the forms of objects in a material manner; and if the intellect is an immaterial power, it receives the forms of objects in an immaterial manner. This means that in the case of sense knowledge, the form is still encompassed with the concrete characters which make it particular; and that, in the case of intellectual knowledge, the form is disengaged from all such characters. To understand is to free form completely from matter.
“Moreover, if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized. Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known. But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality.
In knowledge we become intentionally the object known, and thus acquire a new perfection for ourselves, the same perfection of the things we know. And since, for Aquinas “form” is the principle of perfection, knowledge consists in acquiring or receiving the forms of the things we know and thereby becoming one with them:
The perfection belonging to one thing is found in another. This is the perfection of a knower insofar as he knows; for something is known by a knower by reason of the fact that the thing known is, in some fashion, in the possession of the knower. Hence it is said in The Soul that the soul is “in some manner, all things,” since its nature is such that it can know all things. In this way, it is possible for the perfection of the entire universe to exist in one thing.
De veritate 2, 2
Are you rejecting Kant’s central premise or offering a critique of Kant which preserves this premise?
— Joshs
I am rejecting the premises that (1) the mind imposes forms on experience, (2) we cannot know noumenal reality (the ding an sich), and (3) that we synthesize facts. We know reality, but not exhaustively, as God does. We know it in a limited way, as it relates to us. — Dfpolis
I would ask you to reflect on your claim, "this organizing, categorizing and synthesizing activity of the mind is the condition of possibility for empirical knowledge." It is prima facie impossible. Why? Because the mind could not possibly organize, or categorize facts it does not know. — Dfpolis
According to Kant, it is not that the mind organizes or categories facts, it organizes and categorizes the manifold of sensory intuitions according to the categories of the understanding. — Fooloso4
I am writing an article for publication in a Thomist journal rebutting this idea. I laid some foundations in my two articles on the evolution in Studia Gilsoniana, where I argue the relativity of the species concept.This means that in the case of sense knowledge, the form is still encompassed with the concrete characters which make it particular; and that, in the case of intellectual knowledge, the form is disengaged from all such characters. To understand is to free form completely from matter.
I think that the union of knower and known is independent of the thesis that the essence of intellectual knowledge is universality.This is part of a more general thesis that knowledge involves the union of knower with known: — Wayfarer
This thesis needs elaboration. Form is the principle of actuality of individuals, who strive toward perfect self-realization. There is no universal form. Universals are abstractions, existing only in the minds thinking them. If they are well-founded, they have a sound basis in reality. Still, they have no independent existence and are descriptive, not normative. Thinking that they are normative is the basis of moral condemnation of, and prejudice against, individuals whose self-realization is not "normal."for Aquinas “form” is the principle of perfection
I agree with the quotation from De Veritate, and speak of it in terms of "shared existence." Shared existence is an essential aspect of knowing.Is this something considered in your philosophy? — Wayfarer
That is its context, though I agree with Hume's observations on the lack of necessity in "causality" as he defines it.At this point in my reading of your work, I find I understand it most coherently by placing it within a pre-Kantian and likely pre-Humean historical context. — Joshs
If you read De Anima, you will find that most of my theory is based on its analysis. I found Spinoza's more geometrico is an irrational approach (see my Metaphilosophy article). Leibnitz's monadology assumes Cartesian dualism, which I find wrong-headed. Locke misunderstood the nature of ideas, distorting epistemology. (See Veatch's Intentional Logic.) So, I think you misunderstand me.hat is, despite your embrace of Aristotle, your thinking on God and nature is much more compatible with Enlightenment philosophical ideas circa 1650-1750 than anything produced in Classical Greece. — Joshs
Not "according to the categories," as I understand him, but by imposing the categories. For example, Hume rightly found causality as he defined it lacked necessity. Kant saw the mind as imposing causal necessity on the succession of events.According to Kant, it is not that the mind organizes or categories facts, it organizes and categorizes the manifold of sensory intuitions according to the categories of the understanding. — Fooloso4
So I take then that you don't subscribe to scholastic realism concerning universals? 'Universals, strictly speaking, only exist in minds, but they are founded on real relations of similarity in the world. Scholastic realism goes beyond moderate realism and affirms that universals also exist transcendently; but instead of having a separated existence, transcendent universals exist in God's mind.' — Wayfarer
Aristotle already said much of this. https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=POLANR&u=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FPOLANR.DOChis concept of matter or material (hule) would have undergone a radical transformation. He would retain his focus on intelligible wholes and living beings, but he would no longer regard matter itself as something unformed. Matter or material is self-forming. Matter too is "being at work", energeia. A living organism is not simply a whole but a whole of wholes, a system of systems, self-organizing structuring structures. — Fooloso4
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