Df is not saying that there is a house which is being acted on — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I am but I am not saying it is a completed house, but a house under construction.

This doesn't make any sense — Metaphysician Undercover

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/passion Def 3.

all we have is "the act of building", and "being built". But these two are exactly the same thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have left out the builder and the house. The builder building is the cause. The house being built is the effect. Of course they are concurrent. That is the whole point.

The only necessity here is that these two expressions "building", and "being built", both refer to the exact same thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ta-da! Since they refer to the identical event, the act of the builder building (cause) and the passion of the house being built (effect) are necessarily linked. But, building is not being built. so the cause is not the effect.

If you want to separate cause from effect — Metaphysician Undercover

You do. I don't. In essential causality they are inseparable. In accidental causality (time-sequence by rule) they are separate. That is why there are two kinds of efficient causality. The first is necessary, the second is not.

But it's also the reason why they are not cause and effect. — Metaphysician Undercover

The act of the builder building is not the passion of the house being built. Still, they are inseparable because they are aspects of one and the same event.

How can I possibly assume that you know what you are talking about when you use "passion" in that way? — Metaphysician Undercover

By referring to a good dictionary when you see a term used in a way that is new to you.

But it is not concurrent, it is prior. — Metaphysician Undercover

When willing to walk ends, I am no longer walking willingly. I may continue mechanically because of inertia, but that is not walking voluntarily.

A quote requires a reference. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, they don't. You may want a reference, but they take time, and you have not shown an openness that makes me want to devote that time.

The necessity is not bilateral because from the perspective of the builder, to build is a freely willed choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you are missing the point. The necessity is not in the decision to build, but in the relation between the act of building as cause and the passion of being built as effect.

From the perspective of seeing an existing building, or even a building being built, it is logically necessary that there is a builder. — Metaphysician Undercover

The concurrent necessity between building and being built is being asserted, not a necessity in the choice to build.

Your way of portraying the actions of the agent as concurrent with the effects of those acts, and as a bilateral necessity, completely obscures this issue, of how it is that an intentional agent can work with universal principles, a general formula, to create particular individuals of that type. — Metaphysician Undercover

First, it is Aristotle's insight, not mine. Second, you are thinking of the wrong problem. Yes, the intentional or potential form of the effect is temporally prior to the actual effect in nature (in cases where there is change). That does not mean that the activity of producing the effect (e.g. building) is prior to the passion of the effect being produced (e.g. being built). In the case of planning, the activity of producing a plan is concurrent with the effect of the plan being produced.

You described an instance of the act of building, and this act is caused by final causation, intention, as per Aristotle's description of the four senses of "cause". That you call this "efficient cause" only indicates that you do not understand Aristotle. — Metaphysician Undercover

Try assuming that I know what I am talking about and see if you can make your interpretation of my words fit that assumption. When I say I am only discussing efficient causality, I mean that I am only discussing that one of the four causes. I do not mean that there are no other causes. It is only by looking for ways in which I might be wrong that these two ideas can be confused.

If you recall, you asked a question about efficient causality and how it could be concurrent. You did not ask about free will.

I decide to walk, and the activity of walking is the effect which follows from this cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

Making a commitment is not an isolated event. It sets up a committed state. If I am walking and decide to stop, that commitment (the state of being committed to walking) ends, as does my walking.

Your failure to take into consideration the role of final causation is what produces the faulty description that there is a "bilateral necessity" and that the acts of the builder, and the building being built, are concurrent. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, you are claiming that building and being built are not concurrent? If so, we have no common basis for continuing.

They are very clearly not concurrent because the planning of the building is an act of the builder which is prior to any building being built. — Metaphysician Undercover

I never claimed that any and all acts of the builder are concurrent with being built, but only the act of building. Please do not extend what I say to make it wrong. I never denied that builders plan or have free will.

That would require a reference. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it does not. I do not have time to deal with your negativity. You can take my word for it or Google it.

I do not agree with this interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

You need to do more research.

It is from the perspective of the effect that the efficient cause is apprehended as necessary. If the building has been built, it is necessary that there was an act of building. — Metaphysician Undercover

The necessity is bilateral and in the present tense. There can be no builder building without a building being built and vice versa.

Here you conflate final cause with efficient cause — Metaphysician Undercover

Baloney. The builder is an efficient cause, and that is the only cause I discussed.

what you call "the passion" of the builder — Metaphysician Undercover

Read what I said. I said it is a passion of the house being built. It is not a passion in the emotional sense, but in the technical sense of suffering an action.

The desire to build (intention, final cause) is temporally prior to the activity of building, which is the efficient cause of the house. — Metaphysician Undercover

If I do not wish to build now, I will not build now. Planning may be prior, but the commitment to act now is concurrent with acting now.

The action of the agent is volitional therefore there is no intrinsic necessity to that act. — Metaphysician Undercover

I did not deny that because I did not discuss final causation, but efficient causation. The analysis also applies to cases in which the agent is not a person, e.g. acid eroding metal now is identically metal being eroded by acid now.

Again, there can be no building a house now without a house being built now. So, unlike time-sequenced causality, an essential cause produces its effect necessarily, and the effect, which is a passion, requires a concurrent cause, because no potency can actualize itself. Bricks do not become a house without a builder.

I do not like your characterization of this cause of activity, as "essential efficient causation". — Metaphysician Undercover

It is just what the Scholastics called it -- a name, not something to be liked or disliked.

This is not valid logic. Time is stated as the measure of change, it is not stated as change itself, or even derived from change. — Metaphysician Undercover

You cannot measure what does not exist. So, if there is no change, there is no number associated with it, and time is the number we assign to change. So, there is no time. Measures are derived from what we measure.

But the classical Christian conception of God is as a trinity, so we can still consider a separation, in principle, between plan and execution, in God. — Metaphysician Undercover

The Trinity does not entail separation. It reflects internal relations in God as Source (Father), Self-Knowledge (Logos = Son) and Self-Acceptance (Love = the Holy Spirit). Since both God's Self-Knowledge and Self-Acceptance are complete they are identical to their Source.

If the plan exists in memory — Metaphysician Undercover

Since God is unchanging and timeless He has no past to remember. Everything is present to Him.

this would mean that God is changing in accordance with His Will. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, God willing a changing world can be and is done without a change in God. Again, God has no unactualized potential, and so cannot change.

The end of the line of efficient causation is known under Aristotelian principles as final cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no reason God cannot be both.

hat "change is the actualization of a potential", is your condition, produced from your interpretation, which appears to be a little bit faulty. — Metaphysician Undercover

I quoted Aristotle's definition of change, not mine.

That the will is free implies that it causes a type of change which is not dependent on potential. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it implies that it is not predetermined by potential. Potential is the ability to become other. If something cannot become other than it is, it cannot change.

That prompts the question of how Aristotle was searching for something new or not. And that is different from asking how a set of propositions, defended (and opposed) centuries later, relates to contemporary activities. — Paine

Aristotle would use his potency and act model, and answer that philosophy makes explicit (actual) what we know implicitly (potential).

The world acts on us, projecting its power into us, and so making itself present. When we attend to the resulting experience we know that the world can act as it does act on us, and knowing that is knowing something of the nature of the world -- for its nature is the specification of its possible acts. Thus, true knowledge is awareness of the world as it projects its power into us.

This is why the identity of action and passion is so critical to Aristotle's philosophy. (A acting on B is identically B being acted on by A.) Here, the object informing the subject is identically the subject being informed by the object. In modern parlance, our neural state being modified by a sensed object is identically the sensed object modifying our neural state. That is why direct realism is inescapable.

Of course, our neural state is the result of many such actions, and it requires reflection and analysis to sort them out. Still, human knowledge reflects how the world interacts with us, and not how it is abstractly. We cannot know the world without interacting with it, so it is a contradiction in terms to think of knowing objects in themselves, as not interacting with a knower.

Can you clarify this idea for me? How can you conceive of a form of causality which does not involve temporal priority? Suppose God's intention to create (God's Will) is a cause of what He creates. How can this intention to create be a cause of the creation, and yet not be temporally prior to God's creation? — Metaphysician Undercover

Aristotle and the Scholastics distinguish two kinds of efficient causality: accidental, which is the time sequence by rule Hume and Kant discuss, and essential. Accidental causality involves two events separated in time. Because they are separated, an intervening event can prevent the cause from bringing about the effect. Hence Hume was correct in arguing that time-sequenced causality lacks necessity.

In essential causality there is one event, and cause and effect are concurrent. Aristotle's paradigm case is a builder building a house. The cause is the builder building. The effect is the house being built. Yet, the action of the builder building the house is identically the passion of the house being built by the builder. As there is only one event, no intervention is possible, and this kind of causality (the actualization of a potential by the concurrent action of an agent) has intrinsic necessity. Since potentials are not yet operational, they cannot actualize themselves. So, something else that is already operational (actual) must work to actualize any potential. That is one of the most fundamental insights of Aristotle's metaphysics.

Since God is unchanging, and time is the measure of change according to before and after, God is timeless. So, there is no separation of plan and execution in God. Thus, God's will for a being to exist creates the being. As would be the case when the builder stops building, if God were to stop willing the being of a creature, the effect (the existence of the creature) would cease. Thus, creation is not a launch and forget process, but an on-going activity.

How do you get to the point of concluding that God is unchanging and timeless? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because God is the end of the line of concurrent explanation (essential causality). Since He is the end of the line there is nothing prior to actualize any potential He may have. So, God can have no potential. That means that God is pure act = fully actualized being. Change is the actualization of a potential insofar as it is still in potency. Since God has no unactualized potential, He cannot change. Since he cannot change, there is no before and after in God => God is timeless.

What I am asking is how are you relating "intention" to "unchanging" and "timeless"? — Metaphysician Undercover

I am using Brentano's analysis of intentionality as characterized by aboutness. We do not just know or will, we know or will something, which is what the acts are about. Creation is about what it produces, so it is an intentional act. Intentional acts need not involve intrinsic change. My continuing to know a theorem or love a person does not require a change in my state.

And to say that something which is "pure act" is unchanging and timeless, would be contradictory. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, knowing and willing (both acts) all being at all times requires no change.

We have to be careful, though. The use of the word "decay" isn't being used in the traditional sense of say a uranium atom decaying and releasing an alpha particle or something of the sort. — 013zen

Elementary particles can do the same. Neutrons decay with about a 13 minute half-life into a proton, electron, and electron anti-neutrino. (This implies a change in quarks as well.) Neutral pions can decay into 2 gamma rays, destroying the quarks constituting it. Running the reaction backwards implies that 2 gamma rays can combine to produce a neutral pion with its associated quarks.

Still, it does not matter, philosophically. What matters is the combination of potentiality and actuality that impermanence implies. Things are not only what they are (form), but a determinate tendency to become what they will be (hyle). (They can't become just anything). That is the meaning of hylomorphism.

But, you're right given the historical evidence. We know that Aristotle was wrong, and an idea more akin to Democratus' was more right...there is serious concern regarding the method Aristotle employs to reach "metaphysical knowledge". He uses reason to try and challenge other ideas, and furnish his own account, and it lead us in the wrong direction for generations until folks like Descartes, Bacon, Newton began challenging Aristotle's ideas and considering the atomic mechanical principle of his predecessors. — 013zen

This misunderstands both Aristotle and the history of science. Aristotle was wrong in part. So were Newton and Einstein. Atomism (the belief in permanent, indivisible fundamental particles) is dead as a door nail. Bacon did not invent the scientific method (Robert Grosseteste did).

What specific error did Aristotle's method cause in his metaphysics? What is wrong with reason (aka logic)? Aristotle almost always applies it to observations. I am not saying that his metaphysics is flawless, just that it is well-founded and profound -- and cannot be dismissed by hand waving.

There are a couple of articles showing that Aristotle was the father of mathematical physics and knew more about motion in viscous fluids than Newton. His much criticized relation between force and velocity is taught in every freshman physics course as the power law (P=fv). In comparison, Descartes's physics is laughable.

This is not to deny advances have been made, but to say that more respect should be given to those on whose shoulders we stand.

But, truthfully, I think a modern notion of forms is defensible. The forms are simply the arrangement of quarks, leptons, and bosons that make up protons and neutrons, or the form that a carbon atom takes, etc — 013zen

In the Aristotelian tradition, forms are neither Platonic Ideas nor physical arrangements, but the actuality of what was potential (hyle -- poorly translated "matter"). Since "elementary particles" are not immutable, but can interact and decay to form other particles, they themselves are a combination of form (actuality = what they are now) and hyle (potentiality = what they can become). Their potential aspect is imperfectly described by the laws of physics (e.g. quantum electrodynamics and chromodynamics). See my article, "A New Reading of Aristotle's Hyle"

There are many meanings of "form" in Aristotle and Aquinas, related by an analogy of attribution. As Aquinas explains:

Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things are proportionate to one, thus for example "healthy" predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body, of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause: or according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is said of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. (ST I, 13, 5)

In other words, we may call things "forms" not because they are the same as the form of a body, but because they either cause that form, or are caused by that form.

Forms can be "prior" in two ways:

• God's intention to create whatever he creates, which is in the order of primary (metaphysical) causality, and not temporally prior because God is unchanging and so timeless.
• Immanently, it the laws of nature and the initial conditions that will evolve into the informed object. This is in the order of secondary (physical) causality, and is temporally prior.

In addition, there are "posterior" forms, which are the (1) (incomplete) neural representations and (2) the consequent concepts that result from the action of informed bodied on our nervous system and our awareness of these representations respectively.

The separation of electromagnetism into distinct electric and magnetic fields is something I've never really been able to understand. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is fine. They are the components of a tensor of rank 2 in special relativity. That means that they can transform into each when we change reference frames.

No matter what I tell you, you disagree. I don't have time to tell you why you are wrong. You asked for something you could understand, and I gave it to you. But, instead of researching it, you want to argue about it. I do not.

Ok, thanks for the references Dfpolis. You know my principal interest, as I've developed it in this thread, the concept of mass in physics. Can you direct me toward anything specifically related to the ideas I've expressed here. — Metaphysician Undercover

Probably the easiest thing to grasp is the concept of fields' energy density. Since mass and energy are interchangeable, fields increase the mass of systems. Imagine positively and negatively charged parallel plates. Because they are attracted to each other, pulling them apart takes energy. That energy is stored in the electric field between the plates -- in space. When the plates are released, that energy becomes kinetic energy. The same is true of magnetic fields.

You claim you have been trying to teach me, but you really don't seem to be making much effort. I know that I am of the very skeptical sort, and as such I am a very difficult and trying student, but you often don't seem to be trying very hard yourself. — Metaphysician Undercover

It took 10 years of college and post graduate education to lay the foundation for my understanding, and many years of reflection after that to integrate the pieces into a consistent whole. I do not have that kind of time to spend here. You can look at my (dfpolis) youtube physics videos if you wish. There I have corrected a number of common misunderstandings. You might also look up my paper "Does God Gamble with Creation?"

Since you refuse to study what you insist on discussing, and will not allow me to teach you, there is no point in continuing.

I believe it is simply not the case that wave mechanics can explain the massive nucleus of an atom — Metaphysician Undercover

Then you need to study nuclear physics and the behavior of the quarks in high energy physics.

And "mass" is what is most properly related to "matter". — Metaphysician Undercover

It was not before the advent of Newtonian physics and has not been since the advent of modern quantum physics. Mass is proportional to the frequency of a quantum in its rest frame. This applies to all known quanta and is consistent with special relativity.

The fact that wave mechanics cannot explain the existence of mass — Metaphysician Undercover

No physical theory has explained the existence of mass. We can explain our observations of the quantity of mass, but existence is a metaphysical problem. It was solved by Aquinas, who concluded that it is contingent on the continuing creative act of God.

I am well aware of the strong force. It is described using wave mechanics. Its range is related to the time an intermediating boson can exist (which is inversely proportional to its mass). That time is calculated using Heisenberg's indeterminacy relation. The same is true of all the forces known to physics.

The particle is understood to behave under the principles of Newtonian mechanics. — Metaphysician Undercover

Which has been falsified. Why would anyone want to do that?

If we rob the electron of its mass, take it away, and deny that it has any mass, then that discrepancy in total mass, and violation to conservation laws needs to be accounted for. — Metaphysician Undercover

And, why would we want to discard this, or any other, fact? The mass of the electron is known with great precision. It is not zero.

See, the fault here is to assign momentum to a wave. — Metaphysician Undercover

All known waves, even ocean waves, have momentum. The momentum of sound waves moves your ear drum. It can be and has been measured in quanta.

I think that this is incorrect. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then, you need to study differential equations.

I strongly believe that wave structures cannot account for the mass of a body, — Metaphysician Undercover

You may believe what you wish. I constrain my beliefs by what has been observed. We can and do have energy, which is equivalent to mass, in space free of all "particles." This is known as a field's "energy density" and is proportional to the field strength (e.g. the electromagnetic field) squared.

So, why are we discussing "matter waves" on a philosophy forum. Does the distinction between Particles and Waves have a philosophical significance regarding Dualism & Interactionism? — Gnomon

No. It does not. I am responding to questions about it as a courtesy.

But you leave the key term undefined. Is that an accurate assessment? — Gnomon

The medium is not a key term. Physics is not philosophy. It does not aim to tell us what is, but what we can expect to observe in the physical world. Then, philosophers try to place those observations in a larger context -- one that provides a consistent framework of all human experience.

Can you explain how you conceive of a "matter wave"? — Metaphysician Undercover

In the late 19th century, electrons were discovered. We came to understand that they are part of every atom of matter. At first, for historical reasons, it was thought that they were particles. Because of that assumption, it was decided that there must be light particles (photons) as well. In 1923, it was shown that electrons interfere with each other and with themselves -- something only waves can do. So, electrons, an essential constituent of every atom, are waves. Every property previously explained using the particle assumption can be explained by their wave nature. On the other hand, no wave property is explained by the particle assumption. That means the particle hypothesis is falsified.

We have since found that wave mechanics also applies to protons and neutrons, the constituents of atomic nuclei. Every part of atoms, which constitute both ordinary and ionized matter, behaves like a wave. None is a point particle, or a hard object with a well-defined edge. That physics has nothing more to say about what is vibrating does not mean that the constituents of matter do not oscillate in both space and time in well-defined ways. So, ordinary matter is made of waves. That is what I mean by "matter waves."

We have known that there is electromagnetic field energy and momentum, permeating all space, since the late 19th century. As a result, Newton's third law is violated when electromagnetic forces are involved.

The momentum of the body could be provided by an energy equivalence with the energy of the wave, but the uncertainty principle would render the position of such a body, with a determined momentum, as having no determinable location. — Metaphysician Undercover

But, if there is no body, why would we expect it to have a well-defined (point) location or arrival time? Wave packets are spread out in space and time. Because of Fourier's theorem, which applies to all waves, to have a single wave length, a wave must be infinitely long, and to be at a single point, it must have all wave lengths. When you insist that we are not dealing with waves, but particles, this translates into indeterminacy. Since a quantum's energy is proportional to its frequency and its momentum is inversely proportional to its wave length, finite wave packets have neither well-defined energy nor momentum.

Hence the "matter" wave is better known as a "probability" wave. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no objective randomness. Randomness is a measure of our ignorance. The more we know, the less random processes are. In the quantum case, we know neither the exact initial state of the wave we are trying to measure, nor the exact initial state of the detector that will interact with it. So, all we can predict is a probability -- just as with a dice roll.

the particular wave in the particular set of circumstances is not ever actually represented — Metaphysician Undercover

That is exactly what the wave equations do represent. The problem is that you cannot pick the one actual solution out of an infinity of possible solutions without knowing the initial conditions.

it represents possible locations of the body with mass — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, there is no "body."

The problem being that these equations do not describe waves, and you know this. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am sorry, but you don't know what you are talking about.

What kind of substance (e.g. matter ; math ; other) are "wave structures" made of? — Gnomon

What are light waves made of? We do not know. That does not stop us from knowing that light is a wave. The same is true of matter waves. I should add that there are no mathematical substances, only mathematical concepts, based on abstraction form physical reality. We know some properties of the medium, namely, that it obeys, to a good approximation, the equations currently in use.

"Wave structures" refers to conceptual structures composed of mathematical ideals. — Metaphysician Undercover

Since I made the reference, I know what I am referring to, and I am not saying that bodies that are made of mathematical structures. They are made of waves that may be described by the Schoedinger equation, and more accurately by the Dirac equation. The fact that waves may be described mathematically does not mean that they are mathematical abstractions. Things are not their descriptions, and refusing to admit that is irrational.

The problem is that there is no conventional definition of "matter" which allows this "wave-like" feature of reality to be called "matter waves". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, there is. Matter is what composes bodies. They are composed of wave structures.

The inescapable indeterminacy of quantum non-particles was famously illustrated in his Cat in the Box paradox. — Gnomon

Schroedinger's cat was designed to show the absurdity of the probabilistic interpretation, not support it. It is not a fact. It is the consequence of a hypothetical interpretation, based on thinking of detectors as classical devices. If you think of detectors properly, as composed of atoms behaving quantum mechanically, there is no need for randomness. Indeed, assuming it is contradictory.

the observable properties of the system appears to be non-deterministic. — Gnomon

Only if you assume that electrons are particles. If you drop that assumption, there is no need for them to have either well-defined momentum or well-defined positions. All you have is a complex, extended wave structure.

The outcomes are not determined, so quantum mechanics is indeterministic. — Gnomon

This is a non sequitur. Being unable to predict the exact result of a measurement does not mean that it is not determined. We cannot predict turbulent flow and everyone agrees that it is deterministic.

Also, free will is not indeterminate will. It is will determined by the agent willing.

however that analogy has weaknesses, because electrons really can appear as particles. — Wayfarer

Some of what electrons do can be interpreted as particle behavior. All of what electrons do can be interpreted as wave behavior. That means that the particle hypothesis is falsified, while the wave hypothesis is not. What makes the waves appear to be localized is that they interact with atoms in which the electron waves are localized.

You see, the particular instances of observation utilized by the empirical sciences, do not provide any sort of "reality" to us. Nor do they provide us a window into reality. All they do is give us the information required to make judgements, against or for, the preexisting reality (the prejudices), which form our reality, the world of abstractions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Our concept of reality is based on what can be experienced, aka what can be observed.

You may insist that the idea of immaterial waves, waves without substance, is good enough for physics, but it's not good enough for metaphysics. — Metaphysician Undercover

While it is absurd to call matter waves "immaterial," physics is not the science of being, but of changes in space and time. So, you are right, metaphysics has different concerns.

Wave" is defined in physics as a disturbance moving in a medium. — Metaphysician Undercover

No one is denying this. Physics merely abstracts the aspects of reality it can deal with.

As I have already spent a lot of time trying to teach you what physics tells us, and this whole area is off-topic, I am going to stop here.

It’s probably more that I fail to see the point of the question. But if you mean, is uncertainty a consequence of the lack of knowledge of the initial conditions, I think Brian Greene answers that in the negative. If you don’t think so, maybe you might re-phrase it. — Wayfarer

Uncertainty arises from thinking of waves as particles. The wave structure is perfectly well-defined, but it you insist it is a particle, which it is not, you will be unable to assign particle properties with precision. Similarly, if you insist that a pig can fly, you will have difficulty explaining how.

In quantum mechanics, this determinism is replaced by inherent probabilistic behavior. — Wayfarer

No, it is not. Not being able to determine the exact value of classical variables does not mean that the system is intrinsically random. It only means that classical variables are not the best means of defining its state.

It gives the probability distribution of where a particle is likely to be found at a given time. — Wayfarer

If you insist that quanta are particles, you will suffer the logical consequences of the error you have made. There are no "particles," only wave structures. Wave structures are not point-like and insisting that they are will cause you to think that your non-existent particles are in random places.

you can only predict the probability of obtaining a particular measurement result, not the specific outcome for a single measurement (per Quantum (Manjit Kumar) and Uncertainty (David Lindley)). — Wayfarer

If you are ignorant of the exact initial state, you will be ignorant of the exact final state, no matter how deterministic the dynamics are. Further, quantum measurement is a nonlinear process, which is mathematically chaotic, subject to the Lorenz Butterfly effect.

As with all natural science, it is a theoretical statement. The wave equations of quantum theory are well confirmed, and they are deterministic.

This means that if time ( where time = rate of firing) is not a factor in the formation of the distribution pattern, which implies that time is not a variable in the generation of the interference pattern. — Wayfarer

It is not a variable in describing the final pattern, but it is a factor in describing the dynamics that bring the pattern about. It takes time for the electron wave to arrive, and time for it to interact with the electron waves in the detector's atoms.

The outcome of the experiment, the interference pattern, is a result of the quantum probabilistic nature — Wayfarer

Yes, that is what people say. Yet, it is not the case. It is an accepted fact that all unobserved processes are deterministic. So, put the whole experiment in a box and do not observe it. (You could even include an observer in the box.) Then you can only conclude that the interaction with the detector is deterministic. (If you included an observer, that would also include her observations.) Looking at it after the fact will not change this. So, the hypothesis that observations are random is inconsistent.

In that sense, the wave function is not a function of time, in a way that is very different from physical waves, which are obviously time-dependent. — Wayfarer

There is an experiment in which a beam of neutral kaons interferes with itself, because the neutral kaon has two different states that have different masses and so different frequencies. This can be observed because different combinations of these states decay in different ways. As you move the detection apparatus along the the length of the beam different decay modes are detected, showing that the different mass states interfere with each other in real time.

Quantum waves, or more properly called "wave functions" are ideals, mathematical constructs. They have no physical existence. We ought to start with this clearly stated. — Metaphysician Undercover

Quantum waves constitute matter. Wave functions are the mathematical functions describing these matter waves and their interactions. The concept is an ideal, but it is based on the observation of real wave properties, specifically, interference of the type demonstrated in Young's experiment.

The problem is that physicists tend to represent these as bodies with mass. — Metaphysician Undercover

We do not represent the structures (they are not bodies in the classical sense) with mass. Rather, mass is a quantity associated with them.

So, there is an interaction problem between the bodies with mass representation, and the ideal (immaterial) waves representation. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. There are no bodies -- only waves and waves mischaracterized as "particles" because people apply Newtonian concepts without adequate justification.

Nice try Df, but Planck's law is based in the emission of electromagnetic radiation from bodies (black-body radiation). — Metaphysician Undercover

We have learned a lot since Planck proposed his Black Body Radiation law 1900 and Einstein his explanation of the photoelectric effect in 1905.

The simple fact of the matter is that physicists do not have the required theories, or principles, to measure the energy of wave activity directly, without converting this energy to the activity of a physical body. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, we use material instruments. That does not make the instruments classical bodies instead of quantum wave structures.

So, there is an interaction problem between the bodies with mass representation, and the ideal (immaterial) waves representation. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no such interaction. The interactions observed are between the waves being measured and the wave structures (instruments) used to measure them. These interactions are purely physical. The representations are how we conceive of these physical structures and do not involved in the measurement interactions -- only in how we come to know the results.

Instead, it dogmatically imposes unsubstantiated ideals, like the constant speed of light. — Metaphysician Undercover

You need to read the history of modern physics if you want to think about these things. It was assumed that we could measure different speeds of light as the earth passed through the either. In 1887 Albert A. Michelson and Edward Morley attempted to do so, and failed. They measure the same speed in each direction and at different orbital positions of the earth. So, we were forced, experimentally, to conclude that the measured speed of light is invariant. Contrary to popular belief, their experiment did not show that there is no aether, but that one aether theory was false.

I understand this, it is derived from the Fourier transform. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it is not. Fourier transforms enter into the derivation of the uncertainty principle.

our inability to make measurements of high energy in a very short period of time is the reason for the uncertainty of the uncertainty principle, in general. — Metaphysician Undercover

Whether or not the energy is "high" is irrelevant.

However, stating that energy is understood as "the dynamic variable conjugate to time", does not in any way state what energy is. — Metaphysician Undercover

It does. It is a definition in terms of more fundamental concepts.

This is the physicalist perspective — Metaphysician Undercover

By observation I mean fixing on or attending to experience, whether internal or external. I am not a physicalist. Read my January paper.

OK, you may call it "nearly perfect", but "nearly" is a subjective judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let me be more precise. I mean we have been unable to detect violations of conservation of energy.

The material world which we represent with forms, formal models etc., is not actually as we represent it because we cannot represent the material aspect. — Metaphysician Undercover

But, we can. That is what physics, chemistry, biology, etc. do.

All we have as representation is forms, and "matter" refers to those accidents which always escape the formal representation. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is not what anyone else means by "matter."

What they point to, is the fact that the real features of nature are not perfect symmetries, as modeled. — Metaphysician Undercover

We cannot say that. We can only say that in some cases, we are unable to observe possible imperfections, so, we have no reason to believe that the symmetries are imperfect.

Symmetries are perfectly ideal balances, just like the eternal circular motion described by Aristotle. If that perfect ideal has any interaction with anything else, then by that very interaction, it loses its status as a perfectly ideal balance. — Metaphysician Undercover

You do not understand the meaning of "symmetry" in physics. It is not the kind of thing that can interact. Rather it is a property of the way things interact.

Yes. Symmetries are not observed, but deduced. Like constellations in the sky, the inferred patterns are mental, not material ; subjective, not objective. — Gnomon

This is confused. We make observations and then deduce the consequences. As long as the logic is sound, the conclusions are justified by the observations. If the observations were objective, so are the conclusions.

that waves cannot be described simply by space and time. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not say "by," but "in" space and time.

Furthermore, the subject of the thread is an ontological topic — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but not the ontology of quantum waves.

This misconceives measurement. The instruments are also wave structures. — Dfpolis
Again, this is blatantly wrong, and I'm sure you know it. Energy is not measured by waves structures, it is measured by electrical voltage. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I know that material things are wave structures. I did not say what the units of energy are. They are not volts.

And calculations are done in terms of inertial frames and "rest mass" which is essential. — Metaphysician Undercover

Some are. Some are not.

These are concepts of classical mechanics of bodies, not waves. — Metaphysician Undercover

Both electromagnetic and matter waves have energy and momentum.

What kind of instruments are understood to be wave structures? — Metaphysician Undercover

Objectively, all physical instruments are wave structures. Subjectively, many people fail to understand this.

it doesn't make sense to claim that they are — Metaphysician Undercover

It makes perfect since once you realize that the electrons and nucleons composing atoms are waves.

So the certainty of this understanding of light waves is dependent on the certainty of the theories which relate it to the foundation, the movement of massive bodies, and ultimately the foundation itself, our understanding of the movement of massive bodies. — Metaphysician Undercover

Once you realize that electrons are waves, you need to rethink your understanding of massive bodies.

it's simple fact that these are the concepts which underly our understanding of energy. — Metaphysician Undercover

They underlie the classical understanding, not our quantum understanding. Now we understand that energy depends on the frequency at which elementary structures vibrate. E = h where h is Planck's constant and is the frequency.

This is because "energy" as a concept is fundamentally a property of the momentum of mass (kinetic energy being 1/2mv2). — Metaphysician Undercover

That is only a non-relativistic approximation. It was how the concept was first glimpsed, but it is not how it is understood now. Now we understand energy as the dynamic variable conjugate to time. To explain that, I would have to explain the conceptual framework of theoretical physics, and that is why I ask that you trust my opinion based on my education. If you wish to pursue this, look up Hamiltonian and Lagrangian formalism, and Emmy Noether's theorem

Symmetries are not observed in nature. Each thing that we observe as a near-symmetry is not actually a symmetry, which is an ideal balance. — Metaphysician Undercover

All observations are imperfect. In observing you, I do not gain perfect knowledge of you. Nonetheless observation is the basis of all human knowledge. It may well be that energy is not perfectly conserved. Still, that is very approximately conserved is a real feature of nature and points to nearly perfect time-translation symmetry.

Laws are artificial, and created as universals so your examples are irrelevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. They point to real features of nature. Omniscience is not a rational standard for human knowledge. We know as humans know -- incompletely and approximately in matters involving measurement.

there is an interaction problem involved with trying to demonstrate how the particular partakes of the universal. — Metaphysician Undercover

There are no universal beings to partake in. Aristotle rebutted Platonic Ideas in Metaphysics I, 9 and universal exemplars ideas are incompatible with the simplicity, omniscience and omnipotence of God.

That symmetries are properties does not mean that they do not exist. It only means that they do not have independent existence.

Did you notice that I qualified "instantaneous" with "almost". We're talking about Planck Time here. — Gnomon

No, the times are much longer than the Planck time. Different spectral lines have different frequency widths. The transition time is proportional to the inverse of the associated frequency width. See http://www-star.st-and.ac.uk/~kw25/teaching/nebulae/lecture08_linewidths.pdf

Do you have a good reason for picking nits about metaphors? — Gnomon

Yes, because the transition times can be calculated using the wave model.

Instead of addressing the valid points I brought up, points which are very relevant to the subject, "interactionism", you retort with an implied 'you're wrong because I'm more highly educated than you'. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, that is not the reason you are wrong. It is a reason to trust my views more. The reasons you are wrong are outside the scope of this thread.

If you really have the education which you claim, you could very easily show me why you think I'm wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I can, but I choose not to here.

The problem here is that without a medium (aether or whatever), a substance to support this so-called "wave phenomena", it is fundamentally immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover

Philosophically, I agree that waves are modifications of something; however, saying that contributes nothing to the goal of physics, which is to describe the behavior, and not the ontology, of physical systems. For physics, it is enough that the waves can be described in space and time. If a hypothesis about what they modified, say that it was made of particles or strings, led to a better description, then it would be relevant to physics.

Clearly, what we have here is an interaction problem between the immaterial waves (with no material substance), and the material bodies (instruments of measurement). — Metaphysician Undercover

This misconceives measurement. The instruments are also wave structures.

Quantum field theory and the standard model of particles are composed of immaterial ideals which have no direct correspondence in the physical world. If you have the education you claim, you know this. The truth of this is evidenced by the reality assigned to symmetry in the models, when such symmetries are simply not discovered in nature. Symmetries are ideals which may be artificially synthesized to an extent, in a lab, but have no true occurrence in the natural world. — Metaphysician Undercover

Quantum field theories, like all scientific theories, are hypotheses to explain observed facts. To the extent that they do so, they are adequate to reality and so true. Their truth is not absolute, but limited to how they actually reflect reality. So, it is open to refinement and revision.

Symmetries are observed in nature. We observe temporal translation symmetry when we see that the same laws that operated in the past operate now. Similarly, spatial translation symmetry means that the same laws that operate here, operate there. Rotational symmetry means that the laws do not involve a preferred direction, etc.

Symmetries are known by ideas, but so is everything. The question is whether these ideas are adequately grounded in reality, or simply imagined. So far, it looks like symmetries ideas are.

And this manifests as the problem of how the ideal world of symmetries described by the standard model could interact with the world of material bodies which we live in. — Metaphysician Undercover

It does not because physical symmetries are not interacting things, but properties of interactions of things.

It's simply the emphasis on the sovereignty of self or ego, on the one hand, and the consensus view of philosophical or scientific materialism, that is associated with political liberalism on the other. — Wayfarer

I see liberals as supporting the value of each individual, not their "sovereignty." And, I do not see materialism as a consensus view, although I do see it as a powerful intellectual and social thread.

I understand your view, but I have looked at all proposed mechanisms for determinism and have found no sound arguments. So, I credit my experience that when I am facing a choice, all the real alternatives are equally in my power. Having them in my power means that I am the decisive factor in my decisions and so morally responsible. That does not mean that I think every human act is free, or even that I am in a position to judge which are. Still, if there are no sound arguments, why should I try to escape responsibility for my decisions?

Being with someone I am sufficiently attracted to may indeed be more valuable to me that any number of views of Yosemite Falls. If am more motivated by one than the other then, absent addiction, the more motivating one is more valuable to me. — Janus

I have no problem with this, but it does not support determinism, because it does not point to a source of value beyond your own agency.

You seem to simply beg the question that intentionality can exist without physicality. The problem is that you can't provide any evidence of intentionality without physicality, so it seems you take the possibility of intentionality sans physicality on faith. — wonderer1

The way at this problem is to see what it is to be intentional, and then ask does being intentional require being physical.

You can see the fallacy to this way of thinking by considering the concept of energy. When it was first developed, every known case involved mechanical motion. Then we discovered potential energy in mechanical systems. Subsequently, we discovered thermal energy, chemical binding energy, mass energy, and now dark energy. It is totally irrational to say that because all the cases we know are of one type, no other cases are possible.

Another example is calling the standard model "the theory of everything" (TOE). It is now the TOE-96 -- the theory of everything except 96% of the stuff.

Also, if you read my "Mind or Randomness in Evolution" you will find argument for the existence of God and His being a mind.

Meaning depends on a physical interpretive context. The fact that aababbab doesn't have any clear meaning outside a physical interpretive context isn't relevant to anything. — wonderer1

A "a physical interpretive context" begs the question. The interpretive context depends on the minds of human interpreters. Meaning is not physical. No application of physics will show that X means Y. So, the interpretive context is essentially intentional, not physical except incidentally.

My example is highly relevant, because a and b are arbitrary physical states and neither has an intrinsic meaning. Your response does nothing to show that they do, but admits that they do not.

As far as I can tell there is no intelligibility outside a physically interpretive context so I think that you need to provide some reason to believe that there can be intelligibility outside a physically interpretive context. — wonderer1

If you mean by "a physical interpretive context" that people with brains interpret, I agree. That does not mean that what they know is material.

The reason we need brains is because what we normally think about is neurally encoded. But, not everything we experience is. I suggest you research mystical experience. Some authors you might start with are Richard Bucke (an atheist), William James, W. T. Stace, and D.T. Suzuki. You will find that humans can be aware of non-physical intelligibility. Such intelligibility cannot be neurally encoded for reasons that I do not have time to explain now.

You seem to be getting inputs and outputs confused. Your retinal state supervenes on the physical effect of an apple reflecting light from a light source into your eye. Your brain state supervenes on your retinal state. — wonderer1

My brain state also supervenes on the orbital motion of Halley's comment. Supervenience has absolutely no explanatory power. Tell me something that matters. Like what causes what.

As for input, it is the action of the apple in scattering light into my eye. The output is two distinct concepts. This is a one-to-many mapping. It cannot be explained on physical principles. If materialism is right, one brain state should only one concept.

When you are thinking about the apple you see, you will have a different neural state than when contemplating light striking your retina. — wonderer1

The result of my thinking will lead to different articulations, and they will be encoded differently. That is not the issue. The issue is how do I generate these thoughts, not how do I formulate them.

Let's try this again. The same neural inputs signal (1) something is seen, and (2) my retinal state is modified. No amount of neural processing can separate (1) from (2) because there is only one signal for both. Think of a neural net. The signals that that train it to activate "a retinal modification is occurring" are exactly the same signals that train it to activate "something is being seen." So, there is no way to physically differentiate these intentional states.

Physical ink arranged on physical paper serves just fine for encoding Godel's theorems. — wonderer1

Not alone. A human mind that understands the language is also required -- both for endoding and decoding. Without that intentional capability (the ability to transform marks into meaning and vice versa), there is no encoding. There are only weird ink stains.

Neural states can encode the concept. — wonderer1

How does it get decoded into a concept when required? We do not perceive the pulse rates or neurotransmitter concentrations. So, how do we know what is encoded?

I don't agree with this. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not the place to argue this. Let's just say that my education puts me in a better position to judge.

But the actual jumps seem to occur almost instantaneously. — Gnomon

No, they do not. They generate the light pulses we call photons, which have a finite duration in order to have a well-defined frequency (because of the uncertainty principle). So, we can tell how long the transitions take. Further, the transitions are much better described as wave phenomena than as particle phenomena. The electrons in each level have a well-defined energy and so a well-defined frequency.

'm not mentioning that as an exhortation to a specifically Catholic philosophy, but as preserving what I think of as a kind of universalist insight. Firstly the idea that there's a kind of understanding which also requires a transformation in order for it to be meaningful. Secondly that this is not easy or painless. I don't see an equivalent of that in much of secular philosophy. — Wayfarer

This is an Augustinian insight I touch upon in my current paper.

To know the truth, we must be open, and being open can be painful in many ways. It can rip away the mask hiding our true self. It can destroy the rationalizations excusing our immorality. It can destroy the premises on which we have built a career, or make a career difficult because what we see is rejected by our peers. Since we may see our beliefs as part of our core self, letting go of them can be a small death.